Operational art of the ground forces. Prospects for the Development of Tactics and Operational Art of Forms and Methods of Armed Struggle Based on the Experience of Past Wars

Topic No. 5. The Armed Forces of the USSR and the development of military art in World War II

Lesson number 1. Fundamentals of strategy and tactics of the Soviet Armed Forces during the first period of the Great Patriotic War

Study questions:

2. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War. The defeat of the Nazi troops near Moscow.

3. Battle of Stalingrad.

1. The formation of the Armed Forces of the USSR after the civil war.

The beginning of the peaceful construction of the new Soviet state was fraught with enormous difficulties. In 1920, the output of heavy industry compared with 1913 was reduced by almost 7 times, most plants and factories were idle due to lack of raw materials, the volume of agricultural production was slightly more than half of the pre-war level.
Under these conditions, the army was reduced from 5.5 million people. (end of 1920) up to 516 thousand people. (as of September 1923), that is, more than 10 times. At the same time, however, it was necessary to bring the combat effectiveness of the troops in line with the requirements of a complex international situation, preserving to the maximum the combat experience gained by the army in the last years of the Civil War.
To solve these problems in 1924–1925. military reform was carried out, the main content of which was:
• reorganization of the governing bodies of the Armed Forces (AF) of the USSR;
• transition to a new staffing system;
• introduction of unity of command;
• improvement of the organizational structure of the troops, the principles of their training and education.
The talented commander and prominent military theorist Mikhail Vasilievich Frunze was appointed Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, who led the military reform.
The functions and tasks of the highest bodies of the military leadership were delimited. The headquarters of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) was engaged in solving the problems of the country's defense, developed mobilization and operational plans. The decision of organizational issues was entrusted to the Main Directorate of the Red Army, and the Inspectorate of the Red Army was responsible for organizing the combat training of troops. As part of the reform, the Political Directorate of the Red Army was created, which was engaged in the political training of the army and navy, as well as the Directorate of the Air and Naval Forces, the supply of the Red Army and the Main Directorate of Military Educational Institutions. In the military districts, military councils were introduced - collective bodies for the leadership of troops and military commissariats.
To reduce the cost of maintaining the army, a mixed principle of its recruitment was adopted, when along with personnel formations, territorial formations were created. Most of the rifle and cavalry divisions in the border military districts, as well as the fleet, aviation, artillery and other troops equipped with complex military equipment, basically remained personnel. In the internal military districts, territorial-militia rifle and cavalry units and formations were formed, which had a permanent core in the composition of the command, headquarters, technical unit and subunits, and a variable rank and file. A variable composition did military service at short-term training camps near their place of residence.
The decision on the military training of university students at military departments also dates back to this time (since 1926, military training began at the Nizhny Novgorod State University named after N.I. Lobachevsky).
During this period, according to the principle of territoriality, national formations of the union republics also began to be created.
Such a system of manning the Armed Forces made it possible to organize the preparation of mobilization resources without a long separation of people from production and at a low cost of public funds.
In 1925, a law was passed, according to which military service consisted of:
• pre-conscription training;
• military training in personnel units;
• short-term training camps in the territorial units;
• non-military training;
• being in reserve.
This law also determined the structure of the Armed Forces as part of the Ground Forces (SV), Air Force (Air Force) and Naval Forces (Navy).
The SV was the main type of the Armed Forces and consisted of rifle troops, cavalry, artillery, armored forces and special troops. The highest tactical formation was a rifle corps consisting of three rifle divisions, an artillery regiment, support and maintenance units. The rifle division was the main tactical formation and consisted of three rifle regiments, an artillery regiment, a cavalry squadron and other units. The number of wartime divisions was 12,800 people. It was armed with 54 guns, 189 easel and 81 light machine guns, 243 grenade launchers.
In the Air Force, squadrons of three squadrons of 18 aircraft each were created. The Navy included the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets.
In March 1925, one-man command was introduced in the army, and two types: complete and incomplete. Full - if the commander was a member of the party. Incomplete - if the commander was not a communist. In this case, he solved operational-tactical and administrative-economic tasks, and the appointed commissar was engaged in party political work.
In the course of the reform, the troops received new field manuals, which contained the most important provisions of Soviet military art, including the requirements for close cooperation in battle with all branches of the armed forces, the active nature of the conduct of hostilities, wide maneuvering of forces and means, a comprehensive account of the state of troops and the situation in organizing and conducting combined arms combat.
The rise of the economy and agriculture made it possible from the beginning of the 30s to begin the technical reconstruction and reorganization of the Armed Forces, the need for which was necessary.
The development of the Ground Forces was aimed at increasing their striking power and mobility on the basis of mechanization and motorization. The equipment of units with small arms, especially automatic weapons, has improved significantly. In the period from 1928 to 1937, the number of heavy machine guns in the troops tripled, and light machine guns - more than 10 times (designers F.V. Tokarev ,V.A. Degtyarev , G.S. Shpagin). Since the beginning of the 30s, the armament of the troops began to receive 203 mm howitzers and 122 mm guns, 76 mm anti-aircraft guns. In the period 1936–1940. were adopted 76 mm divisional guns , 122 mm howitzers, 152 mm guns and 180 mm mortars, as well as 82 mm, 107 mm and 120 mm mortars, 37mm and 85 mm anti-aircraft guns. During the same period, prototypes of jet mortars and self-propelled guns were created. Domestic field artillery of that period (designers V.G. Grabin , F.F. Petrov , B.I. Shavyrin etc.) was superior to foreign ones, but the army lacked mechanized traction, which reduced its maneuverability.
Since the beginning of the 30s, serial production of tanks has been mastered T-26, BT-5, BT-7 , T-27 , T-28 , T-35, and a heavy tank created in 1939 HF(constructor J.Ya. Kotin) and medium tank T-34(constructors M.I. Koshkin , A.A. Morozov , ON THE. Kucherenko ) with diesel engines in terms of tactical and technical characteristics were superior to foreign-made tanks. From 1934 to 1938 the number of tanks in the army increased 3 times. The improvement of armored vehicles was carried out through the use of anti-ballistic armor, increased firepower and maneuverability.
The capabilities of the Air Force aviation have increased due to an increase in the range, flight speed and bomb load of aircraft. At the beginning of 1941, fighters began to arrive in aviation units. Yak-1 , MiG-3, LaGG-3 (constructors A.S. Yakovlev , S.A. Lavochkin , V.P. Gorbunov , M.I. Gudkov , A.I. Mikoyan, M.N. Gurevich), bomber Pe-2(constructor V.M. Petlyakov ), attack aircraft IL-2(constructor S.V. Ilyushin). From 1930 to 1938, the industry produced more than 20 thousand aircraft.
In addition to anti-aircraft guns and machine guns of various calibers, the air defense forces were armed with spotlights , balloons, anti-aircraft fire control devices ( POISOT ), optical rangefinders and radar stations as well as fighter planes.
Significant efforts in the period from 1922 to 1929 were made to restore the navy (raising sunken ships and repair them), and then to further build and strengthen it. The fleet began to receive new cruisers with 180-mm guns, destroyers with 130-mm guns, other medium displacement surface ships with new 100-mm guns and torpedo boats, as well as various types of submarines armed with torpedoes and guns. The Navy also had aviation - reconnaissance aircraft R-5, heavy bombers TB-1, TB-2 and long-range bombers DB-3.
Along with technical re-equipment, the structure and system of combat training of the Armed Forces were improved, and their numbers increased. Adopted in 1939, the Law on General Conscription completed the transfer of the army to a personnel position, established the terms and procedure for serving and being in the reserve, as well as the organization of initial and pre-conscription military training. In 1940, along with the Army, Air Force and Navy, the Air Defense Forces became a branch of the Armed Forces.
By June 1941, the total strength of the army and navy exceeded 5 million people, an increase of 2.8 times compared to 1939. This was undertaken in connection with the deterioration of the international situation and the outbreak of World War II, military conflicts in the area of ​​​​Lake Khasan (1938), on the river. Khalkhin-Gol (1939) and the war with Finland (late 1939 - early 1940).
In the interwar years, Soviet military art also developed. A significant contribution to the development of military theory was made by M.V. Frunze, A.I. Egorov, M.N. Tukhachevsky, V.K. Triandafillov, I.P. Uborevich, B.M. Shaposhnikov, R.P. Eideman, I.E. Yakir and many others.
Soviet strategy believed that a future war could begin with broad maneuvering actions and victory in it could be achieved by defeating the enemy’s armed forces and depriving him of all strategic bases for supplying troops.
A characteristic feature of a future war was considered to be large expenditures of economic and human resources, and the war itself was assumed to be long and fierce, which requires the advance creation of a strong rear and mobilization of the efforts of the entire country.
The offensive in the form of simultaneous or successive front-line operations was supposed to be the decisive type of strategic action. Defense was seen as a form of military operations subordinate to the offensive within the framework of a general strategic offensive and only in certain operational areas. The idea of ​​going over to a decisive offensive was laid in the defensive operations of the Soviet troops. In some areas, forced withdrawal of troops was allowed, and the problem of withdrawing large forces from under the enemy’s attack was not developed, which was a significant miscalculation of the Soviet pre-war strategy.
Operational art as a theory and practice of conducting army and front-line operations improved as the technical equipment of the troops grew.
At the end of the 1920s, a general theory of successive operations was developed, according to which the front was supposed to unite troops in the theater of operations (theater of operations) and attack in several operational directions in which the solution of one common strategic task would be achieved. For the front, the width of the offensive zone was assumed to be 300-400 km, the depth of the operation - up to 200 km.
The combined arms army was the main operational formation for operations as part of a front or in a separate operational direction, both in the first echelon in the direction of the main attack and in the secondary direction, and included 2-3 rifle corps (as part of the army in the border area, in addition, there was also a mechanized corps). The rifle corps included 3 rifle divisions, 2 artillery regiments, a separate anti-aircraft battalion, a communications battalion and an engineer battalion.
The width of the army offensive zone was determined to be 50–80 km, the depth was 25–30 km, the duration of the operation was 5–6 days with an average daily advance rate of 5–6 km (Fig. 1).

Fig.1. The scheme of the offensive of the army according to pre-war views in the USSR Armed Forces

With the advent of more advanced military equipment in the 1930s, the rapid development of the Air Force, and the increase in combat capabilities and the role of aviation in the war, the theory of the military art of the Air Force was developed as an integral part of Soviet military art. It was supposed to maintain independent Air operation - coordinated combat operations of one or more aviation formations and formations, carried out independently and in cooperation with other types of armed forces according to a single plan and plan to achieve a strategic or operational goal.", 100, 600, "Definition"); "> air operations , as well as joint actions with other types of aircraft.
In the same period, the foundations of the operational art of the Navy were developed.
The most significant achievement of military science of that period was the development of the theory of deep operation. Its essence consisted in the simultaneous defeat of the enemy to the entire depth of his operational formation using artillery, tank and mechanized troops, aviation and airborne formations.
During the deep operation, two tasks were supposed to be performed:
• the first one is to break the enemy's defense by simultaneous strike of infantry, tanks, artillery and aviation to its entire tactical depth;
• the second is the development of tactical success into operational success by swift actions of mobile, airborne troops and air strikes.
In order to break through the enemy's defenses, it was planned to concentrate superior forces in the attack echelon, success development echelon, reserve, aviation and airborne units in the direction of the main attack.
The theory of a deep operation was tested in exercises in a number of districts (1935-1938) and in battles near Lake Khasan (1938), on the river. Khalkhin-Gol (1939), on the Karelian Isthmus (1939–1940) and was further developed.
According to pre-war views on the direction of the main attack, it was necessary to have density: one rifle division per 2–2.5 km of the front; 40–100 guns and mortars, 50–100 tanks per 1 km of front.
The width of the front offensive zone was assumed to be 150–300 km, the depth of operations was 150–250 km, the breakthrough section was determined to be 60–80 km, that is, compared with the views of the period of the 20s - early 30s, the width of the front offensive zone decreased, and the depth of the operation has increased. The offensive zone of the army remained the same - 50-80 km with a breakthrough section of 20-30 km, while the depth increased to 100 km.
The increase in the above operational indicators is due to an increase in the combat capabilities of the troops, due to an increase in the number and performance characteristics of tanks, aircraft, artillery pieces and mortars, and also due to the development by the troops of new tactics and methods of combat operations when breaking through the enemy’s defenses. In addition, the depth of the enemy's defense has also increased due to the saturation of it with new firepower.
Achieving the goal of the operation was planned through the successive implementation of a number of tasks - immediate, further and subsequent. The army's immediate task was to break through the enemy's defenses and, in cooperation with aviation and mobile troops, to take possession of a strip of his army reserves (50–60 km deep). The further task of the army is to advance to a depth of 100 km and take possession of the band of reserves of the army group. The duration of the front-line operation was expected to be up to 15–20 days, the army operation - 7–10 days, the infantry offensive rate - 10–15 km, and the mobile troops - 40–50 km per day.
Soviet military theory paid much attention to the questions of head-on battles, as the most likely ones at the beginning of the war, due to the desire of both sides to seize the initiative.
The theory of operational defense as a temporary method of action also developed. The defense was supposed to be multi-lane, anti-artillery, anti-tank, anti-aircraft, anti-chemical, ensuring the preservation of manpower and firepower from any type of impact (Fig. 2).

Fig.2. Army defense scheme according to pre-war views in the USSR Armed Forces

The army could defend itself as part of the front or independently, both on the main and on the secondary direction, in a strip of 80-100 km and to a depth of 60 km. The defense included tactical and operational zones. Troops of the first echelon of the army (rifle corps) defended themselves in the tactical zone, while combined-arms, tank and artillery-anti-tank reserves were located in the operational zone. The mechanized corps was in reserve and was used to launch counterattacks against the enemy who had penetrated the defenses to ensure his defeat and the subsequent transition of the troops of the entire army to the offensive.
An important place in operational art was assigned to the study of issues of command and control, interaction and rear support in all types of operations.
In accordance with the requirements of strategy and operational art, tactics were developed and improved as a theory and practice of preparing and conducting combat. The most significant in this area were the works of A.I. Verkhovsky, N.E. Kakurina, A.I. Gotovtseva, V.D. Grendel, K.B. Kalinovsky, A.N. Lapchinsky, D.M. Karbyshev and other military theorists.
In the 1920s, new statutes for the arms and services of the Armed Forces were issued, summarizing the experience of the First World War and the Civil War. Further, in connection with changes in the technical equipment of the troops, in 1935-1941. new charters were adopted, which fixed the theory of deep offensive combat in the tactical level.
The modern battle of that time was defined as a combined arms battle, success in which is achieved by mutually coordinated actions of all branches of the armed forces in terms of purpose, place and time. The main types of combat were offensive and defensive.
In a deep offensive battle, the simultaneous massive use of all forces and means was supposed to suppress the enemy’s defenses and attack the entire depth of his battle formations in order to encircle and destroy the main forces of the defending side.
The breakthrough of the enemy defense was to be carried out by rifle formations reinforced with tanks, artillery and aircraft. The rifle corps advancing in the main direction as part of the first echelon of the army was assigned a strip 18-20 km wide, a rifle division - 5-7 km, and its strike group - 3-3.5 km. In an offensive battle, it was recommended to create shock and holding groups, fire (artillery) groups and a reserve.
The existing cavalry divisions were supposed to be used as auxiliary maneuver formations.
Later, taking into account the experience of fighting on the Khalkhin Gol River and the Soviet-Finnish war, instead of shock and holding groups, combat echelons, artillery groups, tank support groups and reserves (general, tank, anti-tank) were introduced into the battle formations of rifle corps and divisions. In connection with the strengthening of the enemy's defense, the width of the lane offensive rifle corps decreased to 8-12 km, and divisions - to 3-6 km, and the depth of the task of the corps and divisions increased to 20 km, which assumed the mastery of the entire tactical defense zone of the enemy on the very first day of the offensive.
A defensive battle was supposed to be waged during an enemy offensive in order to inflict losses on his superior forces and create conditions for his troops to go on the offensive. During positional defense, the division received a strip 6-10 km wide, battle formations were built in echelon in all links from the battalion to the division. Tactical defense zone The division included a support line (foreground) 10–12 km deep, a main (main) defense line 4–6 km deep, and a second (rear) defense line at a distance of 12–15 km from the front edge of the main defense line.
Thus, in the period between the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars, sufficiently powerful Armed Forces were created in the USSR and the foundations for their use were developed.
However, despite intensive rearmament, improvement of the structure and increase in the size of the army, many problems had not been resolved by the beginning of the war. The share of new types of weapons (especially automatic weapons, tanks and aircraft) was insufficient, and the staffing and formation of many combined arms formations was not completed. So, by June 1, 1941, out of 303 divisions of the Ground Forces, 81 were in the process of formation, and out of 170 divisions of five border districts, not one was staffed according to the wartime staff. The material base of the rear of the districts was weak. There were not enough prepared bases and warehouses for storing and repairing property, as well as tanks for transporting fuel. In connection with the adopted concept of predominantly offensive operations, the stocks of materiel in many districts were located very close to the border, which made it impossible to evacuate them in the event of a forced retreat.
In addition, the mass Stalinist repressions of the 1930s caused an acute shortage of qualified command personnel of the middle and, especially, senior levels.
All these and other problems led to the failures of the first period of the Great Patriotic War.

2. Features of the military art of the Soviet Armed Forces during the first period Great Patriotic War (June 1941 - November 1942)

Beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

By the time of the attack on the USSR, Nazi German troops had occupied Austria (1938), Czechoslovakia (1938–1939), the Memel region (1939), and on September 1, 1939, they invaded Poland, and this date is considered the beginning of the Second world war (album of schemes, scheme 40 ).
After the occupation of Poland by the Nazi troops, Norway and Denmark were captured, then - Holland, Belgium, Northern and Central France. In the spring of 1941 During the Balkan campaign, Nazi troops captured Yugoslavia, Greece and captured the island of Crete.
This completely refuted the principle of "positional warfare", which formed the basis of the doctrines of the British and French armed forces. The massive use of tank and motorized troops by the Nazi commanders gave the war a maneuverable character, and preemptive strikes in order to seize the strategic initiative ensured continued success for the Nazi troops (video).
Direct preparations for an attack on the USSR by fascist Germany and its allies (Italy, Japan, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland) began in the summer of 1940 after the capture of France, and in December of the same year, Hitler signed a war plan against the USSR ( plan "Barbarossa" ), in accordance with which it was supposed to defeat the enemy in the course of a short campaign, destroying the main forces of the Soviet Ground Forces in operations through deep and rapid advancement of tank wedges and dismemberment of the main forces of the Red Army, preventing their retreat deep into the territory of the country
The main forces of the Red Army were supposed to be destroyed up to the line of the Dnieper river, the Western Dvina river, and then it was planned to capture Moscow, Astrakhan, Leningrad, Donbass and go to the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line.
To implement this plan, the Nazi troops deployed three army groups in the strip between the Baltic and Black Seas: "North", "Center" and "South" (album of schemes, scheme 41) (video).
Army Group "North" consisting of 29 divisions (including 3 tank and 3 motorized) occupied their initial position in East Prussia from Klaipeda to Goldap on a front of 230 km and had the task of defeating Soviet troops in the Baltic states, and later, in cooperation with part of the forces Army Group Center, capture Leningrad. The offensive was supported by the 1st Air Fleet (760 aircraft).
Army Group Center was concentrated on a front of 500 km from Goldap to Vlodawa (Poland) and included 50 divisions (of which 15 were tank and motorized) and 2 motorized brigades. Its task was to encircle and destroy the grouping of Soviet troops in Belarus and further attack on Moscow. Army Group Center was supported by the 2nd Air Fleet (1600 aircraft).
Army Group "South" was located on the front 1250 km from Vlodava to the mouth of the river. Danube (territories of Poland, Hungary, Romania) and had 57 divisions (including 9 tank and motorized) and 13 brigades in combat strength. The group was supposed to destroy the Soviet troops on the right-bank Ukraine, go to the river. Dnieper and develop an offensive to the east. She was supported by the 4th Air Fleet (about 1000 aircraft). In addition, two Romanian armies and several Hungarian brigades were in the zone of Army Group South.
On the territory of Finland was the German army "Norway" and two Finnish armies. These forces were supposed to capture Murmansk, Polyarny, the Rybachy Peninsula and the entire Karelian Isthmus, and then link up with the troops of Army Group North in the Leningrad region. Aviation support for this grouping was assigned to the 5th Air Fleet (240 aircraft) and the Finnish Air Force (307 aircraft).
In the reserve of the main command of the ground forces of Germany there were 24 divisions.
In total, 190 divisions, numbering 5.5 million people, were concentrated on the borders with the Soviet Union. and armed with 4300 tanks, 4980 aircraft, more than 47200 guns and mortars. In the first echelon, the Nazi command deployed 103 divisions, including 12 tank divisions.
These forces were opposed by Soviet troops of four border military districts numbering 2 million 680 thousand people, consisting of 170 divisions and two brigades.
In terms of the total number of tanks, aircraft and other military equipment, Soviet troops were not inferior to the enemy, but most of them were already outdated and could not effectively resist the enemy. New models of weapons (1475 new KV and T-34 tanks, 1540 aircraft, etc.) have not yet been fully mastered by personnel, and the troops were dispersed over a vast territory from the Barents to the Black Sea (length 4.5 thousand km) and up to the last moment they continued their activities according to the peacetime schedule.
Early in the morning of June 22, 1941, the troops of Nazi Germany launched an invasion of the USSR without declaring war. Fascist aviation bombarded Sevastopol, Kyiv, Baltic cities, military and civilian airfields and other facilities in the border areas and in the depths of our country. Simultaneously with air strikes, thousands of German guns rained down fire on our border outposts, locations of military units, peaceful cities and towns, after which the invasion of ground forces began.
Mobilization on the territory of 14 military districts of that time, and martial law in a number of republics and regions of the European part of the USSR, were declared only on the first day of the war. The Baltic, Western and Kyiv special military districts were hastily transformed into the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts, respectively, and the Odessa military district into the 9th Army. On June 24, the Leningrad Military District was transformed into the Northern Front, and the Southern Front was formed in the south of the USSR.
For the strategic management of the war, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) was organized.
Despite the unpreparedness of the USSR to repel such a sudden massive invasion of fascist troops, the Great Patriotic War, including its initial period, did not go according to the scenario of Hitler's strategists.
Military historians divide the Great Patriotic War into three periods:
• first: June 22, 1941 - November 18, 1942;
• second: November 19, 1942 - December 1943;
• third: January 1944 - May 9, 1945
In a special period of the war, the war with Japan is singled out (August 9 - September 2, 1945).
The first period of the war includes three campaigns:
• summer-autumn defensive campaign (June-November 1941);
• winter offensive campaign (December 1941 - April 1942);
• summer-autumn defensive campaign (April - November 18, 1942).
In the summer-autumn campaign of 1941, Soviet troops defended themselves in the northwestern, western and southwestern strategic directions. With the forces of the Army Group "North" the enemy struck in the Luga and Pskov directions, but could not take Leningrad on the move and stopped at the near approaches to the city, having exhausted their offensive capabilities (album of schemes, scheme 42 ).
On September 23, 1941, the heroic defense of Leningrad began in the most difficult conditions of the blockade.
On the western (Moscow) direction, the Battle of Smolensk unfolded on July 10, which lasted almost 2 months. The plan of the Nazi command to go to the Soviet capital on the move was thwarted.
In the southwestern direction, from July 11, 1941, the 71-day defense of Kyiv began, in September-October - military operations in the Left-Bank Ukraine, the defenders of Odessa conducted the 73-day defense (August 5 - October 16).
Thanks to the heroic resistance of the Soviet soldiers, the rate of advance of the enemy troops was much lower than envisaged by the Barbarossa plan. However, by the autumn of 1941, the enemy had advanced 600–900 km east, captured Smolensk and Kyiv, and reached the approaches to the Crimea. On November 5, the defense of Sevastopol began, which lasted until July 3, 1942.
Hitler's command focused on attack on Moscow , the capture of which was to be the end of the 1941 campaign of the year and the prerequisite for the final victory in 1942. The plan of Operation Typhoon, which began at the end of September 1941, provided for the defeat of Soviet troops in the western direction. This operation began the battle for Moscow, during which it was planned to dismember the defenses of the Soviet troops with powerful attacks by tank groups, surround and destroy formations of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts in the areas of Vyazma and Bryansk, after which strong mobile groups would envelop Moscow from the north and south, and take over the Soviet capital with a strike by infantry formations from the front.
The operation was carried out by the Army Group "Center" consisting of the 9th, 4th and 2nd field armies, 3rd, 4th and 2nd tank groups. They numbered 74.5 divisions, incl. 14 tank and 8 motorized. The army group had 1,800,000 soldiers and officers, 1,700 tanks, over 14,000 guns and mortars, and 1,390 aircraft (album of diagrams, scheme 43 ).
350-550 km west of Moscow, in a strip 730 km wide, 3 fronts defended: Western (commanded by General I.S. Konev), Reserve (commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny) and Bryansk (commanded by General A.I. Eremenko). The troops of these fronts numbered 1,250,000 men, 990 tanks, 7,600 guns and mortars, and 677 aircraft.
Defense of a strategic group It was built in two echelons. In the first echelon were the troops of the Western, Bryansk and part of the forces of the Reserve Fronts, in the second - the main forces of the Reserve Front. 4 lines of defense were prepared. The main efforts of the fronts were concentrated on the defense of the most critical areas (Vyazma, Spas-Demensky, Bryansk and Oryol) in order to prevent a breakthrough of the defense, inflict as many losses as possible on the enemy, buy time to complete the preparation and concentration of reserves and thereby create conditions for the transition in a counteroffensive.
The depth of defense of the armies reached 20-25 km, and the depth of the fronts in some directions - 30-35 km. The armies defended stripes 25 to 100 km wide. The second echelons (reserves) of the armies were located in the areas of concentration of the main efforts and prepared counterattacks against the enemy. Some armies had their own aviation, but its main forces were at the disposal of the front commands.
Rifle divisions defended strips from 14 to 20 km, as a rule, in a two-echelon battle formation. The depth of defense of the division of the first echelon was 4-5 km. Within its limits in engineering prepared only the first position. The basis of the defense was battalion areas equipped with separate trenches for a rifle squad, machine gun, mortar or gun, not connected by trenches or communications.
The density of troops was 0.3-0.4 rifle battalions, 5-7 (sometimes 10-15) guns and 1-2 tanks per 1 km of front.
The air defense of the troops was weak, but the powerful air defense grouping of Moscow ensured the repulsion of enemy air attacks on the capital from any directions and heights. Moscow was covered from the air by 1100 anti-aircraft guns, about 700 aircraft and fighters, 763 searchlights, 702 VNOS posts.
Operation "Typhoon" began on September 30 with the offensive of the 2nd Panzer Group (since September 5 - the 2nd Tank Army) against the troops of the Bryansk Front, and on October 2, the rest of the armies of the "Center" group joined the offensive, after which fierce battles unfolded, which continued 203 days. These battles, which constitute the content of the battle for Moscow, included a defensive period (until December 5), a counteroffensive (December 5, 1941 - January 7, 1942) and an offensive by Soviet troops in the western direction (January 8 - April 20, 1942).
As part of Operation Typhoon The 4th army of the enemy launched an offensive north of Vyazma, and the 3rd army - south of Vyazma, surrounding parts of the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd armies of the Soviet troops. In the area of ​​​​the Bryansk forests, the 3rd, 13th and 50th armies were also surrounded. As a result of fierce fighting on the way out of the encirclement, Soviet troops pinned down 28 enemy divisions and prevented the development of his attack on Moscow, although the road to it was open. During this time, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command moved forward troops from the reserve and other fronts, which occupied the Mozhaisk defensive line in the main directions. The troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts were merged into one Western Front, commanded by G.K. Zhukov . The Volokolamsk direction was defended by the 16th Army (General K.K. Rokossovsky), Mozhaiskoye - by the 5th Army (General L.A. Govorov), Maloyaroslavets - by the 43rd Army (General S.D. Akimov, from October 24 - General K.D. Golubev), Kaluga - the 49th Army (General N.G. Zakharkin), the 33rd Army (General M.G. Efremov) deployed near Naro-Fominsk.
Events developed northwest and southwest of Moscow especially unfavorably for our troops, as a result of which Kalinin was captured by the enemy on October 14 and a the threat of a breakthrough to Moscow to the rear of the troops of the North-Western Front. The headquarters urgently created the Kalinin Front under the command of General I.S. Konev, whose counterattack forced the enemy to go on the defensive in the Kalinin direction.
By the end of October, the enemy managed to approach Tula, but the enemy was never able to capture it, despite numerous attacks.
On October 19, a state of siege was declared in Moscow. The Nazis managed to capture Kaluga, Maloyaroslavets and Volokolamsk, but at the end of October the troops of Army Group Center on the Volokolamsk, Kubinka, Serpukhov, Aleksin lines were stopped and at the same time severely exhausted and exhausted. For a month of bloody battles, the Nazis managed to advance 200-250 km, but the goal was not achieved - the Nazis did not break through to Moscow.
Having regrouped the forces of the "Center" armies, the enemy continued the offensive on November 15. His plan remained the same: by two mobile groupings to bypass Moscow from the north and south, surround it and capture it with simultaneous strikes from the front. To do this, the enemy concentrated the forces of the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups northwest of Moscow, and in the Tula-Kashirsky direction undertook a strike by the 2nd Panzer Army. In total, 51 divisions were thrown into the battle by the enemy (including 20 tank and motorized).
As a result, on November 23 the enemy captured Klin , then broke through to Yakhroma and Krasnaya Polyana, being only 27 km from Moscow. In the south, Guderian's tank divisions, bypassing Tula, broke through to Kashira.
Exceptional stamina was shown by Soviet soldiers in all directions of the battle near Moscow. A special place in the history of the Great Patriotic War is occupied by the feat of 28 Panfilov heroes, who on November 16 at the Dubosekovo junction near Moscow blocked the path of 50 enemy tanks. As a result of the battle, 18 vehicles were hit, and the German detachment could not break through to Moscow.
During the fighting from November 15 to December 5, the Wehrmacht lost 155 thousand soldiers and officers, 777 tanks, 1500 aircraft near Moscow. Operation "Typhoon" ended in complete failure, and the troops of Army Group "Center" were forced to go on the defensive .
In order to decisively change the general situation on the Soviet-German front in our favor, it was necessary to smash the main strategic grouping threatening Moscow - Army Group Center. Having formed a sufficient number of new divisions, rifle and tank brigades, the Headquarters and the General Staff developed a counteroffensive plan, according to which, on December 5-6, 1941, the troops of the Western (commander General G.K. Zhukov), Kalininsky (commander General I.S. Konev) and the South-Western (commanded by Marshal S.K. Timoshenko) fronts launched a counteroffensive in a sector about a thousand kilometers long (album of schemes, scheme 44). It turned out to be a complete surprise for the enemy. (Video) As a result of counteroffensive operations, Klin, Istra, Kalinin, Sukhinichi, Belev were liberated, the siege of Tula was lifted, and the second tank army of the Nazis, having suffered serious losses, rolled back to the area north of Bryansk. A serious defeat was also inflicted on the enemy troops to the west of Moscow.
The defeat of a large grouping of Nazi troops in the central, Moscow direction created the conditions for the transition of Soviet troops to a general offensive, and in January 1942, up to April of this year, it was already carried out by 9 Soviet fronts. For 4 months, the enemy was driven back to the west by 100–350 km. The threat of taking Moscow was removed, the Moscow, Tula and Ryazan regions and many districts of other regions were completely cleared of invaders. The Soviet Army defeated 50 enemy divisions, the enemy ground forces alone lost more than 832 thousand people.
Thus, the victory in the battle for Moscow dispelled the myth of the invincibility of the Nazi armies, as it was the first major defeat of Germany in World War II. This victory marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War in favor of the Soviet Union.

3. Battle of Stalingrad.

In the spring of 1942, there was a relative calm, and both sides began to develop strategic plans for military operations.
The absence of a second front, which was to be opened as part of the allied obligations of the United States and England, allowed the fascist leadership to transfer additional forces and means to the Soviet-German front. As of May 1, 1942, there were 206 divisions, 26 brigades and 3 air fleets here. According to the plan of the fascist command, Germany in the summer offensive of 1942 was to achieve the military and political goals set by the Barbarossa plan. The main blow was supposed to be delivered on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, capturing the Donbass and the Caucasus, which was supposed to deprive the Soviet Union of oil and coal and disrupt its connection with foreign countries through the Caucasus and Iran. At the same time, an exit to the Volga in the region of Stalingrad was planned.
To solve these problems, Army Group South was divided into Army Group A (1st Panzer, 11th and 17th German and 8th Italian armies) and Army Group B (4th Panzer, 2nd and 6th German and 2nd Hungarian armies).
The Nazi command planned in the summer of 1942 to seize the strategic initiative again and with a decisive offensive to destroy the Soviet troops west of the river. Don.
Under these conditions, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to switch to strategic defense and simultaneously conduct a number of private offensive operations near Leningrad, in the Smolensk, Lvov-Kursk directions, in the Kharkov region and in the Crimea. The offensive of the main enemy forces began on June 28, and until mid-July, he sought to dismember the troops, first of the Southwestern, and then the Southern Fronts (album of schemes, scheme 42). Waging stubborn battles with the formations of the Bryansk and Southwestern fronts, the enemy broke through to Voronezh, the upper reaches of the Don and captured the Donbass. Having broken through the defenses of the Soviet troops between the Seversky Donets and Don rivers in a strip 170 km wide, he was able to develop the attack on the Caucasus with the main forces and part of the forces - directly to the east, to the Volga.
In these difficult conditions, from July 17, 1942, the great battle on the Volga unfolded, where, as part of Army Group B, the 6th Army of Field Marshal Paulus, consisting of 13 infantry and 5 tank divisions, dealt the main blow. This battle was called Stalingrad.
To cover the Stalingrad direction, the Stavka formed the Stalingrad Front (commanded by Marshal S.K. Timoshenko), consisting of the 62nd, 63rd and 64th armies. In addition, from the disbanded Southwestern Front, it included the 21st combined arms and 8th air armies, and later the 28th, 38th and 57th armies, which retreated with heavy losses, and the Volga military flotilla.
In total, the Stalingrad Front had 38 divisions, but only 18 of them were fully equipped, the rest numbered up to 4 thousand people.
The opposing group of Nazi troops outnumbered the Soviet troops in personnel - 1.2 times, in artillery and tanks - 2 times, in aviation - 3.6 times.
Powerful blow on the right flank of the 62nd Army, the enemy, at the cost of heavy losses, broke through the main line of defense and by July 25 reached the Verkhne-Buzinovka area. Up to three Soviet divisions and one tank brigade were surrounded, but the counterattack of the 1st and 4th tank armies, which had not completed the formation, together with the 13th tank corps, stopped the advance of the enemy and ensured the exit of the divisions from the encirclement. Despite the transfer of additional forces to the area of ​​the bend of the Don River (an increase in combat strength to 30 divisions) and a significant superiority in forces and means, the Nazis were unable to develop success in the 61st Army zone and seize the crossings across the river. Don near Kalach. Then they transferred their efforts to the south - to the zone of the 64th Army, where they reached the Don River and captured the crossing in the Nizhne-Chirskaya area.
As a result of the counterattack undertaken by the Soviet command on July 30, the enemy was stopped in this sector as well, which forced the fascist German command to turn the 4th Panzer Army from the Caucasian direction to Stalingrad. These measures allowed the enemy to break through to the Kotelnikovo area and create a direct threat of a breakthrough to Stalingrad from the southwest.
On July 28, the People's Commissar of Defense signed Order No. 227, which characterized the situation with harsh frankness and provided for the most extreme measures against those who would show cowardice and cowardice in battle. In particular, the so-called barrage detachments were introduced. The 51st Army was transferred to the Stalingrad Front, and on August 5, the Headquarters divided the Stalingrad Front into two: Stalingrad (63rd, 21st, 62nd, 4th Tank and 16th Air Armies) under the command of General V. N. Gordov and South-East (64th, 57th, 51st and 8th air armies) under the command of General A.I. Eremenko.
In the first half of August, the enemy tried to break through to Stalingrad from Kalach and Abganerovo, but was counterattacked and forced to go on the defensive. The enemy's plan - with the forces of the 6th Army to break through to Stalingrad on the move - was thwarted by the active defense of the Soviet troops in the large bend of the Don River and on the southwestern approaches to the city. For 3 weeks onset the enemy was able to advance only 60–80 km.
Then the Nazis tried to reach the Volga and capture Stalingrad by simultaneously delivering two attacks on August 19 in converging directions: from the Trekhostrovskaya, Vertyachiy area to the east by the forces of the 6th Army and from the Abganerovo area to the north by divisions of the 4th Panzer Army.
By the end of August 22, the German 6th Army crossed the Don River and on its eastern bank in the Peskovatka area captured a bridgehead 45 km wide, where it concentrated 6 divisions, and on August 23, the 14th Tank Corps broke through to the Volga River north of Stalingrad near the village Market and cut off the 62nd Army from the rest of the forces of the Stalingrad Front.
On the same day, a massive air strike , as a result of which 2 thousand sorties were carried out, and in air battles and anti-aircraft fire 120 German aircraft were destroyed.
On August 28, the actions of the troops of the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts stopped the enemy on the northwestern outskirts of Stalingrad. At the same time, on August 29, the enemy broke through the front of the 64th Army northwest of Abganerovo, and the troops of the 62nd and 64th armies were withdrawn to the inner defensive bypass of Stalingrad, where they kept defense until September 12th.
At the same time, the forces of the 24th and 66th armies, which reinforced the troops of the Stalingrad Front, together with the 1st Guards Army launched a series of counterattacks against the enemy, who had broken through to the Volga. This forced the enemy to turn a significant part of the 6th Army to the north and ease the conditions for the defense of the 62nd Army. The defensive operation of both fronts ended with the withdrawal of troops to the city defensive bypass. The plan of the Nazi command to seize Stalingrad on the move with simultaneous strikes by the 6th and 4th tank armies was thwarted.
The stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops forced the enemy to increase the composition of Army Group B to 80 divisions by the end of September (from 38 in July). Stalingrad was defended by the 62nd Army (commander General V.I. Chuikov) and the 64th Army (commander General M.S. Shumilov). Superiority in forces and means was on the side of the enemy, in some areas reaching 6 times in tanks and artillery, and in aviation 5 times.
September 13 to November 11 the Nazis made 4 attempts to storm the city, carrying out a total of more than 700 attacks, but, having exhausted all offensive capabilities, they could not capture Stalingrad.
During the four-month defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the victorious march of the Nazi troops, which began in 1939, was finally stopped. For 2 months of battles in this direction, the enemy lost 700 thousand personnel, 2 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1 thousand tanks and 1.4 thousand aircraft.
Simultaneously with the defensive battles in the Stalingrad direction, hostilities unfolded in the Caucasian sector of the Soviet-German front. The enemy planned to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops south and southeast of Rostov and take control of the North Caucasus, and then go to the regions of Novorossiysk, Sukhumi, Tbilisi and Baku, take control of the entire Transcaucasus and establish direct contact with the Turkish army.
Having a 1.5-fold superiority in personnel in this direction, 2 times in artillery, more than 9 times in tanks, and almost 8 times in aircraft, the enemy captured Maykop and Krasnodar by August 11, and from August 18 became to develop an offensive to the east with the task of capturing Grozny, and then Baku. However, attempts by the 1st Panzer Army to break through to Grozny failed.
In the Novorossiysk direction, on August 31, the enemy reached the Black Sea coast, captured Novorossiysk on September 10 and tried to break through to the northeast of the city, but was stopped by the stubborn resistance of the 47th Army. In general, although the Nazi troops captured a vast territory, they did not achieve the main goal of the offensive - capturing the Grozny and Baku oil regions and establishing direct links with Turkey.
By the heroic defense of the Caucasus, the Soviet troops stopped the enemy, inflicted irreparable losses on him and fettered his large forces, preventing them from being used near Stalingrad.
The concentration of the main efforts of both sides in the southern direction did not lead to a lull in other directions. In an effort to improve the position of their troops near Leningrad and Moscow, and also to prevent the transfer of additional Nazi forces to the south, the Soviet command in May-September 1942 conducted several private offensive operations in the northwestern and Voronezh directions. These active actions, having pinned down the main forces of the Army Groups Center and North, had a great influence on the outcome of the battles in the southwestern direction and even forced the enemy command to additionally transfer up to 25 divisions to the areas where these two army groups were located, including 9 divisions from the south.
All this taken together, as well as the heroic struggle of the partisans behind enemy lines, contributed to the solution of the main task of the campaign - to disrupt the offensive of the Nazi troops in the Stalingrad direction and in the Caucasus. In a hard and stubborn struggle, the Soviet troops exhausted and bled the enemy, stopping the offensive of his groupings in all directions.
As a result of the huge losses of the German fascist troops and the growing power of the Red Army, by the autumn of 1942 the balance of forces had changed in our favor.

Assignment for independent work:

Explanatory note

The history of military art explores the emergence and evolution of forms and methods of warfare, summarizes the experience of past wars, shows the development of military art and reveals the laws of this process, thereby creating the basis for the development of modern military theory. Military art is the theory and practice of preparing and conducting military operations on land, sea and in the air. Its constituent parts are: strategy, operational art and tactics, between which there is a close connection and interrelation.

The program of this course is intended for teaching students of the profile 10th grade of the defense and sports orientation. The volume is 68 hours, 2 hours per week throughout the year. The course is aimed at encouraging high school students to active self-knowledge, exploring their own cognitive resources and capabilities, developing analytical thinking, the ability to reason and draw conclusions.

The purpose of training:

To reveal the objective essence of the development of military art and the Armed Forces of Russia and the leading powers of the world.

Course objectives:

• to reveal the foundations of the dependence of the forms and methods of conducting military operations on the development of production, the socio-economic and political structure of society;
• reveal the influence of the masses and commanders on the development of military art;
• to assimilate the main periods and stages in the development of military art, its periodization;
• contribute to the formation of a patriotic worldview among students.

The theoretical part deals with the gradual improvement of strategy, operational art, tactics, weapons and the Armed Forces of Russia and the leading states of the world.

The practical part includes various types of creative independent work: writing essays, preparing reports, working with scientific literature. In addition to this, it is planned to watch video material in separate lessons.

The methods of conducting classes provide a quick and lasting assimilation of the material necessary for the further assimilation of the profile disciplines of this class of the defense and sports direction.

To enhance the perception of the elective course, the participation of the students themselves in the preparation and conduct of classes is envisaged. When conducting individual classes, it is advisable to involve a teacher of history, life safety, and physical education.

Reporting on the results of the course is carried out in the form of group and individual tasks. The quality of students' knowledge is ensured by the regularity of their work throughout the entire period of study.

The effectiveness of the course is evidenced by such indicators as the ability to recognize the differences in the gradual development of strategy, tactics, operational art, the ability to compare them on specific military historical events and facts.

The course program assumes the further development of students about the information and patterns of development of military art, armed forces and weapons.

Thematic plan

Section 1. The development of military art before the Great October Revolution (12 hours)

Topic 1. Military art in the era of a slave-owning society (1 hour).

History of the slave society. Types of troops. Weapon. Military training. Strategic defense of the times of A. Macedonian. Naval tactics.

Topic 2. Military art in the era of feudalism (1 hour).

The army is an instrument of feudal domination. The basis of the armed forces. Completion of troops in Russia. Tactics of the Knights. Development of strategy and tactics.

Topic 3. Armed forces (1h)

recruiting system. The impact of production growth on the growth of weapons and military equipment. Changes in the organizational structure of the troops. Fleet base. The transition of Peter 1 to a new way of education and upbringing.

Topic 4. Strategy (1h)

Centralized supply of troops from army bases and warehouses. The emergence of rapid-fire smoothbore weapons. "The Strategy of Destruction". Army mobilization plans.

Topic 5. Tactics (1 hour).

Line tactics. Mass armies. Tactics of columns and loose formation. Shooting line tactics. Creation of material foundations for the creation of massive regular armies.

Practical work: scheme - the development of battle formations in the 18-19th century.

Topic 6. Socio-economic conditions (1h).

The development of capitalism into imperialism. Achievements of science and technology. Private enterprises in the production of military products. The enhanced development of transport is a favorable factor in organizing the material and technical support of active armies.

Topic 7. Military art in the first wars of the era of imperialism (1h)

Spanish American War (1898). Fighting on about. Cuba. Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Widespread use of the telegraph and telephone.

Practical work: scheme - the Soviet Republic in the ring of fronts.

Topic 8. Military art in the First World War (1h).

Complication of the international situation. Creation of military-political alliances. Internal and external contradictions. Monopolies have arrived. World War I is an important stage in the history of military art and the development of the armed forces.

Topic 9. Final lesson (2 hours).

Protection of abstracts, discussion of reports.

Section 2. The military art of Russia and the leading countries of the world before the start of the Great Patriotic War

Topic 10. Creation of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Republic (2 hours).

The problem of the direct organization of the armed defense of the fatherland. Centralized command of the army. Construction of the Red Army. Command cadres of the Red Army. Rifle troops.

Topic 11. Strategy (1 hour).

nature of the civil war. Strategic offensive and strategic defense. Strategic planning of front actions.

Topic 12. Operational art and tactics (2 hours).

Offensive actions of the Red Army. Skillful choice of the direction of the main attack. Flank attack. Frontal impact. positional defense. maneuver defense. Command and directive management methods.

Topic 13. Construction and technical reconstruction of the Armed Forces in the period between the civil and military wars (1 hour).

Military reform (1924-1925). Law on Compulsory Military Service (September 18, 1925). Technical re-equipment. Creation of light high-speed tanks. Creation of motorized troops. development of bomber aviation. Ground troops.

Practical work: drawing up a diagram of an offensive operation of the front.

Topic 14. Military art (1 hour).

"Science of State Defense". Development of the theory of operational art. Conventional and shock armies. Rear management.

Topic 15. Armed forces and theories of Germany (2 hours).

Nazi dictatorship in Germany in 1933. The theory of tank warfare. The role of the branches of the armed forces. Air Force. Ground troops. Preparing the armed forces for war. The concept of "lightning war".

Topic 16. Armed forces and military theories of Italy (1h)

Types of armed forces. Ground troops. Air Force. expectant trend. Signing of the Steel Pact (1939).

Topic 17. Armed forces and military theories of Japan (1h).

Military Doctrine of Japan. Occupation of Manchuria. Aggressiveness of Japanese imperialism. Types of troops. Creation of a ring system. Military conflicts of 1938 and 1939.

Topic 18. Armed Forces and US military theories (1h).

Naval Forces. Air Force. US Ground Forces. The theory of naval warfare. Theory of passive defense.

Practical work: work with the test.

Topic 19. Preparation of the Second World War (1h)

Contradictions between Germany and Italy; England and France. Cap Camp finances Germany to boost the economy in this country. The economic crisis of 1929-1933 Translation of the entire German economy on a war footing. Five periods of the Second World War (1939-1945).

Practical work: compiling a crossword puzzle on the topic.

Topic 20. Armed aggression of Nazi Germany in Europe (1 hour).

Beginning of World War II. German-Polish war. Capture of Norway and Denmark by Nazi Germany. Defeat of the Anglo-French coalition.

Practical work: the scheme is the course of hostilities in the German-Polish war.

Topic 21. Final lesson (1 hour). Protection of the project, abstracts.

Section 3. The development of the military art of Russia and the leading countries of the world in the Second World War

Topic 22. The military-political situation on the eve of the Second World War (1 hour).

The perfidious policy of the imperialists. Direct preparation for an attack on the USSR. Three periods of the Second World War (1941-1945). Preparing the USSR for defense.

Topic 23. The development of Soviet military art (1h).

Organization of a smoothly and rapidly growing military economy. The use of strategic defense and strategic attack. Construction of defensive lines. Operational formation of fronts.

Practical work: drawing up a plan-review of the main military operations.

Topic 24. Partisan movement during the Second World War. Guerrilla tactics (2 hours).

Partisan tactics. Methods of fighting partisans. Raids deep behind enemy lines. Intelligence operations. The specifics of the actions of partisans behind enemy lines.

Practical work: compiling a questionnaire on the activities of the leading partisan detachments.

Topic 25. The program of the struggle of the Soviet people behind enemy lines (1 hour).

underground group activities. Mass participation of the entire population in the disruption of the economic and military measures of the occupiers. Creation of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD) in 1942

Practical work: compiling a crossword puzzle.

Topic 26. Forms of organization of partisan forces (1 hour).

Military training of partisans. Improving the management of partisan forces. Organization of radio communication. Staff-organizational structure of partisan formations.

Topic 27. Interaction of partisans with the Soviet Army (1h)

Organization of interaction. The struggle of Smolensk patriots with a group of General P.A. Belova. Undermining rails, water supply and rolling stock. Belarusian partisans.

Practical work: drawing up an abstract plan.

Topic 28. Results of the Second World War. Military-political results (2 hours).

The decisive defeat of fascist Germany and militaristic Japan. The Second World War is the most important and decisive part of the Second World War. Liberation mission of the USSR. Experience of the Second World War. Source of victory.

Practical work: preliminary listening to short reports on the upcoming project.

Topic 29. The main directions of the development of the Armed Forces (1h).

The structure of the armed forces. Engineering Troops. Signal Corps.

Topic 30. Characteristic features of the Soviet strategy (2 hours). The main objectives of the strategy. Defense goals. The Creative Character of Soviet Military Art. Preparation and conduct of operations to encircle and destroy large enemy groupings. Solving the problem of strategic interaction. Centralization of military leadership.

Practical work: scheme - organization of the offensive of the combined arms army.

Topic 31. Development of operational art (1h).

Front offensive operation. A skillful choice of the direction of the main attack of the front. Creation of shock groups. Forcing rivers in the process of pursuit. Ensuring the secrecy of the preparation and surprise of the strike.

Topic 32. Development of tactics (1 hour).

Joint efforts of all military branches. The construction of the battle formations of the troops. Development of defensive tactics. Improving the fire system in defense.

(NZO, PZO, DON, SO).

Topic 33. Final lesson (2 hours).

Protection of abstracts, reports.

Section 4. Armed forces and military art after the Second World War (16 hours)

Topic 34. Factors and conditions that determined the development of the Russian Armed Forces in the post-war period (1 hour).

Fundamental changes in the international situation. Restoration of the national economy. Cold War politics.

Topic 35. Development of the main means of armed struggle (2 hours).

Nuclear bomb test (Aug. 1949). Rocket and nuclear weapons. Increased firing range. A weapon that provides a high density of fire. Equipping the Air Force with jet aircraft. Development of air defense systems. Construction of nuclear submarines.

Topic 36. Construction of the Armed Forces and the organization of troops (2 hours).

Combining the efforts of all branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms. Five types of the USSR Armed Forces in the first post-war years. The disbandment of the rifle corps. Improving the organization of all types of troops.

Topic 37. The main directions of the development of military art (1h).

A counteroffensive developing into a strategic offensive. The theory of deep offensive operation. The theory of breaking through the defense of the enemy. Theory of military strategy.

Practical work: drawing up a diagram of the directions of military art.

Topic 38. Military-theoretical views (1h).

military doctrines. The concept of "realistic deterrence". The concept of conducting a general nuclear war. "Strategy of containment" of the military doctrine of France.

Topic 39. Development of the main types of weapons (2 hours).

Creation of powerful US nuclear bombs. The main directions of the development of missiles in the 70s. Improving the quality of armored vehicles. The development of anti-tank weapons. The development of fighter aircraft. Improvement of submarines. Anti-missile defense facilities. Sale of weapons by NATO countries.

Topic 40. Construction of the Armed Forces and the organization of troops (2 hours).

Agile response strategy. Armed forces of the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany. Nuclear missile-carrying submarine fleet. The combination of strategic aviation and ballistic missiles.

Topic 41. Development of military art (1h).

The decisive influence of nuclear weapons on the development of military art. Strategic nuclear strikes. Increasing the width of the offensive zone. Basic forms of maneuver in offensive combat. Tasks of operational and tactical airborne assault forces.

Practical work: work with tests.

Topic 42. Final lesson (2 hours).

Protection of projects, reports, abstracts.

Bibliography

Main

Danilov A.A. Kosulina L.G. History of Russia in the XX century. M., Education 2000.

Zhilin P.A. History of military art. M., Military publishing house. - 1986.

Zyryanov P.N. History of Russia in the 19th century. M., Education, 1997.

Kochetov N.S. History of Russia from ancient times to 2001 Volgograd: Uchitel, 2000.

Kochetov N.S. Non-standard lessons at school. Story. Volgograd: Teacher, 2001.

Kochetov N.S. Subject weeks at school. Volgograd: Teacher, 2001.

Levandovsky A.A. Russia in the XX century 10/11cl. M., Enlightenment, 1999

Mazing G.Yu. Rocket and gun. M., Publishing house DOSAAF USSR.-1987.

Hogg Jan. Submachine guns. "Eksmo-press", 2001.

Chernikova T.V. Profile education: a program of elective courses of a health-saving orientation. LLC "TC Sphere", 2006.

Additional

Goldina R.G. Silhouettes of melted centuries. - Izhevsk., 1996.

Eliseev G.A. History of religions. - M., 1997

Lerner I.Ya. development of students' thinking in the learning process. - M., 1982.

Neikhardt A.A. Seven Wonders of the Ancient World. - M., 1966.

Peach S., Millard E. The Greeks. - M., 1994.

Skorospelov A.I. Crosswords for schoolchildren. History. - Yaroslavl, 1997.

Toroptsev A. 1000 great battles from ancient times to the 11th century. - M., 2001.

METHODOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

(VUS-121000,121200)

Topic number 3: "Motorized rifle (tank) battalion in the main types of combat"

departments of signal troops

protocol no.

SOUTHERN RUSSIAN STATE TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF MILITARY TRAINING

MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION TROOPS, TACTICS AND GENERAL MILITARY DISCIPLINES

"I approve"

Head of the military department of the signal troops,

tactics and general military disciplines

Colonel A.Rendak

TEXT OF THE LECTURE

in the discipline "General tactics"

(VUS-121000,121200)

Topic No. 3 "Motorized rifle (tank) battalion in the main types of combat"

Updated: Considered at the meeting

departments of signal troops

protocol no.

Novocherkassk 2010

Lecture #3

Lesson 2. Modern combined arms combat

Educational, methodological and educational goals:

1. Familiarize students with the definition of tactics and show its dialectical connection with operational art and strategy.

2. To study the essence, characteristics, types and basic principles of conducting modern combined arms combat, means of armed combat at the tactical level.

3. To cultivate perseverance and purposefulness in mastering knowledge.

Time: 2 hours.

Lecture plan

Material support:

Literature:

1. General tactics. Textbook. M.: Ed. LLC "Katalit", 2008 p.5-45,

Introduction

Accept report. Check for trainees.

Announce the title of the topic and the lesson, educational questions and goals, ways to achieve them, highlight the corresponding electronic slide. Indicate the relationship of the proposed educational material with other disciplines and the relevance of the issues studied in the light of the upcoming military professional activity.

Main part

Name the first training question and, in accordance with the text of the lecture, bring the content of the training material to the personnel.

· Military art and its components;

· Essence and tasks of tactics;

The subject of tactics.

Remind the second educational question and, in accordance with the text of the lecture, bring the content of the educational material.

Pay special attention to the following concepts and definitions, which must be given under the record and illustrated with the appropriate slides (see the list of slides):

· Tactical actions and their forms;

· Combat and its components;

· Types of combat;

Types of fire and maneuver;

· Means of armed struggle.

When commenting on the content of the slide, it is advisable to give a clear definition of the essence of the issue, and then justify it.

Periodically control the work of students, bypass the audience, check the notes, evaluate the assimilation of the material by a survey of 2-3 cadets.

At the end of the presentation of the material, summarize the educational issue.

Final part

Remind the topic, learning objectives and the degree to which they have been achieved. Announce grades for answering questions. Give a task for independent work, highlight the corresponding slide of recommended literature for independent work. At the same time, it is advisable to give an extremely brief annotation.

Answer the questions. When answering questions, it is better not to repeat verbatim the provisions that were already mentioned during the lecture, but to give them additional evidence and justification, or, depending on the nature of the question, provide new material.

Give a command to end the lesson.

TEXT OF THE LECTURE

INTRODUCTION

Since ancient times, commanders have sought to find "elixirs" of victory. Centuries passed, countless military campaigns, battles were carried out, a sea of ​​​​human blood was shed, before inquisitive minds, comprehending the accumulated combat experience, analyzing the hidden springs and levers that determine the achievement of success, found guiding threads useful for practical activities, developed recommendations for the preparation and conducting the battle. Over time, they enriched themselves, formed into coherent theories.

Over the past millennia, tactics have gone through a long and complex path of development. On the pages of the military press in the past, there have been numerous discussions about whether tactics are science or art. The authors, who did not consider tactics to be a science, cited the following argument as their main argument: tactics cannot provide immutable rules of warfare suitable for all cases, and therefore cannot be a science, it is an art based only on the talent of military leaders. However, every science has its application to life, i.e. its art, and, conversely, every art has its own science, its own theory, which is a generalized experience, a generalized practice. Therefore, the question of what tactics is - science or art, should be answered: both. Tactics, like strategy and operational art, has its own scientific theory and its own art - the application of this theory to life.

The purpose of the lecture is to acquaint you with the basics of modern tactics as an integral part of military science.

MAIN PART

Tactics as an integral part of military art

The current military-political situation in the world over the past decade allows us to conclude that one of the main sources of wars and armed conflicts are conflicts on racial, ethnic and religious grounds, which also have an economic background. This makes it necessary to have armed forces that have the ability, together with other power structures of the country, to solve problems both in large-scale and in local wars and armed conflicts. The participation of the armed forces in solving tasks that are not entirely characteristic of them, for example, the destruction of illegal bandit formations, influenced the development of methods of armed struggle against them.

But in general, these ways of fighting are based on the basic theory of military art.

Military art includes three components (Slide #3) :

· strategy,

· operational art,

· tactics.

Each component has specific features of conducting armed struggle of various scales.

(Slide number 4) Strategy - the highest field of military art, covering the theory and practice of preparing the country and the armed forces for war, planning and conducting war and strategic operations.

(Slide number 5) Operational art includes the theory and practice of conducting operations (combat actions) by formations of the Armed Forces. Guided by the requirements of strategy, we can say that operational art explores (Slide number 6) :

the nature of modern operations;

regularities, principles and methods of their preparation and maintenance;

basics of the use of operational associations;

Issues of operational support;

· Fundamentals of command and control of troops in operations and their logistic support.

The use of the Ground Forces in armed struggle is carried out in the form of operations, battles and engagements. The first operations and combat actions carried out in the initial period of a war in order to repulse and frustrate the enemy's aggression are of paramount importance in modern conditions.

Combat is the only way to achieve victory by formations, units and subunits in an armed clash with the enemy. Tactics just studies the theory and practice of combat.

(Slide number 7) Tactics - theory and practice of preparing and conducting combat by subunits, units and formations of various branches of the Armed Forces, branches of service (forces) and special forces, using all, including the latest, means of armed struggle. It is subdivided into (Slide number 8) :

General tactics

· Tactics of branches of the Armed Forces, combat arms and special forces.

General tactics examines the patterns of combined arms combat and develops recommendations for its preparation and conduct by the joint efforts of subunits, units and formations of various types of armed forces, combat arms and special forces. The basis of general tactics is the tactics of the Ground Forces.

The general tactics and tactics of branches of the Armed Forces, combat arms and special forces are closely interconnected. General tactics determine the tasks of subunits, units, formations, branches of the Armed Forces, combat arms and special forces in combined arms combat, the order and methods of their joint use, and thereby influence the development of their tactics. In turn, changes in the tactics of branches of the Armed Forces, combat arms and special forces have an impact on the development of general tactics.

Tactics has two aspects - theoretical and practical.

Theory of tactics explores the content and nature of modern combat, reveals the patterns and principles of armed struggle, studies the combat capabilities of military formations, and develops methods of preparing and conducting combat. The theoretical provisions of tactics are reflected in regulations, manuals, textbooks, teaching aids, and military-theoretical works.

Practical aspect covers the activities of commanders, staffs and troops in the preparation and conduct of combat. It includes: collecting and studying situational data, making decisions and communicating tasks to subordinates, planning, preparing troops and terrain for combat, conducting combat operations, managing subunits, units and formations, and providing comprehensive combat support.

Tactics as close as possible to the practical activities of the troops; the level of its development, the quality of the tactical training of officers, staffs and combat arms largely determine the success of achieving victory in battle.

Therefore, the main requirement for the theory of tactics is that it stay ahead of practice, pave the way for it, reveal possible paths of development, and thereby accelerate the improvement of methods for preparing and conducting combined arms combat.

Tactics is also inextricably linked with other components of military art, its theory and practice are subordinated to the interests of strategy and operational art, guided by their requirements. In turn, under the influence of the rapid development of armaments and military equipment, tactics have a significant impact on operational art, and through it on strategy.

But tactics, as a science, does not stand still, changes in it are happening more and more rapidly as technical progress accelerates and the means of armed struggle and the morale and combat qualities of army personnel improve.

The introduction of nuclear weapons, the emergence and improvement of high-precision weapons, the continuous growth of firepower, strike force and maneuverability of troops, the introduction of automated command and control systems for troops and weapons have fundamentally changed the nature of the battle and the conditions for its conduct, they have given battle unprecedented decisiveness, maneuverability, dynamism and spatial span.

Significant changes in the capabilities of weapons and the further improvement of combat, technical and logistic support, command and control of troops and weapons create a qualitatively new material and technical basis for the development of combined arms combat tactics, necessitate the solution of emerging problems, a quick and correct response to a changing situation.

The importance of the commander's efficiency of thinking, foresight, reasonable initiative and independence of action has increased, quick and accurate operational-tactical calculations are required, a sharp reduction in the time for preparing a battle and solving problems of controlling units and subunits in the course of its conduct. Of particular importance is the ability to mislead the enemy about the true intentions by using various methods of deceiving him.

Tactics is designed to reveal these changes, to explore the nature of modern combat, its characteristic features, regularity, training, principles and methods of conducting.

Thus, as we can see, the range of tasks of tactics is extensive. It is determined by the level of development of armaments and military equipment, views on the nature of a future war, methods of unleashing and waging it, and specific tasks arising from operational art.

Since the troops must be ready to repel a surprise attack from a potential enemy, then the most important tasks of tactics are (Slide number 9, 10) :

development and implementation of measures to ensure the constant combat readiness of subunits, units and formations to perform combat missions in difficult ground, air and radio-electronic conditions;

development and improvement of methods of conducting combat operations in the initial period of the war;

study of the forces and means of the enemy, his views on their use in combat, as well as on the methods of conducting various types of combat;

identifying the strengths and weaknesses of weapons, equipment, organization of troops and enemy tactics;

study of management issues, comprehensive combat support;

development of requirements for the organizational structure of military formations and the level of combat training.

Tactics develops ways to use various types of modern weapons, as well as to protect troops from the same enemy weapons.

(Slide number 11) Tactical actions - organized actions of subunits, units and formations in the performance of assigned tasks using various types, forms and methods of action. The types of tactical actions include: offensive, defense, meeting engagement, location on the spot, march, transportation, exit from the battle, withdrawal, actions in the environment and when leaving it, change of units, tactical airborne assault and others.

(Slide number 12) Main types of tactical actions are defense and offensive , and the forms the battle , hit and maneuver .

(Slide number 13)The battle- the main form of tactical actions, units. It can be combined arms (ground), air, anti-air and sea. Modern combat of tactical formations, units and subunits is combined arms. This means that subunits, units and formations of various branches of the armed forces (motorized rifle, tank, etc.) and special forces, and in coastal areas - ships of the Navy according to a single plan and plan under the command of a general commander.

(Slide number 14) Combined-arms (ground) combat is organized and coordinated in terms of purpose, place and time strikes, fire and maneuver of subunits, units and formations to destroy (rout) the enemy, repel his strikes (attacks) and perform other tactical tasks in a limited area within a short time.

In battle, various combat forces and assets are used, built in specific battle formations, including motorized rifle, tank, artillery and anti-aircraft units, units of engineering and NBC protection troops, and others. Close and uninterrupted interaction of dissimilar forces and assets in a single combat order allows them to most successfully solve combat missions by mutually complementing each other's combat properties and capabilities, and ensures the most effective combination of strikes, fire and maneuver. From this it follows that the battle is a two-sided phenomenon, in which two groupings of forces and means are confronted, having one and the same goal - to defeat the enemy.

The means of achieving victory are weapons, military equipment and people, and the main means of destroying (rout) the enemy in battle is the fire. It prepares and accompanies the actions of subunits in the course of performing a mission, ensures their speed of action and creates the necessary conditions for the implementation of a maneuver. In defense, in essence, only fire in combination with obstacles, maneuver by subunits (fire weapons, servicemen) and fire predetermines the possibility of repelling an enemy offensive.

(Slide number 15) Fire in modern conditions is firing from various types of weapons and launching missiles in conventional equipment to hit targets or to perform other tasks. It differs in (Slide number 16) :

solved tactical problems,

types of weapons

ways of doing

tension,

shooting direction,

shooting methods,

types of fire.

According to the tactical tasks to be solved (Slide number 17) it is aimed at destruction, suppression, exhaustion, destruction, smoke, etc.

The destruction of a target consists in inflicting such losses (damage) on it, in which it completely loses its combat capability: the crew (crew) is destroyed or the equipment of the combat vehicle is disabled. The probability of hitting individual targets is 0.7 - 0.9 or the mathematical expectation of the number of hit targets from the group target (squad, platoon, battery, etc.) is 50-60%.

Suppression of a target consists in inflicting such losses (damage) on it, in which it is temporarily deprived of its combat capability, its maneuver (by fire, movement) is limited (forbidden), or control is disturbed. The mathematical expectation of the number of hit targets is 25-30%.

Exhaustion consists in the moral and psychological impact on the enemy's manpower by conducting restless fire with a limited number of guns (mortars), tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, other fire weapons and ammunition for a set time.

The destruction of the target consists in bringing it into an unusable state, and the defensive structures cannot be used for further actions.

By type of weapon, it is divided into fire from small arms, grenade launchers, flamethrowers, tanks (tank guns and machine guns), infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers), artillery, mortars, anti-tank missile systems, anti-aircraft weapons and other means.

(Slide number 18) According to the methods of conducting fire, it can be direct and semi-direct fire, from closed firing positions, and another.

Direct fire is called aiming, which is carried out when firing from an open firing position at an observed target (the target is visible in the sight). It is usually carried out from a machine gun (machine gun, sniper rifle), hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher, infantry fighting vehicle (APC), artillery pieces, anti-tank missile systems and other means.

Indirect aiming is called when the weapon's position for firing is set along the horizon with the help of an azimuth indicator (goniometer), and in height - with the help of a side level. Such aiming is carried out when firing from tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery pieces from closed firing positions, at night and in other conditions when the target is not visible to the shooter.

Semi-direct aiming is used when the target is visible in the sight, but the distance to it exceeds the slicing of the sight scales. Semi-direct fire is carried out from tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (BTR), ATS-17 and other weapons.

(Slide number 19) According to the intensity of shooting, fire can be single shots, short or long bursts, continuous, dagger, fluent, methodical, salvo and others.

Dagger fire (only for small arms) - fire opened suddenly from close distances in one direction. It is prepared at distances not exceeding the range of a direct shot at the pectoral figure, and is carried out from carefully camouflaged positions with maximum tension until the enemy is completely destroyed or his attempts to advance in this direction are prevented.

Rapid fire is conducted from one or more tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, guns and mortars; shots follow one after the other as soon as they are ready at the maximum rate, without violating the fire regime and without compromising the accuracy of aiming.

Methodical fire - fire, in which, according to one command, each subsequent shot is fired in a certain sequence at established (equal) intervals of time. It can be fired by tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, guns and mortars.

Volley fire - fire in which shots (launches) from several tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, guns, mortars, rockets, rocket launchers and carbines are fired simultaneously or in the shortest possible time on command (signal) of the unit commander.

Fire in the direction of fire is distinguished as frontal, flank and cross (Slide number 20) .

Frontal fire - fire directed perpendicular to the front of the target (the enemy's battle formation). It is carried out from small arms, anti-tank weapons, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (APCs) and other fire weapons.

Flank fire - fire directed at the flank of the target (the enemy's battle formation). It is conducted from small arms, anti-tank weapons, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (APCs), and sometimes from guns.

Crossfire - fire directed at a target from at least two directions.

(Slide #21) Fire, in addition, differs in the methods of firing from a place, from a stop (from a short stop), on the move, from the side, with dispersion along the front, with dispersion in depth, over an area, and others.

(Slide number 22) types - fire on a separate target, concentrated, barrage, multi-layered, multi-tiered and others.

Fire at an individual target (machine gun, tank, infantry fighting vehicle (APC), ATGM, KNP, etc.) is carried out by one fire weapon (automatic, grenade launcher, machine gun, tank, infantry fighting vehicle (APC), gun), artillery (mortar) platoon or battery.

Concentrated fire (CO) - the fire of several tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, machine guns, machine guns or other fire weapons, as well as the fire of one or more subunits, fired at one target or part of the enemy's battle formation. It is used to destroy important targets and is conducted in certain areas, the size of which is determined by the fire capabilities of the subunits and depends on the power of the ammunition used and the amount of funds involved. For a tank platoon (3 tanks), the SO section can be up to 120 m wide (40 m per gun), 100 m deep (due to natural dispersion - the best part of the dispersion ellipse); for a platoon on an infantry fighting vehicle - up to 75 m (25 m per gun) and 50 m, respectively; for small arms of a motorized rifle platoon, a CO section with a density of 10-12 bullets per 1 linear meter can be up to 100 m. Concentrated fire from machine guns and light machine guns at ground targets is conducted at ranges up to 800 m, air - up to 500 m; from PKTiPK machine guns - up to 1000 m.

Multi-layered fire is fire fired simultaneously from machine guns, machine guns, grenade launchers, infantry fighting vehicles (APCs), tanks, guns, mortars and other fire weapons at the enemy in front of the front of the platoon (company, battalion) operations to a depth of 400 m. It is prepared and conducted to repel enemy attacks on the defensive and counterattacks on the offensive.

Tiered fire is fire fired from machine guns, machine guns, grenade launchers, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (APCs) and other fire weapons located at several tiers in height against the enemy in front of the front of the platoon, company and battalion during defense in the mountains and in the city.

(Slide number 23)Hit- a form of tactical action. It consists in the simultaneous and short-term defeat of enemy groupings of troops and objects by a powerful impact on them with all available means of destruction or by the offensive of troops (strike by troops). (Slide number 24) Depending on the weapons used, strikes can be nuclear and fire, according to the means of delivery they are divided into missile, artillery and aviation, and according to the number of participating means and objects hit - massive, group and single.

A troop strike is a combination of fire and movement of tank, motorized rifle subunits and units, airborne assault forces in order to develop success and complete the defeat of the enemy and capture the designated area (line, object). Therefore, a strike is most characteristic of an offensive, primarily for its decisive element - an attack. In defense, it is usually used when counterattacking. The impact force of attacking (counterattacking) subunits and units is determined primarily by their firepower, the speed (tempo) of movement, and the suddenness of its delivery.

(Slide number 25)Maneuver- a form of tactical action, which is an organized movement of units (fire weapons, military personnel) in the performance of assigned tasks in order to occupy an advantageous position in relation to the enemy and create the necessary grouping of forces and means, as well as the transfer or retargeting (massage, distribution) of strikes and fire to effectively defeat the most important enemy groupings.

The maneuver is carried out by subunits (fire weapons) and fire. AT defense unit maneuver is used to (Slide number 26) :

change position to a more advantageous one,

more reliable cover of the threatened direction,

strengthening (or replacing) the unit located on it,

getting out from under the blow of the enemy,

firing line practice

Entering the line of transition to a counterattack.

AT offensive unit maneuver is carried out for (Slide number 27) :

building up efforts in the direction of the success achieved by introducing the second echelon into battle,

moving part of the units of the first echelon from one direction to another, to attack the enemy in the flank and rear,

· to occupy an advantageous line to repel an enemy counterattack.

Types of maneuver (Slide number 28) divisions are: coverage, bypass, departure and change of area(locations, strong points, positions), and fire weapons - change of firing positions. Coverage - a maneuver carried out by subunits in the course of operations to reach the flank (flanks) of the enemy and attack him. Detour - a deeper maneuver performed by subunits to reach the rear of the enemy. Envelopment and detours are carried out in close tactical and fire cooperation with subunits advancing from the front. Withdrawal and change of positions - a maneuver carried out by subunits (fire weapons) in order to get out from under the blows of a superior enemy, prevent encirclement and occupy a more advantageous position for subsequent actions. It is carried out only with the permission of the senior commander. The change of firing positions is carried out by infantry fighting vehicles (APCs), tanks, anti-tank missile systems, grenade launchers, machine guns, artillery and mortar units, as well as personnel to increase their survivability by reducing the effectiveness of enemy fire and misleading him about their true location. It is carried out by the decision of the commander to whom they are subordinate.

Maneuver by subunits should be simple in concept, carried out quickly, covertly and suddenly for the enemy.

For its implementation, the results of enemy fire engagement (fire), open flanks, gaps, terrain folds, hidden approaches, aerosols (smoke) are used, and in defense, in addition, trenches and communication passages and, if necessary, the optimally expedient amount of forces and means is involved with spending minimal time.

Fire maneuver is used to more effectively defeat the enemy. It consists in the simultaneous or successive concentration of platoon (squad) fire on the most important enemy targets or in the distribution of fire from several targets, as well as in redirecting to new targets.

In this way, The theory and practice of combined-arms combat must be constantly improved, taking into account the requirements of strategy, operational art and changes in the material basis of combat, and the level of tactical art of commanders, staffs and troops must be continuously raised.

The role of tactics in modern conditions, as the experience of local wars confirms, is great. Therefore, tactical training is the most important part of the combat training of troops, the leading academic discipline in military educational institutions.

Following the collapse of the USSR, following the historical necessity, Russia developed the Military Doctrine, which on November 2, 1993, was approved by decree of the President of the Russian Federation as the "Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation." In many ways, this document continued the military-political line of the Soviet Union at the last stage of its existence, fixed on May 29, 1987 in Berlin by the signatures of the heads of the socialist states as the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact countries. The doctrine of 1993 (now Russia) has changed practically nothing in the theory of the Armed Forces, new views on ways to improve the army and navy, when compared with the doctrine of 1987, are not presented.

Unfortunately, neither the doctrine of 1987 nor the doctrine of 1993 said anything about the naval component, nor was naval art (NMI) singled out, although by the end of the 80s it was far ahead of the practice of using even a powerful Soviet Navy. True, after the adoption of the doctrine in 1993, there was a positive theoretical shift in relation to the maritime component. Its essence is as follows. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 11 of January 17, 1997 approved the Federal Target Program "World Ocean". The program clearly spells out specific areas that determine the development of the Navy in the 21st century. Here, the Navy is defined as one of the most important instruments for protecting Russia's military-strategic interests in the World Ocean, and it is also noted that "military force retains its importance as a means of ensuring the national interests and goals of the state, and, if necessary, a means of curbing aggression."

The Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of March 4, 2000 approved the "Marine Policy of Russia". Attached separately to this decree are "Fundamentals of Russian Policy in the Field of Naval Activities until 2010". These documents outlined the main goals for the development of the Navy, clarify the importance of the Navy in the Military Doctrine of Russia. April 21, 2000 the new Military Doctrine is approved by presidential decree. The document emphasizes that the doctrine realistically assesses the military-political situation in the world, in the regions and reveals the nature of external and internal threats to Russia's national interests, including in the World Ocean. Moreover, on July 27, 2001, the Naval Doctrine of Russia was also approved.

It is noted that at present there is a great possibility of confrontation, various conflict situations on the seas and oceans. There are many prerequisites and geopolitical reasons for this. For example, unlike the land area, the vast water area of ​​the World Ocean is not divided. The raw materials of the Earth on the continents are limited in reserves and will be used up within tens of years, not even centuries. And 71% of the globe is the oceans. And it is in it that virtually untouched innumerable energy and food reserves are hidden. At the same time, since ancient times, the seas and oceans have been a vast field of military operations for military fleets - due to the clash of interests of various states or their alliances. That is, there has always been a military threat to this or that state, including Russia, at sea and from the sea. In addition, now the sea power of our country is significantly reduced.

Most of the oceans are the open sea, the so-called. "neutral waters". Consequently, the wealth of these waters can be used by any state. However, as in the past on land, a period will come when the division of wealth will begin, but now it is no longer land, but the World Ocean. It can be unequivocally stated that a weak naval rival will not be allowed to participate in this division. Weakness refers to both the size of the Navy and their ability to defend themselves and water areas that will be divided or seized. Even today, a number of states never for a moment leave the waters of the oceans. It is known that by the beginning of the 21st century, more than 130 warships from the navies of 16-20 states were daily in its seas. Their tasks were different, but many groups operated in areas from which strikes by carrier-based aircraft and high-precision weapons (Tomahawk missile defense systems) are possible on 80% of the territory of the Russian Federation, on which 60-65% of the Russian military-industrial potential is concentrated. That is, in addition to the struggle for the division of the World Ocean, there really exists a military threat to Russia's national interests from maritime directions. It should be taken into account that, according to some estimates, with the current dynamics of development of the Russian Federation, by 2015 it will have only 60 ships, of which 30 will be surface and 30 will be submarines. At the same time, the NATO naval grouping has more than 800 ships, and the fleets of the North Atlantic Alliance are improving their tactical and operational training every day, almost constantly performing certain tasks in the oceans.

Consequently, it is extremely important for Russia to actively build a new fleet. But an equally urgent task is to create for him a coherent system for the preparation and conduct of operations and combat operations at sea. For the ocean fleet, this system, by analogy with the recent past, should have three scales: strategic, operational and tactical. The construction of the fleet and the improvement of naval art are inseparable from the maritime policy of the state, which ensures its national interests in the oceans. Undoubtedly, in modern conditions, the priority in ensuring these interests belongs to non-military methods. But, unfortunately, mankind is still far from solving its problems only by peaceful means. War, as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, includes an obligatory element - armed struggle. How a country prepares and conducts this armed struggle is investigated by a special area - military science. In turn, the most important component of this science is the art of war, which covers issues related to the preparation and conduct of armed struggle in general, as well as various scale operations and combat operations - both on land and in the air and at sea. Thus, depending on the scale of operations, military art consists of three complementary components: strategy, operational art, and tactics. The highest field of military art is strategy. It explores the large-scale problems of armed struggle, the solution of which, ultimately, determines victory in the outbreak of war. Thus, in a broad sense, military strategy should be viewed as Russia's policy in the field of defense, expressed in plans for preparing the country and the Armed Forces to repel an attack from outside, followed by the defeat of the attacking side.

In contrast to strategy, the lower levels in terms of the scale of action are considered by two other components of military art - operational art and tactics. Operational art occupies an intermediate position between strategy and tactics and plays a connecting role between them. The specificity of the composition and nature of each branch of the Armed Forces and the conditions for solving their inherent tasks necessitates the development of operational art for each branch of the Armed Forces, including the Navy.

Tactics is a field of military art that embraces the theory and practice of combat by subunits, units, and formations. It is subordinated to operational art and strategy and follows from them. Compared with them, tactics are more mobile and sensitive to all changes in the material basis of warfare, in people and military equipment. It is people and military equipment that have a direct impact on the means and methods of combat.

Each branch of the Armed Forces, including the Navy, has its own methods of action, its own tactics, and within each branch, its own tactics of the branches of forces (troops).

The strategy, as well as the operational art and tactics subordinate to it, as a system of knowledge, must correspond to the current policy and the real capabilities of the country, that is, the accepted doctrine. For the Navy, due to its specifics, this system of knowledge is called naval science (Theory of the Navy), which has its own most important part - naval art. Contemporary naval arts include: the strategic use of the Navy, the operational art of the Navy, and the tactics of the Navy. There is a close connection and interdependence between these parts. The strategic use of the Navy is the highest field of naval art, which, proceeding from the tasks of military strategy, has a decisive influence on the development of the operational art and tactics of the Navy and sets tasks for them. Operational art and tactics serve the strategic use of the Navy, ensuring that it achieves its goals and objectives in war.

The main task of the Russian Navy, as follows from the above documents, in peacetime is to carry out combat service in readiness to use weapons (the task of countering terrorism at sea has recently been added); in wartime - active military operations to defend its coast and prevent attacks from the sea on land targets of the country by enemy missile submarines and aircraft carriers. Thus, the objects against which military operations will have to be carried out in the World Ocean and on the seas washing the coast of Russia or adjacent to them are aircraft carriers, missile submarines, anti-submarine forces, groups of surface ships cruising in the seas adjacent to the waters of Russia or located in areas of the World Ocean, from which their weapons are capable of hitting objects on our territory or affecting our ship groups.

The Russian Navy, in the event of a war in which maritime countries confront us, the following types of maritime operations can be carried out (each one solves only one task, in contrast to the fleet operation, which is possible in the future):

• a naval operation to destroy enemy ground facilities (it will be carried out in concert with the actions of the Strategic Missile Forces and be an integral part of their operation);
• - a naval operation to destroy enemy missile submarines;
• - a naval operation to defeat the enemy navy in closed seas and ocean areas adjacent to the coast;
• - a naval operation to disrupt (disrupt) enemy ocean and sea transportation;
• - a naval operation to destroy enemy anti-submarine forces;
• - a naval operation to defend their base areas and sea lanes (i.e. this operation consists of solving two interrelated tasks).

All of the above applies to the operational art of the Navy. And this is perhaps the main part of modern naval art. At the same time, it should be emphasized that in any operation, weapons are used by each branch of the forces (this is a set of means of destruction, delivery, control, etc.), and most importantly, people who own these weapons act. They are the most important element that determines the outcome of hostilities at sea. But this is already tactics - a stage of naval art, subordinated to operational art. It seems that the tactics that were worked out in the Soviet Navy can now be fully used in the Russian fleet. And this is not just continuity, but the most holistic way to restore the combat capability of the current Russian fleet.

Historical aspect of naval art

In Europe, during the era of early feudalism (before the 10th century), fleets and naval art did not receive significant development. During the heyday of feudalism in Europe, progress was made in shipbuilding. From 10-11 centuries. sailing ships appear, then - navigation aids (compass, sextant, sea charts), which allows you to make long voyages on the high seas. In the 15-16 centuries. there is a transition from the rowing fleet to the sailing fleet, which was completed by the middle of the 17th century. From the 14th century sailing ships are equipped with artillery. The strategy of the emerging in the 15-16 centuries. colonial empires (Spain, Portugal, later England, France, Holland) increased the role of the fleet in wars, changed the nature of its actions and entrusted the fleet with the fulfillment of independent tasks of disrupting enemy communications and defending its sea lanes. However, the tactics of the first sailing fleets of the 15th-16th centuries. still differed little from the methods of conducting a rowing fleet battle.

In the 17th century permanent, regular military fleets were created, which became an important military means of implementing the foreign policy of the state. Further development of naval artillery, its use as the main weapon in naval battles in the Anglo-Dutch wars of the 17th century. made fundamental changes in the combat composition, organizational structure of the sailing fleet and its tactics; the classification of ships was established and their tasks were determined. Battleships formed the basis of the strike power of the fleets. Frigates, artillery rowboats and fireships were assigned an auxiliary role in naval battles and blockade operations. A combat organization of the fleet was formed. The ships began to unite into squadrons under the unified command of the flagship. The conduct of combat operations by large forces of fleets of a heterogeneous composition increased the requirements for managing a squadron in a naval battle, the outcome of which, to a much greater extent than before, began to be determined by the skill of the flagship - the squadron commander. The main tactical form of conducting naval combat by squadrons of fleets was linear tactics, which provided for the maneuvering of ships in the battle line (wake column). This tactic ensured the most efficient use of artillery mounted on ships along the sides in several rows. The ram began to be used less and less. Boarding persisted throughout the existence of sailing fleets. Linear tactics dominated throughout the 17th and 18th centuries.

A significant contribution to the development of naval art in the first quarter of the 18th century. introduced Russian naval art, which manifested itself in the Northern War of 1700-21 against a strong naval enemy - Sweden. Instead of the coastal raids carried out at that time by the fleets of Western countries, the struggle on communications and the general battle of the fleets, Peter I used a more decisive and reliable method of waging war by occupying the naval bases and coasts of the enemy with joint actions of the army and navy. His tactical art is characterized by: the organization of constant interaction between the fleet and the army, the decisive actions of the fleet to destroy the enemy forces using forms of maneuver unexpected for him (covering the flanks, cutting through the formation, encirclement, boarding, etc.). The generalized experience of the combat operations of the fleet under Peter I was outlined in the Naval Charter of 1720. the effectiveness of naval artillery (increasing the firing range, lethal and destructive power of the cannonball, accuracy of fire) came into conflict with the tactical form of its use - linear tactics. Russian admirals G. A. Spiridov and F. F. Ushakov for the first time in the practice of naval combat abandoned the templates of linear tactics and laid the foundations for a new form of combat use of the fleet - maneuvering tactics. Their naval art was distinguished by high activity, decisive action in achieving the set goals, good organization of the interaction of all forces and was manifested in the victories of the Russian fleet over the Turkish in the battles in the Chios Strait (1770), near about. Tendra (1790) and at Cape Kaliakria (1791).

The first attempts to theoretically substantiate the maneuverable form of naval combat were reflected in the work of the Englishman J. Clerk "The Experience of Naval Tactics" (parts 1-4, 1790-97, Russian translation "Movement of the Fleets", 1803), in which he based analysis of the reasons for the failures of the English Navy in the battles of the mid-18th century. outlined some recommendations for changing linear tactics and introducing maneuvering principles of naval combat. However, in the naval art of the major maritime powers (Great Britain, France, Spain, Holland), linear tactics continued to dominate until the end of the 18th century. The naval victories of the English admiral G. Nelson at Abukir (1798) and Trafalgar (1805) and the Russian admiral D. N. Senyavin in the battle of Athos (1807), in which the principles of maneuvering combat were used, contributed to the establishment of maneuver tactics in the naval art . In addition to maneuvering the squadron, this tactic provided for a more complete use of artillery and disruption of command and control of enemy fleet forces, greater independence in maneuvering individual ships. This introduced new content into the tactics of a single ship and made increased demands on the commander in the art of control and use of the ship's weapons in battle.

The further development of capitalist production, science, and military technology made it possible to improve the design of warships, their sailing and artillery armament. The experience of the Crimean War of 1853-56 showed the advantages of steam-powered ships over sailing ships in maneuvering sea battles. In the 2nd half of the 19th century. in the UK, USA, France, steam ships with armor protection were created. The battleships with powerful artillery weapons and strong armor became the basis of the strike power of the fleets. There were also cruisers, minelayers, destroyers. Changes in the material and technical base of the fleet required the development of tactics for using armored squadrons in naval combat. Russian scientists have made a significant contribution to this issue. Admiral G. I. Butakov in his work “New Foundations of Steamship Tactics” (1863) summarized the experience of combat operations of steam ships and proposed rules for their restructuring in a squadron for naval combat. These rules have received recognition in all fleets of the world. Admiral A. A. Popov, based on the experience of the Crimean War, was the first to correctly assess the great importance of the armored fleet in combat operations at sea. Admiral S. O. Makarov, based on the experience of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78, for the first time outlined the tactics of using mine-torpedo weapons. In his Discourses on Naval Tactics (1897), he was the first to approach the development of armored fleet tactics as a science. In this and other works, Makarov substantiated the need for the interaction of artillery and mine-torpedo ships in a sea battle, theoretically substantiated the expediency of using a wake formation when building battle formations of armored squadrons, and formulated the principles of mine and anti-submarine defense.

In the 90s. 19th century Rear Admiral A. Mahan, one of the creators of the American naval strategy, and Vice Admiral F. Colomb, an Englishman, tried to substantiate the theory of "dominance at sea." They associated this theory with the establishment of American and British world domination by creating overwhelming naval superiority in armored ships of the line and destroying hostile war fleets in one pitched battle. Colomb promoted the "eternal and unchanging" laws of naval warfare, mechanically transferred the methods and forms of warfare at sea by sailing fleets to the steam fleet, and did not take into account the development of new combat forces and means of the fleet. He contrasted the fleet with the army, underestimated the importance of the ground forces, and did not take into account the general course and outcome of hostilities on land and at sea as a whole. The military ideologists of the USA and Great Britain after the 2nd World War of 1939-1945 again turned to the works of Mahan and Colomb to substantiate their ideas about world domination.

In the course of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, naval art was enriched by the experience of conducting combat operations in the defense of naval bases (the defense of Port Arthur) and conducting anti-blockade operations, in which ships of the fleet, coastal artillery, mines and torpedoes were used. The first attempts to use torpedoes and mines showed that artillery, while remaining the main weapon for striking, has ceased to be the only means of combat impact on the enemy. It became necessary to create new classes of ships (battleships, minesweepers, etc.) and new models of mine and artillery weapons. The basics of tactics for conducting large-scale naval battles with the participation of significant forces of armored ships were born (the Battle of Tsushima, the battle in the Yellow Sea, the actions of the Vladivostok detachment of ships, etc.). According to the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, battleships were recognized as the decisive force in the struggle at sea in many fleets of the world. The experience of mine action pointed to the need to organize the daily combat activities of the fleet in the struggle to ensure a favorable regime in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bits bases. Light cruisers began to be used in the fleets of many countries to conduct reconnaissance, combat destroyers, and operate on sea lanes. The military doctrines of the maritime powers did not undergo significant changes after the Russo-Japanese War. As before, it was believed that the conquest of supremacy at sea should be achieved through a general battle of the main forces of the fleets.

During the 1st World War of 1914-1918, destroyers were recognized as universal-purpose ships, light cruisers and especially submarines were used, which turned into an independent branch of the Navy and successfully solved not only tactical, but also operational tasks. This prompted the creation of patrol ships and submarine hunters. Other new classes of ships also appeared - aircraft carriers, torpedo boats, landing craft. The share of large surface artillery ships in combat operations has decreased. Basically, a new kind of naval forces took shape - naval aviation. Achieving strategic goals by conducting one general battle, as envisaged by the Anglo-American doctrine of "dominance at sea", became impossible. Naval art put forward a new form of combat activity of the fleet - an operation that necessitated appropriate measures to ensure it: operational reconnaissance, camouflage, defense of large surface ships during sea passage and in battle from submarines, logistics, etc. further development of the daily combat activities of the fleet to create a favorable operational regime in the area of ​​​​its bases, coast and in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bcombat operations. Russian naval art developed methods for conducting a sea battle on a previously prepared mine and artillery position as a necessary measure in the fight against a stronger enemy. Such a position was created in the Baltic Sea on the line of about. Nargen - the Porkkala-Udd Peninsula in order to prevent the German fleet from breaking into the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. It consisted of several lines of minefields placed across the Gulf of Finland, and coastal artillery batteries on the flanks of positions. In the rear of this position, the main forces of the fleet were deployed and operated. The experience of the war confirmed the effectiveness of this form of naval combat operations in the coastal area against superior enemy forces.

Elements of Soviet naval art originated during the years of the Civil War and the military intervention of 1918-20, when the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Fleet, created by the young Soviet Republic, defended the approaches to Petrograd from the sea, supported the Red Army units on the coast with artillery fire, and ensured the suppression of the White Guard rebellion on the forts "Krasnaya Gorka" and "Gray Horse", landed troops and fought against the lake and river forces of the enemy. The construction of the Navy, which was widely developed due to the successes of socialist industrialization, in the years of the pre-war five-year plans went in the direction of creating surface ships, submarines, naval aviation and coastal artillery modern for that time.

In the period between the 1st and 2nd World Wars, Soviet naval art created the foundations for the operational use of the fleet in various types of hostilities and in joint operations with ground forces in coastal areas, the tactics of the actions of the heterogeneous forces of the Navy, the foundations for interaction between them in naval combat, which are reflected in the Manual on the conduct of naval operations, the Combat Charter of the Navy and other documents published on the eve of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

Naval art in other states after the 1st World War was characterized by the presence of different, often opposing views on the use of the Navy in war. The “omnipotence” of the battle fleet, undermined in the 1st World War, led to the fact that many military theorists began to oppose one type of naval forces to another, trying to find one that could ensure dominance at sea, defended the principles of a general battle, refuted by the course of the war . At the same time, the development of existing and the emergence of new forces and means of struggle necessitated a revision of outdated views. Before the start of World War II, fleets were replenished with aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, torpedo boats, and naval aviation. Radar and hydrolocation have been developed. In military doctrines, the developing forces of combat at sea (aviation, submarines, etc.) and new methods of combat operations initially did not find a proper reflection.

In World War II of 1939-1945, despite the fact that its outcome was decided on land, the scope of armed struggle at sea increased significantly compared to previous wars.

The main content of military operations in the Pacific in 1941-45 consisted of amphibious and antiamphibious operations, strikes against enemy fleet forces at sea, in bases, and combating communications. In the Pacific Ocean, landings were made on about. Leyte (1944), Marshall and Mariana Islands (1944), Fr. Okinawa (1945), in the Mediterranean theater of operations - in Algeria and Morocco (1942), on about. Sicily, in Southern Italy (1943), etc. In total, more than 600 large landings were landed, 6 of them were of a strategic scale. The largest was the Normandy landing operation of 1944. By the beginning of the war, a qualitatively new force appeared in the fleets - aircraft carriers, and the proportion of coastal-based aviation increased in the struggle in closed naval theaters. Carrier aviation moved into the ranks of the main forces of the fleets. Collisions between aircraft carrier formations grew into the largest naval battles of the 2nd World War, during which aircraft carriers were the main striking force and objects of strikes. The use of carrier-based aviation made it possible to conduct naval battles in conditions when the groups of ships of the belligerents were hundreds of miles apart. Groupings of surface forces, covered by carrier-based fighters, were able to operate off the coast of the enemy. Features of the military-geographical conditions of the Pacific theater of operations (the presence of large island archipelagos) revealed the need for long-term combat operations in island areas, where by disrupting enemy communications, suppressing aviation at airfields and in the air, one of the parties could achieve the complete depletion of island garrisons and subsequent landing with little enemy opposition.

The peculiarity of the situation that developed during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 on the Soviet-German front required the use of the fleet primarily for joint operations with the ground forces. The fleet also carried out independent operations and conducted combat operations on enemy sea lanes and in defense of its lanes. The combat operations of the fleet were characterized by the extensive use of diverse forces, and especially by fleet aviation, which was greatly developed during the war. Naval art was enriched by the experience of landing operations (the Novorossiysk and Kerch-Eltigen operations of 1943, the Moonsund operation of 1944, the Kuril landing operation of 1945, etc.), the use of submarines and combating enemy submarines.

In the course of World War II, the naval operation established itself as the main form of employment of the diverse forces of the fleet in armed struggle at sea. Conducting operations over vast areas of the seas and oceans according to a single plan and under a single command increased the requirements for organizing interaction between groupings of forces (operational interaction), between forces in naval battles (tactical interaction) and for command and control of forces in operations and battles. Of particular importance was the secrecy of the preparation of the operation, thorough reconnaissance, swiftness of maneuver, the conquest of air supremacy in the area of ​​the operation, as well as the organization of combat, special and logistic support. Submarines and naval aviation were recognized as the main striking force of the fleet. Naval art developed new tactics for using submarines (group actions) and aviation (massive raids from several directions). With the equipping of fleets with radar surveillance and more advanced hydroacoustics, the methods of firing and tactics of artillery combat of surface ships improved, and the tactical methods of submarines for searching for and attacking targets at sea and evading aircraft and anti-submarine ships were developed. Large artillery ships (battleships, cruisers), due to their great vulnerability to submarines and especially aviation, have lost the role of the main strike force in military operations at sea. Their actions were reduced mainly to assisting the ground forces (fire support for the landing force, artillery shelling of the coast, etc.). In landing operations, the forms of interaction between the forces of the fleet and the ground forces were improved, new methods of landing, forms and methods of conducting a landing battle were developed. The outcome of the war allowed naval art to conclude that in certain maritime and oceanic theaters of operations, navies can have a significant impact on the course of the war. The post-war development of the navies of the most economically and militarily-technically developed states led to the emergence of qualitatively new ocean-going fleets equipped with nuclear missile weapons.

The strike power of the Soviet Navy began to be made up of nuclear submarines and naval aviation, equipped with missile and torpedo weapons. The development of modern means of combat, and especially nuclear missile weapons, has made fundamental changes in naval art and affected all its areas, the fleet has gained the ability to deliver nuclear missile strikes against enemy territory, the Navy and their bases from huge distances, reaching several thousand km, and exert a decisive influence on the achievement of strategic goals in armed struggle at sea. Naval art has been enriched with a new component - the strategic use of the fleet in modern warfare. The following have been developed: new forms and methods for the strategic use of the forces of the Navy, as well as for the operational and combat use of the fleet; tactical methods and methods of using submarines with missile and torpedo armament, naval aviation, surface ships of various classes, units of the marine corps and other forces in combat operations: measures to maintain the forces of the fleet in high combat readiness to repel a surprise enemy attack and solve assigned tasks.

The naval art of the fleets of the USA, Great Britain, France and other countries paid the main attention to the development of methods for conducting combat operations by submarines and aircraft carrier strike forces of fleets in a general nuclear war; at the same time, methods were being developed for using the Navy in local wars. It is believed that the success of solving the main tasks of the Navy will largely depend on the effectiveness of the fight against enemy submarines. In this regard, intensive research work is being carried out in the US Navy, Great Britain and other NATO countries aimed at finding ways to combat submarines, especially armed ballistic missiles. equipped on the deployment routes of submarines, as well as directly in the areas of their combat operations. Particular importance is attached to nuclear missile strikes against submarine bases immediately at the start of the war. Methods are being developed for anti-submarine defense of aircraft carrier strike forces at sea crossings and in areas where they use aviation. To combat submarines, the US Navy has created special large operational formations of anti-submarine forces.

operational art

The historical aspect of operational art

Soviet operational art began to take shape during the Civil War. The operations of the Red Army were characterized and carried out with a wide maneuver of troops, on a large scale, and with decisive goals. The main provisions for planning and conducting front-line and army operations were also determined: the choice of the direction of the main attack, the concentration of forces and means in decisive directions, the creation of strike groups, the flexible use of reserves, the organization of operational cooperation between armies, etc. An important achievement was the use of mobile formations in offensive operations and associations - cavalry corps and cavalry armies, which made it possible to significantly increase the depth of strikes, increase the pace of the offensive, and develop tactical success into an operational one. After the Civil War, operational art was improved on the basis of the experience gained in World War I, and mainly on the basis of generalizations of the practice of operations of the Civil War that were new in nature. An important role in the formation of the theory of operational art was played by the developments that began in the 1920s. creative discussion, works and articles of Soviet military leaders, especially M. V. Frunze, as well as A. I. Egorov, S. S. Kamenev, I. P. Uborevich, B. M. Shaposhnikov. The main provisions for the preparation and conduct of operations by armies and fronts were set out in the manual "High Command. Official Guide for Commanders and Field Directorates of Armies and Fronts" (1924) and developed in the work of V. K. Triandafillov "The nature of the operations of modern armies" (1929) . From the 2nd half of the 20s. the division of Soviet military art into three parts - strategy, operational art and tactics - is practically fixed. This division manifests itself primarily in defining the foundations of operational art. Its further development took place under the influence of the growing economic power of the country and the successful development of the aviation, tank, chemical, automotive and tractor industries, which made it possible to equip the armed forces with the latest military equipment; at the same time, there was a process of improving their organizational structure. In the 1st half of the 30s. in the Soviet Armed Forces, the theory of a deep offensive operation was developed. The essence of this theory lies in the simultaneous suppression of the entire depth of the enemy defense by massive artillery fire, air strikes and the use of airborne assault forces, in creating a gap in the defense through which mobile troops rushed in order to develop an offensive to the entire operational depth. It was believed that the scope of a front-line offensive operation can be characterized by the following indicators: the width of the offensive zone is 150-300 km, the depth is up to 250 km, the rate of advance is 10-15 km or more per day, and the duration is 15-20 days. The army advancing in the main direction received a strip 50-80 km wide, the depth of the operation could reach 70-100 km, the duration of 7-10 days. The army operation was considered as an integral part of the front-line one. In special conditions, armies could conduct independent operations. Achieving the goals of the operation was conceived through the implementation of the immediate and subsequent tasks. Defense was considered in close connection with the offensive. Certain successes have been achieved in developing the principles of operations for the Navy, Air Force, and airborne operations.

In the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, experience was gained in carrying out a front-line operation to break through a fortified area, massive use of rifle troops, artillery and aviation in the main direction.

During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, operational art took a new step in its development. The war confirmed the correctness of the previously developed views on the preparation and conduct of front-line and army operations. In 1941-1942, when the Soviet Armed Forces were conducting mainly strategic defense, experience was gained in organizing and carrying out front-line and army defensive operations. The most important problems that were solved by operational art were the correct determination of the directions of the main enemy attacks and the timely concentration of forces and means to repel these attacks, the development of methods for building a defense in depth and ensuring its stability. Particular attention was paid to the creation of an operational defense capable of withstanding massive strikes by tank groupings and aviation, as well as massive enemy artillery fire, separation of forces and fire weapons, and increasing the activity and resilience of troops. Front defensive operations were, as a rule, an integral part of a strategic defensive operation and were carried out with the aim of repelling the offensive of large enemy groupings, holding important areas and creating conditions for going on the offensive. With the accumulation of combat experience gained in the winter counter-offensive of 1941-1942 near Rostov, Tikhvin and especially near Moscow, the gradual increase in the rate of technical equipment of the branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms, the practice of preparing and conducting offensive operations was continuously improved. Thus, new methods were worked out for creating strike groupings for an offensive in the directions of the main attacks, for the effective use of tanks, artillery and aviation. In the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942-1943 and in the Battle of Kursk in 1943, the methods of organizing a defense in depth, persistent defense and counteroffensive, the correct choice of the direction of the main attack, achieving operational-tactical surprise, accurately determining weak points in the enemy’s defense, and a reasonable calculation of forces were further developed. and means for successfully breaking through tactical defenses and developing success into the operational depth, organizing clear interaction between troops, quickly encircling and defeating large enemy forces. The basic theoretical principles and practical recommendations worked out by operational art were used throughout the war and constantly developed in subsequent operations, especially in the Belarusian operation of 1944. , the Iasi-Kishinev operation of 1944, the Vistula-Oder operation of 1945, the Berlin operation of 1945. During the war, a front-line operation, as a rule, was part of a strategic operation (operation of a group of fronts), an army operation was part of a front-line operation. In some cases, combined-arms armies carried out operations independently. The problem of breaking through the enemy defenses to the full depth and developing tactical success into operational success was successfully solved. Strong second echelons were created in the armies and fronts. Methods were developed for organizing and carrying out an artillery offensive and an air offensive as an effective form of combat use of artillery and aviation to defeat the enemy throughout the entire depth of his defense. Maneuvering reserves, forcing rivers on the move, conducting operational pursuit, night operations, etc., were successfully carried out. All this contributed to an increase in the depth of offensive operations and an increase in the pace of the offensive of troops. So, if in 1942 the depth of front-line offensive operations was 100-140 km, and the rate of advance was 6-10 km per day, then at the final stage of the war, front-line offensive operations were carried out to a depth of 300-500 km with an offensive rate of 15-20 km, and tank armies 40-50 km per day or more. The encirclement of the enemy became a typical form of combat operations of the Soviet troops: the methods of combat operations to eliminate encircled enemy groups were improved. The methods of organizing and conducting reconnaissance, engineering support, camouflage, and rear services were further developed. The most important operations during the war years were carried out, as a rule, with the participation of operational formations of all branches of the Armed Forces. Along with this, methods were developed for the preparation and conduct of independent operations by associations of branches of the Armed Forces - air, airborne, sea, sea landing. The operational art of the Air Force determined the basic principles of the combat use of aviation formations and formations - surprise, massing of efforts, continuity of interaction, wide maneuver, the presence of a reserve, and centralization of control. Techniques have been developed for gaining air supremacy, defeating large enemy air groupings, aviation support for bringing tank armies into battle and their operations in operational depth, assisting troops in eliminating encircled enemy groupings, repelling counterattacks by enemy reserves, combating its operational and strategic reserves, strikes against major political and industrial centers, communication centers, naval bases, etc. The operational art of the Navy was aimed at developing and improving the methods of carrying out operations with the aim of disrupting the enemy's sea communications and protecting their own sea communications, and securing the flanks of fronts operating in coastal directions. Significant development has been made in the art of preparing and conducting amphibious landing operations and combat operations aimed at disrupting enemy amphibious assault operations and delivering strikes from the sea against enemy naval bases and other targets.

The practice of preparing and conducting operations during the war found a theoretical generalization in the orders, directives and instructions of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff, in regulations, manuals and military-theoretical works.

Tactics

In the Russian Armed Forces, tactics are subordinate to operational art and strategy. Operational art determines the tasks and direction of development of tactics. taking into account the tactical capabilities of formations and units, the nature and characteristics of their actions. Under the influence of changes in the methods of conducting military operations, caused by the adoption of nuclear weapons and improved conventional weapons by the troops (naval forces), the relationship and interdependence between strategy, operational art and tactics are becoming more multifaceted and dynamic. Tactical nuclear weapons allow the tactical command to exercise a certain independence in choosing methods of combat operations and achieve faster successes that determine the achievement of operational results. At the same time, the strategic and operational command of inflicting powerful nuclear strikes on important targets and large groupings of enemy troops (forces) can solve major strategic (operational) tasks and create favorable conditions for the accomplishment of tactical tasks.

The main tasks of tactics are: the study of the patterns, nature and content of combat, the development of methods for its preparation and conduct; determination of the most effective methods of using means of destruction and protection in combat; study of the combat properties and capabilities of subunits, units, formations, determination of their tasks and battle formations in the conduct of hostilities and methods of organizing interaction between them; study of the role of fire, strikes and maneuver in combat; development of recommendations on command and control of troops (forces), their combat, special and logistic support; study of the forces and means of the enemy and his methods of conducting combat. Each type of armed forces (Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy), branch of service (forces, aviation) and type of special forces, as well as military rear and parts of the railway troops, have their own tactics., Which studies the combat properties and capabilities formations, units (ships), and subunits of a given type of armed forces, type of troops (forces, aviation), type of special troops, methods of their use and actions in combat independently and in cooperation with other types and types of troops. General laws and regulations for the preparation and conduct of combat by formations, units and subunits of all types of armed forces, combat arms (forces) and special troops form the basis of the general theory of tactics. Exploring the diverse conditions of combat, tactics do not provide ready-made recipes. It develops only the main, most important provisions and rules, following which the commander makes an independent decision corresponding to the specific conditions of the combat situation, showing creative initiative.

Changes in tactics and their development are connected with the achieved level of production, the invention of new types of weapons and military equipment, the degree of general development and the state of the morale of the troops, their training, the development of strategy and operational art, and the organization of troops. The tactics and methods of combat operations are directly influenced by people and military equipment. It is tactics that are the most changing part of the art of war. It is also influenced by the condition and training of the enemy's armed forces, their methods of action, and other factors. New tactical methods, based on the capabilities of more advanced military equipment, are in constant struggle with the old methods of warfare, which have ceased or no longer meet the prevailing conditions, but have become stronger in theory and practice.

Historical aspect of tactics

In the era of feudalism, until the completion of the revolution in military affairs (16th century), caused by the development of firearms, the theory and practice of tactics developed slowly. During the period of the formation and victory of capitalist relations, linear tactics were developed, associated with equipping the armies with firearms, including artillery, and increasing the role of fire in battle, as well as with the recruitment of armies by hired soldiers incapable of independent initiative actions. According to this tactical scheme, the troops were deployed to conduct battle in a line; the outcome of the battle was decided by a frontal collision and the power of rifle and artillery fire. Linear tactics were characterized by the stereotyped and slowness of the actions of the troops.

Russian commanders of the 18th century - Peter I the Great, P.S. Saltykov, P.L. Rumyantsev-Zadunaisky, adhering mainly to linear tactics, sought out new ways of fighting. Peter I, in a linear order of battle, created a reserve and introduced a deeper formation, which contributed to the victory of the Russian troops over the troops of Charles XII near Poltava (1709). Rumyantsev began to use loose formation and square. A. V. Suvorov, along with linear battle formations, used columns, squares, loose formations and combinations of various formations. The tactics of Suvorov's troops were offensive; its main features are decisiveness and suddenness of action, delivering the main blow to the weakest place (rear, flank), concentrating forces to strike in the chosen direction, speed, bold maneuvering and defeating the enemy in parts.

Profound changes in tactics took place during the French Revolution and the national liberation wars of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, which led to the creation of mass armies in the countries of Western Europe on the basis of universal conscription and the improvement of weapons. By the end of the 18th century linear tactics have exhausted their possibilities; French, Russian and other armies switched to a new tactic based on a combination of columns and loose formation. This tactic was characterized by the activity, decisiveness of actions and maneuverability of the troops, the initiative of the commanders, the interaction of the military branches, the dismemberment of battle formations along the front and in depth. The troops in loose formation prepared the battle with fire, and the troops, built in battalion columns, dealt the decisive blow. In the improvement of new methods of warfare in the late 18th - early 19th centuries. a great contribution was made by Napoleon I, who massively used artillery and cavalry, and M.I. Kutuzov, whose tactics of troops were characterized by a decisive offensive and stubborn defense, the use of wide troop maneuver, simultaneous and successive strikes, and relentless pursuit of the enemy.

The further development of tactics is associated with the introduction into the troops in the second half of the 19th century. rifled weapons, which, compared with smooth-bore weapons, had greater range, rate of fire and accuracy. The experience of military operations showed that the use of columns on the battlefield became impossible, since they suffered heavy losses from aimed artillery and small arms fire even during the period of rapprochement with the enemy. Therefore, during the Crimean (1853-56), Franco-Prussian (1870-71), Russian-Turkish (1877-1878) wars, the transition to rifle chains was basically completed. In the offensive, the infantry began to use dashes, crawls and self-digging, to combine fire, maneuver and strike. In defense, in order to increase its stability, the engineering equipment of the terrain began to be widely used, field and long-term defense received significant development, especially during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

In the First World War of 1914-1918, the increased saturation of the armies with rapid-fire artillery and automatic weapons, the emergence of new means of combat (tanks, aircraft, etc.) and a sharp increase in the size of armies created the prerequisites for the further development of tactics. The creation of defensive positions echeloned in depth, the widespread use of trenches, communication passages, engineering barriers, and the use of various types of weapons made the defense more and more powerful compared to the forces and means of the attacking side, which led to the transition to positional forms of struggle. Beginning in 1915, the main problem of tactics was to break through the positional front. To this end, they began to create several echelons of rifle chains - “waves” that followed one after another at a distance of 50-75 m with intervals between fighters of 1 m, but at the same time, the troops, suffering heavy losses, still could not break through the enemy defenses. The advancing side tried to destroy the enemy defenses and pave the way for the infantry with massive artillery fire. For this purpose, multi-day artillery preparation was used, but even it did not ensure the suppression of firing points throughout the entire depth of defense. In 1918, the warring parties finally abandoned the use of "waves" and chains and switched to group tactics, which was the division of rifle chains into small infantry groups (squads, platoons), reinforced with light machine guns, rifle grenade launchers and flamethrowers, which made it possible to better use the opportunities infantry. The appearance in 1916 of escort tanks and artillery increased the firepower and strike power of the advancing troops and made it possible to achieve significant success in carrying out a tactical breakthrough in the enemy's echeloned defense. The offensive was carried out methodically according to the principles: artillery destroys, infantry occupies. The infantry advanced in narrow lanes: a division - about 2 km, a regiment - 1000-1200 m, a battalion - 400-600 m. By the end of the war, the battle became combined arms, since tactical tasks in it were solved by the joint efforts of the infantry, artillery, tanks, engineering troops ; formed
ground forces tactics.

The tactics of the Soviet ground forces began to take shape during the Civil War of 1918-1920. It absorbed all the best of what was accumulated by the Russian army. The large length of the fronts and the relatively low saturation density of their troops necessitated the use of extensive maneuver by forces and means. The main arms of the army were infantry and cavalry. Artillery was used, as a rule, in a decentralized manner, armored trains were widely used. Aviation mainly conducted reconnaissance. The basis of offensive combat tactics was strikes at the weakest points - the flanks and rear of the enemy, bypassing and enveloping his groupings. The offensive was carried out in separate directions at relatively low tactical densities. The combat formations of units and formations were usually built in one echelon, with the allocation of a reserve; rifle companies attacked the enemy in a chain. The cavalry, using the attack in cavalry formation and widely using machine-gun carts, waged highly maneuverable battles and was the main means of developing the offensive. The defense was created in pockets in threatened directions, great importance was attached to counterattacks.

In the period between the 1st (1914-1918) and 2nd (1939-1945) world wars, the development of tactics in all the armies of the world proceeded on the basis of motorization and the widespread introduction of military equipment into the troops - new artillery systems, new types of tanks, automatic weapons and other means of struggle. In the mid 30s. in the Red Army, a theory of deep offensive combat was developed, which was an integral part of the theory of deep operations. The essence of the theory of deep combat was to defeat the enemy with artillery fire and air strikes to the entire tactical depth, to break through his defenses with a powerful breakthrough echelon, consisting of rifle troops, direct support tanks, to develop success by cavalry, long-range tanks, rifle formations in cooperation with airborne troops. The battle was considered as a combined arms battle with the decisive role of infantry and tanks. The theory of deep combat was recognized in most armies and was successfully used by the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. The methods of conducting combined arms combat were reflected in the regulations of the Red Army and foreign armies. These included: deep separation of battle formations, massive fire suppression of enemy defenses, a joint attack of infantry with tanks, artillery escort of their attack, the development of a breakthrough by tank and motorized formations, the use of airborne assault forces, the creation of deep anti-tank defense, the use of minefields in defense, the organization of air defense defense and others.

Comprehensive development of the tactics of the Soviet troops received during the Great Patriotic War. The war confirmed the correctness of the previously developed basic principles of tactics and required their further improvement. At the beginning of the war, when the initiative in combat operations and superiority in forces were on the side of the enemy, the Soviet troops were forced to defend themselves against superior enemy forces in order to inflict maximum losses on him and create conditions for a counteroffensive. In connection with the insufficient equipping of the Soviet troops with weapons and military equipment, the stretching of the front of hostilities, rifle units and formations were initially assigned wide sectors and strips for defense; the defense was built shallow, with low tactical densities and poor engineering equipment. As the troops received weapons and military equipment, the combat capabilities of the troops increased. The development of defense proceeded along the line of increasing its depth, concentrating forces and means in the main directions. The stamina of the troops increased. Already in July 1941, they began to create anti-tank strongholds, from the autumn of 1942 - anti-tank areas, to use trenches in some sectors of the front in company and battalion areas. The tactics of the defense of the Soviet troops were especially developed in the Battle of Leningrad, in the battles near Odessa, Sevastopol, in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk. Soviet troops began to create two lines of defense using a system of trenches. The tactical depth of defense increased from 4-6 km to 15-20 km. The width of the defense zone of rifle formations has decreased: for a corps from 40-60 km to 10-35 km, for a division from 15-18 km to 6-14 km. Tactical densities have increased: for rifle battalions up to 0.8-1.2, for artillery up to 30-40 guns and mortars, for tanks up to 2-5 units per 1 km of the front.

The tactics of the Nazi ground forces on the eve and in the first years of World War II 1939-1945 developed taking into account the massive influx of tanks, aviation, artillery and other means of combat into the troops, the emergence of new types and branches of troops and major changes in the organizational structure of troops (forces). Many provisions of the tactics of the Nazi troops before the start of the war were borrowed from the Soviet theory of deep combat. During the war against the USSR, the tactics of the land forces of fascist Germany proved to be untenable in the confrontation with the tactics of the troops of the Soviet Army.

The tactics of the Anglo-American ground forces in World War II developed along the path of developing the most expedient methods of joint use in combat of the combat arms of the ground forces and aviation. Great experience was gained in conducting sea and landing operations with the participation of ground forces and the widespread use of amphibious tanks as a means of supporting infantry during battles for bridgeheads.

In the post-war period, the introduction of nuclear missile weapons with enormous destructive capabilities, electronics, various types of the latest conventional weapons and military equipment into the troops, the full motorization and mechanization of the ground forces immeasurably increased their combat capabilities, changed the nature and methods of conducting combined arms combat.

The basic principles of tactics follow from the general principles of the art of war. The most important of them are: the constant maintenance of troops, forces and means in high combat readiness for conducting combat operations with and without the use of nuclear weapons; high activity and decisiveness of the troops in the conduct of hostilities; close interaction of all military branches; surprise and secrecy of actions, concentration of forces and means in the most important areas and at a decisive moment, the continuity of hostilities; flexibility of maneuver by troops, forces and means, creation, timely restoration and skillful use of reserves of all types; comprehensive provision of troops in the conduct of hostilities.

Modern means of combat have had a decisive influence on changing the content of combined arms combat. It is believed that in the case of the use of nuclear weapons, the main content of combined arms combat will be nuclear and fire strikes in combination with maneuvers and attacks by troops. There will be a need to use maneuver by troops in order to use the results of their own nuclear and fire strikes to complete the defeat of the enemy or withdraw troops from under his strikes.

The high destructive power of nuclear weapons, long range and accuracy of hitting the target make it necessary to disperse troops along the front and in depth, increase the width of the action zones of formations and units, and concentrate forces and means in the main direction, primarily by massing nuclear and conventional weapons.

The massive introduction of infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, and other military equipment into the arsenal of motorized rifle troops makes it possible to sharply increase the pace of the offensive. Motorized rifle units were able to attack without dismounting together with tanks. As a result of the saturation of troops with helicopters, the widespread use of tactical airborne assault forces, aviation, as well as the implementation of maneuver by troops in the air, combined arms combat acquired a ground-air character.

The tactics of the Air Force is an integral part of the military art of the Air Force, including the theory and practice of preparing and conducting combat by an aviation formation, unit, subunit, and a single aircraft (helicopter). Air Force tactics originated in the early 20th century. with the advent of military aviation. During World War I, reconnaissance, fighter, and bomber aviation stood out, their combat missions were determined, and the tactics of each type of aviation were developed.

The tactics of the Soviet Air Force originated during the Civil War. The basic principles of the combat use of aviation were set forth in the Field Manual of 1919 and other documents. With the advent of assault (1926) and heavy bomber (1933) aviation in the USSR, the development of tactics for their combat use began. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, methods and techniques were developed for conducting single and group air combat, organizing and implementing tactical and fire interaction between the Air Force and the ground forces and the Navy, as well as between aviation branches. The main provisions on the tactics of aviation branches were enshrined in the combat regulations of fighter (BUIA-1940) and bomber (BUBA-1940) aviation.

During the 2nd World War and the Great Patriotic War, Air Force tactics received comprehensive development. A system for guiding fighters to air targets was developed. Radio facilities were widely used to control aviation, airfields and command posts were close to the combat areas.

Group air combat became the basis of fighter aviation tactics. The smallest firing unit was a pair of combat aircraft, which, as a rule, operated as part of an aviation link. The battle of a single aircraft (fighter) was an exception. The use of radar made it possible in many cases to abandon barrage (patrolling) of fighters in the air, replacing it with the method of duty at airfields. The fight against single aircraft and small groups of enemy aircraft over its territory was carried out by the method of "free hunting". Assault aviation carried out an attack on ground (sea) targets from a gentle dive (at an angle of 25-30 °) and from a strafing flight. The basis of the battle formation was a pair of aircraft. To increase the duration of the impact on the enemy, groups of attack aircraft on the battlefield used multiple attacks of given targets. The tactics of bomber aviation were characterized by the use of concentrated strikes by regimental and divisional groups of bombers against large targets, and in difficult meteorological conditions and at night - echeloned strikes by squadrons, units and single aircraft. Dive-bombing at an angle of 50-60° from a height of 2-3 thousand meters was new. The importance of aerial photography increased in reconnaissance aviation tactics. Reconnaissance aircraft were covered by fighters.

In the post-war period, the re-equipment of aviation with jet aircraft, a sharp increase in speeds, flight altitudes, the emergence of more powerful modern aviation weapons and equipment caused a change in the tactics of all branches of aviation and the tactics of the Air Force. Missile-carrying aircraft gained the ability to strike at ground and sea targets without entering the air defense zone of the covered object. Reconnaissance aircraft, thanks to high flight speeds and altitudes, and the availability of highly efficient radar photographic equipment, were able to penetrate deep behind enemy lines and detect any, including small-sized, objects. Interception of air targets on the distant approaches to covered objects and their destruction before the moment of dropping nuclear weapons becomes the most important method of tactical actions of fighters.

Naval tactics is an integral part of naval art, including the theory and practice of preparing and conducting combat and other types of combat operations at sea by formations, units, and subunits of various fleet forces. The tactics of the Navy originated in antiquity with the advent of the rowing fleet, the characteristic features of the tactics of which were: the desire to fight in calm weather and not far from the coast, the use of close formation and frontal collision of ships, ramming, later (5-4 centuries BC. e. ) and abortion.

Until the 16th century The tactics of the Navy, despite the appearance of sailing ships and their arming with artillery, differed little from the tactics of the rowing fleet. In the 17th century the transition from the rowing fleet to the sailing fleet, which had a greater speed and cruising range, was completed. Profound changes in tactics were caused by the development of naval artillery and its use in naval battles during the Anglo-Dutch wars of the second half of the 17th century. as the main weapon. At this time, the classification of ships was established (see Military ship), which began to unite into squadrons. Battleships formed the basis of the strike power of the fleets. The desire to make the most of artillery fire in naval battles led to the development of linear tactics, which in the 17-18 centuries. dominated all fleets. Its main content was the conduct of artillery combat by squadrons of ships that maneuvered in the battle line (wake column) on counter courses or on parallel courses. By the middle of the 18th century. in connection with the increase in the firing range, lethal and destructive power of the core, a contradiction arose between the capabilities of naval artillery and the tactical form of its use - template linear tactics. Russian admirals G.A. Spiridov, F.F. battle abandoned its patterns and laid the foundations for new ways of combat use of the sailing fleet - maneuvering tactics. Its characteristic features were to bring the sides closer to the distance of effective artillery fire, to create superiority in forces or firepower against part of the enemy’s forces, which was achieved by covering the head of the column of his battleships or dismembering their formation, encircling and defeating part of the forces of the enemy fleet, including the flagship. The principles of maneuver tactics were later used by Admiral G. Nelson in the battles of Abukir (1798) and Trafalgar (1805) and by the Russian admiral D. N. Senyavin in the battle of Athos (1807) and contributed to its establishment.

With the transition from sailing to steam fleet in the 2nd half of the 19th century. the main forces of the fleets began to be large artillery battleships and armored cruisers. A significant contribution to the development of steam fleet tactics was made by the Russian admirals G. I. Butakov, A. A. Popov, S. O. Makarov. The basis of the tactics of the Navy was the sea battle of squadrons, which included surface ships of various classes. As a rule, a battle at sea consisted of three stages: reconnaissance of the enemy (by cruisers) and deployment of their own armored forces in battle formation; artillery battle of the main forces; development of success by destroyers or their provision of withdrawal (in case of failure). To cover the head of the enemy squadron, a detachment of high-speed armored cruisers was usually allocated. The tactics of destroyers and minelayers also took shape.

The development of tactics in World War I was associated with profound changes in the nature of naval combat, caused by the use of various new means of combat in it, a sharp increase in the number of ships, and the emergence of the main form of combat activity of the Navy - operations (see Naval operation). Along with the battles of large groupings of the surface forces of the fleet, single actions of submarines and anti-submarine forces became widespread, and the foundations of the tactics of the diverse forces of the fleets were formed. Linear forces, which formed the basis of the strike power of the fleets, could only operate under the cover of light forces from attacks by submarines, destroyers, and from the impact of mine weapons.

During the years of the Civil War, the tactics of the Soviet Navy were born, the tactical principles of the combat use of river and lake flotillas, the joint actions of the fleet forces with the ground forces, the landing of amphibious assault forces and the conduct of sea battles in their coastal zone were developed. With the development of the forces and means of the fleet in the 20-30s. the tactics of the actions of the diverse forces of the Navy and the methods of interaction between them in a sea battle were improved. The foundations of the military aviation of the Navy were enshrined in the Combat Manual of the Naval Forces of the Red Army and other documents.

The development of naval tactics was greatly influenced by the growing importance of submarines and naval aviation during World War II, which became the main striking force of the fleets. In some foreign fleets (Japan, the United States), an important role in combat was assigned to aircraft carriers and tactics were developed for their combat use. Carrier aviation conducted naval battles when the ships of the belligerents were hundreds of miles apart. This led to an increase in the spatial scope of the battle, allowing the forces of the fleet to strike at the enemy from several directions from under the water and from the air.

The main content of the tactics of the Navy in the 2nd World War was air-sea and underwater-sea battles, conducted by interacting heterogeneous forces. The tactics of the Soviet Navy in the Great Patriotic War developed in the independent operations of the fleets and their joint combat operations with the ground forces. The tactics of applying combined strikes by naval aviation, submarines and light surface forces with the aim of disrupting enemy sea lanes were further developed. Methods were developed for the group use of submarines and their interaction with other forces of the fleet. The development of forces and means of combat in the postwar period predetermined profound changes in the nature of combat at sea and the tactics of the Navy, new directions for its development appeared: the tactics of missile submarines, missile ships, missile-carrying aircraft, etc. Nuclear missile submarines were able to maneuver for a long time and covertly outside the zones anti-submarine defense of the enemy with the aim of suddenly delivering powerful strikes from under the water at its important objects. Naval missile-carrying aviation is now capable of delivering missile strikes against enemy ships from distances beyond the reach of its anti-aircraft missiles and artillery and the cover zone of fighters. Cruise missiles, which are in service with submarines and surface ships, allow them to use these weapons from distances that sharply reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's anti-submarine defense and exclude the use of artillery and torpedoes. The most important principle of modern tactics of the Navy is the conduct of combat operations by the combined efforts of diverse forces and various types of weapons in close interaction.

"What should be done to revive the country's sea power?"

Firstly, the authorities in the country are obliged, at a minimum, to strictly, accurately and persistently implement all the provisions of existing doctrinal documents. They must be implemented, and not remain just a declaration.

Secondly, the content of the naval art of modern Russia, which is subject to study by every naval officer, must be formalized into a coherent system.

The fulfillment of these provisions is dictated by the preamble of the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation: "Historically, Russia is a leading maritime power, based on its spatial and geophysical features, place and role in global and regional relations." In addition, the content of the Naval Doctrine states: "The solution of the tasks of parrying threats to the security of the Russian Federation in the World Ocean is based on maintaining a sufficient naval potential of the Russian Federation."

In the conditions of the current development of the situation in the world, as noted by V.V. Putin, "we are forced to think about ensuring our own security." That is, the question of the revival of the Russian Navy is now acute: after all, the United States and most of the major NATO states are maritime powers with powerful fleets.

V.Valkov, Ph.D., Associate Professor

Literature: Klado N. L. Introduction to the course of the history of naval art, St. Petersburg. 1910; Mahan A. T.. The influence of sea power on history 1660-1783, trans. from English, St. Petersburg. 1895; Colomb F. G., Naval warfare, its basic principles and experience, [transl. from English]. St. Petersburg, 1894; Military strategy, 2nd ed., M., 1963, ch. 1-3; History of naval art, vol. 1-3, M., 1963; Gorshkov S. G., The development of Soviet naval art, "Naval Collection", 1967, No. 2: Fleet in the First World War, vol. 2, M., 1964; Campaigns of the Pacific War, [transl. from English], M., 1956: Belli V.A., Penzin K.V., Fighting in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea, 1939-1945, M., 1967, “Great Soviet Encyclopedia”, M, 1975, G. Kostev "Who owns naval art now?", M, 2007

The summer suit consists of a jacket and trousers. It is part of the all-weather set of basic uniforms (VKBO). A suit made of Mirage fabric (PE-65%, cotton-35%), with a high content of cotton - is hygienic and comfortable in everyday wear. Straight cut jacket. The collar is a stand, the volume is regulated by a pata on a textile fastener. The central fastener on a demountable lightning closed by a level on textile fasteners. Two breast patch pockets with flaps on textile fasteners. Back with two vertical pleats for freedom of movement in the area of ​​the shoulder blades. Sleeves are one-piece. In the upper part of the sleeves there are patch pockets with flaps on textile fasteners. In the area of ​​the elbow there are pads-amplifiers with an input for protectors on textile fasteners. At the bottom of the sleeve there is a patch pocket for pens. On a bottom of sleeves cuffs with pats on textile fasteners for volume adjustment. Straight cut trousers. One-piece belt with seven belt loops. The volume of the belt is regulated by a cord with tips. Button closure. Two side slash pockets. On the side seams are two large patch pockets with three folds for volume. The upper part of the pockets is pulled together with an elastic cord with a clamp. Entrances to pockets, designed obliquely, like a hand, are closed with flaps on textile fasteners. In the area of ​​the knees there are reinforcement pads with an input for protectors on textile fasteners. At the bottom of the trousers there are patch pockets with flaps on textile fasteners. The volume on the bottom of the trousers is regulated by a braid. On the back halves of the trousers are two welt pockets with flaps with a hidden button closure. Reinforcement pad in the seat area

Semi-fitted dress in dark blue with a V-neck, decorated with a red silk scarf (included). Fabric - gabardine. According to the order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia No. 575, chevrons are sewn onto the sleeves of the dress at a distance of 8 cm from the edge of the shoulder. A chevron is sewn on the left sleeve, indicating belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, and on the right sleeve, a chevron, indicating the service of a police / justice officer. You can add chevrons with Velcro. A shawl to a dress is worn in a triangle folded in the form of a scarf, the narrow ends are tied together and tucked in at the back inside under the collar. The wide side is tucked in under the neckline of the dress. It is allowed to wear a summer dress without a scarf in the office. The length of the dress along the bottom edge should be at the level of the knees. The Police/Justice short sleeve dress is part of the new police uniform Sample material pattern:

Jacket: - free cut; - a fastener central onboard, a wind-shelter level, on buttons; - coquette from finishing fabric; -2 welt slanted pockets with a flap, buttoned at the bottom of the front; - 1 slant patch pocket on the sleeves; - reinforcing curly overlays in the elbow area; - the bottom of the sleeves with an elastic band; - double hood, with a visor, has a drawstring to adjust the volume; - waist adjustment with drawstrings; Trousers: - free cut; -2 side vertical pockets; - in the area of ​​the knees, on the back halves of the trousers along the seam of the seat - reinforcing pads; -2 side patch pockets with flap; -2 back patch pockets with buttons; - the cut of the details in the knee area prevents them from stretching; - the back halves under the knee are assembled with an elastic band; - waistband with elastic; - bottom with elastic band; - fastened braces (braces); - belt loops; wearing - both in boots and out. material: tent cloth; composition: 100% cotton; density: 270 gr.; overlays: ripstop, oxford; cuffs: yes; sealing gum: yes; jacket/pants pockets: yes/yes; optional: lightweight summer version; high strength fabric and seams; How to wash Gorka suit.

Semi-fitted dress in dark blue with a V-neck, decorated with a red silk scarf (included). Fabric - gabardine. According to the order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia No. 575, chevrons are sewn onto the sleeves of the dress at a distance of 8 cm from the edge of the shoulder. A chevron is sewn on the left sleeve, indicating belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, and on the right sleeve, a chevron, indicating the service of a police / justice officer. You can add chevrons with Velcro. A shawl to a dress is worn in a triangle folded in the form of a scarf, the narrow ends are tied together and tucked in at the back inside under the collar. The wide side is tucked in under the neckline of the dress. It is allowed to wear a summer dress without a scarf in the office. The length of the dress along the bottom edge should be at the level of the knees. The Short Sleeve Police/Justice Dress is part of the new police uniform. Material drawing example:

Material: 100% Cotton Product weight: 52 size -232 g 54 size -265 g

Gorka-3 suit is the most successful and widespread type of Gorka suit. Made from rip-stop material with a density of 270 gr. per 1 m2 of black color, structurally consists of a jacket and trousers. Used to protect the fighter from adverse weather conditions, all-weather. The main difference of this suit is the fleece lining. The jacket has a deep hood with drawstrings, two welt side pockets covered with flaps fastened with a button, one inner pocket for documents and two pockets on the sleeves, just below the shoulders. It is worth noting that the fleece lining is removable, which increases the usability of the suit and allows it to be used in a wider temperature range. Shoulders, elbows, cuffs are reinforced with oxford 0 rip-stop synthetic fabric. Reinforcement on the elbows of the mountain-3 suit is made in the form of a Velcro pocket, completed with hard inserts. The sleeves are equipped with anti-dust cuffs and a hidden volume adjustment elastic band just above the wrist. The jacket also has an adjustable drawstring along the edge and fastens with buttons. Gorka suit trousers have six pockets. Two side slotted, two cargo waybills and two rear. The knees, the bottom of the legs and other loaded areas of the trousers are reinforced with Oxford 0 rip-stop synthetic fabric. The bottom of the legs is double, the so-called “dust boot” reinforced with a cuff that is worn over the boot and prevents dust, dirt and small stones from entering it. Just below the knee bend, the trousers have a fixing elastic band. It automatically adjusts the volume of the leg and prevents the fabric from sailing. Pants are equipped with detachable suspenders. Main features: removable fleece lining demi-season suit strong material inner pocket hood CHARACTERISTICS SUIT CHARACTERISTICS Material: ripstop Composition: 70/30 Density: 240 gr. Overlays: oxford 0 Cuffs: yes Seals: yes Jacket/pants pockets: yes/yes Seasonality: demi-season Additionally: reinforced inserts, removable fleece lining, anthers on trousers, suspenders included

Gender: male Season: summer Camouflage color: khaki Material: "Tent cloth" (100% cotton), pl. 235 g/m2, VO Lining material: Mixed, pl. 210 g/m2, Normative technical documentation: GOST 25295-2003 Outerwear for men and women of coat assortment: suits, jackets, vests, in Color: khaki Lower temperature: 10 Fastening: buttons Country: Russia Description Jacket: free cut; fastener central supatny, on a loop and a button; yoke, overlays and pockets made of finishing fabric; 2 lower welt pockets with a flap, a loop and a button; inside flap pocket with button; on the sleeves, 1 patch inclined pocket with a flap for a loop and a button in the elbow area reinforcing curly overlays; the bottom of the sleeves with an elastic band; double hood, with a visor, has a drawstring to adjust the volume; waist adjustment with drawstring; Pants: loose fit; codpiece with a fastener on a loop and a button; 2 upper pockets in the side seams, in the knee area, on the back halves of the trousers in the seat area - reinforcing pads; 2 side patch pockets with flap; 2 back patch pockets with buttons; the cut of the details in the knee area prevents them from stretching; Dustproof calico skirt at the bottom of the trousers; the back halves under the knee are gathered with an elastic band; elastic waistband; elasticated bottom;

Please note - in this model, fleece insulation is only in the jacket! Coloring: khaki Jacket: - free cut; - a fastener central onboard, a wind-shelter level, on buttons; - coquette from finishing fabric; -2 welt slanted pockets with a flap, buttoned at the bottom of the front; - 1 slant patch pocket on the sleeves; - reinforcing curly overlays in the elbow area; - the bottom of the sleeves with an elastic band; - double hood, with a visor, has a drawstring to adjust the volume; - waist adjustment with drawstrings; Trousers: - free cut; -2 side vertical pockets; - in the area of ​​the knees, on the back halves of the trousers along the seam of the seat - reinforcing pads; -2 side patch pockets with flap; -2 back patch pockets with buttons; - the cut of the details in the knee area prevents them from stretching; - the back halves under the knee are assembled with an elastic band; - waistband with elastic; - bottom with elastic band; - fastened braces (braces); - belt loops; wearing - both in boots and out. material: tent fabric; composition: 100% cotton; density: 270 gr.; overlays: ripstop, oxford 0; cuffs: yes; sealing gum: yes; seasonality: demi-season; additionally: reinforced inserts, removable fleece lining, anthers on trousers, suspenders included

The tunic is part of the daily and exit uniforms of police officers of the new model. Worn with trousers. Material: Suit (semi-woolen) fabric. Composition: 75% wool, 25% polyester 280 g/m2 Lining: Twill 100% viscose 105% g/m2. Fitted, single-breasted, four-button closure. Turn-down collar with lapels. Shelves with cutting barrels. Side pockets are horizontal welt in the "frame" with flaps. A back with the central seam in which lower part the vent is located. Sleeves are set-in, two-sutural. Jacket with lining. On the left shelf of the lining there is an inside pocket with a “leaflet”. Designed for employees of internal affairs bodies with special police ranks, as well as for cadets (listeners) of educational institutions of higher professional education of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. It has red trim on the sleeves. According to the order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia No. 575, chevrons are sewn onto the sleeves of the suit at a distance of 8 cm from the edge of the shoulder. A chevron is sewn on the left sleeve, indicating belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, and on the right sleeve, a chevron, indicating the service of a police officer. You can add chevrons with Velcro. In addition, shoulder straps with buttons are sewn onto this tunic, and two lavalier emblems are also strengthened. How to sew on a shoulder strap? To do this, in addition to the tunic itself and shoulder straps, you will need a ruler, scissors, a needle, a thimble and strong red threads. Be sure to wear a thimble, even if you are used to sewing without it, as sometimes the needle passes through shoulder straps with great difficulty, and you can injure your fingers. If you find it difficult to pull the needle and thread out of the shoulder strap, then you can use pliers or tweezers. 1) First of all, prepare the shoulder strap, i.e. fasten all the required insignia on it, since it will be much more difficult to do this on an already sewn pursuit. 2) Take the shoulder strap and position it so that the side farthest from the button is close to the seam that connects the shoulder of the tunic to the sleeve. At the same time, the upper, directed towards the back, edge of the shoulder strap should go 1 cm from above to the seam running along the shoulder. In other words, the shoulder strap should be slightly shifted forward. 3) Thread the needle and fasten the shoulder strap to the tunic at three points: at the corners of the shoulder strap, at the place where it comes into contact with the sleeve seam and in the center of the semicircular cut. Now the shoulder strap will be securely fastened and will not move from the correct position during the sewing process. 4) Then we sew the shoulder strap very carefully around the perimeter, making stitches in such a way that only barely visible points remain on its surface in those places where the needle enters the shoulder strap, and the thread between two adjacent holes passes mainly from the wrong side (along the gasket) of the tunic . Then the thread will not be noticeable even if it does not quite match the color of the shoulder straps in color. In this case, the optimal length of each stitch should be about 1 cm. 5) With the second shoulder strap, follow the same pattern. How to strengthen lapel emblems? On the collar of the tunic - along the bisector (the line dividing the corner of the collar in half), at a distance of 25 mm from the corner of the collar to the center of the emblem, the vertical axis of symmetry of the emblem should be parallel to the collar. How to place awards on the police jacket? On the left side of the chest, the awards are arranged in the following order: Badges of special distinction are placed so that the upper edge of the medal block is at the level of the ledge of the lapel of the tunic and jacket. When wearing two or more insignia of special distinction, they are arranged separately in one row, from right to left with intervals of 10 mm between the lateral ends of the stars in the order listed. Badges of special distinction of the same name are arranged in the order in which they are awarded. Signs of orders, orders and medals are arranged horizontally in a row from the center of the chest to the edge, from top to bottom in the order listed. When wearing two or more orders or medals, their blocks are connected in a row on a common bar. Orders and medals that do not fit in one row are transferred to the second and subsequent rows located below the first, placing them also from the center of the chest to the edge in the above order. Blocks of orders and medals of the second row should go under the orders and medals of the first row, while the upper edge of the blocks of the lower row is placed 35 mm below the block of the first row. Subsequent rows are arranged in the same order. Signs of orders, orders and medals are located on the single-breasted police tunic so that the upper edge of the block of orders and medals of the first row is 90 mm below the level of the lapel ledge. On the right side of the chest, the awards are arranged in the following order: Orders are arranged from left to right in the order listed. The upper edge of the largest order of the first row is located at the level established for the common bar (block) of the first row of orders and medals placed on the left side of the chest. Orders that do not fit in one row are transferred to the second and subsequent rows located below the first, placing them also from the center of the chest to the edge in the indicated order. The centers of the orders in a row must be on the same level. The distance between orders and rows of orders is 10 mm. The sign of the number of wounds made of gold-colored galloon (in case of a severe wound) or dark red color (in case of a slight wound) is located on a bar made of the fabric of the top of the item. Galun width 6 mm, length 43 mm. The bad wound badge is placed below the light wound badge. The distance between the stripes is 3 mm. The sign of the number of wounds is placed on the tunic and jacket to the right of the sign to the honorary titles of the Russian Federation, and in its absence, in its place.

Consists of a jacket and trousers. Fabric - Rip-Stop, pe-67%, chl-33%. Designed for employees of internal affairs bodies with special police ranks, carrying out outdoor service. Worn with a dark blue T-shirt and a dark blue cap. According to the order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia No. 575, chevrons are sewn onto the sleeves of the suit at a distance of 8 cm from the edge of the shoulder. A chevron is sewn on the left sleeve, indicating belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, and on the right sleeve, a chevron, indicating the service of a police officer. You can add chevrons with Velcro. Above the left pocket (shelf), at a distance of 10 mm, a patch "POLICE" (110x30 mm) is sewn, made in the form of a rectangle with a red edging, the inscription is made in white or silver. On the back, 10 mm above the red line on the back, a patch "POLICE" (275x85 mm) is sewn, made in the form of a rectangle with a red edging and an inscription in white or silver. Employees with special police ranks, when serving in public places, wear badges on the jackets of their summer suit. Badges are fastened with a pin to the left breast pocket. The badge is placed in a removable pocket for the badge, which is worn on the right side of the chest of the suit jackets in dark blue summer suits. The badge is a rectangular card containing the identification data of a police officer.

Moss scout suit The scout suit is made in a very successful design of the demi-season "smok" uniform in the colors of the A-TACS FG experimental camouflage. The suit consists of a jacket and trousers. The jacket is long, below the waist. Equipped with a deep hood with adjustable drawstrings, it has four voluminous cargo pockets closed with flaps on a large English button, which makes it easy to open the pocket in a hurry, with shooting gloves, and in other extreme conditions, when the time count has gone by seconds. The elbows of the suit are reinforced with an additional layer of fabric, the sleeves are equipped with wide rubber bands. The frontal zipper is duplicated along the entire length with smaller English buttons, which are fastened in secret. Trousers of the suit are free-cut, all loaded parts are reinforced with an additional layer of fabric. A wide rubber band is sewn into the waistband, a thin cord for additional tightening, and suspender attachment loops. The trousers have four pockets. Two slotted, covered with valves on a large English button, two cargo overhead, in which additional ammunition can be carried. At the bottom of the legs there is a wide cuff and the so-called "brakes" made of elastic fabric, which prevent the legs from riding up. color moss (A-TACS FG) Main features: coloring drawstring at the waist elastic bands on the pants carrying case for suspenders included CHARACTERISTICS CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SUIT Material: T/S Composition: 65 pe /35 viscose Density: 160 gr. Cuffs: yes Sealing elastic bands: no Jacket/pants pockets: yes/yes Seasonality: all-weather Extras: carrying case

The women's demi-season raincoat is part of the uniform of the police officers of the new sample. Raincoat of a semi-adjacent silhouette, with a central inner secret fastener for five loops and buttons and additionally for an upper uniform button and a through overcast buttonhole, on a warmed stitched lining. On the coquettes in the area of ​​the shoulder seam, there are two belt loops and one non-cut loop for attaching removable shoulder straps. Sleeves are set-in, two-sutural. In the lower part of the middle seam of the sleeve there are stitched-in pats, fastened with a loop and a uniform button. Turn-down collar, with detachable stand. The removable belt is threaded into the loops located in the side seams and fastens with a buckle with a tongue, the free end of which is threaded into the loop. On the right collar there is an internal welt pocket with a leaflet. Jacket fabric (100% polyester) with rip-stop weaving threads and water-repellent impregnation. The second layer is the membrane. Filler: Thinsulate 100 g/m. Recommended temperature range: from +10°С to -12°С. Worn with a dark blue scarf or a white scarf. It is allowed to wear a demi-season raincoat neatly folded with the front side out on the left hand. Demi-season raincoats are worn buttoned up. It is allowed to wear demi-season raincoats with the top button undone. Demi-season raincoats are worn with or without removable insulation with a belt fastened with a buckle. Removable shoulder straps in dark blue and stripes in dark blue are worn on this raincoat.

Winter jacket for the army, navy and air force provides reliable protection against wind and snow. The insulation perfectly retains heat, weighs little, does not deform, does not absorb moisture. The combination of membrane fabric and insulation provides protection from severe frosts. FEATURES Cold protection Stabilized fit For military operations Hand wash only MATERIALS Rip-stop Membrane Fibersoft insulation

The costume consists of a jacket and trousers. Jacket with a central side zipper. Front with upper welt pockets with flaps and leaflets, fastened with textile fasteners and side welt pockets in a “frame”, fastened with a “zipper” braid. Lined front and back of the jacket. Turn-down collar with stand. Staff suit made of rip-stop fabric with Velcro. Back with yoke. The sleeves are set-in, one-sutural, with reinforcing overlays in the elbow area, with stitched cuffs, fastened with a textile fastener - a slit with a puff. For attaching removable shoulder straps, there are loops in the area of ​​the shoulder seams, two continuous loops are sewn perpendicular to the shoulder seam. At the bottom of the jacket there is a cut-off belt, the volume of which is regulated by the side sections with elastic band. Trousers are straight, with stitched arrows and side pockets on the front halves. Fastening of the front of the trousers with a zipper. On the back halves - tucks. On the right back half there is a welt pocket with a flap and a leaflet, fastened with a textile fastener. The belt is stitched, fastened with a loop and a button. To adjust the volume, the belt is pulled together with elastic band, in the area of ​​the side seams. Sample material drawing: Additionally, you can purchase:

The model of lightweight demi-season boots with high-strength hydrophobic leather uppers and rubber soles with embossed tread is consistently popular among employees of various law enforcement agencies, tourists and people who prefer outdoor activities. For greater comfort, the lining in the boots is made of dense PVC mesh. The toe box and heel counter are reinforced with a special thermoplastic material that allows you to maintain the external shape of the boots. The deaf valve prevents foreign objects from entering the boot. Demi-season boots are equipped with a lacing system consisting of eight pairs of D-shaped half rings, which make it possible to significantly facilitate and speed up the process of lacing and unlacing boots without removing the laces from the loops. ASSAULT BOOTS OF URBAN TYPE Continuation of the legendary "COBRA" series. Used in all special divisions of the Russian Federation Top combined: hydrophobic leather (1.2-1.4 mm), “DRYWALKSYSTEM” (R) (CJSC “RUSSIAN KOZHA”) + elastic genuine leather on the top. Lining: mesh. Sole: rubber of increased wear resistance (Italy), BUTEK 1. Sole fastening method: adhesive. Toe cap and heel counter: Reinforced thermoplastic material. Sizes: 40-46. The deaf valve protects a foot from influence of environment (dust, water, dirt) High-speed lacing. Black color. Weight: 570 gr. Specifications Assault boots. Model Cobra 12011 Producer BUTEKS Country Belarus Top material hydrophobic leather (1.2-1.4 mm), "DRYWALK SYSTEM"® (CJSC "RUSSIAN KOZHA") + elastic natural leather on the tibia Lining material mesh Sole fastening glue-on Instep support metal Toe and heel reinforced from thermoplastic material Outsole material rubber of increased wear resistance BUTEK 1, (Italy) Available size range 40-46 Shoe color black Lacing type speed lacing Valve type deaf valve

A set of windproof smoke (jacket) and warm lining with Primaloft ® Black insulation, which can be worn separately as a stand-alone jacket Smoke: Can be worn with or without lining High and wide collar. A hood with a peak in which plastic is inserted to give a rigid form. The hood has three adjustments for a precise fit Front zipper with two locks, unfastens both from above and below Windproof flap covering the front zipper Velcro cuffs for smooth adjustment of the wrist girth Front flap and pockets are fastened with Canadian (on a tape leg) buttons , which have greater reliability compared to conventional buttons. Buttons are large, making them easy to work with thick gloves Volume pockets on the torso have a folded entry that protects the contents from falling out Pockets: 2 large pockets on the chest 2 large pockets on the bottom of the jacket 2 Napoleon pockets with zippers on the chest One flat pocket on the left sleeve and one inside on the left with a zipper Drawstrings: at the waist and bottom of the jacket, with elastic cords to protect against the penetration of cold under clothing ) Fastening to the smoke and fastening when worn as a separate jacket is done using convenient American-style lenticular buttons. Hood adjustable to the shape of the face. Hood interior lined with fleece for comfortable wear Underarm vents Knitted cuffs for comfort Inside left pocket with zipper Product material: Smoke main fabric: Strong high density rip-stop (different from the similar used in summer form Alloy), 35% cotton, 65% polyester Smoka lining: thin blend fabric, 35% cotton, 65% polyester Main liner fabric: 100% polyester Lining padding: body - Primaloft® Black 2×133 g/m 2 sleeves - Primaloft® Black 2×80 g/m 2 Product weight: 46/176 size -1969 g 50/176 size -2097 g 54/182 size -2181 g 56-58/188 size -2439 g Primaloft® YOU MAY BE INTERESTED in: We highly recommend front loading washing machines, if you own a top loading machine we recommend washing clothes and equipment in a mesh laundry bag to protect against possible damage washing machine drum parts. Close all zippers and velcro fasteners and fully loosen all adjustments before washing. If the upper fabric is membrane, then it is better to wash the product with the lining out (turned inside out). Wash on a delicate cycle at 30°C with a double rinse cycle (it is better to use two rinse cycles to ensure that all detergent residues are removed from the fabric and insulation) and spin at medium speed. It is acceptable to use a tumble dryer at medium temperature (40-60°C) for 30-40 minutes or until completely dry, if the top fabric is membrane, it is better to dry the product with the lining out (turned inside out). You can dry the product in a suspended state with the lining out. To remove stubborn stains, before washing, treat the stains with a special product such as Grangers Performance Wash or Nikwax Tech Wash, allowing the detergent to soak in for 10-15 minutes. It is better to store clothes and equipment with synthetic insulation in a straightened (not compressed) state. How to restore the DWR treatment on insulated clothing or equipment DWR is a special polymer applied to the surface of the fabric to make it water-repellent. DWR processing is not forever. During the operation of the product, as well as after a certain number of washes, the effectiveness of DWR decreases. If water droplets have stopped rolling off the surface of the fabric and wet the fabric even after washing, it's time to restore the splash-proof treatment. We recommend the use of specific fabric re-spray formulations, either sprayed or poured into the washing machine, such as Grangers Clothing Repel or Performance Repel, or Nikwax TX.Direct Wash-In or Spray-On. First wash the product according to the washing instructions, then use the selected composition to restore the splash-proof treatment by spraying it directly on the front of the product while it is still damp, or running a second wash cycle, first pouring the required amount of wash-in into the washing machine . The manufacturer's instructions for the restoration of the splashproof treatment on the packaging must be followed exactly. Many DWR reconditioning products require heat activation, so it is best to dry treated clothing and equipment in a tumble dryer or dryer at medium temperature (40-60°C) for 40-50 minutes or until completely dry.

The upper is made of natural chrome leather, 1.4-1.6 mm thick The lining is made of textile material Cambrelle ®, "Super Royal" ® , high density, dries quickly and does not wear off Durable sole is made of thermoplastic, withstands temperatures from -40 ° C to +40 °С The toe and back are reinforced with thermoplastic material TECNO G The model is fixed with lacing and is durable in use Produced and manufactured in Belarus General characteristics ISBN: 5-458-45233-X 978-5-458-45233-5 : - Technical characteristics Boots of army type (Berets). Model Omon 701 Producer BUTEX Country Belarus Top material genuine chrome leather (1.4-1.6 mm) Lining material hygroscopic and wear-resistant fabric (150 g/m2) Sole fastening glue-and-piercing Metal arch support Toe and heel reinforced from thermoplastic material Sole material TEP (±40°С) ) 2121 Available size range 36-50 Shoe color black Valve type blind valve Soft piping present Hooks present

Demi-season boots with a top made of durable elastic chrome leather 1.4 mm thick and with a reliable rubber sole equipped with a large tread are the best shoes used by numerous employees of law enforcement and security agencies, tourists and ordinary people leading an active lifestyle. As a lining, a strong and, at the same time, very soft nylon mesh is used here. The toe cap and heel of the boot are reinforced with a special thermoplastic material. The boots have a high-speed lacing that allows you to quickly and securely fix the foot in the boot. The model is equipped with a deaf valve that prevents foreign objects from entering the boot. ATTACK BOOTS OF URBAN TYPE Combined top: genuine chrome leather (1.2-1.4 mm) + elastic genuine leather on soft piping and valve. Lining: laminated mesh. Sole: rubber of increased wear resistance (Italy), BUTEK 1. Sole fastening method: adhesive. Supinator: metal. Toe cap and heel counter: Reinforced thermoplastic material. Sizes: 40-46. Semi-deaf valve. Soft edge. Black color. Weight: 580 gr. Specifications Assault boots. Model Mongoose 24111 Producer BUTEX Country Belarus Top material genuine chrome leather (1.2-1.4 mm) + on soft edging and valve elastic natural leather Lining material laminated mesh Sole fastening adhesive Instep support metal Toe and heel reinforced from thermoplastic material Sole material rubber of increased wear resistance BUTEK 1 , (Italy) Available size range 38-46 Shoe color black Valve type semi-deaf valve Soft piping present

Retro style jacket Button-down Adjustable hood around the face Elasticated waist and bottom of the sleeves Adjustable drawstring bottom of the jacket 4 outside pockets Material: 100% cotton I’m suffocating from comfort, suddenly crackling fires will blow from the blue edge of the gas above the burner ... ”(B. Vakhnyuk) Once running home, we buried our faces in a windbreaker hanging on a hanger and inhaled the smell of a fire. In windbreakers we went on any trips and at any time of the year. They were not bitten by mosquitoes, they were not blown through, they did not melt from fire sparks. True, they froze, dried slowly and were heavy. Now, when a lot of light modern jackets have appeared, a real canvas windbreaker can be found quite rarely. But even now it is better not to find anything for the forest and the fire. Synthetics do not like fire. And if you do not want your favorite fleece jacket to be in a small (or large) hole, it's time to think about tarpaulins. The retro style jacket is made of high quality tarpaulin. It is very durable and breathes well. And generally pleasant and loved, like Vizbor's songs on a reel-to-reel tape recorder. The hood, adjustable on an oval of the face, elastic bands on sleeves and an inhaling on a bottom of a jacket protect from mosquitoes and wind. Matches, a compass, a map and other necessary items can easily fit in four large pockets. If you like to meet sunrises on a steep coast, wander through the summer tundra, pick cloudberries and cranberries in the swamps, sing around a campfire in the evenings - this windbreaker is for you.

No Velcro for chevrons. The size is indicated by the collar. Shoulder straps can be used Worn loose Waistband adjustable with side elastic bands 2 chest pockets Material: 65% Polyester 35% Viscose