Combat successes of missile systems. A formidable enemy of aviation In anticipation of a new big war

For more than half a century, over 20 types of anti-aircraft missile systems and man-portable air defense systems have had real combat successes. Thanks to MANPADS, infantrymen and even partisans and terrorists were able to shoot down aircraft, and even more so, helicopters.

Attempts to create anti-aircraft missiles were made during the Second World War, but at that moment no country had reached the appropriate technological level. Even the war in Korea took place without anti-aircraft missile systems. They were first used in earnest in Vietnam, having a tremendous impact on the outcome of this war, and since then they have been one of the most important classes of military equipment, without their suppression it is impossible to gain air superiority.

S-75 - "WORLD CHAMPION" FOREVER

For more than half a century, over 20 types of anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) have had real combat successes. However, in most cases it is very difficult to find out the exact results. It is often difficult to establish objectively what exactly was used to shoot down a particular aircraft and helicopter. Sometimes the warring parties deliberately lie for propaganda purposes, and it is not possible to establish the objective truth. Because of this, only the most verified and confirmed by all parties results will be shown below. The true effectiveness of almost all air defense systems is higher, and in some cases - at times.

The first air defense system to achieve combat success, and very loud, was the Soviet S-75. On May 1, 1960, he shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over the Urals, which caused a huge international scandal. Then the S-75s shot down five more U-2s - one in October 1962 over Cuba (after which the world was one step away from nuclear war), four over China from September 1962 to January 1965.

The “finest hour” of the S-75 happened in Vietnam, where from 1965 to 1972 95 S-75 air defense systems and 7658 anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM) were delivered to them. The calculations of the air defense system were at first completely Soviet, but gradually the Vietnamese began to replace them. According to Soviet data, they shot down either 1293 or even 1770 American aircraft. The Americans themselves acknowledge the loss of about 150-200 aircraft from this air defense system. At the moment, the losses confirmed by the American side by aircraft type are as follows: 15 B-52 strategic bombers, 2–3 F-111 tactical bombers, 36 A-4 attack aircraft, nine A-6s, 18 A-7s, three A-3s, three A-1, one AC-130, 32 F-4 fighters, eight F-105s, one F-104, 11 F-8s, four RB-66 reconnaissance aircraft, five RF-101s, one O-2, one transport C- 123, as well as one CH-53 helicopter. As mentioned above, the real results of the S-75 in Vietnam are obviously much greater, but it is already impossible to say what they are.

Vietnam itself lost from the S-75, more precisely from its Chinese clone HQ-2, one MiG-21 fighter, which in October 1987 accidentally invaded the airspace of the PRC.

Arab anti-aircraft gunners in terms of combat training have never been comparable to either Soviet or Vietnamese, so their results were significantly lower.

During the "war of attrition" from March 1969 to September 1971, Egyptian S-75s shot down at least three Israeli F-4 fighters and one "Mister", one A-4 attack aircraft, one transport "Piper Cube" and one air command post (VKP) S-97. Real results may be higher, but not by much in contrast to Vietnam. During the October 1973 war, the S-75 accounted for at least two F-4s and A-4s. Finally, in June 1982, a Syrian S-75 shot down an Israeli Kfir-S2 fighter.

Iraqi S-75s shot down at least four Iranian F-4s and one F-5E during the 1980–1988 war with Iran. The actual results could be many times greater. During Desert Storm in January-February 1991, the Iraqi C-75s had one US Air Force F-15E fighter-bomber (tail number 88-1692), one US Navy F-14 carrier-based fighter (161430), one English bomber "Tornado" (ZD717). Perhaps two or three more aircraft should be added to this number.

Finally, on March 19, 1993, during the war in Abkhazia, a Georgian S-75 shot down a Russian Su-27 fighter.

In general, the S-75 accounted for at least 200 downed aircraft (at the expense of Vietnam, there may actually be at least 500, or even a thousand). According to this indicator, the complex surpasses all other air defense systems in the world combined. It is possible that this Soviet air defense system will remain the "world champion" forever.

WORTHY HEIRS

The S-125 anti-aircraft missile system was created a little later than the S-75, so it did not have time to go to Vietnam and made its debut during the "war of attrition", and with Soviet calculations. In the summer of 1970, they shot down up to nine Israeli planes. During the October war, they had at least two A-4s, one F-4 and one Mirage-3 each. Actual results could be much higher.

Ethiopian S-125s (possibly with Cuban or Soviet crews) shot down at least two Somali MiG-21s during the 1977–1978 war.

Iraqi C-125s have two Iranian F-4Es and one American F-16C (87-0257). At least they could have shot down at least 20 Iranian planes, but now there is no direct evidence.

An Angolan S-125 with a Cuban crew shot down a South African Canberra bomber in March 1979.

Finally, the Serbian S-125 accounted for all the losses of NATO aviation during the aggression against Yugoslavia in March-June 1999. This is an F-117 stealth bomber (82-0806) and an F-16C fighter (88-0550), both belonged to the US Air Force.

Thus, the number of confirmed victories of the S-125 does not exceed 20, the real one can be 2-3 times more.

The world's longest-range anti-aircraft missile system (SAM) S-200 has not a single confirmed victory to its credit. It is possible that in September 1983, a Syrian S-200 with a Soviet crew shot down an Israeli E-2S AWACS aircraft. In addition, there are suggestions that during the conflict between the United States and Libya in the spring of 1986, Libyan S-200s shot down two American A-6 carrier-based attack aircraft and an F-111 bomber. But not even all domestic sources agree with all these cases. Therefore, it is possible that the only "victory" of the S-200 is the destruction of the Ukrainian air defense system of this type of the Russian passenger Tu-154 in the fall of 2001.

The most modern air defense system of the former Air Defense Forces of the country, and now the Russian Air Force, the S-300P, has never been used in combat, so its high performance characteristics (TTX) have not received practical confirmation. The same applies to the S-400.

The talk of "couch experts" about the "failure" of Russian air defense systems in April this year. during the shelling of the Syrian Shayrat air base by American Tomahawks, they only testify to the complete incompetence of the “experts”. No one has yet created and will never create a radar station capable of seeing through the earth, because radio waves do not propagate in a solid body. The American SLCMs passed very far from the positions of the Russian air defense systems, with a huge value of the course parameter and, most importantly, under the folds of the terrain. The Russian radar stations simply could not see them, and accordingly, the guidance of missiles at them was not provided. With any other air defense system, a similar “trouble” would also happen, because no one has yet succeeded in repealing the laws of physics. At the same time, the Shayrat ZRS base was not covered either formally or in fact, so what does the failure have to do with it?

"CUBE", "SQUARE" AND OTHERS

The Soviet military air defense air defense systems were widely used in combat. First of all, we are talking about the Kvadrat air defense system (an export version of the Kub air defense system used in the air defense of the USSR ground forces). In terms of firing range, it is close to the S-75, so abroad it was more often used for strategic air defense than for air defense of ground forces.

During the October 1973 war, the Egyptian and Syrian "Squares" in total shot down at least seven A-4s, six F-4s, one Super Mister fighter. Actual results can be much higher. In addition, in the spring of 1974, the Syrian "Squares" may have shot down six more Israeli aircraft (however, these are one-sided Soviet data).

The Iraqi Kvadrat air defense systems have at least one Iranian F-4E and F-5E and one American F-16C (87-0228). Most likely, one or two dozen Iranian aircraft and, possibly, 1-2 American aircraft can be added to this number.

During the war for the independence of Western Sahara from Morocco (this war has not yet ended), Algeria acted on the side of the Polisario Front fighting for this independence, which transferred a significant amount of air defense equipment to the rebels. In particular, at least one Moroccan F-5A was shot down with the help of the Kvadrat air defense system (in January 1976). In addition, in January 1985, the "Square", already owned by Algeria itself, shot down a Moroccan Mirage-F1 fighter.

Finally, during the Libyan-Chadian war of the 1970s-1980s, the Chadians captured several Libyan "Squares", one of which shot down a Libyan Tu-22 bomber in August 1987.

The Serbs actively used the Kvadrat air defense system in 1993-1995 during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In September 1993, the Croatian MiG-21 was shot down, in April 1994, the English Sea Harrier FRS1 from the Ark Royal aircraft carrier (however, according to other sources, this aircraft was shot down by the Strela-3 MANPADS). Finally, in June 1995, the US Air Force F-16С (89-2032) became a victim of the Serbian "Square".

Thus, in general, in terms of performance among the domestic “large” air defense systems, the “Kvadrat” apparently bypasses the S-125 and takes second place after the S-75.

Created in the development of "Cuba" air defense system "Buk" and today is considered quite modern. He has downed planes on his account, although his successes cannot cause joy in us. In January 1993, during the war in Abkhazia, an Abkhaz L-39 attack aircraft was mistakenly shot down by a Russian Buk. During the five-day war in the Caucasus in August 2008, Georgian Buk air defense systems, obtained from Ukraine, shot down Russian Tu-22M and Su-24 bombers and possibly up to three Su-25 attack aircraft. Finally, I recall the story of the death of the Malaysian Boeing-777 over the Donbass in July 2014, but there are too many obscure and strange things here.

According to Soviet data, from April 1981 to May 1982, the Osa air defense system of the Syrian army shot down eight Israeli aircraft - four F-15s, three F-16s, one F-4. None of these victories, unfortunately, has any objective evidence, apparently, they are all completely invented. The only confirmed success of the Syrian Osa air defense system is the Israeli F-4E, shot down in July 1982.

The Polisario Front received air defense systems not only from Algeria, but also from Libya. It was the Libyan "Wasps" in October 1981 that shot down the Moroccan "Mirage-F1" and the C-130 transport aircraft.

In September 1987, the Angolan (more precisely, Cuban) Osa air defense system shot down the South African AM-3SM (Italian-made light reconnaissance aircraft). It is possible that the Wasp has several more South African aircraft and helicopters on its account.

It is possible that in January 1991, the Iraqi Wasp shot down a British Tornado with tail number ZA403.

Finally, in July-August 2014, Donbas militia shot down, presumably, an Su-25 attack aircraft and an An-26 military transport of the Ukrainian Air Force with the captured Osoy.
In general, the successes of the Osa air defense system are quite modest.

The successes of the Strela-1 air defense system and its deep modification Strela-10 are also very limited.

In December 1983, during the fighting between the Syrian Armed Forces and NATO countries, the Syrian Strela-1 shot down an American A-6 carrier-based attack aircraft (tail number 152915).

In November 1985, the South African special forces with the captured Strela-1 shot down a Soviet An-12 transport aircraft over Angola. In turn, in February 1988, the South African Mirage-F1 was shot down in the south of Angola by either Strela-1 or Strela-10. Perhaps on account of these two types of air defense systems in Angola there were several more South African aircraft and helicopters.

In December 1988, an American civilian DC-3 was mistakenly shot down over Western Sahara by an Arrow 10 of the Polisario Front.

Finally, during Desert Storm on February 15, 1991, two US Air Force A-10 attack aircraft (78-0722 and 79-0130) were shot down by the Iraqi Strela-10. Perhaps, on account of the Iraqi air defense systems of these two types there were several more American aircraft.

The most modern Russian military short-range air defense system "Tor" and anti-aircraft missile and gun systems (ZRPK) "Tunguska" and "Shell" did not take part in the hostilities, respectively, they did not shoot down planes and helicopters. Although there are completely unverified and unconfirmed rumors about the success of the "Shell" in the Donbass - one Su-24 bomber and one Mi-24 attack helicopter of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

MODEST SUCCESSES OF THE WESTERN "COLLEAGUES"

The successes of Western air defense systems are much more modest than Soviet ones. This is explained, however, not only and not so much by their performance characteristics, but by the peculiarity of building air defense. The Soviet Union and the countries oriented towards it in the fight against enemy aircraft traditionally focused on ground-based air defense systems, and Western countries - on fighters.

The greatest success was achieved by the American air defense system "Hawk" and its deep modification "Improved Hawk". Almost all successes have come from Israeli air defense systems of this type. During the "war of attrition" they shot down one Il-28, four Su-7s, four MiG-17s, three MiG-21s of the Egyptian Air Force. During the October war, they accounted for four MiG-17s, one MiG-21, three Su-7s, one Hunter, one Mirage-5, two Mi-8s of the Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian and Libyan air forces. Finally, in 1982, a Syrian MiG-25 and possibly a MiG-23 were shot down over Lebanon.

During the Iran-Iraq war, Iranian Hawk air defense systems shot down two or three of their F-14 and one F-5 fighters, as well as up to 40 Iraqi aircraft.

In September 1987, a Libyan Tu-22 bomber was shot down by the French Hawk air defense system over the capital of Chad, N'Djamena.

On August 2, 1990, the Kuwaiti Advanced Hawk air defense system shot down one Su-22 and one MiG-23BN of the Iraqi Air Force during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. All Kuwaiti air defense systems were captured by the Iraqis and then used against the US and its allies, but without success.

Unlike the S-300P, its American alter ego, the American Patriot long-range air defense system, was used during both Iraqi wars. Basically, its targets were obsolete Iraqi ballistic missiles of Soviet production P-17 (the notorious "Scud"). The effectiveness of the Patriots turned out to be very low; in 1991, it was from the missed P-17s that the Americans suffered the most serious losses in people. During the second Iraq war in the spring of 2003, the first two downed aircraft appeared on the account of the Patriot, which, however, did not give the Americans pleasure. Both of them were their own: the British "Tornado" (ZG710) and the F / A-18C of the US Navy Aviation (164974). At the same time, the US Air Force F-16С destroyed the radar of one of the Patriot battalions with an anti-radar missile. Apparently, the American pilot did this not by accident, but on purpose, otherwise he would have become the third victim of his anti-aircraft gunners.

Israeli "Patriots" also shot with dubious success in the same 1991 at Iraqi P-17s. In September 2014, it was the Israeli Patriot that shot down the first enemy aircraft for this air defense system - the Syrian Su-24, which accidentally flew into Israeli airspace. In 2016-2017, Israeli Patriots repeatedly fired at drones arriving from Syria, in most cases without success (despite the fact that the price of all fired unmanned aerial vehicles taken together was lower than one Patriot air defense missile).

Finally, Saudi Patriots may have shot down one or two R-17s launched by the Yemeni Houthis in 2015-2017, but many more missiles of this type and increasingly modern Tochka missiles have successfully hit targets in Saudi territory, causing extremely significant damage to the troops of the Arabian coalition.

Thus, in general, the effectiveness of the Patriot air defense system should be considered extremely low.

Western short-range air defense systems have had very modest success, which, as mentioned above, is partly due not to technical shortcomings, but to the peculiarities of combat use.

On account of the American Chaparel air defense system, there is only one aircraft - the Syrian MiG-17, shot down by an Israeli air defense system of this type in 1973.

Also, one plane shot down the English Rapira air defense system, an Argentinean Israeli-made Dagger fighter over the Falklands in May 1982.
A little more tangible success has the French Roland air defense system. The Argentine Roland over the Falklands shot down the British Harrier-FRS1 (XZ456). The Iraqi Rolands have at least two Iranian aircraft (F-4E and F-5E) and possibly two British Tornadoes (ZA396, ZA467), as well as one American A-10, but all three of these aircraft are not fully confirmed victories. In any case, it is interesting that all the aircraft shot down by the French air defense system on different theaters are Western-made.

A special category of air defense systems are shipborne air defense systems. Only British air defense systems have combat successes due to the participation of the British Navy in the war for the Falklands. The Sea Dart air defense system shot down one Argentinean English-made Canberra bomber, four A-4 attack aircraft, one Learjet-35 transport aircraft, and one French-made SA330L helicopter. On account of the Sea Cat air defense system - two A-4C. With the help of the Sea Wolf air defense system, one Dagger fighter and three A-4Bs were shot down.

Smashing "ARROWS" AND SHARP "NEEDLES"

Separately, one should dwell on portable anti-aircraft missile systems, which have become a special category of air defense systems. Thanks to MANPADS, infantrymen and even partisans and terrorists were able to shoot down aircraft, and even more so, helicopters. Partly because of this, it is even more difficult to establish the exact results of a particular type of MANPADS than for "large" SAMs.

The Soviet Air Force and army aviation in Afghanistan lost 72 aircraft and helicopters from MANPADS in 1984-1989. At the same time, Afghan partisans used the Soviet Strela-2 MANPADS and their Chinese and Egyptian copies HN-5 and Ain al-Sakr, the American Red Eye and Stinger MANPADS, as well as the British Bluepipe. It was far from always possible to establish from which particular MANPADS this or that aircraft or helicopter was shot down. A similar situation took place during the "Desert Storm", the wars in Angola, Chechnya, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, etc. Accordingly, the results of all MANPADS, especially Soviet and Russian, given below, should be considered significantly underestimated.

At the same time, however, there is no doubt that among MANPADS the Soviet Strela-2 complex is in the same status as the S-75 among the “large” air defense systems - an absolute and, perhaps, an unattainable champion.

For the first time, "Arrows-2" were used by the Egyptians during the "war of attrition". In 1969, they shot down from six (two Mirages, four A-4s) to 17 Israeli aircraft over the Suez Canal. In the October war, they accounted for at least four more A-4s and a CH-53 helicopter. In March-May 1974, the Syrian Strelami-2 shot down from three (two F-4s, one A-4) to eight Israeli aircraft. Then, in the period from 1978 to 1986, Syrian and Palestinian MANPADS of this type shot down four aircraft (one Kfir, one F-4, two A-4) and three helicopters (two AN-1, one UH-1) of the Israeli Air Force and carrier-based attack aircraft A-7 (tail number 157468) of the US Navy aviation.

"Arrows-2" were used at the final stage of the Vietnam War. From the beginning of 1972 to January 1973, they shot down 29 American aircraft (one F-4, seven O-1s, three O-2s, four OV-10s, nine A-1s, four A-37s) and 14 helicopters (one CH-47, four AN-1, nine UH-1). After the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam and until the end of the war in April 1975, these MANPADS accounted for from 51 to 204 aircraft and helicopters of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. Then, in 1983-1985, the Vietnamese shot down at least two Thai Air Force A-37 attack aircraft over Cambodia with Strelami-2.

In 1973, the rebels of Guinea-Bissau shot down three Portuguese G-91 attack aircraft and one Do-27 transport aircraft with Strela-2.

In 1978-1979, the fighters of the Polisario Front shot down a French Jaguar attack aircraft and three Moroccan fighters (one F-5A, two Mirage-F1) from these MANPADS over Western Sahara, and in 1985, a German scientific Do-228 flying to Antarctica.

In Afghanistan, at least one Soviet Su-25 attack aircraft was lost from Strela-2.

The Libyan Strelami-2 in July 1977 may have shot down an Egyptian MiG-21, in May 1978 a French Jaguar. At the same time, in August 1982, the Chadians shot down a Libyan Su-22 attack aircraft with the captured Libyan Strela-2.

In Angola, MANPADS of this type were also fired in both directions. Trophy "Strela-2" Yuarovtsy shot down an Angolan (Cuban) MiG-23ML fighter. On the other hand, the Cubans shot down at least two South African Impala attack aircraft from these MANPADS. In reality, their results were much higher.

In October 1986, in Nicaragua, an American C-123 transport aircraft with cargo for the Contras was shot down by Strela-2. In 1990-1991, the El Salvadoran Air Force lost three aircraft (two O-2s, one A-37) and four helicopters (two Hughes-500s, two UH-1s) from Strel-2s received by local guerrillas.

During Desert Storm, Iraqi Strelami-2 shot down one British Tornado (ZA392 or ZD791), one US Air Force AC-130 gunship (69-6567), one US Marine Corps AV-8B (162740 ). During the second Iraq war in January 2006, Iraqi militants shot down an army aviation AN-64D Apache combat helicopter (03-05395) with this MANPADS.

In August 1995, over Bosnia, the Serbian Strela-2 (according to other sources, the Needle) shot down a French Mirage-2000N bomber (tail number 346).

Finally, in May-June 1997, the Kurds shot down Turkish AH-1W and AS532UL helicopters with Strelami-2.

More modern Soviet MANPADS, "Strele-3", "Igle-1" and "Igle", were not lucky, they almost did not record victories. Only the British Harrier was recorded on Strela-3 in Bosnia in April 1994, which is also claimed, as mentioned above, by the Kvadrat air defense system. The Igla MANPADS “shares” the aforementioned Mirage-2000N No. 346 with the Strela-2. In addition, the F-16С (84-1390) of the US Air Force in Iraq in February 1991, two Georgian Mi-24 combat helicopters and one Su-25 attack aircraft in Abkhazia in 1992-1993 and, alas, the Russian Mi-26 in Chechnya in August 2002 (127 people died). In the summer of 2014, three Su-25 attack aircraft, one MiG-29 fighter, one An-30 reconnaissance aircraft, three Mi-24 attack helicopters and two Mi-8 multi-purpose helicopters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were allegedly shot down from MANPADS of an unclear type over the Donbass.

In reality, all Soviet / Russian MANPADS, including the Strela-2, due to the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, obviously have significantly more victories on their account.

Of the Western MANPADS, the American Stinger has the most success. In Afghanistan, he shot down at least one Su-25 attack aircraft of the USSR Air Force, one MiG-21U of the Afghan Air Force, Soviet An-26RT and An-30 transport aircraft, six Mi-24 combat helicopters and three Mi-8 transport helicopters. The real successes of the Stinger in this war are many times greater (for example, only the Mi-24 could be shot down up to 30), although it is very far from the overall result of the Strela-2.

In Angola, the South Africans shot down at least two MiG-23MLs with Stingers.

The British in the Falklands destroyed one Argentine Pucara attack aircraft and one SA330L transport helicopter with these MANPADS.

The older American Red Eye MANPADS were used by the Israelis against the Syrian Air Force. With its help, seven Syrian Su-7s and MiG-17s were shot down during the October war and one MiG-23BN in Lebanon in 1982. The Nicaraguan Contras shot down four Red Ayami Mi-8 helicopters of government troops in the 80s. The same MANPADS shot down several Soviet aircraft and helicopters in Afghanistan (possibly up to three Mi-24s), but there is no specific correspondence between their victories.

The same can be said about the use of the British Bluepipe MANPADS in Afghanistan. Therefore, on account of his only two well-established victories. Both of them were achieved during the Falklands War, in which this MANPADS was used by both sides. The British shot down the Argentine MB339A attack aircraft, the Argentines - the English Harrier-GR3 fighter.

WAITING FOR A NEW BIG WAR

"Toppling off the pedestal" S-75 and "Strela-2" will succeed only if there is a big war in the world. True, if it turns out to be nuclear, there will be no winners in it in any sense. If this is an ordinary war, then the main contenders for the “championship” will be Russian air defense systems. Not only because of the high performance characteristics, but also because of the features of the application.

It should be noted that high-speed small-sized precision-guided munitions are becoming a new most serious air defense problem, which are extremely difficult to hit precisely because of their small size and high speed (it will become especially difficult if hypersonic munitions appear). In addition, the range of these munitions is constantly growing, removing carriers, that is, aircraft, from the air defense coverage area. This makes the air defense position frankly hopeless, because the fight against ammunition without the ability to destroy the carriers is obviously losing: sooner or later this will lead to the depletion of the air defense system, after which both the air defense systems themselves and the objects covered by them will be easily destroyed.

Another equally serious problem is unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). At the very least, this is a problem because there are simply too many of them, which further exacerbates the problem of lack of ammunition for air defense systems. Much worse is that a significant part of the UAVs are so small that no existing air defense systems can either detect them, much less hit them, since neither the radar nor the missile defense system is simply designed for such purposes.

In this regard, the case that occurred in July 2016 is very indicative. The extremely high level of technical equipment and combat training of the personnel of the Israeli Armed Forces is well known. However, the Israelis were unable to do anything about a small, slow-moving, unarmed Russian reconnaissance UAV that appeared over northern Israel. First, an air-to-air missile from an F-16 fighter, and then two Patriot air defense systems passed by, after which the UAV freely entered Syrian airspace.

In connection with these circumstances, the criteria for the effectiveness and efficiency of air defense systems can become completely different. Like the air defense systems themselves.

At the end of September 1986, Soviet pilots from the temporary contingent of Soviet troops in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan for the first time felt the power of the new weapon that the Americans equipped the Afghan Mujahideen with. Until that moment, Soviet planes and helicopters felt free in the Afghan sky, providing transport and air cover for ground operations conducted by Soviet army units. The delivery of the Stinger man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems to the Afghan opposition units radically changed the situation during the Afghan war. The Soviet aviation units were forced to change their tactics, and the pilots of the transport and attack aircraft became more careful in their actions. Despite the fact that the decision to withdraw the Soviet military contingent from the DRA was made much earlier, it is generally accepted that it was the Stinger MANPADS that became the key to curtailing the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan.

What is the main reason for success

By that time, American stingers were no longer considered a novelty on the arms market. However, from a technical point of view, the combat use of the Stinger MANPADS raised the level of armed resistance to a qualitatively new level. A trained operator could independently make an accurate shot, while being in a completely unexpected place or hiding in a hidden position. Having received an approximate direction of flight, the rocket made a subsequent flight to the target on its own, using its own heat guidance system. The main target of an anti-aircraft missile was a hot aircraft or helicopter engine, which emitted heat waves in the infrared range.

Shooting at air targets could be carried out at distances up to 4.5 km, and the height of the actual destruction of air targets varied in the range of 200-3500 meters.

Needless to say, the Afghan opposition was the first to use American Stingers in a combat situation. The first case of combat use of a new man-portable anti-aircraft missile system was noted during the Falklands War of 1982. Armed with American missile defense systems, British special forces successfully repelled attacks by Argentine troops during the capture of Port Stanley, the main administrative center of the Falkland Islands. The British special forces then managed to shoot down the Pucara piston attack aircraft of the Argentine Air Force from a portable complex. After a while, after the Argentine attack aircraft, as a result of the hit of an anti-aircraft missile fired from the Stinger, an amphibious assault helicopter of the Argentine special forces "Puma" went to the ground.

The limited use of aviation for ground operations during the Anglo-Argentine armed conflict did not allow the combat capabilities of the new weapon to be fully revealed. The fighting was carried out mainly at sea, where aircraft and warships opposed each other.

Regarding the supply of new Stinger MANPADS to the Afghan opposition in the United States, there was no unambiguous position. New anti-aircraft missile systems were considered expensive and complex military equipment that semi-legal Afghan Mujahideen units could master and use in the case. In addition, the fall of a new weapon as trophies into the hands of Soviet soldiers could be the best evidence of the direct participation of the United States in the armed conflict on the side of the Afghan opposition. Despite the fear and fear, the Pentagon decided to start delivering launchers to Afghanistan in 1986. The first batch consisted of 240 launchers and more than one thousand anti-aircraft missiles. The consequences of this step are well known and deserve separate study.

The only digression that should be emphasized. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the DRA, the Americans had to buy out the unused anti-aircraft systems remaining in service with the opposition at a price three times more expensive than the stingers cost at the time of delivery.

Creation and development of MANPADS Stinger

In the American army, until the mid-70s, the main means of air defense for infantry units was the FIM-43 Redeye MANPADS. However, with an increase in the speed of attack aircraft and the appearance of armor elements on aviation equipment, more advanced weapons were required. The bet was made on the improved technical characteristics of the anti-aircraft missile.

The development of a new air defense system was undertaken by the American company General Dynamics. Design work, begun back in 1967, was carried out for a long seven years. Only in 1977, the project of the future new generation MANPADS was finally outlined. Such a long delay is explained by the lack of technological capabilities to create a missile thermal guidance system, which was supposed to be the highlight of the new anti-aircraft missile system. The first prototypes entered the test in 1973, but their results were disappointing for the designers. The launcher was large and required an increase in the calculation to 3 people. The launch mechanism often failed, which led to spontaneous explosion of the rocket in the launch canister. Only in 1979 was it possible to produce a more or less worked out batch of anti-aircraft missile systems in the amount of 260 units.

The new air defense system entered the US troops for comprehensive field tests. A little later, the army ordered the developers to have a large batch - 2250 MANPADS. Having gone through all the stages of growth, MANPADS under the index FIM-92 in 1981 was adopted by the American army. From that moment, the parade procession of this weapon across the planet began. Today, Stingers are known all over the world. This complex was in service with the armies of more than 20 countries. In addition to US allies in the NATO bloc, Stingers were supplied to South Korea, Japan and Saudi Arabia.

During the production process, the following upgrades of the complex were carried out and the Stingers were produced in three versions:

• basic version;
• Stinger FIM-92 RMP (Reprogrammable Microprocessor) version;
• Stinger FIM-92 POST (Passive Optical Seeking Technology) version.

All three modifications had identical performance characteristics and equipment. The only difference was the presence of the last two versions of homing heads. Missiles with a homing warhead were equipped with launchers of modifications A, B and C.

The latest versions of the fim 92 MANPADS are equipped with an anti-aircraft missile, on which there is a high-sensitivity seeker. In addition, the missiles began to be equipped with a complex against interference. Another version of the Stingers, the FIM-92D, fires a POST missile that operates in two ranges at once - in the ultraviolet and in the infrared range.

Missiles have a non-gray target coordinator that allows microprocessors to independently determine the source of ultraviolet or infrared radiation. As a result, the rocket itself scans the horizon for radiation while flying to the target, choosing the best option for the target. The FIM-92B version with a POST homing head was produced most massively in the first period of mass production. However, in 1983, the development company introduced a new, more advanced version of MANPADS with an anti-aircraft missile equipped with a POST-RMP homing head. This modification had microprocessors that could be reprogrammed in the field in accordance with the combat situation. The launcher was already a portable computing software center that contained removable memory blocks.

The main design features of the Stinger MANPADS include the following points:

• the complex has a launch container (TPK) in which an anti-aircraft missile is placed. The launcher is equipped with an optical sight, which visually allows not only to identify the target, but also to accompany it, to determine the real distance to the target;
• the starting device has become an order of magnitude more reliable and safer. The mechanism included a cooling unit filled with liquid argon and an electric battery;
• on the complexes of the latest versions, recognition systems "friend / foe" are installed, which has an electronic filling.

Specifications MANPADS FIM 92 Stinger

As the main technical detail of the design is the "duck" scheme used to create the body of anti-aircraft missiles. There are four stabilizers in the bow, two of which are movable and serve as rudders. The rocket during the flight rotates around its own axis. Due to the rotation, the rocket maintains stability in flight, which is ensured by the presence of tail stabilizers that open when the rocket exits the launch canister.

Due to the use of only two rudders in the design of the rocket, there was no need to install a complex flight control system. Accordingly, the cost of an anti-aircraft missile also decreased. The launch and subsequent flight is provided by the work of the Atlantic Research Mk27 solid-propellant rocket engine. The engine operates throughout the flight of the rocket, providing a high flight speed, up to 700 m/s. The main engine does not start immediately, but with a delay. This technical innovation was caused by the desire to protect the shooter-operator from unforeseen situations.

The weight of the missile warhead does not exceed 3 kg. The main type of charge is high-explosive fragmentation. The rockets were equipped with percussion fuses and fuses, which made it possible to self-destruct the rocket in case of a miss. For the transportation of anti-aircraft missiles, a transport and launch container filled with argon was used. During launch, the gas mixture destroys the protective covers, allowing the missile's thermal sensors to come into operation, looking for a target using infrared and ultraviolet rays.

The total weight of the Stinger MANPADS in the completed state is 15.7 kg. The anti-aircraft missile itself weighs just over 10 kg with a body length of 1.5 meters and a diameter of 70 mm. This layout of the anti-aircraft complex allows the operator to cope with the carrying and launching of an anti-aircraft missile alone. Usually, MANPADS crews consist of two people, however, according to the state, MANPADS are supposed to be used as part of a battery, where the commander directs all actions, and the operator only executes commands.

Conclusion

In general, in terms of its tactical and technical characteristics, the American FIM 92 MANPADS surpasses the Soviet Strela-2 man-portable anti-aircraft missile system, created back in the 60s. The American anti-aircraft systems were no better and no worse than the Soviet Igla-1 portable anti-aircraft missile systems and the subsequent Igla-2 modification, which had similar performance characteristics and could compete with American weapons on the market.

It should be noted that the Soviet MANPADS "Strela-2" managed to significantly ruffle the nerves of the Americans during the Vietnam War. The emergence of the new Igla complex in the USSR did not pass without a trace, which leveled the chances of the two superpowers in the arms market in this segment. However, the unexpected appearance of a new MANPADS in service with the Afghan Mujahideen in 1986 significantly changed the tactical conditions for the use of Soviet aviation. Even taking into account the fact that the Stingers rarely fell into capable hands, the damage from their use was significant. Only in the first month of using the Fim 92 MANPADS in the sky of Afghanistan, the Soviet Air Force lost up to 10 aircraft and helicopters of various types. Su-25 attack aircraft, transport aircraft and helicopters were especially hard hit. As a matter of urgency, they began to install heat traps on Soviet aviation equipment that could confuse the missile guidance system.

Only a year later, after the Stingers were used for the first time in Afghanistan, did Soviet aviation manage to find countermeasures against these weapons. For the entire next 1987, Soviet aviation lost only eight aircraft from attacks by man-portable anti-aircraft systems. These were mainly transport aircraft and helicopters.

The reasoning and conclusions of the public about how it was possible and how it was impossible to shoot down the plane of flight A321 were a little zadolbali. Especially deliver judgments like:

Passer-by: The Americans did not even supply MANPADS to the Syrian rebels, especially to ISIS. And you can’t get an airplane from a MANPADS at an altitude of 9,000 m.

The ceiling is 5,000-6,000 meters, while the Stinger has only 3,500 meters. Not otherwise, the Muslims "Buk" rammed along the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea, and then dragged on camels across the Sinai.

For a "passerby" it is excusable, a typical clockwork parrot repeating opinions from a box, although a paid troll is also possible (whom we no longer know). But after all, they built all these "conclusions" on someone's words. Well, they relayed experts and specialists.

For example, these are:

We asked military expert Viktor Litovkin to express his opinion on the air of Radio Komsomolskaya Pravda.

I dismissed the version with MANPADS. Judging by the latest data, the plane was flying at an altitude of 8300-something meters. The mountains are not so high there. Well, a thousand meters is a mountain, well, one and a half thousand meters. And MANPADS shoot at a height of up to 5 thousand meters. Any that is American, that ours. One hundred "Stinger", that "Arrow", that "Needle", - Viktor Litovkin explained

Or here's another military expert:

According to the editor-in-chief of the National Defense Igor Korotchenko, the terrorists may have several MANPADS. However, this weapon is only effective at an altitude not exceeding about 6.7 km. Passenger planes fly over Sinai at a much higher altitude, TASS reports. Igor Korotchenko, editor-in-chief of the National Defense magazine:

“We admit that in the hands of the IG (. The terrorist organization, as you know, is banned in the Russian Federation - ed.) could have portable anti-aircraft missile systems. However, MANPADS cannot work on an aircraft at an altitude of 10 kilometers, this is out of the question. Therefore, we discard this version.”

Wow, they discard this version. How squeamish. Or maybe they don’t understand that war is the quintessence of forces and opportunities.

I didn't want to arrange a beating of babies - these naive experts, but I have to. For as soon as these woodpeckers plan to fight? But they have already begun, in the expectation that it will be like in a movie, the enemy runs across the field in droves, and the brave heroes mow them down, mow them down with miracle machine guns that do not need to be loaded.

We ourselves are humanitarians, more in terms of worldview, in history, but in the absence of anyone in the foreseeable space, on behalf of the editorial board of the ARI, we will have to take on this function - to figure it out, and give small technical explanations to both experts and clockwork parrots on our fingers. (Although the primacy in understanding technology is determined by our like-minded person and reader expressed in the comments to the previous material).

Shooting from MANPADS "Stinger"

First, before we get to the main point, let's say that the easiest way to shoot down any plane is to put a bomb in your luggage.

With the level of corruption in Egypt, I think this is the easiest and most reliable way. And not expensive. We believe that, first of all, the Islamists could resort to it.

Now the main thing is what the experts are squeamish about. How to shoot down a passenger airliner at an altitude of 9000 meters with the help of a portable anti-aircraft complex, briefly - MANPADS.

Let's just say it's quite possible. Moreover, there was still a case in the Soviet Afghan company, at the dawn of the use of hand-held anti-aircraft systems. Then in 1987, at the Kabul airport, an An-12 made an emergency landing, shot down from a MANPADS near the city of Gardez, the Afghan province of Paktia, at an altitude of more than 9000 m.

How was it done? Just. The Mujahideen used the top of some mountain for an ambush. And there are heights of about 3 thousand meters, from which they beat. This is first.

And secondly, experts and specialists operate with passport data of installations, which are often outdated or do not reflect the real capabilities of the system.

Their real potential is often higher. It also depends on weather and climate conditions.

The height of the reach of firing from these installations also does not depend on the height above sea level, but is calculated from the surface from which the launch is carried out, since reaching the height depends on the operation of the rocket engine, about 8-10 seconds.

A rocket launched from a mountain 3,000 meters high will go up the same 4,500 meters and reach a height of 7,500 meters, if you count from sea level. (I understand that I am writing in too much detail, but for woodpeckers I have to explain in detail). At the same time, the flight altitude of the aircraft is calculated not from the surface, but from sea ​​level.

That is, if flight 9268 from Sharm al-Sheikh flew at an altitude of 9,400 meters above sea level, then the plateau above which it was shot down has a height of 1,600 meters above sea level.

Yes, Sinai is mountains. Accordingly, the relative altitude of the aircraft's flight from the surface over Sinai is 7,800 meters (there is evidence that the aircraft flew at an altitude of 8411 meters, which gives an even lower relative height of 6,800 meters from the ground). And this is already a slightly different calico, especially considering the increased capabilities of MANPADS compared to the 80s of the last century (longer range, more powerful charge). The experts somehow didn’t think of this simple idea when calculating the reach of the aircraft.

Nevertheless, although already closer to reach, it is still a bit high. But this is also completely surmountable. It is only necessary to raise the MANPADS launcher even higher. To be safe, another thousand by three or four meters. How? Elementary.

For this, it is quite possible to use Chinese quadrocopters with a carrying capacity of up to 30 kg. For example, the one in the picture below.

You can buy this everywhere, including in Russia. This thing, in two minutes, is gaining a height of 4,000 meters and can carry MANPADS such as Stinger, Igla, etc., whose weight is 12-18 kilograms, depending on the model. The quadcopter has sharp control, a video information transmission system, and stays in the air for a long time.

It is superfluous to say that all components - MANPADS, quadrocopter, video system are easily integrated into a single system with modern technologies.

That is, the guidance and launch of MANPADS is not difficult. Further, the rocket, after capturing the target, does everything itself. A powerful charge, for example, the Needle has 2.3 kg., Leaves no chance even for a large aircraft.

To detect a target, for example, the Igla MANPADS complex has a portable 1L15-1 tablet, which can be used to track a target in a square of 25x25 kilometers.

Domestic MANPADS: "Needles"

In total, 1600 meters the height of the El Tih plateau above sea level, another 4,000 meters will give a quadrocopter, only 5600 meters.

In the presence of an aircraft at an altitude of 9400 meters, the rocket needs to climb only 3,800 meters before it, which is even less than the capabilities of modern MANPADS.

In addition to a quadcopter, you can use a suitable drone.

Thus, we get that, taking into account modern possibilities, it is not difficult for Islamists in the Sinai Peninsula to get a passenger plane flying at an altitude of 9400 meters above sea level.

For reliability, you can set up 4-5 anti-aircraft crews with quadrocopters or drones along the path of the air corridor, the plane flying in it can be guaranteed to be shot down.

After the end of the Second World War, which radically changed the balance of power in the world, there was an increase in national liberation movements. The peoples of countries that had been colonies of European powers for a long time began the struggle for independence. In states that are not formally colonies, left-wing movements intensified, this was especially characteristic of Latin America.

To combat the armed opposition groups in order to preserve the existing order and prevent "communist expansion", the leadership of these countries actively used the armed forces, including.

At first, these were usually piston fighters and bombers of the Second World War, supplied in significant quantities by the United States and Great Britain to their allies as part of military assistance. These relatively simple aircraft were quite suitable for such tasks and were operated by the Third World Air Force for a long time. So the American-made F-51 Mustang fighters flew into the air as part of the El Salvador Air Force until 1974.

During the American aggression in Vietnam, it soon became clear that modern jet fighters and bombers, created for the "big war" with the USSR, did not correspond well to the realities of this conflict.
Of course, the Stratofortress, Phantoms and Thunderchiefs could destroy objects in the territory of the DRV, but their effectiveness against Viet Cong units in the jungle was extremely low.

Under these conditions, the old A-1 Skyrader piston attack aircraft and the A-26 Invader bombers turned out to be in great demand.
Due to their low flight speed, the presence of powerful weapons and a decent bomb load, they could operate with high efficiency just a few tens of meters from the location of their troops. And economical engines made it possible to carry out long patrols in the air.

The Skyraiders were highly effective in providing close support to ground forces, but were best known for participating in search and rescue operations.

Piston attack aircraft A-1 "Skyrader"

The low minimum speed and long time in the air allowed the A-1 attack aircraft to escort rescue helicopters, including over North Vietnam. Having reached the area where the downed pilot was located, the Skyraders began patrolling and, if necessary, suppressed the identified enemy anti-aircraft positions. In this role, they were used almost until the end of the war.

Twin-engined A-26s fought in Indochina until the early 1970s, operating mainly at night against transport columns on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and providing support to forward bases.

Upgraded "Vietnamese variant" A-26 "Invader"

Taking into account the "night specifics", new communications and navigation equipment, as well as night vision devices, were installed on the Invaders. The rear defensive firing point was dismantled, instead, the offensive weapons were reinforced.

In addition to specialized percussion machines, the T-28 Troyan was widely used. Taking into account the experience of military operations, a light strike AT-28D with enhanced weapons and armor protection was created.

T-28D "Troyan"

The presence on board the "Troyan" of the second crew member not engaged in piloting predetermined the use of this aircraft as a reconnaissance spotter and coordinator of the actions of other attack aircraft during strikes.

Joint flight of A-1 and T-28

The light O-1 Bird Dog created on the basis of the civilian Cessna-170 was used as a short-range reconnaissance and spotter at the initial stage of the Vietnam War. The aircraft was mass-produced from 1948 to 1956.

This light aircraft could land and take off on unprepared sites, for this it required minimal takeoff and run distances. In addition to reconnaissance tasks, he was involved in the evacuation of the wounded, the delivery of reports, and as a radio repeater.

Initially, O-1 Bird Dogs were used over the line of contact with the enemy as unarmed, purely reconnaissance aircraft, but, given the frequent shelling from the ground, they began to hang launchers for unguided missiles. To indicate targets on the ground, the pilots took with them incendiary phosphorus grenades.

Without body armor, the slow-moving O-1s and their crews suffered very serious losses. In the late 60s, these aircraft were replaced by more advanced aircraft in the American reconnaissance squadrons in Vietnam. But as part of the South Vietnamese Air Force, they were actively used until the last days of the war.

Downed over Saigon O-1

The case of flight on April 29, 1975 from the besieged Saigon, Major of the Air Force of South Vietnam Buang Lan, is widely known. Who loaded his wife and five kids into a two-seater Cessna O-1 Bird Dog. Having a minimum remaining fuel, having found the Midway aircraft carrier in the sea, the pilot dropped a note with a request to clear the deck for landing. To do this, several UH-1 helicopters had to be pushed into the sea.

Major Buang Lan's O-1 Bird Dog is currently on display at the National Naval Aviation Museum in Pensacola, Florida.

To replace the O-1 Bird Dog by the American company Cessna, on the basis of the civil aircraft Cessna Model 337 Super Skymaster, the O-2 Skymaster reconnaissance and target designation aircraft was developed. Serial production began in March 1967 and ended in June 1970. A total of 532 aircraft were built.

The O-2 Skymaster was a two-beam monoplane with a six-seat cabin, a high wing and a tricycle retractable landing gear with a nose strut. Equipped with two engines, one of which drives the nose pulling propeller, the second - the tail pusher. The advantage of such a scheme is that in the event of a failure of one of the engines, there is no thrust asymmetry and turning moment (which happens if the engines are located on the wings).

The aircraft was equipped with underwing pylons for NUR, bombs, napalm tanks and rifle-caliber machine guns. The tasks of the O-2 included target detection, designation by fire and adjustment of fire on the target. Part of the aircraft with loudspeakers installed on them was used for the purpose of psychological warfare.

The presence of two engines on the plane made the flight safer. At the same time, the aircraft, created on the basis of a civilian model, was very vulnerable to shelling from the ground. Since the end of the 60s, the air defense of the Viet Cong units has been significantly increased due to the DShK heavy machine guns, ZGU installations and Strela-2 MANPADS.

However, the O-2 Skymaster saw action until the end of the war and was in service with the United States until 1990. A significant number of these aircraft were transferred to the Allies.

Another aircraft of a similar purpose that took part in the hostilities in Vietnam was created by the Grumman company, taking into account the experience of operating reconnaissance spotters - OV-1 Mohawk.
Its development began after the end of the Korean War. The armed forces needed a well-protected, two-seat, twin-engine turboprop instrumental reconnaissance aircraft equipped with the most modern reconnaissance equipment, with the possibility of a short takeoff and landing.

OV-1 "Mohawk"

The aircraft received the official designation OV-1 "Mohawk" in accordance with the tradition of assigning US Army aircraft the names of Indian tribes. A total of 380 aircraft were built between 1959 and 1970.

The appearance of the Mohawk was determined by three main requirements: good visibility, high security of the crew and main systems, good takeoff and landing characteristics.
The Mohawk was equipped with four underwing pylons, which allowed the use of a wide range of weapons, weighing up to 1678 kg.

In 1962, the first OV-1 Mohawk arrived in Vietnam, and a year later, combat tests were summed up, showing that the Mohawk was well suited for counterguerrilla operations. High speed, low noise level and modern photographic equipment contributed to the successful implementation of reconnaissance flights. The maximum number of Mohawks simultaneously deployed in Vietnam reached 80 units, and they were used mainly over the territory of South Vietnam without crossing the demarcation line. Hanging containers with side-scan radar and infrared sensors made it possible to open targets that were not visually observed, greatly increasing the effectiveness of reconnaissance.

The intensive use of Mohawks in Vietnam also led to rather high losses. In total, the Americans lost 63 OV-1s in Indochina.

Unlike other types of aircraft, Mohawks were not transferred to the South Vietnamese, remaining in service only with American squadrons. In the US armed forces, these aircraft were operated until 1996, including in the radio reconnaissance version.

Back in the early 60s, the Pentagon announced a competition under the COIN (Counter-Insurgency-counter-guerrilla) program to develop an aircraft for use in limited military conflicts. The task included the creation of a two-seat twin-engine aircraft with a short takeoff and landing, capable of being operated both from aircraft carriers and from improvised unpaved sites. Particularly stipulated was the low cost and security of the vehicle from light small arms fire.

The main tasks were determined to strike at ground targets, close air support of their troops, reconnaissance, and helicopter escort. It was envisaged to use the aircraft for advanced observation and guidance.

In August 1964, the project of the North American company was recognized as the winner of the competition. According to the test results, in 1966 the aircraft entered service with the US Air Force and Marine Corps. In the armed forces, the aircraft received the designation OV-10A and its own name "Bronco". A total of 271 aircraft were built for the US military. Serial production of the aircraft was completed in 1976.

OV-10 "Bronco"

Small arms include four 7.62 mm M60 machine guns mounted in containers. The choice of infantry, rather than aviation machine guns, is explained by the desire to avoid problems with the replenishment of ammunition in the field. On 7 suspension nodes could be placed: hanging containers with guns, rockets, bombs and incendiary tanks with a total weight of up to 1600 kg.

The main operator of the Bronco in Southeast Asia was the Marine Corps. A number of aircraft were used by the army.
The OV-10 showed very high efficiency in combat operations; it favorably differed from its predecessors in armor, survivability, speed and armament. The aircraft had good maneuverability, excellent visibility from the cockpit, it was almost impossible to shoot it down with small arms. In addition, the OV-10 had a very fast call response time.

For a long time, the Bronco was a kind of standard for a light counterguerrilla attack aircraft. As part of the Air Force of other countries, he took part in anti-insurgency operations and military coups.
- Venezuela: participation in an attempted military coup in 1992, with the loss of a quarter of the Venezuelan Air Force OV-10 fleet.
- Indonesia: against the guerrillas in East Timor.
- Colombia: participation in the local civil war.
- Morocco: against the Polisario guerrillas in Western Sahara.
- Thailand: in a border conflict with Laos, and against local guerrillas.
- Philippines: participation in the attempted military coup in 1987, as well as in anti-terrorist operations in Mindanao.

In the US, the OV-10 was finally withdrawn from service in 1994. Some of the decommissioned aircraft were used by government drug control organizations and in fire aviation.

In 1967, the American light double attack aircraft A-37 Dragonfly "debuted" in Vietnam. It was developed by Cessna on the basis of the T-37 light jet trainer.

A-37 Dragonfly

In the design of the A-37, there was a return to the idea of ​​an attack aircraft as a well-armored aircraft in close support of troops, which was subsequently developed during the creation of the Su-25 and A-10 attack aircraft.
However, the first modification of the A-37A attack aircraft had insufficient protection, which was significantly enhanced on the next A-37B model. During the years of production from 1963 to 1975, 577 attack aircraft were built.

The design of the A-37B differed from the first model in that the airframe was designed for 9-fold overloads, the capacity of internal fuel tanks was significantly increased, the aircraft could carry four additional tanks with a total capacity of 1516 liters, and equipment was installed for refueling in the air. The power plant consisted of two General Electric J85-GE-17A turbojet engines with thrust increased to 2,850 kg (12.7 kN) each. The aircraft was equipped with a 7.62 mm GAU-2B/A Minigun machine gun mount in the nose with easy access and eight underwing external hardpoints designed for various types of armament with a total weight of 2268 kg. To protect the crew of two, multilayer nylon armor protection was installed around the cockpit. The fuel tanks were sealed. Communication, navigation and sighting equipment was improved.

Placement of the 7.62 mm machine gun GAU-2B / A Minigun in the bow of the A-37

Lightweight and relatively cheap, the Dragonfly proved to be excellent as a close air support aircraft, combining high strike accuracy with resistance to combat damage.
There were practically no losses from small arms fire. Most of the 22 A-37s shot down in Southeast Asia were hit by anti-aircraft heavy machine guns and MANPADS.

After the surrender of Saigon, 95 A-37s of the South Vietnamese Air Force went to the winners. As part of the Air Force of the DRV, they were operated until the end of the 80s. In the spring of 1976, one of the A-37B aircraft captured in Vietnam was delivered to the USSR for study, where, after extensive tests, it was highly appreciated.

In the United States, Dragonflies in the OA-37B variant were operated until 1994.
The aircraft were in service with a number of countries in Asia and Latin America, where they were actively used in internal disassembly. In some places, A-37s are still flying.

According to materials:
http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~tpilsch/AirOps/O2.html
http://www.arms-expo.ru/055057052124050055049051055.html
http://airspot.ru/catalogue/aircrafts/type/

Dangerous skies in Afghanistan [Experience in the combat use of Soviet aviation in a local war, 1979–1989] Zhirokhov Mikhail Aleksandrovich

MANPADS

The war in Afghanistan was the first conflict in which MANPADS were massively used, both against helicopters and against aircraft. It was here that Soviet specialists worked out measures and methods to combat MANPADS and increase the survivability of helicopters, and the Americans finalized the methodology for using missile systems.

Note that, according to the experience of the war in Afghanistan, Soviet military experts arranged MANPADS in descending order according to the degree of danger as follows: Jevelin, Strela-2M, Stinger, Bluepipe, Red Eye.

Let's try to figure out the effectiveness of the use of each complex, using the statistics of losses of helicopters of only one type - the Mi-24.

As evidenced by impartial statistics, the most deadly MANPADS in Afghanistan were the British Bluepipe and Jevelin.

Unlike the USSR and the USA, where the main emphasis in the development of MANPADS was placed on missiles with a thermal seeker, in the UK the main emphasis was placed on MANPADS guided to the target using radio command systems. The Blowpipe complex began to be developed back in 1964 by Short Brothers and in 1972, after passing military tests, it was recommended for adoption.

Unlike MANPADS with IR guidance, which implement the “fire and forget” principle, the operator of such a MANPADS, before launching a missile at a target, must point the crosshairs at it and hold it on the target at the time of launch. After launch, the missile was automatically kept on the target line. After the missile was automatically brought to the guidance trajectory, the MANPADS operator switched to the manual guidance mode. At the same time, observing the target and the missile through the sight, he had to combine their images, continuing to keep the target on the crosshairs.

One of the main advantages of this guidance method is that such systems practically do not react to the standard countermeasure systems used by aircraft and helicopters, which are designed primarily to divert missiles with IR-GOS.

However, with all the pluses of Blowpipe, there were many minuses. Thus, the operation of the radio link and tracers on the rocket unmasks the guidance process and the location of the firing position, the use of manual control leads to a strong dependence of the effectiveness of the complex on the degree of training and fitness of the shooter, his psychophysical state. You should not discount the fact that, after launch, it was very problematic for many Mujahideen (among whom there were rarely heroes) to keep an eight-kilogram block with a transport-launch container on their shoulders while aiming. For these reasons, the shelling of helicopters was carried out, as a rule, not from a maximum range of 3.5 km, but from a range of 1.5-2 km, which approximately corresponded to the capture range of the Stinger seeker. At the same time, the high visibility of the operator, together with the low - up to 500 m / s - the maximum speed of the rocket, allowed Soviet helicopter pilots to cover it with a Shturm or a pair of NARs, disrupting guidance, or simply get away from the rocket.

As a result, according to Soviet data, for the period from 1982 to 1989, only two Mi-24s were shot down by Blowpipe hits, moreover, one of them, leaving for the base, was finished off by Strela-2M. Su-25 attack aircraft were also shot down with the same complexes, however, as with helicopters, the percentage of hits on the number of launches was too small - the missile was only suitable for the slow, low-maneuverable and poorly armed Mi-8.

A completely different weapon was the Blowpipe modification - the Jevelin complex. The rocket of this complex had a maximum speed of 600 m / s, for guidance, the operator only needed to combine the mark of the sight with the target, the commands were generated automatically, and the rocket did not unmask itself as a tracer. Unlike its predecessor, the Jevelin no longer had a manual, but a semi-automatic radio command system, and the warhead, located in front, broke through any armor. In addition, the mass of the warhead "Jevelina" was 3 kg, but, unlike the "Stinger", it was more compact in length and had a much greater high-explosive action. Although the Blowpipe and Jevelin warheads were almost identical: the latter's two-module warhead was partially moved forward in such a way that the front 0.8-kilogram cumulative high-explosive charge created a hole for the main 2.4-kilogram charge to penetrate into the internal volumes of any target , including heavily armored ones. However, the main thing is that neither the LTC nor the Lipa impulses acted on these missiles, although, in the end, they learned to jam the radio command channel.

It is interesting that the pilots unmistakably recognized the type of rocket “by behavior”. The weak side of both British missiles was the need to track the target to hit or miss. This was widely used by helicopter crews in paired sorties. In this case, the following tactics were used: the attacked helicopter maneuvered within 60–70 degrees, forcing the rocket to loop, after which the partner hit the operator of the Shturmom MANPADS.

According to impartial statistics, the Jevelin proved to be the most effective MANPADS in Afghanistan. Of the 27 complexes, four were captured, two were destroyed before launch. Of the remaining twenty-one, four missiles were fired at the Su-25 - one was shot down by a single hit, the other was heavily damaged. Of the two launches on supersonic aircraft, one turned out to be the loss of the Su-17 for us. In addition, six missiles were fired at the Mi-8, while only one missed, while the other passed the Mi-8 right through without exploding. Four Mi-8s were destroyed by one hit, with the death of the crew and troops.

Of the nine missiles fired at the Mi-24, five hit, three missed, one lost its guidance due to the destruction of the operator. As a result, four helicopters were shot down - three with one hit, one was finished off by the Strela-2M MANPADS, one was seriously damaged and returned to the base. Despite the small number and episodic use, Jevelin missiles left a serious mark on the history of the Afghan war, shooting down ten aircraft.

The next in terms of effectiveness against Soviet aircraft were the Soviet MANPADS "Strela-2M" and "Strela-2M2". Modification "Strela-2M2" (factory designation 9M32M2) in the USSR was released in a small series of 700 pieces. The release was discontinued due to the appearance of the Strela-3 MANPADS, so the Strela-2M2 was sent to "friendly countries", including Afghanistan. The rocket was distinguished by cooling the sensor to minus 30 degrees with carbon dioxide. These missiles, brought in China and Iran almost to the level of Strela-3, combining an uncooled (for Strela-2M2 - cooled) IR sensor with a photocontrast one, had less protection from the LTC. But on the other hand, they did not react at all to the Lipa's impulses. In addition, it turned out that these missiles could capture the Mi-24 with EVA not from 1.5, but from 2-2.5 km. In addition, the 1.5-kilogram Strela-2M/2M2 warhead had a cumulative funnel, a planned crushing steel case (unlike the Stinger's aluminum warhead case) and carried 200 ten-gram spherical tungsten submunitions.

It is also worth mentioning that the Strela-2M could hit the vital parts of the structure covered with armor with a cumulative jet of the Mi-24, as well as damage armored units with heavy fragments at close range. When hit and close to burst, Soviet-made missiles were an order of magnitude more effective against any heavily armored aircraft - helicopters and attack aircraft.

In general, according to most experts, the Strela-2M inflicted more damage on our Mi-24s in Afghanistan than the Stingers. The advantage of the Strela over the Stinger was that, with a perfect hit, the Stingers hit the engine, and the Arrows hit the gearbox and stern, which were not protected by armor, besides breaking through the armor of the gearbox with a scattered cumulative jet.

It is rather difficult to give complete statistics on Strel launches, since after 1986 all the defeats of helicopters and aircraft were traditionally recorded at the expense of the American Stinger. Today, one can only use statistics from the pre-Stinger period, when at least four Mi-8s, two Mi-24s and two An-12s were shot down by these missiles.

And before moving on to an analysis of the use of Stingers in Afghanistan, it is worth saying a few words about the FIM-43A Red Eye. This complex was supplied to the Mujahideen in the initial period of hostilities and performed poorly in combat conditions. The complex was created for a direct hit on the target. Its main task was to hit the target with a high-explosive factor, then introducing heavy fragments into the airframe, which practically did not happen in real combat conditions.

Purely theoretically, a direct hit by the FIM-43A did more damage than a direct hit by the Stinger, but the power of the warhead was clearly not enough to disable the car, seriously damaging it, and even more so to shoot it down. The Red Eye combat unit had certain advantages over the Stinger-A when attacking the Mi-24, which, however, was absolutely offset by the obsolescence of the Red Eye. The shooting of the LTC reduced the probability of hitting by 80%, the low (500 m / s) initial speed of the rocket and poor controllability on the trajectory allowed the helicopter to easily escape with a couple of energetic maneuvers.

The capture of a helicopter with an EED could be carried out from a distance of no more than 1 km. For helicopters without EED, launches were made almost exclusively on board from 1–1.5 km. But the limited angles and attack distance, which exposed the anti-aircraft gunners under the attack of a helicopter, as well as low accuracy, together with the “addiction” to the LTC, were not the main trouble. The unreliability of both a contactless and a contact fuse meant that the missile could fly a few centimeters from the hull without exploding.

Note that with the help of FIM-43A missiles for 1982-1986. Mujahideen shot down only two Mi-24s and one Su-25. After the massive installation of LBB-166 Lipa pulsed IR interference stations on helicopters, the enemy himself refused to use the remaining FIM-43A, since the probability of their hit was rapidly approaching zero.

The first to enter Afghanistan in 1985 were the Stingers of the first modification - FIM-92A. With similar characteristics to the Red Eye, the Stingers' GGEs broke the skin, in particular, in the projection of the fuel tanks, causing a serious leak, and sometimes a fire, excised the main and tail rotor blades, could interrupt the tail rotor control rods, pierce the hydraulic hoses, in case of luck, without causing harm to the main units of the Mi-24, protected by armor. However, it was almost impossible to shoot down the Mi-24 even with a single FIM-92A hit. Therefore, the Mujahideen practiced paired launches, launches of four MANPADS (in part, given the greater likelihood of a miss on a helicopter equipped with Lipa), as well as entire anti-helicopter ambushes with six to ten Stinger complexes, spare TPKs and a pair of Strela-2M complexes ”, often backed up by ZPU or even light MZA.

The appearance in less than a year of the next, more accurate and noise-proof modification of the "Stinger-POST" (FIM-92B) with a warhead mass of 2.3 kg, as well as improved FIM-92A, with increased power from 0.93 to 1.5 kg The warhead increased the explosive factor by 1.6 times for the 2.3-kilogram warhead and only by 1.3 times for the improved 1.5-kilogram FIM-92A warhead.

From mid-1986, these advanced missiles, along with the remaining 800 Stinger-A, were used for the first time by the Mujahideen against the Mi-24. However, the very first hits confirmed the worst fears of the developers - it was almost impossible to shoot down the Mi-24 with a single hit of the Stinger if the missile did not hit the ammunition, tail boom or tail rotor of the helicopter, or did not cause a fire in the fuel tanks. That is, the relative miss of the Stinger was much more effective than a direct hit on the armor plate of a gearbox, a shielded EVA, or an armored engine. Although the 2.3-kilogram warhead, due to the high-explosive factor and the density of the fragments field, often tore off the armor plate and damaged the engine, which was inaccessible to the Stingers with 0.93 and even 1.5-kilogram warheads. In addition, the Stinger-POST (FIM-92B) simply cut the main rotor blade of the GGE, due to which its efficiency dropped by 30-50%. But the vital, armored units were too tough even for the new FIM-92B modification.

Note that in the latest modification of the FIM-92C Stinger-RPM, the same 2.3-kilogram warhead was used without changes, but when attacking a helicopter, the GOS was reprogrammed to the appropriate algorithm. However, even against the Mi-24, not to mention the Mi-28, such a warhead, without cumulative and armor-piercing elements, a rod scheme or equipped with heavy submunitions, was simply powerless.

As for the statistics of the Afghan war, only 18 helicopters were shot down by 89 Stinger hits on the Mi-24. Some of them were shot down with two or three rockets, as well as a combination with ZPU. Sometimes, after hitting the Stinger, the Mi-24 achieved the Strela. For 18 downed helicopters, there were 31 hits (out of 89). Interestingly, 58 hits caused non-critical damage.

However, after the Jevelin, which was not used in large numbers, the Stinger's hit statistics were the highest: out of 563 launches on the Mi-24, 89 missiles reached the target - about 16%. The strength of the Stinger was that the shooting of the LTC gave only 27% of the “leaving” of the rocket against 54% of the Strela.

Against the Mi-8, the Stingers were very effective - only three Mi-8s survived after a single hit by the Stingers and five after being hit by the Strela-2M. This was largely due to the fact that the LBB-166 Lipa station on the Mi-8 had a dead zone, and besides, the helicopter had significantly larger linear dimensions than the Mi-24 in all angles, relatively low speed and maneuverability.

In addition, the capabilities of the Mi-24 allowed the helicopter pilots to perform an anti-missile maneuver, called the Fatalist or Nahalka. In 65% of cases, when performing this maneuver, it was possible to avoid a seemingly inevitable hit, and on the Mi-8 such a maneuver was simply impossible.

MANPADS "Stinger" was also very effective against jet aircraft. The vast majority of Su-22s, Su-17s and MiG-21s were shot down by missiles of this type. Compared to the Mi-24, the percentage of launches to downed vehicles was significantly higher: 7.2% against jet combat aircraft in total; 4.7% against the Su-25 and 3.2% against the Mi-24. But 18% - in case of use against the Mi-8.

For the first time in Afghanistan (the combat debut of MANPADS took place in 1982 in the Falklands), "Stingers" were used on September 25, 1986 in the Jalalabad region by a detachment of a certain "engineer Ghaffar" from the Islamic Party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. On that day, a group of 35 people set up an ambush in the area of ​​​​the local airfield, firing at eight combat and transport helicopters of the 335th helicopter regiment returning from a routine task of reconnaissance and destruction of caravans.

The rebels damaged the Mi-24V of Lieutenant E.A. with two missiles. Pogorely. The pilot ordered the rest of the crew to leave the helicopter, and he himself tried to force him to land. The attempt was partially successful: they managed to land the car, while Pogorely received serious injuries and died in the hospital. In addition, the Mi-8 exploded in the air. Only the right pilot survived, who was thrown out of the cockpit by an explosion. His parachute opened automatically.

Here is how Colonel K.A. recalls these events. Shipachev, then the commander of the 335th regiment, who was on the ground: “Suddenly we heard a rather strong explosion, then another and another. Trying to understand what was the matter, we jumped out into the street and saw the following picture: six helicopters were descending directly above us in a spiral, and on the ground, at a distance of 100–300 m from the runway, a downed Mi-8 was burning. In the air, jumped out pilots hung on parachutes.

As it turned out later on the analysis, according to the group that was landing, dushmans from an ambush made eight launches of the Stinger MANPADS from a distance of 3800 m from the runway. After the first launch, the flight director gave the command to the crews to turn on the means of protection and open fire on the attackers, but there was nothing to shoot with: all the ammunition had already been completely used up, and the combat helicopters could not even strike back. Everyone who promptly turned on the shooting of heat traps defended themselves from missiles, and two helicopters were shot down.

... Immediately realizing that the pilots could not give an adequate response to the enemy, the command post immediately transmitted the coordinates of the target to the position of rocket artillery, and a retaliatory strike was fired at the bandits. A day later, we escorted the bodies of the dead comrades to their homeland, and already on September 28 we again began to carry out the next tasks.

A rare case for the Afghan war, when there is a description of this remarkable event from the other side. Says Pakistani Brigadier General Mohammad Yusuf, who was responsible until August 1987 for preparing the Stinger crews from the rebels: “The long wait for a suitable target was rewarded at three in the afternoon. Everyone peered into the sky to see the magnificent sight - no less than eight helicopters, belonging to the most hated enemies - Mi-24 fire support helicopters, were approaching the landing strip. Ghaffar's group had three Stingers, the operators of which lifted the already loaded launchers on their shoulders and stood in position for firing. The firing crews were within shouting distance of each other, arranged in a triangle in the bushes, since no one knew from which direction the target might appear. We organized each team in such a way that three people fired, and the other two held rocket tubes for quick reloading ...

When the lead helicopter was only 200 m above the ground, Ghaffar commanded: "Fire!", And the cries of the Mujahideen "Allah Akbar!" went up with the rockets. One of the three rockets did not fire and fell without exploding, just a few meters from the shooter. The other two crashed into their targets. Both helicopters hit the runway like a stone, shattering on impact. There was a wild scuffle between the fire crews during the reloading of missiles, as each of the team wanted to fire again. Two more rockets went into the air, one hit the target as successfully as the previous two, and the second passed very close, since the helicopter had already landed. I believe that one or two other helicopters were also damaged due to the fact that their pilots had to land abruptly ... Five missiles, three hit targets - the Mujahideen triumphed ...

After the ceasefire, Ghaffar's men quickly collected the empty tubes and destroyed the unexploded rocket by smashing it with rocks... Their return to the base was uneventful, although about an hour after their departure they heard the rumble of a jet aircraft in the distance and the sound of exploding bombs.

On that day, there was no immediate reaction to the downed helicopters in Jalalabad, the Russians were simply stunned. Then the airfield was closed for a month…”

As you can see, the testimonies of the parties are somewhat similar, but in some ways they diverge from each other.

Finishing the story, it is worth noting that the Soviet units were hunting for MANPADS systems. What is worth, for example, the story of the capture of the first Stinger complex, which is claimed by two dozen people at different times and under different circumstances (I think their number will only grow over the years).

Most truthfully, in my opinion, the story of the first captured Stinger is described in an article by reserve colonel Alexander Musienko: “The first Stinger portable anti-aircraft missile system was captured by Soviet troops in Afghanistan on January 5, 1987. Lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun and Lieutenant Vasily Cheboksarov of the 186th separate special forces detachment under the general command of the deputy commander of the detachment, Major Evgeny Sergeyev, in the vicinity of the village of Seyid Kalai, three motorcyclists were noticed in the Meltakai Gorge. Vladimir Kovtun described further actions as follows: “When they saw our turntables, they quickly dismounted and opened fire from small arms, and also made two quick launches from MANPADS, but at first we mistook these launches for RPG shots. The pilots immediately made a sharp turn and sat down. Already when they left the board, the commander managed to shout to us: “They are shooting from grenade launchers!” Twenty-fours covered us from the air, and we, having landed, started a battle on the ground. Helicopters and special forces opened fire on the rebels to kill, destroying them with NURS and small arms fire. Only the leading board landed on the ground, and the leading Mi-8 with the Cheboksarov group insured from the air. During the inspection of the destroyed enemy, Senior Lieutenant V. Kovtun seized the launch container, the Stinger MANPADS instrumentation unit and a complete set of technical documentation from the rebel he had destroyed. One combat-ready complex, strapped to a motorcycle, was captured by Captain E. Sergeev, and another empty container and a rocket were captured by the reconnaissance group, who landed from a slave helicopter.

Until the autumn of 1979, the Soviet side tried not to advertise its participation in the war. So, the border guards used the Mi-8 in the color of "Aeroflot" with fake numbers

At the first stage of the war, the Mi-8T made up the majority

Mi-6 helicopters played a very important role in supplying remote garrisons. But in the conditions of mountain warfare, their crews suffered heavy losses.

Due to the high mountain conditions, the Mi-8 was made as light as possible. Pay attention to shy; mania for the lack of trusses for hanging weapons

Kabul Mi-8s served most of the posts around the capital

Mi-8MT at a high mountain post

Mi-8 of the 50th osap parked in Kabul, winter 1988

Due to their enormous size, heavy Mi-26s were used exclusively in the border area to supply border guards.

Aviation played a significant role in the actions of the border guards. In the photo Mi-24

Departure for escort was standard for Mi-24 crews

An-26 from the 50th osap

Unloading IL-76 at the Kandahar airfield

MiG-21 at the initial stage were the basis of the aviation group

MiG-23s were used mainly as fighter-bombers and only in the areas bordering Pakistan - as fighters

Su-25 takes off from the capital's airfield

Su-25 became a real discovery of the Afghan war

Su-17 fighter-bombers operated mainly from shy; border airfields