Analysis of the work of G. Almond and S

G. ALMOND.

Civic culture and stable democracy

Anthology of world political thought: In 5 volumes. M., 1997. Vol. II. pp. 593-600;

Almond GA., Verba S. Civil culture and stable democracy // Political studies. 1992. No. 4.

Chapter 11

This book is a study of the political culture of democracy and the social structures and processes that support democracy. The belief in the inevitable triumph of human reason and freedom, engendered by the Enlightenment, has been shaken twice in recent decades. The development of fascism and communism after the First World War raised serious doubts about the inevitability of democracy in the West, and it is still impossible to say with certainty that the peoples of continental Europe will find stable forms of democratic processes suitable to their cultures and social institutions.

[...] In comparing the political cultures of five modern democracies, we will use several concepts and classifications that need to be defined. We prefer to talk about the “political culture” of a nation rather than about “national character” or “personality model”, about “political socialization” rather than about child development or children’s perception of general concepts, not because we reject psychological and anthropological theories, political views and positions with other components of personality, and not because we reject theories that emphasize the connection between child development in general and children’s entry into political roles and their development of political views and positions. In fact, this study would not have been possible without the prior work of historians, social philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists and psychiatrists who posed the problem of the relationship between the psychological and political characteristics of a nation. In particular, “cultural-personal” or “psychocultural” studies of political phenomena had a great influence on this study. [...]

We use the term "political culture" for two reasons:

First, if we are to define the relationship between political and nonpolitical positions and behaviors, we need to distinguish the former (political) from the latter (nonpolitical), even if the boundary between them is not so clear. The term “political culture” in this case refers specifically to political orientations - views and positions regarding the political system and its various parts and positions regarding one’s own role in this system. We speak of political culture in the same way as we might speak of economic culture or religious culture. This is a set of orientations regarding a certain set of social objects and processes.

But we chose political culture instead of other social aspects, as this allows us to use conceptual frameworks and approaches from anthropology, sociology and psychology. We enrich our thinking by using, for example, categories of anthropology and psychology such as socialization, cultural conflict, cultural integration. Likewise, our ability to understand the origins and transformation of a political system is enhanced when we employ a framework of theory and speculation concerning general phenomena of social structure and processes.

We are aware of the fact that anthropologists use the term "culture" in many senses, and by introducing it into the vocabulary of political science we risk introducing its ambiguity along with its benefits. We emphasize that we use the term “culture” only in one sense: psychological orientations regarding social objects. When we talk about the political culture of a society, we mean a political system internalized in the consciousness, feelings and assessments of the population. People are involved in it just as they are socialized into non-political roles and social systems. Political culture conflicts have much in common with other cultural conflicts; and the processes of integration into political culture become clearer if we look at them in the light of the dividing and unifying tendencies of cultural change in general.

This definition of political culture helps to avoid the spread of such general anthropological concepts as “cultural ethnos” and the assumption of self-geneity that is implied in the definition. This allows us to formulate hypotheses about the relationships between different components of culture and to test these hypotheses empirically.

Using the concept of political socialization, we can go beyond simply adopting the psychocultural school's approach to general patterns of child development and adult political attitudes. We can correlate specific adult political attitudes and behavioral predispositions of children with the perception of the experience of political socialization.

The political culture of a nation is the distribution of patterns of orientation regarding political objects among members of the nation. Before defining this distribution, we need to systematize individual orientations regarding political objects. In other words, we need to define and designate modes [patterns] of political orientation and classes of political objects. Our definitions and classifications of types of political orientations follow the approach of Parsons and Shiles. “Orientations” refer to internalized aspects of social objects and relationships. Orientations include:

1) “cognitive orientations”, i.e. knowledge and belief about the political system, its roles and responsibilities regarding these roles, what the system takes from the environment and what it gives out (what is the “input” and what is the “output” of the system);

2) “affective orientations,” or feelings about the political system, its roles, its work, and the people involved in it;

3) “evaluative orientations,” judgments and opinions about political objects, which usually represent a combination of value standards and criteria, information and feelings.

We begin the classification of objects of political orientation with the “general” political system. We are dealing here with the system as a whole and talking about feelings such as patriotism or alienation, such knowledge and assessments of a nation as “big” or “small”, “strong” or “weak”, and politics such as “democratic”, "constitutional" or "socialist". We distinguish between orientations regarding “ourselves” as a political actor [doer]; the content and quality of the norms of personal political obligations, the content and quality of the sense of personal relationship with the political system. In interpreting the components of the political system, we distinguish, firstly, three broad classes of objects: (1) specific roles or structures, such as legislatures, executives or bureaucracy; (2) role-playing responsibilities, such as monarchs, legislators, administrators; (3) specific public policies, decisions, or circumstances that give rise to decisions. These structures, responsibilities and decisions can be classified more broadly: whether they are involved in the political, "input"(input), or administrative, “on the way out”(output), processes. By the political or “input” process we mean the flow of societal demands for policy and the conversion (turning) of these demands into authoritative policy. First of all, political parties, interest groups and mass media are involved in this “entry” process. By administrative process, or output process, we mean the process by which policies are implemented and reinforced. This process primarily involves structures such as bureaucracies and courts.

We understand that any such distinction limits the real content of the political process and the multifunctionality of political structures. More broadly, politics is made primarily in bureaucracies and courts; and the structures that we have designated as “input”, such as interest groups, political parties, are often associated with elements of the administration and the coercive system. But we are talking here about a difference in emphasis, which is of great importance in the classification of political cultures. The difference we see in participatory and subservient cultures is the presence or absence of orientation towards specialized input structures. It is not so important for our classification of political cultures that these specialized "input" structures are also involved in executive or coercive functions and that a specialized administrative structure is involved in the performance of "input" functions. What is important for our classification is what political objects and how individuals are oriented and whether these objects are included in the “upward” flow of “doing” politics or in the “downward” flow of political coercion.

What we have said about individual policy orientations can be summarized in a simple table.

Table 11. Dimensions of political orientations

Table 1.1. allows us to systematize the political orientations of individuals if we establish the following:

1. What knowledge does an individual have about his nation and about the political system in general, about its history, size, location, strength, “constitutional” characteristics, etc. ? What are his feelings about these system characteristics? What are his more or less conscious views and judgments about them?

2. What does the individual know about the structure and roles of various political elites and about the political proposals and initiatives that are involved in the “upward” flow of “doing” politics? What are his feelings and views regarding these structures, leaders and policy proposals and initiatives?

3. What does the individual know about the “downward” flow of political coercion, about the structures, individuals and decisions involved in this process? What are his feelings and views regarding them?

4. How does an individual perceive himself as a member of the political system? What does he know about his rights, opportunities, responsibilities and access to influence the system? How does he feel these possibilities? What norms of participation and performance does he assimilate and use in forming political judgments and views?

Characterizing the political culture of a nation essentially involves filling out the table. 1.1 for a representative sample of the population. Political culture is a variety of unstable, recurring, cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations regarding the political system in general, its input and output aspects, and oneself as a political actor.

Table 1.2. Types of political cultures

Patriarchal political culture (or the political culture of local communities). If these four types of repeating orientations regarding specialized political objects are not distinguished (absent) and we designate them as zeros, then we call such a political culture patriarchal. The political cultures of African tribes and autonomous indigenous communities described by Coleman fall into this category. There are no specialized political roles in these societies. Leaders, chiefs, shamans are mixed political-economic-religious roles. For members of such societies, political orientations regarding these roles are inseparable from religious or social orientations. Patriarchal orientations also include a relative lack of expectation of change initiated by the political system. Members of patriarchal cultures expect nothing from the political system. Thus, in the centralized African tribes and principalities that Coleman refers to, the political culture is essentially patriarchal, although the development of any more specialized political roles in these societies may mean the emergence of more differentiated political orientations. Even large-scale and more differentiated political systems can have a patriarchal culture at their core. But relatively pure patriarchalism is more likely in simple traditionalist systems where political specialization is minimal. Patriarchal culture in more differentiated political systems is affective and normative rather than cognitive. This means that people in the tribes of Nigeria or Ghana may be vaguely aware of the existence of a central political regime. But their feelings about this regime are vague or negative, and they have not internalized the forms of relationship with it.

Submissive political culture. The second important type of political cultures shown in table. 1.2 is a subject culture. In it, there are stable orientations regarding the differentiated political system and regarding what the system gives “as an output,” but orientations regarding specific objects “at the input” of the system and regarding oneself as an active participant are very weak. The subject of such a system (the subject) is aware of the existence of government power and is sensually oriented towards it, perhaps being proud of it, perhaps not loving it and evaluating it as legitimate or not. But the attitude towards the system in general and what it gives “at the output”, i.e. to the administrative or downstream side of the political system, this attitude is fundamentally passive, a limited form of knowledge and participation that corresponds to the subject culture. We are talking about pure subject orientations, which are most likely in societies where there are no “input” structures formed and differentiated from other elements of the system. Subject orientations in a political system with developed democratic institutions are more likely to be affective and normative than cognitive. Thus, the French royalist knows about the existence of democratic institutions, but he does not consider them legitimate.

Political culture of participation. The third basic principle of political cultures is a participatory culture - a culture in which members of society are specifically oriented towards the system in general, as well as towards both political and administrative structures and processes; in other words, on both the “input” and “output” aspects of the political system. Individual members of such a political system may be favorably or unfavorably oriented towards different classes of political objects. They tend to focus on their own “active” role in politics, although their feelings and assessments of such roles may vary from acceptance to denial.

[...] Civic culture is, first of all, a culture of loyal participation. Individuals are not only oriented “towards the input” of politics, to participate in it, but they are also positively oriented towards “input” structures and “input” processes. In other words, to use the terms we have introduced, civic culture is a participatory political culture in which political culture and political structure are in harmony and correspondence with each other.

It is important that in civil culture, political orientations of participation are combined with patriarchal and subservient political orientations, but do not deny them. Individuals become participants in the political process, but they do not abandon their subservient or patriarchal orientations. Moreover, these earlier political orientations are not only supported by participation orientations, but they are also consistent with participation orientations. More traditional political orientations tend to limit the individual's commitment to politics and make those commitments more lax. Submissive and patriarchal orientations “control” or contain participation orientations. Such attitudes are favorable to the orientation of participation in the political system and play an important role in civic culture, as do such political attitudes as faith in other people and social participation in general. Support for such more traditional installations and their merger with participatory orientations lead to a balanced political culture in which political activity, involvement and rationality exist, but are balanced by humility, respect for tradition and commitment to communal values.

Chapter 15

[...] Is there a democratic political culture, i.e. a certain type of political position that is conducive to democratic stability or, figuratively speaking, to a certain extent “suitable” for a democratic political system? To answer this question, we must turn to the political culture of two relatively stable and prosperous democracies - Great Britain and the United States of America. The political culture of these nations roughly corresponds to the concept of "civic culture". This type of political position differs in some respects from the “rational-activist” model, the model of political culture that, according to the norms of democratic ideology, should be present in a successful democracy. [...]

Research in the field of political behavior has, however, questioned the adequacy of the rational-activist model. They demonstrated that citizens of democratic countries rarely live according to this model. They are neither well-informed, nor deeply involved in politics, nor particularly active; and the process of making electoral decisions is anything but a process of rational calculation. This model does not reflect the civic culture that we identified in the UK and the USA. [...]

Civil culture is a mixed political culture. Within its framework, many citizens may be active in politics, but many others play a more passive role as “subjects.” Even more important is the fact that even among those who actively fulfill a civic role, the qualities of subjects and parishioners are not completely repressed. The participant role is simply added to these two roles. This means that the active citizen retains his traditionalist, non-political connections, as well as his more passive role as a subject. Of course, the rational-activist model does not at all assume that the orientations of the participant replace the orientations of the subject and the parishioner, however, since the presence of the latter two types of orientation is not clearly stated, it turns out that they are not related to democratic political culture.

In fact, these two types of orientation not only persist, but also form an important part of civic culture. First, the orientations of the parishioner and the subject change the intensity of the individual's political involvement and activity. Political activity represents only part of a citizen's interests, and, as a rule, not a very important part of them. Maintaining other orientations limits the degree of his involvement in political activity and keeps politics within the proper framework. Moreover, the orientations of the parishioner and the subject do not simply coexist with the orientations of the participant, they permeate and modify them. For example, primary connections are important in the formation of types of civic influence. In addition, the interpenetrating structures of social and interpersonal connections tend to influence the nature of political orientations - making them less acute and dividing. Being permeated with primary group, as well as general social and interpersonal orientations, political orientations are by no means merely derivatives of clearly expressed principles and rational calculation.

What are the reasons for the discrepancy between the ideals of the rational activist model and the types of political connections that actually exist even in the most stable and prosperous democracies? One possible explanation, which is most common in the literature on citizenship education, is that this discrepancy is evidence of poor functioning of democracy. To the extent that people do not live up to the ideal of the active citizen, democracy has failed. [...]

If one believes that the realities of political life must be shaped in accordance with some political theories, one can be satisfied with such an explanation. But if we take the view that political theories must emerge from the realities of political life - a somewhat simpler and perhaps more useful task - then this explanation of the reasons for the gap between the rational-activist model and democratic realities is less acceptable. Proponents of this point of view may explain the existing gap by saying that the bar has been raised too high. When we consider the complexity of political issues, the presence of other problems that occupy an individual's time, and the difficulty of obtaining the information needed to make rational political decisions, it becomes abundantly clear why the average person is not an ideal citizen. In light of the individual's non-political interests, it may be completely irrational for him to invest in political activity the time and effort required to live according to the rational activist model. Maybe it's just not worth it to be such a good citizen. [...]

But while a fully activist political culture is likely only a utopian ideal, there must be other, more significant reasons why the most prosperous democracies have an intricately intertwined, mixed civic culture. Such a culture, which sometimes includes apparently incompatible political orientations, seems most consistent with the needs of democratic political systems, since they too represent a web of contradictions.

[...] Maintaining a proper balance between government power and government responsibility(responsiveness) - one of the most important and difficult tasks of democracy. If there is no form of control over government elites by non-elites, then the political system can hardly be called democratic. On the other hand, non-elites are not capable of governing themselves. For a political system to be effective, for it to be able to develop and implement policies, adapt to new situations, and respond to internal and external issues, there must be a mechanism through which government officials are endowed with powers that allow them to make powerful decisions. The tension created by the need to resolve conflicting objectives arising from government power and government responsibility becomes most pronounced during periods of crisis. [...]

How should a management system be built to maintain the necessary balance between power and responsibility? E.E. Schattschneider put the question this way: “The problem is not how 180 million Aristotelians can manage democracy, but how to organize a community of 180 million ordinary people in such a way that it remains sensitive to their needs. This is problem leadership, organization, alternatives and systems of responsibility and trust.” When trying to solve this problem, political scientists usually speak in terms of the structure of electoral conflict. An electoral system designed to give power to a specific elite for a limited period of time can provide a balance between power and responsibility: elites gain power, but this power is limited by the very frequency of choice - concern about future elections in the interim and a whole range of other formal and informal control systems. After all, for a system of this kind to work, there must be not just one, but a large number of parties (or at least several competing elite groups potentially capable of gaining power), otherwise the dispute between the elites will lose all meaning; at the same time, some mechanism is needed to allow the elite group to effectively exercise power. This could be the transfer of full power to the winning party in a two-party system or the formation of a workable coalition by a group of parties. [...]

The tension between governmental authority and responsibility has its parallel in the conflicting demands made on citizens in democracies. For the elites to be accountable to the average citizen, a number of things are required of him: he must be able to express his opinion so that the elites understand what he wants; the citizen must be involved in politics in such a way that he knows and cares whether the elites are accountable to him or not; he must be powerful enough to impose responsible behavior on the elites. In other words, elite responsibility presupposes that the average citizen acts according to a rational activist model. However, to achieve the other component of democracy - the power of elites - it is necessary for the ordinary citizen to have completely different attitudes and behave accordingly. In order for elites to be strong and make powerful decisions, the participation, activity and influence of the ordinary citizen must be limited. He must hand over power to the elites and let them rule. The need for elite power assumes that the average citizen will be relatively passive, disconnected from politics, and deferential to the ruling elites. Thus, from a citizen in a democracy, contradictory things are required: he must be active, but... at the same time passive, included in the process, but not too much, influential and at the same time respectful to authority.

[...] From the data we have it follows that there are two main directions in which civil culture supports the fulfillment by its subject of both an actively influential and a more passive role: on the one hand, in society distribution takes place individuals pursuing one of two conflicting civic goals; on the other hand - certain inconsistency in an individual's positions allows him to simultaneously pursue these seemingly incompatible goals. Let us first consider the question of the inconsistency of the individual.

Our research shows that there is a gap between real political behavior respondents, on the one hand, and their perception of their ability and responsibility to act - with another. Respondents from the UK and US demonstrated a high likelihood of what we called subjective political competence. [...] A considerable part of the respondents consider themselves capable of influencing the decisions of local authorities, and a significant, although not so significant, part similarly assesses their capabilities in relation to the central government. However, this high assessment of one's own competence as a citizen capable of exerting influence is absolutely not supported by active political behavior. [...]

There is a similar gap between the sense of obligation to participate in political life and actual participation. The number of respondents who stated that the average person has a responsibility to take part in the affairs of his local community is significantly higher than the number of those who actually participate in them; and again this trend is most clearly evident in the US and UK. As one of the respondents put it: “I talk about what a person should do, and not about what I myself do.” And there is evidence that this position is not so rare. There is also no doubt that the awareness of the obligation of at least some participation in the affairs of one’s own community is more widespread than the feeling of the importance of such activity. The percentage of respondents who stated that a person has such a responsibility in all countries is significantly higher than the percentage of those who, when asked about their leisure activities, indicated participation in community affairs. Thus, 51% of Americans surveyed reported that, in their opinion, the average person should take some active part in the life of their community. But when asked how they spend their free time, only about 10% of respondents named such activities. [...] All this suggests that although the norm requiring one to participate in public affairs is widespread, active participation in them is by no means the most important form of activity for most people. It is neither their main leisure activity nor their main source of satisfaction, joy and excitement.

These two gaps—between a high assessment of one's potential influence and a lower level of actual influence, and between the extent to which verbal recognition of the obligation to participate and the actual significance and scope of participation—help to understand how a democratic political culture helps to maintain a balance between the power of the government elite and its responsibility ( or its addition - a balance between the activity and influence of non-elite groups and their passivity and lack of influence). The comparative rarity of political participation, the relative unimportance of such participation for the individual, and the objective weakness of the ordinary person allow government elites to act. The inactivity of the average person and his inability to influence decisions help provide government elites with the power they need to make decisions. However, all this guarantees the successful solution of only one of the two contradictory tasks of democracy. The power of the elite must be contained. The citizen's counter-role as an active and influential force in holding elites accountable is supported by his deep commitment to the norms of active citizenship, as well as by his conviction that he can be an influential citizen. [...]

A citizen, existing within the framework of civic culture, thus has a reserve of influence. It is not constantly included in politics and does not actively monitor the behavior of decision makers in this area. This reserve of influence - potential influence, inert and not manifested in the political system - is best illustrated by data concerning the ability of citizens to create political structures when necessary. A citizen is not a permanent participant in the political process. He is rarely active in political groups. But he believes that, if necessary, he can mobilize his usual social environment for political purposes. He cannot be called an active citizen. He is a potentially active citizen.

The intermittent and potential nature of political activity and citizen involvement depends, however, on more stable types of political behavior. Living in a civil culture, an ordinary person is more inclined than in any other situation to maintain political connections at a high and constant level, to belong to some organization and to participate in informal political discussions. These activities do not in themselves indicate active participation in public decision-making, but they do make such participation more likely. They prepare the individual to enter a political environment in which citizen inclusion and participation become more feasible. [...]

That politics matters relatively little to citizens is a crucial part of the mechanism by which a system of conflicting policy positions constrains political elites without constraining them so much as to render them ineffective. After all, the balance of contradictory orientations would be much more difficult to maintain if political issues always seemed important to citizens. If an issue arises that they perceive as important, or a deep dissatisfaction with the government arises, the individual is prompted to think about the topic. Accordingly, the pressure increasing, pushing him to overcome inconsistency, i.e. to mutual harmonization of positions and behavior in accordance with norms and perceptions, i.e. transition to political activity. Thus, the discrepancy between positions and behavioral acts acts as a hidden or potential source of political influence and activity.

The thesis that civic culture maintains a balance between power and responsibility points to another point about democratic politics. It provides insight into why critical political issues, if left unresolved, eventually create instability in a democratic political system. The balance between activity and passivity can only be maintained if political issues are not too acute. If political life becomes and remains tense because some central issue is unresolved, the incongruence between attitudes and behavior begins to become untenable. But any relatively long-term destruction of this discrepancy is highly likely to entail adverse consequences. If behavior is aligned with orientations, the amount of control that non-elites will attempt to exercise over elites will create ineffective governance and instability. On the other hand, if attitudes change in such a way that they begin to combine with behavior, the feeling of powerlessness and non-inclusion that arises among citizens can have a destructive impact on the democracy of the political system.

This does not mean, however, that all important issues pose a threat to the democratic political system. Only when they become and then remain sharp can the system become unstable. If important issues arise only sporadically, and if the government is able to respond to the demands stimulated by the emergence of these issues, the balance between civil and governmental influence can be maintained. In a normal situation, citizens have relatively little interest in what those who make government decisions do, and the latter have the opportunity to act as they see fit. However, if any issue comes to the surface, citizens' demands towards officials increase. If these individuals can respond to such demands, politics again loses its meaning for citizens and political life returns to normal. Moreover, these cycles of citizen inclusion, elite response, and citizen disengagement tend to reinforce the balance of opposites necessary for democracy. Within each cycle, the citizen's sense of influence increases; At the same time, the system adapts to new requirements and thus demonstrates its effectiveness. And loyalty generated by participation and effective performance can make the system more stable as a whole.

These cycles of engagement are an important means of maintaining a balanced tension between activity and passivity. Just as constant engagement and activity driven by controversial issues in the spotlight would ultimately make it difficult to maintain balance, so too would a complete lack of engagement and activity lead to the same result. Balance can only be maintained over a long period of time if the gap between activity and passivity is not too wide. If faith in a person's political capabilities is not reinforced from time to time, it is likely to disappear. On the other hand, if this belief is maintained only in a purely ritualistic manner, it will not constitute a potential source of influence and serve as a means of restraining decision makers. [...]

So far we have considered the question of ways to balance the activity and passivity inherent in individual citizens. But such a balance is maintained not only by the set of positions that individuals have, but also by the distribution of positions between different types of participants in the political process operating in the system: some individuals believe in their competence, others do not; some are active, some are passive. This diversity in the ideas and degrees of activity of individuals also helps to strengthen the balance between power and responsibility. This can be seen if we analyze the mechanism of equilibrium formation described above: some issue becomes acute; activity increases; Thanks to the government's response, which reduces the severity of the issue, the balance is restored. One of the reasons why the rise in importance of an issue and the resulting rise in political activity does not lead to overstrain of the political system is that the importance of an issue rarely increases for all citizens at the same time. Rather, the situation looks like this: certain groups demonstrate a rise in political activity, while other citizens remain inert. Therefore, the volume of civic activity in each specific place and at each specific moment is not so great as to lead to overstrain of the system.

All of the above is based on data on the positions of ordinary citizens. However, for the mechanism we have postulated to work, the positions of the non-elites must be complemented by the positions of the elites. Decision-makers need to believe in the democratic myth - that ordinary citizens should participate in politics and that they actually have influence. If a decision maker holds this view of the role of the average citizen, his or her own decisions help maintain a balance between government power and responsibility. On the other hand, the decision maker is free to act in the way that seems best to him, since the ordinary citizen is not banging on his door demanding some action. He is protected by the inertia of an ordinary person. But if a decision maker shares a belief in the potential influence of the average person, his freedom of action is limited by what he assumes: if he does not act in accordance with the wishes of the citizens, there will be banging on his door. Moreover, if an official shares the view that the average person should participate in decision-making, he is motivated to act responsibly by the belief that such citizen influence is legitimate and justified. Although this does not appear from our data, there is reason to assume that political elites share the political structure of non-elites; that in a society where there is a civic culture, they, like non-elites, adhere to positions associated with it. Ultimately, elites are part of the same political system and have undergone much of the same process of political socialization as non-elites. And analysis shows that political and civic leaders, as well as high-status citizens, are more likely to accept democratic norms than those with lower status.

A study of the positions of elites suggests the existence of another mechanism that makes it possible to strengthen responsibility in conditions where the activity and involvement of the ordinary citizen remains low. Citizen influence is not always, or even most of the time, the stimulus that leads to a response (a citizen or group of citizens makes a demand - the government elite takes action to satisfy it). Rather, the well-known law of “expected reactions” applies here. A significant part of civilian influence on government elites is carried out without active action and even without the conscious desire of citizens. Elites can anticipate possible demands and actions and take responsible action accordingly. Elites act responsibly not because citizens are actively putting forward their demands, but in order to keep them from being active.

Thus, within the framework of civic culture, the individual is not necessarily a rational, active citizen. The type of his activity is more mixed and softened. This allows the individual to combine a certain amount of competence, involvement and activity with passivity and non-involvement. Moreover, his relationship with the government is not purely rational, since it involves a commitment - both by himself and by the decision-makers - to what we have called the democratic myth of citizen competence. And the existence of such a myth entails important consequences. First, this is not a pure myth: the belief in the potential influence of an ordinary person has a well-known basis and indicates real behavioral potential. And regardless of whether this myth corresponds to reality or not, they believe in it.

Reprinted from: Political Science: Reader / Comp. prof. M.A. Vasilik, associate professor M.S. Vershinin. - M.: Gardariki, 2000. 843 p. (Red font in square brackets indicates start text on next page of the printed original of this publication)

Due to the controversial issues that are in the spotlight, they would ultimately make it difficult to maintain balance, and a complete lack of involvement and activity would lead to this result. Balance can only be maintained over a long period of time if the gap between activity and passivity is not too wide. If faith in a person's political capabilities is not reinforced from time to time, it is likely to disappear. On the other hand, if this belief is maintained only in a purely ritualistic manner, it will not constitute a potential source of influence and serve as a means of restraining decision makers […]
So far we have considered the question of ways to balance the activity and passivity inherent in individual citizens. But such a balance is maintained not only by the set of positions that individuals have, but also by the distribution of positions between different types of participants in the political process operating in the system: some individuals believe in their competence, others do not; some are active, some are passive. This diversity in the ideas and degrees of activity of individuals also helps to strengthen the balance between power and responsibility. This can be seen if we analyze the mechanism of equilibrium formation described above: some issue becomes acute; activity increases; Thanks to the government's response, which reduces the severity of the issue, the balance is restored. One of the reasons why the rise in importance of an issue and the resulting rise in political activity does not lead to overstrain of the political system is that the importance of an issue rarely increases for all citizens at the same time. Rather, the situation looks like this: certain groups demonstrate a rise in political activity, while other citizens remain inert. Therefore, the volume of civic activity in each specific place and at each specific moment is not so great as to lead to overstrain of the system.
All of the above is based on data on the positions of ordinary citizens. However, for the mechanism we have postulated to work, the positions of the non-elites must be complemented by the positions of the elites. Decision-makers need to believe in the democratic myth—that ordinary citizens should participate in politics and that they actually have influence. If a decision maker holds this view of the role of the average citizen, his or her own decisions help maintain a balance between government power and responsibility. On the other hand, the decision maker is free to act in the way that seems best to him, since the ordinary citizen is not banging on his door demanding some action. He is protected by the inertia of an ordinary person. But if a decision maker shares a belief in the potential influence of the average person, his freedom of action is limited by what he assumes: if he does not act in accordance with the wishes of the citizens, there will be banging on his door. Moreover, if an official shares the view that the average person should participate in decision-making, he is motivated to act responsibly by the belief that such citizen influence is legitimate and justified. Although this does not appear from our data, there is reason to assume that political elites share the political structure of non-elites; that in a society where there is a civic culture, they, like non-elites, adhere to positions associated with it. Ultimately, elites are part of the same political system and have gone through much of the same process of political socialization as non-elites. And the analysis shows that political and civic leaders, as well as high-status citizens, are more likely to accept democratic norms than those whose status is lower.
A study of the positions of elites suggests the existence of another mechanism that makes it possible to strengthen responsibility in conditions where the activity and involvement of the ordinary citizen remains low. Citizen influence is not always, or even most of the time, the stimulus that leads to a response (a citizen or group of citizens makes a demand; the government elite takes action to satisfy it). Rather, the well-known law of “expected reactions” applies here. A significant part of civilian influence on government elites is carried out without active action and even without the conscious desire of citizens. Elites can anticipate possible demands and actions and take countermeasures accordingly. Elites act responsibly not because citizens are actively putting forward their demands, but in order to keep them from being active.
Thus, within the framework of civic culture, the individual is not necessarily a rational, active citizen. The type of his activity is more mixed and softened. This allows the individual to combine a certain amount of competence, involvement and activity with passivity and non-involvement. Moreover, his relationship with government is not purely rational, for it involves a commitment—both by himself and by the decision-makers—to what we have called the democratic myth of citizen competence. And the existence of such a myth entails important consequences. First, this is not a pure myth: the belief in the potential influence of an ordinary person has a well-known basis and indicates real behavioral potential. And regardless of whether this myth corresponds to reality or not, they believe in it.
Ability to manage emotions
[…] There are several reasons why a balance of pragmatic and emotional orientations, rather than the maximum expression of either pragmatism or passion, is necessary for the effective functioning of democracy. First, political commitment, to be reliable, must not be completely devoid of emotion. According to the conclusion made by S. Lipset, loyalty to a political system, if it is based on purely pragmatic considerations regarding the effectiveness of the latter, rests on a very shaky foundation, since it depends too much on how this system functions. To remain stable over a long period of time, a system needs political commitment based on a more general attachment to it, on what we might characterize as “system feeling.” Further, repeating the idea expressed by G. Eckstein, it can be noted that purely pragmatic, unemotional political involvement implies the pursuit of an opportunistic policy, which often leads to cynicism. On the other hand, if emotional attitudes towards politics or a particular political group become too strong, this can have detrimental consequences for democracy. First, strong emotional involvement in politics threatens the balance between activity and passivity, since maintaining this balance depends on the low importance of politics. Secondly, political inclusion of such a plan leads to “increasing political stakes,” creating fertile ground for messianic mass movements that undermine the stability of democracies. Moreover, the consequences of strong emotional partiality can be harmful both when such partiality is directed at the system as a whole and at officially sanctified elites, and when it concerns specific social subgroups. It is clear that too strong affiliation with certain political parties and groups can lead to a destabilizing level of fragmentation of the system. But even if such commitment is directed at the political system and the officially sanctified elites, the consequences are likely to be unfavorable. For citizens to have any degree of control over political elites, their loyalty to the system and these elites must not be complete and unconditional. In addition, civic culture, along with the role of citizen, implies the preservation of more traditional roles of the churchgoer. Maintaining a non-political sphere of activity is a very important factor if one is to strive for a balanced impact of civic culture.
From all this it follows that participation in politics should be neither purely instrumental nor purely emotional. A person who takes part in politics should receive both pragmatic and emotional rewards from such participation. And balanced inclusion in politics again turns out to be characteristic of the civic culture of the most prosperous democracies. […]
Agreement and disagreement
[…] The importance of social trust and cooperation as a component of civic culture cannot be overestimated. In a sense, they are the main reservoir from which the democratic order draws its ability to function. Constitution-makers invented formal structures of political life designed to foster trustworthy behavior, but without existing relationships of trust such institutions seem to be of little value. Social trust promotes political cooperation between citizens of these countries, and without this cooperation, democratic politics is impossible. Such trust is also likely to form part of the relationship between citizens and political elites. We said earlier that democracy requires maintaining the power of elites. Now we want to add that the feeling of trust in relation to the political elite, the belief that the feeling of trust in relation to the political elite, the belief that they are not a hostile and external force, but part of the same political community, makes citizens strive to transfer power to her. Along with this, the presence of general social attitudes reduces the danger that emotional commitment to a particular political subgroup will lead to political fragmentation. […]
All of the above brings us to the understanding that in a democratic system another balance must be maintained - between agreement and disagreement. […] In society, in the words of T. Parsons, there should be “limited polarization.” If there is no agreement, there is little chance of the peaceful resolution of political disputes that is associated with the democratic process. If, for example, the ruling elite considers the opposition too dangerous, it is unlikely to allow peaceful competition with the latter to achieve the status of the ruling elite.
The balance between agreement and disagreement is maintained in civil culture through a mechanism similar to that which ensures the balance between activity and passivity, namely, through the discrepancy between norms and behavior. […] This is just one of the ways in which civic culture tames divisions in society. In general, such taming is accompanied by the subordination of conflicts at the political level to some higher, overarching orientation towards cohesion, be it norms associated with the “democratic rules of the game”, or the belief that there is solidarity in society based on criteria not related to political unanimity , but standing above party interests.
The balance in question must be maintained not only at the level of citizens, but also at the level of elites. […] For example, the complex formal and informal rules of etiquette in the legislative bodies of the United States and Great Britain encourage and even require friendly relations (or at least friendly words) between supporters of parties in opposition to each other. And this softens their obvious focus only on their supporters. Of course, this does not mean that loyalty to “one’s own” ceases to be an important force, it is simply kept within acceptable limits by means of more general norms of human relations.
To sum up, the most striking feature of civic culture as described in this book is its heterogeneous character. First, it is a mixture of the orientations of parishioner, subject and citizen. The parishioner’s orientation towards primary relationships, the passive political position of the subject, the activity of the citizen - all this merged in civic culture. The result is a set of tamed or balanced political orientations. There is also political activity here, but not so much that it would be possible to destroy government power; there is involvement and commitment, but it is relaxed; There are disagreements, but they are moderated. In addition, the political orientations that make up civic culture are closely related to general social and interpersonal orientations. Within civic culture, norms of interpersonal relationships, general trust, and trust in one's social environment permeate and moderate political positions. The mixture of positions characteristic of civic culture is completely “suitable” for a democratic political system. In many of its parameters, it most closely corresponds to such a mixed political system as democracy3.
Sources of civic culture
[…] Statesmen seeking to create political democracy often concentrate their efforts on establishing a formal set of democratic government institutions and on drafting constitutions. They can also focus on the formation of political parties to encourage mass participation. But developing a stable and effective democracy requires more than specific political and governance structures. This development depends on the orientations people have towards the political process, that is, on political culture. If it is unable to support a democratic system, the chances of its success are very weak.
Civil culture remains the most suitable for a democratic political system. This is not the only type of democratic culture, but it seems to be the type that is most consistent with a stable democratic system. Therefore, it is advisable to look at how civic culture is transmitted from generation to generation. The first thing to note in this regard is that it is not taught in any real sense of the word in schools. Civic education in the United States emphasizes behavior that is closer to the rational-activist model than to civic culture. This type of behavior constitutes an important component of civic culture, but no more than a component. In Great Britain, whose political culture is also very close to civic culture, we see almost no pronounced attempts to instill in children either the system of norms of behavior associated with civic culture, or that expressed in the rational-activist model. There is virtually no clearly formulated theory as to what a “good British subject” is and how to prepare children for the role of citizen. This does not mean that direct schooling does not play any role in developing a civic culture. The point is rather that his role is secondary.
It is not surprising that civic culture is not transmitted solely through direct teaching. Its components of orientation and behavior are connected in a complex, confusing way - after all, this is a culture characterized by a certain amount of inconsistency and balanced opposites. One of the most important parts of civic culture is a set of attitudes regarding trust in relation to other people - a multi-layered, sometimes contradictory set that is difficult to convey through direct instruction. How then is civic culture transmitted from generation to generation?
The answer to the question lies in the process of political socialization. Civic culture is transmitted through a complex process that involves learning in many social institutions—the family, the peer group, the school, the workplace, and the political system itself. The type of experience gained at these institutes varies. Individuals acquire political orientations through directed instruction—for example, in special civics classes; but they also learn by being exposed to political experiences that are not intended to be learned from, such as hearing his parents discuss political issues or observing the activities of actors in the political system. The development of political orientations may be non-directional and non-political in nature, as is the case when an individual learns about authority from his participation in the power structures of the family or school, or when he learns about the trustworthiness of people from his early contacts. with adults.
Such a broad nature of political socialization provides an excellent opportunity to comprehend the subtleties on which civic culture is based. Because some of the lessons are not expressed explicitly, contradictions between orientations may go unnoticed. And since political learning occurs simultaneously through many channels, a person can perceive different aspects of political culture from different sources. This nature of learning makes it possible to reduce to the limit the tension that could arise if the orientation towards activity and the orientation towards passivity (as one example of the opposing political attitudes included in civil culture) came from a single source. Thus, through his participation in the life of the family and school, as well as through his perception of the norms of political participation, the child can learn to count on the possibility of real participation in decision-making. At the same time, inevitable contact with the hierarchical type of power in the family and school moderates the desire to dominate one’s political environment. Likewise, what is read from books about the need for political activity and idealism in politics will be tempered by observations of actual political behavior and orientations of adults. And this heterogeneous set of orientations developed in childhood will still be modified under the influence of subsequent direct experience of contact with politics. Expectations and norms regarding participation will interact with the actual opportunities for participation that the political system provides, with the meaning that the person himself attaches to a particular issue, and with the demands that other roles impose on him.

Is there a democratic political culture, that is, a certain type of political position that is conducive to democratic stability, or, figuratively speaking, to a certain extent “suited” to a democratic political system? To answer this question, we must look to the political cultures of two relatively stable and prosperous democracies: Great Britain and the United States of America. The political culture of these nations roughly corresponds to the concept of civic culture. This type of political position differs in some respects from the “rational-activist” model, the model of political culture that, according to the norms of democratic ideology, should be present in a successful democracy...

Civil culture is a mixed political culture. Within its framework, many citizens may be active in politics, but many others play a more passive role as subjects. Even more important is the fact that even among those who actively fulfill a civic role, the qualities of subjects and parishioners are not completely repressed. The participant role is simply added to these two roles. This means that the active citizen retains his traditionalist, non-political connections, as well as his more passive role as a subject. Of course, the rational-activist model does not at all assume that the orientations of the participant replace the orientations of the subject and the parishioner, however, since the presence of the latter two types of orientations is not clearly stated, it turns out that they are not related to democratic political culture.

In fact, these two types of orientation not only persist, but also form an important part of civic culture. First, the orientations of the parishioner and the subject change the intensity of the individual's political involvement and activity. Political activity represents only part of a citizen's interests, and, as a rule, not a very important part of them. Maintaining other orientations limits the degree of his involvement in political activity and keeps politics within the proper framework. Moreover, the orientations of the parishioner and the subject do not simply coexist with the orientations of the participant, they permeate and modify them. For example, primary connections are important in the formation of types of civic influence. In addition, the interpenetrating structures of social and interpersonal connections tend to affect the nature of political orientations - making them less acute and dividing. Being permeated with primary group, as well as general social and interpersonal orientations, political orientations are by no means merely derivatives of clearly expressed principles and rational calculation...

But while a fully activist political culture is likely only a utopian ideal, there must be other, more significant reasons why the most prosperous democracies have an intricately intertwined, mixed civic culture. Such a culture, which sometimes includes apparently incompatible political orientations, seems best suited to the needs of democratic political systems, since they too represent a web of contradictions...

That is, a certain type of political position that is conducive to democratic stability, or, figuratively speaking, to a certain extent “suitable” for a democratic political system? To answer this question, we must look to the political cultures of two relatively stable and prosperous democracies: Great Britain and the United States of America. The political culture of these nations roughly corresponds to the concept of civic culture. This type of political position differs in some respects from the “rational-activist” model, the model of political culture that, according to the norms of democratic ideology, should be present in a successful democracy […]
Research in the field of political behavior has, however, questioned the adequacy of the rational-activist model. They demonstrated that citizens of democratic countries rarely live according to this model. They are neither well-informed, nor deeply involved in politics, nor particularly active; and the process of making electoral decisions is anything but a process of rational calculation. This model does not reflect the civic culture that we identified in the UK and the USA […]
Civil culture is a mixed political culture. Within its framework, many citizens may be active in politics, but many others play a more passive role as subjects1. Even more important is the fact that even among those who actively fulfill a civic role, the qualities of subjects and parishioners are not completely repressed. The participant role is simply added to these two roles. This means that the active citizen retains his traditionalist, non-political connections, as well as his more passive role as a subject. Of course, the rational-activist model does not at all assume that the orientations of the participant replace the orientations of the subject and the parishioner, however, since the presence of the latter two types of orientations is not clearly stated, it turns out that they are not related to democratic political culture.
In fact, these two types of orientations not only persist, but also form an important part of civic culture. First, the orientations of the parishioner and the subject change the intensity of the individual's political involvement and activity. Political activity represents only part of a citizen's interests, and, as a rule, not a very important part of them. Maintaining other orientations limits the degree of his involvement in political activity and keeps politics within the proper framework. Moreover, the orientations of the parishioner and the subject do not simply coexist with the orientations of the participant, they permeate and modify them. For example, primary connections are important in the formation of types of civic influence. In addition, the interpenetrating structures of social and interpersonal connections tend to influence the nature of political orientations - making them less acute and dividing. Being permeated with primary group, as well as general social and interpersonal orientations, political orientations are by no means merely derivatives of clearly expressed principles and rational calculation.
What are the reasons for the discrepancy between the ideals of the rational activist model and the types of political connections that actually exist even in the most stable and prosperous democracies? One possible explanation, which is most common in the literature on citizenship education, is that this discrepancy is evidence of poor functioning of democracy. To the extent that people do not live up to the ideal of the active citizen, democracy has failed […]
If one believes that the realities of political life must be shaped in accordance with some political theories, one can be satisfied with such an explanation. But if we take the view that political theories must emerge from the realities of political life - a somewhat simpler and perhaps more useful task - then this explanation of the reasons for the gap between the rational-activist model and democratic realities is less acceptable. Proponents of this point of view may explain the existing gap by saying that the bar has been raised too high. When we consider the complexity of political issues, the presence of other problems that occupy an individual's time, and the difficulty of obtaining the information needed to make rational political decisions, it becomes abundantly clear why the average person is not an ideal citizen. In light of the individual's non-political interests, it may be completely irrational for him to invest in political activity the time and effort required to live according to the rational activist model. Maybe it's just not worth it to be such a good citizen […]
But while a fully activist political culture is likely only a utopian ideal, there must be other, more significant reasons why the most prosperous democracies have an intricately intertwined, mixed civic culture. Such a culture, which sometimes includes apparently incompatible political orientations, seems best suited to the needs of democratic political systems, since they also represent a web of contradictions […]
Power and responsibility
Maintaining the proper balance between government power and government responsiveness is one of the most important and difficult tasks of democracy. If there is no form of control over government elites by non-elites, then the political system can hardly be called democratic. On the other hand, non-elites are not capable of governing themselves. In order for a political system to be effective, so that it is able to develop and implement some kind of policy, adapt to a new situation, and respond to internal and external issues, there must be a mechanism through which government officials are endowed with powers that allow them to make powerful decisions. The tension created by the need to deal with conflicting objectives arising from government power and government responsibility becomes most pronounced during periods of crisis […]
How should a management system be built to maintain the necessary balance between power and responsibility? E.E. Schattschneider put the question this way: “The problem is not how 180 million Aristotelians can manage democracy, but how to organize a community of 180 million ordinary people in such a way that it remains sensitive to their needs. This is a problem of leadership, organization, alternatives and systems of responsibility and trust." When trying to solve this problem, political scientists usually speak in terms of the structure of electoral conflict. An electoral system designed to give power to a specific elite for a limited period of time can provide a balance between power and responsibility: elites gain power, but this power is limited by the very frequency of elections - concerns about future elections in the interim and a whole range of other formalities. and informal control systems. After all, for a system of this kind to work, there must be not just one, but a larger number of parties (or at least several competing elite groups potentially capable of gaining power), otherwise the dispute between the elites will lose all meaning; at the same time, some mechanism is needed to allow the elite group to effectively exercise power. This could be the transfer of full power to the winning party in a two-party system or the formation of a workable coalition by a group of parties. […]
The tension between governmental authority and responsibility has its parallel in the conflicting demands made on citizens in democracies. For the elites to be accountable to the average citizen, a number of things are required of him: he must be able to express his opinion so that the elites understand what he wants; the citizen must be involved in politics in such a way that he knows and cares whether the elites are accountable to him or not; it must be powerful enough to impose responsible behavior on elites. In other words, elite responsibility presupposes that the average citizen acts according to a rational activist model. However, to achieve the other component of democracy - the power of elites - it is necessary for the ordinary citizen to have completely different attitudes and behave accordingly. In order for elites to be strong and make powerful decisions, the participation, activity and influence of the ordinary citizen must be limited. He must hand over power to the elites and let them rule. The need for elite power assumes that the average citizen will be relatively passive, disconnected from politics, and deferential to the ruling elites. Thus, from a citizen in a democracy, contradictory things are required: he must be active, but at the same time passive, included in the process, but not too much, influential and at the same time respectful to power.
Norms, perceptions and activities
[…] From the data we have it follows that there are two main directions in which civil culture supports the fulfillment by its subject of both an actively influential and a more passive role: on the one hand, in society there is a distribution of individuals pursuing one of two conflicting civilian purposes; on the other hand, a certain inconsistency in the individual’s positions allows him to simultaneously pursue these seemingly incompatible goals. Let us first consider the question of the inconsistency of the individual.
As our research shows, there is a gap between the actual political behavior of respondents, on the one hand, and their perception of their ability and responsibility to act, on the other. Respondents from the UK and US demonstrated a high likelihood of what we called subjective political competence. […] A considerable part of the respondents consider themselves capable of influencing the decisions of local authorities, and a significant, although not so significant part, similarly assesses their capabilities in relation to the central government. However, this high assessment of one's own competence as a citizen capable of exerting influence is absolutely not supported by active political behavior. […]
There is a similar gap between the sense of obligation to participate in political life and actual participation. The number of respondents who stated that the average person has a responsibility to take part in the affairs of his local community is significantly higher than the number of those who actually participate in them; and again this trend is most clearly evident in the US and UK. As one of the respondents put it: “I talk about what a person should do, and not about how I myself act.” And there is evidence that this position is not so rare. There is also no doubt that the awareness of the obligation of at least some participation in the affairs of one’s own community is more widespread than the feeling of the importance of such activity. The percentage of respondents who stated that a person has such a responsibility in all countries is significantly higher than the percentage of those who, when asked about their leisure activities, indicated participation in community affairs. Thus, 51% of Americans surveyed reported that, in their opinion, an ordinary person should take some active part in the life of his community. But when asked how they spend their free time, only about 10% of respondents named such activities. […] All this suggests that although the norm requiring one to participate in public affairs is widespread, active participation in them is by no means the most important form of activity for most people. It is neither their main leisure activity nor their main source of satisfaction, joy and excitement.
These two gaps—between a high assessment of one's potential influence and a lower level of actual influence, and between the extent to which verbal recognition of the obligation to participate and the actual significance and scope of participation—help to understand how a democratic political culture helps maintain a balance between the power of the government elite and its responsibility ( or its addition - a balance between the activity and influence of non-elite groups and their passivity and lack of influence). The comparative rarity of political participation, the relative unimportance of such participation for the individual, and the objective weakness of the ordinary person allow government elites to act. The inactivity of the average person and his inability to influence decisions help provide government elites with the power they need to make decisions. However, all this guarantees the successful solution of only one of the two contradictory tasks of democracy. The power of the elite must be contained. The citizen's counter-role as an active and influential force in holding elites accountable is supported by his deep commitment to the norms of active citizenship, as well as by his conviction that he can be an influential citizen. […]
A citizen, existing within the framework of civic culture, thus has a reserve of influence. It is not constantly included in politics and does not actively monitor the behavior of decision makers in this area. This reserve of influence - potential influence, inert and not manifested in the political system - is best illustrated by data concerning the ability of citizens to create political structures when necessary. A citizen is not a permanent participant in the political process. He is rarely active in political groups. But he believes that, if necessary, he can mobilize his usual social environment for political purposes. He cannot be called an active citizen. He is a potentially active citizen.
The intermittent and potential nature of political activity and involvement of citizens depends, however, on more stable, more permanent types of political behavior. Living in a civil culture, an ordinary person, more than in any other situation, is inclined to maintain political connections at a high and constant level, join some organization and participate in informal political discussions. These activities do not in themselves indicate active participation in public decision-making, but they do make such participation more likely. They prepare the individual to enter a political environment in which citizen inclusion and participation become more feasible. […]
That politics matters relatively little to citizens is a crucial part of the mechanism by which a system of conflicting policy positions constrains political elites without constraining them so much as to render them ineffective. After all, the balance of conflicting orientations would be much more difficult to maintain if political issues always seemed important to citizens. , which they perceive as important, or deep dissatisfaction with the government is born, the individual is prompted to think about this topic. Accordingly, the pressure increasing, pushing him to overcome inconsistency, i.e. to mutual harmonization of positions and behavior in accordance with norms and perceptions, i.e. transition to political activity. Thus, the discrepancy between positions and behavioral acts acts as a hidden or potential source of political influence and activity.
The thesis that civic culture maintains a balance between power and responsibility points to another point about democratic politics. It provides insight into why critical political issues, if left unresolved, eventually create instability in a democratic political system. The balance between activity and passivity can only be maintained if political issues are not too acute. If political life becomes and remains tense because some central issue is unresolved, the incongruence between attitudes and behavior begins to become untenable. But any relatively long-term destruction of this discrepancy is highly likely to entail adverse consequences. If behavior is aligned with orientations, the amount of control that non-elites will attempt to exercise over elites will create ineffective governance and instability. On the other hand, if attitudes change in such a way that they begin to combine with behavior, the feeling of powerlessness and non-inclusion that arises among citizens can have a destructive impact on the democracy of the political system.
This does not mean, however, that all important issues pose a threat to the democratic political system. Only when they become and then remain sharp can the system become unstable. If important issues arise only sporadically, and if the government is able to respond to the demands stimulated by the emergence of these issues, the balance between civil and government influence can be maintained. In the ordinary situation, citizens have relatively little interest in what those who make government decisions do, and the latter have freedom to act as they see fit. However, if any issue comes to the surface, citizens' demands towards officials increase. If these individuals can respond to such demands, politics again loses its meaning for citizens, and political life returns to normal. Moreover, these cycles of citizen inclusion, elite response, and citizen disengagement tend to reinforce the balance of opposites necessary for democracy. Within each cycle, the citizen's sense of influence increases; At the same time, the system adapts to new requirements and thus demonstrates its effectiveness. And loyalty generated by participation and effective performance can make the system more stable as a whole.

In the modern world there is a wide variety of national types of political cultures. In order to study and classify them, it is necessary to have an adequate tool, that is, some ideal model (or models) of political culture. Taking into account the main provisions of the structural-functional approach to the analysis of political systems, G. Almond and S. Verba identified the political system as a whole, its “input” and “output” (that is, demands and support, as well as reaction to decisions made and their implementation), the individual as a political actor. In their opinion, each model of political culture (each “ideal type”) corresponds to its own combination of orientation towards these objects.

Based on these premises, G. Almond and S. Verba identified three main models (“ideal types”) of political culture:

- “Parochial culture” political culture (sometimes called parochial, traditional, patriarchal). This type of political culture is characterized by a complete separation of the population from the political system, a complete lack of knowledge about it. In such societies there are no specialized political roles; the main actors (leaders, shamans, etc.) simultaneously implement political, economic, and religious functions. In addition, the political, economic and religious orientations of the population are not differentiated. Territorial and socio-cultural identification predominates: a person identifies himself, first of all, as part of a local community (clan, village, etc.).

- Subject culture. This type of political culture is characterized by passive political behavior, orientation toward dominant official values ​​and norms, and a lack of independent comprehension of these values. In general, people have a kind of consumer-paternalistic attitude towards the political system: members of the community either expect benefits or are afraid of punishment. This type of political culture can be found in societies where there is no clear identification of the input channels of the political system, and individuals do not consider themselves as political actors.

- “Participant” political culture (participant culture) or culture of participation (activist political culture). The “participatory” type of political culture is characterized by the active participation of individuals in political life, based on a sufficiently high political literacy of citizens and their conviction in the ability to influence the process of political decision-making through their own participation. Such societies are characterized by a relatively high degree of functional differentiation: various spheres of social life are relatively autonomous, and the subsystems are quite developed and branched (in particular, the political subsystem).

In the modern world, these types of political culture do not exist in their pure form. In particular, in democratic countries it is impossible to find a pure participatory type of political culture: “citizens of democratic countries rarely live in accordance with this model. They are neither well-informed, nor deeply involved in politics, nor particularly active, and the process of making electoral decisions is anything but a process of rational calculation.”

In reality, national political cultures combine different types, that is, they are mixed. Combinations of these types can be different. G. Almond and S. Verba, in a comparative study of political cultures, asked the question of whether there is a democratic political culture, that is, a certain set of orientation that is conducive to the stability of democracy, that is, “suitable” for a democratic system.

Their main conclusion was that the most optimal for countries with stable democracies is the mixed type of political culture identified in the UK and the USA - civil political culture (or political culture of citizenship). Within this culture, "many citizens may be active in politics, but many others play the more passive role of subjects; even among those who perform the civic role, the qualities of subjects and parishioners are not completely repressed... This means that the active citizen retains his traditionalist, non-political connections, as well as the passive role of the subject. Political activity represents only part of a citizen's interests, and, as a rule, not a very important part of them. Maintaining other orientations limits the degree of his involvement in political activity and keeps politics within the proper framework. Moreover, the orientations of the parishioner and the subject do not simply coexist with the orientations of the participant, they permeate and modify them. So, for example, primary connections are important in the formation of types of civic influence. In addition, the interpenetrating structures of social and interpersonal connections tend to influence the nature of political orientations - to make them less acute and dividing."

According to G. Almond and S. Verbe, civic culture is characterized by two “contradictions”: 1) between a high assessment of one’s potential influence on political decisions and a lower level of actual influence; 2) between the extent of the spread of verbal recognition of the obligation of citizens to participate in political life and the real significance and volume of participation. These two contradictions, according to the authors of “Civic Culture,” help to understand how in stable democracies a dilemma is resolved, the optimal combination of sides of which is extremely important for maintaining stability: between the activity and influence of non-elite groups and their passivity and lack of influence, between the power of the ruling elite and its control and responsibility. On the one hand, the inactivity of the ordinary person helps provide the ruling elites with the power necessary to effectively solve problems. On the other hand, the citizen's role as an active and influential force in holding elites accountable is maintained through his commitment to the norms of active citizenship and his belief that he can be an influential political actor.

Thus, a citizen in a country with a civil political culture is potentially active. He does not act as a permanent participant in the political process, he is rarely active in political groups, but at the same time he has a reserve of potential influence. That is, he believes that, if necessary, he can mobilize his social environment for political purposes. A citizen living in such a country is more inclined to maintain political connections at a high and constant level, join any organization and participate in informal political discussions. These activities do not in themselves indicate active participation in the political decision-making process, but they do make such participation more likely.

Each of the ideal types of political culture proposed by G. Almond and S. Verba in practice, as the authors of the typology believed, reflects the specifics of a particular “ideal” subculture. The special combination of these subcultures determines the national characteristics of political culture in a particular country. Based on an analysis of the results of sociological research, they made an attempt to describe the approximate proportions in which subcultures corresponding to ideal types coexist in national political cultures. The approximate “formula” of civic culture looked like this: 60% “participants”, 30% “subjects” and 10% “parochials”. Other “formulas” were also identified, corresponding to an authoritarian transitional system, a “democratic” pre-industrial system, etc.