The largest center for the production of artillery in the years of the Second World War. Artillery was the main firepower of the ground forces during the Great Patriotic War.

EXPERIENCE TEACHES GUNNERS

At the beginning of the Civil War, artillery was used in combat in the old way, as they were used to using it at the end of the First World War. In connection with the new forms of warfare, it was necessary to use artillery in a completely new way. The old tactics of artillery were replaced by the tactics of flexible maneuver and decisive concentration of artillery in the direction of the main attack of the troops.
The following examples speak of how old obsolete traditions were broken in the combat use of artillery. In October 1918, General Krasnov's 70,000-strong White Guard army, armed and equipped by the Germans, surrounded Tsaritsyn and pinned the city's heroic defenders to the banks of the Volga. The number of Soviet troops defending Tsaritsyn did not exceed 50 thousand people. The supply of shells and cartridges from the defenders of the city was coming to an end, and the lines of communication with Moscow and the Caucasus were cut off by the Whites. The situation was difficult. On October 16, the White Guards occupied the Voroponovo station, located just 10 kilometers west of the city, and continued to move forward, showering shells on the Red Army units. Due to the lack of shells and rifle cartridges, the heroic defenders of Tsaritsyn increasingly had to fight back with bayonets and checkers. By the end of the day on October 16, the front was already 7 kilometers from the city. In the evening, our observers noticed that new military units arrived to help the Whites. As it turned out later, a White Guard officer brigade of about a thousand people approached the front.
The critical moment has come. Tsaritsyn was in mortal danger.
At this difficult moment, Comrade Stalin, who personally led the defense of Tsaritsyn on the instructions of the Central Committee of the Party, mobilized all forces and means to repulse the enemy. Almost all artillery pieces and ammunition were concentrated in the central sector of the front against the Voroponovo station.
There were about 200 guns on the front stretching 40 kilometers. Almost all of them were now converging on the central sector of the front. Batteries stood only a few dozen steps from one another, preparing to repel the attack of the Whites.
At dawn, the white artillery opened fire, and soon their infantry also went on the attack. In full dress uniform, chain after chain, column after column, the officer regiments marched. An officer brigade was ahead, followed by the regiments of General Krasnov. The White Guards counted on the fact that the Red Army soldiers would not stand it, that the mere sight of a mass of armed men steadily moving forward would demoralize them. The artillery of the Red Army was silent: it was waiting for the prearranged signal. The advanced lines of the Whites are already half a kilometer from our infantry ... Already only 400 meters remain ... Every second one could expect that the lines of the White Guards would change their fast pace to a swift run and go over to the attack. At that moment, a signal was given: 4 high bursts of shrapnel - 4 bright white smoke clouds hanging in the clear morning sky. And after that, the whole steppe rumbled. The sounds of shots and explosions of shells merged into a continuous continuous rumble. Each battery fired at the sector of the front assigned to it, and all together created a solid wall of fire. Shells burst in the thick of the advancing enemy columns. Having suffered heavy losses, the Whites lay down. They were stopped, but not yet defeated. At this time, an armored train approached from the north along the ring railway line; on the right and left flanks of the front section, trucks converted into armored vehicles and armed with machine guns burst forward; the batteries shifted their fire deep into the location of the Whites in order to cut off the escape routes of their advanced units. The Red Infantry went on the counterattack. She moved forward quickly. And as the artillery carried the fire farther and farther, a still smoking battlefield, littered with the corpses of the White Guards and plowed up with shells, opened up before the eyes of the observers. The half-destroyed White Guard regiments retreated in disarray to the south and west, dispersed across the steppe. The ring of siege was broken. Red Tsaritsyn was saved. In 1919, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Party, Comrade Stalin led the defeat of the White Guard troops of General Yudenich, who were rushing to Petrograd. The position of the Soviet troops was complicated by the fact that a counter-revolutionary rebellion was raised in the rear of the Red Army at the forts Krasnaya Gorka and Gray Horse. It was impossible to take well-armed forts by storm, advancing only from land with the support of small artillery. Comrade Stalin proposed to attack the rebellious forts with a combined attack from land and sea, using the powerful artillery of the ships of the Baltic Fleet. Comrade Stalin's plan was approved and put into practice. The suppression of the rebellious forts was carried out brilliantly. The rebellious forts, which could not withstand the powerful blows of naval artillery, were taken by the Red Army units and detachments of Baltic sailors and St. Petersburg workers. Yudenich's army was defeated and its remnants were driven back to Estonia. Artillery provided powerful support to the infantry on the Southern Front, when troops under the leadership of M.V. Frunze stormed Perekop. The artillery of the First Cavalry Army also acted boldly and decisively, showing examples of skillful interaction with cavalry and high maneuverability on the battlefield. The study of the experience of past wars helped our Party and the Soviet Government to correctly outline further steps along the path of development of Soviet artillery and clearly define the tasks that artillery must solve in battle. The re-equipment of artillery with new types of guns that followed in 1937 and 1938 contributed to a significant increase in its power. The force of the crushing blows of Soviet artillery was soon experienced by the enemies of our Motherland, who dared to encroach on the inviolability of the borders of the country of the Soviets. In the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River in 1939 and in the Soviet-Finnish war in 1939/40, our artillery provided powerful support to infantry and tanks, hit the enemy’s manpower, destroyed his military equipment and destroyed his powerful engineering structures.

THE REAR HELP THE FRONT

In some battles of the Great Patriotic War, our artillery fired more shells in one day of battle than the Russian army used during the entire war with Japan in 1904-1905.
How many defense plants were needed, how fast they had to work in order to produce such a huge amount of guns and ammunition. How skillfully and accurately the transport had to work in order to uninterruptedly transfer countless guns and shells to the battlefields!
And the Soviet people coped with all these difficult tasks, inspired by their love for the Motherland, for the Communist Party, for their Government.
Soviet factories during the war produced huge quantities of guns and ammunition. Back in 1942, our industry in just one month produced much more guns of all calibers than the Russian army had at the beginning of the First World War.

Thanks to the heroic labor of the Soviet people, the Soviet Army received a steady stream of first-class artillery weapons, which in the capable hands of our artillerymen became the decisive force that ensured the defeat of Nazi Germany and the victorious end of the war. During the war, our domestic industry increased its output from month to month and supplied the Soviet Army with tanks and aircraft, ammunition and equipment in increasing quantities.
The artillery industry annually produced up to 120,000 guns of all calibers, up to 450,000 light and heavy machine guns, over 3 million rifles, and about 2 million machine guns. In 1944 alone, 7,400,000,000 cartridges were produced.
Soviet people, selflessly working in the rear, helped the Soviet Army to defend the freedom and independence of our Motherland and saved the peoples of Europe from fascist enslavement.
The victory of our country in the Great Patriotic War speaks of the vitality of the Soviet social system, of the invincibility of the cause for which the Soviet people fought under the leadership of our Party in the Great October Socialist Revolution.
The great strength of the leadership of the Communist Party ensured the Soviet people a complete victory over a strong and treacherous enemy in the most difficult of all wars that mankind has ever had to fight.
During the Great Patriotic War, the Communist Party appeared before all the peoples of the Soviet Union as the inspirer and organizer of the nationwide struggle against the fascist invaders. The organizational work of the Party united and directed to a common goal all the efforts of the Soviet people, subordinating all forces and means to the cause of defeating the enemy. During the war, the Party has become even more closely related to the people, has become even more closely connected with the broad masses of the working people.

SOVIET ARTILLERY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR
We have already said that by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, our army had first-class artillery, which in all respects was superior to the artillery of any foreign army. Soviet artillery personnel were well trained and distinguished by high moral character.
In the initial period of the war, our artillery repulsed the attacks of enemy tanks, which were the main striking force of the fascist German army, with their fire, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment, helped our infantry stop the enemy and gain a foothold on advantageous lines.
How did artillery solve its combat missions?
When the Nazi armored hordes attacked our Motherland, they met stubborn resistance and well-aimed fire from the Soviet artillery, which took on the brunt of the fight against enemy tanks. Our artillery was the force that helped the Soviet Army to thwart Hitler's plans for the "lightning" defeat of our Motherland.

For a more successful fight against Nazi tanks, it was necessary to form new anti-tank artillery units. Special anti-tank artillery units were formed, which played a crucial role in defeating enemy tanks.
Bravely defending the prepared lines, the Soviet gunners dealt the enemy blow after blow. Each city approached by the enemy turned into a fortress, on the outskirts of which selected German fascist units perished. The legendary defense of the hero cities: Odessa, Leningrad, Sevastopol, Stalingrad has gone down in history forever.
In all defensive battles, artillery, with its fire, ensured the strength of the defense of our troops. In the defense of Leningrad and Sevastopol, along with hired artillery, coastal and naval artillery successfully operated, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy.
Soviet artillery was especially famous in the battles on the outskirts of Moscow, for the capture of which the Nazis sent 51 divisions, including 13 tank and 5 motorized divisions, to defeat the Soviet Army and, having captured Moscow, end the war before the onset of the winter of 1941.

For twenty days in a row, the battle on the outskirts of the capital of our Motherland did not subside for an hour. Artillerymen courageously fought against fascist tanks, tens and hundreds set fire to and knocked out armored vehicles. One of the anti-tank artillery regiments destroyed 186 enemy tanks on the outskirts of Moscow. For the courage shown in battles with the Nazi invaders, for the steadfastness, courage and heroism of the glorious destroyers of enemy tanks, this regiment was transformed into the 1st Guards Anti-Tank Fighter Regiment.

The Soviet troops, having crushed the enemy's strike forces, stopped him "and then, pulling up and concentrating reserves, on December 6, 1941, they launched a counteroffensive. Near Moscow and in other sectors of the enemy front, the enemy was defeated and thrown back far to the west. During these battles, the enemy suffered huge losses. During the first 40 days of our offensive, the Nazis lost only 300,000 soldiers and officers killed, hundreds of tanks, guns and mortars, thousands of vehicles and many other weapons and military equipment.
The defeat of the enemy armies near Moscow was of great importance for the further course of the war. For the first time during the Second World War, the fascist troops were not only stopped, but suffered a complete defeat. As a result of the defeat of the Nazis near Moscow, the myth of the invincibility of the Nazi army was dispelled.
Assessing the role of artillery in the defensive battles of the Soviet Army near Moscow and Leningrad, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union Stalin wrote in an order dedicated to the celebration of Artillery Day on November 19, 1944: “As you know, artillery was the force that helped the Red Army stop the advance of the enemy at approaches to Leningrad and Moscow.

SOVIET ARTILLERY IN THE BATTLE NEAR STALINGRAD
At the beginning of the book, we already mentioned what role the Soviet artillery played in the Battle of Stalingrad. The role of our artillery was so great that it is necessary to tell a little more about it.
Having suffered a defeat near Moscow and in other sectors of the Soviet-German front, the Nazis hastily began to prepare a new offensive against the Soviet Union. They wanted to break through our defenses, bypass Moscow from the east, cut it off from the Volga and Ural rear, and then strike at Moscow. In this adventuristic plan of the Nazis, the capture of Stalingrad was envisaged. To accomplish this task, the Nazi command concentrated huge forces of infantry, tanks, self-propelled artillery, aviation, and many other military equipment in the Stalingrad direction.
The Nazi command decided to launch an offensive with the expectation of capturing Stalingrad by July 25, and capturing Kuibyshev by August 15 and ending the war in the east by the winter of 1942. The Nazis began to carefully prepare for the offensive. A breakthrough of the front was planned in the direction of Voronezh and Stalingrad.
In developing their plans, the Nazis counted that the American-British imperialists would not come to the aid of the Soviet Union, that they would not land their troops on the coast of France in order to create a second front against Nazi Germany.
Indeed, the American-British imperialists kept delaying the opening of a second front in Europe, they wanted to exhaust and weaken the Soviet Union in such a way that after the war our country would become economically dependent on the United States of America and Britain.
In addition, they expected that a difficult war with the Soviet Union would weaken Nazi Germany; which was the most dangerous competitor of the USA and England in the world market.
On July 24, 1941, in The New York Times, American Senator Truman, who later became President of the United States, wrote: “If we see that Germany is winning, then we should help Russia, and if Russia wins, then we should help Germany . And thus, let them kill as many as possible."
Violating their allied obligations, the US-British imperialists were secretly negotiating peace with fascist Germany from the Soviet Union.

In the days of heavy Stalingrad battles, the American-British imperialists had about six million idle soldiers under arms and huge masses of military equipment. These forces and means could "provide substantial assistance to the Soviet Army, but in the summer of 1942 the American-British reactionaries raised a fuss in their newspapers that the American and British troops were not prepared for the opening of a second front in Europe.
By this they made it clear to Hitler that he could concentrate all his forces against our army without fear for his rear.
At the same time, the US and British imperialists supplied Hitlerite Germany with the most important military materials through the "neutral" countries.
Thus the US and British monopolists openly and secretly helped Hitlerite Germany in its struggle against the Soviet Union.
Choosing the Stalingrad direction, the Nazis hoped that in the Stalingrad steppes they would be able to make the most extensive use of tank and mechanized troops, quickly complete the capture of Stalingrad and Kuibyshev, and finally defeat the Soviet Army.
But they miscalculated cruelly, they did not take into account the ability of our army to resist for a long time; nor did they foresee the inexhaustible strength of our Soviet people, their unshakable will in striving to destroy the enemy.
The Supreme High Command promptly unraveled the plans of the Nazi command and developed a plan for the defeat of the fascist troops near Stalingrad. The Soviet troops were given the task of exhausting and bleeding the Nazi troops rushing to Stalingrad in stubborn battles, and then encircling them and destroying them. This plan was successfully implemented.

In the battles that unfolded between the bend of the Don and the Volga, our army dealt heavy blows to the Nazi troops, destroying the elite Nazi regiments and divisions and holding back the advance of the Nazi troops. To go the distance from the Don to Stalingrad, the Nazis had to fight bloody battles for about two months. Only in mid-September, the Nazi troops were able to approach the outskirts of the city.

At Stalingrad, the Nazis met resistance and stubbornness of the Soviet troops and workers of Stalingrad enterprises unprecedented in the history of wars.
The enemy threw division after division into battle, but all his attempts to capture the city were shattered against the staunch defense of our troops. The approaches to the city and the ruins of city blocks were littered with the corpses of the Nazis. The enemy's strength was fading. The heroic defenders of Stalingrad smashed the elite Nazi troops and prepared the conditions for their complete defeat.
Soviet artillery played a particularly important role in this battle; it waged a fierce and protracted struggle against the fascist German tank and mechanized troops on the far and near approaches to Stalingrad and delayed their advance. Artillerymen with the fire of their guns blocked the path of the infantry and tanks of the enemy, inflicting huge damage on him in manpower and equipment. By this, the artillery made it possible for our troops to prepare the defense of the city.
Artillery of all calibers took part in the heroic defense of Stalingrad, from small-caliber guns to high-powered guns. Together with ground artillery, our anti-aircraft artillery destroyed the enemy in the air and on the ground.
The interaction of artillery fire with infantry was very well organized. Defensive battles in Stalingrad were very active. Our units continuously counterattacked the enemy and kept him in a tense state, in constant expectation of an attack.
During September - October and the first half of November 1942, the Nazis made an average of 10 attacks per day. The struggle was for every inch of Soviet land, for every quarter, for every house, for every floor of the house. Soviet soldiers, including artillerymen, heroically defended the city. They turned every quarter, street, house into fortresses, which destroyed fresh reserves brought into battle by the Nazi command.
In the same months, the Nazis launched 4 offensive operations that lasted several days; they threw more than ten divisions into battle at the same time, supported by 400-500 tanks.
The German fascist invaders managed to break into the city, but they could not completely capture it.
The defenders of Stalingrad remembered the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - "Stalingrad must not be surrendered to the enemy" - and sought to defend the glorious Soviet stronghold on the Volga at any cost. The soldiers of the Stalingrad Front wrote to Comrade Stalin: “Before our battle flags, before the entire Soviet country, we swear that we will not disgrace the glory of Russian weapons, we will fight to the last opportunity. Under your leadership, our fathers won the Battle of Tsaritsyno, under your leadership we will win now in the great battle of Stalingrad! The defenders of Stalingrad kept this oath with honor.
Thousands of Stalingraders - residents of the city - took part in street battles.
Here is one typical case. The Nazis tried to force the Russian woman to help them bypass the house, which was defended by our machine gunners. This attempt cost the Nazis dearly. The woman led the enemy soldiers into the courtyard under the fire of our shooters and shouted: “Shoot, comrades!” Almost all the Nazis were killed. One of the Nazis, wounded, shot at the woman. When our shooters ran up to her, she said: "Still, I was not mistaken." Glory to the nameless heroine!
The defensive battles of the Soviet Army near Stalingrad were only the first stage of the Battle of Stalingrad. Heroically resisting, the defenders of Stalingrad stopped the advance of the Nazis in the Stalingrad direction.

The destructive fire of the Soviet artillery produced enormous devastation in the disposition of the enemy.

During the defensive battle, which lasted from mid-July to November 19, the Nazi armies were bled dry. They lost 182,000 killed and over 500,000 wounded. In addition, our troops knocked out and destroyed 1,450 enemy tanks, 4,000 machine guns, over 2,000 guns and mortars. Anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft destroyed 1,337 aircraft. All this affected the morale of the Nazis and made them talk about the "impregnability of the Stalingrad fortress", about the "Volga Verdun", about the "incomprehensible stubbornness of the Russians."
Corporal Walter wrote in a letter home: “Stalingrad is hell on earth, Verdun, Red Yerden with new weapons. We attack daily. If we manage to occupy 20 meters, then in the evening the Russians will push us back.”
But, despite heavy losses, the Nazis decided to hold their positions near Stalingrad during the winter, and in the summer to start the offensive again in order to achieve their crazy goal - to capture Moscow.
Even while fierce battles were going on in the streets of the city, our new units and formations armed with new military equipment capable of defeating the enemy were concentrated in the Stalingrad region.
To defeat the enemy, it was necessary to concentrate a large number of troops and military equipment. Especially much was needed for artillery, the main striking force of the advancing fronts. Artillery was supposed to crack the enemy defenses with its fire and ensure the transition of our troops to the counteroffensive. In the silence of the night, the roar of engines was constantly heard. It was guns, tanks, cars moving towards the front" and there was no end in sight to the long columns of people and equipment. All preparations for the offensive were carried out covertly. Troops approached the front only at night. During the day, they took refuge in settlements and in numerous beams, carefully disguising themselves from airborne observers! enemy. Our troops carefully prepared for the upcoming battles. A lot of work in the preparatory period was done by the Soviet artillery reconnaissance. She identified important targets on which artillery was supposed to bring down her fire. Much attention was paid to the organization of interaction between various branches of the armed forces.
Finally, by mid-November, preparations for the offensive were completed. The task was to surround and completely destroy all the enemy divisions that had broken through to Stalingrad.
To do this, our troops in close cooperation were to break through the front of the Nazis and defeat them in the sector of the middle reaches of the Don and south of Stalingrad, and then, with a swift blow of the mobile troops in the direction of the Don, surround the Nazi hordes at Stalingrad and destroy them.
On November 19, 1942, according to the plan developed by the Supreme High Command, the Soviet troops launched a decisive counterattack.

Before the start of the offensive of the infantry and tanks, artillery preparation of an unprecedented force was carried out. Thousands of guns and mortars rained down on the enemy positions a huge number of shells and mines. A sudden powerful fire strike was inflicted on the enemy's centers of resistance on the front line and in the depths of the defense, on his mortars and artillery batteries, on command posts, on reserves. The whole area was, as it were, plowed up by a gigantic plow of war. The surface of the earth was pitted with many craters from explosions of shells, mines and aerial bombs. Entire enemy units ran out of trenches and dugouts and rushed from side to side in a panic, finding no escape. The losses of the Nazis in manpower and equipment were enormous. Despite the fog, which limited visibility, our artillery did an excellent job with its tasks.
Enemy trenches and fortifications were destroyed by massive artillery fire. On the first day of the offensive, artillery from only one front destroyed and suppressed 293 heavy machine guns, 100 artillery and 60 mortar batteries, destroyed 196 dugouts, 126 defensive structures. Artillery fire destroyed a lot of enemy soldiers and officers.
Having broken through the front of the enemy, our troops began to move forward rapidly. Our artillery advanced along with the troops and did not lag behind them.
During the offensive, the Soviet gunners showed great skill in controlling massive fire. They smashed the enemy fortifications and accompanied our attacking infantry, cavalry and tanks with fire.
Thus began the rout of the Nazi army, a rout in which Soviet artillery played an outstanding role.
As a result of a well-organized infantry offensive in cooperation with artillery, tanks and cavalry on November 23, a 330,000-strong group of selected Nazi troops was surrounded. The history of wars knows no example of the encirclement and complete defeat of such a huge mass of troops armed with the latest technology.
In December 1942, Hitler addressed the encircled troops with a special order - he demanded at all costs to hold positions near Stalingrad.
The Nazi command made desperate attempts to save the encircled troops. To assist them in the areas of Tormosino and Kotelnikovo, the Nazis created two strong groupings of troops, 8 divisions each, which were supposed to break through the ring of Soviet troops around Stalingrad.
In December, our troops defeated both of these enemy groupings and continued to develop the offensive further and further to the west.

So ingloriously ended the attempts of the Nazis to free their encircled armies.
Meanwhile, our troops, who surrounded the main Nazi group near Stalingrad, were preparing to destroy it.
In the last, decisive battle, according to the plan of our Supreme High Command, it was necessary to dismember the encircled enemy troops into parts and then destroy each isolated enemy grouping separately. Artillery was entrusted with the task of paving the way for infantry and tanks through the enemy's fortifications, suppressing and destroying his firepower and manpower.
On January 10, at 08:50, from the point of the commander of the troops of the front, there was a command to begin the offensive. The air shuddered from the thunder of the artillery cannonade, which simultaneously began on the entire front. Squadrons of our bomber and attack aircraft appeared in the sky.
The offensive of our troops was supported by strong artillery fire. Artillery was used in large numbers and provided good fire for the actions of our infantry and tanks.
The sounds of shots and explosions of artillery shells, mines and air bombs merged into a continuous rumble. Losses inflicted on the enemy

the fire of our artillery, mortars and aircraft were very significant. According to the testimonies of the prisoners, "whole battalions knelt down and turned to God with a prayer, asking for mercy and to protect them from the fire of Russian artillery."
Our tanks with landing troops landed on them rushed at the enemy; after them went on the attack infantry units. For two weeks, units of the Soviet Army, advancing from the west, with fierce battles moved east to Stalingrad, and by the end of January 26, 1943, in the Mamaev Kurgan area, they joined with the troops of General Chuikov, advancing from Stalingrad.
The Nazi troops were cut into two parts: the northern one in the area of ​​the tractor factory and the Barrikady plant, and the southern one in the northwestern half of the city.
On January 31, the southern grouping of Nazi troops was finally defeated; On February 1, our troops launched an assault on the northern grouping of enemy troops. After artillery preparation, the enemy defenses were broken through, and the next day our troops defeated this last enemy center of resistance. Our artillery honorably fulfilled the tasks assigned to it. Suffice it to say that in the period from January 10 to February 2, artillery fire

98 tanks were hit and burned, more than 70 batteries were suppressed and destroyed, about 1000 wood-and-earth firing points and over 1500 dugouts were destroyed. Several tens of thousands of fascist invaders died under the explosions of shells and mines.

Our anti-aircraft artillery provided great assistance to the advancing troops. In the battles near Stalingrad, anti-aircraft artillery shot down 223 enemy aircraft and disabled a large number of aircraft.
The front commander reported to the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief that the destruction of the encircled Stalingrad grouping of enemy troops had ended at 4 pm on February 2, 1943.
The battle of Stalingrad ended with the complete defeat of the 330,000-strong selective Nazi army, which consisted of 22 divisions.

The size of the battle, unprecedented in history, is indicated by the numbers of enemy losses. At the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, 147,200 corpses of the killed Nazis were picked up and buried in the ground. In the period from January 10 to February 2, the troops of the front destroyed about 120,000 and captured 130,000 Nazi soldiers and officers.

In addition, it was captured: guns - 5762, mortars - 1312, machine guns - 12701, tanks - 1666, armored vehicles - 216 and many other property.
Thus ended one of the greatest battles in the history of warfare - the Battle of Stalingrad. In the battles near Stalingrad, the role of artillery in modern warfare was especially clearly revealed as the most formidable weapon, as the main striking force of the Soviet Army. On the example of the Battle of Stalingrad, it became clear on what a large scale it is necessary to use artillery to achieve victory in modern warfare. The Stalingrad victory showed how much the military skill of our soldiers, officers and generals had grown.

The battle of Stalingrad put an end to the offensive of the Nazi troops deep into our country. The mass expulsion of the invaders from the Soviet land began. The word "Stalingrad" has become a symbol of the courage and heroism of the Soviet people. It echoed in the hearts of all honest people of the world and raised them to fight against fascism, to fight for their freedom and independence.

The defeat of the Nazi army at Stalingrad forced imperialist Japan and Turkey, a secret ally of fascist Germany, to refrain from any intention of openly opposing the Soviet Union.

SOVIET ARTILLERY IN THE BATTLE OF KURSK
Back in January-February 1943, our troops defeated the Nazis in the region of Voronezh and Kursk and pushed the Nazi troops far to the west.
A protrusion formed in the outlines of the front, which protruded deeply into the enemy's disposition. At this turn, the front stabilized, and both belligerents began to prepare for summer hostilities.

The Nazi army intended to once again break through the front of the Soviet Army. By strikes from the north and south, the Nazis wanted to pincer the Kursk grouping of our army in order to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops concentrated in the Kursk region, to capture Kursk on the fifth day of the offensive, and then move on to Moscow.

In order to imagine the scale of this battle, it is enough to say that the Nazi command concentrated in the Kursk direction: over 430 thousand soldiers and officers, more than 3 thousand tanks, including new heavy tanks "tiger" and self-propelled guns "Ferdi-nand", 6763 guns, 3200 mortars and 1850 aircraft, including about a thousand bombers.
And this plan of the enemy was timely unraveled by the Soviet command. The necessary measures were taken to prevent the Nazi command from carrying out its plans. The troops defending Kursk were prepared both for defense and for the offensive.
The Soviet Army, taking into account its rich experience in the battles near Moscow and Stalingrad, was preparing for decisive battles with the enemy.
Our troops created powerful defenses in the areas of a possible offensive by the Nazis in order to wear down and bleed the enemy in defensive battles, and then go on to a decisive counteroffensive and defeat the enemy.

Artillerymen carefully prepared for the upcoming battles. They studied the experience of past battles, improved their skills, learned to beat the enemy for sure.
On the night of July 5, when the Nazis concentrated large forces in the initial areas for the offensive, our artillery, 10 minutes before the start of the offensive, made a powerful fire attack on the enemy. Several hundred guns suddenly rained their shells on the Nazi positions. Artillery smashed the enemy's infantry, its tank and motorized troops, which were preparing for the offensive, as well as the enemy's batteries, observation and command posts.

The crushing fire of artillery and mortars inflicted huge losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment and lowered the morale of the fascist troops. As a result of a powerful artillery fire raid, the Nazis lost 90 artillery and mortar batteries, 10 warehouses with ammunition and fuel were blown up, 60 observation posts were suppressed, many tanks and other military equipment were knocked out.

A sudden attack by our artillery and mortars upset the battle formations of the infantry and tanks of the enemy. Having suffered heavy losses in artillery, the Nazis were forced to shift part of the tasks of artillery to aviation. Only a few hours later the Nazis recovered from the unexpected blow and were able to launch their offensive.
And when the Nazis nevertheless went on the offensive with large forces of tanks and infantry, they met fierce resistance from the Soviet troops. The famous Battle of Kursk began.
South of Orel and north of Belgorod, battles flared up, unprecedented in their fierceness and in the amount of military equipment used in them. In the northern direction from the Orel region, the Nazis threw into battle 7 tank, 2 motorized and 11 infantry divisions, and from the Belgorod region - 10 tank, one motorized and 7 infantry divisions, the bulk of which operated along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. Tanks and self-propelled guns were the first to go on the offensive. The infantry moved behind the tanks in armored personnel carriers. Enemy bombers in large groups, wave after wave, covered their advancing troops.

Despite the huge forces, the Nazis were unable to break through our defenses. They were met by strong massed fire from our artillery and defending troops. Enemy tanks took off into the air, exploding in minefields, catching fire from well-aimed shots of artillerymen and armor-piercers. Five times the Nazis rushed to the attack, but to no avail. Fierce fighting continued throughout the day. The enemy failed to achieve major successes. On the Oryol and Belgorod directions, at the cost of heavy losses, the fascist troops only wedged a few kilometers into our location.
On July 11, a fierce tank battle of unprecedented size unfolded again, in which more than 1,500 tanks and large aviation forces participated from both sides. In one day of battle, the enemy lost over 400 tanks and did not advance a meter. Already on the seventh day after the start of the offensive, the northern grouping of troops was stopped, and on the twelfth day, the southern one. By July 13, the Nazis, as a result of huge losses, were forced to stop the offensive on the entire front. The new campaign against Moscow ended in complete failure for the Nazis.
The plan of the Nazi command collapsed. The stable, pre-prepared defense of the Soviet troops turned out to be really insurmountable.
An exceptionally large role in the battles near Kursk was played by our artillery, which took upon itself the brunt of the struggle against the masses of fascist heavy and light tanks, which were trying to make a breach in our defenses. The struggle of Soviet guns with enemy armored vehicles ended in victory for the Soviet gunners. In the first three days of fighting alone, Soviet artillerymen, together with other branches of the armed forces, destroyed 1,539 enemy tanks and self-propelled guns.
Artillerymen steadfastly and courageously fought against enemy tanks and heroic deeds increased the glory of Russian artillery. In some cases, the gunners fired to the last shell, and then switched to hand-to-hand combat. Here is an example of the courageous struggle of “Soviet artillerymen with enemy tanks.
In the battle near Ponyri, a large group of enemy tanks and infantry moved towards Sergeant Sedov's gun. Sergeant Major Sedov, letting the enemy within 200 meters, opened fire on the tanks. He fired from the gun at the most vulnerable places of the tanks, not allowing the enemy to come to his senses. In a short period of time, Sedov knocked out four "tigers" from his gun and destroyed up to 100 enemy soldiers. And when an enemy shell broke the gun, then Sedov and his comrades took anti-tank grenades and continued to fight with fascist tanks.
An invaluable service to the ground troops was provided by anti-aircraft artillery, which acted jointly with them on the battlefield. Anti-aircraft artillery in the battles near Kursk destroyed 660 enemy aircraft.
Having exhausted and bled the elite fascist divisions in the Battle of Kursk, our troops broke through the enemy front and themselves launched a counteroffensive, which then unfolded into a powerful offensive along a front stretching over 800 kilometers. Powerful defensive lines prepared in advance, deeply echeloned and fortified centers of resistance, created by the Nazis for almost two years, were destroyed by our artillery, which operated jointly with other branches of the armed forces.
As a result of the defeat of the Nazi armies near Kursk, the myth of the Nazis was dispelled that "Russians can only advance in winter." Soviet troops proved that in summer they break through enemy defenses and conduct an offensive just as well as in winter.
On August 5, 1943, the Soviet Army, after intense street fighting, captured Orel and Belgorod. On this day, in the capital of our Motherland - Moscow - the first artillery salute sounded in honor of the victory of our troops, who liberated Orel and Belgorod. Since then, every major victory of the Soviet troops began to be celebrated with artillery salutes.
The Battle of Kursk played an important role during the Great Patriotic War. On the significance of the battle of Kursk, the Chairman of the State Defense Committee, I. V. Stalin, said: “If the battle of Stalingrad foreshadowed the decline of the German fascist army, then the battle of Kursk put it before a catastrophe.”
After the defeat near Kursk and Kharkov, all the hopes of the Nazis to stay in the east collapsed.
The continuous offensive of the Soviet Army to the west began.
1943 was a turning point in the Great Patriotic War. The major victories of the Soviet troops were not only of great importance for the Soviet-German front, but they also influenced the entire course of the Second World War.
In 1944, the Soviet Army delivered ten crushing blows to the enemy, as a result of which up to 120 divisions of Nazi Germany and its allies were defeated and put out of action. In these decisive battles, the Soviet artillery, as always, honorably performed all the tasks assigned to it.
Having expelled the Nazi troops from the borders of our country, the Soviet Army shifted its combat operations to enemy territory. Soviet troops, advancing to the west, liberated one after another the countries enslaved by Nazi Germany. And only after it became obvious that the crushing blows of the Soviet Army were inevitably fatal and the Soviet Union alone would finish off Nazi Germany and its satellites, the American and British generals were forced to hurry up with the opening of a second front with a delay of two years.
However, despite the existence of a second front in Western Europe, the main forces of the fascist German armies were still on the Soviet-German front. Our army continued to bear the brunt of the war on its shoulders.
The offensive of the Soviet Army in the winter of 1944/45 was one of the largest in the entire war. In terms of the number of troops and military equipment participating in it, in terms of the strength of the blows, this was an offensive unparalleled in the history of wars. Suffice it to say that in just 40 days of our offensive, the Nazis lost: over 1,150,000 soldiers and officers captured and killed, about 3,000 aircraft, more than 4,500 tanks and self-propelled guns, and at least 12,000 guns. With a mighty blow, the artillery broke the enemy defenses on a 1,200-kilometer front from the Baltic to the Carpathians; by the end of January 1945, the Soviet Army cleared the territory between the Vistula and Oder rivers from enemy troops, thwarted the Nazi offensive on the Western Front in the Ardennes and reached the last fortified lines that covered the capital of Nazi Germany - Berlin.

SOVIET ARTILLERY IN THE BATTLE FOR BERLIN
The battle for Berlin began in the second half of April 1945, when our troops captured bridgeheads on the Oder and Neisse rivers.
The Nazi command understood that the fate of Berlin would be decided on the Oder, therefore, throughout the vast territory from the Oder to Berlin, a system of heavily fortified defensive lines with numerous concrete firing points and other engineering structures was created in advance.
Every inch of land in this area was prepared for defense; the presence of numerous lakes, rivers, canals, a dense network of settlements with stone houses further strengthened the defense.
Berlin and the approaches to it were also turned into a fortified area. On the outskirts of Berlin, the Nazis built an additional three powerful lines of fortifications. Berlin was divided around the circumference into eight sectors of defense, the city center was most heavily fortified.
Barricades, anti-tank barriers and concrete emplacements were built on every street. To defend the approaches to Berlin, the Nazis put up several armies. All special units, military schools and academies were also sent to defend Berlin. Members of the Nazi Party were mobilized to create tank destroyer brigades, which were armed with Faust cartridges (a new jet weapon for fighting tanks). Separate battalions were specially trained for street fighting. In total, in the Berlin direction, the Nazi command concentrated up to half a million troops with a huge amount of combat equipment.
Soviet soldiers were irresistibly striving for Berlin in order to quickly put an end to the fascist beast in its lair.
By order of the command in the artillery units, a struggle began for the honor of firing the first shot at Berlin. In the units, the appeal of the Military Council of the front was read with enthusiasm, which said: “Fighting friends! Comrade Stalin, on behalf of the Motherland and the entire Soviet people, ordered the troops of our front to defeat the enemy on the nearest approaches to Berlin, capture the capital of Germany - Berlin and hoist the banner of Victory over it.
To complete this last battle, such an amount of manpower and military equipment was concentrated that made it possible to break the resistance of the fascist troops in the shortest possible time and capture Berlin. No other operation involved so much artillery as it was concentrated for the attack on Berlin.
The preparation of the offensive was carried out very carefully and secretly,
The Nazis did not know when our offensive would begin.
On April 14, 1945, our artillery suddenly opened powerful hurricane fire along the entire front. The enemy took this as the beginning of the offensive of our troops. But there was no offensive from our side, and the Nazis calmed down, believing that the offensive had failed. In fact, artillery firing was undertaken for reconnaissance purposes.

The attack was scheduled for another day.
The beginning of the general offensive against Berlin was announced by a salvo of a huge mass of artillery and mortars. On the night of April 15-16, a blow of unprecedented force was suddenly dealt to the enemy's defensive lines.
After artillery and aviation preparation, the Soviet infantry, tanks and self-propelled guns went on the attack. The rapid offensive of our troops was supported by artillery fire and air bombing strikes.
Our attack turned out to be unexpected, stunning for the enemy. Our tanks quickly crushed the advanced positions and broke into the enemy defense zone. Destroying trenches, breaking barriers, destroying the enemy and his firepower, Soviet tanks and infantry were rapidly moving forward. The Nazis did not expect such a powerful blow, their resistance was quickly broken. The defeated Nazi divisions began to retreat to Berlin. Parts of the Soviet Army pursued the enemy on the heels and on April 20 approached the capital of Germany.
At 11 o'clock on April 20, the division commander, Major Zyukin, was the first to open fire on the lair of the fascist beast - Berlin. Artillery

the fire kept growing - following the batteries of Major Zyukin, other batteries entered the battle. The closer our troops approached Berlin, the more the resistance of the Nazis increased.
After five days of fierce fighting, our troops surrounded Berlin, and on April 21, the assault on the city itself began.
Our warriors met with pre-prepared defenses. The Nazis blocked the streets with numerous blockages and barricades. Groups of multi-storey buildings were turned into powerful strongholds with many firing points. Soviet troops had to knock out the enemy from every street, from every building. Fierce fights took place on the stairs of multi-storey buildings, in basements, on roofs. From building to building, from block to block, our infantrymen, artillerymen, mortarmen, tankers, sappers, and signalmen advanced forward with a fight.
In these difficult conditions, our gunners brilliantly coped with the tasks assigned to them. Rolling out their guns for direct fire, they destroyed enemy firing points, destroyed their defenses and cleared the way for infantry and tanks. Brave Soviet artillerymen, under enemy fire, rolled their guns on their hands through dilapidated barricades and rubble.
Our artillery helped the infantry and tanks to cross the river Spree and canals, of which there are a lot in the city. Having suppressed the enemy's defenses on the opposite bank, artillery ensured the capture of coastal quarters.
So, clearing quarter after quarter, our troops, supported by artillery fire, made their way to the city center, to the Reichstag building.
Before the assault on the Reichstag, the last short artillery preparation was carried out, after which our infantry rushed to the attack and broke into the building. The battle for the capture of the Reichstag lasted several hours.
At 2:20 p.m. on April 30, 1945, the Reichstag was taken. The banner of the Victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany was hoisted over Berlin.
At 3 pm on May 2, 1945, the Berlin garrison unconditionally surrendered to the victorious Soviet troops.
With their crushing blows, Soviet artillery contributed to the final defeat of the Nazi troops defending Berlin.
41,000 artillery pieces and mortars took part in the battle for Berlin, firing a huge number of shells and mines with a total weight of over 26,000 tons.
In the bloody battles for Berlin, which lasted sixteen days, about 150,000 Nazi soldiers and officers were killed; over 300,000 Nazis were taken prisoner by Soviet troops. (475)
The greatest offensive in history of the heroic Soviet Army ended in the complete defeat of the Nazis and brought the peoples of Europe liberation from the terrible tyranny of Hitlerism.
* * *
The victorious Battle of Berlin ended the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against Nazi Germany. In commemoration of the victory over Nazi Germany on May 9, 1945, on Victory Day, the capital of our Motherland saluted the valiant troops of the Soviet Army with thirty artillery volleys from a thousand guns.
However, there was another threat of an attack on our Motherland - from imperialist Japan, which for decades provoked military clashes in the Far East.
On the borders with the Soviet Union, Japan concentrated its best, selected troops - the 1.5 million Kwantung Army, which relied on numerous field and long-term defensive fortifications.
In order to eliminate this last hotbed of war and secure the Soviet Far East from the threat of a military attack, it was necessary to defeat the Japanese Kwantung Army and force Japan to unconditional surrender.
Three months after the end of the war in Europe, the Soviet Army, true to its allied duty, began military operations against the Japanese Kwantung Army.
On the night of August 9, 1945, the Soviet Army, the ships of the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Flotilla dealt crushing blows to the enemy. The defeat of the Japanese army began.
Despite the difficult conditions, the fighting of our troops was distinguished by great swiftness. The retreating Japanese units did not have time to prepare for battle, as they were already overtaken by shells of Soviet artillerymen.
Thanks to such swiftness and high mobility, Soviet artillery, along with infantry and tanks, in a short time fought through the whole of Manchuria and ended its military campaign on the shores of the Yellow Sea.
By their combat actions, the Soviet artillery contributed significantly to the defeat of the Japanese army.
On September 2, 1945, militaristic Japan recognized itself as defeated and surrendered unconditionally.
The military war of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany in the West and against the Japanese militarists in the Far East was victoriously completed.
Having won the Second World War, the Soviet people defended the freedom and independence of our Motherland and saved the peoples of Europe from the threat of fascist enslavement.
The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War was the victory of the new Soviet social and state system, the victory of our Armed Forces.
Everything that is told in this book shows how diverse and responsible the combat work of gunners is, how much knowledge they must have in order to successfully cope with their work.
“To be a good artilleryman,” said Comrade Voroshilov, “especially an artillery commander, means to be a comprehensively educated person. Perhaps not a single type of weapon requires such a discipline of mind, will and knowledge from the commander and fighter as artillery.
On the battlefield, gunners must be proactive, bold and courageous; the fate of the battle very often depends on their courage and heroism.
The Great Patriotic War showed that all these qualities are fully possessed by the gunners of our glorious Soviet Army who are selflessly devoted to their Motherland.
Having such a cadre of artillerymen, our artillery, armed with the most advanced artillery equipment, together with other branches of the armed forces, will ensure the victory of the Soviet Army over any enemy, if he dares to interfere with the peaceful and victorious movement of the Soviet people towards their great goal - communism.
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government have always shown and continue to show tireless concern for the defense capability of our Motherland. The 19th Congress of the Communist Party, outlining the majestic program for building communism in the USSR, set before the Communist Party the task of strengthening in every possible way the active defense of the Soviet Motherland against the aggressive actions of its enemies.
Our people, defending the cause of peace with all means, can boldly rely on their Soviet Army and its main striking fire force, artillery.

SOVIET ARTILLERY

IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Report 35 pages, 9 figures, 5 tables, 9 sources.

combat use of artillery, grouping of artillery, artillery offensive, artillery preparation for attack

The object of the study is domestic artillery, the history of its development during the Great Patriotic War, the improvement of the material part, forms and methods of its combat use.

The aim of the work was to study the experience in solving issues of combat use: maneuver and massing of artillery, grouping and control of artillery, planning and organizing an artillery offensive, organizing anti-tank defense, planning and conducting counter-training during the Great Patriotic War in all types of military operations.

Based on the results of the work, a teaching aid is being prepared for publication and a report is made at a military scientific conference.

Introduction

2 Artillery combat

Conclusion

List of sources used

Introduction

Despite the fundamental transformations that have taken place in the development of means of destruction, all types of weapons and military equipment, the progress of modern artillery weapons and the theory of the combat use of rocket troops and artillery is unthinkable without a deep study and use of the experience of the Great Patriotic War.

Soviet artillery played an exceptionally important role in the Great Patriotic War and became the main firepower of the Ground Forces. She was the backbone of the defense of the Soviet Army and was the force that helped stop the enemy. In the battle near Moscow, the myth of the invincibility of the fascist army was dispelled. Formidable fighting qualities were demonstrated by Soviet artillery in the great battle on the Volga. In the battles near Kursk, artillery played a decisive role with its fire in creating a turning point in the course of hostilities, and then ensured the advance of our troops.

The strategic offensive of the Soviet Army after the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk continued until the very end of the Great Patriotic War. Each operation of our troops began under the thunder of artillery cannonade of hundreds and thousands of guns and developed with continuous artillery escort. In defense, anti-tank artillery was the main one. It accounts for over 70% of the destroyed enemy tanks. Respect for artillery was so great that since 1940 it was called the "god of war".

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, our artillery increased quantitatively by 5 times. The Soviet Union surpassed Germany in the production of guns and mortars by 2 and 5 times, respectively, the USA - by 1.3 and 3.2 times, England - by 4.2 and 4 times. During the war, our industry provided the front with 775.6 million shells and mines, which made it possible to inflict crushing fire strikes on the enemy. The power of artillery, mass heroism and the military skill of Soviet artillerymen together ensured victory in this difficult war.

The paper considers the development of ground artillery during the Great Patriotic War.

1 The development of artillery on the eve and during the Great Patriotic War

1.1 Development of the materiel of artillery

During the years of the pre-war five-year plans, various design bureaus carried out work to modernize the existing equipment of artillery, which was aimed at increasing the firing range, increasing the rate of fire, increasing the angles of fire, increasing the power of ammunition, etc. At the same time, new systems were being developed.

The first new weapon of our Soviet artillery was the 76-mm regimental gun of the 1927 model. And although the gun was heavy and had an insufficient horizontal angle of fire, it remained the best regimental gun of that time.

In the 1930s, 37 mm and 45 mm anti-tank guns were adopted. The latter was a powerful means of dealing with all types of tanks of that time.

A major achievement of Soviet scientists and Soviet industry was the creation of a 76-mm gun mod. 1939 (USV), 122-mm howitzers mod. 1938 (M-30), 152 mm howitzer-cannon 1937 (ML-20), 203 mm howitzer mod. 1931 (B-4) (Figures 1, 2).

The main tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War are given in Table 1.

In the prewar years, mortars were recreated. The number of mortars in the Red Army increased sharply after the military conflict with Finland, where the fighting showed the high effectiveness of these weapons.

Table 1 - The main tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War

So, if during the whole of 1939 1678 82-mm battalion mortars were produced, then from January to April 1940 they were released 5322. At the beginning of the war, mortars of caliber 37 mm, 50 mm, 82 mm, 107 mm were in service and 120 mm.

The first work on the creation of self-propelled artillery began in the 1920s at the Commission for Special Artillery Experiments, the most complete research and experiments unfolded in the 1930s. Some samples were tested in a combat situation on the Karelian Isthmus, but for a number of reasons, none of the self-propelled artillery mounts was put into service.

Much attention was paid to the creation and development of jet weapons. By the beginning of 1941, an experimental batch of BM-13 combat installations was manufactured, in February they switched to their factory production, and already on June 21, 1941, a decision was made on the comprehensive development of multiple launch rocket systems and on the immediate deployment of their mass production.

Thus, thanks to the care on the part of the party and the government, the Red Army entered the Great Patriotic War, having, in the main, modern artillery materiel. A number of guns fully met the requirements of wartime, some of them were in service until the end of the war. But combat practice required the presence of new types of artillery, ammunition, instruments and means of propulsion.

By the end of the war, in ground artillery, the share of anti-tank guns was 14%, for firing from closed firing positions - 86%. In artillery for firing from closed firing positions, guns accounted for 36%, mortars - 61% (excluding 50-mm mortars), BM RA - 3%.

The main anti-tank gun of the Soviet Army in the first period of the war is a 45-mm cannon mod. 1937 (Figure 3)

The modernization of this gun in 1942 further increased its anti-tank capabilities. In 1943, a new system entered service - a 57-mm anti-tank gun of the 1942 model ZIS-2. During the Second World War, not a single army in the world had an anti-tank gun whose combat characteristics would exceed those of the ZIS-2.

To improve the armor of enemy tanks, Soviet designers responded with the creation of a 100-mm field gun of the 1944 model BS-3. The gun had high ballistic data, combined the qualities of an anti-tank and hull gun (firing range of 20 km). The gun was distinguished by the originality of the design of the nodes and their layout.

In 1943, to replace the regimental 76-mm cannon mod. In 1927, a new system arrived, which was distinguished by ease of production and higher maneuverability. By imposing a 76-mm barrel on a carriage of a 45-mm gun mod. In 1942, a regimental 76-mm cannon mod. 1943 (ob-25).

Starting from 1942, the divisional artillery was put into service, instead of the 76-mm cannon mod. 1939 (USV), a new 76-mm gun mod. 1942 ZIS-3. It became not only the best, but also the most massive gun of the Second World War - the artillery of the Red Army received over 48 thousand of these guns. The rate of fire of the ZIS-3 was 25 rounds per minute, and the firing range was 13 km. If necessary, the gun could be controlled by one person. Many gunners from the ZIS-3 crews became Heroes of the Soviet Union for single-handed fights with several enemy tanks.

With the restoration in 1943 of the corps control link, it became necessary to have a corps howitzer. Along with the modernization of the samples created in the pre-war period, a hull 152-mm howitzer of the 1943 model D-1 was developed. This gun was also created by imposing the barrel of a 152-mm howitzer of the 1938 model (M-10) on the carriage of a 122-mm howitzer of the 1938 model (M-30) with the introduction of a number of design changes. The main performance characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army, produced during the Great Patriotic War, are shown in Table 2.

On the basis of pre-war developments and experience in the use of rockets in pre-war conflicts, the development of rocket artillery continued. Dozens of types of unguided missiles and launchers were used in the Great Patriotic War. The best known are BM-8, BM 13 (Figure 4). In March 1944, a self-propelled launcher for M-31 shells on the Studebaker chassis - BM-31-12 was put into service.

The main direction of improving rockets during the war was to improve accuracy, as well as to increase the weight of the warhead and the range of the projectile. The main tactical and technical characteristics of the rockets of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War are given in Table 3.

Table 2 - The main performance characteristics of the artillery systems of the Red Army, produced during the Great Patriotic War

During the war, the number of mortars increased by almost six times. This is due to the high combat qualities and the ability to ensure their mass production at a lower cost. The 82-mm battalion and 107-mm mountain pack mortars (1943) underwent modernization. 37-mm and 50-mm mortars did not receive further development and were withdrawn from service. 120-mm regimental mortar mod. 1938 in 1943 (Figure 5) was also upgraded. The result was a system that to this day, with minor improvements in combat formation. In 1944, a 160-mm mortar was adopted. The design feature of the mortar was that it had an inseparable wheeled carriage and was loaded from the breech.

Table 3 - The main performance characteristics of rockets of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War

Self-propelled artillery received its development, in essence, only during the war years. At the end of 1942, the SU-76 light self-propelled guns, based on the T-70 tank, equipped with a 76-mm ZIS-3 gun, were put into service. The gun was located in an armored wheelhouse open at the top and rear. It was first used in combat in January 1943 and was successfully used until the end of the war.

At the end of 1942, the production of self-propelled guns SU-122 began on the basis of the T-34, from August 1943 the medium SU-85 entered the fight against enemy tanks, which at the end of 1944 was replaced by the new SU-100.

Heavy installations such as ISU-122 and ISU-152, which were nicknamed "St. John's Wort", were created in 1944 on the basis of the heavy tank IS-2. There are cases when ISU-152 shells tore down towers from heavy enemy tanks. These self-propelled guns were used to escort all types of tanks and infantry in battle, successfully fought against heavy tanks and self-propelled guns of the enemy, and were also used to destroy other defensive structures, having perfectly shown their fighting qualities during the assault on the forts of Koenigsberg and during street fighting in Berlin.

Since 1943, self-propelled artillery was removed from the subordination of the Commander of Artillery of the Red Army and subordinated to the Commander of Armored and Mechanized Troops, in combat use it was equated with tanks and is not considered further in this work.

1.2 Development of artillery organization

The development of the organizational forms of Soviet artillery took place depending on the economic capabilities of the country and the specific conditions of warfare. Two stages can be noted in the development of artillery organization. At the first stage, which coincides with the first period of the Great Patriotic War, organizational forms adapted to the conditions of defense and the material capabilities of the state. The transition of the Soviet Army from defense to offensive operations marked the beginning of the second stage in the development of artillery organization. Naturally, at each stage, the decisive factor was our ability to provide the troops with materiel.

During the war, organizational changes took place both in the military artillery and in the artillery of the RVGK. At the very beginning of the war, an imbalance was revealed between the military artillery and the RVGK. Their specific gravity was 5 and 95%. This was, as before, a consequence of ideas about the purely maneuverable nature of a future war. The mistake had to be corrected immediately.

Already in July 1941, due to the weakening of the artillery of rifle formations, the artillery of the RVGK was strengthened. It could be maneuvered, massaging artillery in the main directions. Thus, the overall degree of use of the capabilities of the armed forces in operations increased. In general, the artillery of the RVGK received the greatest development, especially with the transition of the Red Army to strategic offensive operations. By the end of the war, its share increased to 50%. By the way, in the Wehrmacht, measures to increase the artillery of the RGK were taken too late, and its share did not exceed 18%.

Military artillery developed evolutionarily. It was based on the regular artillery of rifle divisions. Corps artillery existed at the beginning of the war, in 1941 it was transferred to the RVGK artillery, and reappeared with the restoration of the corps. There was no army artillery before the war and at the beginning of the war; it began to be created in the spring of 1943.

The staff of the rifle division during the war years changed 6 times. During the course of the war, the artillery of the divisions was strengthened mainly by mortars. The main staff was established in December 1942. Fundamental changes relate to divisional artillery. So, in July 1941, the second (howitzer) artillery regiment was withdrawn, and at the end of 1944, an artillery brigade of three regiments (including a regiment of 160-mm mortars), an anti-aircraft battalion, a battalion of self-propelled installations, anti-tank division (armed with 76-mm guns). The number of guns and mortars in the division increased to 282.

In the rifle corps, according to the state of 1943, there was a corps artillery regiment. Since December 1944, the guards rifle corps usually had two artillery regiments or an artillery brigade of two regiments.

In April 1943, army artillery appeared as part of the combined arms army: cannon and anti-tank artillery regiments, and a mortar regiment. In 1944, on the basis of cannon regiments, two-regiment cannon artillery brigades began to be created in the armies.

The artillery of the RVGK grew especially rapidly. Its numbers increased primarily due to light artillery and mortars. In total, during the war years, the number of mortars in the artillery of the RVGK increased 17 times, guns - 5 times. Therefore, the artillery of the RVGK was a means, first of all, of quantitative reinforcement of the artillery of combined arms formations and associations in the main directions

In the artillery of the RVGK, the number of individual units continuously increased, especially in 1942. By the end of the first period of the war, it had 199 cannon regiments, 196 howitzer, 240 anti-tank, 256 anti-aircraft, 138 jet, 83 mortar. This led to a sharp increase in the number of reinforcement artillery in the fronts. Even in the defensive operation near Stalingrad, some fronts had up to 70 reinforcement regiments. To control such a mass of artillery and quickly create the necessary groupings, it was necessary to form fundamentally new artillery formations of the RVGK - artillery and guards mortar (rocket artillery) divisions, breakthrough artillery corps. Along with them, there were separate artillery, mortar and guards mortar brigades. In order to massively use artillery forces and means in the fight against tanks, anti-tank regiments and brigades were created in the artillery of the RVGK.

The first artillery divisions, created in the autumn of 1942, consisted of eight regiments (two cannon, three howitzer and three anti-tank, a total of 168 guns). Since 1943, brigade artillery divisions have been created, as well as breakthrough artillery corps. The breakthrough artillery division included six brigades (light, howitzer - all three regiments each, cannon - two regiments, heavy howitzer and howitzer of high power; a total of 356 guns and mortars), in 1944 the division included seven brigades.

In the summer of 1941, instead of 72-gun brigades, 16, 20, 36-gun regiments began to be created in anti-tank artillery, armed with 37, 45, 76 or 85-mm guns. Since July 1942, all anti-tank artillery was renamed anti-tank artillery, and the regiments received a single organization (5 batteries, 20 guns). In 1943, a more expedient form of organization was found - an anti-tank artillery brigade. She had three regiments (60 guns) of 45, 57 and 76 mm caliber. In 1945, the brigades were partially rearmed with 100 mm guns.

The creation of large artillery formations was a new moment in the organization of artillery. They became in the hands of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command a powerful means of quantitatively and qualitatively strengthening the artillery of the fronts and armies operating in the direction of the main attack. With their creation, the possibilities of massing artillery and maneuvering its large masses in battle and operation have increased. It was due to her that it became possible to create artillery groups at all levels, from the regiment to the army. This orderly system of artillery groups lasted more than 50 years.

1.3 Development of the combat use of artillery in offensive and defensive operations

In the first major offensive operations of the Red Army in late 1941 and early 1942. serious shortcomings were identified in the combat use of artillery, in the organization and conduct of the offensive by formations and formations. Thus, in the counter-offensive near Moscow, artillery was distributed relatively evenly in the zones of the advancing armies, which did not make it possible to achieve fire superiority over the enemy.

One of the main requirements of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was the decisive concentration of forces and means in the area of ​​the proposed breakthrough. Gradually, the maneuver and massing of artillery outgrew the tactical framework and was carried out on an operational, and even strategic, scale.

Since the second half of 1942, there has been an increase in the number of artillery in the breakthrough areas of formations (combinations) and an increase in the degree of its massing, which is characterized by the width of these areas and the number of guns, mortars and rocket artillery located on them.

In offensive operations in the breakthrough areas, the following operational densities were created: in 1941-1942. - up to 70-80; in 1943 - up to 130-200; in 1944 - up to 150-250; in 1945 - 250-300 guns and mortars per 1 km of the breakthrough area.

The decisiveness of the massing is evidenced by the fact that with the width of the breakthrough sections, which accounted for 10-15% of the total length of the front line, up to 80-90% of all artillery was concentrated on them.

The quantitative and qualitative growth of artillery as a branch of service during the war, the increased scale of maneuver and massing of artillery in the main directions of formations and formations in battles and operations forced the search for new forms of its combat use.

The basis of the combat use of artillery is the distribution of its forces (formations) and the choice of forms and methods of fire engagement of the enemy.

Until 1944, i.e. before the troops were saturated with RVGK artillery, artillery groups were created according to the nature of the tasks performed, i.e. on a target basis.

The grouping of artillery during this period is very diverse: infantry support groups (PP), long-range (DD), destruction artillery (AR), guards mortar units (GMCH), direct fire guns (OPN) and others. The development of the grouping is reflected in Table 4.

In 1944, an artillery grouping system was developed, created according to the organizational and tactical principle. In special instructions, approved by the artillery commander of the Soviet Army, the most appropriate grouping of artillery, corresponding to the nature of modern combat and operations, was determined. It provided for the creation of a regimental artillery group (PAG) in a regiment, a divisional artillery group (DAG) in a division, a corps artillery group (KAG) in the corps, and an army artillery group (AAG) in the army.

Artillery groups created in combined arms formations from the regiment to the army were intended to solve problems in the interests of these formations. For example, the PAG supported rifle battalions, fought mortars, and sometimes enemy artillery. With the development of the offensive, part of the artillery from the regimental group was reassigned to the commanders of the battalions of the first echelon, which ensured closer interaction between artillery and combined arms units with the development of combat in depth and increased the independence of the advanced units of the regiments.

For divisional artillery groups, the main objects of destruction were artillery and enemy reserves. In addition, by decision of the division commander, in the most critical periods of the battle, the divisional group, in whole or in part, was involved in reinforcing the fire of regimental artillery groups, especially when breaking through the defenses of enemy first-echelon battalions, repelling counterattacks by his brigade (divisional) reserves, and breaking through intermediate defense lines on the move in depth, etc.

The army (corps) artillery group, created to solve problems in the interests of the main grouping of the army (corps), was able to successfully fight enemy artillery, inflict defeat on his reserves in concentration areas, on the march and during deployment, disrupt enemy control, increase artillery fire divisions of the first echelon and to support the entry into battle of divisions of the second echelon.

Depending on the situation, sometimes an army (corps) artillery group, by decision of the army commander (corps commander), was divided into subgroups of divisions operating in the main direction. Along with the AAG, a group of GMCH (Guards mortar units) was created in the army, later called the Army Rocket Artillery Group (AGRA).

Artillery anti-tank reserves (APTRez) were created in armies, corps and divisions to destroy enemy tank groupings that had broken through.

The new grouping of artillery had fundamental differences from the previously created one. Groups were to be created at all levels of the combined arms command and report directly to the combined arms commander. Groups have become an organic part of the combined arms combat formation and operational formation of troops. During the battle and operation, they did not disintegrate, but could only change their composition, supporting units and formations at all stages of the battle and operation.

The unification of artillery into artillery groups ensured the possibility of massive use of artillery assets by the corresponding artillery commanders and the continuity of interaction between artillery and infantry and tanks for the entire period of the battle. First of all, the effectiveness of fire destruction of the enemy by artillery increased.

The beginning of a new stage in the development of the combat use of artillery, primarily fire damage to the enemy, was the directive letter of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated January 10, 1942 No. 03 on an artillery offensive.

Its essence boiled down to three basic requirements, without the fulfillment of which one cannot count on the success of the offensive; this is a decisive massing of means and forces in the breakthrough sector, the continuity of artillery support for the offensive, and the organic combination of fire and strike by the advancing troops.

“Artillery should not operate randomly,” the directive said, “but concentratedly, and it should not be concentrated anywhere on the front, but in the area of ​​\u200b\u200boperation of the shock group of the army, the front. ... In order to make artillery support real and the infantry offensive effective, it is necessary to move from the practice of artillery preparation to the practice of artillery offensive. ... Artillery cannot be limited to one-time actions for an hour or two hours before the offensive, but must advance together with the infantry, must fire at short breaks throughout the offensive until the enemy’s defensive line is broken to the full depth.

For the first time, an artillery offensive was carried out in January 1942 in the offensive zone of the 20th Army of the Western Front when breaking through the enemy defenses on the river. Lama. And in full in the operation of the group of fronts, it was carried out in November 1942 in the counteroffensive near Stalingrad. In subsequent years, all issues of the artillery offensive developed and improved.

The artillery offensive was divided into three periods - artillery preparation, artillery support for the attack, and artillery escort by infantry and tank fire during the battle in depth.

The artillery preparation of the attack (APA) was planned in all cases in the most detailed way. Its duration and formation depended on the specific conditions and differed significantly from one another, which is presented in Table 5. This made it possible to avoid a pattern that could lead to the loss of tactical surprise. The achievement of tactical surprise also determined the desire to conduct a relatively short APA.

The duration of the artillery preparation of the attack, as a rule, was 1-2 hours. But depending on the specific conditions, the APA was planned to be both longer and shorter. So, the longest APA was in the Svir-Petrozavodsk operation of the Karelian Front in 1944 - 3 hours 32 minutes (including 30 minutes of fire control), a three-hour artillery preparation for the attack was carried out during the assault on the Koenigsberg fortress. The shortest artillery preparation was in the 5th shock army in the Berlin operation - 20 minutes. By the end of the war, in view of the increase in the number of artillery involved, they sought to reduce the duration of artillery preparation to 40-20 minutes.

The main content of the APA was massive artillery strikes on the entire tactical depth of the enemy's defense. At the same time, depending on the nature of the enemy's defense (increase in depth, separation of battle formations, transition to trench, multi-position defense), as well as on the amount of artillery involved, the depth of simultaneous suppression of defense objects changed. So, in 1941-1942, when the enemy's defense was focal and shallow, massive artillery fire was conducted mainly to a depth of 1.5-2.5 km and on artillery batteries. In 1943, when the Nazi troops switched to trench defense and the depth of its main line increased, massive artillery fire was carried out to a depth of 3-4 km or more, in 1944 - up to 6-8 km and in 1945 - up to 8-10 km.

Artillery preparation began, as a rule, with a sudden powerful fire raid, which was achieved in a short time by inflicting maximum losses on the enemy who did not have time to hide, and was directed primarily against manpower and fire weapons in the strongholds of the first line or in the first trench. By the end of the war, the duration of the first fire raids increased compared to 1941-1943. from 3-5 to 10-15 min.

In order to reduce artillery preparation, especially strong structures were destroyed in a few days or on the eve of the offensive. For example, in the Krasnoselsk and Vyborg operations of the Leningrad Front, the destruction period was one day; during the assault on Koenigsberg by the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, the period of opening and destruction was four days; during the Crimean operation by the 4th Ukrainian Front - two days.

Carrying out (since 1942) on the eve or on the day of an offensive reconnaissance in force by the forces of advanced battalions or reconnaissance detachments required a partial re-planning in a limited time of the original version of the artillery offensive. In this regard, in 1945, advance planning of several options for artillery preparation and attack support was practiced, depending on the actions of the advanced battalions. Thus, the gap between the completion of the battle of the advanced battalions and the introduction of the main forces into battle was eliminated.

Artillery preparation ended with a powerful fire raid lasting 5-10 minutes (1941-1943) or 15-25 minutes (1944-1945).

The fire raid, which ended the artillery preparation for the attack, was planned to be powerful and was carried out with an increase to the maximum fire regime. In its power and character, it, in fact, did not differ from the artillery fire at the beginning of the artillery support of the attack. This sought to eliminate a noticeable transition from artillery preparation to attack support. As a rule, one of the fire raids on enemy artillery and mortar batteries blocked the moment of the end of artillery preparation and the beginning of artillery support. Consequently, the enemy's batteries were subjected to strong fire at the most crucial moment, when the infantry and tanks began the attack.

In a number of cases, to deceive the enemy, false transfers of fire were successfully used, which, if well organized (with a simultaneous demonstration of the attack), gave good results. However, the complexity of their implementation and the lengthening of the period of artillery preparation forced the abandonment of false transfers of fire.

Artillery support for an attack was carried out, as a rule, to the depth of defense of the regiments of the first echelon, and the method of its implementation depended on the nature of the enemy's defense. The main methods were sequential concentration of fire, a single fire shaft, and a combination of both. In addition, the gunners of the 1st Belorussian Front developed and first used in the Belorussian operation of 1944 a double fire shaft. Other types of attack support methods were also used - a growing barrage, a sliding method, a combing fire, a mortar barrage, etc.

Using various combinations of types of fire, massively attracting artillery, it was possible to achieve success. For example, in the Oryol offensive operation, artillery support for the attack in all armies was planned differently. So, in the 11th Guards Army, the following method of artillery support for the attack was chosen: combing artillery fire at the lines every 100 meters to a depth of 500-700 m was prepared. For each strong point or center of resistance, occupied by forces up to a battalion, the fire of 5-6 divisions was concentrated. The fire on each object was carried out for 5-10 minutes, and with repeated attacks - up to 15 minutes.

The depth of artillery support for the attack increased and reached 3-4 km by the end of the war. At the same time, Soviet artillery successfully coped with the task of organizing support for an attack by infantry and tanks at night (Berlin operation of the 1st Belorussian Front).

In the offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War, great experience was gained in the implementation of the third period of the artillery offensive - escorting infantry and tanks during battle in the depths of the enemy's defenses.

The fire support of the battle in depth was based on the principle of the continuity of the interaction of artillery with infantry and tanks. It was achieved by reinforcing the infantry units with direct escort guns, assigning artillery spotters to tanks, by creating artillery groups capable of providing fire support to the infantry at any time, and by timely massing artillery and its fire in the main directions of the offensive.

The escort of infantry and tanks during the battle in the depths of the enemy's defense was carried out by escorting them with fire and wheels and was carried out by concentrated fire of divisions, individual batteries and guns at targets that prevented advance. For direct support of the formations during the battle in depth, they were given anti-aircraft artillery units, anti-tank regiments on mechanical traction, and when they were introduced into the gap, part of the howitzer regiments and rocket artillery regiments were reassigned to them. Artillery attached to mobile formations was successfully used to repel enemy counterattacks and deliver fire strikes against resistance nodes. She followed in the columns of tank and rifle formations closer to their heads, which made it possible to quickly put artillery into action. Detailed planning of the third period of the artillery offensive was carried out for the first time in the counter-offensive operation near Stalingrad.

One of the important problems in the use of artillery in the war was the organization of the fight against enemy artillery. The counter-battery battle was usually planned, depending on the situation, by the artillery headquarters of the corps, the army, and, more rarely, the front. The main goal of the counter-battery fight was to suppress the batteries. On the Leningrad front, the destruction of enemy artillery batteries was also used. In offensive operations, the fight against enemy artillery was usually assigned to long-range groups and began simultaneously with the artillery preparation for the attack. It was planned in most detail for the first two periods of the artillery offensive.

The organization of counter-mortar combat proved to be a more difficult problem, mainly due to the difficulties of reconnaissance of mortar batteries. Since the fight against mortars had its own specifics, special divisional and corps counter-mortar groups were created for its conduct, which consisted mainly of howitzer and mortar units.

The development of the combat use of artillery in defense took place in close connection with the development of forms and methods of conducting defensive battles and operations. Experience shows that the importance of artillery in defense has steadily increased. The main tasks solved by artillery were the fight against enemy artillery, its tanks, the defeat of advancing groupings, and covering the combat formations of troops from the air.

The difficult conditions in which the war began, the forced retreat of the Soviet troops, heavy losses in people and military equipment (including artillery), the need to conduct defense in wide lanes led to a number of shortcomings in the combat use of artillery in the first period of the war (especially in summer- autumn campaign of 1941). The most serious shortcomings include: uniform distribution of artillery between divisions and within divisions along the entire defense front (including anti-tank artillery); insufficient organization of a wide and flexible maneuver by artillery means (especially in combat operations in the summer of 1941). But, despite the shortcomings that took place, artillery was of decisive importance in defeating the advancing enemy groupings.

Due to the heavy losses that the enemy suffered from the blows of our troops, he was forced to abandon the offensive in several directions and concentrate his efforts on one. This raised the problem of organizing the maneuver even more. Meanwhile, it could be successfully carried out only if the troops held the defensive lines occupied, preempting the enemy in concentrating additional forces and means.

Under these conditions, the task of artillery, especially military artillery, was to support the infantry while holding defensive positions and to promptly build up artillery resources at the expense of RVGK artillery. The High Command took every measure to concentrate the maximum amount of artillery to defeat the main enemy groupings. With the increase in the number of artillery, the possibilities for operational and tactical maneuver by artillery in defense also increased.

An example of a decisive maneuver by artillery on the defensive is the concentration of up to 50% of all artillery of the RVGK in the zones of operations of fronts in the western direction in the fall of 1941. The same picture - in the south-western and Stalingrad directions. So, in the summer of 1942, there were only 4282 guns in the Stalingrad direction, and by the end of defensive operations their number increased to 12000. Military artillery also participated in the maneuver.

As a result of the maneuver, the density of artillery in the defense increased. The operational density of artillery in operations in the main directions reaches 50-80, and in secondary directions - 15-20 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front. In the defensive operation of the 13th Army of the Central Front near Kursk in 1943, the density of artillery reached 105 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front (this was the highest density of artillery in defense during the war).

The grouping of artillery on the defensive did not qualitatively differ from its grouping on the offensive, but artillery groups had less artillery than on the offensive. However, there were exceptions. In 1942, during the period of defensive operations near Stalingrad, a front-line artillery group was created for the first time. In those specific conditions, when the most important task of the front was to hold a large city, the creation of such a group fully justified itself. In defensive operations near Leningrad, experience was gained in creating a front-line artillery group for counter-battery combat. Its basis was the 3rd Leningrad counter-battery artillery corps.

When creating an artillery grouping, as well as in an offensive, it became necessary to have artillery groups in the hands of each combined arms commander. In addition, the defense provided for the creation of various artillery reserves (anti-tank and general).

The artillery fire system was built for the entire depth of defense. The basis of the fire system was the fire of artillery and mortars from closed firing positions, combined with the fire of direct fire guns and machine gun fire. The artillery fire system included: long-range fire attacks, concentrated fire, mobile barrage fire, fixed barrage fire, direct-fire guns.

Artillery counter-preparation (AKP) occupied a special place in the fire defeat of the enemy in the defense. The AKP was prepared in the presence of a sufficient amount of artillery and time to prepare the fire system and was carried out on the scale of the army (and sometimes the front). In the autumn of 1941, it was carried out in the armies of the Northwestern and Western fronts, in September-October 1942 - in the armies of the Stalingrad Front, in 1943 - on the Central and Voronezh fronts near Kursk and in other defensive operations of the war.

Thus, powerful AKP, in order to disrupt the enemy's attack on Leningrad, which was being prepared, were carried out on September 12 and 21 in the zone of operations of the 42nd Army. Their duration ranged from 15 to 30 minutes. More than four artillery regiments were involved, as well as artillery of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and coastal artillery. They fully achieved their goal, the enemy attacks began scattered and were not successful.

In the defensive battle near Moscow, the command of the Western Front provided for artillery counter-preparation in the zones of operations of the 20th, 16th and 19th armies. The AKP was planned according to four options, depending on the possible directions of enemy attacks, up to 300 guns were involved. Enemy attacks in the center of the Western Front were weakened by artillery counter-preparation and were unsuccessful.

The defensive battle near Kursk began with a powerful artillery counter-preparation, which preempted the start of the enemy offensive by 10 minutes. The AKP was planned in advance on the scale of the Central and Voronezh fronts according to several options. The average density of artillery was 30 guns and mortars and 3 rocket artillery installations per 1 km. In the most important areas, the density reached 60-70 guns and mortars. The duration of counter-training is 30 minutes. Powerful artillery strikes were unexpected for the enemy, as a result, the enemy began his artillery preparation with a delay of 2 hours, disorganized and scattered. The first blow of the enemy was significantly weakened, his troops suffered losses even in their original position, were upset and demoralized. In total, 0.5 combat sets of ammunition were used for artillery counter-training.

In the organization and conduct of artillery counter-training, there is a noticeable tendency to increase the number of artillery used in it, which significantly increased the effectiveness of counter-training.

Anti-tank defense received great development during the war. Before the war, it was considered as a combination of fire from individual direct-fire guns on individual tanks and concentrated fire from indirect firing positions on groups of tanks in areas of their accumulation or during movement and attack. It was also envisaged the creation of anti-tank guns, and in the event of a breakthrough of tanks in the area of ​​​​the main firing positions of artillery, direct fire with batteries at closed firing positions.

However, at the beginning of the war, significant shortcomings in the organization of anti-tank defense were revealed, the most important were: the lack of proper interaction between artillery and other means of combat (tanks), underestimation of engineering obstacles and obstacles, insufficient density of anti-tank artillery and its even distribution along the front; shallow depth of anti-tank defense; artillery from closed firing positions fought tanks only sporadically.

Taking into account these shortcomings, in July 1941, the Red Army artillery headquarters developed for the troops "Instructions on the organization of the artillery fire system in the defense." Here the demand was put forward - to counter the massive use of enemy tanks with the massive use of anti-tank weapons and, first of all, artillery.

These problems, in the end, were solved by developing an anti-tank defense system, which is a system of anti-tank strongholds and areas, as well as anti-tank reserves.

Anti-tank strongholds created by artillery assets merged with infantry strongholds, representing a single system of combined arms defense. This gave them greater stability in the fight against enemy tanks, with submachine gunners on tanks and with infantry advancing behind tanks. For greater stability of the defense of individual strongholds, close interaction was organized between them along the front and depth, and the fire of strongpoints was linked into a single interacting system, first on the scale of divisions, then corps, armies, and, finally, the front.

Areas occupied only by artillery and prepared to fight tanks with direct fire became known as anti-tank areas. They were created, as a rule, in the depths of defense

An even more robust anti-tank defense system was developed in 1944. Since that time, it included company anti-tank strongholds, united in battalion anti-tank units, anti-tank areas (as part of anti-tank artillery, tanks and self-propelled artillery installations), artillery and anti-tank reserves. The role of artillery, which occupied closed firing positions, increased more and more in the fight against tanks. It was now located in tank-hazardous directions and conducted massive fire on enemy tank groups, and with a breakthrough of tanks into the depths of the defense, it hit them with direct fire.

Gradually, an insurmountable anti-tank defense was developed and created in the tactical and operational zones of the struggle. Already in the defensive period near Stalingrad, this system was quite perfect, but its classic expression was the anti-tank defense system in the Battle of Kursk.

New in anti-tank artillery defense was the gradual development of tactics for the combat use of artillery and anti-tank reserves. At first they were allocated in armies, divisions, then on the fronts. Artillery and anti-tank reserves began to be allocated in the operational zone for each (or two adjacent) directions. Hence the need arose to organize interaction between them and other reserves of divisions, corps, armies and fronts, as well as between them and the system of anti-tank strongholds and areas formed by the troops of the first echelons.

The developed anti-tank defense system proved its viability - it turned out to be insurmountable for enemy tank groups.

2 COMBAT ARTILLERY

2.1 Artillery management of the Soviet Army

In July 1941, the post of chief of artillery of the Red Army was restored, to which colonel-general of artillery N.N. Voronov was appointed, and the Main Directorate of Chief of Artillery of the Red Army was formed. It included a headquarters, a combat training department for ground and military anti-aircraft artillery, an inspector, a personnel department and several departments.

The Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army (GAU KA), which worked under the direct supervision of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, as well as in close contact with the headquarters of the Logistics of the Red Army, was engaged in providing the army with weapons and ammunition. There were military representatives at industrial enterprises who were responsible for the quality of weapons and ammunition supplied to the troops. GAU KA also carried out maintenance, evacuation and repair of weapons and military equipment. To solve these problems, the Artillery Supply Department, the Artillery Operations Department, the Artillery Repair Department, the Tractor Department and others were created in the GAU KA.

On November 8, 1942, an NPO order was issued to increase the role of artillery commanders in directing the combat activities of artillery. The chiefs of the artillery of the Red Army, the front, the army became, respectively, the commanders of the artillery of the Red Army, the front, the army, the corps. The commander of the artillery of the Red Army was at the same time the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense.

By a GKO decree of April 29, 1943, the guards mortar units were subordinate to the commander of the artillery of the Red Army. The commander of the GMCH became the deputy commander of the artillery of the Red Army for guards mortar units. Major General of Artillery P. A. Degtyarev was approved for this position. The complete integration of the HMC with artillery contributed to a more accurate planning of the enemy's fire engagement and their more expedient combat use, taking into account the fire capabilities of artillery.

By the same decree of the State Defense Committee, under the commander of artillery of the Red Army, a Military Council was created consisting of Colonel General of Artillery N. D. Yakovlev, Major Generals of Artillery P. A. Degtyarev, L. M. Gaidukov and I. S. Prochko.

Colonel-General of Artillery N. N. Voronov was the Commander of the Artillery of the Red Army, the Commander of the Air Defense of the country and was the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on many fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

At the very beginning of the war, he personally developed and submitted to the State Defense Committee specific proposals on the organization of anti-tank defense. N. N. Voronov was the author of a new, more advanced artillery structure, which provided for the creation of artillery brigades and divisions of the RVGK, and then breakthrough artillery corps. Under his direct supervision, methods for the combat use of rocket artillery were developed, as well as a Directive letter from the Supreme Command Headquarters on an artillery offensive.

Under his leadership, the artillery headquarters, which was headed by Colonel-General of Artillery F.A. Samsonov throughout the war, developed and introduced new methods of combat use of artillery, methods of controlling concentrated, massive and accompanying fire into the troops. So, summarizing the first experience of using a double fire shaft on an operational scale, N. N. Voronov issued instructions on organizing and mastering it by all artillery commanders and headquarters.

N. N. Voronov rendered great and effective assistance to the chiefs of artillery of the fronts in the development and implementation of plans for an artillery offensive. During the liquidation of the encircled enemy grouping near Stalingrad, being the Representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command at the Don Front, he participated in organizing an artillery offensive, in which for the first time in the practice of the Great Patriotic War a fire shaft was used to a depth of 1.5 km.

January 18, 1943 N. N. Voronov, the first in the Soviet Armed Forces, was awarded the rank of Marshal of Artillery.

2.2 Artillery feats of arms

The success of artillery combat operations was determined not only by the presence of modern equipment, but also by its skillful use, the heroism of the artillerymen, and the high combat and moral qualities of all the personnel of our artillery.

The special merits of artillery to the Fatherland are marked by the assignment of honorary titles to a number of its units and formations, primarily guards. In January 1942, eight regiments that distinguished themselves in the battle near Moscow became the first in the artillery to become guards. During the war years, this title was awarded to six artillery divisions, 7 divisions of rocket artillery, 11 anti-tank brigades, 64 artillery regiments and others. More than 2100 artillery formations and units were awarded military orders.

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The development of artillery after the Second World War as formations, units and subunits armed with guns, mortars, rocket launchers and anti-tank projectiles, reconnaissance, communications, traction, transport and fire control devices.

Consider its effectiveness and the effectiveness of the armored forces visually. Taking as a point of reference the most accurate criterion of effectiveness - the number of enemy soldiers destroyed.

I'm not going to calculate the number of tanks, guns and mortars that took part in the battles to one. It is not necessary. We are interested in the order of the numbers.

So that there is no cry, we will take the initial figures from the most kosher ones from the tables of reference work:

Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR
Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU
Institute of General History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR
Institute of History of the USSR of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR
STORY
SECOND WORLD WAR
1939-1945
Order of the Red Banner of Labor
Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR
Moscow.

And we won’t even look closely at them, although to be honest I really want to. Ask what and how they counted in these tables.

The most massive German artillery system, the 75 mm RAK.40 anti-tank gun, was produced from 1942 to 1945, in total 23303 units were produced (2114, 8740, 11728 and 721, respectively. All figures are according to Shirokorad).

The most common howitzer of the Wehrmacht, the cornerstone of divisional artillery - 10.5 cm le.F.H.18 (in all modifications) was released during WWII in the number of 18432 units (from 1939 - 483, 1380, 1160, 1249, 4103, 9033, 1024).

A roughly comparable number fired 8.8 cm FlaK 18/36/37 anti-aircraft guns.

Let's not be petty. As a basis for calculations, we take tables No. 6 and No. 11 above, with general data.

About amendments to tables.

As we know, the Allies supplied tanks and artillery through Lend-Lease, and in fairly large quantities. We will neglect these figures, we will count them for the post-war release of tables.
We also recall that at the beginning of the war the Red Army and Navy had 117,581 artillery systems and almost 26,000 tanks; On the German side, we will balance the captured weapons of the countries captured by Hitler and the entire production of weapons and military equipment until 1940 inclusive. In general, we will calculate the efficiency based on the release of 1941-1945.

We consider (Germany-USSR):
Artillery (all in thousand pieces):
1941: 22.1 - 30.2; 1942 40.5 - 127.1; 1943 73.7 -130.3; 1944 148.2 -122.4; 1945 27 - 72.2.
mortars:
1941: 4.2 - 42.4; 1942 9.8 - 230; 1943 23 - 69.4; 1944 33.2 -7.1; 1945 2.8 - 3.
Tanks (self-propelled guns):
1941: 3.8-4.8; 1942 6.2 - 24.4; 1943 10.7-24.1; 1944 18.3 - 29; 1945 4.4 - 20.5.
Total:
Artillery:
311,5 - 482,2
mortars:
73 - 351,9
Tanks (self-propelled guns):
43,4 - 102,8
Or:
427,9 - 936,9 .

In general, the USSR produced tanks, guns and mortars more than twice as much as Germany. But that's not all! As my readers probably know, the USSR fought Germany far from alone. And whether anyone likes it or not, Hitler's losses on the Western Front (I will equate West Africa with him) are about a third of the total during WWII.

Since this material will spoil a lot of chairs at Internet pocreots, I will be kind, we will accept that although the mentioned weapons and military equipment were involved in the West, it was a quarter of its total number.

3/4 of 427.9, this is approximately 321 thousand tanks, artillery systems and mortars who killed soldiers of the Red Army and 936,9 killed soldiers of the Wehrmacht.

Round the numbers up to 320 000 and 930 000 respectively, for simplicity of further calculations. Even 350 000 and 900 000 . Think about the allies of the Reich.

Now we find out how many of each other's servicemen managed to kill.

Regarding the losses of the Soviet Union, curious people can go to reference and get acquainted with the calculations slightly refuting Grigory Fedotovich Krivosheev, with the same initial ones as his.

It must be said that shadow_ru far from alone, and the mistakes of "Vulture ..." with the calculations in the balance sheet of the re-conscripted, with a chuckle (already) have been procrastinating among people interested in the issue since at least 2006. In general, everyone who needs to know about these more than 2 million fighters knows, but no one in power is interested in this.

Total reliable figure of irretrievable demographic losses of the USSR Armed Forces (calculated by the balance method without Krivosheevsky errors with the balance) - 11 405 thousand people.

With the losses of the enemy in the "Vulture ..." is also a very funny situation, for example result of viewing the latest edition. This is just aerobatics, to recognize the figures of the German researcher Rüdiger Overmans as kosher and start to bring a new balance like this:

"After 2000, German scientists led by historian Professor Rüdiger Overmans carried out many years of work on a thorough analysis of reporting and statistical documents stored in the archives of Germany. As a result of the study, it was found that the total irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht amounted to 5 million 300 thousand soldiers and officers. This information is published in the book "German Military Losses in World War II", Munich.
Taking into account the results of the study of German scientists, the authors of this work made appropriate adjustments to the previously available information about the irretrievable losses of the countries of the fascist bloc on the Soviet-German front. They are reflected in Table. 94".

Tab. 94 corresponds to table. 201 editions of "Russia and the USSR ..." and instead of 3,604.8 thousand killed, died of wounds, etc., there were 5,300 thousand.

Further, the authors conclude that the ratio of deadweight losses was 1:1.1 (previously it was 1:1.3).
Megaperederg, do not say anything. Overmans has this number - the total number of those killed, dead and dead on all fronts, as well as in captivity.

In this situation, if Grigory Fedotovich was again a little mistaken by 2 million people, it is logical to turn to the figures he recognized as reliable, directly. So to speak, without intermediaries:

In general, the mortality figures of 46, 47 and beyond are practically the Soviet Union alone, the Allies sent the bulk of the Boches home by the end of 1945.

As a result, approximately 7.5 million Soviet soldiers and approximately 3.7 million military personnel of Germany and its allies (130,000 Romanians, 195,000 Hungarians, 58,000 Finns - I don’t know how G.F. balanced 682,000, I don’t think that the rest are Slovaks)

And now we consider the efficiency.
Not so long ago, Christoph Rass's book "Human Material. German Soldiers on the Eastern Front" (M., Veche, 2013, ISBN 978-5-9533-6092-0) was published regarding the 253rd Infantry Division operating in the east.
Impressions can be read. Among other things, it gives the ratio of shrapnel and bullet wounds among the military personnel of the division, 60 to 40%. The infantry division for 4 years of the war is a very good sample, and we dance from it.

We multiply 3.7 million soldiers of the Reich and its allies by 0.6, we get 2.22 million invaders who died from shrapnel wounds - mostly from artillery fire. Although the figure is very optimistic, the Finns have a ratio of bullet wounds to shrapnel wounds according to the results of the Continuation Wars 69% to 31%. We reset 120,000 for losses from aircraft and estimate losses from artillery (including tanks) and mortar fire at about 2 million souls. We'll drop another 100,000 on grenades. Everything here is overpriced, but so be it. I will save the hearts of the saviors of the motherland.

Based on Ozeretskovsky's Wound Ballistics, on the other side of the front, on average, the same ratio was observed during the war, adjusted for higher mortality from shrapnel wounds (scan .

2,000,000 / 900,000 = 2.22 people.
4,275,000 / 350,000 = 12.21 people .

I kiss you on the forehead. The effectiveness of enemy tanks and artillery in terms of a mortar or gun crew, a platoon, a battery, or a tank there exceeded the Soviet one by about 6 (six) times.

If anyone wants, we can jointly repeat the calculations not with approximate, but with exact figures.
I can’t imagine how this ratio can be reduced to at least 1: 5. But maybe I’m wrong?

One can continue to glorify the personnel policy of the most effective manager of the century in the 20s and the first half of the 30s with "politically valuable" graduates of artillery schools, who even at graduation have no idea about logarithms. Miracles in this world could obviously not be expected by atheists.

The fighters of these units were envied and - at the same time - sympathized with. “The trunk is long, life is short”, “Double salary - triple death!”, “Farewell, Motherland!” - all these nicknames, hinting at high mortality, went to the soldiers and officers who fought in the anti-tank artillery (IPTA) of the Red Army.

The calculation of the anti-tank guns of senior sergeant A. Golovalov is firing at German tanks. In recent battles, the calculation destroyed 2 enemy tanks and 6 firing points (the battery of Senior Lieutenant A. Medvedev). The explosion on the right is the return shot of a German tank.

All this is true: the salaries increased by one and a half to two times for the IPTA units on the staff, and the length of the barrels of many anti-tank guns, and the unusually high mortality among the artillerymen of these units, whose positions were often located near, or even in front of the infantry front ... But the truth and the fact that anti-tank artillery accounted for 70% of the destroyed German tanks; and the fact that among the artillerymen awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War, every fourth is a soldier or officer of anti-tank units. In absolute terms, it looks like this: out of 1744 artillerymen - Heroes of the Soviet Union, whose biographies are presented in the lists of the Heroes of the Country project, 453 people fought in anti-tank units, the main and only task of which was direct fire at German tanks ...
Keep up with the tanks

In itself, the concept of anti-tank artillery as a separate type of this type of troops appeared shortly before the Second World War. During the First World War, conventional field guns were quite successful in fighting slow-moving tanks, for which armor-piercing shells were quickly developed. In addition, until the beginning of the 1930s, tank reservations remained mainly bulletproof, and only with the approach of a new world war began to intensify. Accordingly, specific means of combating this type of weapon were also required, which became anti-tank artillery.

In the USSR, the first experience of creating special anti-tank guns came at the very beginning of the 1930s. In 1931, a 37 mm anti-tank gun appeared, which was a licensed copy of a German gun designed for the same purpose. A year later, a Soviet semi-automatic 45 mm cannon was installed on the carriage of this gun, and thus a 45 mm anti-tank gun of the 1932 model of the year - 19-K appeared. Five years later, it was modernized, resulting in a 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1937 model of the year - 53-K. It was she who became the most massive domestic anti-tank gun - the famous "forty-five".

Calculation of the M-42 anti-tank gun in battle. Photo: warphoto.ru

Soviet gunners are preparing to open fire with a 45-mm anti-tank gun. Karelian front.

Alas, by the beginning of World War II, the country did not have time to complete the formation of anti-tank brigades of the RGC. But even unformed, these units, which came under the command of the army and the front, made it possible to maneuver them much more effectively than anti-tank units in the state of rifle divisions. And although the beginning of the war led to catastrophic losses throughout the Red Army, including in artillery units, due to this, the necessary experience was accumulated, which rather soon led to the emergence of specialized anti-tank units.

Birth of artillery special forces

It quickly became clear that regular divisional anti-tank weapons were not capable of seriously resisting the Wehrmacht’s tank spearheads, and the lack of anti-tank guns of the required caliber forced light field guns to be rolled out for direct fire. At the same time, their calculations, as a rule, did not have the necessary training, which means that they sometimes acted insufficiently efficiently even in favorable conditions for them. In addition, due to the evacuation of artillery factories and the massive losses of the first months of the war, the shortage of main guns in the Red Army became catastrophic, so they had to be disposed of much more carefully.

Soviet artillerymen roll 45-mm M-42 anti-tank guns, following in the ranks of the advancing infantry on the Central Front.

Soviet gunners with a 45 mm anti-tank gun in December 1941. Photo: Museum of Engineering Troops and Artillery, St. Petersburg

The crossing of the artillery crew and the 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K across the river. The crossing is carried out on a pontoon of landing boats A-3

Pushkar elite

The appearance of the order was preceded by a great deal of preparatory work, concerning not only calculations, but also how many guns and what caliber the new units should have and what advantages their composition would enjoy. It was quite clear that the fighters and commanders of such units, who would have to risk their lives daily in the most dangerous areas of defense, needed a powerful not only material, but also a moral incentive. They did not assign the title of guards to the new units during formation, as was done with the units of the Katyusha rocket launchers, but decided to leave the well-established word “fighter” and add “anti-tank” to it, emphasizing the special significance and purpose of the new units. For the same effect, as far as can be judged now, the introduction of a special sleeve insignia for all soldiers and officers of anti-tank artillery was calculated - a black rhombus with crossed golden trunks of stylized Shuvalov "unicorns".

All this was spelled out in the order in separate paragraphs. The same separate clauses prescribed special financial conditions for new units, as well as norms for the return of wounded soldiers and commanders to duty. So, the commanding staff of these units and subunits was set one and a half, and the junior and private - a double salary. For each downed tank, the crew of the gun was also entitled to a cash bonus: the commander and gunner - 500 rubles each, the rest of the calculation numbers - 200 rubles each. It is noteworthy that initially other amounts appeared in the text of the document: 1000 and 300 rubles, respectively, but the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin, who signed the order, personally reduced the prices. As for the norms for returning to duty, the entire commanding staff of the anti-tank destroyer units, up to the division commander, had to be kept on special account, and at the same time, the entire staff after treatment in hospitals had to be returned only to the indicated units. This did not guarantee that the soldier or officer would return to the very battalion or division in which he fought before being wounded, but he could not end up in any other units other than anti-tank destroyers.

The new order instantly turned the anti-tankers into the elite artillery of the Red Army. But this elitism was confirmed by a high price. The level of losses in anti-tank fighter units was noticeably higher than in other artillery units. It is no coincidence that anti-tank units became the only subtype of artillery, where the same order No. 0528 introduced the position of deputy gunner: in battle, crews that rolled out their guns to unequipped positions in front of the defending infantry and fired at direct fire often died earlier than their equipment.

From battalions to divisions

The new artillery units quickly gained combat experience, which spread just as quickly: the number of anti-tank fighter units grew. On January 1, 1943, the anti-tank artillery of the Red Army consisted of two fighter divisions, 15 fighter brigades, two heavy anti-tank regiments, 168 anti-tank regiments and one anti-tank battalion.

Anti-tank artillery unit on the march.

Guards artillerymen rolling a 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K (model 1937) into a prepared trench. Kursk direction.

Soviet gunners at the 45 mm M-42 anti-tank gun. In the background is the T-34-85 tank.

Masters of "firebags"

In ambush "forty-five", 45-mm anti-tank gun model 1937 (53-K).

Soviet artillerymen from the units of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps fire at the enemy from a camouflaged position. In the foreground: 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K (model 1937), in the background: 76-mm regimental gun (model 1927). Bryansk front.

Unknown Soviet female soldiers from the anti-tank artillery unit (IPTA).

The crew of Soviet artillerymen fires from a 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1937 model (53-K) at a German tank on a village street. The number of the calculation gives the loader a 45-mm sub-caliber projectile.

Knowing all this, one is no longer surprised at the number of heroes among the fighters and commanders of anti-tank fighter units. Among them were real gunners-snipers. Such as, for example, the gun commander of the 322nd Guards Anti-Tank Regiment of the Guard, Senior Sergeant Zakir Asfandiyarov, who accounted for almost three dozen fascist tanks, and ten of them (including six "Tigers"!) He knocked out in one battle. For this he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Or, say, the gunner of the 493rd anti-tank artillery regiment, Sergeant Stepan Khoptyar. He fought from the very first days of the war, went with battles to the Volga, and then to the Oder, where in one battle he destroyed four German tanks, and in just a few January days of 1945 - nine tanks and several armored personnel carriers. The country appreciated this feat: in April, the victorious forty-fifth, Khoptyar was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Hero of the Soviet Union gunner of the 322nd Guards Fighter Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment of the Guard Senior Sergeant Zakir Lutfurakhmanovich Asfandiyarov (1918-1977) and Hero of the Soviet Union gunner of the 322nd Guards Fighter Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment of the Guard Sergeant Veniamin Mikhailovich Permyakov (1924-1990) are reading the letter. In the background, Soviet gunners at the 76-mm ZiS-3 divisional gun.

Z.L. Asfandiyarov on the front of the Great Patriotic War since September 1941. Particularly distinguished himself during the liberation of Ukraine.
On January 25, 1944, in the battles for the village of Tsibulev (now the village of Monastyrishchensky district of the Cherkasy region), a gun under the command of the guards senior sergeant Zakir Asfandiyarov was attacked by eight tanks and twelve armored personnel carriers with enemy infantry. Having let the enemy attacking column into direct range, the gun crew opened aimed sniper fire and burned all eight enemy tanks, of which four were Tiger-type tanks. The senior sergeant of the guard Asfandiyarov himself destroyed one officer and ten soldiers with fire from personal weapons. When the gun went out of action, the brave guardsman switched to the gun of the neighboring unit, the calculation of which failed and, having repelled a new massive enemy attack, destroyed two tanks of the Tiger type and up to sixty Nazi soldiers and officers. In just one battle, the calculation of the guards of senior sergeant Asfandiyarov destroyed ten enemy tanks, of which six were of the Tiger type and over one hundred and fifty enemy soldiers and officers.
The title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 2386) was awarded to Asfandiyarov Zakir Lutfurakhmanovich by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 1, 1944.

V.M. Permyakov was drafted into the Red Army in August 1942. At the artillery school he received the specialty of a gunner. From July 1943 at the front, he fought in the 322nd Guards Anti-Tank Regiment as a gunner. He received his baptism of fire on the Kursk salient. In the first battle, he burned three German tanks, was wounded, but did not leave his combat post. For courage and steadfastness in battle, accuracy in defeating tanks, Sergeant Permyakov was awarded the Order of Lenin. He especially distinguished himself in the battles for the liberation of Ukraine in January 1944.
On January 25, 1944, in the area at the fork in the road near the villages of Ivakhny and Tsibulev, now the Monastyrishchensky district of the Cherkasy region, the calculation of the guards of senior sergeant Asfandiyarov, in which sergeant Permyakov was the gunner, was among the first to meet the attack of enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers by infantry. Reflecting the first onslaught, Permyakov destroyed 8 tanks with accurate fire, of which four were tanks of the Tiger type. When the positions of the artillerymen approached the enemy landing, he entered into hand-to-hand combat. He was wounded, but did not leave the battlefield. Having beaten off the attack of machine gunners, he returned to the gun. When the gun failed, the guards switched to the gun of the neighboring unit, the calculation of which failed and, repelling a new massive enemy attack, destroyed two more Tiger-type tanks and up to sixty Nazi soldiers and officers. During a raid by enemy bombers, the gun was broken. Permyakov, wounded and shell-shocked, was sent to the rear unconscious. On July 1, 1944, Sergeant Veniamin Mikhailovich Permyakov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 2385).

Lieutenant General Pavel Ivanovich Batov presents the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal to the commander of an anti-tank gun, Sergeant Ivan Spitsyn. Mozyr direction.

Ivan Yakovlevich Spitsin has been at the front since August 1942. He distinguished himself on October 15, 1943 when crossing the Dnieper. Direct fire, the calculation of Sergeant Spitsin destroyed three enemy machine guns. Having crossed to the bridgehead, the artillerymen fired at the enemy until a direct hit broke the gun. Artillerymen joined the infantry, during the battle they captured enemy positions along with cannons and began to destroy the enemy from his own guns.

On October 30, 1943, for the exemplary performance of combat missions of command on the front of the fight against the Nazi invaders and the courage and heroism shown at the same time, Sergeant Spitsin Ivan Yakovlevich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 1641).

But even against the background of these and hundreds of other heroes from among the soldiers and officers of anti-tank artillery, the feat of Vasily Petrov, the only one among them twice Hero of the Soviet Union, stands out. Drafted into the army in 1939, right on the eve of the war he graduated from the Sumy Artillery School, and met the Great Patriotic War as a lieutenant, platoon commander of the 92nd separate artillery battalion in Novograd-Volynsky in Ukraine.

Captain Vasily Petrov earned his first "Gold Star" of the Hero of the Soviet Union after crossing the Dnieper in September 1943. By that time, he was already deputy commander of the 1850th anti-tank artillery regiment, and on his chest he wore two orders of the Red Star and a medal "For Courage" - and three stripes for wounds. The decree on awarding Petrov the highest degree of distinction was signed on the 24th, and published on December 29, 1943. By that time, the thirty-year-old captain was already in the hospital, having lost both hands in one of the last battles. And if it were not for the legendary order No. 0528, ordering the return of the wounded to anti-tank units, the freshly baked Hero would hardly have got a chance to continue fighting. But Petrov, who was always distinguished by firmness and perseverance (sometimes dissatisfied subordinates and superiors said that he was stubborn), achieved his goal. And at the very end of 1944 he returned to his regiment, which by that time had already become known as the 248th Guards Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment.

With this regiment of the guard, Major Vasily Petrov reached the Oder, crossed it and distinguished himself by holding a bridgehead on the western bank, and then participating in the development of the offensive on Dresden. And this did not go unnoticed: by decree of June 27, 1945, for the spring exploits on the Oder, artillery major Vasily Petrov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the second time. By this time, the regiment of the legendary major had already been disbanded, but Vasily Petrov himself remained in the ranks. And he remained in it until his death - and he died in 2003!

After the war, Vasily Petrov managed to graduate from Lviv State University and the Military Academy, received a PhD in military sciences, rose to the rank of Lieutenant General of Artillery, which he received in 1977, and served as Deputy Chief of the Missile Forces and Artillery of the Carpathian Military District. As the grandson of one of General Petrov's colleagues recalls, from time to time, when going for a walk in the Carpathians, the middle-aged commander managed to literally drive his adjutants who could not keep up with him on the way up ...

Memory is stronger than time

The post-war fate of anti-tank artillery completely repeated the fate of all the Armed Forces of the USSR, which changed in accordance with the changing challenges of the time. Since September 1946, the personnel of anti-tank artillery units and subunits, as well as anti-tank rifle subunits, ceased to receive increased salaries. The right to a special sleeve insignia, which the anti-tankers were so proud of, remained ten years longer. But it also disappeared over time: the next order to introduce a new uniform for the Soviet army canceled this patch.

Gradually, the need for specialized anti-tank artillery units also disappeared. Cannons were replaced by anti-tank guided missiles, and units armed with these weapons appeared on the staff of motorized rifle units. In the mid-1970s, the word “fighter” disappeared from the name of anti-tank units, and twenty years later, the last two dozen anti-tank artillery regiments and brigades disappeared along with the Soviet army. But whatever the post-war history of Soviet anti-tank artillery, it will never cancel the courage and those feats with which the fighters and commanders of the anti-tank artillery of the Red Army glorified their kind of troops during the Great Patriotic War.

Appendix 7

Deliveries and losses of artillery and ammunition in the Great Patriotic War

Table 46 Supply of artillery pieces to the fronts from June 22, 1941 to May 5, 1945

Table 47 Supply of artillery pieces to new formations in 1941–1944

Table 48 Deliveries of artillery systems by industry from June 22, 1941 to May 5, 1945

Table 51 Deliveries of tank weapons by the industry from June 22, 1941 to May 5, 1945

Table 53 Ammunition consumption in 1941–1945 (thousand pieces)

Table 54 Ammunition production 1941–1945 (thousand pieces)