Fight in the Bay of Pigs. What is the Bay of Pigs famous for, and why is it so named? Evolution of the nature of the operation

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Erneido Andres Oliva Gonzalez # Side forces

Losses

Audio, photo, video at Wikimedia Commons

Operation at the Bay of Pigs, landing at the Bay of Pigs, operation "Zapata"- a military operation prepared by the US government since 1960 to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro in Cuba.

background [ | ]

Evolution of the nature of the operation[ | ]

(a) the creation of a unified Cuban opposition; (b) the deployment of a radio station for "gray" broadcasting to Cuba on short and long waves; (c) the continued establishment of an intelligence and subversive network in Cuba; (d) continued preparations for the establishment of a paramilitary force outside of Cuba.

In essence, a combination of guerrilla action and psychological warfare was proposed at this stage. The CIA immediately began training 300 guerrillas, first in the United States and the Panama Canal Zone, and then in Guatemala. The radio station on Bolshoy Sisne Island became operational on 17 May using equipment left on the island after being used for radio propaganda as part of Operation PBSUCCESS. In June, the CIA managed to form from the fragmented Cuban opposition (184 groups according to the calculations of the CIA itself) (KDRF).

In the fall of 1960, the CIA realized that guerrilla warfare might not reach the critical mass needed for an uprising against Castro, and the nature of the operation began to change from guerrilla warfare to amphibious landings. In September, a military adviser appeared in the WH / 4 group involved in the preparation of the operation - Colonel of the Marine Corps J. Hawkins (English). In the CIA correspondence on October 31, 1960, it was indicated that, according to a plan not yet approved, the sabotage group would be no more than 60 people, and at least 1,500 people in several battalions, and possibly US special forces, would participate in the landing operation.

After the failure of landing and resupply operations for guerrilla groups in October 1960, at a meeting at the White House on November 29, the CIA proposed a new plan for approval by the president, who was clearly irritated by Castro's persistence in Cuba. Nobody in the audience objected to the new approach; Eisenhower still demanded that "America's hand not be seen." The decision to use amphibious landings, like many others, was not written down on paper; as in other cases, the president did not get involved in the details of the covert operations, which was necessary to preserve his ability to plausible deniability.

On January 4, 1961, the CIA presented a new plan, according to historian P. Gleichesis (English), "the most realistic" and much more thoughtful than the later Trinidad and Zapata plans. The plan included the following sequence of actions:

Under Eisenhower, the US military was used solely for support and was not used in planning; although representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were present at all key meetings and did not object, they were never asked to evaluate the plans of the CIA or the quality of the training of the paratroopers. Kennedy immediately involved the military in discussing plans, revealing significant differences in positions at a meeting on January 28, 1961. Plans reported to the President changed at this point: Richard M. Bissell (English), who was responsible for planning the operation, in a memo dated February 8, Kennedy spoke of the optimism of the CIA and the Department of Defense about the invasion: "in the worst case, the landing force will be able to break into the mountains, and in the best, develop a large-scale civil war in which we can openly support the opponents of Castro ". At the same time, diplomat T. Mann (English) believed that there were no chances for a quick uprising against Castro, and the United States would essentially have to choose between the loss of the landing force, the difficulties of supplying guerrillas in the mountains, and direct intervention.

The "Trinidad" plan, recommended by the CIA on March 11, 1961, included capturing and holding a foothold near the city of Trinidad, repulsing Cuban militia attacks, and setting the stage for a large-scale uprising. If unsuccessful, the paratroopers were to withdraw to the nearby mountains and move on to guerrilla warfare. The plan was silent about how the paratroopers - after the defeat on the bridgehead - would make their way to the mountains through the environment, but noted that "the provisional government should be landed immediately after the capture of the bridgehead." In the event of a successful operation, the government was supposed to recognize and thereby create conditions for at least non-state material support. Kennedy rejected the plan, demanding that it be replaced with a less ambitious one that could more plausibly look like a purely Cuban operation.

a smaller version of the Trinidad, with a night landing without airborne assault and air support;
landing on the northeast coast of Cuba;
landing in the Bay of Pigs, which by March 16 had become the Zapata plan.

US domestic political considerations[ | ]

Shortly after Eisenhower's approval of the amphibious assault plan, there was a change of administration in the United States, with Kennedy as president. By the time the new president came in, the practical details had not been clarified, and after the disaster, Eisenhower justified himself by saying that he was only training a small number of Cubans, "despite a lot of talk, there were no plans yet with a specific number, landing site or support" .

Kennedy was informed about the preparation of the operation during the election campaign. After his victory in the election, in November 1960, Dulles and Bissell informed the future president about the details of the operation, Kennedy did not object, and preparations continued. However, key members of the future administration were not briefed, and Kennedy did not request further information. As a result, according to T. Mann, who unsuccessfully tried to arrange the transfer of cases between administrations, it turned out “stupidity - as if it [the operation] will disappear if it is not dealt with. Kennedy tried to ignore it when he still had many months to think."

The above-mentioned CIA plan of January 4, 1961 explicitly mentioned the need to obtain the consent of the new president for air support for the landing.

Kennedy's hands were tied by his campaign stance in confrontation with Castro. During the campaign, he attacked Eisenhower for admitting the possibility of a communist threat "90 miles from the United States." This position attracted voters to him, but, after coming to power, made the cancellation of the operation almost impossible; according to Robert Kennedy, “everyone would say he chickened out… that was Eisenhower's plan; Eisenhower's people were confident of success."

Kennedy himself preferred a strategy of gradually building up guerrilla warfare and repeatedly expressed this, but the CIA assessed such actions while impossible, including because of the position of Cuban emigrants prepared for the landing, who believed that an open attack had better chances for a direct military attack. US support. Unconvinced by the CIA's assessments, Kennedy hesitated, but the preparations for the operation proceeded on their own, and the delay brought the president closer to approving the landing.

Kennedy continued to have doubts about the chosen plan of operation. So, on April 4, he again reported that he would prefer to see an invasion force of 200-250 people; The CIA again replied that this was impossible.

"Phase Two" [ | ]

In February 1961, discussion of what would happen after the landing and capture of the beachhead (the so-called "Phase 2") was practically abandoned, despite disagreements between Bissell and Mann. Bissell later justified this by saying that planning for the subsequent stages in covert operations is usually incomplete, since the outcome of the first phase is usually difficult to predict: "we did not agree on what to do after the establishment of a beachhead."

Disagreements about phase 2 were not only between the CIA and the State Department, but also within the CIA. Bissell and those around him in the CIA believed that if the landing force could hold out for a few days, they could hold out for a month, and in the meantime, while Castro could not retake the beachhead, the rebel air forces controlled the sky, bombed without interruption and with increasing efficiency - something will happen. However, at the same time, Hawkins believed that the brigade would attract young people, strengthen and go to Havana, and Bissell himself thought that options with the recognition of the interim government and direct support from either the United States or the OAS were more likely. Mann's disbelief in the possibility of any success in phase 2 did not go beyond the memorandum: being essentially alone, at the decisive moment he did not object to the landing - but was eager to stop his participation in the planning of the operation and left Washington before the landing; at the time of the disaster, Mann was ambassador to Mexico.

In fact, there was a fundamental difference between the views of the President and the CIA in assessing what would happen if the landing did not develop according to an optimistic scenario: Dulles and Bissell believed that, given a choice between failure of the operation and direct US military intervention, the President would choose open invasion of Cuba. Kennedy repeatedly made it clear during the planning process that he would not issue such an order, but Bissell in particular assumed that, faced with the possibility of failure, Kennedy would change his mind. According to P. Gleichesis, Kennedy and the CIA at that moment resembled ships that diverged at night in different courses, but did not understand this. To get the plan approved by the president, the CIA kept describing the possibility of the amphibious going over to guerrilla warfare and thus the impossibility of a total failure, when in fact it didn't even plan for that option (singing a "lullaby" for the president, according to Gleichesis).

Preparing for an invasion[ | ]

The preparations took place in complete secrecy, in the words of Eisenhower himself, "everyone had to be ready to swear that he had not heard anything about it." The planning of the operation was carried out similar to PBSUCCESS, a special unit within the Directorate of Plans. (English), practically without the participation of the Directorate of Intelligence.

General management of the operation (received the code name Operation Pluto) was carried out by CIA Director Allen Dulles. Responsible for the development and implementation of the operation was General Richard M. Bissell, who served as CIA Deputy Director for Planning (English). In doing so, Dulles gave Bissell wide discretion in operational matters. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Whiting Willauer coordinated the State Department's preparations for the invasion. The head of the project (WH / 4 group) inside the CIA was J. Esterline (English).

At the same time, significant efforts were made to consolidate the political opponents of Castro (who had already created about 60 associations and groups). As a result, the "Democratic Revolutionary Front" ("Democratic Revolutionary Front") was created. Frente”), which included five groups, Manuel A. Verona became its leader.

In November 1960, under the pretext of "protecting Nicaragua and Guatemala from a possible attack from Cuba," the United States sent a group of US Navy warships to the coast of Cuba, which was the next stage of preparation for the landing operation in the Bay of Pigs.

The preparations for the operation did not go unnoticed. Separate references to the military training of Cuban emigrants appeared in the open press. On December 31, 1960, at a meeting of the UN General Assembly and on January 4, 1961, at a meeting of the UN Security Council, Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Castro Roa made a statement about the preparation by American intelligence services of an armed invasion of Cuba.

After taking office as President J.F. Kennedy, on January 20, 1961, A. Dulles and R. Bissell acquainted him with the plan of the landing operation (“ Operation Trinidad”), and the president expressed the wish that the plan be further studied by Pentagon experts. On January 26, a meeting was held, as a result of which a slightly modified version of the operation plan was approved, which provided for an increase in the number of paratroopers from 800-1000 to 1443 people, providing them with bulldozers and tools for preparing a field airfield, as well as additional weapons.

On April 8, 1961, a radio message was broadcast to the Cuban people and governments of Latin American countries calling for an armed struggle against Castro.

fighting [ | ]

Sabotage and sabotage[ | ]

Before the start of the operation in Cuba, the “fifth column” of the opponents of the Cuban revolution (who received the contemptuous nickname “gusanos”, Spanish) became more active. gusanos- letters. "worms").

Events April 14-16[ | ]

On April 14, 1961, an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft took photographs of Cuban airfields, as a result of which 15 of the 24 Cuban aircraft were located.

As a result of Cuban anti-aircraft fire, two B-26s were damaged - one of them fell into the sea 50 km north of Cuba (the crew of two people died), the second damaged aircraft landed at the Key West airbase, but later in did not take part in the operation.

A third B-26 landed at Miami International Airport. The pilot of this plane made a statement that he and his associates were deserters from the Cuban Air Force, after which he turned to the US authorities with a request for political asylum. However, the disinformation mechanism did not work, as the invited journalists noticed the differences between the landed version of the B-26 and those that were in service with the Cuban Air Force, and drew attention to the fact that, contrary to the story of the pilots, the bomber's machine guns were not used (the trunks were clean). The incident caused significant international outcry.

A second raid on Cuba was canceled by order of President J.F. Kennedy.

The fleet of the "Cuban Expeditionary Force" consisted of two landing ships (LCI " Blagar" and LCI " Barbara J"") and five cargo ships - "Houston" (code designation " Aguja”), “Rio Escondido” (code designation “ Ballena”), “Caribe” (code designation “ Sardinia”), “Atlantico” (code designation “ Tiburon) and Lake Charles. Radars and anti-aircraft machine guns were installed on landing ships, and anti-aircraft guns were installed on transport ships.

Amphibious operation and battle of Playa Giron[ | ]

A fragment of a US combat aircraft shot down by Cuban air defenses during the fighting with the landing of Cuban counter-revolutionaries in the Bay of Pigs. Cuba, April 1961. State Central Museum of Contemporary History of Russia

At about 07:30, six military transport aircraft (five C-46s and one C-54), in accordance with the Sokol plan, dropped the 1st airborne battalion of the “2506 brigade” (177 people) in the San Blas area .

By 11 o'clock, the two remaining transports of the "brigade 2506" withdrew to the open sea.

On the evening of April 17, more than 2,000 122-mm shells were fired at the landing, but shelling of a long and narrow front turned out to be ineffective, since the paratroopers had already dug in.

The bombers were supposed to escort US jet fighters from the aircraft carrier Wessex, but the aircraft missed each other, and two B-26s with crews of US citizens (pilots of the Alabama National Guard) were shot down by the Cuban Air Force.

At the same time, the Nicaraguan dictator Somoza proposed the use of six P-51 Mustang fighters of the Nicaraguan Air Force (on which identification marks began to be painted over) for air support, but this decision was rejected.

On the same day, Cuban T-34-85 tanks destroyed two tanks of the Brigade 2506.

In the afternoon, two American destroyers, USS Eaton (code Santiago) and USS Murray (code designation Tampico) approached the coast of the Bay of Pigs in order to evacuate the personnel of the invasion forces, however, after several shots in their direction from tank guns, the ships left for the open sea.

The Cuban Air Force and Air Defense shot down 12 B-26 "Invader", C-46 and other types of airborne troops, including several with crews of US citizens. Of these, 7 B-26s and 1 C-46 were shot down by Cuban fighters, who suffered no losses.

The Cuban government estimated the damage caused to the country by the invasion at $53 million. In April 1962, the Husanos prisoners from Brigade 2506 were tried and handed over to the United States in December 1962 in exchange for a $53 million shipment of medicines and food, which were provided by the US government, but made on behalf of charitable foundation "Tractors for Freedom Committee" .

Subsequent events[ | ]

The failure of the operation caused a significant resonance in the US and internationally. In Cairo, Jakarta, Rio de Janeiro, and Lima, protesters made attempts to storm US diplomatic missions.

At the UN meeting, representatives of 40 countries condemned the US aggression against Cuba.

The government of the USSR condemned the armed invasion and sent a note of protest to the United States calling for measures to stop the aggression against Cuba.

In 1986, representatives of the US scientific community (American historians Howard Zinn, William Appleman Williams (English), Gabriel Kolko (English), Lloyd Gardner (English), David Horowitz and others) recognized that the US operation in 1961 was US interference in the internal affairs of Cuba, an act of US aggression against Cuba and a direct violation of Article 18 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, under which the US in 1948 put its signature prohibiting anyone to interfere in the internal affairs of any country. The text of the expert opinion was published in full in The Nation.

Review by General Maxwell Taylor[ | ]

On April 22, 1961, President Kennedy demanded that General Maxwell Taylor, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Admiral Arleigh Burke, and CIA Director Allen Dulles form a Cuba Study Group to investigate the failure of the operation. On July 13, General Taylor sent the report of the commission of inquiry to President Kennedy. The reasons for the defeat, according to the compilers of the report, were related to the lack of early deployment, the inability to succeed by covert means, and insufficient air support (insufficient number of pilots involved and air strikes), an insufficient amount of weapons and ammunition provided to the “2506 brigade”, flooding of the ships of the brigade .

Declassified US government documents show that after the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation, the US continued to consider and prepare a direct military invasion of Cuba.

According to the report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States (Operation Northwoods) on March 13, 1962, a number of provocations were supposed to be used as a reason for direct military intervention in Cuba, in particular:

1. Sabotage in and around the American military base in Guantanamo (as examples were considered: arson of an aircraft and flooding of a ship; it was necessary to publish a list of non-existent "dead" in the media).
2. The sinking of the ship with Cuban refugees.
3. Organize terrorist attacks in Miami, other cities in Florida and Washington, directed at Cuban refugees. Arrest "Cuban agents" and publish fake "documents".
4. Carry out an air raid on the territory of states adjacent to Cuba.
5. Simulate attacks on passenger planes and shoot down an unmanned American plane or blow up a radio-controlled ship. To simulate attacks, use the F-86 Saber fighter repainted under the "Cuban MIG". It was also planned to publish in the newspapers a list of those killed in a downed plane or a blown up ship.
6. Simulate the downing of a US military aircraft by a Cuban MiG.

Each incident was supposed to be blamed on the Cuban government.

"Gusanos" [ | ]

Declassification of documents[ | ]

Memory [ | ]

Entrance to the operation museum

Later, an operation museum was opened in Playa Giron, at the entrance to which one of the Cuban Air Force aircraft ("Sea Fury"), which participated in the operation, was installed. Along the entire road along which Cuban troops marched to Playa Giron, commemorative obelisks were erected in places where soldiers died during the bombing. The victory is celebrated annually on April 19, in its commemoration, Air Force and Air Defense Day is set on April 17, and April 18 is Tankman Day. In July 1961, the Council of Ministers of the country established the Order of Playa Giron, one of the highest state awards in Cuba.

Reflection in literature, art and journalism[ | ]

Operations in the Bay of Pigs are devoted to a number of literary and artistic works, films, paintings.

Encyclopedic YouTube

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Operation in the Bay of Pigs

Subtitles

Before going into the details of the Bay of Pigs operation, it is necessary to describe the situation in Cuba and the United States at the time and the reasons for the invasion. So, in the late 50s, Cuba was ruled by this man named Batista. This was a dictator supported by the United States. To make it clear what kind of person he was, I will quote from the speech of John F. Kennedy, which took place in 1963, that is, after the Bay of Pigs incident and the Caribbean crisis had already occurred. Kennedy was not a big fan of Fidel Castro. But what he said "in hindsight", and this was said by him, John F. Kennedy, is a fairly objective assessment of Batista as a Cuban dictator. So this is what Kennedy said: “I am sure that there is no country in the world, including every single country under colonial yoke, where economic colonization, humiliation and exploitation were worse than in Cuba, and partly this was due to the policy of my country during the Batista regime... To a certain extent, Batista was like the incarnation of sins on the part of the United States. Now we have to pay for these sins." Therefore, even Kennedy said after the fact that Batista was far from the best person, and it was not the best idea on the part of the United States to support such a corrupt Cuban dictator for so many years. You can see Batista in the photo. Here he is with the American generals at the parade during one of his visits to Washington. Therefore, it is clear that in Cuba, as a ruler, he was not very loved, and in 1959 there was a revolution, as a result of which he was overthrown. 1959 - revolution. It was led by this man - Fidel Castro. His "right hands" were Raul Castro and Che Guevara - here they are in the photo. So, they seized power in Cuba. They were participants in this revolutionary nationalist movement. And that's what they did. They were left-wing politicians from the very beginning, and people thought that these rulers were perhaps communists or almost communists. From the very beginning, as soon as they came to power, they began to confiscate land that was privately owned. Part of it was Cuban private property, part - American. Their argument was that these riches, this private property, were ill-gotten, and they were acquired during Batista. These people carried out large-scale confiscation of large areas of land and private property, and the people began to think: "This is not only a nationalist revolution, this is also a communist revolution." And we must understand that after Castro seized power, a large-scale emigration of Cubans to the United States began, and it was primarily the representatives of the middle class, the bourgeoisie, educated Cubans who emigrated who were really afraid of the confiscation of private property and land plots. As a result, a community of fugitive Cubans began to form. They settled in Florida, mostly in Miami, and they still live there. They really did not like Fidel Castro (here he is in the photo). And now we'll fast-forward to 1961. John F. Kennedy became president. He was elected at the beginning of 1961, in April. John F. Kennedy has only been in office for a couple of months. But you can imagine how many Cuban emigrants there were, and how different they were - representatives of the bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, the middle class, and they all hated Fidel Castro. He confiscated their lands, which were now abandoned. And all this was taking place against the backdrop of the Cold War, and the United States was wary of countries leaning toward communism. It looked like Fidel Castro was a communist, so the US decided that since there were so many Cuban exiles who wanted to overthrow Castro, and the US itself only wanted to overthrow him because he was a communist, and they were afraid that he would want to stand up on the side of the Soviet Union. And in connection with this and with such a large number of Cuban emigrants, the CIA (here on the right in the photo is the director of the CIA during the Kennedy administration, or at least at the beginning of this administration, Allen Dulles, his brother is John Foster Dulles, whose name named airport in Washington and which was the Secretary of State of the United States). So, the CIA decided to overthrow Fidel Castro, but to do it in such a way that no one knew that America was carrying out the invasion. The states were planning an invasion with the help of Cuban emigrants. They found 1,400 Cuban exiles who agreed to join a CIA-backed US government-backed group, landing in Cuba and overthrowing Fidel Castro's regime. This whole plan was based on assumptions (you can imagine - this happened during the war in Iraq), when the CIA, the American president surrounded themselves with people who offered them very optimistic, hopeful scenarios that said: “We understand very well what wants the Cuban people." They said that if we just start a revolution, Fidel Castro will be overthrown. But the reality, at least at the time, was different. In the early 60s, Fidel Castro was very popular among the Cubans, especially among the poor who did not own land, and suddenly they got such a leader, I don’t know how popular he is now, but then he was definitely much more popular than the fugitive Cubans. And the CIA convinced Kennedy otherwise, so they got permission to plan the operation. Kennedy said: "If we can get rid of Castro, we reduce the risk of a communist state appearing off the coast of Florida." So they were planning a landing, but you understand they did it in total secrecy because they didn't want it to look like an American invasion, they wanted it to look like a pure Cuban counter-revolution. And to a certain extent, everything was mixed up there and looked really suspicious, because they were doing something that was not entirely clear. But by April 15 everything was ready for the operation. Here you need to talk about its details. 1400 emigrants were supposed to participate in it. They had several ships and planes that had their markings removed so they didn't look American. Or they were given false identification marks of the Cuban air force. So they could well be confused. And so, on April 15, 1961, we remember that it was only a few months after the Kennedy administration took office, they began to launch air strikes. The planes took off from airfields in Nicaragua. The purpose of the air strikes was to weaken the Cuban Air Force before the landing of 1,400 fugitive Cubans. They had eight planes, eight bombers. Taking off from Nicaragua, they bombed airfields located in Havana and not far from the current base in Guantanamo Bay. The purpose of the bombing was to destroy the Cuban air force. And it turned out that they did not succeed. By marking the American bombers with Cuban air force markings, they wanted to create confusion. So, 8 planes took off and bombed, one of them was shot down. The ninth plane took off from Nicaragua, and it was pre-pierced with bullet holes to make it look like it was being fired from anti-aircraft guns, and the plane flew to Florida. I think the idea here was to make it look like a Cuban pilot took off in Cuba or somehow escaped Cuba in a Cuban plane with these markings, tried to destroy a lot of Cuban planes and then escaped to the United States. That is the impression they wanted to create, and it is not clear whether the Cubans were "led" to him. When it happened in 1961, almost everyone understood that the attack was organized by the Americans. We now move to the night of April 16th (let's write "April 16th") when everyone was expecting an American attack. And this is one of the reasons that led to the fact that the attack turned out to be a series of poorly organized operations. It turned out that some of these emigrants talked too much about the upcoming operation, and Soviet intelligence found out about it, so the Cubans knew about the upcoming operation. So, on April 16th, a fake attack began at Baia Honda located here, it used mock ships with loudspeakers that broadcast the sounds of firing to confuse the Cubans, and Castro mistakenly thought for a while that the operation began there, because the Cubans were in a state of on high alert, expecting an imminent attack, but this was a false attack. So, this happened on the evening of April 16th. And the real attack began on the morning of April 17th. 1,400 Cuban émigrés, supported by the CIA and the American army (all of which was kept secret) launched an attack in the Bay of Pigs. In short, it was not the most successful operation. It was derailed as a result of poor planning and incompetence at some stages. If the operation continued from April 17 (it was its first day), then by the 19th, the invasion force (they are also counter-revolutionaries), consisting of 1400 Cuban emigrants, were driven back to the beaches, more than 100 of them were killed and more than 1000 - captured. Over 1,000 were taken prisoner. And in the same year, Fidel Castro... Some were executed immediately after being taken prisoner. So, in the same year, Fidel Castro made a deal with the United States, under the terms of which he handed over the prisoners to the United States in exchange for assistance and supplies in the amount of 58 million dollars. And from a military point of view, as well as from the point of view of the United States, it was a complete defeat. And you understand that after everything that happened, the people of the United States began to look for someone to blame. The CIA and the Cuban émigrés blamed the Kennedy administration, they said, "Look, he didn't want to do what was needed to make the operation successful, he didn't want to provide quality air support when the operation started, he didn't want to use more US troops when the operation started. , and the situation was not in favor of emigrants. Kennedy, for his part, blamed the CIA. He said: "Look, everything was done and planned incompetently." He said that "you gave me wrong information, you told me that when the operation starts, the people will revolt against Fidel Castro, and this did not happen." Here is a quote from John F. Kennedy's statement after the Bay of Pigs operation. "The first piece of advice I want to give to my successor is to control the generals, because they are military men, and because of that, their opinions on military matters are damnable." This is what John F. Kennedy said after the Bay of Pigs operation. You can "dig" deeper and find out exactly how he said and what he did. But the most important thing here is that the failure had very negative consequences for the United States. After that, the power of Fidel Castro in Cuba ... America simply could not do anything better. It was a huge embarrassment for them, for the United States, which allowed Fidel Castro to concentrate all power in his hands and led to the fact that he openly took communist positions, and also ... Although before the operation in the Bay of Pigs he made some attempts to improve relations with the United States. But America didn't like him because he confiscated private property and was clearly leftist. After the operation in the Bay of Pigs, he definitely began to move closer to the Soviet Union. He began to talk openly about Cuba being a Marxist-Leninist, communist state, and because he feared a new American invasion, he allowed the Soviet Union to deploy ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba, next to US territory, which led to the Caribbean Crisis. That is, all these events have caused exceptional harm to the United States. Subtitles by the Amara.org community

background

Evolution of the nature of the operation

In fact, at this stage, a combination of guerrilla action and psychological warfare was proposed. The CIA immediately set about training 300 guerrillas, first in the United States and the Panama Canal zone, and then in Guatemala. The radio station on Bolshoy Sisne Island began operating on May 17 using equipment left on the island after being used for radio propaganda as part of Operation PBSUCCESS. In June, the CIA managed to form the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front (KDRF) from the fragmented Cuban opposition (184 groups according to the CIA's own calculations).

In the fall of 1960, the CIA realized that guerrilla warfare might not reach the critical mass needed for an uprising against Castro, and the nature of the operation began to change from guerrilla warfare to amphibious landings. In September, a military adviser appeared in the WH / 4 group involved in the preparation of the operation - Colonel of the Marine Corps J. Hawkins (English) Russian. In the CIA correspondence on October 31, 1960, it was indicated that, according to a plan not yet approved, the sabotage group would be no more than 60 people, and at least 1,500 people in several battalions, and possibly US special forces, would participate in the landing operation.

After the failure of landing and resupply operations for guerrilla groups in October 1960, at a meeting at the White House on November 29, the CIA proposed a new plan for approval by the president, who was clearly irritated by Castro's persistence in Cuba. Nobody in the audience objected to the new approach; Eisenhower still demanded that "America's hand not be seen." The decision to use amphibious landings, like many others, was not written down on paper; as in other cases, the president did not get involved in the details of covert operations, which was necessary to preserve his ability to plausible deniability.

On January 4, 1961, the CIA presented a new plan, according to historian P. Gleichesis (English) Russian, "the most realistic" and much more thoughtful than the later Trinidad and Zapata plans. The plan included the following sequence of actions:

landing of 750 people captures a small bridgehead in Cuba. The purpose of the landing will be to survive and hold a bridgehead in conditions of complete air superiority. The document explicitly stated that the operation should not be carried out unless tactical air support was available and proposed the use of airfields in Florida, making the illusion of American non-intervention impossible;
The CIA expected a general uprising against Castro to begin within a few weeks of the landings and be successful within a few more weeks. Until such an uprising begins, the landing force should not attempt to expand the bridgehead;
if the uprising does not start, then a provisional government will be landed on the bridgehead, which will be recognized by the United States and possibly other Latin American countries and will ask for help. This assistance will be provided in the form of direct US military intervention.

Under Eisenhower, the US military was used solely for support and was not used in planning; although representatives of the Committee Chiefs of Staff were present at all key meetings and did not object, they were never asked to evaluate the plans of the CIA or the quality of the training of the paratroopers. Kennedy immediately involved the military in discussing plans, revealing significant differences in positions at a meeting on January 28, 1961. Plans reported to the President changed at this point: Richard M.Bissell (English) Russian, who was responsible for planning the operation, in a memo dated February 8, Kennedy spoke of the optimism of the CIA and the Department of Defense about the invasion: "in the worst case, the landing force will be able to break into the mountains, and in the best, develop a large-scale civil war in which we can openly support the opponents of Castro ". At the same time, diplomat T. Mann (English) Russian believed that there were no chances for a quick uprising against Castro, and the United States would essentially have to choose between the loss of the landing force, the difficulties of supplying guerrillas in the mountains, and direct intervention.

a smaller version of the Trinidad, with a night landing without airborne assault and air support;
landing on the northeast coast of Cuba;
landing in the Bay of Pigs, which by March 16 had become the Zapata plan.

US domestic political considerations

Kennedy was informed about the preparation of the operation during the election campaign. After his victory in the elections, in October 1960, Dulles and Bissell informed the future president about the details of the operation, Kennedy did not object, and preparations continued. However, key members of the future administration were not briefed, and Kennedy did not request further information. As a result, according to T. Mann, who unsuccessfully tried to arrange the transfer of cases between administrations, it turned out “stupidity - as if it [the operation] will disappear if it is not dealt with. Kennedy tried to ignore it when he still had many months to think."

The above-mentioned CIA plan of January 4, 1961 explicitly mentioned the need to obtain the consent of the new president for air support for the landing.

Kennedy's hands were tied by his campaign stance in confrontation with Castro. During the campaign, he attacked Eisenhower for admitting the possibility of a communist threat "90 miles from the United States." This position attracted voters to him, but, after coming to power, made the cancellation of the operation almost impossible; in the words of Robert Kennedy, “everyone would say that he chickened out ... it was Eisenhower's plan; Eisenhower's people were confident of success."

"Phase Two"

Preparing for an invasion

The preparations took place in complete secrecy, in the words of Eisenhower himself, "everyone had to be ready to swear that he had not heard anything about it." The planning of the operation was carried out similarly to PBSUCCESS, a special unit within the Directorate of Plans. (English) Russian, practically without the participation of the Directorate of Intelligence.

General management of the operation (received the code name Operation Pluto) was carried out by CIA Director Allen Dulles. Responsible for the development and implementation of the operation was General Richard M. Bissell, who served as Deputy Director of Planning for the CIA. (English) Russian). In doing so, Dulles gave Bissell wide discretion in operational matters. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Whiting Willauer coordinated the State Department's preparations for the invasion. The head of the project (WH / 4 group) within the CIA was J. Esterline (English) Russian.

After taking office as President J. F. Kennedy, on January 20, 1961, A. Dulles and R. Bissell acquainted him with the plan of the landing operation (“ Operation Trinidad”), and the president expressed the wish that the plan be further studied by Pentagon experts. On January 26, a meeting was held, as a result of which a slightly modified version of the operation plan was approved, which provided for an increase in the number of paratroopers from 800-1000 to 1443 people, providing them with bulldozers and tools for preparing a field airfield, as well as additional weapons.

On April 8, 1961, a radio message was broadcast to the Cuban people and governments of Latin American countries calling for an armed struggle against Castro.

A second raid on Cuba was canceled by order of President J.F. Kennedy.

Amphibious operation and battle of Playa Giron

By 11 o'clock, the two remaining transports of the "brigade 2506" withdrew to the open sea.

On the evening of April 17, more than 2,000 122-mm shells were fired at the landing, but shelling of a long and narrow front turned out to be ineffective, since the paratroopers had already dug in.

At the same time, the Nicaraguan dictator Somoza proposed using six P-51 Mustang fighters of the Nicaraguan Air Force (on which identification marks began to be painted over) for air support, but this decision was rejected.

On the same day, Cuban T-34-85 tanks destroyed two tanks of the Brigade 2506.

The Cuban Air Force and Air Defense shot down 12 B-26 "Invader", C-46 and other types of aircraft that covered the landing, including several with crews from the United States. Of these, 7 B-26s and 1 C-46 were shot down by Cuban fighters, who suffered no losses.

Subsequent events

The failure of the operation caused a significant resonance in the US and internationally. In Cairo, Jakarta, Rio de Janeiro, and Lima, protesters made attempts to storm US diplomatic missions.

At the UN meeting, representatives of 40 countries condemned the US aggression against Cuba.

The government of the USSR condemned the armed invasion and sent a note of protest to the United States calling for measures to stop the aggression against Cuba.

In 1986, representatives of the US scientific community (American historians G. Zinn, V. E. Williams, G. Kolko, L. Gardner, D. Horowitz, etc.) admitted that the US operation in 1961 was US interference in the internal affairs of Cuba , an act of US aggression against Cuba and a direct violation of Article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, under which the United States put its signature in 1948, prohibiting anyone from interfering in the internal affairs of any country. The text of the expert opinion was published in full in The Nation.

Review by General Maxwell Taylor

Declassified US government documents show that after the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation, the US continued to consider and prepare a direct military invasion of Cuba.

1. Sabotage in and around the American military base in Guantanamo (as examples were considered: arson of an aircraft and flooding of a ship; it was necessary to publish a list of non-existent "dead" in the media).
2. The sinking of the ship with Cuban refugees.
3. Organize terrorist attacks in Miami, other cities in Florida and Washington, directed at Cuban refugees. Arrest "Cuban agents" and publish fake "documents".
4. Carry out an air raid on the territory of states adjacent to Cuba.
5. Simulate attacks on passenger planes and shoot down an unmanned American plane or blow up a radio-controlled ship. To simulate attacks, use the F-86 Saber fighter repainted under the "Cuban MIG". It was also planned to publish in the newspapers a list of those killed in a downed plane or a blown up ship.
6. Simulate the downing of a US military aircraft by a Cuban MiG.

Each incident was supposed to be blamed on the Cuban government.

"Gusanos"

Additional Information

Memory

Later, a museum of the operation was opened in Playa Giron, at the entrance to which one of the Cuban Air Force aircraft ("C Fury"), which participated in the operation, was installed. Along the entire road along which Cuban troops marched to Playa Giron, commemorative obelisks were erected in places where soldiers died during the bombing. The victory is celebrated annually on April 19, in its commemoration, Air Force and Air Defense Day is set on April 17, and April 18 is Tankman Day. In July 1961, the Council of Ministers of the country established the Order of Playa Giron, one of the highest state awards in Cuba.

On the coast of Cuba there is a pool that intrigues with its name. What became famous for the Bay of Pigs and why it is so named, the material will tell.

Spanish riddle

Matanzas is one of the largest provinces in the Republic of Cuba. There are dozens of factories working with sugar cane and several oil refineries on the territory. Due to this, the zone is considered the most industrialized region of the country. The capital of this province is the city of Matanzas.

However, most of the tourists who had to visit the Island of Liberty (as Cuba is called) remembered the province of Matanzas thanks to the beautiful beaches. One of the most exotic corners of this region is the Bay of Pigs, which is better known as the Bay of Pigs. This pool is located on the southern coast of Cuba, which overlooks the Caribbean Sea.

From Spanish, the name of the bay sounds Bahía de Cochinos and translates as "Bay of Pigs". However, in fact, the nickname is not associated with animals. This is a homonym, that is, a word that is different in meaning, but the same in sound. Therefore, from another translation, Cochino is the name of a tropical sea fish that is found in this area. The second name of this species is the Royal triggerfish.

Background of the uprising

However, for most people who are interested in history, the Bay of Pigs serves as an example of international military strategy. Why the bay is called so, experts do not care today. Instead, they want to know more details about the operation that took place on this island in 1961.

This unique event was due to the fact that Fidel Castro and his supporters seized power in Cuba. The previous dictator Batista was forced to flee. Together with the former ruler, officials and rich people left the island, most of whom took refuge in Miami and Florida (USA). The intelligentsia and the middle class were afraid of persecution and did not want to part with their acquired property.

If the top of the country did not support the new leader, then the poor liked him. Castro confiscated the land and property of the bourgeoisie and distributed it to the people. Therefore, his policy immediately took the side of the ideas of communism.

Preparing for an attack

In this regard, the CIA began to organize an attack that took place in the Bay of Pigs (Bay of Pigs). What became famous for this pool and why the operation became a failure is described below.

America did not want Castro and his country to take the side of the Soviet Union. It was decided to take advantage of the indignation of the Cuban emigrants, launch an offensive operation and throw Fidel out. The US quickly found 1,400 disgruntled people who were ready to take part in the battle. The CIA was confident that the people would support the rebels and the communist regime would be overthrown. But America did not take into account the fact that the people who received the land supported Castro.

On April 15, 1961, emigrants began to carry out air strikes in unmarked planes. Airfields were bombed. The goal is to destroy aviation. However, this mission failed due to the inexperience of the rebels.

The next day, the Cubans were waiting for an attack from America. The leader of the country tried to protect people as much as possible. However, the attack took place only on 17 April.

instant war

The goal of the thousands of Cubans who landed on the island is to free their compatriots from communism. To start the operation, a not very good place was chosen - a bay in the province of Matanzas, the Bay of Pigs. This area is limited by swamps, which were extremely difficult to move around. Wasting no time, the rebels asked for help in the United States. An additional force arrived at a certain place within a few hours and immediately captured several points.

Castro decided that the only way to win this battle was to start an instant war. Consequently, all the forces of the revolutionaries were immediately directed to this zone. Despite the fact that the United States outnumbered the Cubans in military ammunition, Fidel's young and inexperienced soldiers managed to shoot down several enemy planes and sink two ships with help on board. Already on April 18, the revolutionaries won back part of the occupied territories.

Unsuccessful ending

The next day, the situation for the rebels worsened even more. The Bay of Pigs has become a kind of cage. On the one hand, this territory was washed by the sea, and on the other hand, it was surrounded by impenetrable swamps. In this regard, part of the rebel army surrendered. The other - fled back to the United States on ships. In total, more than 200 people died in this battle. Over 1,000 American soldiers were captured. Very soon Cuban leaders accused Kenedy and the CIA of trying to take over the island. Subsequently, the United States ransomed its military for colossal sums.

The whole world draws conclusions from this battle. The operation was poorly planned and staged. If earlier Castro intended to cooperate with America, then after this event he categorically refused to deal with it. Moreover, he became close to the Soviet Union and allowed the deployment of nuclear weapons on his territory. All this led to

Entertainment for every taste

The Bay of Pigs has something to seduce the sophisticated foreign tourist today. On the right side of the bay there are unique coral reefs. Also here are the marshes of Zapata. This is a valuable find for tourists who are interested in nature. The territory is protected by law. Hundreds of animals live freely here, which can only be found on this island. For example, here people see pink flamingos, and avocets woodpeckers.

Next to this reserve is another tourist point. This village of Guama is a model of an Indian settlement. Small huts are built on tiny islands connected by beautiful bridges. In general, this is a picturesque and sincere place.

On the east coast are the Mangroves. The ecosystem of this zone amazes scientists, but for an ordinary tourist it can be boring and even dangerous here. Today, many foreigners are attracted to the Bay of Pigs because of the opportunity to engage in recreational diving here.

Edge of eternal summer

In addition to the fact that Cuba is the Island of Freedom, it is also an endless summer. Even in January, the temperature here does not fall below 25-27 °C. The air is warmest in August. Then the marks reach 30-32 ° C. The rainy season lasts from May to November. Most precipitation is recorded in June and October.

Cuba has a lot to offer vacationers. But the main thing that tourists come here for is that the Bay of Pigs made the province of Matanzas popular. There are two beaches on the coast - Playa Giron and Playa Larga.

Recently, more and more tourists are interested in diving. Real underwater excursions are carried out in this bay. In addition, vacationers can visit flooded caves.

The Bay of Cochinos is a unique natural reserve whose landscapes fascinate and inspire.

“Our revolution is a revolution of the dispossessed, made by the dispossessed for the dispossessed. We are ready to give our lives for her! Homeland or Death!"
Fidel Castro

On January 1, 1959, revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba. The victory of the Cuban socialists could not but alarm Washington, the American commercial and industrial corporations and, of course, the American mafia, which lost its real estate in Cuba and lost its colossal income. In addition, in a short period of time, the entire former political and business elite immigrated from Cuba, who enjoyed the patronage of the former dictator Fulgencio Batista. As a result, many Cubans settled in American Miami: students, intellectuals, bandits - a real little Cuba was formed in Florida, living according to the usual capitalist laws, a kind of Cuban abroad.

Counting on the support of Cuban emigrants, the American leadership decided to overthrow Castro by military means. To solve this problem, the US command developed Operation Pluto, which provided for a sudden landing on the southern coast of Cuba in April 1961. At the same time, it was assumed in advance that the Cuban counter-revolutionaries would announce the creation of a provisional government on the island, which would ask for help from the United States. The landing of the American troops was to be carried out immediately after the request of the provisional government of Cuba for help. In addition, to confirm the justice of the invasion, the Americans planned to use the support of the countries of the Organization of American States (OAS), a purely pro-American international organization. The OAS was supposed to provide its own military contingent, the number of which could be up to 15,000 people. To prepare the operation, several groups of CIA saboteurs and provocateurs were sent to Cuba, who were preparing a series of sabotage on the island, designed to destabilize the situation in the country on the eve and directly on the day of the American invasion.

It was planned to prepare the amphibious landing operation by bombing the three largest military airfields in Cuba, on which all the military aviation of the Cuban revolution was concentrated. Eight bombers were prepared for the bombing, and the strike was scheduled for 15 April.

The amphibious landing was planned to be carried out in the Bay of Pigs (translated into Russian - the Bay of Pigs). The landing site was not chosen by chance: a significant part of the coast of the bay can be used as an airfield, and landing on a flat sandy beach, which is the coast of the bay, given the complete absence of antiamphibious defense, seemed to the Americans an easy and pleasant adventure. In addition, the area has excellent defensive capabilities: a huge swamp begins a few kilometers from the sea. The coast of the bay was connected with the rest of the island by only one road. These circumstances, of course, were considered by the Americans as conducive to their consolidation on the island, as well as the accumulation of troops for further advancement deep into Cuba.

The landing date was set for the night of 17 April. It would be naive to believe that the upcoming American landing was a surprise for the Cubans. It is reasonable to assume that Soviet intelligence also played an important role in this. However, this is a topic for another conversation, and also a topic for separate discussions for military historians.

On April 14, 1961, a US Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft took photographs of all of Cuba. According to the data received, up to 15 aircraft were stationed at Cuban airfields. The next day, according to the plan, 8 American B-26 bombers bombed the airfields of Campo Colombia, San Antonio le Los Baños and Santiago de Cuba. As a result of the strikes, most of the aircraft of the revolutionary Air Force were declared destroyed. However, the Cubans, who knew about the impending aggression in advance, replaced the combat aircraft with dummies. Therefore, out of 24 aircraft that the Cubans had, only 2 were lost.

Fidel Castro and Cuban tankers in the Bay of Pigs (photo http://komiunity.ru)

The raid by US bombers, among other things, had very specific political consequences, bringing only one harm to the Americans. On April 16, a mourning ceremony was held in Cuba for the seven Cubans who died as a result of the American bombing, at which Fidel Castro delivered a fiery speech and once again confirmed that Cuba was choosing a socialist path of development. American bombing and sabotage only rallied the Cubans, finally denoting the image of the enemy.

The ships of the flotilla of interventionists, which left in the direction of the Island of Freedom, carried about 2.5 thousand tons of weapons and ammunition. At 1:15 a.m., an encrypted radio message was transmitted to Cuban counter-revolutionaries and CIA agents stating that the invasion had begun and that the time had come for active action to organize large-scale sabotage. However, Cuban counterintelligence managed to nip in the bud all attempts to destabilize the situation in the country, and thus American plans to create at least a semblance of a provisional government in Cuba were doomed to failure.

At dawn on April 17, the landing of the first echelon of troops began. On the road connecting the coast of the bay with the rest of the island, paratroopers were dropped. The fight has begun. About 100 Cuban border guards and milicianos (militia fighters) delayed the advance of the enemy, who had almost a tenfold superiority over the defenders.

With the beginning of the intervention in Cuba, a general mobilization was organized. But the Cubans, who learned that the revolution was under threat, did not need special invitations. There were so many volunteers that there was simply not enough for them, distribution points for which were organized right on the streets.

The offensive of the invaders began in three directions at the same time: three battalions went to Playa Giron, one - to Playa Larga, and a battalion of paratroopers moved to San Blas. To capture the airfield in the Playa Giron area and prepare it to receive their aircraft, separate units were allocated.

To stop the advance of the invaders inland, the high command of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba decided to use aviation to disrupt the landing of troops on the coast, as well as the subsequent blocking and defeat of the landing forces from the sea and land. To solve this problem, the main command allocated 7 infantry battalions, 20 T-34 tanks and 10 self-propelled guns-100, as well as 14 mortar and artillery batteries.

The Cuban command had only to transfer these very impressive forces to the battlefield. Thirty-fours and self-propelled guns-100 hit the positions of the invaders. The lead thirty-four was commanded by Fidel himself, the fact of being on the battlefield gave the young Cuban tankers an unprecedented enthusiasm.

By April 18, the initiative completely passed into the hands of the Cuban revolutionary troops, and during the general offensive that began, the Cubans sank four enemy ships, shot down five aircraft, pushing the interventionists to the very coast of the bay, almost throwing them into the sea. Thus, by the evening of April 18, 1961, the operation to overthrow Castro, prepared by the CIA, suffered a complete collapse.

Against the backdrop of the apparent failure of the landing operation, Kennedy gave the order to use aircraft. However, due to a ridiculous mistake related to confusion in time zones, the bombers missed the fighters and did not dare to attack.

On the morning of April 19, the Cuban revolutionary troops, after a half-hour artillery preparation, finally broke the resistance of the enemy. The interventionists tore off their uniforms and fled. Losses of "gusanos" - mercenary interventionists amounted to 82 people. 1197 people surrendered. The revolutionary forces lost 156 people killed and about 800 wounded.

CIA mercenaries defeated in the Bay of Pigs and captured by the Cubans (photo http://komiunity.ru)

Later, Fidel Castro assessed the role of the Battle of Playa Giron in the Cuban people: "The Battle of Playa Giron did not allow the history of Cuba to turn back to the old times, and saved the revolution." In July 1961, the Cuban Council of Ministers established the Order of Playa Giron as one of the highest state awards.

The first US intervention in Latin America was a total failure. Cuba managed to defend its right to freedom and independence. However, the American leadership was preparing a revenge, and in November 1961 developed a plan for a new regime change operation in Cuba, codenamed "Mongoose", which was to begin in October 8-12, 1962. To prevent a new invasion of Cuba, the USSR secretly deployed medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads on board in Cuba. As a result, the Caribbean Crisis broke out - the greatest military-political confrontation of the 20th century.

Original taken from m2kozhemyakin in Landing on Playa Giron 04/17/1961 in the illustrated magazine "Life" and photographs.

The bearded, eternal and legendary Fidel Castro is not without reason known as one of the most eloquent orators of the 20th century, therefore, for a detailed, although somewhat lengthy (Fidel and conciseness are incompatible concepts;)) characterization of these events, we will give the first word to the leader of the Cuban revolution.
At the links below you will find "Reflections of Comrade Fidel Castro: The Battle of Playa Giron" recorded on April 14 and May 25, 2011, in two parts:
http://forum.polismi.org/index.php?/topic/5212-reflections-comrade-fidel-castro-battle-on-pl/
http://forum.polismi.com/index.php?/topic/5223-reflections-comrade-fidel-castro-battle-on-pl/

A detailed history of the preparations for the landing on Playa Giron and the fighting in English, also containing amusing illustrations: http://www.combatreform.org/airbornebayofpigs.htm

And here is the Russian-language history of the operation in the Bay of Pigs (this sonorous Spanish name is so tritely translated) April 14-19: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bay_of_Pigs_Operation

There will also be illustrations made by the famous American poster artist and illustrator Sandy Kossin for the popular magazine "Life", published on May 10, 1963, in the hot pursuit of events.

"Bay of Pigs. The raw untold truth from the people who fought," reads the catchy headline.

As they say, how many soldiers - so many views on the battle. This is still leaving the inevitable ideology and propaganda "overboard" ...
Therefore, in order to contrast with the drawings of Kossin, reflecting the view of the American public and Cuban anti-communist emigrants, it would be appropriate to place photographs taken directly on the battlefield, with appropriate explanations.

So, illustrations by Sandy Cossin were prepared according to the stories of the few surviving members of the Cuban emigrant formation, trained and thrown into Playa Giron with the participation of special services and, to a lesser extent, the US armed forces - the so-called "assault brigade 2506" (Brigada de Asalto 2506).

Brigade 2506.
1. It was a sabotage and assault unit, which began to form in May 1960, as stated, "from volunteers - opponents of the Fidel Castro regime." Simply put - from Cuban emigrants who ended up in the United States. The brigade was trained with the participation of the US CIA and American instructors (the so-called CIA contractors, not necessarily full-time employees, but working under a contract with the CIA). Training and formation were carried out at several bases scattered throughout different countries of Latin America: "Camp Trax" and the airfield "Rayo Base" in Guatemala, "Camp Tide" (known among cadets as the "Valley of Happiness") in Nicaragua, as well as on the island of Vieques ( Puerto Rico).
2. The brigade got its name from the personal number of cadet Carlos Rodriguez, a 25-year-old former student from Havana who died during training.

A portrait of this same cadet Rodriguez from Sandy Kossin (in the margins are photographs of brigade officers):

3. On paper, the brigade looked like an impressive force: at least 2,680 Cubans underwent military training, of which, after repeated structural and organizational rearrangements, as of early April 1961, 5 infantry battalions (one motorized), 1 parachute battalion, artillery a mortar battalion, an armored detachment (in fact, a tank company) and some other units. In addition, a formidable air contingent was created to bomb Cuba under the guise of its own Air Force allegedly rebelling against the revolutionary government, and a flotilla of armed transport and landing craft to deliver the brigade to the Cuban coast and land as the vanguard of the "revolution against the revolutionaries."
Further, according to the calculations of the CIA, at best, the discontented Cuban population should have fit in, at worst - the US Marine Corps, and optimally - both of them.
Captain José Alfredo Pérez San Roman commanded "Brigade 2506" of the former army of the former Cuban dictator Batista, a brigade banner and field chaplains were wound up, inspiring personnel to "liberate beautiful Catholic Cuba from the godless power of vile fidelists."

The banner of the brigade, which has now become a museum exhibit in the United States

Propaganda picture of the corresponding content (the wrecked fidelist tank is depicted symbolically and most of all resembles the self-propelled guns "Ferdinand"):

From the generosity of the US government (which, of course, knew nothing at all), the brigade was given:
"- 32 B-26 bombers, nine of them - B-26B to participate in an air raid on Cuban airfields (Operation Puma) were repainted and carried Cuban Air Force identification marks; another 20 received from the US Air Force reserve and previously stored in a mothballed condition, were repaired and modernized - they installed additional fuel tanks and missile launchers;
- five M41 tanks;
- ten armored personnel carriers M8;
- three 75-mm anti-tank recoilless artillery guns M-20;
- 18 pcs. 57 mm M18 recoilless artillery pieces;
- 6 pcs. 106.7 mm mortars; 36 pcs. 60 mm mortars;
- 75 pcs. 88.9 mm M20 bazooka anti-tank grenade launchers;
- 8 pcs. flamethrowers;
- 44 pcs. large-caliber 12.7-mm machine guns "Browning" M2HB;
- 3 heavy and 30 light machine guns "Browning" M1919 chambered for 7.62 × 63 mm;
- 108 pcs. light 7.62-mm machine guns "Browning" M1918;
- small arms (485 M-1 "garand" rifles, 150 carbines, 470 submachine guns and 465 pistols);
- hand grenades;
- a significant amount of ammunition;
30 thousand gallons of aviation fuel for refueling aircraft."
Source: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brigada_2506
4. Despite the rich experience of covert operations and gunboat diplomacy, in the history of US covert wars, it is difficult to find an operation conceived more out of touch with reality and prepared more carelessly than the landing on Playa Giron.
In his speech on April 19, 1963, in honor of the second anniversary of the victory over the interventionists, Fidel Castro called those who developed this adventure "ignorant people in social and political, but not in military matters" ... He clearly flattered them and himself: defeating a strong enemy is always more honorable!
In the military component of the preparation of the "counter-revolutionary revolution" there were no less jambs than in all the others.
The most important of them is simply enchanting delitantism.
Among the notorious CIA contractors were dominated by former US military personnel from World War II and the Korean War. However, the experience of some of them is hopelessly outdated, while others did not sniff gunpowder at all - far from all the multimillion-strong US armed forces of the second half of the 1940s - early 50s. "saw action" (literally: saw fighting) even from afar.
The main trouble of the "brigade 2506" was a very "uneven" personnel. Undoubtedly, staunch opponents of the Fidel Castro regime or people who suffered severely from him were also there. However, a huge layer was made up of "poor fellows who were wrecked on the seas of life," as one of the former officers of the brigade, D. Moska, later described them. The financial allowance of $400, paid monthly to each cadet, plus $175 for the maintenance of a wife and $50-25 for a child, attracted many needy Cuban emigrants into the ranks of future "interventions" (even if "in that life" they were people wealthy - the more difficult were the disasters of exile for them).
As a result, the staff turnover in the brigade was significant: having "earned" a couple of monthly fees, many cadets fled back "to civilian life", often showing genuine courage and ingenuity for this - no one voluntarily let them go. Such are the "irreconcilable fighters against the fidelist regime."
As a result, a little more than 1,500 brigade fighters managed to take part in the operation itself - 1,334 paratroopers and sailors of landing craft, 177 paratroopers and several dozen pilots and auxiliary aviation personnel.

But in Sandy Cossin's picture, of course, they look like just epic heroes:

Military training was conducted by American instructors, also essentially random people, not responsibly, and the cadets, at the first opportunity, arranged a fiesta in a bright Latin American style instead.
"Of course, we have ceased to be civilians, but it cannot be said that we have become military in the full sense of the word," the same D. Mosca described the level of training of the "brigadiers".
A total of 135 fighters of the "2506 brigade" were former soldiers of the Batista army who had experience in the counter-guerrilla struggle against the fidelists, and, probably, few other than them could be considered a real warrior. Of course, there were brave, convinced people in the brigade, not without them. Only courage and ideological preparation were not to be occupied by Fidel's supporters either.
In a word, the landing of "Brigade 2506" (although it was required to hold out only a few days until the US Marine Corps cavalry arrived) could only be successful under the following circumstances:
- if the Cuban population rebelled against the fidelists (and the Cubans at that time supported them with an absolute majority);
- if in place of the well-armed (including the Warsaw Pact countries) and inspired by the ideas of the "Olive Revolution" (then it had not yet completely become "red"), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba would have been the classic underpaid and poorly equipped Latin American army of 1960- x years;
- if the "brigade 2506" landed not in Cuba;)
Cuba is just the strategists from the CIA did not take into account.

Fighting on Playa Giron.
However, after painful delays, on April 15, 1961, B-26 bombers (painted as FAR aircraft - Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Cuba- with visually identifiable shoals) attacked Cuban airfields, and on the night of April 17, the landing of sea and paratroopers of the "2506 brigade" began.

Landing on Playa Giron through the eyes of Sandy Cossin:

"At midnight on April 16, 1961, Cuban patriots landed on a remote beach of their homeland... This extraordinary story - often heroic, always chaotic and chilling in the finale - begins with this pattern of the first attack..." reads the catchy journalistic caption .

The paratroopers with fierce faces are irresistibly rushing forward, firing directly from the surf, the ships support them with fire, something impressive is already exploding on the shore ... Just some kind of "Omaha Beach" in Normanidia in 1944!

In fact, the Cuban armed forces, misled the day before by a demonstration off the coast of the province of Oriente (perhaps the only success of the American special services in this operation), slept through the landing in Playa Giron.
The emigrant paratroopers were resisted only by the patrol of the 339th reserve battalion guarding the coast of five (!!!) people, armed only with Czech M52 rifles (the same Mauser magazines). But he also managed to hold out for almost 40 minutes and only retreated when three of the five fighters were wounded and one died (in the picture above, this poor fellow is probably lying under the feet of the paratroopers).

The paratroopers of the "brigade 2506" at that time stubbornly climbed out of the swamp, into which they "splashed" in the San Blas area.

Sandy Kossin honestly portrayed this unpleasant moment:

Soon oncoming battles with the people's militia detachments unfolded. (Milicias Nacionales Revolucionarias), promptly abandoned by the Cuban revolutionary command to the landing area. Butduring the first hours of hostilitiesthe more numerous and better armed "brigades" really pressed the "milisianos". In addition, the emigrants managed to arrange several successful fire ambushes, in which the "irregular" fidelists suffered significant losses.

"Brigadiers" who sat down by the road shoot a truck literally full of "milisianos":

Well, that's pretty much true, especially since the Cuban militias actually went to war like this:

The same scene of the ambush, no longer looking so triumphant against the backdrop of the "return" depicted on the spread, which the landing group of the "2506 brigade" began to receive from the first Cuban regular contingent that reached the battlefield - combat aircraft "Revolutionary Air Forces (FAR)".
The landing ship Houston, destroyed by Cuban aircraft, is sinking, and the infantry battalion riding on it in full strength jumps into the water and swims "to land light" - without weapons:

The quite recognizable T-33 "Shooting Star" FAR fighter proudly flies over the dying ship.
In the upper part of the picture, an unidentified aircraft is crashing into the water (most similar to the Messerschmidt Bf-109, which definitely was not in the Bay of Pigs), shot down by fire from landing ships. An obvious fantasy of the artist or storytellers: both (according to other sources - three) aircraft lost in those days by the Cuban FAR were burned at the airfields by air strikes.

And here is how the sinking of the ship "Houston" looks in the photographs:

However, the air crews of "Brigade 2506", staffed by Cuban expatriate pilots and American mercenary pilots of predominantly "Latin" origin , April 17 also quite actively supported their ground units.

A joint strike by surprise of the "brigadiers" and B-26 bombers on the advancing convoy of fidelists:

A reliable fact: the bombers covered the 123rd battalion of the people's militia moving towards the front in marching order. However, on the road, Milicianos vehicles intermingled with civilian vehicles, and the airstrike hit both. Most of the Cuban civilians who died these days were killed then.

Photos of the defeated column taken by Cuban photojournalists:

One of the B-26 bombers with Cuban markings used by the CIA in the Playa Giron operation:

Frozen moments of the battle: the crew of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba fires at the "enemy" B-26 from the quad 12.7-mm DShKM mount of Czechoslovak production (part of the "disinterested" military assistance of the Warsaw Pact):

... The main law of propaganda: "I screwed up myself - transfer the arrows to the enemy" - in action. That's why, it turns out, the CIA bombers emptied the bomb bays on the civilians: the "vile fidelists" are hiding in a crowd behind a car with Red Cross signs:

With the entry into hostilities of the first Cuban regular ground units (the 11th and 12th infantry battalions, reinforced with tanks, self-propelled guns and artillery) under the command of former Batistian career officers and former Fidel partisan commanders, the brief period of success of the "2506 brigade" abruptly ended. By the end of the day on April 18, 1961, the initiative had irrevocably passed into the hands of the fidelists.

On the map of hostilities, Sandy Kossin records how, with inevitable inevitability, the bridgehead held by the "brigades" was shrinking day by day and the tragic end for them was approaching:

With visible pleasure, Cuban troops "run in" T-34-85 tanks, SU-100 self-propelled guns, 152-mm howitzers in battles:

Comandante The Prime Minister of Cuba, Major Fidel Castro, personally directs the fighting, in his inimitable style, not missing the opportunity to pose for photojournalists on the armor of formidable equipment received "from friends from the Warsaw Pact":

It was here that the "moment of truth" came for "brigade 2506". The cruel logic of defeat itself separated those who deliberately came to Cuba to overthrow Fidel from those who were more interested in 400 bucks a month plus another 175 for a spouse.
And while the former fought fiercely, the latter indulged in despair or robbery.

Tragi-comic picture from Sandy Cossin: just a group of looting "brigades" irritated a pig farm (Bay of Pigs!) and was about to arrange a "barbecue" of piglets, when the Cuban "Shooting Star" appeared and broke off their whole buzz:

The revolutionary Cuban Air Force in the battles at Playa Giron is not even a poem, it's a legend!
By the beginning of the landing of "brigade 2506", Cuba had only FIVE (according to other sources - seven) pilots for 24 aircraft.
And, nevertheless, saddling the most combat-ready vehicles, this handful of desperate brave men supported their ground forces, sank landing ships (the already mentioned Houston and the Rio Escondido transport, with which the lion's share of the interventionists' ammunition, as well as two landing barges), shot down enemy aircraft (a total of seven air victories: six B-26 bombers and one C-46 transport).

One of the most productive Cuban pilots on Playa Giron, Lieutenant D. Del Pino with his fighterT-33Shooting Star:

Such is the lieutenant, middle-aged, but brave, from the former Batista Air Force pilots, who managed to sit in prison with him for sympathizing with the revolutionaries ...

Fighter T-33 "Shooting Star" of the Revolutionary Air Force of Cuba:

The results of the work of Cuban fighter pilots at Playa Giron: the wreckage of enemy aircraft, half-sunk landing barges:

At the wreckage of the B-26, a Miliciano armed with a Czech SA-25 submachine gun poses:

And Fidel himself!

We must pay tribute to the "brigade 2506" - at least two days of fierce fighting with a superior enemy, she withstood - from the evening of April 17 to the evening of the 19th.

Night battle of "brigadiers" with Fidel's tanks:

The realistic depiction of Soviet T-34-85 tanks is clearly not one of Sandy Kossik's virtues as a military artist. (it seems that the IS-2 heavy tanks, which were not in Cuba) served as a "model" for him. On the other hand, it is extremely picturesquely depicted how a tank crushed a man and how the ill-fated fidelist was blown in half by a burst from a heavy Browning machine gun.

"Night horror - the Reds crush their own wounded" (Sic!) What a rare filth! ;)
Although, probably, several wounded milicianos or soldiers lying on the battlefield were indeed crushed by tankers during a night attack. The inhuman and random grimaces of war...

The only Cuban T-34-85, reliably destroyed by the "brigades" on Playa Giron with three bazooka shots:

Another one toppled over into a ditch (a poster by the road gives rise to associations with an ambush site from one of the first pictures by Sandy Cossin):

There is a version that it happened like this:

In turn, Fidel Castro's tankers reported the destruction of at least two M41 Walker Bulldog tanks - both in battles on April 19, 1961.

Padded and captured armored "Bulldog" "Brigade 2506":

On April 19, the agony of "Brigade 2506" began, pressed to the sea on a tiny patch of bridgehead at the Bay of Pigs, shot by fidelist artillery, left to the mercy of fate by the US government, which hastened to deny its role in this bloody adventure. After all, there was not enough time to deploy a nominal "revolutionary counter-revolutionary" government in Cuba that would call on American troops for help! And assessing the strength of the resistance of the Cuban armed forces, the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff decided that it would be too risky to land the marines.

There's nowhere left to go,
Behind the Caribbean
Cuba ends here
Seniors - and we!

The despair of tired, demoralized "brigades" who lost faith in salvation and in themselves, Stanley Kossin managed to convey perfectly!

At 5:30 pm on April 19, 1961, units of "Brigade 2506" ceased organized resistance and began to surrender to the victorious Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba.
The daredevils, who did not want to capitulate, dressed in civilian clothes and tried to seep through the battle formations of the fidelists ... "To look again at her, victorious, / albeit incomprehensible, albeit not forgiving, / her beloved land ..."
Others on boats and improvised means sailed out to sea, hoping to escape from the raid on the coastal reefs or to be picked up by the US fleet "grazing" off the Cuban coast.
It is believed that about 20-30 "brigadiers" managed to escape by sea.
How many on land managed to evade the persecution of the fidelists, who had been combing the area in the battle area for five days, is not known exactly.
Several of the wounded were taken out by the only C-46 transport aircraft that landed on the coastal strip on the night of April 18.

Captured fighters of the "brigade 2506", some are already in civilian clothes:

Captured weapons of the interventionists, exhibited in Havana:

The "bloody losses" of the "brigades 2506" turned out to be surprisingly small compared to the number of those who surrendered: 114 were killed against 1,202 prisoners (incl. 360 wounded, nine of whom died during the not-so-careful transport by the fidelists to Havana).
Five US citizens were killed in the battles on Playa Giron: one CIA contract soldier (former army paratrooper) - in ground battles, and in the air - three pilots of the US National Guard Air Force, who replaced Cuban émigré pilots in the planes at the final stage of the fighting. The latter refused to "fly to the slaughter", which is quite reasonable, because. The CIA did not plan airborne gunners in the B-26 crews in order to save money, and when meeting with Cuban fighters, it remained only to rely on maneuver and the Providence of the Lord.

The Fidelists also suffered serious losses, which various sources still differ in their estimates. Their total number is even estimated at several thousand people, although this is hard to believe: after all, the troops of revolutionary Cuba showed their complete superiority over the enemy on Playa Giron and won a relatively easy victory! It is authentically known that only in the ranks of the Revolutionary Armed Forces there were 176 killed and more than 500 wounded. There is no exact data on the people's militia.

Fidel Castro showed unexpected mercy to the captive "brigadiers" of Providence. After the completion of the first trial in the case of the Intervettes, on September 8, 1961, only three were sentenced to death, convicted (it is not entirely clear - justified or not) of torturing Cuban prisoners and killing the wounded. All the rest, despite the standard sentences of 30 years in prison, were returned to the United States alive and relatively healthy during 1962 in exchange for a large batch of "humanitarian aid", and in fact - as an act of generosity of the victors. Moreover, almost a thousand members of their families were allowed to leave the country with them.
Fidel Castro, as they would say now, has always been a master of "white PR"!

And the "olive" Cuban revolution after Playa Giron finally "blushed" - in the confrontation with a close and powerful enemy, which does not miss twice in a row, Cuba needed no less powerful allies!
________________________________________ _____________________________________Mikhail Kozhemyakin