5th Guards Tank Army. Polygalova L.A.

Most likely, the decision of General P. A. Rotmistrov to advance on his own was affected by his own negative experience in the summer of 1942. At that time, in the 5th Tank Army of Major General A.I. Lizyukov, the tank corps transferred by rail were introduced into battle at the same time, which largely determined the overall failure of the counterattack. In addition, fears about the bombing of Rotmistrov's army formations on the march turned out to be unfounded. The German command concentrated the main efforts of aviation on direct support of the offensive of its troops. Therefore, unlike the mechanized corps showered with bombs in the summer of 1941, the 5th Guards Tank Army moved to the front, practically without being exposed to the enemy.

Another army from the Headquarters reserve, the 5th Guards Army of Lieutenant General A. S. Zhadov, as already mentioned, received an order to advance to Prokhorovka on July 8, 1943. At that time, it included the 32nd and 33rd Guards Rifle Corps, which united six divisions: the 6th Guards Airborne, 13th Guards Rifle, 66th Guards Rifle, 9th Guards Airborne, 95th Guards Rifle, 97th Guards Rifle. Another formation (42nd Guards Rifle Division) was in the commander's reserve. The army received the task of advancing to the line of the Psel River by July 11 and taking up defensive positions, preventing the enemy from advancing to the north and northeast. The formations of the army of A. S. Zhadov had to go from 60 to 80 km on foot.

At this time, in the Prokhorovka direction, there was a struggle for the third defensive line. On the evening of July 9, the commander of the 4th Panzer Army of the Wehrmacht, Colonel General Goth, sent order No. 5 to the troops, which, in particular, stated: “The 2nd SS TC is attacking the enemy southwest of Prokhorovka and pushing him to the east. He takes possession of the heights on both sides of the river. Psel northwest of Prokhorovka. To solve the task, the SS men used the same method as the formations of the 48th tank corps of General t / v von Knobelsdorf - concentrating efforts on a narrow section. Breaking through the front with a narrow wedge, followed by a breakthrough to the rear of the units of the 183rd Infantry Division defending in the Prokhorovka direction, on July 10, the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler" managed to occupy the Komsomolets state farm. Further advance was stopped by our tanks from the 2nd Panzer Corps. In turn, units of the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division “Dead Head” (“Totenkopf”) managed to seize a small bridgehead on the northern bank of Psel by the evening of July 10 after a bloody struggle.

The next phase of the struggle followed on 11 July. The defense in the Prokhorovka direction began to be "built" from suitable reserves. The 58th motorized rifle brigade of the 2nd tank corps and the 9th guards airborne division were advanced to positions between Psel and the railway. The formations occupied the indicated positions from the march; an integral defense system was not organized. The 2nd Tank Corps, which was the "core" of the defense on the outskirts of Prokhorovna, consisted of 74 tanks (26 brigade - 3 T-34-76, 9 T-70; 99 brigade - 16 T-34-76 and 19 T-70; 169 brigade - 16 T-34-76, 7 T-70, 15 Guards Otp - 4 "Churchill"). At the same time, the corps of General A.F. Popov was scattered along the front and could not simultaneously bring all these 74 tanks into battle. The consequences of the development of the situation were quite predictable. Applying the same method of concentrating the strike force on a narrow front, the Leibstandarte managed to break through on July 11 along the railway to the Prokhorovka station and capture the Oktyabrsky state farm. It was possible to stop further advance and even force the enemy to move away from Prokhorovka by pulling the SS artillery units and rocket mortars that had broken through to the flanks.

At the same time, our artillerymen developed tactics that included several effective techniques at once, which made it possible to fight German tanks and motorized infantry.

When the German troops were accumulating forces for an attack southwest of Prokhorovka, bypassing the reserves put forward by our command (the formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 5th Combined Arms Army. - Note. ed.), the 315th regiment of guards rocket mortars of Lieutenant Colonel A.F. Ganyushkin fired volley fire (stretched in time) alternately with platoons and batteries for an hour. And all this time the enemy could not resume the offensive. According to Soviet data, the Katyushas set fire to and disabled 27 enemy tanks.

This tactically new way of shooting proved to be quite effective. Under the fire of rocket-propelled mortars extended over time, the enemy's nerves often could not stand it and his forces retreated from the occupied territory. But most often on that day, the Katyushas had to shoot at direct fire, and in this case, special courage and special skill were required, and above all from the commanders of divisions, batteries, crews, their ability to aim and organize people for selfless actions, to ensure that under fire, quickly bring combat vehicles to an open combat position, aim them at the target in a matter of seconds and fire a volley. But the artillerymen and mortarmen could only temporarily delay the enemy. In order to turn the tide, it was necessary to bring into battle new, much larger reserves.

The situation was getting out of control of the Soviet command, and in order to save the situation, the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Combined Arms Armies hurried to the battlefield. Now their formations became the "framework of defense" in this sector, which is why the 2nd Tank Corps was transferred to the operational subordination of 5 TA. Also, Rotmistrov's army, in addition to regular guns, was attached to artillery formations and units from the reserve of the main command. Tanks covered as many as two anti-aircraft artillery divisions, apparently, the fear of German aviation was quite great. Now let's see what the 5th Guards Tank Army had at its disposal in the fight against the German steel avalanche.

This army association belonged to the tank armies of the second formation.

The creation of the 4th and 5th tank armies began on February 22, 1943 in accordance with the directive of the people's commissar of defense. This document stated: “In pursuance of the decision of the State Defense Committee No. 2791 of January 28, 1943, I order:

1. During the period of February-April, 1943, form two guards tank armies in composition and according to the state according to the list-proposal No. 1.

2. Deployment and terms of readiness of the guards tank armies to establish:

b) 4th Guards Tank Army - Kupyansk, Krasny Liman. Completion date April 15, 1943.

3. Include in the composition of the guards tank armies:

a) To the 5th Guards Tank Army: 3rd Guards Kotelnikovsky Corps, 29th Tank Corps, 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

b) To the 4th Guards Tank Army: 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, 23rd Tank Corps, 1st Guards Mechanized Corps.

It should be said that by the summer of 1943 the composition of the army had changed somewhat. When, according to the directive of the General Staff of July 6, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army was included in the Voronezh Front, it included: the 18th and 29th Tank and 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, the 53rd Guards Tank, 1- 1st Guards Motorcycle, 678th Howitzer and 689th Guards Mortar Regiments, 6th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division, 4th Communications Regiment, 377th Motorized Engineer Battalion, rear units of the institution.

As is already known, Lieutenant General of Tank Troops P. A. Rotmistrov was appointed commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Major General of Tank Troops P. G. Grishin was a member of the Military Council, and Colonel V. N. Baskakov was appointed chief of staff.

The two-corps organization (2 tank corps in the army), in accordance with which 5 TA was formed, no longer fully met the principles for the use (which had already developed in 1943) of tank armies. By the end of the war, almost all tank armies will have three tank corps. But in 1943, the understanding of the optimal staffing structure was only being formed, moreover, by trial and error.

By the beginning of the operation, the 5th Guards Tank Army, according to the state, included the 18th and 29th Tank Corps, as well as the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps. In addition, the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps and the 2nd Tank Corps were attached to the army association. Both of the corps formations mentioned by the latter had already participated in the battles, therefore they had about 200 tanks, an "incomplete set" of artillery and other types of weapons. The artillery of the tank army, together with the reinforcement received (by order of the commander of the Voronezh Front, the 5th tank army was given the 114th and 522nd howitzer artillery regiments, the 1529th self-propelled artillery regiment, the 16th and 80th guards mortar regiments. - Note. ed.) consisted of one cannon brigade (in different documents, in the list of parts of attached artillery, the numbering of the regiments does not always coincide, but, apparently, the cannon brigade included the 93rd and 148th cannon artillery regiments: eighteen 122-mm A-19 artillery systems in each .- Note. ed.), three howitzer regiments, eight anti-tank artillery regiments, three mortar regiments, three rocket artillery regiments, and two anti-aircraft artillery divisions. Part of the artillery was attached to the tank corps, and the other part became part of the army artillery group.

Thus, before the start of the counterattack, the 5th Guards Tank Army, together with attached corps, included 501 T-34-76 medium tanks, 261 T-70 and 31 light tanks (as indicated in the document, 21 tanks are assigned according to the state. - Note. ed.) heavy infantry support tank MK IV "Churchill III / IV" British production. Total - 793 tanks.

The material part of the artillery consisted of 45 122-m guns, 124 artillery systems with a caliber of 76.2 mm, 330 45-mm anti-tank guns, 1007 anti-tank rifles, 495 mortars and 39 RS M-13 installations (the indicated amount of artillery did not include artillery equipment attached to the front .- Note. ed.).

The main striking force of the 5th Guards Tank Army was the medium tanks T-34-76 - the famous "thirty-four".

By the summer of 1943, our combat vehicles had lost their superiority over a significant number of German tanks and self-propelled guns - and not even over the "Tigers" with their most powerful 88-mm artillery systems 56 calibers long, but over medium tanks Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.H (except tanks Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.H, which were produced from April 1943 to May 1944, later versions (412 units) of the earlier modification Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.G. - Note. ed.) and StuG III Ausf.G assault guns equipped with the 75 mm Kwk 40 artillery system.

Let's evaluate the dueling capabilities of Soviet and German combat vehicles. The 75 mm Kwk 40 tank gun with a barrel length of 48 calibers quite confidently hit the T-34-76 tanks. According to Soviet data, the following distances (in meters) for a 75-mm armor-piercing projectile were the limit of through armor penetration (PSP) and, accordingly, dangerous tank damage:

From the above data, it follows that the T-34-76 turret armor was no longer a noticeable obstacle to German shells. The hull was confidently hit by a direct hit almost at a direct shot distance, however, at certain heading angles, the shells simply glided over the armor. 13% of 75-mm shells hit the hull with a ricochet.

The domestic 76.2-mm F-34 tank gun, on the contrary, could no longer destroy German armored vehicles head-on. Her shots did not pose a danger to heavy tanks of the Pz.Kpfw.VI (H) "Tiger" type, which were in the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. 76, 2-mm armor-piercing shells could not penetrate thick, 100–200 mm, frontal armor at all, and only occasionally from minimum distances hit side plates 80 mm thick made of ductile steel of medium hardness.

Our tankers did not have to meet the Ferdinands and Panthers on the Prokhorovsky field (out of 2772 German tanks and self-propelled guns operating on the Kursk Bulge, the Tigers, Panthers and Elefants / Ferdinands accounted for only 17% of the total number .- Note. ed.), but mass medium-class vehicles - Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks and a significant part of the assault guns in 1943 entered the battlefield with frontal protection from 80-mm sheets of rolled steel of medium hardness, not too inferior in durability to the side armor of the Tigers. Soviet tankers could only rely on the possibility of shelling the weak sides of enemy vehicles, and even the Pz.Kpfw.IV turret, which, unlike the hull, retained 50 mm thick frontal armor.

The only hope for the crews of the T-34-76 tanks was the BR-354P sub-caliber armor-piercing tracer shells with a tungsten carbide core. They were put into service in April-May 1943. A small amount of such ammunition, according to the memoirs of M. E. Katukov, fell into the 1st Guards Tank Army before the Battle of Kursk. With armor penetration of 90 mm along the normal at a distance of 500 m, BR-354P (another version of UBR-354P may also be mentioned. - Note. ed.) could hit Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks and StuG III assault guns in the forehead. Due to the coil form, the sub-caliber projectiles practically did not know ricochets and entered the armor at an encounter angle of only 10 °. Sometimes at short distances they could knock out a Panther and even a Tiger in the forehead. Whether there were such ammunition in the 5th Guards Tank Army, the author does not know.

In total, the tanks of all three SS Panzergrenadier divisions (1 SS Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, 2 SS Reich and 3 SS Totenkopf / Totenkopf) took part in the battle of Prokhorovka, as well as separate parts of the 11- 1st Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht.

The material part of the panzergrenadier and tank divisions of the German troops that took part in the tank battle near Prokhorovka (data as of 1.07.43)

This table does not contain quantitative materials on assault guns and self-propelled anti-tank self-propelled guns, but this does not change the general situation in any way. Everywhere (except for the "Leibstandarte"), "fours" and "Tigers" accounted for less than 50% of the tank fleet of the formations represented.

The rest of the German armored vehicles that the "thirty-fours" could meet in the battle of Prokhorovka: medium tanks Pz.Kpfw.III (the most massive vehicles. - Note. ed.) and light Pz.Kpfw.II, self-propelled guns "on a moving carriage", half-tracked armored personnel carriers and cannon armored vehicles - were easily destroyed by 76.2-mm armor-piercing or even high-explosive fragmentation shells.

But the T-34-76 vehicles, in the case of a long tank battle, were inferior to the German "panzers" in terms of internal ergonomics, had worse and less convenient radio equipment and surveillance equipment (even the commander's cupola on the T-34-76 tanks appeared only in August-September 1943 .- Note. ed.), the “thirty-four” gearbox (more precisely, its switching) during marches and in battle greatly exhausted the driver. In general, a comparison of the capabilities of the T-34-76 tank with potential German competitors was not very pleasing - the "thirty-four" almost did not get rid of "childhood diseases" three years ago, but it lost its main advantages - excellent armor protection and powerful weapons. As for the T-70 and MK IV Churchill IV tanks, as well as the SU-122 and SU-76 self-propelled guns, they were very specific vehicles for highly specialized tasks. Only heavy self-propelled guns SU-152 from the ADD group were “on the shoulder” of any targets, but there were negligible few of them (self-propelled guns).

In general, the SU-152 self-propelled guns were our dialectical response to the powerful German "Tigers" (heavy self-propelled guns "Elephant / Ferdinand" and tanks "Panther" were first used on the Kursk Bulge, so there was no way to familiarize yourself with the structure of captured vehicles, let alone fire at them no possibility. Note. ed.). Why dialectical? Yes, because such an ACS was designed and built by our specialists in just 25 days: a well-developed artillery system - a 152-mm ML-20 howitzer cannon, was placed practically unchanged on the tracked base of a KB-1C heavy tank.

Despite the tight deadline of the task, there was a competition, the favorite of which was the project of the venerable tank designer Zh. Ya. Kotin. According to his idea, the oscillating part of the 152-mm ML-20 howitzer gun was installed practically unchanged in a frame and, together with the ammunition load and the crew, was placed in a specially designed conning tower on the chassis of the “Kotinsky tank” KV. At the same time, the serial gun was almost not subjected to design changes, only the recoil devices and the location of the gun trunnions changed slightly. According to the Kotin project, the recoil force decreased and the length of the cradle was reduced, on which a reinforced clip with trunnions was installed. At the same time, the armor shield, in addition to protecting against shells, also served as a balancing element.

The most important issue that worried the developers the most was the possibility of placing such an artillery system on a tank chassis. Fortunately, the gun fit in, and even managed to place twenty 49-kilogram high-explosive shells and as many large cartridge cases for them, since the howitzer gun was a towed artillery system, with all the ensuing features of its combat use. Thus, the rate of fire of the self-propelled gun, as well as the ammunition load, were small. The initial velocity of the projectile - about 655 m / s - was also not high. But at such a speed, ammunition the size of a suitcase and weighing 43.56 kg destroyed the frontal parts of the armor of any tank of that time, and hitting the turret inevitably tore it off the shoulder strap. The dynamic impact was such that the crew of the enemy combat vehicle, if for some reason they did not receive “mechanical” damage, could no longer continue the battle for medical reasons (loss of consciousness, concussion, etc.). In addition to firing at tanks from a howitzer cannon, it was possible to fire along a hinged trajectory from closed positions. The latter indicator was probably the only one where our artillery self-propelled gun surpassed the Tiger in its capabilities, but in the conditions of a fleeting tank battle, the shortcomings of the domestic self-propelled guns were greatly leveled by the gigantic caliber of the artillery system, a well-developed and reliable artillery and tracked base, as well as the high qualification of the crews, which in the first half of the formation of self-propelled artillery units was staffed by artillery personnel, traditionally the intellectual elite of the Russian army.

The SU-152 design group under the general supervision of Zh. Ya. Kotin was created at the end of 1942 (it included 7 people: L. S. Troyanov, G. N. Rybin, K. N. Ilyin, N. N. Zvonarev, V. M. Seleznev, P. S. Tarapatin and V. I. Tarotko. Note. ed.), the ACS project was defended on January 2, 1943, and on January 25 of the same year, the finished SU-152 rolled out to the firing test site.

The speed of designing and building the self-propelled gun was amazing. Around the serial gun, delivered from factory No. 172 (Motovilikha) and standing on a pedestal, according to sketch drawings from plywood, they began to build a hull model in the maximum allowable dimensions. It was possible to ensure the rotation of the artillery system with a horizontal angle of rotation of 12 °, an elevation angle of 18 ° and a declination angle of 5 °. On the basis of "plywood patterns" they created drawings, and already on them they "dressed" the gun in armor.

Finally the prototype was ready in metal. It's time to put the cannon brought from Perm to its intended place. But then, during the assembly of the machine, it turned out that the gun did not pass through the opening left for him in the conning tower.

Have you seen your work? - Flashing his eyes, the chief designer of serial production N. L. Dukhov asked the blundered designer.

What will you do?

Cut live with a welding machine.

That's right, go ahead.

And he, turning, went to a group of military men and representatives of the people's commissariat, who were right there in the shop waiting for the assembly to be completed. To excited questions about what happened, what was the reason for the delay, N. L. Dukhov laughed it off:

Yes, we inserted the gun with the wrong end.

The tension disappeared, everyone understood that the mistake was fixable and there was no need to make a tragedy out of it.

January 25, 1943 came. At the training ground near Chelyabinsk, the first shots from the new artillery self-propelled gun were to be fired. Prepared to shoot blanks weighing 50 kg. The distance is only 80 m. A roaring shot sounded. The car jerked, even sat down a little, and rolled back a meter. At the same time, several balancers of the rollers reached the stops, but nothing broke anywhere, the chassis remained intact. The first success inspired people. Maybe that's why they laughed heartily at one engineer when, unexpectedly caught by the roar of a shot, he fell into a snowdrift.

Well, the first victim! - comrades joked about him.

This success was followed by heated discussions on the fire capabilities of the vehicle. The installation of such a powerful gun for direct fire was unusual. The representative of the Main Artillery Directorate, engineer-lieutenant colonel P.F. Solomonov, did not have the necessary calculated data to assess what the trajectory of a high-explosive fragmentation or armor-piercing projectile would be when fired at direct fire from a 152-mm howitzer. How long will a heavy projectile fly before it hits the ground? None of those present at the tests could determine this: all verified tables of firing in terms of range and dispersion ellipse from this gun were compiled only for mounted fire. Truly, the development team was on unbeaten paths! Their doubts could only be resolved during test firing at a special range. Such a landfill existed in the Chelyabinsk region.

They started shooting with blanks at plywood shields measuring 2x2 m. The first shot from 500 m. Excellent hit! The second shot from 800 m. Also a hit. They shoot at 1000 m, at 1200 m - the result is the same - an exact hit on the shield! Could not resist, shouted: "Hurrah!"

The success of the tests meant that the new SU-152 self-propelled guns could hit enemy tanks with direct fire from a considerable distance and fire at the embrasures of enemy bunkers and bunkers, while the crew would be covered behind a powerful frontal armor shield. But the rate of fire was still low: 3-4 rounds per minute. The optimal range of a direct shot was 890 m. Armor penetration at an angle of 90 °: from 500 m - 105 mm, from 1000 m - 95 m.

The optical sight had to be set as it was: vertical aiming - by combining the crosshairs in the sight and on the plywood shield. For the fastest training of crews, this is even good - the preparation is the simplest. A typical approach of the national design school.

At the test site, the testers had the opportunity to try out a new self-propelled gun in shooting at a captured tank. Speaking about this, Zh. Ya. Kotin recalled how one of the shells, hitting the turret, completely demolished it from the hull of a German tank.

So we forced the Nazi beasts to take off their hats in front of our gun, - said one of those present.

A few days after the designers eliminated the shortcomings noticed by the military representatives, the State Commission signed a report with recommendations on the adoption of the 45-ton SU-152 self-propelled artillery mount. On this occasion, there is a modest mention in the “History of the Great Patriotic War”: “On the instructions of the State Defense Committee, a prototype of the SU-152 self-propelled artillery mount was designed and manufactured at the Kirov plant in Chelyabinsk within 25 days, which went into production in February 1943” . These machines were mass-produced at the Kirov plant for a whole year.

The successful design and rapid production of the new machine was successful for the designers and manufacturers due to the most severe unification of most parts of the machine and weapons - all the main parts were taken from serial samples. This simplified the coordination of work with many allied factories supplying armor, weapons, sights, motors, electrical equipment and entire components and assemblies.

Recalling one of the battles with the participation of the Kotin SU-152s, a former member of the Military Council of the 1st Tank Army, Lieutenant General N.K. Popel, told how a wedge of German tanks broke through our defenses. Heavy vehicles, having crushed the anti-tank battery on the move, broke out into the open. They were met by self-propelled gunners ... “From above, from the crest of the hill, they hit 152-mm guns, each shell not only breaking through the armor, but making huge gaping holes, turning the tank around as if it were cardboard,” N. K. Popel wrote. - Of the forty Nazi tanks that broke through, eight returned.

They returned and brought to the fascist troops the news of a new terrible weapon of the Russians.

Unfortunately, there were few such self-propelled guns in the 5th Guards Tank Army, or rather, in the artillery group attached to it - there were 11 such vehicles in the 1529th self-propelled artillery regiment. And little is known about their use.

The heavy tanks MK IV Churchill IV, which were in service with the 15th and especially the 36th Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiments, were very specific vehicles.

British military theorists divided their combat vehicles into cruisers and infantry support. The heavy Churchills belonged to the latter and had very powerful armor (forehead - 101, side - 76, stern - 64, roof - 15-19, bottom - 19, tower - 89 mm. - Note. ed.), but a small speed - no higher than 27 km / h.

Imagine such a moving 40-ton (combat weight - 39.574 tons) "safe", armed with a 57-mm (6-pound) MK III cannon with a barrel length of 42.9 calibers. Her armor-piercing projectile left the barrel at a speed of 848 m / s and could penetrate 81 mm thick armor at a distance of 450 m (with a plate tilt of 30 °). A more advanced version of the 57-mm artillery system - MK V had a length of 50 calibers and an initial speed of 898 m / s, which, under the same conditions, made it possible to penetrate 83-mm armor. Ammunition "Churchill" was 84 artillery rounds and consisted only of armor-piercing shells; high-explosive fragmentation, necessary to support the infantry, was not available at all. But in this particular case, especially in the conditions of a tank battle, in which the 15th and 36th separate breakthrough tank regiments participated, this was not so important.

Thus, it turned out that the "thirty-fours" and "Churchills" were close in their dueling characteristics in relation to the tanks and assault guns of the enemy, with the exception of the "Tigers". Only the T-34-76 was more versatile, especially when escorting infantry, and the Churchills, with their extremely thick armor, were advantageous to use in (relatively) close tank combat, which, in general, was subsequently done.

The 122-mm self-propelled guns SU-122, which were available in mixed self-propelled artillery regiments, could quite successfully destroy medium and heavy tanks and assault guns of the enemy, but the light self-propelled guns SU-76 and T-70 tanks in the battle on Prokhorovka field were not better meddle: the first - because of weak armor, and the second - because of weak weapons.

To confirm my words, I will give the following example. The head of the political department of the 26th Tank Brigade of the 2nd Tank Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Geller, in one of his reports noted the skill of the commander of the T-70 light tank from the 282nd Tank Battalion, Lieutenant Illarionov:

“In the battles of 12.7.43 Comrade. Illarionov knocked out the Tiger tank, and then set it on fire with 3 shells on board.

Theoretically, this would be possible if the T-70 gun opened fire on the "Tiger" from a distance of half a meter, and even then it was necessary to find an appropriate place in the side armor. Most likely, the German "troika" or "four" were destroyed by Illarionov, which for a tank of this type was simply an excellent result.

The forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the formations and units attached to it were approximately equal in dueling capabilities to the German tank group. Against better quality Pz.Kpfw.IVs and StuG IIIs, we could put up more numerous T-34-76s, SU-122s and Churchills, and SU-152s could easily cope with the Tigers.

But a real war is not a duel with rapiers, the winner is the one who maneuvers better, uses aviation and artillery as support, and finally, who has better trained crews, junior and middle-level commanders. There would be a desire.

But there was a desire. Both ordinary soldiers and generals, and maybe even marshals, were eager to “knock” with the German tankers. We have something like that in our blood, and how could such a gigantic state be put together without an indefatigable national character.

The terrain on which the 5th Guards Tank Army was to attack was rugged, had many ravines, gullies and small river barriers (Solomatinka, Vorskla, etc.). The most significant obstacles to the enemy's advance in the direction of Kursk were the rivers Psel and Seim.

By forcing the Psel River, the enemy in this direction received freedom of maneuver, while at the same time falling under cut-off fire from the line of the Seim River. Consequently, for an unimpeded attack on Kursk, the enemy simply needed to capture this water barrier as well, or "cover behind barriers with the front to the northeast."

Separate sections of the terrain were completely open, did not have trees or shrubs, which made it possible for aviation to freely destroy the infantry and armored vehicles of the opposing side.

The presence of a large number of heights, mounds and settlements contributed to the success of defensive battles. Such conditions significantly delayed the advance of our troops in the event of an enemy withdrawal, but, in turn, played a positive role in the success of the defense against the Germans in the first days of the operation on the Kursk salient.

Locality (even in those years. - Note. ed.) had a wide network of dirt and country roads, which was the most important condition for the movement and rapid concentration of troops, as well as the smooth operation of rear units.

The general nature of the terrain allowed for a wide maneuver of large tank formations, which contributed to the deployment of a major tank battle here.

The total distance of the upcoming march was determined at 200–220 km.

By decision of the army commander, the march of the corps was carried out along two main routes.

Formations and units of the army set out for the new concentration area at 01.30 on July 7, 1943. Fearing bombardments, the tank army made the most of the night. The movement was organized as follows:

a) Advance Detachment (in some documents it is referred to as a reserve detachment. - Note. ed.) under the command of Major General Trufanov (deputy commander of 5 TA. - Note. ed.) as part of the 1st separate Red Banner Guards Motorcycle Regiment, 53 Guards. tp, 689 iptap, one battery 678 gap moved along the route Ostrogozhsk, Krasnoye, Bolotovo, Chernyanka. By noon on July 7, this group advanced to the Protochnaya, Krasnaya Polyana line, ensuring the exit and concentration of army corps.

b) The 29th tank corps with an anti-aircraft artillery regiment of the 6th anti-aircraft artillery division, moving along the route of the forward detachment, reached the Saltykovo, Sergeevka, Bogoslovka, Volkovo, Dubenka area by the end of the day on July 7.

c) The 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky mechanized corps, which was also covered by a regiment of anti-aircraft guns from the 6th anti-aircraft artillery division, having the main route Karpenkovo, Alekseevka, Verkhososensk, Novy Oskol, Korostovo, by the morning of July 8, had completed its concentration in the Verkhnee-Atamanskoye, Korostovo area , Sorokino.

d) The 18th Panzer Corps set out from the Rossosh region at 10.30 on July 7 and by the morning of July 8 completed its concentration in the Ogivnoye, Konshino, Krasnaya Polyana, Olshanka regions.

e) The 76th Guards Mortar Regiment and the 768th Howitzer Artillery Regiment concentrated in the area of ​​the Orlik settlement.

Thus, the army corps, having made marches of 200–220 km in a day, concentrated in the indicated area by the morning of July 8, 1943.

The dimensions of the concentration area along the front were 40–45 km, and in depth 30–35 km.

At 01.00 on July 9, a combat order was received: “By the end of 9.7, go to the area of ​​Bobryshevo, Bolshaya Psinka, Charming, Aleksandrovsky, Bolshiye Seti with the task of being ready to repel the attacks of the advancing enemy.”

During the day of July 9, the troops of the 5th TA again marched and, having traveled another 100 km during the daytime, concentrated in the rear of the 5th Guards Army, which by this time was already fighting.

The 5th Guards Mechanized Corps concentrated in the area of ​​Bobryshevo, Nagolnoe, Bolshaya Psinka. By the morning of July 10, two brigades took up defense along the northern bank of the Psel River in the Zapselets (claim.), Vesely sector. The 11th Guards Mechanized Brigade, together with the 104th Anti-Tank Regiment, was located at the Zapselets-Lip line (17 km southeast of Oboyan); The 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade, together with the 1447th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment, occupied the line of Lip (claim), Vesely (claim), Kurlov; The 12th mechanized brigade concentrated in the forest northwest of Upper Olshanka (Vyshnyaya Olshanka); The 24th Guards Tank Brigade, together with the 285th Ministry of the Regiment, were in Bolshaya Psinka. The corps headquarters was located in the Nagolnoye settlement.

By 2300 on July 9, the 18th Tank Corps concentrated in the area of ​​Verkhnyaya Olshanka, Kartashovka, Aleksandrovsky, Prokhorovka and took up the defense of the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade with the support of the 1000th Anti-Terrorist Regiment and the 298th Minpolka along the Vesely line, high. 226, 6, Mikhailovka, southern outskirts of Prokhorovka, Quiet Padina.

The 29th Panzer Corps concentrated in the area of ​​Chernovetskaya, Vikhrovka, Svino-Pogorelovka, Zhuravka.

The mobile detachment of Major General Trufanov (in the previous composition) was advanced to the Oboyan region to the mouth of the Zapselets River. This battle group was tasked with: "... to prevent the enemy from reaching the northern bank of the Psel River, and to hold the occupied line, as well as the city of Oboyan until the troops of the Voronezh Front approach."

The 678th howitzer regiment and the 76th guards regiment of the RS concentrated in Ploskoye and Kolbasovka in readiness to support the actions of the 5th mechanized and 18th tank mechanized corps.

Thus, the army troops made a total march of 320–350 km within three days, which averaged 100–115 km per day. Thanks to the thoughtful organization of the march, the troops arrived in these areas on time. This made it possible to immediately organize a defense by part of the forces of 5 TA and begin preparing for the upcoming offensive.

At the same time, it should be noted that our armored vehicles, especially the "thirty-fours" produced at factories in the first half of 1943, for a number of organizational and technological reasons, were not adapted to such long marches "without MTBF" and often failed . "God have mercy", and enemy aircraft, as already mentioned, did not bomb tank columns, but breaking vehicles were either towed or repaired "according to a temporary scheme" so that they somehow "hobbled" to the starting area. In 18 TCs, out of 187 tanks available at 22.00 on July 8, 104 vehicles or 55.6% of the entire fleet remained on the march. Due to technical malfunctions, the 29th Tank Corps "lost" 13 units of armored vehicles (six T-34-76, 5 T-70, one KV, one SU-76) and 15 vehicles. The losses of this formation on the march were insignificant: 1 was killed (hit by a tank) and 3 people were wounded (which once again confirms that the columns were not bombed during the march. - Note. ed.). At 17.00 on July 11, there were 33 tanks on the way in the 18th shopping mall, 13 combat vehicles in the 29th shopping mall, and 51 in the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps (a quarter of the entire fleet). In total, 198 tanks and self-propelled guns, or 27.5% of the army’s materiel, lagged behind on the march out of 721 armored units of 5 TAs (without formations and reinforcement parts). It is clear that it was impossible to go into battle with such equipment without maintenance, repair and restoration. It took several days, but they just didn’t exist. The men were also exhausted from the three-day "maneuvers" and the enemy was inexorably approaching.

There was also some funny stuff. The 1062nd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment of the 6th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division, equipped with ZiS-42 half-tracked vehicles instead of standard vehicles as traction means, managed to be 8-10 hours late everywhere on the march. The tanks were already in place, and the anti-aircraft gunners covering them were moving somewhere behind. In the same way, the advance of the 29th Panzer Corps was delayed (for 3 hours) by the advanced army detachment, which was slowly “dragging” at the head of the columns. So the implementation of the march left an ambiguous impression.

Nevertheless, the lessons of the summer tank battle of 1942 went to our generals for the future - the defense lines were occupied mainly by motorized rifle formations of the corps. Tank brigades were retained as a shock fist - for delivering counterattacks from the depths.

For example, on July 10, 1943, the 29th Tank Corps, which played a crucial role in the Battle of Prokhorovka, had 130 T-34-76, 85 T-70, one KV, 12 SU-122, 9 SU-76. Two refuelings of fuel and lubricants were brought to the concentration area, ammunition - 1.5 b / c, food - 8 daily dachas. The supply station was already 300–350 km from the location of the compound.

The total length of the defense front of 5 TA on July 10 was 60-70 km, and in depth the positions were echeloned by 35-40 km. In anxious tension, our fighters waited for the approach of the enemy.

The 5th Guards Combined Arms and 5th Guards Tank Armies, which arrived from the Stavka reserve, could be used in accordance with various operational and tactical schemes. But the Soviet command, remembering the year-long fiasco of the tank corps and the 5th tank army in the battle in the Voronezh region, wanted to finally use a powerful armored grouping as a single "ram fist". The optimal form of using a tank army is an offensive, as long as the terrain and conditions allow. The last parameter made its own adjustments - in this particular case, it could only be a counterattack. Its successful implementation could contribute to the destruction of one or more enemy formations, at worst, undermine their offensive power.

It was this option that was chosen and defended by the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky. The commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army M.F. Vatutin, did not object to such a development of events.

Detailed planning of the counterattack (taking into account the terrain and the current situation) most likely began on July 9, since Vasilevsky himself later wrote that “since the evening of August 9, 1943, I have been continuously in the troops of Rotmistrov and Zhadov on Prokhorovskoye and southern directions". Consequently, the overall management of the planning of the counterattack fell primarily on his shoulders, especially since Vasilevsky was directly involved in organizing the strike of the 5th Panzer Army by Major General A.I. Lizyukov a year ago. According to the original plan, the 5th Guards Tank Army was to go on the offensive from the Vasilievka - Komsomolets state farm - Belenikhino line. In this area it was possible to deploy and at the same time bring into battle large forces of tanks. They had to go only 15-17 km to the Oboyanskoye Highway, which was by no means an excessive task. The 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies were supposed to deliver an auxiliary blow towards Rotmistrov's tanks from the west. With a favorable set of circumstances, there was every chance, if not to surround the enemy strike force, then at least inflict heavy losses on it.

One should not think that the form and place of the counterattack were "by definition" erroneous, and in general such an idea could only come into the heads of our generals. In the course of repelling the Soviet offensive on the Mius at the end of July 1943, the German command in the same way planned a deep strike by the SS corps into the center of the bridgehead captured by the Southern Front. The actions of the Germans on the Mius were, in essence, a reduced-scale counterattack of the Voronezh Front. In a word, no one developed new operational-tactical forms of combat, and the decision to counterattack was justified, and its form was acceptable and logical in its own way.

The representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the commander of the Voronezh Fronts, assessing the situation that developed during the unfolding battle in the defense sector entrusted to them, concluded that by concentrating efforts in the Prokhorovka direction, the enemy was introducing more and more available forces into battle and that a crisis of the enemy offensive was brewing. A decisive disruption of the enemy offensive and the defeat of his wedged grouping under the prevailing conditions could be achieved in several ways, the most optimal of which, in the opinion of our generals, was a powerful counterattack by the troops of the Voronezh Front, reinforced by the strategic reserves of the Stavka.

Vasilevsky and Vatutin decided to launch a counterattack on the morning of July 12. It was envisaged to deliver two strikes in a converging direction to Yakovlevo: from the northeast - by the forces of the 5th Guards Army; from the northwest - the 6th Guards and 1st Tank armies. The 7th Guards Army, by striking forces in the direction of Razumnoe south of Belgorod, was supposed to contribute to the fulfillment of the main task of the front. The rest of the armies of the Voronezh Front were ordered to defend on the occupied lines. The 2nd and 17th air armies received the task of supporting the counterattack of the ground forces with their main forces.

However, the planned preparation of the offensive operation was disrupted. On the morning of July 11, the enemy resumed the offensive and achieved some success. He managed to push the troops of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards Armies in the direction of Oboyan, and the formations of the 5th Guards Army and part of the 2nd Tank Corps - in the direction of Prokhorovka. In the zone of the 69th Army, the enemy managed to break through the defenses of the 305th Infantry Division. As a result of the withdrawal of our troops, a two-day preparation of artillery to support the counterattack of the 5th Guards Tank Army was disrupted. Part of our artillery was destroyed, having fallen under the blow of enemy tanks during the exit to firing positions, and the other part was forced to retreat to new areas. Therefore, artillery preparation had to be organized anew and in a hurry, which in turn subsequently affected the course of the entire operation.

Thus, the conduct of the counterattack was called into question by the events that took place during its preparation, that is, on July 10–11. The complication of the situation in the Korochan direction forced the division of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the advancement of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps to the Korocha region. Thus, the number of formations simultaneously introduced into battle has decreased by a third. A much more unpleasant event was the German breakthrough in the Prokhorovka area and the capture of positions from which Rotmistrov's tanks were supposed to advance. However, it was too late to give up the counterattack.

The situation is very original. The Soviet command did not yet know what the enemy would do, and, like a doctor who cannot make a final diagnosis to the patient, he constantly "was at the bedside of the latter, assessed the external symptoms and measured the temperature of the object of treatment." That is why Marshal Vasilevsky did not get out of the front line.

“07/11/43 from 03.00 the corps commander with a group of headquarters commanders, brigade commanders, following the order of the commander of the 5th Guards. TA, made a reconnaissance of the area: Leski, railway. Booth 2 km west of Leska, Barracks, Shakhovo with the task:

a) Choice of starting positions for the body.

b) Determine the patency of tanks and artillery through the Sakhnovsky Donets stream, through the railway bed. Log Dry Raft.

c) Ways of approach to the area of ​​starting positions.

d) Determine the possibility of accumulating infantry for an attack on Log Dry Raft.

e) Places of command post and NP, as well as OP artillery.

In Shakhovo, at 0600 on 07/11/43, the results of the reconnaissance were reported to the commander of the 5th Guards TA, Lieutenant General Rotmistrov, who, after reports from the corps commanders, gave the order.

Extract from the combat order to the troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army.

"one. The enemy, with the forces of 4 tank and one mechanized divisions, continues to push our units in the north-eastern directions, trying to connect with the northern grouping of the Oryol-Kursk direction.

By 11.00 on 11.07.43, the advanced units of the enemy reached the line: Kochetovka, Krasny Oktyabr, Vasilyevka, the Komsomolets state farm, Ivanovsky settlement, Yasnaya Polyana, Belenikhino and further south along the railway line. to Gostishchevo.

2. 29 shopping mall with the 366 MZA regiment, 76 RS regiment, 1529 SAP - the task at 3.00 12.07.43 was to attack the enemy in the band:

right: high 252, 2, forest sowing. state farm "Komsomolets" 1 km, sowing. outskirts of Bolshiye Mayachki, vys. 251, 2;

left: Grushki, Watchtower, vys. 223, 4, north-west. outskirts of Pogorelovka - destroy the enemy in the area: high. 255, 9, forest 1 km southeast. H. Teterevino, vys. 256, 2, in the future to act on Big Lighthouses, Pokrovka.

On July 11, 1943, at 15:30, the corps began to move to its starting positions for the attack: the Oktyabrsky state farm, vys. 245, 8, Guard.

By the end of the day on July 11, 1943, the enemy pushed back the rifle units of the army, occupied the Oktyabrsky state farm, the Stalinskoe department state farm, Storozhevoye, and there was an immediate threat of the capture of Prokhorovka.

In connection with the occupation of the indicated line by the enemy, the corps, not having reached the intended starting positions, on 11.07.43 by 22.00 took up new starting positions: 0.5 km west and south-west of Prokhorovka in readiness to repel enemy attacks in the offensive in the southwestern direction.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasilevsky, who arrived in the corps, ordered to attack the enemy on July 11 at 21:00, but since the enemy did not show much activity in the corps and army sector, the attack was postponed and scheduled for 07/12/43 at 03:00.

Units and subunits of the corps with access to their original positions began to prepare personnel and materiel for the attack.

On July 12, 1943, at 0300, there was no signal to attack. At 4.00 an order was received from the commander of the 5th Guards. TA about changing the start time of the attack:

“To the commander of the 29th TC, Major General Comrade Kirichenko

1. The task of the corps is the same, that is, actions from 76 GMP, 1529 SAP, to break the enemy’s resistance at the turn: a grove 1 km north of the Komsomolets state farm, to destroy his grouping in the area of ​​Luchki, Bolshiye Mayachki, Pokrovka, by the end of 07/12/43. go to the Pokrovka area, preparing for further actions to the south:

2. The beginning of the attack. 07/12/43 at 8.30. Beginning of artillery preparation from 8.00.

3. I allow you to use the radio. 07/12/43 from 7.00.

(Commander of the 5th Guards TA) (Lieutenant General Rotmistrov.) (Chief of Staff of the 5th Guards TA) (Major General Baskakov ".)

These documents show that our command had a very vague idea of ​​the intentions and actions of the enemy.

It may seem strange, but the German command did not have clear information about the upcoming counterattack by large forces of tanks and infantry. Of course, German reconnaissance aircraft observed the concentration of tank units. However, they could not give definite data on what forces were assembled on the outskirts of Prokhorovka. Also, there could be no question of revealing the numbering of parts and connections. In the conditions of a dense positional front, there could be no question of any raids deep into the Soviet rear in order to capture "tongues". The brigades of Rotmistrov's corps observed the strictest radio silence regime, which did not allow the enemy's radio intelligence to calculate the arrival of tanks. Probably, on most used vehicles, tactical markings were also deliberately absent. In a word, the secrecy measures taken significantly disoriented the enemy and ensured the surprise of the counterattack.

Even on the evening of July 11, the command of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps had no idea what kind of "surprise" was waiting for him the next day. The report, signed by the chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the corps, contains only general words about the intentions of the enemy:

“General impression: it is possible to strengthen the enemy in the Prokhorovka area. Presumably located in the bend of the river. The psel of the 10th tank corps is represented only by the 11th motorized rifle brigade, since the remaining three tank brigades are located in the area west of the Belgorod-Kursk road.

Intensive traffic in the Oboyan area indicates the enemy's intention to stop the advance of the left neighbor (the 47th tank corps of the Wehrmacht. - Note. ed.) in the area south of the Oboyan settlement. The blow on the left flank of the corps has not yet been identified.

As we can see, no assumptions were made about the impending large-scale Soviet counteroffensive by the headquarters of the 2nd SS TC. Based on the currently available data, the author cannot assert about a trap prepared in advance by the Germans for the 5th Guards Tank Army. The plan of the German command provided for an exit to Prokhorovka and a transition to the defensive in anticipation of possible counterattacks by our forces or until the approach of German reserves. However, on July 12, such a blow was not yet expected (or was not expected any more, based on the events of the previous days). The main operating factor was that the command of the 4th Panzer Army was in some confusion regarding plans for further actions. Therefore, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of SS-Obergruppenführer Hausser did not receive offensive tasks pursuing decisive goals on July 12. If such tasks were received, the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler division could regroup and take a more advantageous position to repel a counterattack. This could be the allocation and promotion to another direction of the armored group. Instead, the division only took up positions from Psel to the railway on a front of about 7 km. The artillery regiment of the 1st SS PgD was supposed to support the attack of the 3rd SS PgD "Totenkopf" from the bridgehead on the Psel River, therefore an observer-coordinator was sent to the SS Brigadeführer Priss compound. At 18.35 on July 11, the Leibstandarte tank regiment consisted of 4 Pz.Kpfw.II, 5 Pz. Kpfw.III, 47 Pz.Kpfw.IV, 4 Pz.Kpfw.VI "Tiger" and 7 command tanks. The assault gun battalion of the division had 10 combat-ready vehicles. Of course, theoretically, a certain number of previously damaged tanks could be restored by repair services by the morning of July 12th. One way or another, the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division of Brigadeführer Theodor Wisch could field about 60 tanks and 10 StuG IIIs on the battlefield. Regarding the location of the Leibstandarte tanks on the morning of July 12, there are discrepancies. According to some testimonies, they were pulled into the depths of defense, according to others, they occupied positions at the Oktyabrsky state farm, that is, they were at the forefront of defense.

On the eve of the battle, the 2nd SS PGD "Reich" had 95 serviceable tanks and self-propelled guns, including 8 captured T-34-76, and the 3rd SS PGD - 121 units. But no one planned to use all armored vehicles as a "shock fist".

It should be noted that both Vasilevsky and Vatutin were primarily talented staff officers, the “lucky star” of their careers rose precisely during their service in the General Staff of the Red Army. Therefore, the operations developed by these military leaders were less improvised, but thoroughly detailed.

According to the order received from the headquarters of the Voronezh Front, the 5th Guards Tank Army, in close cooperation with formations and units of the 5th Guards Army and the 1st Tank Army, from the morning of 07/12/43 should go on the offensive with the task of destroying the enemy that had broken through in the area Pokrovka, Greznoye, Kochetovka, preventing the enemy from retreating to the south, and by the end of the day reach the Krasnoye Dubrovo-Yakovlevo line.

The commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General of the military corps Rotmistrov, decided: with the forces of the 18th, 29th, and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, “to strike the main blow in the direction of the railroad. on Pokrovka, Yakovlevo in order to cut the Belgorod highway at the turn of height 242.1, Yakovlevo. With the forces of the 2nd Panzer Corps, cover the concentration of troops in the initial position for the offensive and prevent the enemy from breaking through to the east, with the start of the attack on 18.29 and 2 Guards. maybe support their attack with all firepower, in readiness for an attack in the direction of Dry Solotino.

The 5th Guards Mechanized Corps should concentrate in the area of ​​Sokolovka, Dranny, Krasnoye, Vysypnoy, Sagaidachnoye in readiness to build on the success of the 2nd Guards. shopping mall in the general direction to Prokhorovka, Luchni, Smorodino.

At 08.30, after a short shelling of enemy positions, the army troops went on the offensive.

The tank attack was preceded by a 15-minute artillery preparation (started at 08.00. - Note. ed.), which ended with a 5-minute fire attack along the enemy's front line. The fire was fired at areas with a density somewhat lower than that envisaged by the combat order. As a result, the enemy artillery was not suppressed and our tanks immediately met with strong artillery fire and fierce counterattacks.

Why did it happen? The answer is simple - the first order to attack by brigades and separate regiments was received by the end of the day on July 11, and then the army formations were kept at their original positions, constantly postponing the start of the counteroffensive. It is clear that proper reconnaissance of the terrain and enemy forces by formations and units of the army was not carried out. Even worse, due to the events of July 10-11, artillery reconnaissance was practically absent, and artillery observation posts were not created in the battle formations of tank and motorized rifle formations, both at the beginning and in the first hours of the battle.

But the grouping (artillery) was rather big and, with proper use, had great potential. As already mentioned, by the beginning of the offensive, the artillery of the army was reinforced by the front with the “following composition”:

a) the 1529th self-propelled artillery regiment, which had 11 self-propelled guns SU-152;

b) a group of long-range artillery, structurally consisting of the 522nd howitzer regiment of high power (12 203-mm guns), the 148th howitzer artillery regiment (18 152-mm howitzers), the 148th cannon artillery regiment (18 122-mm guns ) and the 93rd cannon artillery regiment (also 18 122-mm guns);

c) a front-line group of guards mortar units, consisting of the 16th and 80th guards mortar regiments (24 M-13 installations each) and additionally reinforced by the 76th guards mortar regiment from the 5th guards tank army, 409th a separate guards mortar battalion from the 5th mechanized corps and the 307th separate guards mortar battalion from the 2nd tank corps.

There were also quite a lot of artillery units in the combat formations of the offensive grouping of the 5th Guards Tank Army. Before the start of the attack, the distribution of forces and means was decided to be made as follows:

a) 18 tk - 271 mp, 108 iptap, 1446 sap;

b) 29 tk -1502 iptap, 269 mp, 307 ogmd (after general artillery preparation advanced to the battle formations of the corps), 1698 glanders;

c) 2 tk - 273 mp, 1500 iptap, 755 iptad, 1695 sap;

d) 2nd Guards. tk - 285 mp, 104 iptap, 447 omp, 409 ogmd (after general artillery preparation, it advanced into the battle formations of the corps);

e) 5th Guards. mk - 689 iptap RGK, 522 gap RGK, 76 guards. MP, 1529 SAP, 148 GAP RGK, 27th Cannon Brigade, 80 Guards. MP, 16 Guards. mp, 6th and 26th anti-aircraft artillery divisions (522, 148, 76, 80, 16th regiments, as well as the 27th cannon brigade, were placed at the disposal of the commander of the 5th MK after general artillery preparation);

f) The 36th Guards Tank Regiment of the breakthrough, equipped with Churchills with 57-mm guns, received an additional 292 mp and 1000 iptap.

The density of artillery in our offensive groupings before the start of the battle (data for July 12, 1943) is given in the following table.

It is interesting to note that the planned assignment of artillery units to corps and combat groupings, moreover, on the same day - July 12, according to various documents, coincides only fragmentarily, although the data given is based on reports from the 5th Guards Tank Army and the corps that make it up. The answer was not found immediately, but it is!

But the fact is that the front-line group of long-range artillery for the duration of the operation was not subordinate to the artillery commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army and acted autonomously. There was not even a direct connection between them - the artillery commander of 5 TA (who did not have his own radio station) contacted the ADD group using the radio station of the front group of guards mortar units. Thus, after the initial artillery preparation, part of the ADD group, contrary to the plan, did not reinforce the offensive groupings of the 5th Panzer Army. The distribution of artillery had to be urgently reshuffled, based on the available forces and means. Without communication, the ADD group could not even support the advance of our troops with artillery fire, which, under the bombardment of enemy aircraft, engaging in oncoming battles with enemy tanks, began to move forward. The next day, the error was corrected (the ADD group was subordinated to the artillery commander of 5 TA. - Note. ed.), but the offensive has already fizzled out.

It turns out that the 5th Guards Tank Army did not have effective support for artillery and aviation. In addition, our aviation did not operate on the morning of July 12 due to bad weather conditions (German aviation, according to our own reports, actually began to operate in the morning. - Note. ed.). It remained to hope for the surprise of the strike and the massive introduction of a large tank group into battle. The commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, General P. A. Rotmistrov, wrote about the beginning of the battle, which later became a heroized legend:

“Finally, volleys of the army artillery group burst out. Artillery batteries of direct support for tanks hit. Artillery fired mainly on the areas - the alleged areas of concentrations of enemy tanks and the firing positions of his artillery. We did not have time to determine exactly where the enemy batteries were located and where the tanks were concentrated, so it was not possible to determine the effectiveness of artillery fire.

The barrage of fire from our artillery had not yet ceased, when volleys of regiments of guards mortars were heard. This is the beginning of the attack that my radio station duplicated. “Steel”, “Steel”, “Steel”, - the head of the radio station, a junior technician, Lieutenant V. Konstantinov, broadcast on the air. Immediately followed by signals from the commanders of tank corps, brigades, battalions, companies and platoons.

The radio silence, which helped the formations of the army of lieutenant general t / v P. A. Rotmistrov to hide their appearance from the enemy, was finally broken. The suddenness of the strike was formally achieved, it only remained to put it into practice. Tank corps entered the battle.

But even in this case, tactical surprise could not be fully preserved. German reconnaissance aircraft, despite the non-flying weather, still took to the air and detected the movement of large masses of tanks, indicating their presence with a prearranged signal - purple smoke from special missiles. Rockets warning of the appearance of Soviet tanks soon rose over the positions of the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler". This SS formation could no longer radically reorganize its battle formations, but some changes in the alignment of troops could be made. Yes, and the moral and psychological state of the l / s in the case of an expectation of an attack (in comparison with a sudden blow) is already different.

We proceed to the description and analysis of hostilities.

In the first echelon of our two attacking tank corps (18th and 29th tank corps) in a strip 6 km wide there were four brigades, one breakthrough tank regiment and one self-propelled artillery regiment. In total, 234 tanks and 19 self-propelled guns moved into battle in the first line.

The plan of action for the 18th and 29th Panzer Corps was as follows. The Oktyabrsky state farm area was supposed to fall into the “pincers”, on the one hand, formed by the 181st Tank Brigade and the 36th Guards Breakthrough Regiment, and on the other, by the 32nd Tank Brigade with three batteries of the 1446th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment and 170th tank brigade. They were followed by the infantry of the 33rd Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Army. It was assumed that the 181st tank brigade, advancing through the villages along the river, which the tankers of the 2nd tank corps had only recently left (meaning the settlements of Vasilievka and Andreevka), should not meet stubborn resistance, so it would move faster. The 32nd Tank Brigade was to pave the way for the main forces of the 29th Tank Corps along the railroad. The 9th Guards Airborne Division and two regiments of the 42nd Guards Rifle Division were to consolidate the expected success of the 32nd, 181st and 170th Tank Brigades (“clear” Hill 252.2 and the village near the river from the enemy).

The second echelon of the 18th and 29th tank corps of generals V.S. Bakharov and I.F. Kirichenko had the task of increasing the force of impact and restoring the number of tanks of the first echelon after they suffered losses during the breakthrough of the defense near the Oktyabrsky state farm and height 252, 2.

The 18th tank corps of Major General V.S. Bakharov acted on the right flank of the army, and the battle order was built in three echelons. In the first echelon were 170 (39 tanks) and 181 (44 tanks) tank brigade, in the second echelon - the 32nd motorized rifle brigade with an artillery group, the third echelon was the 110th (38 tanks) tank brigade. The 36th Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment, equipped with heavy Churchill tanks (19 units), operated behind the 170th Tank Brigade in the second echelon.

The 170th and 181st tank brigades had the task of attacking the enemy in the corps zone, capturing Malaye Mayachki, and then advancing and reaching the Krasnaya Polyana-Krasnaya Dubrava line. By 14.30 on July 12, as a result of fierce fighting, the brigades captured the Oktyabrsky state farm (either this information is incorrect, or the state farm was soon recaptured by the Germans. - Note. ed.) and came close to Andreevka and Vasilievka. An hour earlier, at 13.30, the brigades were attacked from the flank by 13 Tigers (approximately from the area of ​​\u200b\u200bheight 226.6), which were moving towards the northwestern outskirts of Mikhailovka from a ravine south of Andreevka.

In Andreevka, the 180th tank brigade ran into a large column of enemy tanks. In addition to the Tigers, these were assault guns that fired heavily from a height of 241.6. As a result of the oncoming battle, the German tanks were thrown back to Kozlovka with heavy losses. Between 17.00 and 18.00 the corps commander brought into battle the 36th Guards Tank Regiment of the breakthrough (19 MK IV Churchill IV tanks), which was almost completely destroyed as a result of the hardest battle. Despite huge losses, the 170th Tank Brigade and the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade advanced. By 18.00, the corps brigades had finally captured Vasilievka and reached the approaches to Kozlovka. But at the turn of heights 217.9, 241.6, the 18th Panzer Corps, making its way forward, met strong enemy fire resistance. I had to take up defense: the 32nd motorized rifle brigade and the 170th tank brigade with the remnants of the 36th Guards Tank Regiment of the breakthrough were located in the Vasilyevka, Mikhailovka, Prelesnoe area; The 181st tank brigade - in Petrovka, the 110th tank brigade - on the outskirts of Petrovka and Beregovoy.

The defense was organized "round" in order to prevent the advance of enemy tanks and infantry in the direction of Vesely, Polezhaev, Vasilievka, and the Komsomolets state farm.

During the day of fighting, the 18th Tank Corps lost: medium tanks T-34-76-20 units, light tanks T-70 - 11 units, heavy tanks MK IV "Churchill IV" - 15 units. Total - 46 units. 21 people were killed and 107 people were injured.

The 29th Tank Corps of Major General of the Tank Forces I.F. Kirichenko became the "main face" of the tank battle unfolding near Prokhorovka. The order of battle of this formation was built in two echelons.

At 08.30, immediately after the volley of the 76th mortar regiment of the RS, which (volley) was the signal for the start of the offensive, formations and parts of the corps went on the attack in the direction of the Oktyabrsky state farm, the Stalinist branch state farm, Storozhevoye.

The formation of the 29th Tank Corps, as mentioned earlier, was in two echelons: in front of the 32nd Tank Brigade, followed by the 31st and 25th Tank Brigades, the 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade, along with the 271st Mortar Regiment.

The 29th Panzer Corps operated in the main direction for the army, attacking along the railway and inflicting its main blow with the right flank in the direction of the Komsomolets state farm, Tetervino farm, Pokrovka.

The attack began without artillery preparation of the line occupied by the enemy and without air cover.

This made it possible for enemy troops to open concentrated fire on the battle formations of the corps, as well as to bomb our tanks and motorized infantry with impunity, which in turn led to heavy losses and a decrease in the rate of attack. Our slowly advancing armored vehicles began to be effectively “shoot off” by anti-tank guns and Leibstandarte tanks, especially since the latter fired from a place. The situation was further complicated by the heavily rugged terrain, unsuitable for the advance of tanks. The presence of hollows impassable for armored vehicles northwest and southeast of the Prokhorovka-Belenikhino road forced our tanks to cling to it (the road) and open their flanks, unable to cover them.

Despite the strong fire resistance of the enemy, the 32nd tank brigade, without losing organization in combat formations and in cooperation with the 25th tank brigade, was moving forward, conducting massive fire from tank guns. When approaching the line - the state farm "Oktyabrsky", the state farm "Stalin's department", Storozhevoye - our tanks were stopped by strong frontal and flank artillery and mortar fire, which forced them to gain a foothold on the reached line, gather forces for further advance and prepare to repel possible attacks enemy.

Separate subunits that rushed forward came close to the Komsomolets state farm, but, having suffered heavy losses from anti-tank artillery and tanks that fired from ambushes, retreated to the line occupied by the main forces.

From 11.00 am 29th shopping mall, it fixed itself at the reached line: 0.5 km northeast of the Oktyabrsky state farm, 0.5 km northeast of the Stalinskoye branch state farm, 0.5 km southeast of Storozhevoy. At this line, the corps repelled repeated attacks by enemy infantry and tanks, inflicting heavy losses in manpower and equipment.

Now we will analyze the actions of the brigades of the corps and the units attached to them.

a) The 32nd tank brigade at 08.30 on July 12, without artillery and aviation treatment of the front line of the enemy’s defense, without having accurate data on his firepower, attacked the enemy’s positions in the direction of the Oktyabrsky state farm, the Komsomolets state farm, Pokrovka along the railway line in two echelons / d in a strip of 900 m. In this main direction, the enemy concentrated a large number of Tiger tanks, assault guns, and other anti-tank weapons.

32 brigade was followed by 31 brigade. The attack of the 32nd Tank Brigade proceeded at an exceptionally fast pace. The report says so: "All the tanks went on the attack and there was not a single case of indecision or lagging behind the battle." By 1200, the tank battalions broke through into the area of ​​the enemy's artillery positions. The German infantry began to retreat in panic. Realizing the success of the brigade, the enemy took to the air and attacked the front line with more than 150 aircraft. Air strikes forced the infantry of the 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade to lie down, following behind the tanks, and disabled several combat vehicles. The 31st Tank Brigade, instead of building on the success of the 32nd Tank Brigade, "continued to stagnate behind." The command of the "Leibstandarte" noticed that the pace of the attack had fallen, and pulled up fresh tank reserves and infantry. By this time, the 32 brigade had lost up to 40 tanks and about 350 personnel and was forced to stop.

At 16:00, the brigade commander gathered the remaining combat vehicles and threw his reserve (15 tanks in total) into an attack on the Oktyabrsky state farm. This operation was not successful, as the enemy brought up a large number of anti-tank weapons and tanks from the 3rd SS Totenkopf paramilitary group.

The brigade, shielded by its infantry and infantry of the 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade in the area of ​​​​a hollow 1.5 km from the Oktyabrsky state farm, went on the defensive.

b) The 31st tank brigade was ready for an attack as early as 01.30, when the tanks and the motorized rifle and machine gun battalion of the formation took up their starting position for the offensive 1 km southwest of the village of Barchevka.

At 08.30, after the signal (RS salvo), the attack began, without artillery preparation and air cover. Enemy planes soon began to bomb the battle formations of the advancing tanks and infantry (for some reason, our planes did not fly at the same time due to bad weather. - Note. ed.). The raids were carried out in groups of 8 to 37 units, the Luftwaffe used Me-110 and Yu-87 aircraft. Our armored vehicles suffered heavy losses from enemy aircraft and artillery fire. But the brigade stubbornly continued to attack in the direction - the Oktyabrsky state farm, through the northwestern outskirts of Prokhorovka (Aleksandrovsky). At 10.30 the tanks of the brigade reached the frontier - the Oktyabrsky state farm. Further advance was halted by continuous enemy air strikes.

There was no air cover for the advancing tanks until 1300. Since that time, our fighters have appeared in the air, operating in groups of two to ten aircraft.

At 15.40, the enemy launched a counterattack, which was repulsed (probably, the forces of the 3rd SS Totenkopf paramilitary group counterattacked. - Note. ed.). As a result, during the day of fighting, the brigade had losses: 24 T-34-76 tanks, 20 T-70 tanks, one 45-mm gun, an easel machine gun - 1, PPSh - 2, a rifle - 1; killed - 44 people, wounded - 39 people, missing - 18 people.

Destroyed and knocked out enemy manpower and equipment: small and medium tanks - 21, heavy tanks "Tiger" - 6, machine-gun emplacements - 17, up to 600 enemy soldiers and officers.

c) The 25th tank brigade, by order of the corps command at 08.30 July 12, accompanied by batteries of self-propelled guns SU-122, went on the offensive in the direction: Storozhevoye, Ivanovsky settlement, Tetervino, high. 228, 4, western outskirts of the settlement Luchki, vys. 246, 3, 218.3 with the task of destroying the enemy in these areas and by the end of the day to concentrate in the area of ​​​​the settlement of Krapivinskiye Dvory with a readiness to act in the direction of the city of Belgorod.

The 362nd tank battalion, supported by a company of submachine gunners of the MSPB and a battery of 122-mm self-propelled guns, advanced on the right. A ledge on the left behind 362 TB was advancing by 25 TB with small tanks without one company, with a battery of 45-mm anti-tank guns and a battery of self-propelled guns SU-76.

As the tanks approached the front line of the enemy defenses from the forest northwest of Storozhevoye and east of the outskirts of Storozhevoye, the enemy opened heavy fire from ambush tanks Pz.Kpfw.IV and Pz.Kpfw.VI "Tiger", StuG III self-propelled guns and anti-tank guns. The infantry was cut off from the tanks and lay down. Having broken through into the depths of the enemy's defenses, our armored vehicles suffered huge losses.

The remnants of the material part of the brigade by 10.00 on July 12 retreated "from the depths of the enemy's defense" and concentrated in a hollow 1.5 km southeast of Storozhevoy. By 10.30, the 25th brigade, in which only 6 T-34-76 and 15 T-70 remained, took up defensive positions along the slopes of nameless heights 600 meters southeast of Storozhevoy. The enemy, who went over to the attack twice, rolled back from the positions defended by the brigade, with heavy losses for him.

By the end of the day on July 12, the 25th brigade had the following losses: the brigade lost 26 T-34-76 and 24 T-70 tanks, a mortar - 1.45-mm anti-tank gun - 1; personnel: killed - 40 people, wounded - 91 people, missing - 27 people. In total - 158 people.

During the day of the battle on July 12, parts of the brigade were destroyed: soldiers and officers - up to 350 people, small and medium tanks - 2, heavy tanks - 1, self-propelled guns - 2, anti-tank guns - 3, mortars - 2, heavy machine guns - 1, hand machine guns - 6, fuel and lubricants warehouse - 1, trucks with cargo - 4.

d) The 53rd motorized rifle brigade on July 12 at 09.00, in cooperation with the 31st and 25th tank brigades, went on the offensive and by 11.00 reached the line: the state farm "Stalin's department", the state farm "Oktyabrsky", Storozhevoe.

Parts of the enemy, supported by a large number of aircraft and tanks, launched a counterattack, and the brigade units were forced to withdraw to the line: a hollow 0.5 km east of the Oktyabrsky state farm, the southeastern outskirts of the Yamki settlement.

e) The 1446th self-propelled artillery regiment - at 03.00 on July 12, settled in battle formation on the western outskirts of the village of Berchevka and supported the 25th tank brigade with two batteries (1st and 6th), having the task of following on the flanks of the formation and suppressing firing points during an attack on the front line of the enemy. The 2nd, 3rd and 5th batteries supported the 32nd Tank Brigade in the following disposition - two batteries on the flanks and one in the center.

The regiment began the attack together with the 32nd and 25th tank brigades in the area of ​​the state farm "Stalin's department" and the village of Storozhevoe. During the attack on the front line of the enemy, self-propelled guns, acting in the first echelon of battle formations of tanks, suffered losses from anti-tank fire of heavy enemy tanks (11 self-propelled guns were put out of action).

During the attack, the regiment destroyed: heavy tanks "Tiger" - 1 (knocked out), tanks of other brands - 4, 75-mm guns - 3, anti-tank guns - 23, anti-tank rifles - 5, machine guns - 10, self-propelled guns - 1, vehicles - 7, dugouts - 3, bunkers - 2 and up to 300 infantry.

f) The 271st mortar regiment, with the introduction of units of the 53rd motorized rifle brigade, provided it with fire support. Three divisions supported the 1st Battalion of the 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade, which operated in the direction northeast of the edge of the forest, which was located north of Storozhevoy. It should be noted that the entry into the battle was done in a very organized manner, the command of the regiment perfectly organized interaction with the combined arms commanders, following the infantry, the divisions advanced their battle formations forward. Due to a number of the above reasons, the attack was not a complete success, so the mortar units had to gain a foothold in positions located near the 53rd motorized rifle brigade.

g) The 108th anti-tank artillery regiment supported the attack of tank units. Destroyed 2 anti-tank guns and up to an enemy infantry platoon. Casualties: 2 wounded.

The remaining parts of the corps provided the actions of brigades and regiments.

According to the report of the 29th shopping mall, excerpts from which were given above, the unit completed its task: it stopped the enemy’s offensive and laid the foundation for the defeat of his military grouping. Of course, the compilers of the document cannot refuse logic, the “glass”, from their point of view, is “half full”. But, if we consider the results achieved in relation to the tasks set by the front and army commands, then the counterattack was not successful - here "the glass is half empty."

It was noted that the battles on both sides were particularly tenacious, often ending in hand-to-hand combat. Our tanks, as a rule, did not retreat from the achieved lines, and if the enemy managed to recapture this or that point, then the tankers either died or fought on foot in groups to the last.

According to the data given in the report of the 29th shopping mall, the losses of this formation for July 12 amounted to: killed - 72 people. commanding staff (officers), 144 people. junior commanding staff (foremen and sergeants) and 88 people. privates; wounded - 75 people. commanding staff, 197 people. junior commanding staff and 241 privates; missing - 19 people. commanding staff, 100 people. junior commanding staff, 164 privates. Total were lost: 166 officers, 441 foremen and sergeants, 493 privates.

The losses of the material part (armored vehicles) were as follows. Total participated in the battle: 122 T-34-76, 70 T-70, 11 SU-122, 9 SU-76. Total losses: 95 T-34–76s, 36 T-70s, 10 SU-122s, 9 SU-76s. Irretrievable losses: 75 T-34–76, 28 T-70, 8 SU-122, 6 SU-76.

Other losses: rifles - 200, anti-tank rifles - 25, heavy machine guns - 25, light machine guns - 62, 82-mm mortars - 2, 120-mm mortars - 2, anti-tank gun - 1.

During the day of hostilities, l / s 29 tk were destroyed up to 3620 enemy soldiers and officers, 138 machine guns, 54 guns, 17 mortars, 68 tanks, 127 vehicles, 16 motorcycles, 2 aircraft, 2 ammunition depots, 4 mortar batteries and 9 artillery batteries.

Just as described above, the day of July 12 is described in the report of the 29th Panzer Corps. It is not clear from this document whether the Komsomolets state farm was taken by the troops of the corps or not. And how did things go with the liberation of the Oktyabrsky state farm? In the seemingly detailed "to the limit" document, there is not a word about this.

In the report “The July operation of the 5th Guards Tank Army in the Belgorod direction”, prepared by Colonels G. Ya. Sapozhkov and G. G. Klein, the description of the battles of 29th shopping mall on July 12 has a slightly different time and geographical framework.

According to this document, the 29th TC, acting in the main direction of the army, attacked along the railway, delivering the main blow with its right flank in the direction of the Komsomolets state farm and the Tetervino farm. The 32nd and 31st tank brigades combined had 67 tanks, and the 25th tank brigade had 69 tanks. In 1446 there were 19 self-propelled guns. In total - 155 armored vehicles.

The morning part of the battle is omitted in this document for inexplicable reasons, but the actions of the corps after 1300 are indicated. At 13.30, the 32nd and 31st tank brigades, after a fierce oncoming battle with enemy armored vehicles at the turn of the roads south of the Oktyabrsky state farm, were stopped by “hurricane fire from anti-tank guns and tanks buried in the ground.” Reflecting counterattacks and air strikes, our armored formations went over to the defensive.

The 25th tank brigade attacked the enemy in the direction of the state farm "Stalinskoye branch" and after stubborn fighting, having suffered significant losses from aviation and artillery fire, by the end of the day took up defense along a hollow 1 km southeast of the state farm "Stalinskoye branch".

The 53rd motorized rifle brigade, after fierce battles for the Komsomolets state farm, occupied it by 14.30 (!), but under "pressure from superior enemy forces and strong air influence" was forced to leave this settlement. The 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade retreated to the line of the Stalinist Branch state farm, where, together with the 25th Tank Brigade, it went on the defensive, repelling "fierce counterattacks by enemy tanks and motorized infantry."

Of course, the 29th CC that day had the biggest tests, since it was on its offensive sector that the main forces of the 2nd SS TC were located. But this is not so much an accident as the miscalculations of the Soviet command, which forced the 29th shopping mall to attack blindly.

It is clear from this report that the Komsomolets state farm was liberated, but soon abandoned again, and our troops apparently failed to take the Oktyabrsky state farm, although the battles were going on literally a few meters from it (and victorious reports were already sent up - Note. ed.).

As a result of the fighting on the day of July 12, the 29th Panzer Corps had little tactical success in the "territorial advance", but suffered heavy losses in personnel and equipment.

During the day of fighting on July 12, the 29th Tank Corps lost: medium tanks T-34-76-95 units, light tanks T-70 - 38 units, self-propelled guns - 8 units. Total - 141 tanks and self-propelled guns. 240 people were killed and 210 injured.

According to Soviet estimates, the corps destroyed 41 enemy tanks and self-propelled guns (of which 14 were Tigers), 43 guns of all calibers, about 100 soldiers and officers were killed.

Referring to the report of the 5th Guards Tank Army regarding the battles of the 29th Tank Corps on July 12, 1943, the author wants to draw the following conclusions, which reflect the opinion of the army command on what happened:

“It must be said that the 29th Tank Corps, which operated in the main direction of the army, found itself in a difficult situation, since the direction of the main attack of the Germans coincided with the area of ​​\u200b\u200bactions of the corps.

The corps had little tactical territorial success and suffered heavy losses. However, parts of the corps, by their heroic actions, inflicted such a blow on the enemy, after which he was no longer able to launch a large offensive in this direction.

Here it is - the fundamental principle of glorification of ongoing events, successfully hiding the mistakes of the commander of the 5th Panzer Army in organizing the operation.

Although it must be honestly admitted that Rotmistrov himself and his headquarters were under pressure from the headquarters of the Voronezh Front and its commander, General of the Army N.F. Vatutin, as well as the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky. Such is the peculiarity of the Russian mentality: the plan is excellent, but we all know its implementation - they didn’t finish it there, they forgot it, they didn’t organize something, they didn’t think it through, but people are dying! In this particular case (with the success of the battle for us on the Kursk Bulge as a whole), large losses of personnel and equipment were attributed to the uniqueness of the tank battle. Although there are many questions about this definition.

The main question that worries the reader when describing the Prokhorov battle is the number of tanks of the opposing sides that filled the battlefield. For example, Rotmistrov himself wrote: "Two huge tank avalanches were moving towards." As it became clear, there was no avalanche of tanks from the Germans, and the organization of such a group of 60 tanks was not necessary for tactical reasons. The well-known Russian military historian A. Isaev is inclined to the version that much larger masses of tanks acted from our side, and cites the following arguments to substantiate his assumption: “Any anti-tank defense could be saturated with the attack of a large number of tanks on a narrow front. Tanks moving in a dense mass are able to cover each other and effectively duel with anti-tank artillery. At least due to the fact that more eyes are looking for flashes of anti-tank guns and more barrels hit them. The Germans themselves, as we see from the general course of the battle, often used this technique - the concentration of a large mass of tanks on a narrow front. If the Soviet side had succeeded in concentrating the main forces of the 18th and 29th Panzer Corps in a single shock fist, the defense of the Leibstandarte would have been crushed. The capture of starting positions for a counterattack led to the fragmentation of the attacking forces into several echelons. A deep beam with a developed system of spurs in front of Oktyabrsky prevented the normal entry into battle of the 170th tank brigade of the 18th tank corps. A forced decision was made to send it behind the 32nd Tank Brigade of the 29th Tank Corps. So the forces of the first echelon of the 18th Panzer Corps were reduced to one brigade. As a result, only two brigades entered the Prokhorovskoe field (from Psel to the railway) at 08.30: the 32nd and 181st. Accordingly, the total strength of the first echelon of Rotmistrov's army was 115 tanks and self-propelled guns. There are also quite a few combat vehicles, but by no means an “avalanche”.

Most likely, the distortion of the real situation is associated with a different idea or even an approach to assessing what is happening between the military leaders leading the operation and ordinary participants in the events. On July 14, from the battle area, Marshal Vasilevsky sent a report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which also describes the events on the Prokhorovka field: “Yesterday, I myself personally observed a tank battle of the 18th and 29th corps southwest of Prokhorovka with more than two hundred enemy tanks in a counterattack . At the same time, hundreds of guns and all the RSs we have took part in the battle. As a result, the entire battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks for an hour.

Is there a lie here? Of course not. For Vasilevsky, as for a commander who viewed the operation through the prism of "space - time", the situation was seen as a single battle of armored formations maneuvering and fighting each other on a front of 32-35 km. He understood the meaning of everything that was happening, but he saw one of the battles of two (among several locally participating in the battle) tank groups. The number of one group in its maximum value fluctuated between 80-100 tanks and self-propelled guns, which, in general, is confirmed by ordinary participants in the events from the German side:

“A wall of purple smoke rose into the air, it was smoke projectiles. This meant: attention, tanks!

The same signals could be seen all along the crest of the slope. Purple signals of impending danger also appeared further to the right at the railway embankment.

A small valley stretched out to our left, and as we went down the front slope, we noticed the first T-34 tanks, which, obviously, were trying to envelop us from the left flank.

We stopped on a slope and opened fire. Several Russian tanks caught fire. For a good gunner, 800 meters was the ideal range.

As we waited for more enemy tanks to appear, I looked around out of habit. What I saw left me speechless. Due to a small elevation at a distance of 150-200 meters, 15, then 30, then 40 tanks appeared in front of me. Finally I lost count. T-34s rolled at us at high speed, carrying infantry on them.

Along the entire front of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, the same picture was repeated again and again. The memoirs of a Leibstandarte officer quoted above are supplemented by another soldier (2nd SS Panzer Corps):

“... Three ... five ... ten appeared above the hill to the left of the embankment ... But what was the point of counting? Rushing at full speed and firing from all barrels, the T-34s one by one rolled over the hill, right in the middle of our infantry positions. We opened fire with our five guns as soon as we saw the first tank, and it was seconds before the first T-34 stood up, shrouded in black smoke. Sometimes we had to fight the Russian infantry, riding on tanks, in hand-to-hand combat.

Then suddenly 40 or 50 T-34 tanks appeared, advancing on us from the right. We had to turn around and open fire on them ...

One T-34 appeared right in front of me when my gunnery partner shouted so loudly that I could hear him without a headset: “Last round in the barrel!” Only that was not enough! I turned around, facing the T-34 tank, which was rushing at us at a distance of about 150 meters, when another disaster struck.

The rear support pin of the gun broke, and the barrel shot up into the sky. I did my best to turn the turret and lower my 75mm cannon down, managed to get the T-34 turret in sight and fired. Hit! The hatch opened and two men jumped out. One stayed where it was while the other hopped across the road. About 30 meters in front of me, I knocked out the T-34 again.

Burning tanks were visible everywhere, they filled an area 1500 meters wide; 10 to 12 artillery pieces also smoked. Presumably, one hundred and twenty tanks were involved in the attack, but there could be more. Who counted!

As they say, fear has big eyes. In reality, there were somewhat fewer tanks. Let's briefly evaluate their actions.

In conditions when the "defense" of the enemy was not "torn" by artillery and aircraft, the attack of hundreds of tanks and self-propelled guns on the dense defense of the SS division had dubious prospects. Even without tanks, the Leibstandarte had Marder self-propelled anti-tank guns and towed anti-tank artillery in the grenadier regiments. Therefore, approaching the enemy's defense line, the tanks of the 32nd and 181st tank brigades began to flare up one after another. Only one battalion of the 32nd brigade (under the command of Major S.P. Ivanov) managed to slip under the cover of a forest belt along the railway deep into the enemy defenses, to the Komsomolets state farm.

In the situation that developed in the first minutes of the offensive, the situation could be corrected by the introduction of the second echelon into battle, but it was late. The 31st tank brigade entered the battle only at 09.30-10.00, when a significant part of the tanks of the first echelon had already been knocked out. In addition, having met a flurry of fire from enemy anti-tank weapons, the commander of the 32nd brigade changed the direction of the offensive, but not along the forest belt, but entering the lane of the neighbor on the right - the 18th tank corps. Accordingly, the success of Major S.P. Ivanov was not used. Moreover, the route along the railroad was the only possible one. Soviet tanks that broke through into the depths of the defense of the 1st SS infantry regiment stumbled upon an anti-tank ditch blocking the path to the Komsomolets state farm. It was a Soviet ditch from the system of the third line of defense, and it is very strange that the tankers inflicting a counterattack were not warned of its presence.

Another brigade of the 29th Tank Corps, the 25th Tank Brigade of Colonel N.K. Volodin, collided with a battalion of Leibstandarte assault guns. The brigade was advancing on Storozhevoye, south of the railway. StuG III with long-barreled 75-mm guns were a tough nut to crack. Already by 10.30, six T-34s and fifteen T-70s remained from the brigade of N.K. Volodin. The brigade commander was shell-shocked and sent to the hospital.

The results of the first hours of the counterattack were discouraging. For 2–2.5 hours of battle, three brigades and a self-propelled artillery regiment of the 29th tank corps lost more than half of their combat vehicles. According to a similar scenario, events developed in the 18th tank corps. Entered into battle after the 181st tank brigade, the 170th tank brigade by 12.00 lost about 60% of its tanks.

The commander of a tank platoon of the 170th tank brigade, V.P. Bryukhov, recalled: “The tanks were burning. From the explosions, five-ton towers broke off and flew off to the side by 15–20 m. Sometimes the upper armor plates of the tower were torn off, soaring high into the air. Slamming hatches, they tumbled in the air and fell, instilling fear and horror in the surviving tankers. Often, the entire tank fell apart from strong explosions, at the moment turning into a pile of metal. Most of the tanks stood motionless, mournfully lowering their guns, or burned. Greedy flames licked at the red-hot armor, raising clouds of black smoke. Together with them, tankers were on fire, unable to get out of the tank. Their inhuman cries and pleas for help shocked and clouded the mind. The lucky ones who got out of the burning tanks rolled on the ground, trying to knock the flames off their overalls. Many of them were overtaken by an enemy bullet or shell fragment, taking away their hope for life.

Nevertheless, with great difficulty, the 181st tank brigade of the corps of V.S. Bakharov managed to break into the Oktyabrsky state farm. The infantry of the 42nd Guards Rifle Division followed the tankers, and although the Soviet troops fought on its outskirts, they failed to consolidate their success. Unlike his neighbor, V. S. Bakharov had not yet managed to bring all three of his brigades into battle. The 110th tank brigade remained at the disposal of the corps commander. This allowed at 14.00 to resume the offensive, changing the direction of the blow. Now the direction of the main attack of the 18th Panzer Corps lay close to the floodplain of the Psel River. Although here the tankers had to face the defense of one of the Totenkopf regiments and the heavy tanks of the Leibstandarte, the battalions of the 181st and 170th tank brigades managed to break through to the enemy artillery positions. Parts of the two brigades managed to advance to a depth of 6 km. The command of the "Leibstandarte" managed to rectify the situation only due to the counterattacks of their tank regiment, which became the "fire brigade". In addition, the successful offensive of the "Dead Head" from the bridgehead on the Psel River put the 18th Panzer Corps at risk of encirclement in the event of a reverse forcing of the river. All this forced the brigades to be pulled back.

Nevertheless, the courage and bravery of the crews of tanks and self-propelled guns of the 18th and 29th tank corps are not even discussed here - in their vehicles, which were significantly inferior in quality and combat capabilities to the latest German armored vehicles, they stubbornly and purposefully tried to complete a permanent task. Eternal glory to the heroes!

German troops could have suffered less losses if they had not been drawn into dueling at close range, beneficial to the Soviet side.

"Tigers", deprived in close combat of the advantages that their powerful guns and thick armor possessed, were successfully shot by "thirty-fours" at close range. A huge number of tanks mixed up on the entire battlefield, where several local battles were going on at the same time. Shells fired at close range pierced both the side and frontal armor of the tanks. When this happened, ammunition often exploded, and tank turrets were thrown tens of meters away from the mangled vehicles by the force of the explosion.

Subsequently, the commander Rotmistrov assessed the events as follows:

“Our tanks were destroying the Tigers at close range… We knew their vulnerable spots, so our tank crews fired on their sides. Shells fired at very close range punched huge holes in the armor of the Tigers.

Studying archival documents, the author came to the conclusion that during July 12, 1943, on the Prokhorovka field, formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army had two relatively large local collisions with enemy units equipped with heavy tanks Pz.Kpfw.VI "Tiger". And what's more - get ready for them!

One of them was in the Andreevka area, where the 180th tank brigade of the 18th tank corps was advancing. As soon as the "Tigers" were discovered, the absolutely fresh 36th Guards Tank Regiment of the breakthrough was immediately introduced into the battle, equipped with "Churchills", equal in armor protection to the "Tigers". Crews on British-made tanks tried to impose close combat on the Germans and, having lost 15 vehicles, forced the German tank group to retreat to Kozlovka. The Germans had losses, but their exact number is unknown to the author.

The second battle took place in the area of ​​the state farm "Stalin's branch", the positions of which the 25th tank brigade of the 29th tank corps tried to attack. And again, as soon as the "Tigers" were discovered, a characteristic maneuver followed: trying to impose close combat on the Germans, batteries of the 1446th self-propelled artillery regiment, equipped with self-propelled guns SU-122, were introduced into the battle. During the battle, our self-propelled gunners lost 10 self-propelled guns, 6 of them burned down. The Germans for the whole day in the sector of responsibility 29 mk lost 14 "Tigers". It was not possible to recapture the state farm "Stalin's branch" that day.

Interestingly enough, our anti-tank artillery acted at the same time. On the Willys and Dodge vehicles, anti-tank guns quickly moved between the centers of local battles and rolled out to fire direct fire at enemy armored vehicles. Another part of the anti-tank artillery systems, especially the 76.2-mm guns, was in the reserve of the artillery commanders of the corps and operated from closed positions.

The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, Major General A.S. Burdeiny, being in the Vinogradovka, Belenikhino area, with the forces of two tank brigades (94 tanks) went on the offensive at 11.15 in the direction of Yakovlevo. Overcoming the fierce resistance of the enemy, by 14.30 on July 12, the corps reached the following lines.

The 25th Guards Tank Brigade - to the western edge of the forest, 1 km northeast of Kalinin, where it launched an offensive to a height of 243.0. The enemy met our formation with strong artillery fire and the fire of tanks dug into the ground. In addition, enemy aircraft periodically attacked the advancing tank brigade.

The 4th Guards Tank Brigade “crossed” the railway and by 14.30 was fighting on the outskirts of Kalinin, but had no success.

The 4th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, advancing on the left flank of the corps, entered the road south of Kalinin, where it met strong enemy resistance from the eastern edge of the grove southwest of Kalinin.

At this moment (at about 14.30), the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, advancing in the direction of Kalinin, suddenly collided with the 2nd SS Reich Panzergrenadier Division moving towards it, which in turn was supposed to secure the flank of the Leibstandarte. In connection with the unsuccessful results of the offensive of the 29th shopping mall, the flank of the 2nd Guards. mk "bare". The enemy immediately struck at the "weak" place and forced the "Tatsins" to retreat to their original position.

By the end of the day on July 12, 2 Guards. TC, in connection with the withdrawal of the 53rd motorized rifle brigade (29th TC) from the Komsomolets state farm and the threat created to its right flank from this direction, retreated to the line of Vinogradovka, Belenikhino, where it entrenched itself. It became impossible to maneuver, the pouring rain turned the land into a swamp.

Corps losses for the day of fighting were as follows: medium tanks T-34-76 were lost 10 units, light tanks T-70 - 8 units, 85-mm guns 52-K model 1939 - 4 pieces.

By noon on July 12, it became completely clear to the German command that the frontal attack on Prokhorovka had failed. Then it was decided to cross the Psel River, part of the forces to go north of Prokhorovka to the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army, for which 11 TD and the remaining units of the 3rd PgD SS Totenkopf were allocated (96 tanks, a regiment of motorized infantry, up to 200 motorcycles with the support of two divisions of assault guns). The grouping broke through the battle formations of the 52nd Guards. sd and by 13.00 mastered a height of 226.6. But on the northern slopes of the height, the 95th Guards continued to defend. sd, reinforced by an anti-tank artillery regiment and two divisions of captured guns. Until 18.00 she successfully held the defense.

At 20.00, after a powerful enemy air raid, due to the lack of ammunition and heavy losses of l / s 95 guards. under the blows of the approaching German motorized infantry, it retreated behind the Polezhaev settlement.

Around 20.30, enemy troops managed to break through on the right flank of the 5th Guards. TA and reach the line: the northern outskirts of Polezhaev, vys. 236, 7. By order of the commander, the 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade was advanced to the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe settlement of Ostrenky with the task of preventing the spread of the enemy in the eastern and northeastern directions. At the same time, the 24th Guards Tank Brigade advanced to the state farm named after K. E. Voroshilov with the task of attacking the enemy in the direction of 1 km west of the state farm named after K. E. Voroshilov, Nizhnyaya Olshanka, Prokhorovka and preventing its advance in the east and northeast directions .

The commander of the 18th TC was ordered to put forward a cover on the northern outskirts of Petrovka and elev. 181.9 to ensure the release of 24 Guards. TBR to the area of ​​the state farm named after K. E. Voroshilov. With the onset of night, the fighting began to subside.

During the day of July 12, the enemy, "having received a strong counterattack in the direction of Prokhorovka," continued to look for a weaker point in the system of battle formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army in the direction of Vypolzovka, Avdeevka. Having some success, he began to throw his units there, trying to develop an offensive along the Seversky Donets River and go to the rear of the army. As soon as this became known at the headquarters of the 5th Guards. The 11th and 12th mechanized brigades of the 5th guards mechanized corps were advanced to this area to eliminate the advancing group. In addition, the commander ordered the head of the mobile (reserve) detachment, Major General Trufanov, to unite under his command the 11th, 12th mechanized brigades and the 26th tank brigade, transferred from the 2nd Guards. maybe, and immediately advance to the area of ​​​​Ryndinka, Avdeevka, Bolshie Podyarugi with the task of destroying the enemy grouping that had broken through in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bRyndinka, Rzhavets.

And in this direction the enemy was stopped. So by 18.00 the 11th Guards Mechanized Brigade, reinforced by a division of the 85th mortar regiment, together with the 26th Guards. brigade captured Ryndinka from the north. And the 12th Guards Mechanized Brigade captured Vypolzovka and entered the road two kilometers southeast of Vypolzovka. The mobile detachment itself, in the same composition, went to Oboyan and concentrated in the settlement of Bolshiye Podyarugi. Throughout the day, intense battles were going on in the Rzhavets, Ryndinka area. The enemy, throwing up reserves, sought to move forward. But everything was unsuccessful.

The 2nd Tank Corps of General A.F. Popov, according to the order of the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, put himself in order with the expectation of launching an offensive in the direction of Storozhevoye, Greznoye, the Solotino state farm. By that time, there were about fifty combat vehicles in the corps, and his evening attack, which began between 19.00 and 20.00, was not successful.

By the end of the day, the 26th and 99th tank brigades were respectively in the southern and northern parts of Ivanovka, the 58th motorized rifle brigade was located in a grove east of Ivanovka, and the 169th tank brigade was "hiding" in a large ravine east of the Storozhevoye settlement.

The 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, having concentrated in the area of ​​Krasnoe, Vysypnoy, Sokolovka, Dranny, Sagaidachnoye, Kamyshovka, as already mentioned, received an order at 10.00 on July 12 "to throw the 11th and 12th th guards motorized rifle brigades to eliminate the impending danger from Rzhavets, Ryndinka, the 10th tank brigade to enter the area with the task of preventing the enemy from spreading to the northeast.

The 24th Guards Tank Brigade was ordered to advance to the area of ​​the Voroshilov state farm with the task of preventing the enemy from advancing to the northwest and southwest.

Its special task (and this was also mentioned, but the data are given from other sources. - Note. ed.) continued to carry out the so-called mobile (reserve) detachment of Major General Trufanov - in essence, a consolidated combat group operating in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bRyndinka, Rzhavets.

By six in the morning on July 12, the enemy, with up to 70 tanks, captured these settlements and made his way in the direction of Avdeevka, Plots.

The army commander ordered Major General Trufanov to unite units of the 376th Rifle Division, 92nd Rifle Division, 11th and 12th Infantry Rifle Brigade, 26th Infantry Brigade, 1 Ogmtsp (motorcycle regiment), 689 Iptap and one battery of 687 Gap - with the task of destroying the enemy that had broken through in the Rzhavets, Ryndinka area.

Partially, this was done, and fierce battles unfolded in the indicated area. Rzhavets and Ryndinka changed hands several times, until by 1600 our command had brought up 10 tanks from the Shakhovo area and 16 tanks from the Kurakovo area. Only by the end of the day, Trufanov's battle group managed to liberate the settlements of Rzhavets and Ryndinka.

Vasilevsky and Vatutin believed that they should continue to hold the strategic initiative and put pressure on the enemy along the entire front. Therefore, Vatutin ordered that all the forces of the front "... prevent the further advance of the enemy to Prokhorovka from the west and from the south, liquidate the enemy groups that penetrated the northern bank of the Psel River by joint operations of part of the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army - two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps ; liquidate units of the 3rd tank corps of the Wehrmacht that broke into the area of ​​the settlement Rzhavets; and continue the offensive with the forces of the 1st Panzer and 6th Army on the right flank of the 5th Guards Army.

Meanwhile, Trufanov was preparing to attack the 3rd Panzer Corps of the Wehrmacht. This was to be a determined attempt to stop the advance of the 3rd Tk in a northerly direction, and stop it once and for all. Trufanov's group was supposed to be supported as much as possible by the aircraft of the 2nd Air Army.

Thus, on the night of July 13, the corps were given the task of gaining a foothold on the achieved lines, regrouping units in order to be ready to continue the offensive by morning. But this never happened. Why?

On July 13, the enemy himself began to attack in the morning, and the order to advance the 5th Guards. TA had to be cancelled. All day most of the formations of the 5th Guards. TA fought off the enemy. This is the first. There was another reason as well.

The battle on the Prokhorovsky field caused real devastation in the ranks of two corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army. According to the data given, the 29th Tank Corps lost 131 tanks and 19 SU-122s and SU-76s destroyed and burnt out, which accounted for 71% of the combat vehicles participating in the attacks. In the 18th Panzer Corps, 46 tanks were knocked out and burned, that is, 33% of the number participating in the battle. The mechanized formations operating in neighboring areas also did not avoid sensitive losses of armored vehicles. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps lost 18 tanks on July 12, or 19% of those participating in the counterattack. The 2nd Panzer Corps suffered the least - it lost only 22 tanks. However, data on losses in different documents vary.

In general, the total losses (236 tanks and self-propelled guns) are significant (especially in 29 tanks), but this cannot be considered a rout. With the exception of 29 shopping malls and partially 18 shopping malls, all other connections are 5 guards. TAs were fully operational and the next day they were supposed to be used in the offensive, and then in defensive battles.

German losses were much less. According to the reports of the 1st SS PgD, on the day of July 12, German tankers destroyed 192 Soviet tanks and 13 anti-tank guns, losing 30 of their vehicles. Own losses may be true, and the Soviet ones are most likely an exaggeration characteristic of the Germans.

According to the above-mentioned report of Colonels G. Ya. Sapozhkov and G. G. Klein, the oncoming tank battle that unfolded on July 12 continued on July 13 and 14, and only on July 15 the 5th Guards Tank Army officially went on the defensive.

As already mentioned, on May 13, Rotmistrov's tankers received an order to continue the offensive, but were forced to fight off German attacks.

So, the 18th TC repelled a strong attack of enemy tanks and infantry on Polezhaev, Petrovka (carried out from the ravine south of Andreevka).

29th shopping mall at 11.30 and 15.30 successfully repelled the attacks of the division "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler" in the direction of the state farm "Stalin's branch", Yamki.

The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky tank corps in its sector throughout the day also successfully repulsed the attacks of enemy tanks and motorized infantry.

The 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps improved its positions on the left flank of the army with its active actions. The 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade and the 24th Guards Tank Brigade attacked and drove the enemy out of the Polezhaev area, height 226.6, and after regrouping, they again advanced in the direction of Klyuchi, Krasny Oktyabr.

By the end of the day, the 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade was withdrawn to the Zhilomostnoye area in the reserve of the army commander.

The detachment of Major General Trufanov defended the Podyaruga, Novo-Khmelevskaya area and part of the forces delivered a counterattack in the direction of Aleksandrovka, for which the 53rd Guards Regiment was used, which supported the batteries of the 689th anti-tank artillery regiment. At 22.00, our tankers broke through to the northwestern outskirts of Aleksandrovka, where they were suddenly attacked from a hollow (1.5 km southwest of Aleksandrovka) by 28 enemy tanks (including 2 Tigers) supported by 13 guns. Our losses were nine T-34-76s and three T-70s.

Thus, according to the report, "despite the numerous and fierce attacks of large enemy forces and their desire to move forward, the troops of the army in the battles and the next day, that is, 13.07, completely eliminated the plans of the Nazi command."

On July 14, the enemy showed no activity. The troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army held the occupied lines, regrouping forces on the left flank.

The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, "in order not to scatter forces", was forced to leave Belenikhino and retreat behind the railway. Corps formations defended the following lines: 4th Guards. tbr - Ivanovka; 25 Guards tbr - southern outskirts of Ivanovka, slopes of height (1 km east of Leska); 4th Guards MSBR - slopes of an unnamed height (1 km east of Leska), northwest of height 225.0; 26 Guards tbr - Shakhovo.

The detachment of Major General Trufanov that day assisted the left neighbor - the 69th Army - repelled the attack of enemy tanks and took the following position: 1 Guards. kmtsp - height 223.5, western outskirts of Novo-Khmelevskaya; 689 iptap - at the base station Novo-Khmelevskaya, height 223.1.

The defensive stage of the actions of the tank army of General Rotmistrov in the above document begins on July 15th.

In the report "Fighting of the 5th Guards Tank Army from 7 to 24.07.43", compiled by Major of the General Staff of the KA Chernik on August 1, 1943, the defensive stage of the actions of the 5th Guards. TA starts July 13th.

In any case, the clashes on July 13-14 no longer had such a global goal as a day earlier (for the Soviet troops, for sure. - Note. ed.), and our armored formation should be replenished with reserves and put itself in order. The offensive potential of the army, albeit for a while, was exhausted.

On July 13, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal G.K. Zhukov arrived at the Voronezh Front. Apparently, Stalin, fearing a deterioration in the situation (which followed from Vasilevsky's reports), sent our most competent military leader to this theater of operations.

And the not very beautiful “undercarpet fight” began. Georgy Konstantinovich, with his characteristic frankness, began to criticize Rotmistrov and Zhadov for heavy losses and inept leadership of the formations entrusted to them.

But after all, these were only “performing generals”, true arrows flew at the main creators of the counterattack: the commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army N.F. Vatutin and the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky - Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

The latter was worried, if not frightened, by the situation that was taking shape by the morning of 14 July. Here is an assessment of the situation by Vasilevsky, sent by the Chief of the General Staff to I. V. Stalin: “Tomorrow the threat of enemy tanks breaking through from the south to the Shakhovo, Andreevka, Aleksandrovka area continues to be real. Throughout the night, I take all measures to bring here the entire 5th mechanized corps, the 32nd motorized brigade and four IPTAP regiments. Considering the large tank forces of the enemy in the Prokhorovka direction, here on 14.VII, the main forces of Rotmistrov, together with the rifle corps of Zhadov, set a limited task - to defeat the enemy in the Storozhevoye area, the Komsomolets state farm, to reach the Gryaznoye-Yasnaya Polyana line and, all the more, to secure the Prokhorovka direction .

The possibility of an oncoming tank battle is not ruled out here and tomorrow. In total, at least eleven tank divisions continue to operate against the Voronezh Front, systematically replenished with tanks. The prisoners interviewed today showed that the 19th Panzer Division currently has about 70 tanks in service, although the latter has already been replenished twice since 5.VII.43. The report was delayed due to the late arrival from the front: 2 hours 47 hours 14.VII.43. From the 5th Guards Tank Army.

Turning to medical terminology, we can say that by the actions of the enemy "the final diagnosis has not been made." And if the Germans start a new counterattack, it will be difficult to defend: the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Armies are bled white, there are no significant reserves nearby. Zhukov, like an "academician of medical sciences", was sent to prevent the emerging panic moods and make his own "diagnosis". After reviewing the situation, it was he who expressed the idea that the enemy was exhausted.

In reality, the Germans were more hampered by geostrategic concerns. The beginning of Operation Kutuzov, the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy emasculated the value of Operation Citadel.

In order to raise morale, the commander of the 4th Wehrmacht Army, General Goth, sent a message to the troops from the commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal von Manstein, who stated that he would like to “... express my gratitude and admiration for the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps for their outstanding achievements and exemplary conduct in this battle."

But it was a sweet pill. Despite the heavy losses of our troops, the counterattack partially achieved its goal - the German plans were thwarted, the Soviet grouping could not be surrounded. Meanwhile, the geostrategic situation was rapidly changing not in favor of the German side.

The actions of Vasilevsky, Vatutin and Rotmistrov are the author (despite the fact that the tasks set by the command of the 5th Guards TA were not completed. - Note. ed.) generally considers successful, and Zhukov's criticism - excessive. Georgy Konstantinovich himself had such "failures" throughout the war "at least a dime a dozen." Nevertheless, on July 14, Vasilevsky was transferred to the Southwestern Front to coordinate the upcoming offensive there. Marshal G.K. Zhukov remained on the "economy" on the Voronezh Front.

In order to understand the full depth of the operational-tactical plans of our command, let us return a few hours ago, when the troops of the front were just preparing to launch a counterattack. The capture by the Germans of the starting positions for the offensive planned by our command seriously complicated the operation. Therefore, in the early morning hours of July 12, an attempt was made to recapture the Oktyabrsky state farm. The task of recapturing the state farm was given to two regiments from the 9th Guards Airborne Division and the 95th Guards Rifle Division. The attack began early in the morning, and the first battle of the eventful day on July 12 lasted about three hours. Artillery preparation was not carried out - shells were saved for artillery preparation at 8.00. It was believed that it would be possible to recapture the Oktyabrsky by supporting the attack with their own infantry firepower. These expectations were not met. The SS stopped the guardsmen with concentrated artillery fire in front of their front line. Apparently, counting on the success of the paratroopers' attack, the artillery assigned to support Rotmistrov's army was aimed at strikes along the Vasilievka - Komsomolets state farm - Ivanovsky Vyselok - Belenikhino line. After that, the gunners had to move the fire into the depths. Such a plan of artillery preparation actually excluded the leading edge of the defense of the Leibstandarte from the targets of artillery. A similar picture is observed when considering the air preparation plan for a counterstrike. Assault and bomber aircraft were aimed at the depth of the enemy formation.

This development of events indirectly contributed to the failure of the counterattack of our tank corps.

But in addition to a counterattack in the Prokhorovka area, the Soviet command set the 5th Guards Army the task of eliminating the bridgehead on the north bank of Psel, captured by units of the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division "Totenkopf". It was supposed to tie down the SS units on the bridgehead, and the successful offensive of Rotmistrov's army would lead to the capture of crossings and the encirclement of the enemy.

The main difference between the position of the Soviet units near Prokhorovka and on the perimeter of the bridgehead captured by the 3rd Totenkopf infantry fighting group was a different degree of readiness for a counterattack. If under Prokhorovka Rotmistrov's corps were ready to advance already with the first rays of the sun, on the bridgehead on the morning of July 12, the concentration of forces was in full swing. Actually, on the perimeter of the bridgehead by the beginning of the day there were only parts of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division of Colonel G. G. Pantyukhov, reassigned to the army of A. S. Zhadov. The formation participated in the battles from the first day of the battle and by the end of July 11, there were only 3380 people. The 95th Guards Rifle Division of the 5th Guards Army was to turn around on the morning of July 12 for an offensive under the cover of Colonel Pantyukhov's units. This division was much more numerous - 8781 people on July 10th. Also on the way to the battlefield was the 6th Guards Airborne Division (8894 people).

The Soviet command believed that the Germans would not be able to concentrate tanks on the bridgehead along the crossings, which were under constant artillery fire and air strikes. However, the tanks of the "Dead Head" were nevertheless transported through Psel. This allowed them to forestall a counterattack by A. S. Zhadov’s troops and at 05:25–05:40 on July 12 begin “opening up” the bridgehead. The positions of the small 52nd Guards Rifle Division were crushed, and German tanks and infantry attacked units of the 95th Guards Rifle Division, which were preparing to attack the bridgehead. The artillery regiment of the division had not yet managed to reach positions, but artillery became the main means of deterring the enemy's offensive. Already in the middle of the day, units of the 6th Guards Airborne Division had to engage in battle with the SS "Totenkopf". They hurriedly dug in on positions in the depths of the defense north of the bridgehead. Also, a means of blocking the breakthrough of the 3rd SS Pgd from the bridgehead was the concentration of artillery against it from neighboring divisions of the 5th Guards Army, including the 42nd Guards Rifle Division from the southern coast of Psel.

Until July 11, inclusive, the 5th Guards Army did not have any armored vehicles in its composition. Only in the evening of that day, the 1440th self-propelled artillery regiment, transferred from the 6th Guards Army, arrived in the army formation, in which there were 8 medium self-propelled guns SU-122 and 5 light self-propelled guns SU-76. On July 12, the regiment was placed at the disposal of the commander of the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps, and by 18:00, two SU-76 batteries attached to the 13th Guards Rifle Division took up firing positions in the area of ​​height 239.6 with the task of repelling enemy tank counterattacks.

Due to the lack of 122-mm ammunition in the regiment and in the warehouse, the SU-122 battery was not brought into battle until July 13, being in the reserve of the commander of the 32nd Guards. sk .

The counterattack near Prokhorovka did not give the result expected by the Soviet command. The Germans managed to repel it without losses, leading to a loss of combat capability. However, on July 12, the offensive of the Western and Bryansk fronts began on the northern face of the Kursk salient. Model took command of the 2nd Panzer and 9th Armies, and the continuation of the offensive on the northern front (Kursk Bulge) had to be forgotten. The cessation of the offensive of the 9th Army made the further advance of the 4th Panzer Army in a northerly direction pointless. The command of Army Group South continued the operation. An attempt was made to encircle and destroy the 48th Rifle Corps of the 69th Army with a strike in converging directions by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf Army Group. The Germans intended to close the ring around those Soviet forces on the ledge, which were sandwiched between 2nd SS TC and 3rd Wehrmacht TC. Both the Leibstandarte and the Reich had to hold their positions, although the 3rd SS Totenkopf / Totenkopf was ordered to attack the next day: “... continue their attack with the right flank in the Psel river valley to the northeast and throw as much force as possible to the ridge of heights north of the Psel River to the road connecting Beregovoe with Korievka. They were supposed to force Psel in the southeast and destroy enemy forces southeast and southwest of Petrovka in cooperation with the Leibstandarte. This environment was partially implemented, but large losses were avoided. Soon, Manstein had to abandon even local offensives on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge - the offensive of the Southern Front on the Mius and the Izyum-Barvenkovskaya operation of the Southwestern Front began. The 24th Panzer Corps and the withdrawn 2nd SS Panzer Corps were used to repulse these new two Soviet attacks. On July 16, the withdrawal of the main forces of the shock group of Army Group South began to their original positions under the cover of strong rearguards. Operation Citadel ended in failure for both enemy army groups.

1. Notes on the use and operation of BT and MV of the Voronezh Front from July 5 to July 25, 1943 (TsAMO RF, f. 38, op. 80040ss, d. 98, m. 15–22).

2. Report of the headquarters of the 5th Guards. TA on the military operations of the army from July 7 to July 24, 1943 (TsAMO RF, f. 332, op. 4948, d, 31, pp. 2–89).

3. Description of the hostilities of the 5th Guards. TA from July 7 to July 24, 1943 (TsAMO RF, f. 38, op. 80040ss, d. 1, pp. 95–181).

4. Report of an officer of the General Staff of the Red Army at the headquarters of the 5th Guards. TA on the military operations of the army from July 7 to July 24, 1943 (TsAMO RF, f. 332, op. 4948, d. 51, pp. 1–28).

5. Description of the July operation of the 5th Guards. TA in the Belgorod direction (TsAMO RF, f. 332, op. 4948, d. 85, pp. 2–39).

6. Report of the headquarters of the Commander of the BT and MV of the 5th Guards. And about the combat operations of the armored and mechanized troops of the army from July 1 to August 7, 1943 (TsAMO RF, f. 323, op. 4869, d. 3, ll. 113-118).

7. Report of the headquarters of the 29th TC on the combat operations of the corps from July 7 to 24, 1943 (TsAMO RF, f. 332, op. 4948, d. 46, pp. 1–16).

8. Soviet artillery in the Great Patriotic War. 1941–1945 M., military publishing house. 800 s.

9. Designer of combat vehicles. Leningrad, Lenizdat, 1988. 382 p.

10. Vasilevsky A. M. The work of a lifetime. Minsk, "Belarus", 1988. 542 p.

11. Isaev A. V., Moshchansky I. B. Triumphs and Tragedies of the Great War. M., Veche. 622 p.

12. Rotmistrov P. A. Steel Guard. M., Military Publishing House, 1984. 420 p.

13. Cornish N. Battle of Kursk The greatest tank battle in history. July 1943. M., Tsentrpoligraf, 2009.224 p.

14. Ustyantsev S., Kolmakov D. Fighting vehicles of Uralvagonzavod. Tank T-34. Nizhny Tagil, Media-Print Publishing House, 2005. 232 p.

15. Thomas L. Jentz. Panzertruppen 1943-1945. Schiffer Military History, 1996. 287 p.

The plan of the counterattack of the troops of the Voronezh Front and the grouping of Soviet troops on the morning of July 12, 1943

Notes:

Koch T., Zalewski W. El Alamein. Warszawa, 1993, s. 28.

The Brereton Diaries. New York, 1946, p. 148. Designer of combat vehicles. Leningrad, Lenizdat, 1988, p. 283.

Isaev A. V., Moshchansky I. B. Triumphs and Tragedies of the Great War. M., Veche, 2010, p. 377.

Cornish N. Battle of Kursk The greatest tank battle in history. July 1943. M., Tsentrpoligraf, 2009, p. 180.

Ibid, p. 180–181.

Isaev A. V., Moshchansky I. B. Triumphs and Tragedies of the Great War. M., Veche, 2010, p. 378.

Rotmistrov P. A. Steel Guard. M., Military Publishing, 1984, p. 187.

TsAMO RF, f. 332, he. 4948, d. 51, l. 7.

There, l. eight.

TsAMO RF, f. 323 he. 4869, d. 3, l. 113.

REPORT OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5th GUARDS MECHANIZED CORPS TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY,

Major General Comrade Baskakov

1. Parts of Major General Rodimtsev from 15.00 went on the offensive in the general direction at st. Maksimovka, as a result of which they did not advance at all and occupies the former boundaries.
2. 5 Guards MK provided assistance to the 32nd SC with fire, but due to the passive actions of the 32nd SC, this help was also not real.
3. 5 Guards MK occupies a position according to his morning operational summary. The hull has losses of 2 T-34s and 2 T-70s.
4. The enemy does not show activity, with the exception of artillery fire, which is conducted in response to ours.
5. According to Shabarov, between 12–13.00 19.8.43 at st. Maksimovka passed 2 echelons of covered wagons. With what? Don't know. In addition, during the day there was an active movement of cars Maksimovka - height 217 (both ways).
6. According to Shabarov, the avenue pulled up rocket artillery, which prevails in this area.
7. With an attack of 15-10 tanks, the pr-k took possession of a grove that southwest. high 209.5, knocking out parts of Rodimtsev from there.
8. Rodimtsev decided to operate at night in small groups in order to restore his position.

Guards sub. Dokukin

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, unit ridge 71, ll. 208–209.

BATTLE REPORT No. 74 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 20, 1943

Combat Report No. 74 Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank. 12.00 20.08.43.

1. By 12.00 20.08.43, there were no changes in the position of the Army units.

Parts occupy areas and lines, as indicated in report No. 73 of 08/19/43.

2. By order of the General of the Army comrade. Vatutin, transferred on behalf of Comrade. Yuryev at 03.00 20.08.43 - 29 TC I prepared for actions on MURAFA.

Corps, continuing to remain in the MAL area. SENNYANKA and forests to the north, by 08.00 08.20.43, conducted a reconnaissance of routes to the MURAFA area, crossings over the MERLA River, and also entered into contact with the 6th Guards. The army of General CHISTYAKOV and 1 TA of General KATUKOV.

The commander's reconnaissance checked: 163 SD - occupies the front south of MURAF in sector 10 HUNDRED, PEACE: 71 SD - defends the claim line. PEACEFUL. Svh. KARLOVKA and a grove north of Khrushchev Nikitovka.

At the turn of 163 SD and 71 Guards. The SD is also defending the tank corps from the 1st TA. The hull was not replenished with tanks.

At 11.30 on 20.08.43 from the General of the Army comrade. Vatutin, I received a second order also on behalf of Comrade. YURYEV - during the day of 08/20/43, to conduct a reconnaissance of the movement routes for the concentration of the Army (without 29 TC) in the FIELD, DERGACHI area, which was done.

29 TC ordered to leave in place and be ready for action on MURAF.

Due to the fact that during 19 and 20.08.43 the 5th Guards. The army in the KRYSINO-KADNITSA section does not solve active tasks, I believe that the further use of 5 GZMK here is not advisable and therefore I ask you to allow 5 GZMK to withdraw 5 Guards from combat formations. Army and concentrate in the area in accordance with the new task of the Army.

4. Shtarm - forest, south. X. AKHRIMTSEV.

TROOP COMMANDER 5 GTA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

ROTMISTROV

MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GTA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF 5 GTA

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, unit ridge 67, l. 97

PRIVATE BATTLE ORDER No. 20 TO THE COMMANDER OF THE FORWARD DETAIL OF THE ARMY ON THE CONDUCT OF ACTIONS IN THE DIRECTION OF GAVRILOVKA, August 20, 1943

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE FORWARD DETAIL OF THE Guard, lieutenant colonel comrade DOKUDOVSKY

Private combat order No. 20 Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank

16.30 o'clock 20.8.43 Map 100.000 1941

On August 20, 1943, units of the 53rd Army captured Peresechnaya, Gavrilovka, Kuryanka and continue to successfully move forward.

I order:

1. The forward detachment of the army, consisting of 1 OGKMTsP, 53 Guards. TP, 689 IPTAP - speak

At 16.30. 20.8.43 and by 20.20. 20.8.43 will concentrate in the forest area, to the north of the utility room. household (5 km. North Gavrilovka).

Upon reaching the area, immediately organize reconnaissance in the direction of Gavrilovka, establish contact with the units of the 53rd Army operating in front, and if these units force the river. Uda, occupy and defend the existing crossings, ensuring the crossing of the main forces of the army.

Route of movement: Zaryabinka, B. Rogozyanka, Field.

1. Convey:

About the performance. Radio signal - 666.

About the exit to the concentration area. Radio signal - 777.

More every two hours.

1. Storm - from 20.00. 20.8.43 in the area of ​​the forest, north of Polevoe.

Commander of the troops of the 5th GTA Member of the Military Council of the 5th GTA

GuardsLieutenant General of the Guard Major General

Tank Troops Tank Troops

Rotmistrov Grishin

Chief of Staff 5 GTA

Baskakov

TsAMO RF, f. 2UV, op. 2779, unit ridge 40, l. 206.

BATTLE REPORT FROM THE COMMANDER OF THE 18TH TANK CORPS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY, August 22, 1943

Guards general-l-tu Rotmistrov

7.50 the first echelon left high. 123.1 advanced 1.5 km. The enemy with his tanks from the ravine that sowing. Commune 300–400 m up to 4 heavy tanks, 2 self-propelled guns. Two companies of infantry and up to 3 minutes. Batteries, division art. from high 182.6 resists. On the line st. Shpakovka advances 5 microns, brigade commanders sent to battle formations.

I continue to complete the task.

I have losses.

The neighbor on the right hasn't started moving yet.

I ask you to give a fire screen in the direction of Lyubotin.

Guards gene. Major Trufanov

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, unit ridge 71, l. 227.

№ 29

BATTLE REPORT No. 77 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 22, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT Colonel-General comrade. KONEVA.

Combat report No. 77. Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank. 11.30 08.22.43

I report:

At 0800 hours on 08/22/43 units of the Army went on the offensive from the area of ​​st. SHPAKOVKA (southern railway) on BABAI, bypassing KOROTICH from the east.

When advancing in the direction of KOROTICH, the tanks were met by strong anti-tank fire and enemy tanks from the north and north-west altitudes. SHORT The attack of our tanks with anti-tank fire and enemy tanks was stopped.

To accomplish the task, parts of 18 TK and 5 GZMK regrouped even closer to the railway and at 10.00 the Army units again went on the offensive.

Our losses from air bombardment, anti-tank artillery and enemy tanks are being specified.

At the observation post in the area of ​​1 km north-east. PERESECHNAYA 5 GZMK Major General SWAN.

TROOP COMMANDER 5 GTA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

ROTMISTROV

MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GTA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF 5 GTA

Guards Major General of the Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, unit ridge 67, l. 100.

BATTLE REPORT No. 87 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 18TH TANK CORPS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY, August 22, 1943

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5 GUARD. TANK. ARMY.

BATTLE REPORT No. 87, Shtakor 18 tank., Forest 2 km. sowing GRIGORIEVKA,

22.8.43 to 19.00, map 100.000–42

1. The enemy stubbornly defends at the turn: x. SMORODSKY, KAZAROVKA, COMMUNE, KOROTICH, x. SHPAKI his artillery is firing from the areas: the forest sowing. X. SMORODSKY, LYUBOTIN, KOROTICH, x. SHPAKI.

1. 110 brigade at 18.05 consisting of: T-34 tanks - 8, MSPB 84 people. I cut the highway and village KHARKOV-BOGODUKHOV north KOROTIC, continues to advance.
2. 170 brigade consisting of T-34 tanks - 4, T-70 tanks - 2, with 53 gtr - T-34 tanks - 8 by 14-00 reached the country road north. 1.5 km. SHORT Further advance was halted by strong enemy artillery fire from the KOROTICH, LYUBOTIN area.

Brigade losses per day: T-34 tanks - 6, personnel - 2 killed, 10 wounded, the radio went out of order.

1. 181 tbr by 17.20 reached 2 km. southern Art. PACKING.

In the ranks of T-34 tanks - 2.

1. 32 MSBR - southwest. 400 meters PUTTER against the bend of the river. UDY.

Losses per day: two 76 mm guns were disabled by enemy artillery fire.

Mortar fire brigade on high. 182.6 2 enemy vehicles were hit and up to an infantry company was destroyed. Suppressed enemy minbattery fire to the northeast. env. STAR. LYUBOTIN (at the bridge). A 75 mm cannon (without a propeller) and 10 boxes of shells for it were captured.

1. I decided: having a close connection with the neighbors, by the end of 22.8. complete the assigned task.
2. KP - forest 2 km. sowing GAVRILOVKA.

NP - art. PACKING.

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, unit ridge 71, l. 229.

BATTLE REPORT No. 79 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 22, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT Colonel-General comrade. KONEVA.

Combat report No. 79. Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank by 21.50 22.08.43

I report:

1. During the day, Army units (without 23 TC), following your orders, conducted offensive battles in the direction of KOROTIC, BABAI and three times repelled enemy counterattacks with a force of up to 2 battalions of infantry and tanks from the STAR area. Lyubotin at st. PACKING.

By 19.00 on 22.08.43, units 18 of the TK and 5 of the GZMK, having broken the resistance of the enemy, captured KOROTICH and received the task:

a) 18 TK and 5 GZMK- create detachments of tanks, anti-tank missiles and motorized infantry, led by the best initiative commanders and immediately pursue the enemy with the task of capturing BABAI, POKOTILOVKA and cutting off the escape route of the Kharkov enemy grouping to the south.

The rest of the corps continue to carry out the task.

b) motorcycle regiment- set the task of conducting reconnaissance at BUDY.

2. 29 TC continued to defend BOGODUKHOV from the south in readiness to act to the west.

3. Losses and trophies, after clarification, will be reported by the operational summary.

Shtarm - forest, northeast. utility room household

NP - nameless. height, which is 1 km east. CROSSING.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5 Guards. TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF, 5th GV. TA

Guards Major General of the Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, unit ridge 67, l. 101.

BATTLE REPORT No. 80 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 23, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT Colonel-General comrade. KONEVA

Combat Report No. 80. Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank. 13.45 08.23.43

I report the situation at 13.00 on 23.08.43:

1. A group of tanks 18 TK in the amount of 7 pcs. with a landing of motorized infantry, thrown out at night from the KOROTICH region to intercept roads from KHARKOV to MEREFA, reached the highway KHARKOV, MEREFA in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe inscription POKOTILOVKA, where it went on the defensive and at dawn on 08/23/43 fought with the enemy, holding the occupied area.

A detachment of tanks 5 GZMK by dawn on 08/23/43 reached the forest 3 km north. BIRCH, where he fights with the enemy.

The main forces of the 5th GZMK and 18th TCs are fighting to clear KOROTICH from the enemy, who approached from the direction of LYUBOTIN at dawn on 08/23/43 and occupied it from the south. Southern and southwest. outskirts of KOROTICH.

2. The enemy puts up stubborn resistance from the southwest forest area. KOROTICH and from the heights of the south. SHORT

At 10.00 enemy tanks with a total of up to 20 tanks attacked the battle formations of Army units from the STAR area. LYUBOTIN, LYUBOTIN in the direction of KOROTICH, the enemy's attack was repulsed.

In the forests and southwest. KOROTICH continues to accumulate enemy tanks from the LYUBOTIN area.

At 11.30 on 23.08.43, over 20 enemy aircraft bombed the combat formations of Army units in the GAVRILOVKA, KOROTICH area.

As a result of the night battle, the battle formations of the Army units were mixed up, in connection with which the control in the units was disrupted. On the morning of 08/23/43, measures were taken to restore control and organization of the battle, for this purpose Shtarm commanders were sent to the unit at dawn.

NP - nameless. high 1 km east CROSSING.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5 Guards. TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF, 5th GV. TA

Guards Major General of the Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, unit ridge 67, l. 103.

BATTLE REPORT OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 994th LIGHT BOMBER AVIATION REGIMENT TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY, August 23, 1943

BATTLE REPORT

1. The regiment in the amount of 6 aircraft worked on a special task of the 5th military aviation regiment, on August 22 it made 49 sorties, flying 30 hours 55 minutes.

2. There are 8 serviceable aircraft at the airfield of deployment, 1 aircraft is on a long business trip, on the instructions of the headquarters of the 5th c.t.a.

3. The regiment is provided with shoes, uniforms by 90%, food for 12 daily dachas, B-70 aviation gasoline for 1.6 gas stations, gasoline for 4.6 gas stations, MK oil for 7.3 gas stations, auto scrap for 4.9 gas stations.

4. Ammunition for personal weapons and Shkas machine guns, 2 rounds each.

5. Communication with the headquarters of the city of military a. carried out by aircraft through a liaison officer.

6. A regiment of 14 aircraft can carry out communications missions.

Time Beginning headquarters 994 A.P.

Art. those. lieutenant KONUSHKIN

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, unit ridge 71, l. 246.

BATTLE REPORT No. 89 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 18TH TANK CORPS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY, August 23, 1943

BATTLE REPORT No. 89, Shtakor 18 tank., Forest 4.5 km. sowing GAVRILOVKA,

23.8.43 to 19.00, map 100.000–42

1. The enemy is leading a strong art. min. fire from the area east. X. RICH, high 200.0, RAYELENOVKA, KOROTIC, continues to defend stubbornly at the turn: x. RICH, SHORT.

Enemy mortar batteries are located - north-west log. and southeast. KOROTICH, anti-tank guns are located on the north-east. outskirts.

Enemy aircraft carried out reconnaissance flights with single planes.

2. At 02.00 on 23.8.43, I sent a consolidated detachment under the command of Lieutenant Comrade Ivashchenko, consisting of 7 tanks with troops, with the task of cutting the railroad. and the highway in the POKOTILOVKA area.

Around 3.50 23.8, the detachment, according to the oral report of Lieutenant IVASHCHENKO, reached the railway station. in the area indicated above and cut it, 2 tanks were hit and burned by the enemy (of which 1 was a radio).

The tank of the commander of the detachment, Lieutenant IVASHCHENKO, was hit, and IVASHCHENKO was wounded. According to him, the infantry dismounted from the tanks and took up defensive positions, he did not know the further actions of the detachment.

At 10.00 from the 11th brigade, I sent a group of scouts to the POKOTILOVKA area with the task of establishing communication with the consolidated detachment and the reality of the interception of the train. in the POKOTILOVKA area.

I don't have any research results. I take a second step to establish contact with the detachment.

3. Parts and formations of the corps reached the line:

110 brigade consisting of T-34 tanks - 9, T-70 tanks - 5 - in the area of ​​mounds 1 km. northeast SHORT

170 brigade consisting of T-34 tanks - 5, T-70 tanks - 1 - landing 300 meters. southern highway that sowing. SHORT

181 brigade consisting of T-34 tanks - 3, T-70 tanks - 2 - 1 km. sowing SHORT

32 MSBR - took up defense along the railway. d. Sev. SHORT

Artillery units have OP in the area: platf. SPA, st. PUTTING, support the actions of the body parts.

4. Material condition:

Tanks on the move T-34 - 18, T-70 - 8

Tanks on the move along the route of the T-34 - 12

Under repair: current tanks T-34 - 7, T-70 - 3.

Medium tanks T-34 - 29, T-70 - 3.

Capital. tanks T-34 - 9.

Losses per day: T-34 tanks - 10, of which 9 are irretrievable.

5. KP - forest 4.5 km. sowing GAVRILOVKA.

NP - grove 1 km. southern GAVRILOVKA.

Commander of the 18th Corps Guards. Major General of the Tank Troops Trufanov

Chief of Staff of the 18th Corps, Colonel Vorobyov

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, unit ridge 71, l. 210.

BATTLE REPORT OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 4th SEPARATE COMMUNICATION REGIMENT TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY, August 23, 1943

Troop Commander

5th Guards Tank Army

Combat report No. 94, staple 4

At 19-00 23.8.43 the card is 100.000 - 40

The 4th separate communications regiment occupies a forest concentration area of ​​2 km. sowing Kuryanka. The regiment serves the communications center for the 5th Guards. and telephone and mobile communications.

1. headquarters battalion.

The telegraph company provides a communication center and puts the equipment in order.

The telephone exchange serves internal telephone communication.

RPSS serves with mobile communications KP Shtarm.

Armored company: three T-34 tanks are located at the command post of the 5th Guards. that and one T-34 in the location of the regiment. Armored vehicles are located at the POD and the operational department of the army.

2. The radio battalion has radio communication: with the General Staff; with the Voronezh Front; with the Steppe Front; with 5 GZMK; 18 TC: 29 TC; with corps artillery; with artillery units of the army; with headquarters: 7th Guards. BUT; 57 A; 69 A; 53 A; 5 VA. Radio exchange per day: 28 radiograms received - 685 grams; transmitted - 18 radiograms - 849 groups.

Interruption of communication: with the Steppe Front from 22-00 to 14-00 - not passing the wave and malfunction of the radio; with the GShKA - communication appeared from 22-00 and lasted until 6-00, from 6-00 to 13-15 - great interference; from 18 TC - from 20-00 to 8-00 - no wave passing; from TC 29 from 20-00 to 14-00 the reason is not clear.

The 1st telegraph and cable company, consisting of 2 platoons, provided communication lines: NP 5 GTA - 18 TK; NP 5 GTA - 29 TC. One platoon is in the location of the regiment.

The 2nd telegraph and cable company, consisting of 3 platoons, provides communication lines: TsTS - NP 5 GTA; TsTS - regimental headquarters; CFTS - 53 A; CTS - - 1 building 53 SA. One platoon is in reserve at the location of the regiment.

1127 OKSHR, consisting of 2 platoons, provides communication lines, the rest put the equipment in order.

1129 OKSHR is in reserve and puts the equipment in order.

08/23/1943 at 11-00 while performing combat missions - the regiment's armored vehicle came under enemy fire, while the driver of the armored vehicle, ml. Sergeant Kapustin and the commander of the armored vehicle Senior Sergeant Gvozdarev was wounded.

Security:

Ammunition, weapons, basic means of communication completely.

Transport package:

Cargo. GAZ "AA" - 12 units; passenger cars "Willis" - 8 pcs.; motorcycles - 18; armored vehicles - 2 pcs.

Food:

Crackers - 2.5 s / d; different cereals - 6.7 s / d; pasta - ?; canned meat – 4.4 s/d; live cattle - 8.5 s/d; fats - 3.9 s / d; sugar - 5.7 s / d dry rations - 1.8 s / d; different canned food?

Motor gasoline - 0.7 orders; diesel fuel - 1.3 orders; oil - 0.3 refills; autol - 2.0 ref.

Commander of the 4th Ops Guards. lieutenant colonel Gorbachev

Chief of Staff Major Shevtsov

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, unit ridge 71, l. 247.

BATTLE REPORT No. 81 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 23, 1943

Combat report No. 81 Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank. 22.00 23.08.43

I report on the actions of the Army units for 08/23/43:

1. At dawn on August 23, 1943, the enemy, with a force of up to an infantry battalion with tanks, launched an attack from the LYUBOTIN area and from the side of BUDA to KOROTICH and captured the south. and southwest. env. KOROTICH, taking advantage of the fact that tanks 18 TK and 5 GZMK, which entered from the evening of 22.08.43, were sent at night as forward detachments to BEREZOVOE, and by this time the main forces of the corps and infantry were still only concentrated in KOROTICH.

Later, having brought up artillery, mortars and tanks, the enemy launched two counterattacks on KOROTICH from the LYUBOTIN area in order to capture KOROTICH.

Throughout the day, units of the Army were fighting in KOROTIC, which prevented the fulfillment of the task - an attack on BUDY.

2. Carrying out the task of attacking BEREZOVOE, BABAI, the forward detachment of the 5th GZMK reached the forest 3 km north by dawn on 08/23/43. BIRCH, where he entered into battle with enemy tanks and artillery. Subsequently, communication with the detachment was interrupted, the crew of the burned-out tank of this detachment returned, reported that three tanks had burned down from the fire of enemy tanks, and the fate of the rest of the detachment was unknown.

According to reports, three tanks of this detachment were on the south. env. KOROTICH, where they dug in and remained throughout the day, fighting with the enemy (the data is being verified).

3. The advance detachment of the 18th TC, consisting of 7 tanks with a motorized infantry landing, fulfilling the assigned task, by the morning of 08/23/43, reached the line of the highway and railway KHARKIV - MEREFA in the POKOTILOVKA area, where he entered into battles with the enemy and, going on the defensive, held the occupied line throughout the day.

Attempts by the 170th TBR to connect with a detachment from the KOROTICH region were unsuccessful.

4. At 19.00 on August 23, 1943, after the regrouping of forces, units of the Army launched a general offensive with the task of completely destroying the enemy in the KOROTICH area and reaching BUDY.

The position of the Army units and the result of the offensive, as well as losses and trophies for 23.08.43, will be reported by the operational summary.

NP - on the nameless. high 1 km post. CROSSING.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5 Guards. TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF, 5th GV. TA

Guards Major General of the Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, unit ridge 67, l 104.

OPERATIONAL REPORT OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY,

OPERSVODKA No. 41 by 24.00 23.08.43 5 Guards Tank, Shtakor forest, 2 km north. auxiliary household

1. The enemy offers stubborn fire resistance with tanks and artillery. At dawn on August 23, 1943, before the enemy infantry battalion with tanks from the Lyubotin area and from the direction of BUDA, they launched an attack on KOROTICH and went south. and southwest. env. KOROTICH, taking advantage of the fact that tanks 18 TK and 5 GZMK, which entered from the evening of 22.08.43, were sent at night as forward detachments to BEREZOVOE, and by this time the main forces of the corps and infantry were still only concentrated in KOROTICH.

Subsequently, having brought up artillery, mortars and tanks, the enemy launched two more counterattacks on KOROTICH from the LYUBOTIN area.

Enemy aircraft in groups of 15-30 aircraft repeatedly bombed the combat formations of army troops.

2. The troops of the army (without 29 TC) fought throughout the day in the KOROTICH region, which prevented the fulfillment of the task - the attack on BUDY.

At 19.00 on 23.08.43, after the regrouping of forces, units of the army launched a general offensive with the task of completely destroying the enemy in the KOROTICH region and reaching the BUDA region.

3. 18 TC with 53 Guards. The TP fought an offensive battle in the KOROTIC area and repelled enemy counterattacks.

At 19.00 on August 23, 1943, after regrouping, parts of the corps launched a general offensive from the line:

a) 32 MSBR - yellow. sowing road. SHORT

b) 181 TBR - 1 km north. KOROTICH (with a ledge beyond 32 MSVR).

c) 140 and 170 TBr - sowing. env. garden that sowing. SHORT

By the end of the day, units of the corps, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy, are fighting in the KOROTICH area, having the task, together with the 5th GZMK, to destroy the enemy in the KOROTICH area and go to the BUDA area.

As a result of the battle for 08/23/43, parts of the corps destroyed:

Enemy tanks - 4 pcs.

Guns of different caliber - 6 pcs.

Mortars - 4 pcs.

A Yu-88 aircraft was shot down by FOR fire.

Tanks T-34 - 10 pcs.

Of these, irretrievable losses - 6 pcs.

85 m / m guns - 2 pcs.

120 m / m mortars - 2 pcs.

Cars - 5 pcs.

Personnel killed - 19 people.

Wounded personnel - 32 people.

The corps has tanks on the move:

Tanks T-34 - 18 pcs.

Tanks T-74 - 8 pcs.

53 Guards. TP has tanks on the move:

Tanks T-34 - 20 pcs.

Tanks T-70 - 2 pcs.

Total tanks on the move: T-34 - 38 pcs., T-70 - 10 pcs.

Security:

Screw cartridges -1.6 b / c

Food 7 s/d.

Shtakor Task Force 1.5 km. south GAVRILOVKA.

4. 5th Guards ZMK - During the day, he fought an offensive battle in the KOROTICH area and repelled counterattacks from enemy tanks and infantry.

From 19.00 on 23.08.43, after regrouping, parts of the corps went on the general offensive from the line:

a) 24 Guards. TBR - and 12 Guards. MBR - north env. SHORT

b) 10th and 11th Guards. MBR - north-east. env. garden that sowing. SHORT

By the end of the day, units of the corps were fighting in the KOROTICH region, with the task of completely destroying the enemy in the KOROTICH region and reaching the BUDA region.

On 08/23/43, parts of the corps destroyed:

Enemy tanks: destroyed - 2

Hit - 2

Guns - 4

Machine guns - 4

Cars - 3

Soldiers and officers - up to 150 people.

Hull losses for 08/23/43

Tanks T-34 - 4 pcs.

Cars - 2 pcs.

Radio stations - 1 pc.

Killed personnel - 23 people.

Wounded - 34 people.

The corps has tanks on the move:

T-34 - 35 pieces; T-70 - 5 pcs.

Security:

Ammunition 45 and 76 m / m shots - 1 b / c

Screw cartridges 1.2

Food 2 s/d.

Shtakor task force 1 km north. SHORT

5. 1 OGKMTsK with 689 IPTA (3 guns) - the commander's reserve was concentrated in the garden of the sowing. KOROTIC is ready to act in the direction of BUDA-MEREFA.

The regiment has tanks on the move: T-34 - 6 pcs; active motorized infantry bayonets - 120 people.

Security:

45 and 76 m / m shots - 1 b / c

Screw cartridges - 1

Food - 3 s / d

Losses of the regiment for 23.08.43

Personnel killed - 12 people

Injured - 6 people.

6. 29 TC with one brigade (25 TB) continues to defend BOGODUKHOV from the south at the turn: g. d. booth 1 km south. X. SEMENOV YAR, south. env. X. MUSIYKI.

The remaining brigades of the corps from 17.30 on 23.08.43 were on the march to the area of ​​​​concentration of the forest of the northern auxiliary. household (6 km north-east. PERESECHNOE).

The corps has tanks on the move:

T-34 - 93 pcs.

T-70 - 11 pcs.

Security:

Ammunition - 45 and 76 m / m shots - 2 b / c

Screw cartridges - 2 b / c

Food 5 days-dachas.

Shtakor - on the march to the corps concentration area.

7. Communication with the army troops: radio, telephone, telegraph, mobile equipment and communications officers.

8. The weather is clear, the roads for all types of transport are passable.

STARM - in the forest 2 km north. utility room household / 3 km north-east. CROSS

NP - bezim. high 1 km north-east CROSS

CHIEF OF STAFF

5 GUARDS TANK ARMY

GUARD GENERAL-MAJOR

TANK TROOPS

BASKAKOV

HEAD OF OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

GUARD COLONEL

BELOZEROV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, unit ridge 82

BATTLE REPORT No. 82 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 24, 1943

Commander of the Steppe Front Colonel-General comrade. Konev.

Combat Report No. 82. Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank. By 12.00.

24.8.43 Map 100,000 1941

I report:

1. The enemy in front of the army continues to offer strong fire resistance from the Lyubotin, STAR area. LYUBOTIN, from the forests and heights to the west, south and east of KOROTICH.

Up to 20 tanks and up to a battalion of motorized infantry, reinforced by artillery, were found in KOROTICH.

1. Army units: 18 TK, 5 GZMK, 1 OGKMTsP, from 4.30. 24.8.43

continue actions to destroy the enemy in KOROTICH.

Overcoming strong enemy resistance and suffering losses, the units made little progress.

1. 29 TC (without 25 TBR) is finishing its concentration in the forest area, north of Kuryanka

NP - nameless. high 1 km. east Crossroads.

TsAMO RF, f. 2UV, op. 2779, unit ridge 40, l.235.

BATTLE REPORT No. 84 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 25, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT Colonel-General comrade. KONEVA.

Combat report No. 84. Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank. 20.40 25.8.1943

I report:

29 TK - at 13.00 on 25.8.43, he attacked the enemy in the direction of the department of temporary storage. KOMMUNAR /2 klm. app. KOROTIC /, BUDY, MEREFA.

The enemy continuously led a strong artillery fire. At 13.40. attacked from the forest that east. svh. KOMMUNAR with 8 tanks, the counterattack was repulsed. At 15.40. the enemy again launched a counterattack with 6-8 TIGER tanks, which was repulsed.

At 18.00, the corps is fighting for the grove, south. svh. KOMMUNAR, repulsing the third attack of enemy tanks from the direction of LYUBOTIN.

2. 5 GZMK - 24 TBR, 10 GV. ICBMs, self-propelled artillery regiment - at 16.00 they went to their original position for an attack in the direction of the wing. COMMUNAR, BUDY.

3. 18 TK - at 16.00 received an order to attack the enemy in the direction of the temporary storage warehouse. COMMUNAR, BUDY.

4. Losses - up to 20 T-34 tanks. Up to 10 enemy tanks burned down. The data is being checked.

PP - nameless. high 1 km. east CROSSING.

Commander of the 5th Guards. TA Member of the military council of the 5th Guards. TA

Rotmistrov Grishin

Chief of Staff of the 5th Guards TA

Guards Major General of the Tank Troops

Baskakov

TsAMO RF, f. 2UV, op. 2779, unit ridge 40, l. 236.

BATTLE REPORT No. 85 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 26, 1943

Commander of the steppe front, Colonel-General comrade. Konev.

Combat Report No. 85. Shtam 5th Guards Tank. 13.30

26.8.43

I report:

1. Parts of the army during 25.8.43, the night of 26.8.43 and the first half

day 26.8.43, performing the task, with varying success fought with the enemy at the turn

otd. svh. Kommunar, St. Kommunar, Korotich. They took possession of St. Kommunar and repelled four enemy attacks. In the area of svh. Kommunar, St. Kommunar during 25.8.43, more than 50 enemy tanks operated against army units.

On 25/8/43 and on the night of 26/8/43, up to 15 enemy tanks were knocked out and destroyed by army units.

The enemy is conducting strong barrage artillery, mortar and tank fire from the forest area west. and southwest. svh Kommunar. At 10.00 on August 26, 1943, from the direction of the department. svh. Kommunar up to 15 enemy tanks again attacked units of 29 TK and 5 GZMK at temporary storage warehouses. Kommunar. Attack repulsed. Knocked out - 5 enemy tanks.

In the area of ​​St. Kommunar captured a prisoner who testified that he belonged to the 44th SS Viking Division and, as part of a battalion, arrived to replenish the Viking SS Division on 23.8.43.

1. 18 TK - fire supported the offensive of 29 TK and 5 GZMK being at the turn of the railway. d. to the north. env. short

By 10:00 am on August 26, 1943, 25 TBRs of the 29th TK, with 13 tanks, arrived in the Gavrilovka area. The brigade received the task: after mastering the border of the railway. southern svh. Kommunar to develop success in the direction of Buda, Merefa.

NP - nameless. height 1 km. east Crossroads.

TsAMO RF, f. 2UV, op. 2779, unit ridge 40, l. 247.

BATTLE REPORT FROM THE COMMANDER OF THE 18TH TANK CORPS TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY, August 27, 1943

BATTLE REPORT No. 91,

Shtakor 18 south of 1.5 km KURYAZHANKA, 8.40, 27.8.43, map 100.000

1. By 7.40 32 MBR with reinforcement units reached 50-60 m. d. Booth app. 1 km Korotich

2. Pr-k resists - 2 heavy tanks, rouge. bullet fire from the western environs. short

3. I roll out artillery to fight tanks in an open position. The infantry crawls forward.

Commander of the 18th TC Trufanov

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, unit ridge 71, l. 278.

BATTLE REPORT No. 87 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 27, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, General of the Army comrade. KONEVA.

Combat report No. 87. Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank. 14.00 27.08.43

I report:

1. Motorized infantry with anti-tank artillery of the Army during the night of 08/27/43, continuing to carry out the task, by 07.00 08/27/43 reached the line of 200 meters north. railway KHARKOV - POLTAVA in the area of ​​the railway. booth that app. KOROTICH 1 km, bypassing the SVH. KOMMUNAR from the west and east.

During the night, the enemy with artillery fire and machine-gun fire delayed the advance of our units.

At dawn on August 27, 1943, the enemy fired tanks from the southern encirclement. svh. KOMMUNAR - did not allow our tanks to try to get to the railroad track, where our motorized infantry went out during the night.

From 12.00 on 27.08.43, bypassing the right flank of the 29th TC, the enemy pulled up to 2 companies of infantry with tanks to the temporary storage warehouse. KOMMUNAR, from the grove of the south. simultaneously counterattacked units of the Army from the direction of the svh. KOMMUNAR, trying to cut off our units that passed to the railway.

2. Senior Sergeant BOLDYREV - scout from the 2nd Guards. Motorcycle battalion 5 Guards. ZMK, which came out on the night of 08/27/43 from the RAYELENOVKA area, reported that the enemy was taking up defensive positions along the line of the railway. in the platform area. RAYELENOVKA. In RAYELENOVKA there is a medical aid station, where he observed a large number of wounded soldiers and officers of the enemy.

3. I report that the units of the 53rd Army, which were supposed to interact with my tank corps, did not take a single step forward for 3 days and today continue to be inactive, remaining at the turn of the sowing. highway going from Lyubotin to Pesochin.

4. On August 26, 1943, as a result of fierce battles with the enemy in the area of ​​temporary storage warehouses. KOMMUNAR have significant losses, and, in particular, in the command staff.

Killed: Commander of the 32nd Tank Brigade - Colonel LINEV.

Head of the Operative Department of the 29th TC - Lieutenant Colonel LUKASHIN.

shell-shocked Commander of the 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade - Lieutenant Colonel LIPICHEV.

Injured- Commander of the 110th Tank Brigade - Colonel Khlyupin and a number of other responsible commanders and political workers.

Detailed data on losses in personnel and materiel are presented in the operational summary.

5. NP - nameless. high 1 km east CROSSING.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5 Guards. TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF, 5th GV. TA

Guards Major General of the Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, unit ridge 67, l. 110.

REPORT OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT TROOPS

General of the Army comrade KONEVA

I report:

Your order No. 00518/OP of 27.08.43 was received by me at 15.45 on 27.08.43.

In pursuance of your order, in order to communicate and clarify the situation at the 214th SD section, I sent the headquarters commanders. I am sending reconnaissance to the sector of this division.

I keep 25 TBRs of the 29th tank corps in my reserve - in readiness for developing success in the 214th SD section or in the direction of the temporary storage warehouse. COMMUNAR, BUDY.

Commander of 53 MANAGAROV has been acquainted with your order.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5 Guards. TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF, 5th GV. TA

Guards Major General of the Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, unit ridge 67, l. 112.

BATTLE REPORT OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 18TH TANK CORPS

BATTLE REPORT No. 91, Shtakor 18 tank., Forest 1 km. southeast FIELD,

by 19.00, 27.8.43, map 100.000–42

1. The enemy is on the former lines of defense. During the day, he led artillery fire on the battle formations of the corps.

Enemy aircraft in batches of 25-30 aircraft are bombing our battle formations.

2. Parts of the 18th shopping mall entered the reserve of the Commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army with the task of bringing the remaining materiel in order and replenishing the combat materiel to the state.

3. 32 MSBR, 292 Ministry of Regiment consisting of six 120 m / m mortars, 1000 iptap - 4 - 45 m / m and 1 - 76 m / m guns, 170 brigade consisting of T-34 tanks - 2, T-70 tanks - 1 - occupy the defense of the north. railway SHORT

4. 110 brigade - forest south. FIELD

5. 170 brigade - forest southwest. FIELD

6. 181 brigade - forest zap. SEMENOVKA.

7. Corps parts - forest southeast. FIELD.

8. NP - high. 171, 2 1.5 klm. southern KURYAZHNOE.

Commander of the 18th Corps Guards. tank major general Troops Trufanov

Chief of Staff of the 18th Corps, Colonel Vorobyov

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, unit ridge 71, l. 269.

BATTLE REPORT No. 89 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 28, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, ARMY GENERAL comrade Konev.

Combat report No. 89 Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank 12.10 28.08.43

I report:

1. On the night of August 28, 1943, units of the Army in advanced detachments conducted offensive battles with the task of capturing the bridgehead across the railroad. d. KHARKOV - POLTAVA on the site to the south of COMMUNAR. Having met the stubborn resistance of the enemy from the line of the railroad track. and from the forest area to the south and southwest of the SVKh. KOMMUNAR - had no promotion.

At dawn on 08/28/43, the enemy launched two counterattacks with the forces of 9 tanks with infantry. Enemy counterattacks repulsed.

2. On 08/28/43, the army units set the task:

Together with units of the 53rd Army, with a decisive attack at 13.00 on 28.08.43, seize the bridgehead across the railway bed. KHARKOV - POLTAVA in the area to the south of the temporary warehouse. KOMMUNAR, having in mind to further develop the offensive against BUDY.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5 Guards. TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF, 5th GV. TA

Guards Major General of the Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, unit ridge 67, l. 113.

BATTLE REPORT No. 90 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 28, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT, General of the Army comrade. KONEVA

Combat Report No. 90 Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank. 20.30 08.28.43

I report:

1. The enemy, during the whole day of 08/28/43, offered strong resistance to the advancing units of the Army, repeatedly counterattacked with tanks with infantry from the area of ​​a large forest, southwest. svh. KOMMUNAR in the direction of St. COMMUNAR.

In front of the Army front on the site: otd. svh. KOMMUNAR - KOROTIC - in total, more than 20 enemy tanks were noted on August 28, 1943.

2. Parts of the Army were fighting for the mastery of the railway line. southern svh. COMMUNAR, subjected to strong artillery fire and enemy tank fire.

By 20.00 on 28.08.43, the ADVANCED DETAIL of the 5th GZMK managed to cross the railway track in the area of ​​the booth 1 km west. SHORT

The detachment received the task of capturing high. 200.0.

According to preliminary data, on August 28, 1943, 10 enemy tanks were destroyed.

3. In the area of ​​svh. KOMMUNAR 08/28/43, a prisoner was captured belonging to the reconnaissance battalion 106 PD, which showed that the division was under reinforcement 50 km south-west. KHARKOV (the prisoner does not know the point). The reconnaissance battalion 106 PD, in which the prisoner served, consists of 2 squadrons of 60 people each. in everyone. The battalion arrived in the area of ​​svh. COMMUNAR 25.08.43

The prisoner personally saw - 10 German tanks, of which - 4 Tiger tanks in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe railway. canvases of the southern svh. COMMUNAR.

On August 27, 1943, he observed how, for several minutes, in the area of ​​the temporary storage warehouse. KOMMUNAR were burned - 3 German tanks, of which - 1 "Tiger".

According to the testimony of the prisoner, in the KOROTICH area, SS units are operating, he does not know their walkie-talkies. Who is acting to the left - he also does not know.

4. NP - at high. 1 km. east CROSSING.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5 Guards. TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF, 5th GV. TA

Guards Major General of the Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, unit ridge 67, l. 114.

REFERENCE OF THE 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY

ABOUT DAMAGE CAUSED TO THE ENEMY AND OWN LOSSES

ABOUT THE DAMAGE CAUSED TO THE ENEMY AND OWN LOSSES FOR 08/28/43.–

5th Guards Tank Army

Destroyed:

1. Enemy tanks: burned - 8.

Hit - 7

2. Guns of different caliber - 11

3. Machine guns - 23

4. Cars - 7

5. Soldiers and officers - up to 370 people.

Army losses:

1. T-34 tanks burned - 3

Hit - 4

2. T-70 tanks - 2

3. Killed personnel - 51 people.

4. Wounded - 169 people.

Note:

The information was compiled on the basis of operational reports of units and formations of the Army.

Appendix to operational summary No. 41.

POM. CHIEF OF THE OPERATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE HEADQUARTERS 5 GV. TA

Guard Captain

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, unit ridge 82, l. 101.

BATTLE REPORT No. 91 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 29, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT Colonel-General comrade. KONEVA.

Combat report No. 91 Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank. 11 o'clock 30 minutes 29.8.1943

I report:

1. During the night on August 29, 1943, units of the Army fought with the enemy for capturing the border. d. yuzhn. svh. COMMUNAR. As a result of the battle, the advanced units of the 5th GZMK by dawn on August 29, 1943 reached the high line. 300.0 (1 km. southwest. KOROTICH).

From 7.00 29.8.43, 25 TBR 29 TC were led into battle with the immediate task of capturing the crossings across the river. MEREFA in the BUDA area and further advance on the OLD VODOLAG. At 10.00 on 29.8.43, the brigade fought for BUDY, meeting the resistance of enemy tanks and anti-tank artillery from the BUDY line.

2. In the area of ​​svh. KOMMUNAR captured the captured SS divisions "Reich" and 198 PD, which showed that as a result of the heavy losses they suffered in previous battles, 80-100 soldiers remained in the regiments of these divisions. The SS Reich division on 28.8.43 had only 30 tanks, of which 10 were Tiger tanks.

3. The fact that in the area of ​​temporary storage KOMMUNAR and forests to the south left significant groups of prisoners who are caught by our units, suggests that the Germans retreated very hastily, without having time to warn their units about the withdrawal.

4. In the forest area, sowing. BUDY, parts of 29 TK captured - 50 prisoners. Control prisoners were taken from among them, the rest were shot.

I ordered the commanders of the units: - from now on, do not shoot the prisoners, but deliver them to the army headquarters.

5. NP - on the nameless. height 1 km east CROSSING.

The new NP is being equipped at a high 200.0 (1 km south-west of KOROTICH).

TsAMO RF, f. 2UV, op. 2779, unit ridge 40, l. 264.

BATTLE REPORT No. 92 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 29, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT TROOPS, General of the Army comrade. KONEVA

Combat report No. 92 Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank. 14.30 08.29.43

I report:

1. At 09.30 on 08/29/43, Army units entered BUDY and are fighting to clear BUDY from the enemy and to take control of the river crossings. MEREFA.

From 10.00 on August 29, 1943, in the BUDA area, units of the Army began to build crossings over the river. MEREFA, after which they will continue to act on the OLD VODOLAG.

2. In the BUDA area, our Il-2 attack aircraft bombed the Army units.

I ask you to send aviation to the regions of the south. R. MEREFA and along the border of the river. MJA.

3. NP - I am transferring to the south. slopes of heights north of BUDA.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5 Guards. TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF, 5th GV. TA

Guards Major General of the Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, unit ridge 67, l. 117

BATTLE REPORT No. 94 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 29, 1943

Combat report No. 94 Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank 18.00 29.08.43.

I report:

1. At 17.00 on 08/29/43, Army units complete the clearance of BUDA from the enemy and clear mine crossings across the river. MEREFA, at the same time reconnaissance of fords in the area of ​​el. 119.3 and crossings at GIEVKA.

2. At 12.00 on August 29, 1943, the head company of the 25th Tank Brigade broke into BUDY, went to the crossings in the center of the village, at the same time, a column of enemy tanks (10–12 vehicles) departing from the SOUTHERN direction approached the same crossings. A strong tank battle broke out near the porcelain factory, as a result of which the enemy tanks were forced to retreat to the southeast. direction.

25 TBRs lost burnt out - 7 T-34 tanks.

When our tanks approached the crossing west of the porcelain factory, the bridge in the center of the village was blown up by the enemy.

3. I am with the Task Force Shtarm - south. env. SHORT

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5 Guards. TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF, 5th GV. TA

Guards Major General of the Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, unit ridge 67, l. 119.

OPERATIONAL REPORT No. 47 of the HEADQUARTERS of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY,

Opersvodka No. 47 by 24.00 on 29.08.43 Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank.

1. Enemy from heights 175.8; 157.9 conducts artillery-mortar and rifle-machine-gun fire.

Crossings over the river MEREFA in the GIEVKA, BUDY sections were blown up, the river bed was mined.

2. Parts of the Army, starting an offensive from the line of the railway. KHARKIV - POLTAVA, on the site KOROTIC - LYUBOTIN, during the day of the battle on 29.08.43 they mastered a height of 200.0; southwest KOROTICH and by the end of the day on August 29, 1943, they occupied BUDY, motorized infantry began crossing the river. MEREFA.

3. 29 TC- pursuing the retreating enemy, he went to the BUDA area. Farf area. head - BUDY parts of the corps fought with an approaching column of enemy tanks (in the amount of 10-12 units) from the SOUTH region, as a result of which the enemy suffered losses and retreated to the southeast. direction.

By the end of the day, parts of the corps went to the area:

a) 25 TBR with 33 MSBR- farf. head - BUDY.

b) 31 and 32 TBR- they don’t have materiel (tanks), they went to the kirs area. - BUDY.

The corps has the task of crossing the river. MEREFA, by dawn on 08/30/43, master the height. 175.8, in the future to attack the OLD VODOLAG.

As a result of the battle with parts of the corps for 29.08.43. destroyed:

Enemy tanks burned and knocked out - 9

Self-propelled guns - 1

Guns of different caliber - 3

Machine guns - 17

Soldiers and officers - up to 150 people.

Losses cases for 29.08.43:

T-34 tanks burned - 4

T-34 hit - 5

Killed personnel - 24 people.

Wounded - 74 people.

The corps has tanks in service: T-34 - 8, T-70 - 7.

security:

Ammunition - 45 and 76 mm shots - 2 b / c

120 mm mines - 1.3 b / c

Screw cartridges - 1.5 b / c

Food - 3 days.

Shtakor - grove, 1.5 km north. BUDY - area K.

4. 5 GZMK- by the end of the day, he went to the BUDA area and began crossing the river with motorized infantry. MEREFA.

a) 12 Guards. MBR- at the turn of the crossing over the river. MEREFA near BUDA.

b) 11 Guards. MBR- southwest env. BUDY

in) 10 Guards MBR and 24 Guards TBR- materiel (tanks) and motorized infantry do not have, concentrated in the forest, app. SEMENOVKA for the restoration of the material part and resupply.

The corps has a task - having crossed the river. MEREFA, by dawn on 08/30/43, master the height. 157.9, in the future to attack the OLD VODOLAG.

The corps has tanks in service: T-34 - 13, T-70 - 5.

Security:

120 mm mines - 1 b / c

Screw cartridges - 1.25 b / c

Food - 3 days.

Shtakor - east. edge of the forest, 1.5 km southwest. SHORT

5. 18 TC- 32 MSBR with 53 Guards. TP went to the south. edge of the forest, BUDY, has the task of crossing the river. MEREFA, by dawn on 08/30/43, go to the gardens to the south. env., where to take up defense with the front to the south, to ensure the crossing of Army units.

53 Guards. TP has tanks in service: T-34 - 13, T-70 - 1.

For 29.08.43 the corps destroyed:

Anti-tank guns pr-ka - 1

6-barreled mortars - 4

Machine guns - 1

Mortars - 3

Losses cases for 29.08.43:

Broken 76 mm guns - 1

Hit - 3

Killed personnel - 11 people.

Wounded - 35 people.

The remaining parts of the corps during the day of 08/29/43 remained in the former concentration area and restored the materiel.

a) 170 TBr– forest, 1.5 km. southern FIELD.

b) 110 TBr– forest, 1.5 km. southeast FIELD.

in) 181 TBR- forest, app. SEMENOVKA.

All restored tanks of the corps in the amount of T-34 - 19, T-70 - are transferred to 181 TBR, which by 09.00 08.30.43 goes into the forest, sowing. BUDY in readiness for action 30.08.43

security:

120 mm mines - 1 b / c

Screw cartridges - 1.5 b / c

Food - 3 days.

Shtakor - forest, 1.5 km southeast. FIELD.

5. 1 OGKMTsP- went south. edge of the forest 1 km north. BUDY. Conducts active reconnaissance at RAKITNOE.

The regiment has tanks in service: T-34 - 4.

Active motorized infantry bayonets - 166 people.

security:

Ammunition - 2 b / c

Food - 4 days.

8. The weather is clear. Roads for all types of transport are passable.

Task Force Shtarm- in the gardens to the south. env. SHORT

CHIEF OF STAFF, 5th GV. TA

Guards Major General of the Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

Guard Colonel

BELOZEROV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, unit ridge 83, ll. 1-2.

BATTLE REPORT No. 96 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 30, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT TROOPS, General of the Army comrade. KONEVA.

Combat report No. 96 Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank 10.00 08.30.43

I report:

1. 6 am 08/30/43, he entered into communication with the commander of the 69th Lieutenant General comrade. KRYUCHENKIN.

We organize joint actions to seize the bridgehead across the river. MEREFA near BUDA.

2. Parts of the Army during the night in small groups under rifle and machine-gun fire of the enemy crossed the river. MEREFA near BUDA.

Attempts to transport the tanks were unsuccessful. The tanks that approached the crossing were hit by enemy tank fire and anti-tank guns from the south. banks of the river MEREFA.

The almost complete absence of motorized infantry in my Army did not allow me to capture and provide a bridgehead for crossing tanks.

The reconnaissance carried out in the direction of GIEVKA and southeast of BUDA found that all crossings over the river. MEREFA was blown up by the enemy, and the river bed was mined.

3. Parts 5 GZMK and 29 TK occupy BUDY and the forest to the north.

181 TBr 18 Tk- focuses in the forest, sowing. BUDY in readiness for action on STARAYA VODOLAGA.

4. Task Force Shtarm - in the gardens, to the south. env. SHORT

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5 Guards. TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF, 5th GV. TA

Guards Major General of the Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, unit ridge 67, l. 121.

BATTLE REPORT No. 97 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 30, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT Colonel-General comrade. KONEVA.-

Combat report No. 97 Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank. 16.30 30.8.1943

I report:

1. Your combat order No. 0592 of 30.8.43 was received by me at 14.40 on 30.8.43.

Even before receiving a written order in the direction of STARY MERCHIK, reconnaissance of routes was sent from all units and a task force of the army.

At 14.00 on 30.8.43, the tanks of the Army units were in BUDA in the combat formations of the infantry of the 69th Army, and the motorized infantry crossed to the southern bank of the river. MEREFA and is fighting for the purification of it from the enemy. The enemy, occupying commanding heights on the southern bank of the river. MEREFA, puts up strong resistance to Army units.

During the day, enemy artillery fire destroyed the crossing over the river three times. MEREFA, induced by parts of the Army in the BUDA area.

At 15.00 on August 30, 1943, a joint offensive began between units of the 69th Army and the 5th Guards. Tank Army with the task of capturing the infantry bridgehead across the river. MEREFA in the BUDA area, in order to further advance on the OLD VODOLAG.

The preparation and organization of the offensive were carried out jointly with General KRYUCHENKIN even before receiving your order.

3. In connection with the current situation, it was decided:

With firepower, motorized infantry and part of the tanks - to help the infantry of the 69th Army to go out and gain a foothold on the heights south of BUDA, and in case of success - to advance here with all your might, fulfilling the task you set earlier.

If the infantry does not receive the expected advance, then by 17.00 on 30.8.43 I will remove the units of the Army and begin to concentrate in the STARY MERCHIK area.

4. Task Force Shtarm - in the gardens to the south. env. KOROTICH, further in the FEDOROVKA area.

TsAMO RF, f. 2UV, op. 2779, unit ridge 40, l. 269.

BATTLE REPORT No. 94 of the HEADQUARTERS of the 18th TANK CORPS

BATTLE REPORT No. 94 by 19.00 30.8.43 Shtakor 18 tank., Forest 1 km. southeast FIELD, card 100.000 - 42

1. The enemy takes up defensive positions on the right bank of the river. Merefa. Its firepower is located in the area of ​​elev. 175.8 - anti-tank battery, to the east. edge of the forest, in a hollow 1.5 km. app. BUDY - a battery of 6-barreled mortars, south. 1 km. the letter "R" of the inscription r. MEREFA - artillery battery.

The enemy leads artillery min. fire on the location of our units.

1. 32 MSBR consisting of: 1st MSPB, 1 line company - 18 people, minbattery 22 people, anti-tank battery 20 people, machine gunners company 12 people, artillery div. 101 people, Minbat 85 people - occupies defense in the southeast. slopes high 182.8.
2. 181 brigade is the reserve of the Commander of the 5th Guards. TA, by 9.30 concentrated in the area - a forest of 1.5 km. sowing BUDY.

Composition of the brigade: 1st TB - T-34 - 15, T-70 - 6 (arrived in the area of ​​concentration), MSPB - 143 people.

1. The remaining parts of the corps are in the former areas.

The personnel is engaged in the repair of combat materiel and combat training.

1. NP - high. with elev. 195.9.
2. The corps commander left in parts.

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, unit ridge 71, l. 308.

OPERATIONAL REPORT No. 48 of the HEADQUARTERS of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY,

Opersvodka No. 48 by 24.00 on 30.08.43 Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank.

Goryuny (2 km. northeast. STARY MERCHIK).

1. The enemy, occupying commanding heights on the southern bank of the river. MEREFA, throughout the day provided strong fire resistance to the advancing units of the Army.

During the day of 08/30/43, the enemy repeatedly destroyed crossings over the river with artillery fire. MEREFA, induced by parts of the Army.

2. Units of the Army, together with units of the 69th Army, during the day of 08/30/43 conducted offensive battles with the task of capturing the infantry foothold across the river. MEREFA in the BUDA area with further development of success on STARA VODOLAG.

In view of the strong resistance of the enemy, which is at the turn of the command heights, app. BUDY, it was not possible to break - the infantry did not have the expected success.

According to the order of the commander of the STEPPE FRONT No. 00592 / OP dated 08.30.43, units of the Army from 17.00 on 08.30.43 began to regroup in the STARY MERCHIK area with the task of advancing in the direction of Cheremushnaya, Valki.

3. 18 TC- all the restored materiel (tanks) and motorized infantry were handed over by 181 TBR, which by 23.00 on 30.08.43 concentrated on the south. edge of the forest, 2 km north. OLD MERCHIK.

The brigade has tanks in service: T-34 - 17, T-70 - 5.

Exploded by mines: T-34 - 1.

The remaining brigades of the corps, remaining in the former area of ​​​​concentration - the forest of the south. and southeast. FIELD, during the day of August 30, 1943, the material part was restored.

security:

Ammunition - 45 and 76 mm shots - 1.5 b / c

120 mm mines - 1 b / c

Screw cartridges - 1.5 b / c.

Food - 2 days.

Shtakor– in the forest, 1.5 km. southeast FIELD.

4. 5 GZMK- all materiel (tanks) and motorized infantry were transferred to the 12th Guards. TBR, which by the end of the day was finishing its concentration in the area x. MISHCHENKOV.

The brigade has tanks on the move: T-34 - 13, T-70 - 5.

The remaining brigades of the corps, without materiel and motorized infantry, are concentrated in the forest area, west. SEMENOVKA for the restoration of the material part and understaffing.

security:

Ammunition - 45 and 76 mm shots - 1.25 b / c

120 mm mines - 1 b / c

Screw cartridges - 1.25 b / c.

Food - 2 days.

Shtakor Task Force– RED. ZORI.

5. 29 TC- during the day he fought for mastering the bridgehead across the river. MEREFA. From 17.00 on 30.08.43, having transferred all materiel (tanks) and motorized infantry of the 25th Tank Brigade, he began to regroup in the STARY MERCHIK area.

By the end of the day on 08/30/43, 25 TBRs, consisting of 13 T-34 tanks, were completing their concentration in the west. env. X. MANCHENKO.

The remaining brigades of the materiel corps (tanks) and motorized infantry do not have them, they are concentrated in the forest, 2 km north of KURYAZHANKA.

As a result of the battle with parts of the corps, for 30.08.43. destroyed:

Enemy tanks - 3

Guns of different caliber - 5

Machine guns - 6

Self-propelled guns - 2

Soldiers and officers - up to 200 people.

Hull losses for 08/30/43:

T-34 tanks burned - 1

T-34 hit - 2

Killed personnel - 7 people.

Wounded - 21 people.

security:

Ammunition - 45 and 76 mm shots - 3 b / c

120 mm mines - 1 b / c

Screw cartridges - 1.5 b / c.

Food for 6 days.

Shtakor Task Force- app. env. X. MANCHENKOV.

6. 1 OGKMTsP- consisting of 160 people. Motorized infantry and 4 T-34 tanks, by the end of 08/30/43, finishes concentrating in the east. env. X. MANCHENKOV.

security:

Ammunition - 2 b / c

Food - 3 days.

7. Communication with the troops of the Army: radio, mobile equipment and communications officers.

8. Cloudy weather with little precipitation. Roads for all types of transport are passable.

Shtarm - GORYUNY (2 km north-east. STARY MERCHIK).

CHIEF OF STAFF, 5th GV. TA

GUARDS MAJOR GENERAL OF TANK TROOPS

BASKAKOV

CHIEF OF OPERATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF HEADQUARTERS 5 GV. TA

GUARD COLONEL

BELOZEROV.

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, unit ridge 83, ll. 3-4.

BATTLE REPORT No. 99 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 31, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT TROOPS, General of the Army comrade KONEV.

Combat report No. 99 Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank. 09.30 08.31.43

I report:

1. By 07.00 on August 31, 1943, army units concentrated:

a) 181 TBR - 18 TC in the forest, 1 km south. Art. MERCHIK.

Has T-34 tanks - 10. T-70 - 4.

b) 12 Guards. MBR 5 GZMK - in the area x. MISHCHENKOV.

Has T-34 tanks - 13.

c) 25 TBr 29 TK - concentrated in the area x. IVASHCHENKOV.

It has T-34 tanks - 13.

2. Conducted reconnaissance of the area in the direction of attack. From 10.00 on August 31, 1943, the brigades went to their starting position for the attack - gardens to the south. env. DOBROPOLIE.

3. Consolidated brigades of the corps are united by Major General comrade. SKVORTSOV.

The corps was given the task of attacking in the direction of Dobropolye, x. DRILLING, zap. env. CHERMYSHNAYA - take possession of the area of ​​​​high. 184.7 h. CHELYUKOVKA, high. 200.5 with the exit of 5 GZMK to the area of ​​the west. Chermyshnaya. The advanced detachment as part of a motorcycle regiment and 58 Guards. TP (11 T-34 tanks), - I throw it on the ROLLS.

4. Established contact with the left-flank units of the army of ZHADOV and units of MANAGAROV operating in this direction.

5. The start of the attack, by prior arrangement, was scheduled for 14.00 on 31.08.43.

Comrade's final decision. MANAGAROVA and the timing of the attack has not yet been received. I expect at 10.00 on 08/31/43.

6. Headquarters - GURINS (1 km northeast. STARY MERCHIK).

NP - high. 215.6 (2 km south station MERCHIK).

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5 Guards. TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF, 5th GV. TA

Guards Major General of the Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

Right: Pom. Head of the Operational Department of the Guard Captain (Left)

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, unit ridge 67, l. 124.

BATTLE REPORT No. 162 OF THE STAFF OF THE 181st TANK BRIGADE TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY,

Commander 5 GTA

Copy: Commander 5 gmk, 18 tk

Combat Report No. 162

Staff 181 brigade 16.50 31.8.43 map 100000 south. outskirts of Artel

The brigade, performing the task - to act with / x artel, x. Burivka, x. Chelyukovka, by 16.00 on 31.8.43, while fighting, reached a height of 204.3 and continues to fulfill the task. As a result of the battle, 5 enemy tanks were knocked out. 1 tiger brand tank was completely captured and 2 guns from which they fire at the enemy. The enemy has a strong art. fire resistance from x. Khvorostov and machine-gun fire kurgan + 00. Up to 2 batteries of mortars fire from the x direction. Naryzhny. As a result of the battle, I have losses: 2 T-34s, 1 T-70, 15 people were wounded. Of which wounded art. adjutant of the 1st battalion of the guards. Art. lieutenant Shkurdalov.

Beginning headquarters 181 t. br Major Popov

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, unit ridge 71, l. 321.

BATTLE REPORT No. 95 of the HEADQUARTERS of the 18th TANK CORPS

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY,

BATTLE REPORT No. 95 by 19.00 31.8.43 Shtakor 18 tank., Forest 1 km. southeast FIELD, card 100.000 - 42

1. Parts of the corps in the former areas.

2. 110 brigade - south of 1.5 km FIELD as part of T-34 tanks - 4.

3. 170 brigade southwest. FIELD

4. 181 brigade consisting of tanks T-34 - 15, T-70 - 6 in the operational subordination of 5 gzmk concentrated forest sowing. STAR. MERCHIK (11.00).

5. 32 small brigade - concentrated forest 1, 5 km west. SEMENOVKA.

6. Body parts and art. regiments in the former areas.

7. Shtakor - forest 1 km south-east. FIELD.

8. Komkor and NS left in parts.

COMMANDARM 18 TC GUARDS GENERAL-MAJOR Trufanov

CHIEF OF STAFF 18 TC GV. LIEUTENANT COLONEL SEMYONOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, unit ridge 71, l. 318.

BATTLE REPORT No. 215

STAFF OF THE 5th GUARDS MECHANIZED CORPS

Combat report No. 215. Shtakor 5 gZmk,

31.8.43 20.00. Map 100.000 - 42

1. The enemy, after stubborn resistance at 20.00, withdrew behind the line. d. Kharkov-Poltava and leads a strong art. min. fire from the direction of the forest east. X. Rogovka, app. high, that east. X. Rogovka 2 km, and south. edge of the forest that east. Likhovki. Observation established up to 20 tanks in the area x. Likhovka.

At 15.30, 5 tanks of the pr-ka counterattacked the 12th Guards. mbr from x direction. Shilov attack repulsed.

At 6:30 pm aviation, up to 18 Yu-88 and Yu-87 aircraft, bombed the battle formations of the units and the NP of the corps.

2. Parts of the hull, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the pr-ka, at 20.00 went beyond the railroad. d.

3. 12 Guards. MBR with 285 MP and 1104 iptap, at 15.30 attacked from for example. high 203.1 and by 20.00 left the railroad. d. in the district of sowing. X. Likhovka. In its composition it has: tanks "T-34" - 9, "T-70" - 4, active bayonets - 56. During the day of the battle it has losses - tanks "T-34" - 9, personnel killed and wounded about 25– 30 people

4. 181 brigade with 694 iptap, ipa div. 286 MP, consisting of: "T-34" - 5 tanks and approx. 80 people infantry at 14.00 attacked for example. high 204.3 and by 20.00 left the railroad. d. to the right of 12 guards. mbr. During the day of the battle, it has losses: tanks burned "T-34" - 6, "T-70" - 1. "T-70" - 2. Personnel 37 people.

5. 25 brigade with 108 iptap consisting of 8 T-34 tanks and personnel - 35 people. (active bayonets) 16.30 attacked for 12 guards. mbr in the direction north-east. slopes 204.3 and by 20.00 reached the line of railway. to the left of the ledge and beyond 12 mbr.

Losses per day of tanks: "T-34" -4, "T-70" - 3, personnel about 20 people.

6. 678 GAP, 409 otmd, 76 mm 1529 odp, 737 ip - reserve.

7. Losses caused by pr-ku per day are being specified.

8. KP - a garden that is northeast. svh. Shock

NP - elev. 186.3

9. The corps commander is slightly shell-shocked, is in the area of ​​the command post.

For the corps commander Gv. Major General TV (signature)

For the chief of staff of the Guards. captain (signature)

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4949, unit ridge 71, l. 316.

BATTLE REPORT No. 102 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 31, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT Colonel-General comrade. KONEVA.

Combat Report No. 102. Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank. 31.8.1943

I report:

1. Parts of the 5th GZMK consisting of 181 TBR, 25 TBR, 12 Guards. ICBMs, reinforced by all army artillery, at 14.30. 31.8.43 from the border of the river. MERCHIK went on the offensive in the direction of high. 188.7, MOG. GRUSHKI, BURIVKA, and by the end of the day on August 31, 1943, they are fighting:

12 Guards. MBR - having mastered the MTF. PEARS, high 207.0, crossed the railroad. d. and 6 tanks reached the heights. 211.1, continues to expand the occupied area, pulling up artillery.

181 TBR - having mastered the high. 188.7 and DATSKIVKA and having beaten off the counterattack of the enemy tanks from the side of TETYUSHINA BALKA, reached the line: heights 203.4, 203.1 and continues to advance towards the roadbed. d.

25 Tank Brigade - attacked opponents in the beams south of DOBROPOLYE, reached the line of high. 207.0, BARABASHI and continues to advance towards the railroad track.

2. ADVANCED TEAM consisting of: 1 OGKMTSP, 53 Guards. The TP, having the task of capturing VALKI by the end of the day on 31.8.43, by 19.00 on 31.8.43 part of the forces crossed the railway track in the area of ​​​​the booth, 2 km north. east HVOROSTOVO, continues to advance in the direction of LIHOVKA, vys. 184.7.

3. For the night from 31.8.43. On September 1, 1943, he set the task of the 5th GZMK - to firmly secure a foothold south of the railway in the BURIVKA area, put the units in order so that at dawn on September 1, 1943, continue to fulfill your task.

4. In the afternoon of 31.8.43, enemy aircraft bombed the orders of Army units three times.

NP - high. elev. 215.8.

TsAMO RF, f. 2UV, op. 2779, unit ridge 40, l. 281.

BATTLE REPORT No. 100 OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT, August 31, 1943

Commander of the STEPPE FRONT TROOPS, General of the Army comrade. KONEVA.

Combat report No. 100 Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank 21.00 08.31.43

I report:

1. Parts of the 5th GZMK consisting of 181 TBR, 25 TBR, 12 Guards. ICBMs reinforced by all army artillery, at 14.30 on 31.08.43 from the turn of the river. MERCHIK went on the offensive in the direction of high. 188.7, MOG. GRUSHKI, BURIVKA and by the end of the day 08/31/43 are fighting:

12 Guards. MBR- having mastered the MTF. PEARS, high 207.0, crossed the railroad. d. and 6 tanks reached the heights. 211.1 continues to expand the occupied area, pulling up artillery.

181 TBR- having mastered the height 188.7 LATSKIVKA and having beaten off the counterattack of enemy tanks from the side of TETKINA BALKA reached the line: heights 204.3, 203.1 and continues to advance towards the railroad track.

2. ADVANCED TEAM consisting of: 1 OGKMTsN, 53 Guards. TP, 578 IPTAP, having a task by the end of the day on 08/31/43, part of the forces crossed the railway bed in the area of ​​​​the booth, 2 km northeast. HVOROSTOVO, continues to advance in the direction of LIHOVKA, vys. 184.7.

3. On the night of 08/31/43 to 09/01/43, he set the task of 5 GZMK - to firmly secure a bridgehead south of the railway in the area of ​​​​LIKHOVKA BURIVKA, put the units in order so that at dawn on 09/01/43 continue to fulfill your task .

I set the FORWARD DETAIL the task of developing an offensive against VALKI.

4. In the afternoon of August 31, 1943, enemy aircraft bombed the combat formations of Army units three times.

5. During the day of the battle I have up to 25 tanks knocked out and burned by the enemy. Losses are specified.

6. Shtarm - x. GURINY (1 km. northeast. STARY MERCHIK)

NP - high. elev. 215.8.

7. Infantry 53 Arm. comrade Managarov is not behind the battle formations of 5 MK.

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS 5 Guards. TA

Guard Lieutenant General

Tank Troops

Rotmistrov

MILITARY COUNCIL 5 GV. TA

Guard Major General

Tank Troops

CHIEF OF STAFF, 5th GV. TA

Guards Major General of the Tank Troops

BASKAKOV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, unit ridge 67, l. 125.

OPERATIONAL REPORT No. 49 of the HEADQUARTERS of the 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY,

Opersvodka No. 49 by 24.00 on 31.08.43 Shtarm of the 5th Guards Tank. Goryuny (1 km northeast. STARY MERCHIK).

1. The enemy was knocked out by units of the Army from the occupied line - the heights of the south. DOBROPOLIE and retreated behind the line of the KHARKOV-POLTAVA railroad, where it provides fire resistance to the advancing units of the Army.

At 15.30 on August 31, 1943, 5 enemy tanks from the TETYUSHINA BALKA area counterattacked the 12th Guards. MBR - attack repulsed.

In the afternoon, enemy aircraft in groups of up to 25 aircraft bombed the combat formations of Army units three times.

2. Parts 5 GZMK- consisting of: 12 Guards. MBR, 181 TBR 18 TK, 25 TBR 29 TK, reinforced by all army artillery, at 14.30 on 31.08.43 from the turn of the river. MERCHIK went on the offensive in the direction of high. 188, 3 MOG. GRUSHKI, DRILLING with the task of mastering Cheremushnaya and further stepping on VALKI.

Having broken the resistance of the enemy at the turn of high. south of DOBROPOLYE, repelling a counterattack - 5 enemy tanks, parts of the corps went south. wish. dor. KHARKIV - POLTAVA, by the end of the day they are fighting at the turn:

a) 181 TBR - behind the railway line. d. in the area of ​​the south. railway booths (1 km north-east Khvorostov).

b) 12 Guards. MBR - south. slope height 211.1 that Sev. LIHOVKA.

c) 25 TBR - at the turn of the railway. in the area of ​​north.vys. 211.1 (1 km north Likhovka).

On the night of August 31 to September 1, 1943, the corps was tasked with firmly securing the bridgehead of the southern. railway in the area of ​​​​LIKHOVKA, BURIVKA, put the units in order and from the dawn of 09/01/43 continue to carry out the task.

Corps losses per battle day:

Tanks T-34 - 19 pcs.

Tanks T-70 - 6 pcs.

Killed personnel - up to 75 people.

Losses and trophies - clarified.

The corps has tanks on the move: T-34 - 23 units, T-70 - 4 units.

Active bayonets of motorized infantry - 171 people.

security:

Ammunition - 45 and 76 mm shots - 1 b / c

120 mm mines - 1 b / c

Screw cartridges - 1.5 b / c.

Food - 6 daily dachas.

The remaining brigades of the corps (10th, 11th Guards MBR and 24th Guards TBR) do not have materiel (tanks) or motorized infantry. Concentrated in the forest area zap. SEMENOVKA for the restoration of the material part and understaffed

Shtakor - garden, south. SHOCK.

3. Advance Detachment consisting of: 1 OGKMTsP, 53 Guards. TP, having the task - by the end of 08.31.43, to master the VALKI, by the end of the day he crossed the railway line. d. in the area of ​​​​the booth (1 km northeast. Khvorostov). The detachment continues to advance in the direction of LIHOVKA, high. 184.3 ROLLS.

The detachment has tanks on the move: T-34 - 11.

Active bayonets of motorized infantry - 160 people.

security:

Ammunition - 45 and 76 mm shots - 1.75 b / c

Screw cartridges - 1.5 b / c.

Food - 3 days.

4. 18 TC(without 181 TBR) - has no materiel (tanks) and motorized infantry.

During the day of August 31, 1943, he restored the material part in the former concentration area - the forest, south and southeast. FIELD.

Shtakor - in the forest, 1.5 km southeast. FIELD.

5. 29 TC(without 25 TBR) - has no materiel (tanks) and motorized infantry. Concentrated in the forest 2 km north. KURYAZHANKA for the restoration of the material part and understaffing.

Shtakor - in the forest, 2 km north. KURYAZHANKA.

6. Communication with the troops of the Army - radio, mobile equipment and communications officers.

7. Cloudy weather with little precipitation. Roads for all types of transport are passable.

Shtarm - GORYUNY (1 km northeast. STARY MERCHIK).

KP - high. with elev. 215.8.

CHIEF OF STAFF, 5th GV. TA

GUARDS MAJOR GENERAL OF TANK TROOPS

BASKAKOV

CHIEF OF OPERATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF HEADQUARTERS 5 GV. TA

BELOZEROV

TsAMO RF, f. 5 Guards TA, op. 4948, unit ridge 83, ll. 5–6.

REPORT OF THE COMMANDER AND HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT TROOPS ON THE LOSSES SUFFERED BY THE ARMY IN JULY-AUGUST 1943, THE QUANTITY AND THE CONDITION OF EQUIPMENT AND THE NEED TO REPLENISH THE ARMY,

OWL. SECRET

CONTROL

5 Guards

TANK ARMY

combatant

Ref No. 00350

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE STEPPE FRONT

Army General Comrade KONEVA.

Leaving the area of ​​the city of Ostrozhsk on July 6, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army spent 2 months of heavy offensive battles.

With a counter tank battle near PROKHOROVKA, the Army participated in the liquidation of the summer offensive of the German army, breaking the main tank group advancing on KURSK from the south. Further, advancing west of BELGOROD on ZOLOCHEV, and cutting off the retreat of the enemy from BELGOROD to the south with one corps, the 5th Guards Tank Army took part in the capture of BELGOROD.

In connection with the current situation in the BOGODUKHOV area, where the enemy created a tank group, with the task of reaching the flank and rear of our troops advancing on KHARKOV from the north, in order to disrupt this offensive, the 5th Guards Tank Army, on the orders of the Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade. ZHUKOVA, for one day concentrated in the area of ​​BOGODUKHOV, subsequently, maneuvering in this area, did not allow the enemy to carry out his plan.

Subsequently, the 5th Guards Tank Army was again transferred to the east and, having received the task of advancing from PERESECHNAYA to BUDA, by entering the KOROTYCH region, it created a threat to the encirclement enemy in KHARKOV. As a result, the enemy left the city of KHARKOV.

In subsequent battles, the 5th Guards Tank Army received the task of advancing on VALKI, which it continues to carry out.

All these battles were fought on critical sectors of the front, where the enemy put up the strongest resistance, often not even taking into account losses.

From the first day of entering the battle, the SS Panzer Corps acted against the Army, which is considered one of the strongest and most reliable units of the German army.

In all these battles, the 5th Guards Tank Army suffered heavy losses in materiel, weapons and personnel.

In two months of fighting, the Army lost a large number of senior officers. The deputy commander of the 5th GZMK, Major General comrade, was killed. SWAN. Of the 12 brigade commanders, 6 people were killed and wounded. In total, 1624 officers were out of order. The losses of all personnel are equal - 18,219 people.

The army suffered heavy losses in arms.

On 30.8.43, the state is missing:

The army is not enough to the state -1468 vehicles.

142 radio stations dropped out from enemy fire, as a result of which control is extremely difficult.

All this speaks for the fact that the Army requires replenishment not only with tanks, but also with personnel, artillery, vehicles, means of communication, etc. It requires at least a minimum period to put itself in order, to familiarize the newly appointed command staff with its units and conducting at least one or two classes with them based on the experience of the battles of the summer campaign of 1943.

Reporting to you on the state of the Army, I AM ASKING you to equip it with tanks and other types of combat equipment for at least 80% of the regular strength, in particular, increase the number of tanks in the Army to at least 450-500 tanks.

In the same case, when the number of tanks in the Army is reduced to 150-200 tanks, the organization of tank brigades is completely disrupted and there is no opportunity to deliver a massive tank strike and develop an offensive in depth.

Commander of the 5th Guards. TA Member of the Military Council of the 5th Guards TA

Lieutenant General Tank. Troops Guards. Major General of Tank Troops

Rotmistrov Grishin

Chief of Staff of the 5th Guards TA

Guards Major General of the Tank Troops

Baskakov

TsAMO RF, f. 2UV, op. 2779, unit ridge 40, ll. 288–290.

REPORT ON THE LOSS OF PERSONNEL OF THE 5th GUARDS TANK ARMY, August 1943

10.03.2013

On March 6, 2013, a solemn meeting and a festive concert dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the 5th Guards Tank Red Banner Army, whose headquarters were in Bobruisk, took place in the Central House of Officers in Minsk. Veterans-tankers were honored, generals and officers spoke with memories.

The 5th Guards Tank Army was formed in February-March 1943. As part of the Voronezh, Steppe, 2nd Ukrainian, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts, she traveled the battle path from Prokhorovka to Danzig, participated in the Battle of Kursk, battles to expand the bridgehead on the Dnieper southeast of Kremenchug, in Kirovograd, Korsun-Shevchenko, Uman-Botoshansk, Belorussian, Baltic and East Prussian operations. During the war, 53 of its soldiers became Heroes of the Soviet Union, 14 holders of the Order of Glory of three degrees, over 38 thousand were awarded other state awards.

Many formations and units of the 5th Guards Tank Army were awarded military orders, awarded the honorary titles of Znamensky, Kirovograd, Korsun, Dniester, Minsk, Kovno, Molodechno, Vilna, Tannenberg. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief J. V. Stalin announced 17 thanks to the troops of the army, the capital of the USSR, the city of Moscow, on behalf of the Motherland, saluted the heroic tankmen 11 times.

In peacetime, the 5th Guards Tank Army became one of the leading operational formations in the Ground Forces. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 21, 1974, the army was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

In positions from platoon commander to battalion commander in the tank regiment of the 5th Guards Tank Army, the current Minister of Defense of the Republic of Belarus, Lieutenant General, began his officer career Yu. V.Zhadobin.

More than twenty years ago, the 5th Guards Tank (from July 1946 to May 1956 - mechanized) Red Banner Army (military unit 43060), whose headquarters was located in Bobruisk on Kirova Street, 25, ceased to exist. For almost half a century, the army lived one life with Belarus and the city of Bobruisk, made a significant contribution to the post-war revival and subsequent development of the region.

In August 1992, the 5th Guards Red Banner Tank Corps was transformed into the 5th Guards Army Red Banner Corps (later the command of the Ground Forces) of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus.

Events dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the 5th Guards Red Banner Tank Army were held in Bobruisk. A solemn ceremony of laying wreaths and flowers to Bakharov's tank took place on Victory Square. One more photo ...

Let's remember the names of the commanders

The 5th Guards was, perhaps, the only one in the Soviet Army, in which subsequently three Marshals of the Soviet Union, the Chief Marshal and two marshals of the armored forces, six generals of the army, the seventh and ninth post-war chiefs of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the fourth Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces by the forces of the states - participants of the Warsaw Pact - the first deputy minister of defense of the USSR, three deputy ministers ...

During the years of its existence, the 5th Guards Tank Army was commanded by 22 commanders: Marshal of the Armored Forces Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov (1943–1944); Lieutenant General, Colonel General of Tank Forces Mikhail Dmitrievich Solomatin (1944 - died due to a severe wound, 1945–1946); Colonel-General of Tank Troops Vasily Timofeevich Volsky (1944–1945); Major General of Tank Troops Maxim Denisovich Sinenko (1945); Lieutenant General of the Tank Troops Pavel Pavlovich Poluboyarov (1946–1949), Mikhail Fedorovich Panov (1949–1951); Colonel General of Tank Troops Mikhail Efimovich Katukov (1951–1955); lieutenant generals of the tank troops Pyotr Ivanovich Kalinichenko (1955–1958), Vladimir Ivanovich Smirnov (1958–1960), Semyon Konstantinovich Kurkotkin (1960–1965), Boris Sergeevich Likhachev (1965–1967), Soltan Kekkezovich Magometov (1967–1969), Mikhail Mitrofanovich Zaitsev (1969–1972), Valery Aleksandrovich Belikov (1972–1974); Lieutenant General Vitaly Vasilyevich Saltykov (1974–1976), Ivan Andreevich Gashkov (1976–1979), Petr Vasilyevich Ledyaev (1979–1982), Vyacheslav Dmitrievich Khaidorov (1982–1984), Valery Ivanovich Fursin (1984–1987), Anatoly Anatolyevich Ushakov (1987–1989); Major General Valery Vladimirovich Lagoshin (1989–1992); Lieutenant General Stanislav Stepanovich Rumyantsev (1992).

Each of the commanders of the 5th Guards Tank Army had rich service and combat experience, solid military academic training. Almost all commanders graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR named after K. E. Voroshilov or the Higher Academic Courses attached to it. A number of them, for example, P. I. Kalinichenko and S. K. Magometov, received diplomas from the All-Union Academy of Arts with honors.

P. A. Rotmistrov, M. D. Solomatin, V. T. Volsky, M. D. Sinenko, P. P. Poluboyarov, M. F. Panov, M. E. Katukov, P. I .Kalinichenko, V.I.Smirnov, S.K.Kurkotkin, B.S.Likhachev, S.K.Magometov, M.M.Zaitsev, V.A.Belikov, V.V.Saltykov.

Heroes of the Soviet Union were M. E. Katukov (twice - 1944, 1945), M. F. Panov (1945) and P. P. Poluboyarov (1945).

In the post-war period, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to P. A. Rotmistrov (1965), S. K. Kurkotkin (1981) and M. M. Zaitsev (1983).

The tank guards always helped the city of Bobruisk if necessary, constantly feeling the reciprocal care and attention. The military glorified Bobruisk more than once in amateur folk art and sports.

Suffice it to recall that the folk theater of the garrison House of Officers was a laureate of the All-Army Festival of the Creativity of Soldiers dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the Victory, the winner of the All-Union Festival of amateur art in honor of the 50th anniversary of Soviet power and other competitions. Great merit in this was the then artistic director of the theater, V. Ya.

Citizens remember how the football team SKA (Bobruisk) played in the USSR championship (class "B"), how skillfully the army team fought in the boxing ring - two-time champion of the Soviet Union, champion of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the Spartakiad of friendly armies Anatoly Berezyuk and bronze medalist of the USSR championship Gennady Kaminsky ...

After serving in the 5th Guards, its commanders were appointed to higher positions in the Armed Forces of the USSR, sent to military-diplomatic work.

P. A. Rotmistrov(1901–1982) ended the Great Patriotic War as deputy commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the Red Army. Then he commanded BT and MB in the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, in the Far East, headed the department at the Higher Military Academy (later the Military Academy of the General Staff), the Military Academy of Armored Forces, worked as an assistant to the Minister of Defense of the USSR for higher military educational institutions, general inspector Groups of general inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense. First Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces (1962). Doctor of Military Sciences (1956). Professor (1958). He was buried in Moscow at the Novodevichy Cemetery.

M. D. Solomatin(1894-1986) since 1946, he headed the headquarters and temporarily served as deputy commander of the BT and MB of the Soviet Army, worked as head of the department of tactics of higher formations and assistant head of the Military Academy named after M. V. Frunze. Since 1959 - retired. Buried in Moscow.

V. T. Volsky(1897–1946) from March 1945 was on treatment. He was buried in Moscow at the Novodevichy Cemetery.

M.D.Sinenko(1902-1991) from 1946 headed the 1st Guards Ulyanovsk Tank School, served as inspector general of the BT and MB of the Main Inspectorate of the Soviet Army. Lieutenant general of tank troops (1945). Since 1952 - in reserve and retired. Buried in Moscow.

P. P. Poluboyarov(1901-1984) since 1949 - deputy and first deputy commander of the BT and MB, head of the armored personnel carrier, tank troops of the Soviet Army, military inspector-adviser of the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Colonel General of Tank Forces (1949). Marshal of the armored forces (1962). He was buried in Moscow at the Novodevichy Cemetery.

M. F. Panov(1901-1979) after Bobruisk, he studied at the Higher Academic Courses at the Higher Military Academy, commanded the BT and MB of the Leningrad Military District, the 7th mechanized (tank) army in the Belarusian Military District, served as deputy commander of the North Caucasian Military District, head engineering-tactical and command faculties of the Military Academy of Armored Forces. Since 1967 - retired. He was buried in Moscow at the Kuntsevo cemetery. The name of M. F. Panov is the College of Metrostroy No. 53 of Moscow.

M. E. Katukov(1900–1976) since 1955 served as inspector general of the Main Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, deputy head of the Main Directorate of Combat Training of the Ground Forces, military inspector-adviser of the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Marshal of the armored forces (1959). He was buried in Moscow at the Novodevichy Cemetery. The name of M. E. Katukov was given to the 1st Guards Chertkovsky Tank Regiment of the 9th Bobruisk-Berlin Tank Division of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, streets in Moscow, Volokolamsk, Orel and other cities, secondary school No. 37 in Orel.

P. I. Kalinichenko(1904–1986) since 1958 - First Deputy Commander of the Belarusian Military District, senior representative of the High Command of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states in the Bulgarian People's Army. Since 1963 - in reserve and retired.

V. I. Smirnov(1908–1982) was buried in Minsk at the Eastern (Moscow) cemetery.

S. K. Kurkotkin(1917-1990) since 1966 - First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, Commander-in-Chief of the GSVG, Deputy Minister of Defense - Head of Logistics of the Armed Forces of the USSR, General Inspector of the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Colonel General (1967). General of the Army (1972). Marshal of the Soviet Union (1983). Honorary Soldier of the 13th Guards Tank Shepetovsky Regiment of the 4th Guards Tank Kantemirovskaya Division. He was buried in Moscow at the Novodevichy Cemetery. The name of S. K. Kurkotkin is carried by a street in Naro-Fominsk.

B. S. Likhachev(1914–2012) in 1967–1975 - First Deputy Commander of the Baltic Military District. Since 1975 - retired. Buried in Moscow.

S. K. Magometov(1920–1989) since 1969 - chief military adviser in Syria, first deputy commander of the Trans-Baikal Military District, chief military adviser in Afghanistan, first deputy head of the Military Academy named after M. V. Frunze. Colonel General (1978). Since 1984 - in reserve and retired. Buried in the city of Karachaevsk. The name of S. K. Magometov is given to schools in Kislovodsk and Karachaevsk, streets in the settlements of Karachay-Cherkessia.

M. M. Zaitsev(1923-2009) since 1972 - First Deputy Commander and Commander of the Red Banner Belarusian Military District, Commander-in-Chief of the GSVG, troops of the Southern Direction, military inspector-adviser of the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Colonel General of Tank Forces (1976). General of the Army (1980). Since 1990 - retired. He was buried in Moscow at the Troekurovsky cemetery.

V.A.Belikov(1925-1987) since 1974 - First Deputy Commander of the Odessa Military District, Commander of the North Caucasus and Carpathian Military Districts, Commander-in-Chief of the GSVG. Colonel General (1977). General of the Army (1983). He was buried in Kyiv at the Berkovtsy cemetery.

V. V.Saltykov(1925–1997) graduated from military service as First Deputy Commander of the Transcaucasian Military District. Colonel General.

I. A. Gashkov(1928-2003) since 1979 - Chief of Staff of the Red Banner Belarusian Military District, Commander of the Ural Military District, Head of the Main Operational Directorate - Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Head of the Higher Officer Courses "Shot" named after Marshal of the Soviet UnionB. M .Shaposhnikova, representative of the High Command of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states in the Bulgarian People's Army. Colonel General (1982). Buried in Moscow.

P. V. Ledyaev(1938-1997) departed from Bobruisk to the post of First Deputy Commander of the Trans-Baikal Military District. He was buried in Minsk at the Eastern (Moscow) cemetery.

V. D. Khaidorov(1936-1985) after the 5th Guards Army, he served as the first deputy commander of the KBVO. He was buried in Minsk at the Eastern (Moscow) cemetery.

V. I. Fursin(b. 1940) since 1987, he headed the headquarters of the Moscow Military District and the GSVG (Western Group of Forces).

A.A.Ushakov(1942-2005) since 1989 - senior group of Soviet military specialists in Algeria. He was buried in Bobruisk at the Minsk cemetery.

V. V. Lagoshin from Bobruisk was sent as a military adviser to Afghanistan.

S. S. Rumyantsev(b. 1940) until recently headed the Mogilev regional organization of the public association "Belarusian Union of Officers".

Retired lieutenant colonel Vsevolod GRINYAK,

5th Guards Tank Army formed on February 25, 1943 on the basis of a directive of the General Staff of February 10, 1943 in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It included the 3rd Guards and 29th Tank Corps, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, the 994th Light Bomber Aviation Regiment, artillery and other formations and units.
In connection with the breakthrough of the enemy in the Kharkov region, the 3rd Guards Tank Corps, even before the formation was completed, was withdrawn from the army and sent to the Voronezh Front.
On April 6, the army became part of the Reserve Front (since April 15 - the Steppe Military District). Being in the area of ​​​​concentration south-west of the city of Stary Oskol, on July 9 it was transferred to the Voronezh Front.
During the defensive period of the Battle of Kursk (July 5-23), its troops, reinforced by the 2nd Guards Tank and 2nd Tank Corps, in an oncoming tank battle in the Prokhorovka area, stopped the advance of the enemy’s strike force and inflicted significant damage.
During the Belgorod-Kharkov strategic operation (August 3-23), acting as part of the Voronezh (from August 9 - Steppe) Front, the army, in cooperation with the troops of other armies, defeated a strong enemy grouping and advanced to a depth of 120 km.
On September 10, 1943, the army was withdrawn to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, on October 7 - included in the Steppe (from October 20 - 2nd Ukrainian) Front, in which, in October - December, it fought to expand the bridgehead on the Dnieper River southeast of the city of Kremenchug.
In the first half of January 1944, the army took part in the Kirovograd (January 5-16), then in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky (January 24 - February 17) and Uman-Botoshansky (March 5 - April 17) offensive operations.In the course of their conduct, the army troops fought about 500 km; participated in the defeat of large enemy groups in the regions of Kirovograd and Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, in the crossing of the Southern Bug, Dniester and Prut rivers, the liberation of the cities of Kirovograd (January 8), Zvenigorodka (January 28) and Uman (March 10).
On June 23, 1944, after a short stay in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the army was included in the 3rd Belorussian Front, in which it participated in the Belarusian strategic operation (June 23 - August 29). Introduced into the battle on June 25 in the offensive zone of the 5th Army, formations and units of the army defeated the reinforced 5th Panzer Division of the enemy advancing towards the city of Krupki and reached the Berezina River north and south of Borisov.
After the liberation of Borisov (July 1), the army developed an offensive in the direction of Minsk, Vilnius.
From July 26, formations and units of the army waged offensive battles in order to complete the liberation of the territory of the Lithuanian SSR and reach the borders of East Prussia.
On August 17, 1944, the army was transferred to the 1st Baltic Front, in October it participated in the Memel offensive operation (October 5-22), on October 20 it was withdrawn to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
In 1945, as part of the 2nd (from January 8), then the 3rd (from February 11) Belorussian Fronts, the army took part in the East Prussian strategic operation (January 13 - April 25). The army troops, introduced into the breakthrough on January 17 in the zone of the 48 Army, reached the Mlavsky fortified area by the end of the day, by the morning of January 19 they defeated the garrison defending it and, developing an offensive in the direction of Elbing, on January 25 went to Frisches-Haff (Vistula) Bay, cutting off the main communications of Army Group Center.
At the end of January - February 1945, the army took part in repelling counterattacks of the enemy, who was trying to push the Soviet troops back from the coast and restore their land communications.
In early April, the army, together with the attached 98th rifle corps and the 1st Polish tank brigade, fought to eliminate the remnants of German troops in the area of ​​​​the mouth of the Vistula River, where it celebrated Victory Day.
For feats of arms during the war years, more than 38 thousand soldiers of the army were awarded orders and medals, more than 50 of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Army commanders: Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces, from October 1943 - Colonel General of the Tank Forces, from February 1944 - Marshal of the Armored Troops Rotmistrov P. A. (February 1943 - August 1944) ; Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Solomatin M.D. (August 1944); Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces, from October 1944 - Colonel General of the Tank Forces Volsky V. T. (August 1944 - March 1945);Major General of Tank Forces Sinenko M. D. (March 1945 - until the end of the war).
Member of the Military Council of the Army - Major General of the Tank Forces Grishin P. G. (April 1943 - until the end of the war).
Chiefs of Staff of the Army: Colonel, from June 1943 - Major General of Tank Forces V. N. Baskakov (April 1943 - May 1944); Major General of the Tank Troops Kalinichenko P. I. (May - November 1944); Major General of Tank Forces Sidorovich G. S. (November 1944 - until the end of the war).

POLYGALOVA L.A.

5th Guards Stalingrad Tank Corps in the Battle of Prokhorovka.

The heroic years of the war for the freedom and independence of our Motherland go farther and farther away. Fewer and fewer remain those who took a direct part in the battles, gaining victory with their own hands and sacrificing their lives.

More than 70 years have passed since the hopes of the Nazi command to take the initiative into their own hands and turn the tide of the war were finally shattered on the Kursk Bulge. The Battle of Kursk lasted 50 days and nights - from July 5 to August 23, 1943 and was distinguished by exceptional tension and fierceness of the struggle. It is one of the largest battles of the Second World War in terms of its scope, attracted forces and means, results and military-political consequences.

At the first stage of the Battle of Kursk, two defensive operations of the Central and Voronezh fronts were carried out, which in turn consisted of a series of battles. One of the most famous, widely covered in the press, in various fundamental publications, in memoirs and memoirs, is the Battle of Prokhorov. The soldiers of the 5th Guards Stalingrad Tank Corps also took an active part in the operation.

After fierce fighting in the Voronezh-Kastornensky operation near Kharkov in January - February 1943, from April 18 to July 5, 1943, the 5th tank corps went to the Upper Olshanka area, st. Rzhava, where he was replenished with people and equipment. He was preparing for the upcoming battles on the Kursk Bulge.

Fighting in the Prokhorovka direction began already on the third day of the German offensive on the Kursk Bulge. The 4th German tank army under the command of Colonel General G. Goth, breaking through the second army defense line of the Voronezh Front troops in the Yakovlevo-Teterevino sector, tried to go along the Belgorod-Kursk highway to the city of Oboyan. In parallel, motorized divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps under the command of SS Obergruppenführer P. Hauser attacked the defenses of the 59th Army, which, together with units of the 31st Tank Army of the 1st Tank Army, Lieutenant General M.E. Katukov and 5th Guards. Stalingrad shopping mall defended the Prokhorov direction.

The purpose of this offensive was: firstly, to cover the right flank of the strike force, and secondly, to test the strength of the defense of our troops in this area.

5 Guards the shopping mall was supposed to cover the Prokhorovka direction, taking up defense in the second lane along the front 12 km, and 2 guards. shopping mall - cover Gostishchevo at the front 10 km.

On the afternoon of July 5, 1943, the chief of staff of the front, Lieutenant-General S.P. Ivanov summoned the commander of the 5th Guards to Bodo's apparatus. Stalingrad Tank Corps Major General A.G. Kravchenko. A combat private order No. 005 / OP of the headquarters of the Voronezh Front was issued on July 5, 1943.

“By 14.30 on July 5, 1943, the enemy captured the village. Rattlesnake and with a force of up to two tank divisions is striving to reach the Belgorod-Oboyan highway for a further offensive on Kursk. I order: Commander of the 5th Guards. tank corps by 24.00 5.07.43 to advance to the area: Lunino, Teterevino, Malinovka, Shtakor - Kalinin (2 km south of Belenikhino). A task:

A) Take up defense at the line: Lunino, Teterevino, Petrovka and under no circumstances prevent the enemy from breaking through in the direction of Prokhorovka.

B) Be ready from dawn on 07/06/43 in cooperation with the 2nd Guards. maybe go to the counterattack in the direction: Teterevino, Bykovo and further Rakovka.

Dig in tanks on the defensive. Demand swift and decisive action from the troops.

Keep in mind that during the night the 2nd Panzer Army advances to the line: Melovaya, Syrtsev, Yakovlevo. Execution to convey "

From the report of the Commander of the 5th Guards Stalingrad Tank Corps, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Kravchenko A.G. to the commander of the Voronezh Front:

The 5th Stalingrad Guards Tank Corps on July 6, by 5.00, with the main forces, entered the area assigned to it with. Teterevino, x. Ozerovsky, the Kozinka tract (3 km north-east of the village of Luchki (southern)). From 6 Guards. Only the artillery battalion, the mortar battalion and the PTR company arrived in the Luchka area.

The battle order of the corps was built as follows: in the first echelon - at the turn of the Kozinka tract, height. 232.0, Luchki (southern), Teterevino deployed 22 guards. brigade under the command of Colonel F.A. Zhilina, 20 guards. brigade lieutenant colonel P.F. Okhrimenko and part of the forces of the 6th Guards. MSBR.

The second echelon - 21 guards. brigade colonel K.I. Ovcharenko and 48th Guards. heavy breakthrough tank regiment (ttpp) - deployed on the paths of the probable directions of movement of enemy tanks: in the area x. Ozerovsky and groves sowing. X. Sobachevsky. The central position of the breakthrough tank regiment made it possible to freely maneuver on any of the flanks of the corps.

There was no neighbor on the right flank of the corps. A gap of up to four kilometers formed in the defense in the Prokhorovka direction. Realizing what consequences this threatens, the corps commander at the line of heights 243.2, 246.3 advanced a tank detachment, reinforced by a rifle company, and to ensure a junction with the left neighbor (parts of the 2nd Guards TTK), he sent a tank company reinforced by a motorized rifle company 1 to the Petrovsky, Nechaevka line. Such a battle formation made it possible to firmly hold the occupied defense sector. At the same time, the corps commander had an impressive mobile tank reserve.

Immediately after the breakthrough of the battle group TD SS "Reich" positions of the 51st Guards. sd, in s. Luchki stubbornly resisted the SS units of the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade of Colonel A.M. Cheek from the 5th Guards. Stk, but the forces were unequal. The enemy crushed the line of its defense and continued the offensive in the direction of the Kalinin farm, where at that time the headquarters of General A.G. Kravchenko and his main forces. Attacks by tanks and motorized infantry were accompanied by strong air strikes against the retreating troops. As the surviving participants of those events recalled, enemy planes literally hung over this area, preventing them from raising their heads. The powerful air cover of the SS divisions was an important component of their success on this day. Having received a report from General I.M. Chistyakov about the breakthrough, N.F. Vatutin ordered the transition to active operations of 1 TA and separate tank corps of A.G. Kravchenko and A.S. Burdeyny to localize the breakthrough. However, due to a number of reasons, it was not possible to fully fulfill the plan. Left flank of the 6th Guards. And it was crushed, the troops of three divisions at once (51 guards, 52 guards and 67 guards divisions) partially fell into the ring, were partially dispersed, the main burden of the fight against the SS corps fell on the tank brigades of M.E. Katukov. In an effort to block the enemy in with. Yakovlevo and prevent its spread through Bolshie Mayachki and Gryaznoe to the village. Kochetovka, where at that time the headquarters of the 6th Guards. A, Mikhail Efimovich at 13.30 gave an order to the commander of the 3rd MK, Major General S.M. Support Krivoshein with one battalion of the 49th brigade of the 1st guards. Tbr.

At this time, TD SS "Reich", relentlessly pursuing those knocked out of the village. Luchki of the 51st Guards. SD and 5 Guards. Stk, struck two blows: the first - in the x direction. Ozerovsky, the second - in the x direction. Sobachevsky, x. Kalinin. It became clear: P. Hausser was striving to take units of the 5th Guards. mk in the ring. Taken by the brigade commander F.A. Zhilin counterattack from the Kozinka tract in the direction of high. 232.0, Luchki (southern) was not successful. To the aid of the 22nd Guards. tbr A.G. Kravchenko nominated the 21st Guards. tbr. and 48 Guards. ttpp, but they could not stop the SS. The enemy crushed the 22nd Guards. brigade near the farms of Ozerovsky and Kalinin, and by 16.30 surrounded two brigades and a tank regiment in the area of ​​​​the Kozinka tract, after which he tried to capture the Belenikhino station and strike at x. Watchtower. Sufficient reserves to prevent the encirclement of the main forces of the 5th Guards. tk, his commander was no longer there.

Here is how A.G. Kravchenko to the commander of the Voronezh Front about the circumstances of the encirclement of his corps:

“The enemy on July 6, 1943, with large forces of tanks, at least two TDs, and motorized infantry at 12.00 began to advance in two columns from the Smorodino, Kozmo-Demyanovka region and the forest to the east to the north. and north-east. direction.

As is now well established, the enemy delivered the main blow against parts of the corps. It was here that the edge of the tank wedge, numbering up to three hundred tanks, and the mechanized division was located. With the beginning of this advancement, enemy aviation systematically processed battle formations and areas of concentration of corps units. During the day, at least 1,500 sorties were recorded. During the advance of the enemy tank grouping, the commander of the 23rd sent me a request on your behalf to transfer two tank brigades and a regiment of Churchill tanks outside their area for a counterattack in the area of ​​heights 246.3, 243.2 and a grove to the northeast. Already after I received this order, given on your behalf, he came to me with authority from the commander of the 6th Guards. And Colonel Nikiforov, who threatened to use weapons if the corps did not launch a counterattack. This order was carried out by me. Despite the fact that the sector of the defense of the corps was weakened, until 23.00 on 07/06/43, parts of the corps continued to hold back the main enemy forces until they were completely surrounded. The car for the removal of staff documents was allocated when the encirclement was already closed. Therefore, the documents were burned. In the summer of 2004, the Belgorod search group found a charred suitcase at this place, where there were charred newspapers and documents, as well as badges "Guard" and "Excellent tanker". One of the signs is on display in the museum.

From the memoirs of a veteran of the 5th Guards. Stalingrad tank corps, retired colonel N. Semyonov: “... The sun has already set. Crimson smoky veil covered the fields. The fiery tornado, which had raged since early morning and claimed many human lives, gradually began to subside. The brigade units found themselves in a semi-encirclement. The only narrow corridor remained free - through the Ozerovsky farm. With the permission of the corps commander, received by radio, Colonel Ovcharenko removed the battalions from their positions and brought them into two columns. The first with the tanks of the 149th battalion was led by himself, the second was led by the commander of the 152nd battalion, Major Feoktistov. Ahead was reconnaissance - a platoon of tanks with machine gunners under the command of Senior Lieutenant Andronikov. The movement of the column was not an ordinary march. In one of the sections it was required to overcome the enemy's fire zone. Having reached it, submachine gunners and machine gunners opened furious fire. They were immediately supported by tankers who temporarily took up battle formation.

Having safely overcome the enemy's fire zone, the tanks rushed on at high speed. They walked unhindered until a deep ravine blocked the way for the tankers. Major Feoktistov and Major Seleznev, who were traveling in the same car, together with the driver-mechanic Isachenkov, examined the approaches to the obstacle, and found the most convenient descent for the tanks. The descent was, however, rather steep, but there was no better nearby. At dawn, both columns went to the designated areas ... "

Having left the encirclement with battles, the corps took up defense along the railway line in the Ivanovsky Vyselok, Belenikhino, (claim.) Teterevino sector, having guard units 1 km west. railroad. Waging fierce battles with large tank forces of the enemy and not supported by the actions of the neighbor on the right (parts of 1 TA) and on the left (parts of the 2nd Guards Corps), the corps lost 110 tanks during 07/06/43 "[From the report of the command of the 5th Guards. Stalingrad Tank Corps, Commander of the Voronezh Front on the combat operations of the Corps for the period July 6-9, 1943. 2, l. 136-138]. In two days of fighting, almost all the soldiers of the 5th Guards distinguished themselves. Stk.

When defending x. Kalinin showed steadfastness and courage among the personnel of the 1698th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment of the 5th Guards. Stk. From the report of the regiment headquarters: “07/06/43 at 0600, on your order, the regiment took up firing positions in the x. Kalinin with the task of covering the headquarters and tank groups of the corps from an attack by enemy aircraft from the air ... At 17.00, during a massive dive of enemy aircraft on the tank groups of the corps and on batteries of gun crews, despite the close explosions of bombs, 5 enemy aircraft were destroyed and knocked out by aimed fire. During this attack, some Red Army soldiers and junior commanders, being wounded, continued to perform their duties, remaining at the guns and continuing to fire. At 18.00, when attacking enemy tanks and submachine gunners, all batteries, by order of the command, went over to anti-tank defense, during which many soldiers and commanders died a hero's death. Regiment commander Major Savchenko and deputy. The regiment commander for political affairs, Major Gumanovsky, until the last moment of his life, continued to command units and direct the battle from the command post, destroying the advancing submachine gunners. Lieutenant Biryukov, following the order of the regiment commander in connection with the battery, led the defense of the battery and by personal example destroyed a tank landing from a machine gun with the words "For the Motherland!", "For Stalin!". He led the personnel into battle with tanks and machine gunners, dying the death of a hero.

During the battle with tanks, having knocked out and destroyed 3 T-VІ tanks and up to a platoon of machine gunners, the Red Army soldier Bogdanov showed courage, who, when two T-VІ tanks approaching at 15-25 m, firing point-blank at the battery, boldly, risking his life, ran out towards and with three anti-tank grenades knocked out one tank, and set fire to the other and destroyed it. Art. Lieutenant Korotkov, Guards. Sergeant Dudko, Red Army soldier Dodonov, with massive fire from their guns and batteries, knocked out the T-V1 tank and, having destroyed up to a platoon of submachine gunners, after the order of the gun commander, under enemy fire, they removed the materiel and personnel of the battery from under fire ... "[From the report of the command 1696 anti-aircraft artillery regiment to the commander of the 5th Guards. Stalingrad tank corps "On the fighting 1696 zap from 5 to 23 July 1943". 2, l. 211]

Communication with the headquarters of the corps, which was located in x. Kalinin, was lost. The units defending the farm began to retreat to the village. Yasnaya Polyana. From the report of the command of the 23rd separate reconnaissance battalion (orb) of the 5th guards. Stk: “The battalion commander sent a separate reconnaissance landing force (hordes) into reconnaissance as part of one platoon of armored vehicles with the task of establishing contact with parts of the corps and clarifying the situation. A platoon of Lieutenant Stepanov left for reconnaissance along the route Kalinin, Ozerki, Bol. Beacons. Intelligence did not return. From the headquarters of the corps do not receive any orders until 18.00. Meanwhile, the bombardment intensified, the situation was unclear ... At the same time, the head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the guards corps withdrew with the battalion. Major Efremov and other staff members. By order of the battalion commander, Captain Chuev, the battalion took up defensive positions at the Belenikhino junction. Soon the 80th motorcycle battalion (omtsb) arrived there and, together with the 23rd orb, took up defense. From 20.00, separate tanks of the 20th Guards began to break through to the junction. and 21st Guards. brigade of the corps, where, together with the 23rd orb, they took up defense. Soon the tanks of the 20th brigade concentrated here and began to conduct intense fire on the enemy. The tanks were arriving throughout the night, and the Belenikhino junction thus became a strong knot of resistance and a grave for dozens of enemy tanks ... "

Having collected all available forces - 23 orb, 80 omtsb, as well as 60 people from 3 sb 6 guards. MSBR, commander of the 20th Guards. The brigade created a tough defense in the shortest possible time, burying tanks in the ground. Thanks to this, it was possible to repulse the attack of the SS, who not only did not take the station, but also retreated to x. Kalinin.

“Unfortunately, not all soldiers and officers defending near Yakovlevo and Luchek managed to safely get out of the circle,” recalled I.S. Vakhromeev, a participant in the battles near Prokhorovka. - Some of them, mostly wounded and shell-shocked, were captured by the Nazis. After the battles under Cheerful, Private Semyon Lychkov, a native of Kursk, entered our platoon in the order of replenishment. We became friends with him, and he told me that he was taken prisoner by the Germans in the battles near Yakovlevo and placed in a prisoner of war camp, located in the near rear of the German army. There were not much more than a hundred prisoners in the camp. The Nazis brutally dealt with them: in the early morning they took them to the steppe, to a beam, lined up and shot them from machine guns that were previously placed along the edge of the tank, and then, in order to finish off the survivors, they crushed them with tanks. Semyon, with two slightly wounded soldiers, jumped up as the tanks approached and ran for the edge of the beam opposite from the enemy machine guns. They shot at them, but the bullets, thank God, do not reach them. During the day, the fugitives hid in a grain field, and at night they crossed the front line and ended up in the location of our troops.

During July 7, there were no major changes in the operational situation in the Prokhorovka sector. The most fierce fighting continued in the offensive zone of the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. Its troops struck from the Pokrovka area in the direction of Bolshaya Mayachki, Malye Mayachki, Greznoye, trying to reach Kochetovka and the bend of the river. Psyol near Red October. The main blow of the SS men was reflected here by formations of 31 TC.

At 04:00 on 07/08/43, I personally received a combat mission from the chief of staff of the front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, about the corps going on the offensive at 10:30 on 07/08/43 in cooperation with neighbors on the right and left, - wrote the commander of the 5th guards. TC General A.G. Kravchenko - Parts of the corps at 10.30 on 07/08/43 went on the offensive in a given direction and by 15:00 on 07/08/43 they captured the x. Kalinin and reached the line Ozerovsky, Sobachevsky, an unnamed height south of x. Sobachevsky.

During these days of fighting, the corps lost a large percentage of commanders tested in battles, participants in the defeat of the enemy near Stalingrad. 2 regiment commanders, two chiefs of staff of the brigade, and the commander of the breakthrough tank regiment were seriously wounded. Killed and wounded 75% of battalion commanders, 70% of company commanders.

5th Guards Stk was located on the lines of Bogatoye - Kuznetsovo and he had to play the main role in the counterattack of the auxiliary strike group, diverting significant enemy forces. In particular, 21, 22 Guards. tb and 262 cn at 10 am on July 12, located at the boundaries of the Kuznetsovo tract - the southwestern outskirts of the village. Rich, moved to the front line to go on the attack in the direction of the Chapaevo farm. The brigades approached the area of ​​the farm by 12-00, and a battle ensued, the first was 21 TB (therefore, the losses were the largest), followed by a ledge of 22 TB, an hour later the village was liberated. Here is a report from the head of the political department of the 21st Guards. TB lieutenant colonel Polukarov: “07/12/1943 the brigade went on the offensive on the Chapaevo farm and, having mastered it, continued to the village of Rakovo. The whole day the brigade waged a stubborn battle with the enemy for the village of Rakovo. As a result of this battle, up to 500 soldiers and officers with vehicles were destroyed, 22 people were captured, 17 machine guns, 8 mortars, 11 guns, 3 bunkers and 12 dugouts were destroyed, a command post with 3 radio stations and maps was captured. Our losses are as follows: tanks T-70-6, T-34-6, "Churchill" -3, a motorized rifle and machine-gun battalion lost 92 people killed and wounded. During 13/7/43, the corps units entrenched themselves at the reached line, simultaneously conducting enhanced reconnaissance in the direction of Rakovo, Berezovka. In the afternoon of 15.7.43, according to the order, the corps became subordinate to the 6th Guards. Army.

From 3 to 30 August, the 5th Guards Tank Corps advanced in the direction of Tomarovka - Graivoron - Kaplunovka.

List of sources and literature

1. TsAMO RF, Fund 5 Guards. shopping mall, inventory 1, file 12.

2. TsAMO RF, Fund 5 Guards. shopping mall, inventory 1, case 7.

3. Vasilyeva L.N., Zheltov I.G., In the sight - Prokhorovka. Moscow; Belgorod; Prokhorovka: Constant, 2013. V.2.

4. Lopukhovsky L. "Prokhorovka. Without the stamp of secrecy" Zamulin V.N. "Prokhorovka. Unknown details about the famous battle.

5. Collections of FBUK VIMZ “Prokhorovskoye Pole”, memoirs of I.S. Vakhromeev "Prokhorovka - the battlefield".

6. Funds of the FGBUK VIMZ “Prokhorovskoye Pole”, memoirs of Colonel N. Semyonov “Participation of the 5th Guards. Stalingrad tank corps in the Battle of Kursk from July 5 to August 23, 1943.

Applications:

Corps Commander Major General Andrey Grigoryevich Kravchenko

Chief of Staff Colonel Serov

20 Guards tank brigade, commander lieutenant colonel Okhrimenko Pyotr Fedorovich

21 Guards tank brigade, commander lieutenant colonel Ovcharenko Kuzma Ivanovich

22 Guards tank brigade, commander lieutenant colonel Koshelev,

6 Guards motorized rifle brigade, commander Colonel Schekal Alexander Mikhailovich

454 motorized rifle machine-gun battalion, commander,

455 motorized rifle machine-gun battalion, commander,

48 Guards. heavy breakthrough tank regiment, Colonel

454 mortar regiment, commander

1499 anti-tank artillery regiment, commander

1696 anti-aircraft artillery regiment, commander,

23 separate reconnaissance battalion, commander

80 separate motorcycle battalion, commander

4th Guards communications battalion, commander

60 sapper battalion, commander

mobile repair base,

mobile repair base,

fuel delivery company.

By 5.7.43. in its combat strength, the corps had:

6th Guards MSBR - personnel 3262 people; 76-mm guns -12; 120mm mortars - 6 pcs.; 82mm-30 pcs.

1499 IPTAP-45mm guns -20

1696 ZAP - 37mm guns - 16; DShK-16 machine guns

544 MP - 120mm mortars - 36; PTR-36

2. Losses of the 5th Guards. Stalingrad tank corps for three days of fighting in the Prokhorovka direction *. No. Name of armored vehicles and weapons Availability of weapons Total lost