Heavy tank t 35 dimensions. Service and combat use

The Soviet T-35 tank, abandoned and blown up by the crew on the eastern outskirts of the city of Kharkov near the experimental agricultural station, not far from the place where Stalin Avenue (now Moskovsky Prospekt) passed into Chuguevskoye Highway. The tank was moving east towards Chuguev. This is one of four T-35s that took part in the defense of the city in October 1941. The tactical sign of the German 100th Light Infantry Division (the letter "S" and the image of a Christmas tree) is visible on the tank.

A tank with cylindrical turrets, on the main turret there are eight mounts for mounting a handrail antenna and one hatch, machine gun turrets without additional armor, an early type silencer.By characteristic features, the car was produced in 1936. Tank #220-28. It is known that in the summer of 1941, there were five T-35s at factory #183 in Kharkov, waiting for a major overhaul. Minor repairs were made on four vehicles, after which the tanks were sent to the anti-tank detachment of the granizon of the city of Kharkov.

Let's remember the history of the creation of this armored monster:

Work on the creation of heavy tanks began in the USSR in December 1930, when the Directorate of Motorization and Mechanization (UMM) of the Red Army signed an agreement with the Main Design Bureau of the Gun-Weapon-Machine-Gun Association to develop a project for a heavy breakthrough tank, which received the designation T-30.

It was supposed to be a 50 ton vehicle, armed with two 76 mm guns and five machine guns. But the lack of domestic experience in tank building did not even allow the creation of a project for a full-fledged combat vehicle of this class. At the beginning of 1932, after completing the draft drawings and building a wooden model of the tank, all work on the T-30 was stopped due to its complete failure as a combat vehicle.

The attempt of the Autotank-Diesel Department of the Economic Directorate of the OGPU (ATDO ECU OGPU) (the prison design bureau in which the arrested designers worked) to develop a project of a breakthrough tank weighing 75 tons before 1931 was not crowned with success. Like the T-30, this project had many shortcomings that excluded the possibility serial construction of such a machine.

Only the intervention of foreign experts moved the matter forward. In March 1930, a group of engineers headed by Edward Grotte arrived in the Soviet Union from Germany. At the Leningrad plant "Bolshevik" they formed the design bureau AVO-5, which included this group. In addition to German, the group also included young Soviet engineers. After the construction of the TG-1 tank in August 1931 and its testing, Grotte and German engineers refused further services for a number of reasons. AVO-5 was reorganized, and it was headed by a young and energetic engineer N.V. Barykov, who had previously worked as Grotte's deputy. The design bureau also included designers M.P. Zigel, B.A. Andrykhevich, A.B. Gakkel, Ya.V. Obukhov and others.

The new design bureau received from the UMM of the Red Army the task "To develop and build a new 35-ton breakthrough tank of the TG type by August 1, 1932." This machine was assigned the index T-35. On February 28, 1932, the deputy head of the UMM of the Red Army, G.G. Bokis, reported to M.N. Tukhachevsky: “Work on the T-35 is proceeding at an accelerated pace, and there are no plans to miss the deadlines for completing the work.”

When designing the T-35, one and a half years of experience in working on the TG-1 was taken into account, as well as the results of testing German tanks "Grosstractor" at the training ground near Kazan and materials (intelligence information) of the commission for the purchase of armored vehicles in the UK.

The assembly of the first prototype, which received the designation T-35-1, was completed on August 20, 1932, and on September 1 it was shown to representatives of the UMM of the Red Army, led by Bokis. The car made a strong impression on those present. Outwardly, the T-35 turned out to be similar to the English experimental five-turret tank A1E1 "Independent" of the company "Vickers", built in 1929. It is generally accepted that the T-35 was created according to the Independent type, but there is no evidence in the Russian archives that the Soviet Purchasing Commission, which was in England in 1930, was interested in this machine. It is most likely that the Soviet designers came to the five-tower scheme on their own, as the most rational, regardless of their English colleagues.

The main turret of the T-35-1 was supposed to house a 76-mm tank gun, increased power PS-3 and a DT machine gun in a ball mount. But due to the lack of a gun, only its mock-up was mounted in the tank. In four small towers, of the same design, there were (diagonally) two 37-mm PS-2 guns and two diesel engines. Another DT machine gun was installed in the frontal sheet of the hull (forward).

The undercarriage of the machine, in relation to one side, consisted of six road wheels of medium diameter, grouped in pairs into three bogies, six support rollers, guide and drive wheels. The track roller carts were designed according to the suspension type of the German Grosstractor tank from the Krupp company. However, Soviet designers have significantly improved the principle of operation of the suspension used on the Grosstractor.

The T-35-1 engine and transmission group was made taking into account the experience of working on the TG-1 tank. It consisted of a M-6 carburetor engine, a main clutch, a gearbox with herringbone gears and side clutches.

To control them, a pneumatic system was used, which made the process of driving a car weighing 38 tons extremely easy. True, during tests in the fall of 1932, a number of shortcomings in the power plant of the tank were revealed. In addition, it became clear that the design of the transmission and pneumatic control is too complex and expensive for mass production. Therefore, work on the T-35-1 was stopped and at the end of 1932 the prototype was transferred to the Leningrad Armored Command Staff Improvement Courses (LBTKUKS) for training commanders.

In February 1933, the tank production of the Bolshevik plant was spun off into an independent plant No. 174 named after K.E. Voroshilov. On it KB N.V. Barykov was transformed into the Experimental Design Engineering Department (OKMO), which, taking into account the shortcomings of the first, began to develop a second prototype tank, called the T-35-2. On the personal instructions of I.V. Stalin, the main turrets of the T-35 and T-28 were unified. The T-35-2 also received a new M-17 engine, a different transmission and gearbox. Otherwise, it practically did not differ from its predecessor, except for the modified bulwark design and the real 76.2-mm PS-3 gun.

The assembly of the T-35-2 was completed in April 1933. On May 1, he walked at the head of the parade along Uritsky Square (Palace Square) in Leningrad, while the T-35-1 at that time carved sparks from the paving stones of Red Square in Moscow.

In parallel with the assembly of the T-35-2, OKMO was developing drawings of the serial T-35A tank. Moreover, the T-35-2 was considered only as a transitional model, identical to the production model only in terms of transmission. In accordance with the Decree of the Government of the USSR in May 1933, serial production of the T-35 was transferred to the Kharkov Comintern Steam Locomotive Plant (KhPZ). There, in early June 1933, the T-35-2, which had not yet been tested, and all the working documentation for the T-35A were urgently sent.

The project of the latter was significantly different from both prototypes. The tank had a chassis extended by one cart, small machine gun turrets of a new design, larger medium turrets with 45-mm 20K guns, a modified hull shape, etc. In essence, it was already a new machine, which caused a number of difficulties in its manufacture.

Several factories were connected to the production of the T-35, including Izhora (armored hulls), Krasny Oktyabr (gearboxes), Rybinsk (engines). According to the plan of the Kharkov enterprise, subcontractors were supposed to start shipping their products to KhPZ in June 1933, but in reality they were able to do this only in August.

The T-35 was manufactured according to the nodal principle (9 nodes), while the final assembly of the first machine was carried out on special goats (stocks). It began on October 18, 1933 and ended on November 1. After a preliminary run-in, the tank took part on November 7 in a festive parade in Kharkov (at that time the capital of Ukraine). On the same day, both prototypes - T-35-1 and T-35-2 were shown at a parade in Moscow.

In accordance with the Decree of the Government of the USSR of October 25, 1933, KhPZ was supposed to produce five T-35A and one T-35B tanks (with the M-34 engine) by January 1, 1934. By the indicated date, only one tank was fully ready, and three more, although they were on the move, did not have weapons and internal equipment. As for the T-35B, it was never built, although the issue of the production of this machine was raised for a year and a half, after which it was “forgotten”. The T-35 was grandiose for its time not only in size, but also in terms of the financial costs of its development, construction and operation (the T-35A cost the treasury 525 thousand rubles; nine BT-5 light tanks could be built for the same money ). This circumstance, in part, influenced the fact that none of its further modifications went into the series.

Heavy tank T-35A.

According to the plan for 1934, KhPZ planned to produce 10 T-35A vehicles. Moreover, given the complexity of the tank, the UMM of the Red Army concluded an agreement with KhPZ for these vehicles, as for the first experimental batch. In the process of mastering production, the plant, on its own initiative, made a number of changes, both to improve the design of the tank and to facilitate its manufacture. But despite this, the development of the T-35 caused great difficulties: for example, tracks that were cast from Gatfield steel broke very often. Prior to that, not a single plant in the USSR, in mass quantities, produced this steel, KhPZ was the first. In addition, it was not possible to eliminate the overheating of the M-17 engine, and the gearbox housing was not strong enough. But, in addition to technical and technological, there were also difficulties of a different kind. So, the head of the 2nd department of the Scientific and Technical Directorate of the UMM RKKA Sviridov, who visited Kharkov in April 1934, reported: “The director of the KhPZ, Comrade Bondarenko, not only does not mobilize plant workers around the T-35, but in all possible cases discredits the car. At KhPZ, no one seriously wants to deal with it, with the exception of the design bureau of the plant, which is really working to produce a good combat vehicle.”

The repression of engineering and technical workers also did not contribute to the rapid development of the production of the T-35. For example, in March 1934, KhPZ received an instruction “about the need for a thorough check of design calculations, especially for the gearbox, since designer Andrykhevich, now arrested, took part in its design.”

The first T-35 with completely eliminated shortcomings was supposed to be delivered by August 20, 1934, but this deadline was missed by the plant. On this occasion, at the end of August, the head of the UMM of the Red Army, I.A. Khalepsky wrote to the director of KhPZ I. Bondarenko: “Now we have to talk about more than one car. You and I are faced with a responsible task: to provide at least 6 vehicles for the parade by November 7, and they must be completely finished for work in the army. Now there can be no excuses. We are responsible for this matter as members of the Party. We need to take on this task very firmly now ... ”And they really“ took it strong ”- six brand new T-35s participated in the Moscow parade, and by the end of 1934 four more vehicles were handed over to the army.

In 1937, the gearbox, side clutches, oil tank, electrical equipment were modernized, the bulwark design was changed, special seals were designed and installed on the machines, which protect the machine from water ingress. In addition, the muffler was removed inside the hull, and only exhaust pipes covered with armored casings were brought out. Thanks to this upgrade, the reliability of the tank has greatly increased.

In 1937 KhPZ began designing the T-35 with conical turrets. The production of such tanks began at KhPZ from the end of 1938. In total, for 1932-39. two prototypes were made (T-35-1 and T-35-2) and 61 production vehicles.

The T-35 is the only mass-produced five-turreted tank in the world and is a unique combat vehicle despite all its shortcomings.

The composition and placement of its weapons are optimal for a multi-turreted tank. Five towers arranged in two tiers made it possible to concentrate massive fire from 76-mm, one 45-mm cannons and three machine guns forward to backward or on any side. However, such a large firepower required an increase in the number of crew members and the complexity of the design of the tank. The two-tier arrangement of the towers led to a significant height of the vehicle, which increased the vulnerability of the tank on the battlefield. Almost 10-meter length led to a sharp decrease in maneuverability. In addition, the T-35 had a large number of shortcomings associated with the engine and transmission. Unfortunately, they have not been completely eliminated. In fairness, it should be said that the T-35 suspension, for all its bulkiness, generally proved to be good and was distinguished by a smooth ride.

The height of the tank, in addition to increasing vulnerability on the battlefield, also caused a number of problems during operation. For example, fenders were located at an almost two-meter height. So climbing onto the tank was a lot of work, and if there are no special ladders, it is almost impossible without outside help. Given that tankers preferred to take people of short stature (about 160 cm), one can imagine what it was like for the crew of the car to take their places on alarm!

Externally, the T-35 is stunning in its size, but the internal volume of the giant is very small. The fighting compartments do not communicate with each other, so it is impossible to penetrate from one to another without leaving the tank.

Visibility from the T-35 was simply disgusting, especially from the driver's seat. It can be assumed that in combat conditions he had to drive the car almost blindly, since the viewing slots allowed him to see the area only to the left and in front, and even then in very limited sectors.

But the biggest problem was to leave the padded car. After all, the exit was carried out only through the upper hatches, and at the same time, the crew of the main tower, for example, found itself at a four-meter height under enemy fire. The driver's hatch cannot be opened without turning the machine-gun turret to the left, the jamming of which could cost him his life. The exit from the rear towers is very difficult due to the niche of the main tower hanging over them and the handrail antenna. Therefore, we can safely say that such a rather important parameter in battle as the convenience of boarding and disembarking the crew was completely not thought out by the designers of the T-35 tank. Crew members became, in fact, hostages of their own combat vehicle.

If until 1935 the tactical data of the T-35 allowed him to perform the tasks assigned to him, then the technical imperfection and lack of knowledge of the machine nullified the possibility of such an application. After 1935, when the reliability of the machine was significantly increased, it was already obsolete and no longer met the requirements for it. The increased power of anti-tank artillery left the bulky and clumsy "land battleship" with little chance on the battlefield. The already heavy vehicle no longer had a reserve to increase the thickness of the armor. At the same time, it should be noted that during the period of “conformity to tasks”, it was not possible to test the idea of ​​​​a multi-turreted heavy breakthrough tank in a combat situation, and therefore, the question of whether these combat vehicles should or should not have been built remains open.

The first serial T-35 vehicles entered the 5th heavy tank regiment of the High Command Reserve (RGK). in Kharkov on December 12, 1935, this regiment was deployed into the 5th separate heavy tank brigade. Organizationally, it consisted of three linear tank battalions of one combat support training battalion and other units. By order of the People's Commissar of Defense of May 21, 1936, the brigade was assigned to the Reserve of the High Command. It was intended to reinforce infantry and tank formations when breaking through especially strong and fortified enemy positions in advance.

Abandoned T-35s and T-26s of the 8th mechanized corps. Dubno area. July 1941.

In accordance with this appointment, tankers were also trained according to a program specially developed by ABTU. The training of the crews was carried out at special courses, which were led by engineers from KhPZ. In addition, in 1936, a training tank battalion T-35 was created in Ryazan under the 3rd heavy tank brigade.

The operation of the machines of the first releases (1933-1936) in the army showed their very weak traction characteristics. So, according to the report of the T-35 commanders, "the tank overcame the rise only at 17 °, could not get out of a large puddle." The military noted the low reliability of its units, and the large mass of combat vehicles caused difficulties. In this regard, the following document, addressed to the command staff of the RGK heavy tank brigade, can be considered very characteristic:

“I propose to adopt the following rules for movement on the bridges of T-35 tanks for steady leadership:

1. On single-span bridges - only one tank at a time

2. There can be several tanks on multi-span bridges, but not less than 50 m apart

3. Movement on the bridge in all cases should be carried out so that the axis of the tank strictly coincides with the axis of the bridge. The speed on the bridge is no more than 15 km / h.

In addition to the 5th heavy tank brigade, T-35 tanks entered various military educational institutions. So, according to the data of January 1, 1938, the Red Army had 41 T-35 tanks, 27 - in the already mentioned tank brigade, 1 - at the Kazan armored courses for improving the technical staff (KBTKUTS), 2 - at the NIBT training ground in Kubinka, 1 - in 3rd heavy tank brigade in Ryazan 1 - at the Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization (VAMM) in Moscow, 1 - at the Oryol Armored School, 1 - at LBTKUKS (T-35-1), 1 - at the Leningrad School of Tank Technicians, 1 - at Institute # 20 (with a centralized guidance system) and 5 - at KhPZ.

Before the start of the Great Patriotic War, T-35 tanks did not participate in any hostilities. Mentions in Western and some domestic publications about the use of these machines in the Winter War do not correspond to reality.

In less than six months, the "service career" of the T-35 almost ended. On June 27, 1940, a meeting “On the system of armored vehicles of the Red Army” was held in Moscow, at which the issue of promising types of tanks and the decommissioning of old models was considered. Opinions were divided regarding the T-35. Some believed that they needed to be converted into self-propelled artillery installations of high power (such as SU-14), others proposed to transfer them to the VAMM tank regiment and use them for parades. But in connection with the reorganization of the Red Army tank forces and the formation of mechanized T-35 corps, they decided to “leave them in service until they are completely worn out, having studied the issue of their screening up to 50 - 70 mm.

As a result, almost all the vehicles ended up in the 67th and 68th tank regiments of the 34th tank division of the 8th mechanized corps of the Kyiv Special Military District. The combat career of the T-35 was very short.

June 21, 1941 at 24.00 in the regiments of the 34th Panzer Division, stationed in Grudek-Jagellonsky southwest of Lvov, the alarm was raised. The vehicles were refueled and taken to the training ground, where the loading of ammunition began. During subsequent hostilities, all T-35s of the 8th mechanized corps were lost. You are given a unique opportunity to trace the fate of each of them, down to the vehicle number, date and place of death, and the nature of combat or technical damage. This can be done by the acts on the write-off of combat vehicles preserved in the archives, from which it follows that on July 18, 1941, T- 35 of the 67th and 68th tank regiments were lost.

From these acts it follows that most of the T-35s of both regiments were lost for technical reasons. Only a few tanks were killed in action. Four vehicles that were under repair at KhPZ in July-August 1941 were hastily repaired and handed over to the troops. Two T-35s took part in the battles near Moscow as part of the VAMM tank regiment, however, details about this combat episode have not yet been found. The only copy of the T-35 heavy tank has survived to this day. It is on display at the Museum of armored weapons and equipment in Kubinka.

T-35A in standard camouflage from the 1930s. 3rd tank, 1st tank company, 3rd tank battalion, 5th heavy tank brigade. 1936. (drawing by V. Lobachev)

T-35A in standard winter camouflage. Tank Regiment VAMM. Winter 1941. (drawing by V. Lobachev)

English tank A1E1 "Independent" (fig. M. Petrovsky)

Parameter A1E1 "Independent" Crew, people 8 Weight, kg 31,500 Armament 1×47mm cannon

4 × 7.62mm machine guns Reservations, mm 13-28 Armstrong-Siddley engine, 398 hp Max. speed, km/h 32 Power reserve, km 320

Production of T-35 tanks

Undercarriage T-35A

T-35A tank fire sectors

And now the photographs:

It all started back in the twenties. The young Soviet Union was well aware that they would not just leave it alone, and built - including tank ones. It had to be done almost from scratch. There were, of course, foreign tanks captured from the Whites, but they were rapidly becoming obsolete, so it was necessary to create something of our own.

The most powerful weapon of the Soviet armored forces was supposed to be, as they said then, a "positional tank" - that is, a heavy one. The requirements for it were as follows: 60-70 tons, the ability to drive through a four-meter ditch and a width that allows the tank to be transported both on Russian and European railways. The commission carefully looked at the super-heavy tanks of other countries - buying a license and setting up production is always easier than starting a completely original development. But a worthy candidate was never found.

Time passed, but the Red Army did not have a truly formidable tank. Then, in 1929, they decided to use the Great Depression, which sharply lowered the standard of living in Western countries. A group of German engineers headed by designer Edward Grote was discharged from Germany. It was he who developed several tanks at once - from 25 to 100 tons. They were good, especially the detailed 25-ton. But the Germans could not achieve a reasonable unit cost necessary for mass production: a 25-ton Grote tank cost 1.5 million - like 25 light Bt-2s. It was too much!

Then it was decided to take domestic designers who had gained experience from the same Grote, combine this experience with the study of foreign tanks purchased at the end of 1929 and create their own heavy vehicle. Work on it began in August 1932.

Giant Form

The tank received the T-35 index - it was assumed that it would weigh 35 tons. However, this mass could not be sustained - on the first prototypes it was already 38 tons, then it jumped to 42, and later the car "recovered" right up to 50. This, however, was offset by impressive combat power. Five towers, a 76-mm gun (later it will be changed to another of the same caliber as on the T-28 tank), two 37-mm guns (then they will be replaced with "forty-fives") and four machine guns (later - seven).

An interesting solution was the pneumatic control system, which greatly facilitated the work of the driver. True, it didn’t work out very well with her - she, of course, provided the levers with such a desired lightness, but she was constantly capricious and broke. Therefore, the tank that went into series was deprived of it. The result was the “oakness” of control, typical for domestic cars of that time. But this was the inevitable cost of increased reliability.

Later, in 1935, they will try to seriously improve the tank. First, they want to create twice as powerful a diesel engine with 800 horsepower. Secondly, they will start developing a fire control system similar to a naval one. Still, five towers on two tiers shoot too randomly. Alas, none of these good undertakings will be carried out - contractors will always have more important orders or force majeure obstacles.

Mass production

It was decided to assemble the T-35 at the Kharkov Locomotive Plant. The first serial tank was ready on November 7th, 1933, just in time for the holiday. True, he did not take root well at the plant - the reason for this was the adjustment of the plan, lowered from above in 1934. Now Kharkovites were supposed to make 10 cars a year instead of 30. And, apparently, something like the effect of deceived expectations happened to the plant management. At least since that time, the T-35 has turned from a desired child into an unloved stepson.

It got to the point that inspectors from Moscow complained about the director of the plant, who "... discredits the car in every possible way." The enthusiasm of workers and resources were directed to other projects, which could not but affect the pace of production of the T-35. For example, in 1935, the 9-month plan was completely thwarted - out of the five proposed tanks, the plant did not deliver a single one. True, there were still problems with subcontractors - the Mariupol plant could not supply the required amount of armor, and the Rybinsk plant could not supply engines.

Not surprisingly, over the years of mass production, only 59 machines were built. The release of the T-35 was discontinued following the results of the Spanish Civil War. It turned out that armor of 20–30 mm was no longer sufficient against modern anti-tank artillery. They tried to extend the life of our hero by trying to increase the armor to 40-55 mm, but this undertaking failed - the weight of the giant would have grown to very indecent values.

War

The first and only conflict of the T-35 was the Great Patriotic War. And here, of course, several factors came together at once. First, the obsolescence of the giant itself. Insufficient armor plus the lack of reserves for modernization made it as vulnerable as possible - with such and such a size! Secondly, the campaign itself in the summer of 1941 was extremely unpleasant for the Soviet Union - in such conditions, not only “thirty-fifths”, but also KVs were massively burned.

The latter factor sharply increased the number of non-combat losses. The chaos of frantic counterattacks "at random" in an attempt to somehow react before it was too late, led to long marches. And the technology inevitably broke down. And the Red Army, inexperienced in big wars, paid unjustifiably little attention to providing tank troops. As a result, the required number of spare parts was not brought to the battlefield, and the repair and evacuation services were not well and fully organized.

That's why many T-35s were simply abandoned. The only thing that the crews who got into such a situation could do was to remove light weapons and optics from the tanks and bury them in the hope of returning for them soon, when "ours will drive the Germans back."

Those T-35s that reached the battle sooner or later died under the blows of superior enemy forces, but resisted with dignity. So, for example, they participated in a successful counterattack near the village of Verba on June 29, 1941. The Germans were forced to temporarily retreat from there, and the T-35s were taken by them for much more serious KVs. Well, not only ours to confuse the Ferdinand with any other self-propelled guns with a cabin in the rear of the hull.

Several T-35s remained in the Red Army until the Battle of Moscow, but were used there only for training or propaganda purposes. One giant captured by the Germans was sent to Germany, where he was driven around the training ground for some time. There is a version that in 1945 he managed to take part in the battle against the advancing Soviet troops, but disputes about its realism are still ongoing.

The most famous Soviet tank, which largely ensured our country's victory in the Great Patriotic War, was the legendary T-34. However, the medal "For Courage" does not depict him at all, but the T-35 five-turret tank, which was practically not used in battles, but on the other hand, formidable in appearance.

Fortress on wheels

Paradoxically, but the T-35, which Soviet artists liked to depict on propaganda materials from the Great Patriotic War by 1941, two years later, was discontinued. In total, 61 vehicles of this model of heavy tanks were produced in the USSR. Its main difference from other combat vehicles of the USSR was the presence of five combat towers at once. During the military parades of the 1930s, indeed, the T-35 looked like an invincible bulk. At the same time, it should be noted that if the Germans unsuccessfully tried to put their multi-turreted tanks into mass production only at the end of the war, then in the USSR they were mass-produced starting in 1933. At the same time, no matter how surprising it sounds, but the most powerful tank of the Soviet Union in the period from 1933 to 1939, when it was taken out of production, did not participate in hostilities. You could see him only on Red Square during parades or exercises. To the front, individual samples of this combat vehicle were sent only after the start of World War II. But on the battlefields, they proved themselves extremely unimportant. Heavy, clumsy, often breaking down T-35s quickly broke down or were destroyed by the enemy. At the same time, the fewer samples of this tank remained in the troops, the more the number of its images on propaganda posters grew, calling for fighting to the last drop of blood. On them, the T-35 was supposed to personify the power of the Soviet army, although in reality it never was.

Birth of a legend

However, the blame for the almost complete inability to fight in the Great Patriotic War lies not with the crew of the tank or its designers, but with the rapid evolution of military equipment, during which the T-35 quickly became obsolete. The appearance of this combat vehicle was due to the work in the USSR in 1930 of the German tank designer Edward Grotte. A talented inventor with a group of assistants worked in the Soviet Union on the creation of the first domestic heavy tank. However, shortly before the completion of the work, the designer was politely sent home, and Soviet military engineers continued his work. As a result, by 1932, the T-35-1 was born, weighing 42 tons. The armor of the tank reached 40 mm, and the crew consisted of 11 people. Five combat towers, two cannons and three machine guns were installed as weapons on the combat vehicle. During the tests, the tank completely satisfied the military, but the designers decided to refine their brainchild a little more. First, by 1933, the T-35-2 tank appeared, and then the T-35A, which went into the series. The latest version of the tank had an improved undercarriage and machine gun turrets significantly changed from the original version. In 1934, a heavy tank entered the troops. At the time of its appearance, the five-turreted T-35 tank was the most formidable tank in the world in terms of firepower. Five rotating turrets of the combat vehicle were armed with machine guns and could conduct a circular battle. In turn, three cannons also placed on the towers could create significant gaps in enemy manpower and equipment. The main disadvantages of the tank were thin armor and low movement speed due to the huge mass of the tank. However, by 1941, over the past seven years since its creation, the tank was obsolete, although it still gave the impression of a serious combat vehicle.

Combat use

In the first days of the war, the Red Army had 48 T-35 tanks. Basically, they were on the balance sheet of the 67th and 68th tank regiments, as well as the 34th division of the Kyiv military district. As soon as the war began, the command of the Red Army tried to use the tanks that had never fought before. Unsuccessfully. Thirty-five of them broke down on the way to the front, and only seven died during the fighting. True, in fairness it should be noted that two T-35 tanks performed well during the battle near Moscow. But most of the T-35s were abandoned by their crews due to technical malfunctions. In doing so, one interesting fact can be noted. When the Germans captured the first captured T-35, it was immediately sent to Berlin for study. The tank was in the capital of the Third Reich until May 1945, when the repaired one was used by the Germans during the defense of the city, but was quickly knocked out by the Soviet troops. This episode was the last in the history of combat use of the T-35. However, this tank, which did not take place as a combat vehicle, played a significant propaganda role during the campaign during the Great Patriotic War.

Main characteristics

Briefly

in detail

1.3 / 1.3 / 1.3 BR

10 people Crew

195% Visibility

forehead / side / stern Booking

30 / 20 / 20 cases

20 / 20 / 30 towers

Mobility

52.0 tons Weight

954 l/s 500 l/s Engine power

18 HP/t 10 HP/t specific

29 km/h ahead
4 km/h ago27 km/h ahead
3 km/h back
Speed

Armament

96 shells ammo

4.0 / 5.2 sec recharge

5° / 25° UVN

226 shells ammo

2.9 / 3.8 sec recharge

8° / 32° UVN

3,780 rounds of ammunition

8.0 / 10.4 sec recharge

63 rounds clip size

600 shots/min rate of fire

2,520 rounds of ammunition

8.0 / 10.4 sec recharge

63 rounds clip size

600 shots/min rate of fire

Economy

Description

Soviet heavy tank T-35 was a true symbol of the power of the Red Army in the 1930s.

These multi-tower combat vehicles led the columns of military equipment in parades on Red Square in Moscow and on Khreshchatyk in Kyiv. Moreover, the T-35 tank was depicted on many posters and postcards, it is also present in a stylized form on the obverse of the Soviet soldier's medal "For Courage" - an award given only for military merit.

The T-35 was the only five-turreted tank in the world that was mass-produced, albeit in very limited quantities. The purpose of this tank was to qualitatively strengthen other formations of the Red Army when breaking through heavily fortified defense lines. Powerful armament: three cannons and five machine guns, placed in five towers, provided the “thirty-fifth” with the possibility of all-round fire from at least two guns and three machine guns.

During the war, T-35 tanks took part in the battles in Western Ukraine in the first, most difficult months of the war. It is known, for example, that four "thirty-fifths" were used in the defense of Kharkov in October 1941. All combatant T-35s were lost in these battles, and not so much from enemy fire, but for technical reasons or exhaustion of fuel and ammunition.

To this day, the only instance of the T-35 has been preserved, which is on display at the Military Historical Museum of Armored Weapons in Kubinka, and not so long ago this tank was restored to running condition.

T-35- premium heavy tank in the Soviet tech tree with BR 1.3 (AB/RB/SB). Was introduced in update 1.43.

Main characteristics

Armor protection and survivability

The armor of the T-35 was quite good for its time and could withstand the shells of anti-tank guns that existed at that time, whose caliber did not exceed 40 mm. Hull forehead - 30 mm, VLD - 24 mm with a slope of 77 °, sides - 23 mm, feed - 20 mm. True, the sides are still covered with bulwarks to protect the undercarriage, 11 mm thick, and the side walls of the turret box are 10 mm armored with tool boxes. The towers also do not shine with the thickness of the armor. The 76-mm turret is armored in a circle with 20-mm armor, the mask and front part are 20 m, the 45-mm gun turret has a thickness of 25 mm in a circle and a mask of 17 mm, the machine-gun turret is 23 and 22 mm, respectively. Theoretically, armor of this thickness should not be a problem for "classmates". In practice, however, they do not always break through it.

The layout of the tank is quite dense, but, oddly enough, the destruction of the vehicle with one hit is extremely rare. A very high survivability for its BR is greatly facilitated by a huge, by tank standards, crew of 10 people and the separation of weapons into independent towers.

Mobility

The T-35 cannot boast of any outstanding speed characteristics. The power of the M-17T for such a weighty (52 tons) machine is clearly not enough. In AB, the tank accelerates to 29.8 km / h, in RB - up to 28 km / h, and on various bumps and climbs, speed is lost quite quickly. Turns the tank so reluctantly that it can be said that it cannot turn at all. And this should be taken into account when choosing a route. It should also be noted that the tank is simply huge compared to other peer-to-peer vehicles and it is very difficult to hide it behind some kind of cover.

The pluses include the fact that, due to the fair length of the hull, various kinds of ditches and trenches, the machine overcomes easily and freely.

Armament

The main feature of the tank, which distinguishes it from the general range, is the range and location of weapons. The same feature was one of the reasons why such tanks did not receive further development. It turned out to be almost impossible for one commander to control the fire of five towers located in two tiers. Insufficient visibility did not allow him to cover the entire battlefield, so the commanders of the towers were forced to independently search for and destroy targets. To facilitate the work of the commander, the Special Technical Bureau for Special-Purpose Military Inventions (“Ostekhbyuro”) received the task of developing a fire control system for the T-35 tank. Its manufacture was to be carried out by Ostekhbyuro, and installation and testing were planned to be carried out in Kharkov, at the KhPZ. However, the work was not finished.

Judging by the description, the T-35 fire control system was supposed to consist of a tank artillery fire control device and a naval rangefinder.

main gun

The T-35-1 used the 76-mm PS-3 cannon designed by Syachintov as the main gun, but it was never brought to mass production. Instead, the T-35A and early T-28s were fitted with the 76mm KT cannon (which can be found on the T-26-4 in the game, for example). The T-35 tower of the early series was unified with the T-28 tower of the corresponding period. The turret provides horizontal guidance of the gun in the range of ±180° and vertical - -5/+25°. The horizontal pointing speed is 33 ° / sec, vertically - 7.2 ° / sec. Piston gun breech, unified with regimental cannon arr. 1927, reloading the gun takes about 4.3 seconds. The ammunition load of the main gun is 96 rounds, of which 22 rounds are best unloaded, thereby freeing the upper side stowage. The following shells are available for the gun:

  • W: Sh-353 - 6.2 kg / 85 g TNT, 381 m / s, armor penetration along the normal - 27 mm at 10 m, 25/100, 21/500;
  • OF: OF-350M - 6.2 kg / 710 g TNT, 387 m / s, high-explosive armor penetration - 11 mm, regardless of distance;
  • BB: BR-350A - 6.3 kg / 155 g TNT, 370 m / s, normal armor penetration - 37 mm at 10 m, 37/100, 33/500, 30/1000.

Since our tank is premium, the entire range of shells is available initially, unlike the linear T-26-4. Therefore, it makes no sense to load shrapnel at all - its armor penetration and armor action are still worse than those of the chamber BR-350A. The HE shell works well on unarmored vehicles and very mediocrely on vehicles with at least light armor. For some reason, kinetic armor penetration for an HE shell was not delivered, and only a high-explosive beating of 11 mm remained.

Additional weapon

The T-35's secondary guns are the well-known 45mm 20-K cannons mounted in two diagonal small turrets. Initially, the small turrets on the T-35-1 carried 37 mm Syachintov PS-2 guns, but later on the production tanks the small turrets were unified with the BT-5. Turret mounts provide horizontal guidance of guns in the range of -50/+123° ​​for the front turret and -48/+117° for the rear. Elevation angles are identical for both turrets - -8/+32°. The horizontal pointing speed is 22 ° / sec, vertically - 7.2 ° / sec. The shutter of the wedge gun, reloading the gun takes about 3.2 seconds. The ammunition load of each gun is 113 rounds. The following shells are available for the guns:

  • BB: BR-240SP - 1.43 kg, 757 m/s, normal armor penetration - 73 mm at 10 m, 71/100, 62/500;
  • BB: BR-240 - 1.43 kg / 19 g A-IX-2 (29.2 g TNT), 760 m / s, armor penetration along the normal - 69 mm at 10 m, 68/100, 59/500.

The main purpose of the "forty-five" was the fight against armored vehicles, therefore, unlike the main gun, they do not have HE shells in their ammunition load. The armor penetration of a solid projectile for this BR seems even redundant, so it's up to you to decide whether it is worth taking them. The chamber projectile quite confidently hits all opponents, and the presence of a charge brings a much better armor impact.

Machine gun armament

7.62-mm DT machine guns on the T-35 are installed in the amount of five barrels. One - in the ball mount of the main turret, two - as twins in small gun turrets and two more - in small machine gun turrets. At least three of them can work in a circle, leaving no areas that cannot be shot through. Small machine gun turrets provide horizontal guidance of -10/130° for the front turret and -20/140° for the rear turret. Pointing speed - 37 ° / sec. The ammunition load of each machine gun is 1260 rounds in magazines of 63 rounds with non-pumpable packing BZ-BZT.

Use in combat

Actually, the methods of using a tank in battle directly follow from its characteristics. A very tenacious tank with powerful and varied weapons and mediocre speed and maneuverability. Therefore, we choose the direction of the main blow and push through it, supporting the attack of our teammates. As for weapons. For a successful battle on the T-35, you will have to master a strong sorcery called "shooting from a multi-turreted tank". You can, of course, shoot from the main and auxiliary guns with a doublet - in the short term this method of shooting brings wonderful results in the form of a “shot-corpse”, but at a distance serious differences in the ballistics of the main and auxiliary guns come into force and one projectile will almost certainly be wasted. Well, in parallel with the development of separate firing, the words that it was difficult for the T-35 commander to control the fire of so many guns and machine guns will become clearer than ever.

Advantages and disadvantages

In general, we have a heavy tank, on its BR it fully meets its purpose - to support the attack of lighter brethren in the most important direction. Due to low speed and maneuverability, a quick throw to the other flank for the T-35 is impossible under any circumstances, so think over the trajectory of movement in battle in advance.

Advantages:

  • Good survivability;
  • Powerful and varied weapons;
  • Large crew;
  • The possibility of separate firing from the main and auxiliary guns.

Flaws:

  • Low speed and maneuverability;
  • Big sizes;
  • Difficulty in weapon control.

History reference

Two legends are associated with the T-35 tank. One of them says that the T-35 was copied from the English "Independent", the second - that it was developed by a group of German engineers led by Edward Grotte, who worked in the USSR for some time and was engaged in heavy tanks. Both legends are far from the truth. In fact, the starting point for the emergence of the T-35 was the report "On the organization of work in the field of tank building", made on October 8, 1924 at a meeting of the leadership of the GUVP (Main Directorate of the Military Industry). It considered promising types of tanks, such as: maneuverable, escorts and positional. If everything was more or less clear with maneuverable (later - fast) tanks and infantry escort tanks, then literally the following was said about positional ones:

It must be admitted that, with all the considerations in favor of a broad maneuver for the future clash of the Red Army, one cannot but reckon with the possibility of the need to overcome fortified positions in advance or in general for a long time, in which case the power of tanks of the maneuver type will be insufficient. In view of this, there is a need for a third type of heavy powerful tank capable of overcoming obstacles encountered in a positional war. This kind of tank can only be a special tool given to troops when overcoming heavily fortified positions (breakthrough tank). Supplying the Red Army with such tanks is a task of the second order. This kind of tank of a heavy type is hereinafter referred to as positional (heavy).

That is, what this heaviest tank should be like - there was no clear idea, and the task of creating it seemed clearly of secondary importance, but it did not become simpler from this. The point is also that there was no own school of tank building either in the Republic of Ingushetia or in the USSR, everything had to be started from scratch. That is why the Grotte group was invited to work. The result of the work of the Grotte group was the TG tank, which was not suitable for production in a number of parameters, but its design gave the necessary initial experience to Soviet designers who worked with the Germans. As for the Independent, in fact, negotiations were conducted with Vickers not about its purchase, but about developing heavy tank according to the Soviet TK of 1929. But - it didn't work out.

And so, in November 1930, the development of a heavy tank based on the tactical and technical requirements developed by the UMM of the Red Army began at the Main Design Bureau (GKB) of the Gun-Weapon-Machine-Gun Association. The work was delayed, created by the end of 1931, the project of the T-30 multi-turreted tank was rejected. It was followed by the development of the T-32 tanks and, in parallel, the medium TA-1, TA-2 and TA-3. None even reached the prototype. After the departure of the Grote group, the design bureau was reorganized. It additionally included domestic designers M. Siegel, B. Andrykhevich, A. Gakkel, Y. Obukhov and others. The new design bureau was headed by Nikolai Barykov, who at one time worked for E. Grote as a deputy. The new design bureau received the task from the UMM of the Red Army "to develop and build a new 35-ton breakthrough tank of the TG type by August 1, 1932." Work on the design of a new machine, which was supposed to have a mass of 35 tons, a running gear and a “power unit” of the TG type, armament and layout - of the T-32 type developed by N. Barykov and M. Siegel, began in November 1931 . Soon the tank was assigned an index - T-35.

The assembly of the first prototype, which received the designation T-35-1, was completed at the Bolshevik plant in Leningrad on August 20, 1932. On September 1, the tank was shown to representatives of the UMM of the Red Army, led by G. Bokis, who made a strong impression on them. As a result, the tank incorporated many features of previous projects. Armament was arranged according to the Independent type, a transmission was taken from the TG, the design of the undercarriage was greatly influenced by the German Grosstractor of the Krupp company, which was tested a year earlier at the Kama school training ground near Kazan and was available for study Soviet military experts. According to the results of field tests, it became clear that the design of the transmission and pneumatic control is too complex and expensive for mass production. Therefore, it is quite clear that the main attention in the design of an improved version of the T-35-2, which began in November of the same year, was paid to the utmost simplification and reduction in cost of the sample. The T-35-2 received a new engine - the M-17, a different transmission and gearbox, and a PS-3 gun with progressive rifling was mounted in a large cylindrical turret. Otherwise, the T-35-2 practically did not differ from its predecessor, except for the modified bulwark design.

At the time when the prototype T-35-2 was being assembled, the design bureau was finishing work on the project of the T-35A tank, which was to be mass-produced. Moreover, the T-35-2 was considered only as "transitional, identical in terms of transmission to the serial model." In terms of power plant, running gear and transmission, the new vehicle was similar to the T-35-2, but had an elongated hull of a modified design, a chassis reinforced by one bogie, small machine-gun turrets of a new design, oversized medium turrets with 45-mm guns and a modified shape corps. In accordance with the decree of the Government of the USSR in May 1933, serial production of the T-35 was transferred to the Kharkov Comintern Locomotive Plant (KhPZ). There, in early June 1933, the T-35-2, which had not yet passed the tests, and all the working documentation for the T-35A were urgently sent. In addition to KhPZ, several other plants were involved in the cooperation, including Izhora (armored hulls), Krasny Oktyabr (gearboxes), Rybinsk (engines), Yaroslavl (rubber rollers, oil seals, etc.).

Production of the T-35 was difficult and slow. The plant handed over several tanks a year, which is not very surprising, since the car turned out, even after all the simplifications, complex and expensive. Suffice it to say that the T-35A cost the state 525 thousand rubles (for the same money it was possible to build nine BT-5 light tanks). In parallel with the production of T-35 tanks, the plant was working to improve its design and increase the reliability of components and assemblies. At the same time, work on the power plant of the tank was considered a priority. The M-17T engine, which was installed on the "thirty-fifth", was a variant of the M-17 aircraft engine. On the "tank" version, the candles were moved inside the collapse of the cylinders, and to increase the engine's life, the number of revolutions was reduced, as a result, the maximum power decreased to 500 hp. The M-17 engine installed on the 14-ton BT-7 provided the tank with very high dynamic characteristics, but for the 50-ton T-35, the “engine” turned out to be rather weak. He often did not "pull" a heavy car, he overheated a lot. The issue of manufacturing the T-35B was raised several times - a machine with the installation of an M-34 engine with a power of 750 hp, but things did not go beyond the project, although mention of the T-35B is found in documents and correspondence for 1936. In addition, a BD-2 diesel engine was experimentally installed on one tank.

In total, by the beginning of the war, taking into account the experimental T-35-1 and T-35-2, only 59 tanks of all modifications were produced. The Red Army had 48 T-35 tanks, which were in service with the 67th and 68th tank regiments of the 34th tank division of the Kyiv OVO. The rest were at the disposal of military educational institutions and under repair (2 tanks - VAMM, 4 - 2nd Saratov BTU, 5 - under repair at plant No. 183). In addition, the T-35-2 was, as an exhibit, in the BT Museum in Kubinka, and the T-35-1 was decommissioned in 1936. All combat tanks were lost in the first months of the war, one was captured by the Germans and transported to the training ground in Kummersdorf, and there are references that in 1945 he took part in the hostilities. At the same time, there are also photographs of this tank taken by our fighters in 1945 in the Zossen area and, judging by the lack of tracks, the car had not been on the move for a long time.

Media

    T-35 projections

    Tank T-35 (No. 0183-5) overcomes the ford. June 1936

    T-35 tanks pass through Red Square. May 1, 1937. Most likely, the car was produced in late 1936.

    Tank T-35 from the training tank regiment of the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization named after IV Stalin. 1940

    The Red Army is the pride of the people! Poster from 1937.

    Medal "For Courage", 1942

    The poster "Forward, to the West!", judging by the presence of the banner of the Sumy Division - the poster was published after September 1943.

    T-35 on the frieze of the House of Soviets, St. Petersburg

    Tank T-35 with conical turrets and an inclined turret box. Moscow, 1940

The first serial T-35 vehicles entered the 5th heavy tank regiment of the High Command Reserve (RGK) in Kharkov.

On December 12, 1935, this regiment was deployed to the 5th separate heavy tank brigade. Organizationally, it consisted of three linear tank battalions, one training, combat support battalion and other units. By order of the People's Commissar of Defense of May 21
In 1936, the brigade was assigned to the Reserve of the High Command. It was intended to reinforce infantry and tank formations when breaking through especially strong and fortified enemy positions in advance. In accordance with this appointment, tankers were also trained according to a program specially developed by ABTU. The training of the crews was carried out at special courses, which were led by engineers from KhPZ. In addition, in 1936, a training tank battalion T-35 was created in Ryazan under the 3rd heavy tank brigade. "About the combat crew of the T-35" as of 1936 and the duties of its members:
1) commander (senior lieutenant) - in tower No. 1 (main), to the right of the gun, fires from a diesel engine, loads a gun with the help of a radio operator, commands a tank;

2) assistant commander (lieutenant) - in turret No. 2 (front cannon), fires from a 45-mm gun, is a deputy commander, is responsible for the condition of all tank weapons, supervises the training of artillerymen and machine gunners outside of combat;

3) junior tank technician (military technician of the 2nd rank) - in the control department, manages the movement of the tank, is responsible for its technical condition, supervises the training of driver-mechanics and mechanics outside the battlefield;

4) driver (foreman) - in tower No. 3 (front machine gun) at the machine gun, fires, provides care for the engine, is the deputy driver of the tank, is responsible for the state of armament of tower No. 3;

5) the commander of artillery tower No. 1 (junior platoon commander) - is placed to the left of the gun, fires, is responsible for the state of the armament of the tower;

6) turret commander No. 2 (separated commander) - to the right of the gun, acts as a loader, in the event of the departure of the assistant tank commander, fires from a 45-mm cannon, is responsible for the state of armament of turret No. 2;

7) turret commander No. 4, rear cannon, (separated commander) - at the 45-mm gun, fires from it, is the deputy commander of turret No. 1, is responsible for the state of armament of turret No. 4;

8) junior driver (separated commander) - in tower No. 4, to the right of the gun, performs the functions of a loader, provides care for the undercarriage of the vehicle;

9) the commander of the machine gun turret (separated commander) - in turret No. 5 (rear machine gun), fires from a machine gun, is responsible for the state of armament of turret No. 5;

10) senior radio-telegraph operator (separated commander) - in tower No. 1, serves the radio station, helps to load the gun in battle;

11) a senior driver (junior platoon commander) - is outside the tank, provides care for the transmission and running gear, is the deputy foreman - driver;

12) minder (junior technician) - outside the tank provides constant care for the motor, its cleaning and lubrication.

The operation of the machines of the first releases (1933-1936) in the army showed their very weak traction characteristics. So, according to the report of the T-35 commanders, "the tank overcame the rise only at 17 degrees, could not get out of a large puddle." The military noted the low reliability of its units, causing difficulties and a large mass of combat vehicles. In this regard, the following document, addressed to the command staff of the RGK heavy tank brigade, can be considered very characteristic.

“I propose to adopt the following rules for movement on the bridges of T-35 tanks for steady leadership:
1) on single-span bridges - only one tank at a time;

2) there may be several tanks on multi-span bridges, but not less than 50 m from each other.
Movement on the bridge in all cases should be carried out so that the axis of the tank strictly coincides with the axis of the bridge. Speed ​​on the bridge - no more than 15 km / h.

In addition to the 5th heavy tank brigade, T-35 tanks entered various military educational institutions. So, according to data as of January 1, 1938, the Red Army had 41 T-35 tanks: 27 - in the already mentioned tank brigade; 1 - at the Kazan armored courses for improving the technical staff (KBTKUTS); 2 - at the NIBT training ground in Kubinka; 1 - in the 3rd heavy tank brigade in Ryazan; 1 - at the Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization (VAMM) in Moscow; 1 - at the Oryol armored school; 1 - on LBTKUKS (T-35-1); 1 - at the Leningrad School of Tank Technicians; 1 - at Institute No. 20 (with a centralized guidance system) and 5 - at KhPZ.

Already by this time, the combat value of these machines had become dubious. The only place where they showed themselves to the fullest was military parades. Starting from 1933 and up to the beginning of the Great Patriotic

T-35 wars participated in all parades in Moscow and Kyiv. True, the number of "participants" was small: for example, on November 7, 1940, only 20 cars were brought to the parades (10 each in Moscow and Kyiv).

Before the start of the Great Patriotic War, T-35 tanks did not participate in any hostilities. Mentions in Western and some domestic publications about the use of these machines in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 do not correspond to reality.

On March 31, 1939, the 5th heavy tank brigade was transferred to the KVO and transferred to the city of Zhitomir. Soon she changed her number and became the 14th heavy tank brigade.

In less than six months, the "service career" of the T-35 almost ended. On June 27, 1940, a meeting "On the system of armored vehicles of the Red Army" was held in Moscow, which considered the issue of promising types of tanks and the removal of old models from service. Regarding the T-35, opinions were divided. Some believed that they needed to be converted into self-propelled artillery installations of high power (such as the SU-14), others suggested transferring them to the VAMM tank regiment and using them for parades. But in connection with the beginning of the reorganization of the tank forces of the Red Army and the formation of mechanized corps, they decided to "leave the T-35 in service until it is completely worn out, having studied the issue of shielding them up to 50-70 mm."

As a result, almost all vehicles ended up in the tank regiments of the 34th Panzer Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps of the Kyiv Special Military District (KOBO).

In general, according to updated data, as of June 1, 1941, the Red Army had 59 T-35 tanks in the following units and educational institutions: 8th mechanized corps (KOBO) - 51 vehicles (of which 5 required medium and 4 major repairs, of the last four tanks 3 were sent to the plant number 183); Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization (MVO) - 2 vehicles; 2nd Saratov Tank School and Kazan Armored Courses for the Improvement of Technical Staff (PriVO) - 6, of which 2 required major repairs and were sent to plant No. 183. As can be seen from the above data, in June 1941, 5 T-35s were under repair in Kharkov.

The combat career of the T-35 was very short. June 21, 1941 at 24.00 in the tank regiments of the 34th Panzer Division, stationed southwest of Lvov, the alarm was announced. The vehicles were refueled and taken to the firing range, where loading of ammunition began.

During subsequent battles, all T-35s of the 8th mechanized corps were lost.

So, in the "Journal of Military Operations of the 34th Panzer Division" there are the following entries about the T-35: "On June 22, 1941, the division came out with 7 KV, 38 T-35, 238 T-26 and 25 BT ...

On June 24, by the time the division left the forest of Yavorov - Grudek-Jagellonsky, 17 T-35s fell behind ...

And in the "Acts on the lost cars T-35

34 Panzer Division" you can trace the fate of each tank:

"67th Tank Regiment:
No. 0200-4, 196-94, 148-50 - left during the production of medium repairs in Sadovaya Vishna. Armament and optics were removed by order of the deputy. the commander of the regiment, Major Shorin, were blown up during the withdrawal on June 24;

No. 220-29, 213-35 - stuck in a swamp, left during the retreat;

No. 0200-8 - the crankshaft was broken in the area of ​​Garden Cherry. June 26 left, weapons and optics removed;

No. 220-27, 537-80 - in the region of Grudek-Jagiellonsky, a breakdown of the final drive and gearbox. June 24 abandoned, machine guns and ammunition removed and buried;

No. 988-17, 183-16 - left in the Lviv region in anticipation of a major overhaul. 29 June, armament and optics removed;

No. 339-30, 744-61 - transmission and final drive failure, No. 0200-9 - hit by the enemy and burned down. Abandoned during the withdrawal on June 30, weapons and optics were removed from all three vehicles;

No. 183-3 - engine failure. Abandoned by the crew near Belo-Kamenka on June 30. Armament and ammunition removed and buried;

No. 288-74 - accident of the main and onboard clutches. Set on fire by the crew during the withdrawal on July 1 in the Tarnopol area;

No. 482-2 - breakdown of the gearbox. Left in the forest before reaching the village of Sasovo on July 1, machine guns removed, optics buried;

No. 744-63 - jamming of pistons in the engine. Left on the way from Zlochev to Tarnopol on July 1, machine guns removed;

No. 988-15 - breakdown of the gearbox. Left in Zlochev on July 1, weapons, optics and ammunition were handed over to the military unit warehouse in Zlochiv;

No. 715-61 - breakdown of the gearbox. Left 15 km behind Lvov, machine guns removed;

T-35, abandoned by the crew east of Lvov.

No. 234-35 - capsized into the river up the caterpillars in the village. Ivankovtsy, commander of the vehicle Ogiev;

No. 744-62 - the main clutch was burned. Left in Grudek. June 26, the shells were all shot, the commander of the car Taranenko;

No. 744-64, 196-95, 330-75 - remained in Grudek in a state of disrepair, as they were in an average repair;

No. 196-7 - the main clutch was burned, there are no batteries. Left in with. D. July 9, commander of the vehicle, Lieutenant Taranenko;

No. 197-1 - the main clutch was burned. Left 20 km east of Grudek.

Vasily Vikentyevich Sazonov, fought in tank troops from June 22, 1941 to June 1942. He met the war on the T-35, and here is what he said about this tank:

“I met the war with the turret of the front artillery turret of the T-35 tank. This tank is unlucky in our books. Everyone scolds him, what the world stands on. Yes, of course, there is something to scold him for, but not in the same way.

Firstly, for some reason they talk about the stupidity of a multi-turret layout, that it is difficult for the commander, they say, to control all the numerous weapons of the tank in battle. Of course it's hard. Is it really easy for a company commander to control each tank of a company? And without radio stations, this is generally impossible. And in addition to every turret of every tank. Stupid? And what is this from the commander of the T-35 to demand? But the T-35 is a tank company on only two tracks. Are you used to hearing this? And before the war, at the school, they taught us exactly that a medium tank is a platoon of light ones, and a heavy one is even a company, but with one engine and on one pair of tracks. Therefore, according to the ranks, the commander of the light one is “commander platoon”, the middle one is “commander platoon”, and the heavy one is “komroty”. Here is the commander (and with us he was generally in the rank of captain - with a "sleeper" in his buttonhole) and gave us, the commanders of the towers, tasks like those that the platoon commander gives tank commanders. And it was up to us, the turrets, to decide on whom and how to shoot in the first place. Or the TPU commander would prompt when he could. And by the way, I was a lieutenant then, although I only led the tower. He commanded, as if a BT or T-26 tank, and he himself often decided on whom and when to open fire in my firing sector.

For example, I had task number one. If an enemy tank suddenly appeared ahead of me along the course or in the firing sector of my tower, I had to knock it out first. The same, if I saw an anti-tank gun - fire on it. And as for the infantry or some kind of bunker, I had to first report to the commander and get instructions from him. If the commander was unavailable (the TPU was broken), I had to aim the machine gunner-mechanic in tower number 3 at the enemy infantry, or shoot from a machine gun myself, and open fire into the embrasure of the bunker from my cannon, but only fragmentation. Only in extreme cases could I act on the infantry with my "forty-five". This was not welcome.

Their second misconception is that they write that the T-35 had weak armor. Also nonsense in vegetable oil. As far as I remember, not one of our “Ryabyshevs”, who drove the T-35 before the battle, talked about a broken frontal armor. In general, only Sashok Mordvin spoke about broken armor. And that one was struck by him somewhere under the tower with some kind of blank, and not “thirty-seven”.

Anyway. The Lord is with them, experts that the tanks do not know. Listen, I remember how the first days of the war turned out for us.

On the night of June 22, the tanks of our 34th division were alerted out of Sadovaya Cherry. That's for sure. But not all left, several cars remained under repair. From them, I remember, we took the cartridges, the transported spare parts and accessories and went to Przemysl. Not reaching about halfway, they turned us to the East, and on the 23rd they again threw us to the West, and there - Lvov. The first two days went slowly. They rushed from side to side and everyone was waiting for someone - either those who had fallen behind and lost their way, or those who had broken down and started to be repaired. But on the 25th, an order was issued: “Do not wait for those who stragglers,” since we did not have time to concentrate anywhere on time. Well, they immediately went faster, and began to lose their tanks. Everyone joked that there would be nothing to fight. We will reach the German, and the tanks are all under repair. And so it happened.

On the first day they abandoned, as they said, about twenty tanks on the roads. Repairmen were supposed to fix them, but it was a good wish. They didn’t really have anything, not even tractors. And how much can you start on a "lorry" with a box of wrenches and soldering with copper? I doubt. The next day, not a single fixed tank caught up with us, and we threw a dozen more. Well, by the end of the third day, “there were nothing left of the five-turrets.

Our last fight was stupid. First, they fired from the main towers across the river at some farm behind Sitno, and then attacked it with the remnants of the infantry. Fifty Van infantrymen participated in that attack, three “thirty-fifths” and four either BT or “twenty-sixths”, I don’t remember. The infantry, of course, lagged behind as soon as the German bullets began to sing. I am completely silent about my artillery. That one, without shells and tractors, stuck with us for the third day. True, we didn’t see German tanks there at all, only there were rumors about them - about the “Rheinmetals” there, about the “krupps” are different, one is more terrible than the other. But I haven’t seen German tanks in battle yet, and there didn’t seem to be a lot of their infantry there.

We went on the attack on the farm, and the German cannon opened fire on us on the left. I turned the tower there - I looked, looked, I don’t see anything!

On the tower - boom! And you can't get out of the tower. Bullets are sprinkled like peas, and it’s impossible in battle. Your main tower will tear the skin from your head to the jester, or maybe tear your head off. So I look into my periscope - I see nothing, only German trenches. And for us again: “Boom! Boom!!" German shells are hollowed out in 5 seconds each, and not only on the port side, but also in my tower arrive. I saw a flash. Well, he pointed it there, opened fire - sent ten shells. It looks like it did, but maybe not. We are being beaten again. We did not reach the farmstead about fifty meters away - the caterpillar was cut off to us. What to do? Leave the tank? It seems to be nothing. We shoot in all directions with everything that is! Again, I don't see anything. I shoot into the white light, while there are shells. Ours have gone further. And it got even worse for us - they were hammering from all sides. The engine has stalled, the cannon has jammed, the main turret won't turn. German soldiers showed up. They run to the tank with some boxes, and I can only shoot at them with a revolver.

I realized that it was time to drape. Crawled out of the tower, jumped from a height onto the road. It's good that their machine gun fell silent. My loader jumped after me, sprained his leg. I dragged him into a roadside pit behind me. The mechanic followed us. They began to crawl away, then our tank gasped. It was the Germans who ripped him off. And we crawled down the ditch to the river.

Then three more strayed to us - the crew of the T-26. With them, we went back to Sitno, but we found our own there only about a dozen people - the remains of different crews. Of the "thirty-fifths" four and all from different cars. One was rushed, like us, one was blown up by a mine, one burned down by itself. With them, we left the encirclement five days later. This is how the tank battle near Dubno ended for me. And I didn’t see more “thirty-fifths” in battles. I think that they could normally fight in the forty-first. Tanks could. Tankers - not yet.

And here is what former sapper Gryaznov Anton Platonovich said about the T-35:

“So on the third day from the start of the war, I saw how our tanks went to the Germans - two pieces, big ones like on Courage! All in cannons and machine guns, five towers big and small! They overtook us somewhere near Dubno. As soon as they moved forward, a dozen German tanks fell on us from the side. They did not pay attention to the five-turrets - immediately to us, but to the infantry. And our "cruisers" crawled away on their own way. They never saw German tanks. Before we had time to look back, they crossed from our rear to the German rear. Then I remember one such “cruiser” trying to break through back to its own. He could, probably, there were no Germans, but he got stuck at the exit from the river. We ran to help the tankers. Two more of our light tanks approached. They tried to pull the big one ashore with two cables - the cables were cut off. Then they took off everything that was possible from the heavy one, drained the gasoline, broke the rest, sat on the light ones and the tank brothers left. And they forgot about us."

As for the T-35s that were under repair in Kharkov, apparently they were never restored. So, on August 21, 1941, in his telegram to the district engineer of the GABTU of the Red Army at plant No. 183, the head of the GABTU Fedorenko reported: “The 4 T-35 tanks No. 148-30, 537-90, 220-28 and 0197- 2 to carry out minor repairs, enabling the tanks to move independently, install the required weapons and urgently ship from the factory according to the order of the GABTU KA. Let me know about your readiness."

As can be seen from the document, one T-35 was repaired in the summer of 1941 and sent to the duty station. Most likely it was a tank from the PriVO troops.

As for the four machines mentioned in the telegram, most likely, the repairs were never carried out. In any case, the surviving documents No. 183 say that in October 1941, "during the defense of Kharkov, these tanks were used as fixed firing points." There is a German photo in March 1943 (after the second capture of Kharkov by the Germans), which depicts the T-35 (without part of the towers), which was used as a gate in the barriers of metal gouges and hedgehogs. Most likely, the car has stood since the autumn of 1941. According to the recollection of one of the veterans, "one T-35 after the war stood for a long time at the former line of defense in one of the parks of Kharkov."

In the summer of 1941, one captured T-35 was repaired by the Germans and sent to Germany. According to the memoirs of a German driver, “the control of the tank was extremely difficult, and switching levers and pedals was very difficult.

During the loading and transportation of the tank by rail, a number of difficulties arose due to the fact that the T-35 did not fit into the railway gauge (the gauge in Western Europe is less than in the USSR and Russia - 1420 mm versus 1535 mm). However, the tank was taken to the German tank range in Kummersdorf, where it was tested. The further fate of this T-35 is unknown.

In October 1941, a tank regiment was formed from the VAMM training park. Among other tanks, the regiment also included two T-35s, which were registered with the academy. However, judging by the latest archival data, this regiment was never sent to the front and did not take part in the battles near Moscow.

There was another "combat" debut of the T-35. This time in the cinema. We are talking about the documentary film "Battle for Moscow". Some episodes of the picture were filmed near Kazan, and two T-35s with KBTKUTS participated in these shootings.