The international position of the Russian in modern conditions. The role of international organizations in the modern world

From a Chain of Political Upheavals in Latin America to an Endless Political Crisis in the UK. From a series of armed attacks on tankers in the Persian Gulf to sharp fluctuations in US-China relations.

Against this complex background of chronic instability and volatility in the international situation, Russian foreign policy stood out especially clearly. Even the most irreconcilable critics of Moscow are forced to admit that in the past year the Russian line in international affairs was characterized by continuity and consistency. Far from everyone on the world stage, Russia looks like a convenient partner, but it can by no means be reproached for being an unreliable and unpredictable partner. This undeniable advantage over some other great powers inspires the respect not only of our friends and allies, but also of our adversaries and opponents.

Apparently, the coming 2020 will be characterized by a further decrease in the stability of the global system. Of course, I would like to be mistaken, but the energy of the collapse of the old system of international relations has clearly not yet been fully exhausted. It is unlikely that it will be possible to stop the chain reaction of decay so quickly - this is not a task for a year or two, but for a long historical perspective. And the task is not for one or a group of leading world countries, but for the entire international community as a whole, which, for a variety of reasons, is not yet ready to take it seriously.

Under these conditions, a natural temptation may arise to limit Russia's participation in international affairs as much as possible, to fence itself off from the unpredictable and dangerous outside world, and to focus on solving internal problems. The unwillingness to “import instability”, to become unwitting hostages of those negative processes and trends in world politics, which we are unable to manage and which no one is able to control, is understandable. The society's request for the country's leadership to focus on our internal problems, which, unfortunately, we still have in abundance, is also understandable.

But the strategy of self-isolation, even if temporary and partial, is dangerous in at least two respects. First, consistent self-isolation in today's interdependent world is almost impossible, except for such rare exceptions as North Korea. And for Russia, deeply integrated into global political, economic and social processes, any attempts at self-isolation will inevitably mean the rejection of many of the most important achievements of our foreign policy over the past 30 years. And, moreover, they will significantly slow down the solution of those internal tasks on which it is proposed to focus.

On the world stage, Russia does not look like a convenient partner for everyone, but it cannot be reproached for being an unreliable and unpredictable partner.

Secondly, the strategy of self-isolation will actually also mean Russia's self-withdrawal from active participation in the creation of a new system of international relations, in the construction of a new world order. And the creation of this new world order is inevitable in any case - the main questions are only in terms and in the price that humanity will have to pay for this world order. When the era of instability is left behind and global governance is restored in one way or another, we will have to play by the rules developed by someone else and reflecting the interests not of Russia, but of other participants in world politics.

Therefore, Russian foreign policy in the coming year, it seems, should not be limited to solving predominantly current, operational tasks in various regions of the world, although the importance of these tasks can hardly be overestimated. But no less important is the development of new principles, models and mechanisms of international cooperation for the future. Figuratively speaking, if today it is too early to start building the building of a new world order, then it is possible and necessary to select individual “bricks” and even entire building blocks for this future building today. There is something to rely on in this complex work of Russian foreign policy.

For example, in Syria, our country has accumulated a unique experience of multilateral diplomacy, which makes it possible to bring together the positions of seemingly most irreconcilable adversaries and achieve a steady reduction in the intensity of military confrontation. Russia has managed to achieve in Syria what very many not so long ago considered unattainable in principle. Obviously, in the coming year it is worth trying to extend this practice to the Middle East region as a whole, consistently developing and concretizing the Russian concept of a regional system of collective security, which is undoubtedly in demand in the Middle East.

In Asia, Russia and its partners were able to take serious steps towards building a fundamentally new democratic and open system of international institutions. Among recent achievements, suffice it to mention the expansion of the SCO, the promotion of the BRICS+ concept, the activation of the trilateral format of the RIC (Russia, India, China), impressive progress on the path of conjugation of the development of the EAEU and the Chinese One Belt, One Road project. Apparently, it is especially important here to fill the new institutional forms with concrete content. Russia, hosting the 2020 BRICS and SCO summits on its territory, could confirm its leading role in expanding the "project portfolio" of these organizations.

Russian-Chinese relations are confidently becoming an influential factor in the entire system of international relations. A further increase in the level of coordination between Russia and China in the international arena, including in the field of security, will continue to strengthen their authority and influence in world affairs.

In the European direction, the outgoing 2019, although it did not become a turning point for the better for Moscow, nevertheless brought certain positive results. Russia returned to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. It was possible to achieve common approaches of Russia and the West to resolve the political crisis in Moldova. After a long break, the mechanism of Normandy Four summits on a settlement in Donbass began to work. There has been progress in trilateral negotiations with Ukraine and the European Union on energy issues.

Europe is entering a stage of deep rethinking of its model of regional integration. And it's not just about Britain's upcoming exit from the European Union. On the agenda are acute issues of socio-economic development, regionalization, security issues, etc. Against this background, a serious political dialogue on the future of relations between Russia and Europe in all strategic areas of our relations is becoming more than in demand. And such a dialogue must begin without delay.

In the United States, the 2020 election campaign is already in full swing - not the best time to start trying to fix our bilateral relationship. But one cannot agree with those who believe that Moscow should take a break in these relations, waiting for the results of the presidential elections and the US exit from the deep political crisis that split American society three years ago. History shows that waiting for the “opportune moment” can last forever, and there are always plenty of good reasons to extend the pause again and again. If contacts with the executive branch of the United States are objectively difficult today, then we need to intensify our activity along other lines, including on the second track of our relations.

In relations with Africa, 2019 was a breakthrough year - the Sochi Russia-Africa summit not only demonstrated the existence of mutual interest in developing cooperation, but also revealed the potential for such cooperation. Now the main thing is that the momentum received does not go into the sand, and therefore 2020 in this sense should become a year of practical steps.

These and many other problems will face Russian foreign policy in 2020. Our country has already demonstrated the skills of an effective crisis manager capable of coping with the most serious current challenges to regional and global security. In addition to these skills, Russia has the opportunity to demonstrate the ability of an experienced design engineer who, together with his partners, is ready to design individual components and entire assemblies of a complex and as yet unfinished mechanism of the new world order.

2020 will be held under the banner of the 75th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War and World War II. Looking back, it should be noted that already in 1945, far from us, the victorious powers, despite deep differences on the most fundamental issues of world development, were able to agree not only on common rules of the game on the world stage, but also on the creation of a whole system of international institutions guaranteeing the preservation of global and regional stability. This system, with all its shortcomings and imperfections, served mankind for many decades.

Today, the international community faces challenges comparable in scale to those of the middle of the last century. I would like to hope that modern politicians, like their great predecessors, are aware of their historical responsibility and demonstrate statesmanship in the interests of resolving the pressing problems of our time.

article. Clause 1 of the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation dated July 23, 2009 No. 64 “On Some Issues of the Practice of Considering Disputes on the Rights of the Owners of Premises to the Common Property of a Building”8 states that since the relations of the owners of premises located in a non-residential building arising from the common property in such a building is not directly regulated by law, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Art. 6 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the norms of legislation regulating similar relations, in particular Art. 249, 289, 290 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.

Since 2009, the provisions of the aforementioned Plenum have been actively used in judicial practice and in terms of recognizing the right of common shared ownership of common property to the owners of premises located in a non-residential building9.

As a result of our excursion into the development of legal regulation in relation to common property in non-residential premises, we believe that it is necessary to fix the status of common property in non-residential premises at the legislative level and thereby establish gaps in the legislation.

1 Some legal aspects of building management. RELGA - scientific and cultural journal. No. 17. 2011, Internet resource: http://www.relga.ru/EotkopM^ebObjects/tgu-ww.woa/wa/Mam?textid=3030&1eve1 1=mat&^e12=ar11c^

2 Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation. 2005. No. 4.

3 Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation. 2002. No. 12.

4 See, for example: Decree of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Far Eastern District of December 18, 2002 No. F03-A51/02-2/2512; decrees

Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Urals District No. F09-2398/03-GK of 03.09.2003, No. F09-4495/04-GK of 20.01.2005; Decree of the FAS MO dated August 17, 2005 No. KG-A40 / 7495-05. The documents were not officially published (see ATP).

5 See, for example: Lapach V.A. Non-residential premises as objects of civil rights // Legislation. 2003. No. 4. S. 12.; Ilyin D.I. Real Estate Legislation: Problems of the Content of Used Concepts // Journal of Russian Law. 2005. No. 8. P. 150; Khurtsilava A.G. Civil law grounds for acquiring rights to non-residential premises: Abstract of the thesis. Diss... cand. legal Sciences. M., 2006. S. 9-10; Pidzhakov A.Yu., Nechuikina E.V. On the issue of legal regulation of the turnover of non-residential premises // Civil law. 2004. No. 2. S. 47.; Skvortsov A. Distribution of shares in the implementation of an investment and construction project // New Legislation and Legal Practice. 2009. No. 1.

6 Suite Yu.P. Features of ownership of the common property of apartment buildings and non-residential buildings // Laws of Russia: experience, analysis, practice. 2011. No. 6.

7 Chubarov V.V. Problems of legal regulation of real estate: Abstract of the thesis. Diss... doc. legal Sciences. M., 2006. S. 30.

8 Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation. 2009. No. 9.

9 See: Determination of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation dated August 19, 2009 No. 10832/09; Decree of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the North-Western District of October 22, 2009 No. А05-3116/2009; Resolution of the Thirteenth Arbitration Court of Appeal of St. Petersburg dated September 21, 2009 No. 13AP-7641/2009; Resolution of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the North-Western District in the case of November 18, 2009 No. А05-9710/2008; Decree of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Volga District in the case of November 10, 2009 No. A65-3807 / 2009; Decree of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Urals District dated November 09, 2009 No. Ф09-8894 / 09-С5. The documents were not officially published (see ATP).

INTERNATIONAL STATION OF RUSSIA AT THE PRESENT STAGE

DEVELOPMENT

V.N. Fadeev,

Doctor of Law, Professor, Professor of the Department of Criminology, Moscow University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation Scientific specialty 12.00.08 - Criminal Law and Criminology;

penal law Reviewer: Doctor of Economics, Candidate of Law, Professor Eriashvili N.D.

Email: [email protected] en

Annotation. An analysis of the international position of Russia at the present stage of historical development is given. Identified and substantiated trends that negatively affect the socio-political situation, the viability and security of our country in modern conditions and in the future; an assessment of their current state and development prospects is given.

Keywords: death of the Soviet empire; European metropolises; colonial possessions; authoritarian traditions; counterterrorism cooperation.

INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE CURRENT STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT

Doctor of Juridical Science, professor of Criminology department

of Moscow University MVD RF

Abstract. The author conducted the analysis of the international position of Russia on the current stage of historic development. The author identified and rationalized the tendencies that have a negative impact on the social-political situation, viability and security of our country in the modern conditions and for the future time, as well as estimated their current condition and prospect of development.

Keywords: collapse of the soviet empire; European metropolises; colonial possessions; authoritative traditions; counter terrorist cooperation.

The United States, which is facing "threats" from Al-Qaeda and Iran, growing instability in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East, the growing power and geopolitical weight of China and India, clearly does not need new enemies. Nevertheless, their relations with Russia will objectively worsen every year. The intensity of mutual rhetoric on both sides is growing, previously signed security agreements are under threat, and Moscow and Washington are increasingly looking at each other through the prism of the Cold War. Radar stations in the Czech Republic and anti-missiles in Poland do nothing to ease tensions. Ignoring the position of the UN Security Council and Russia on the issue of self-proclamation and recognition of Kosovo's independence by the US, Great Britain, Germany and France, other NATO countries and their vassals puts the world on the brink of a new redistribution. The world order, laid down after the Second World War, began to crumble before our eyes. The United States continues to equip the world according to its scenario. The West echoes them and unconditionally supports them.

China has always had and will always have a special opinion and a special status. India is still busy with its own problems. Russia remains. Of course, the United States would like to deal with obedient "Kozyrev" Russia, or at least the one it was under the late Yeltsin - let it "blather", let it "rattling", but they knew that we had almost nothing behind our souls It was.

It's not that the US didn't expect the oil price boom in recent years - they provoked it themselves - they didn't expect the oil genie to pull Russia out of the debt swamp so quickly. Russia today begins to rise from its knees. And this cannot but irritate the US and the West. It should be noted that our relations with Japan in the last years of Putin's rule somehow faded into the background. This does not indicate the loss of our interest in contacts with Japan. This says more about the weakening of the combined influence of Japan on the world stage.

Undoubtedly, the main reasons for the disappointment of the United States and the West in Russia were the increasing independence in domestic and assertiveness of Moscow in foreign policy. However, the US and the West also bear a considerable share of the responsibility for mutual cooling and the gradual disintegration of bilateral ties. To reverse the situation, Russia has only gas in its hands. But one gas may not be enough.

But the United States is especially annoyed and the West is alarmed by the “disordered” transformation of Russia, according to their scenario, from an expansionist communist empire into a great Power of the traditional type, which sets itself ambitious tasks of modernizing the economy, and hence the army. The United States in relation to Russia will still have to rely on the opinion prevailing in Washington that the Reagan administration won the Cold War in general, alone. And only, they say, the United States is the winner in the Cold War. There were two winners in World War II - the USSR and the USA and allies, and the world became bipolar. Today, according to the same logic, the world should become unipolar. In fact, this is not so, and, undoubtedly, the majority of Russian citizens perceive the collapse of the Soviet state in a completely different way.

The collapse of the USSR is, of course, the greatest defeat of our Fatherland, perhaps in its entire history. A great state has been destroyed - in fact, an empire. But this is the outside. The US and the West did indeed win the Cold War, but in this case, the victory of one side does not mean the defeat of the other. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and their advisers believed that they, along with the United States, also belonged to the number of winners in the Cold War. They gradually came to the conclusion that the communist system was not suitable for the USSR, and especially for Russia. In their opinion, they acted in the best interests of their country, and did not need any external pressure. This psychology is akin to psi-

chology of the Vlasovites or other traitors during the war who served the enemies of the Fatherland in the name of the notorious idea of ​​fighting the Bolsheviks.

But here we must not forget about the deep goals of the destruction of our state - this is the last stronghold of Orthodoxy, a huge territory and huge resources. Even if someday, however, hypothetically, Russia becomes a more democratic country than the United States, the desire to destroy us will still remain. Of course, the realities of the XXI century. more than once will force the United States to reconsider its strategy towards Russia. From a geopolitical point of view, Russia is a bridge between East and West, between North and South. This means that Russia is a bridge between world civilizations.

Regardless of the world order (unipolar or multipolar), the world always strives for the form of communicating vessels for the movement of people and capital. And here you can’t do without the Russian bridge. Control over the bridge is a very important argument for the future policy of the superpowers. And who are they, the superpowers, today and tomorrow? The answer is obvious - USA, Europe (West) and China. If in the XX century. the thesis was relevant - whoever controls Eurasia controls the world, then tomorrow the emphasis may shift to the level of a bridge. And Russia may find itself at the epicenter of superpower interests. And here, in order to dictate the rules on its own bridge and not be under the bridge, Russia will have to be strong and independent both economically and militarily-politically. There is simply no other way. One-sided orientation only to the West or to the East is disastrous for Russia. Remember our coat of arms. Our eagle is not a freak, not a mutant or a victim of Chernobyl. It contains the great meaning of our place and our role in the world.

It is possible that in the coming years the United States will not be up to Russia. Too many internal problems have accumulated, and not all is well in external affairs. Washington's diplomacy toward Russia has always left the impression that making Russia a strategic partner has never been a priority. The administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush believed that if they needed cooperation from Russia, they could provide it without much effort or concessions. The Clinton administration seemed especially inclined to view Russia as an analogue of post-war Germany or Japan, as a country that could be forced to follow the political lead of the United States, and which, in time, even should like it. Washington seemed to be forgetting that there were no American soldiers standing on Russian soil, and its cities were not razed to the ground by atomic bombs. Russia is the legal successor of the USSR, but Russia is not the USSR. Psychologically Russia

practically already got rid of the complex of defeat of the USSR. Russia is another country. Therefore, Russia, in a big way, was not defeated; began to carry out transformations and “clean up” after the collapse of the “parental home”. It is not the same. And this, basically, will determine Russia's reaction to the actions of the United States.

Since the collapse of the USSR and the fall of the Iron Curtain, Russia has been building relations with the United States not as a client state, reliable ally, or true friend, but also not as an adversary, and, moreover, not as an adversary with global ambitions and hostile to us. messianic ideology. However, the risk of Russia moving into the camp of US opponents is quite real. In many approaches to foreign policy issues, the points of view of the United States and Russia are diametrically opposed. And this is a serious reason for a future confrontation. The US does not yet consider Russia strong enough to take our point of view into account. And political confrontation, backed up by real military threats (radar stations in the Czech Republic and anti-missiles in Poland, further expansion of NATO at the expense of Georgia and, possibly, Ukraine), will inevitably lead to a military confrontation, albeit based on the deterrence doctrine. But this is a new round of the arms race.

For the US and the West, this is a technological gap from Russia and China; for us, these are unsustainable costs, akin to those that Reagan arranged for us with his concept of “star wars”. To catch up with the weak strong means hopelessly lagging behind. And this path is ordered to us by the fate of the USSR. To avoid such an outcome, Russia must understand where the weaknesses of the United States and its allies, where they make mistakes, and urgently take adequate measures to stop the downward spiral of the situation.

Russia must understand that in the XXI century. it is not just a bridge, it is a fork, if you like, a crossroads of world civilizations. And whether there will be accidents or other cataclysms at this crossroads largely depends on Russia and you and me. In the meantime, we have sat too long at a low start. Misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the events that led to the end of the Cold War significantly influenced the formation of US policy towards Russia. While Washington's actions were one of the important factors that hastened the collapse of the Soviet empire, it should, more than is usually done, be credited to reformers in Moscow itself.

Let's not forget that at the beginning of the second half of the 1980s, the collapse of the USSR and even the Soviet bloc was by no means inevitable. After Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985, his goal was to solve problems that had already appeared in the days of Leonid

Brezhnev. And these are: the lack of free military resources, which was especially exposed in Afghanistan and Africa, huge defense spending that placed an unbearable burden on the Soviet economy, the fall in the overall prestige of the USSR, and the accumulated problems in relations with the countries of Eastern Europe within the framework of the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact. The result was to be an increase in the influence and prestige of the USSR.

When Gorbachev drastically cut subsidies to Eastern Bloc countries, withdrew his support for retrograde ruling regimes in the Warsaw Pact states, and initiated “perestroika,” the dynamics of political processes in Eastern Europe changed radically, resulting in the largely peaceful fall of communist regimes and the weakening of Moscow’s influence in the region. Ronald Reagan contributed to this process by increasing pressure on the Kremlin. But it was Gorbachev, not the White House, who ended the Soviet empire.

American influence played an even smaller role in the collapse of the USSR itself. The administration of George W. Bush supported the independence aspirations of the Baltic republics and signaled to Gorbachev that violent action against the legitimately elected separatist governments in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia would jeopardize Soviet-American relations. However, by allowing pro-independence parties to run and win relatively free elections, and by refusing to take drastic measures to remove them from power with the help of security forces, Gorbachev effectively secured the Baltic states' exit from the USSR. Russia itself dealt the final blow to it, demanding for itself the same institutional status as that of the other union republics. At a meeting of the Politburo, Gorbachev said that if Russia were allowed to gain sovereignty, it would be "the end of the empire." And so it happened. After an unsuccessful attempt at a reactionary coup in August 1991, Gorbachev could no longer prevent Yeltsin, as well as the leaders of Belarus and Ukraine, from "dismantling" the Soviet Union.

The Reagan and Bush Sr. administrations were aware of all the dangers associated with the collapse of the superpower, and ensured that the collapse of the USSR was "manageable", skillfully combining sympathy with firmness. They treated Gorbachev with respect, but did not make any significant concessions to the detriment of US interests. Thus, they outright rejected Gorbachev's desperate requests for large-scale economic assistance, since the United States had no reason to help him save the Soviet empire. However, when the Bush administration rejected Moscow's requests to refrain from military action against Saddam Hussein after

After he took over Kuwait, the White House tried very hard to show Gorbachev due courtesy, "not to poke his nose" in this fact, as then Secretary of State James Baker put it. As a result, the United States managed to kill two birds with one stone: defeat Saddam and maintain close cooperation with the Soviet Union, mostly on Washington's terms.

If the administration of George W. Bush had provided emergency economic assistance to the democratic government of independent Russia in 1992, then a large-scale “package” of financial assistance could have prevented the collapse of the Russian economy and, in the long run, would have contributed to a closer “tie” of Russia to the West. However, Bush's position was too weak to take bold steps to help Russia. At that time, he was already losing the election battle to Democratic candidate Bill Clinton, who criticized the incumbent president for being too focused on foreign policy and inattention to the economic situation in the United States.

Although domestic political issues were central to his campaign, once in the White House, Clinton immediately tried to help Russia. His administration arranged for substantial financial assistance to Moscow, mainly through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Even in 1996, Clinton was ready to speak highly of Yeltsin, so much so that he even compared his decision to use military force against separatists in Chechnya with the actions of Abraham Lincoln during the American Civil War. Yeltsin was practically on the "short leash" of Clinton. Actually, this leash Clinton gave to Bush. In the United States, unlike in Russia, with the change of the owner of the White House, foreign policy does not change much. Americans choose the president for themselves, not for the outside world, and even more so, not for Russia.

The main miscalculation of the Clinton administration in keeping the "short leash" was its decision to continue to exploit Russia's weakness. She sought to achieve maximum advantages for the United States in terms of foreign policy, economy, security in Europe and the post-Soviet space until Russia recovers from the shocks of the transition period. The US and the West did not expect that the transitional period in their relationship with Russia would end with Vladimir Putin. Many US politicians thought that Russia would not soon wake up from the “hangover syndrome” of the first president. But Russia "sobered up" much earlier than expected in the US and the West; moreover, everything that had happened to her "the evening before", in the morning she began to recall selectively and with indignation.

Behind the façade of foreign friendship, Clinton administration officials believed that the Kremlin should unconditionally accept the American concept of Russia's national interests. In their view, if Moscow's preferences don't align with Washington's goals, they can be safely ignored. After all, the Russian economy was in ruins, the army was collapsing, and in many ways she herself behaved like a defeated country. Unlike other European metropolises that were leaving their former colonial possessions, Russia did not try to negotiate terms that would protect its economic and security interests in Eastern Europe and the countries of the former USSR. As for domestic policy, Yeltsin's team of radical reformers often only welcomed pressure from the IMF and the United States, justifying the tight and highly unpopular monetary policy that they actually pursued on their own.

Soon, however, even Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, dubbed "Mr. Yes" for his acquiescence to the West, began to irritate the "cruel affair" with the Clinton administration. Once he told Talbott, who held in 1993-1994. Ambassador-at-Large to the Newly Independent States: “It’s already not very pleasant when you guys tell us: we will do such and such, whether you like it or not. So at least don't rub salt in the wounds by saying that it's in our best interest to obey your orders."

But these requests of even Yeltsin's most devoted US reformers were ignored in Washington, where such an arrogant approach was becoming increasingly popular. Talbott and his aides called this approach “feeding Russia spinach”: Uncle Sam paternally regales Russian leaders with political “foods” that Washington considers “healthy for the new Russia,” no matter how unappetizing they may seem to Moscow. Yeltsin's reformers, like in kindergarten, followed the rule: "The more you tell them that this is for their own good, the more they choke." By making it clear that Russia should not have an independent foreign - and even domestic - policy, the Clinton administration certainly generated strong rejection among sane politicians in Moscow. Until they were in power, this US neo-colonialist approach, which went hand in hand with the recommendations of the IMF, which, according to most even Western economists today, was absolutely not suitable for Russia and was so painful for the population that it was easy to implement them democratically impossible. However, individual Yeltsin

radical reformers were ready to impose these measures on the people without their consent. At one time, the Communist Party interfered with them, then Yevgeny Primakov.

However, politicians such as former President Nixon, as well as many prominent American businessmen and experts on Russia, recognized the fallacy of Washington's course and called for a compromise between Yeltsin and the conservative parliament. Nixon, for example, was alarmed when Russian officials told him that Washington had expressed a willingness to turn a blind eye to the Yeltsin administration's "drastic" measures against its Supreme Soviet if the Kremlin simultaneously accelerated economic reforms. "Encouraging a departure from the principles of democracy in a country with such an authoritarian tradition as Russia's is like trying to put out a fire with gasoline," Nixon warned. Moreover, he argued, if Washington proceeded from the “fatally erroneous assumption” that Russia was no longer a world power and would not become one for a long time to come, its actions would endanger peace and democracy in the region.

However, Clinton ignored Nixon's advice and continued to turn a blind eye to Yeltsin's most egregious excesses. Relations between President Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet soon reached a stalemate, followed by Yeltsin's unconstitutional decree dissolving it, which eventually led to an outbreak of violence and the shelling of the parliament building with tank guns. After that, Yeltsin "pushed through" a new constitution that gave the head of state the broadest powers to the detriment of the legislature. Actually, according to this Constitution, Russia lives to this day. Then this step made it possible to strengthen the power of the first president of Russia, and the Constitution marked the beginning of a “drift” towards authoritarianism. This, in turn, was the logical result of Washington's frivolous encouragement of Yeltsin's propensity for authoritarianism, enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

Other aspects of the arrogant foreign policy of the Clinton administration only increased the displeasure of sensible politicians in Russia. NATO expansion - especially its first wave to Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic - was not in itself such a big problem. Most Russians were ready to agree that NATO expansion is an unpleasant event, but so far there is almost no threat to their country. But this was the case until the crisis over Kosovo in 1999, when NATO launched a war against Serbia, despite the categorical objections of Moscow and without the sanction of the Security Council.

According to the UN, the Russian elite and people soon came to the conclusion that they were being deliberately misled. NATO is still a military bloc directed against Russia, against the Orthodox peoples.

Of course, the Russian elite, which considers itself the custodian of the traditions of the Great Power - especially in a state of "decline" - never liked such demonstrations of their insignificance. This played into the hands of those forces that seriously thought about the future of Russia as a sovereign state with a thousand-year history. They felt that Russia seriously faced the Hamlet question: "to be or not to be." And this understanding by Putin's team is much more important today than the ideas of nationalization “according to Zyuganov” and Zhirinovsky's foreign policy ambitions combined.

Today, Russia is getting out from under the "umbrella" of the United States and even offers itself an energy umbrella to Europe. This is a welcome trend for us. But it will undoubtedly provoke sharp opposition from the US and NATO. And we will soon feel it. The next cycle of the global economic crisis that began in 2008 will not bypass Russia. If Russia, not caring about its rear (domestic market), gets carried away by the expansion of capital abroad, then it will be like playing hockey without a goalkeeper. Perhaps we will score pucks in other people's nets, but how many will we let in our own? We have already almost lost our domestic market. The WTO will finally complete this "dirty deed". What kind of innovative or other new economy can we talk about if the domestic market, which in normal countries works up to 90% of the domestic economy, we give to foreigners?

Moderation and accuracy, economy in everything, protection of our national interests always and everywhere, subtle diplomatic play on the contradictions between the powerful of this world, dosed assistance, taking into account our interests in solving their problems - this is what should form the basis of our policy in the coming years, until The US and the West will not be up to us. At the same time, silently and imperceptibly, we must modernize our economy and military forces. Russia has only 7-10 years to do this. And time has gone. In this regard, we must not talk away what should have been done yesterday.

The absence of a clear foreign policy doctrine does not yet allow for warning of possible threats. And there can be no clear foreign policy doctrine without a clear strategy for the internal development of the state. The United States and the West have already become accustomed to disregarding Russia (what is Russia, they do not reckon with the UN either). Therefore, we will continue to find ourselves in an uncomfortable position. In these cases, you can not hesitate and pro-

show excessive "flexibility of the back", otherwise we will constantly find ourselves turned to events "backwards". And in order to get out of this pose with dignity, one must have a filigree technique or know 1001 tales of Shahrazade. Something Vladimir Putin has learned.

There are enough examples. Despite Russia's outrage over the Kosovo events, in late 1999 Vladimir Putin, while still prime minister, immediately after the invasion of Chechnya, made an important demarche towards the United States. He was concerned about Chechen ties to al-Qaeda and the fact that Afghanistan, ruled by the Taliban, was the only country in the world to establish diplomatic relations with Chechnya. Guided by these security interests, and not by a sudden “flash of love” for the United States, Putin proposed to establish cooperation between Moscow and Washington in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This initiative fell on prepared soil, as it already had its own background. After the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the US administration had more than enough data to understand the deadly danger Islamic fundamentalists posed to the US.

At one time, Clinton and his advisers, irritated by Russian opposition in the Balkans and the removal of reformers from key positions in Moscow, ignored this factor of cooperation with Russia. The United States then still viewed Russia not as a potential partner, but as a nostalgic, incompetent, financially weak state, and sought to provide the United States with maximum benefits at the expense of Russia. Under Clinton, the United States tried to consolidate the results of the collapse of the USSR by taking as many post-Soviet states as possible under Washington's wing. Therefore, they "pressed" Georgia to take part in the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, connecting the Caspian Sea with the Mediterranean, bypassing Russia. They encouraged Georgian opportunist President Eduard Shevardnadze to join NATO and instructed US embassies in Central Asia to counter Russian influence.

That is why in 1999 the United States rejected Putin's proposal for Russian-American counterterrorism cooperation, viewing the Russian proposal as a gesture of a desperate neo-imperialist trying to regain his influence in Central Asia. The Clinton administration did not understand at the time that by doing so it was missing a historic chance to force al-Qaeda and the Taliban

go on the defensive, destroy their bases, and possibly disable major operations. Such cooperation began only after the September 11, 2001 attacks claimed the lives of nearly 3,000 American citizens.

When George W. Bush took office in January 2001 - eight months after Vladimir Putin became president of Russia - his administration faced new, relatively obscure figures in the Russian leadership. Struggling to distance itself from Clinton's policies, the Bush team did not consider relations with Russia as a priority: many of its representatives considered the Kremlin to be corrupt, undemocratic and weak. While this assessment may have been correct at the time, the Bush administration lacked the strategic foresight to reach out to Moscow. However, personal contacts between Bush and Putin developed successfully. During their first meeting - at the summit in Slovenia in June 2001 - Bush, as we all remember, personally "vouched" for the democratic convictions and spiritual qualities of the new Russian president.

The events of September 11, 2001 radically changed Washington's attitude towards Moscow and evoked in Russia an emotional wave of support and sympathy for the United States. Putin reaffirmed the earlier offer of cooperation in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Russia granted the US Air Force the right to overfly Russian territory, supported the establishment of American bases in Central Asia, and, perhaps most importantly, helped Washington to establish contact with Russian-trained and equipped military formations of the Northern Alliance. Of course, Vladimir Putin acted in the interests of Russia itself. But for Putin, as an aspiring politician, the entry of the United States into the fight against Islamist terrorism was a real gift of fate. Like many other alliances, Russian-American counterterrorism cooperation was based on a convergence of fundamental interests, not a common ideology or mutual sympathy.

Despite such interaction, relations between the two countries remained tense in other areas. Bush's announcement in December 2001 of the United States' withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty - one of the last surviving symbols of Russia's superpower status - once again hurt the Kremlin's pride. Similarly, our animosity towards NATO only intensified when the North Atlantic Alliance annexed the three Baltic states, two of which are Estonia and

Latvia - had territorial disputes with Russia, problems related to the position of the Russian-speaking minority.

Around the same time, Ukraine became a new serious source of mutual tension. There is no doubt that the United States support for Viktor Yushchenko and the Orange Revolution was associated not only with the spread of democracy, but also with the desire to undermine Russian influence in a country that voluntarily joined the Muscovite state in the 17th century, very close to Russia in cultural terms. plan, and had a significant Russian-speaking population. Moreover, many in Russia rightly believe that the current Russian-Ukrainian border - established by Stalin and Khrushchev as the administrative border between the two union republics - stretches far beyond the historical territory of Ukraine, resulting in areas inhabited by millions of Russians, which gives rise to interethnic, linguistic and political problems.

The Bush administration's approach to dealing with Ukraine—namely, its pressure on a divided Ukraine to apply for NATO membership and financial support for non-governmental organizations actively helping pro-presidential political parties—should constantly fuel our concern that whether the United States has moved to a new variant of containment policy towards Russia. Few Bush administration officials or congressmen have thought about the consequences of Russia's opposition in a region as important to its national interests as Ukraine, Crimea, the Black Sea, and on an issue that carries the strongest emotional load.

Georgia soon became another "battlefield" between Moscow and Washington. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili sought to use the support of the West, and especially the United States, as the main tool for restoring Georgia's sovereignty over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where indigenous peoples supported by us have been fighting for independence since the early 1990s. But Saakashvili's ambitions extended much further. He not only demanded the return of two self-proclaimed republics under the control of Tbilisi: he openly positioned himself as the main supporter of “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet region and the overthrow of leaders who sympathize with Russia. He portrayed himself as a pro-democracy activist enthusiastically supporting US foreign policy. Saakashvili went so far as to send Georgian troops to the Allied contingent in 2004

Iraq. Actually, Yushchenko did the same. The fact that he received a suspiciously high number of votes (96%) when he was elected president, and also took control of parliament and television, did not cause much concern outside of Georgia itself. The obvious arbitrariness with which he subjected the leaders of the business community and political rivals to repression did not raise questions. In 2005, when the popular Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania - the only one who still served as a political counterweight to Saakashvili - died under mysterious circumstances (it was alleged that as a result of a gas leak), his family and friends publicly rejected the official version of what happened, transparently hinting that the Saakashvili regime was involved in the death of the politician. If the death of even little-known Russian opposition members causes concern in the United States, then the death of Zhvania or Patar-Katsishvili seems to have been ignored in Washington.

The farce of early resignation from the presidency in 2007, the massacre of the opposition in the center of Tbilisi in November 2007, the falsification of the election results in January 2008, the unexpected death of another of his implacable opponents, Badri Patar-Katsishvili, should have finally , cross out the credibility of Saakashvili as a legitimate president. However, this does not happen. In fact, the Bush administration and influential circles in both parties have constantly supported Saakashvili in the fight against Russia, despite all his excesses. On several occasions, the United States urged him to moderate his ardor so as not to provoke an open military clash with Russia. It is obvious that Washington has chosen Georgia as its main "client state" in the Transcaucasus and near-Caspian region. In the Balkans, Kosovo has been chosen as such a client state.

The United States is supplying weapons and training to the Georgian military, allowing Saakashvili to take a tougher stance towards Russia; the Georgian military even went so far as to detain and publicly humiliate Russian soldiers stationed in South Ossetia as peacekeepers and stationed on the territory of Georgia itself.

Of course, the behavior of Russia itself in relation to Georgia is far from ideal. Moscow granted Russian citizenship to most residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and rather timidly imposed economic sanctions against Georgia.

At the time, Washington's blind support for Saakashvili must have reinforced the perception that the goal of US policy was to undermine the already sharply weakened Russian influence in the region, as a result of which, in August 2008, a military conflict was provoked on the Georgian side with

Russia. The US is more interested not so much in supporting the leaders of democracies as such, but in using them as a tool to isolate Russia in the post-Soviet space.

Despite rising tensions, Russia has not yet become an adversary to the US. There is still a chance to prevent further deterioration of relations between the two countries. This requires a sober assessment of the US goals in the post-Soviet region and an analysis of the situation in those numerous areas where the interests of the US and Russia coincide - especially in the fight against terrorism and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Skillful diplomacy will also be required in cases where the goals of both countries are the same, but tactical approaches differ, for example, in relation to the Iranian nuclear program.

But most importantly, the US must recognize that it no longer enjoys unlimited influence over Russia. Today, Washington is simply not in a position to impose its will on Moscow, as it did in the 1990s. A number of influential members of the US Congress reasonably note that it is precisely anti-terror and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that should be the defining directions of Russian-American relations. Another priority issue is stability in Russia itself, where there are thousands of nuclear warheads. Russia's support for sanctions - and, if necessary, the use of force - against "destructive states" and terrorist groups would also be a major help for Washington.

The United States is also interested in spreading and deepening democratic practices in the post-Soviet region, but it is already naive to expect Russia to support its efforts to introduce American democracy. Therefore, Washington will continue to strive to ensure that no one, including Russia, prevents other countries from choosing a democratic form of government and independently making foreign policy (pro-American) decisions. However, the United States will have to understand that its options for this task are limited.

Russia, benefiting from high energy prices, while pursuing a prudent financial policy, having reined in the "oligarchs", no longer needs large-scale foreign loans and economic assistance. Despite the growing tension in interstate relations with the West, large-scale foreign investments are beginning to “flow” into Russia willingly. As long as stability and relative material well-being are maintained in Russia itself, a newfound sense of pride in one's country will

restrain the discontent of the people by tightening state control and gross manipulations in the political sphere.

The negative image of the United States and its Western allies in Russian society, reasonably supported by the authorities, sharply limits the ability of the United States to create a "base of support" for its recommendations regarding internal processes in the country. In the current environment, Washington can only make it clear to Moscow in no uncertain terms that domestic political repression is incompatible with a long-term partnership with the United States. Nor does it help the cause that the reputation of the United States itself as a moral model has been seriously damaged in recent years. Moreover, Moscow's suspicion of Washington's intentions is only growing today. In a number of cases, Moscow began to reflexively perceive with apprehension even those decisions that are not directed against Russia. In general, this is not so bad in the current situation around Russia.

While Moscow itself views the West with suspicion, Russia's use of its energy resources for political purposes is outraged by Western governments, not to mention neighboring countries who are completely dependent on energy supplies from Russia.

Russia, of course, must continue to actively use the energy lever as a political tool. Unfortunately, only Gazprom is in the hands of the government so far. But, apparently, in the future, if necessary, the matter may reach the oil companies, in particular, Rosneft today has become a giant on a global scale.

Undoubtedly, Gazprom supplies energy carriers to friendly states at preferential prices. In essence, Russia is simply rewarding countries that maintain special political and economic relations with it by selling oil and gas to them at below-market prices. Of course, politically we can come to terms with the "NATO" choice of neighboring countries, but after that Russia is not obliged to subsidize them. It must always be borne in mind that when Washington reacts with noble indignation to Russia's "politicized" use of its energy resources, it does not look too sincere: after all, no state imposes economic sanctions against others as often and with such enthusiasm as the United States.

The United States constantly accused Russia of obstructionist actions in Kosovo, but Moscow's publicly voiced position was that it would accept any agreement reached by the Kosovars and Serbia. Moscow has never dissuaded Belgrade from an agreement with Kosovo. But also to recognize one

Russia had no intention of declaring Kosovo's independence earlier. After Kosovo's self-declaration of independence, the situation changed dramatically. The United States and Western allies "spit" on international law on the UN Security Council, on Russia. This should untie Russia's hands. From the decision of the unrecognized republics on the territory of the former USSR, especially Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and later Transnistria, to gain independence without the consent of the states from which they wanted to secede, Moscow will only benefit. Many in Russia are content that the fate of Kosovo has set a precedent for unrecognized post-Soviet territories, most of which yearn for independence and eventual integration with Russia. And here there is no need for Russia to hold on to the letter of international law, which was not violated by us.

A number of other disagreements on foreign policy issues only exacerbate tensions. Russia, for example, did not support Washington's decision to invade Iraq, and the same position was taken by some key US NATO allies, in particular France and Germany. Russia has been supplying conventional weapons to some states that the US considers hostile, such as Iran, Syria and Venezuela, but it does so on a commercial basis without violating international law. It is understandable that the United States may perceive such actions as provocative, but many Russians feel the same way about US military supplies to Georgia.

Contrary to its interests, Russia should stop participating in the policy of soft "curbing" of Iran and North Korea. On the one hand, Russia does not go as far as the US and Europe would like, and, in the end, still supports the imposition of sanctions against both countries.

There are a lot of disagreements between the US and Russia, but this does not mean that Russia is an enemy of the US. And the main thing here is that Russia does not support Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups waging war against America, and is no longer spreading a “competing” ideology, aiming at world hegemony, as it was in the days of the USSR. In addition, Russia has never invaded or threatened to invade the territory of any of the neighboring countries. Finally, Russia has decided not to fan separatist sentiments in Ukraine, despite the existence of a significant and very active Russian minority in that country.

The main thing for Russia is to accept that the United States is the most powerful power in the world, and there is no point in provoking it unnecessarily. However, it makes no sense for Russia to adapt to American preferences anymore, especially to the detriment of its own interests.

Russia in the system of military-political relations in the world

The current stage of world development is characterized by the most acute socio-economic conflicts and political contradictions. Despite the fact that the problem of global and regional security is increasingly shifting to political, financial, economic, ethno-national, demographic, etc. issues, the role of military force still remains an effective deterrent in stabilizing international relations.

The current military-political situation in the world

The world military-political situation today is characterized by a combination of two main trends: on the one hand, the desire of most states of the world to form a democratic, more equitable system of international economic and political relations. On the other hand, the expansion of the practice of using armed force on the basis of national decisions and outside the UN mandate. Confirmation - unsanctioned by the UN Security Council of the war against Yugoslavia and Iraq.

The current military-political situation in the world can be characterized by the following main trends.

FIRST, in the global system of military-political relations, counteraction to new challenges, stimulated by the processes of globalization, comes to the fore. This is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; international terrorism; ~ ethnic instability; activities of radical religious communities and groups; drug trafficking; organized crime.

It is impossible to deal effectively with all these manifestations within the framework of individual states. Therefore, the importance of international cooperation of law enforcement agencies, including special services and the armed forces, is increasing in the world.

SECONDLY, the implementation of international operations on the use of force outside of traditional military-political organizations is becoming a reality. Military force is increasingly used in temporary coalitions. Russia stands for strict observance of the norms of international law and will join such coalitions only if it is required by its foreign policy interests.

THIRD, there is a further economization of foreign policy priorities of states. Economic interests are becoming more important than political and military-political ones. In addition, a more complex combination of economic interests of individual states and the interests of large transnational companies is emerging. As a result, the understanding of the conditions for the use of armed force has changed significantly. If earlier the reason for this was most often the presence of a direct military threat to the security or interests of a particular state, now military force is increasingly used to ensure the economic interests of a particular country, which objectively expands the scope of its foreign policy relevance.

FOURTHLY, there has been a merging of domestic and international terrorism. Modern terrorism is global in nature, poses a threat to most states, their political stability, economic independence, its manifestations lead to mass casualties, destruction of material and spiritual values.

In modern conditions, when the emergence of an international anti-terrorist international has become a reality, attempts to divide terrorist activity into domestic and international become meaningless. This applies both to political approaches to curbing terrorist activity and to forceful measures to neutralize terrorist activity. It is obvious that terrorism has turned from a political threat into a military-political one, and the sphere of responsibility of the armed forces, in particular the Russian Armed Forces, to counter it has expanded significantly.

The transnational nature of the growing threats from terrorist activities and criminal extremism puts on the agenda the need for Russia's international cooperation, primarily with the CIS member states, within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.

Today, the CIS states, due to their geopolitical position, are at the forefront of the fight against international terrorism, which is confirmed by the events in the North Caucasus and the Central Asian region. The situation may become much more complicated in connection with the collapse of the far-reaching plans of the extremists in the North Caucasus and the concentration of the main forces of jihad in the Central Asian direction. These are not virtual scenarios, but quite specific plans for a radical “redrawing” of the political map of the entire region.

It would be naive to believe that the plans of terrorists will be limited to the framework of one single state. The tentacles of extremism have already penetrated many countries. And if he manages to destabilize the situation in any of the states of Central Asia, no borders will stop the chain reaction.

The realization of terrorist goals by the forces of international terrorism and religious extremism can lead to a radical change in the geopolitical situation in Central Asia with unpredictable consequences. This is not just about maintaining strategic stability in the region, but about ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation and the CIS countries.

FIFTH, the importance of non-state participants in the system of international relations has significantly increased in determining the nature of the foreign policy priorities of various states of the world. Non-governmental organizations, international movements and communities, interstate organizations and informal "clubs" have a wide, sometimes contradictory impact on the policies of individual states. Russia seeks active participation in major interstate and international organizations to ensure various aspects of its foreign policy and security interests.

The main military threats to the national interests of Russia and the tasks of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation until they are neutralized

An analysis of the military-political situation in the world allows us to conclude that for Russia there are real threats to its national interests: external, internal and cross-border.

External threats include:

Deployment of groupings of forces and means aimed at a military attack on Russia or its allies;

Territorial claims against the Russian Federation, the threat of political or forceful exclusion from Russia of its individual territories;

Implementation by states, organizations and movements of programs to create weapons of mass destruction;

Interference in the internal affairs of the Russian Federation by organizations supported by foreign states;

Demonstration of military force near the borders of Russia, conducting exercises with provocative goals;

The presence near the borders of the Russian Federation or the borders of its allies of centers of armed conflicts that threaten their security;

Instability, weakness of state institutions in border countries;

build-up of groupings of troops, leading to a violation of the existing balance of forces near the borders of the Russian Federation or the borders of its allies and the sea waters adjacent to their territory;

Expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the military security of Russia or its allies;

The activities of international radical groups, the strengthening of the positions of Islamic extremism near Russian borders;

The introduction of foreign troops (without the consent of the Russian Federation and the sanction of the UN Security Council) on the territory of states adjacent and friendly to the Russian Federation;

Armed provocations, including attacks on military installations of the Russian Federation located on the territory of foreign states, as well as on objects and structures on the state border of the Russian Federation or the borders of its allies;

Actions that impede the operation of the Russian systems of state and military administration, ensuring the functioning of strategic nuclear forces, warning of a missile attack, anti-missile defense, control of outer space and ensuring the combat stability of troops;

Actions that impede Russia's access to strategically important transport communications;

Discrimination, suppression of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign countries;

The proliferation of equipment, technologies and components used to manufacture nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as dual-use technologies that can be used to create WMD and their means of delivery.

Internal threats include:

Attempts to forcibly change the constitutional order and violate the territorial integrity of Russia;

Planning, preparation and implementation of actions to disrupt and disrupt the functioning of public authorities and administration, attacks on state, national economic, military facilities, life support facilities and information infrastructure;

Creation, equipment, training and functioning of illegal armed formations;

Illegal distribution (trafficking) on ​​the territory of the Russian Federation of weapons, ammunition, explosives, etc.;

Large-scale activities of organized crime, threatening political stability on the scale of the subject of the Russian Federation;

Activities of separatist and radical religious-nationalist movements in the Russian Federation.

The concept of cross-border threats includes political, military-political or forceful threats to the interests and security of the Russian Federation, which combine the features of internal and external threats. Being internal in form of manifestation, in their essence (sources of emergence and stimulation, possible participants, etc.) are external.

These threats include:

Creation, equipment, support and training on the territory of other states of armed formations and groups for the purpose of their transfer for operations on the territory of the Russian Federation or the territories of its allies;

Activities of subversive separatist, national or religious extremist groups directly or indirectly supported from abroad, aimed at undermining the constitutional order of the Russian Federation, creating a threat to the territorial integrity of the state and the security of its citizens;

Cross-border crime, including smuggling and other illegal activities on a scale that threatens the military and political security of the Russian Federation or stability on the territory of Russia's allies;

Conducting information (information-technical, information-psychological, etc.) actions hostile to the Russian Federation and its allies;

Activities of international terrorist organizations;

Drug trafficking activities that pose a threat to the transportation of drugs to the territory of the Russian Federation, or the use of the territory of Russia for the transportation of drugs to other countries.

Neutralization of external threats, as well as participation in the neutralization of internal and cross-border threats, is the task of the Russian Armed Forces and is carried out jointly with other law enforcement agencies, as well as with the relevant authorities of the countries - allies of the Russian Federation.

Actions to curb such threats are carried out taking into account the provisions of international and humanitarian law, proceeding from the interests of Russia's national security and its legislation. Considering the changes in the geopolitical situation in the world, it must be stated that ensuring the security of Russia only through political opportunities (membership in international organizations, partnerships, opportunities for influence) is not effective.

As the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin in his Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on May 26, 2004, “we need combat-ready, technically equipped and modern Armed Forces for reliable defense of the state. So that we can calmly solve internal socio-economic problems.”

We need a strong, professional and well-armed army for the successful and peaceful development of the country. It must be able to protect Russia and its allies, as well as effectively interact with the armed forces of other countries in the fight against common threats.

In accordance with the Federal Law "On Defense", the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are intended to repel aggression directed against the Russian Federation, to defend the integrity and inviolability of the territory of Russia by armed means, and to perform tasks in accordance with international treaties of the Russian Federation.

In more detail, the tasks of the Armed Forces are defined by the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 706 of April 21, 2000:

1. In armed conflicts and local wars, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are faced with the task of localizing a hotbed of tension and ending hostilities at the earliest possible stage in order to create the prerequisites for resolving the conflict by peaceful means on terms that meet the interests of the Russian Federation. Armed conflicts and local wars can, under certain conditions, develop into a large-scale war. If necessary, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will be deployed to use all the forces and means available to them.

To prevent wars and armed conflicts and to ensure the deterrence of aggressors from unleashing any wars, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are entrusted with the following tasks:

Timely discovery, together with the forces and means of other federal executive bodies, of an impending armed attack or a threatening development of the situation and warning the top leadership of the state about them;

Maintaining the composition and status of strategic nuclear forces at a level that ensures guaranteed infliction of the specified damage to the aggressor under any conditions;

Maintaining the combat potential of groupings of general-purpose troops in peacetime at a level that repels aggression of a local (regional) scale;

Providing, within the framework of state measures to transfer the country from a peaceful to a military position, the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

Protection of the state border in the airspace and in the underwater environment.

2. Separate formations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation may be involved in the liquidation of internal armed conflicts that threaten the vital interests of the Russian Federation and may be used as a pretext for other states to interfere in its internal affairs. The task of using the troops and forces involved in the localization and suppression of such conflicts is the speedy normalization of the situation, the suppression of armed clashes and the separation of the opposing sides, as well as the protection of strategically important objects.

3. When participating in peacekeeping operations conducted by decision of the UN Security Council or in accordance with Russia's international obligations, the following tasks may be assigned to the contingent of its Armed Forces:

Disengagement of armed groups of the conflicting parties;

Ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid to the civilian population and its evacuation from the conflict zone;

Blockade of the conflict area in order to ensure the implementation of sanctions adopted by the international community.

The solution of these and other tasks is carried out by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in close cooperation with other troops of Russia. At the same time, the Border Guard Service of the FSB of Russia is entrusted with the protection of the state border on land, sea, rivers, lakes and other bodies of water, and the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia are entrusted with the protection of important state facilities and the suppression of especially dangerous offenses, sabotage and terrorist acts.

Given the changed situation in the world and the emergence of new threats to Russia's security, the tasks assigned to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have also changed. They can be structured in four main areas:

1. Deterrence of military and military-political threats to the security or interests of the Russian Federation.

2. Ensuring the economic and political interests of the Russian Federation.

3. Implementation of military operations in peacetime.

4. Use of military force.

The peculiarities of the development of the military-political situation in the world make it possible for the fulfillment of one task to grow into another, since the most problematic, from the point of view of the security of the Russian Federation, military-political situations are complex and multifaceted.

The nature of the tasks facing the Russian Armed Forces, taking into account the specifics of armed conflicts and wars in which they may be involved, requires the formulation of new approaches to them.

The main priorities in the construction of the Russian Armed Forces are determined by the nature of the tasks in the field of national security and the geopolitical priorities of the country's development. We can talk about the existence of several fundamental requirements for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which will determine the main parameters of military organizational development:

Ability to implement strategic deterrence;

High combat and mobilization readiness;

strategic mobility;

A high degree of staffing with well trained and trained personnel;

High technical equipment and resource availability.

The implementation of these requirements makes it possible to choose the priorities for reforming and strengthening the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at the present time and in the future. The main ones include:

1. Preservation of the potential of the Strategic Deterrence Forces.

2. Increasing the number of formations and units of constant readiness and the formation of groupings of troops on their basis.

3. Improving the operational (combat) training of troops (forces).

4. Improving the system of manning the Armed Forces.

5. Implementation of the program for the modernization of weapons, military and special equipment and maintaining them in a state of combat readiness.

6. Improvement of military science and military education.

7. Improving the systems of social security for military personnel, education and moral and psychological training.

The ultimate goal of these measures is the elimination of duplicating links and ensuring, if necessary, the integrated use of the Armed Forces and military units of power ministries and departments of the Russian Federation.

From the above it can be concluded:

1. Despite positive changes in the international situation, a sharp reduction in military confrontation between states, the military-political situation in the world remains complex and contradictory.

2. Russia, due to its geopolitical position, is acutely aware of the impact of negative factors and features of the current military-political situation.

3. There are real sources of threat to Russia's national security. This requires strengthening and increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

In the introductory speech, the head of the UGP should emphasize the importance of this topic, determine the purpose of the lesson, its main issues.

Opening the first question, it is advisable to draw the attention of listeners to the fact that in recent years many different events have taken place in the world that have had a significant impact on the national security system of the Russian Federation, therefore the primary task for our country is to ensure its military security.

When considering the second question (for all categories of UCP listeners), it is important to understand that the ongoing changes in the world have led to the emergence of new threats to Russia's military security. The greatest danger in modern conditions is represented by cross-border threats that combine the features of internal and external threats.

It is necessary to achieve an understanding by the audience that the modern Russian Armed Forces must correspond to the nature of the international situation and the specifics of the geopolitical position of the country, they must be built on the achievements of modern military science and practice. In this regard, the most important task remains the modernization of our Armed Forces.

The consideration of the second question should be completed with a statement of the specific tasks of combat training to be performed by subunits in the winter (summer) periods of training.

In conclusion, it is necessary to draw brief conclusions, answer questions from the audience, give recommendations on studying the literature and preparing for the conversation.

2. Actual tasks of development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation //

3. Message of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly // Rossiyskaya Gazeta. - 27 May. - 2004.

4. Gordlevsky A. Armed Forces of the Russian Federation // Landmark. - 2004. - No. 2.

5. Fatherland. Honour. Duty. Textbook for public-state training. Issue #4. - M, 1998.

Candidate of Philosophy, Associate Professor, Colonel
Alexander Chaevich

Simultaneously with the collapse of the Soviet Union, our country acquired a whole "bouquet" of both internal and external problems. The current foreign policy situation is strongly influenced not only by the “achievements” of diplomats and politicians in the field of international relations, but also by the domestic political and economic situation in our country.

First of all, the weakening of national security and international relations makes Russia very vulnerable to a wide variety of threats, both external and internal. Among the most serious threats to national security, both external (international terrorism, the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism, an attempt to dictate by the United States) and internal (scientific, technical and economic backwardness, the threat of Russia's collapse) are noted:

Threatsnational security of Russia, in %

• 61.0 - International terrorism, the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism and its spread to the territory of Russia
• 58.6 - Low competitiveness of Russia in the economic sphere
• 54.8 - Russia's growing backlog in terms of scientific and technical potential from the United States and other Western countries
• 52.9 - Further expansion of NATO to the East and the inclusion in this bloc of the former republics of the USSR (the Baltic countries, Ukraine, Georgia, etc.)
• 51.4 - Establishment of world domination by the United States and its closest allies
• 51.0 - Pressure on Russia from international economic and financial institutions to eliminate Russia as an economic competitor
• 26.2 - The threat of the collapse of Russia
• 18.6 - Information wars, information and psychological impact on Russia
• 17.1 - Demographic expansion of China
• 16.7 - Weakening of the position of the UN and the destruction of the global system of collective security
• 15.7 - Large-scale man-made disasters
• 11.9 - Unauthorized proliferation of nuclear weapons
• 10.0 - Global threats (climate warming, ozone depletion, AIDS, depletion of natural resources, etc.)
• 7.1 - Territorial claims to Russia by neighboring states
• 3.3 - There is no real significant threat to Russia's national security.

Draws It is also noteworthy that Russian experts do not attach significant importance to global threats, which are increasingly moving to the center of attention of the Western community. It seems that this is largely due to the fact that Russia as a whole, and experts in this case are no exception, has long lived what is called "today." No one thinks far into the future, and therefore real, but "postponed" threats (depletion of natural resources, climate warming, unauthorized proliferation of nuclear weapons, demographic expansion of China, etc.) are not perceived as relevant. This is also emphasized in the new “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” recently adopted by the government and the president of the Russian Federation: “... the military-political rivalry between regional powers, the growth of separatism, ethno-national and religious extremism. Integration processes, in particular in the Euro-Atlantic region, are often selective and restrictive. Attempts to belittle the role of a sovereign state as a fundamental element of international relations create the threat of arbitrary interference in internal affairs. The problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is acquiring serious proportions. A threat to international peace and security is posed by unresolved or potential regional and local armed conflicts. The growth of international terrorism, transnational organized crime, as well as drug and arms trafficking is beginning to have a significant impact on global and regional stability.”

Despite the fact that rising tensions with the United States and the Western community stand out in the first place among the threats to national security, nevertheless, the possibility of a return to the state of the Cold War, in general, does not seem very likely. The fact is that despite all the complexities of mutual relations between Russia and the West, especially with the United States, a long way has already been traveled not only political, but also cultural interaction: Western mass culture has become commonplace in Russia, educational and tourist contacts have increased many times over, etc. . At present, the majority of Russians do not believe in the likelihood of a tough confrontation between Russia and the United States (Table 2).

table 2

But Nevertheless, the main threats not only to the foundations of the country's national security, but also to its authority in the international arena, continue to be such internal problems of the country as its economic weakness, corruption and crime. The war in Chechnya, however, as a factor undermining Russia's authority, although it remains among the most significant, is nonetheless regarded today as such by half as often as five years ago (Table 3).

Table 3

it Many foreign observers also note the same, for example, National Security Adviser to the US Vice President Leon Firth, in an interview with Radio Liberty, said that the US government has done everything possible to help Russia in the fight against corruption, but only the Russian leadership can eradicate it. At the same time, according to him, the ideas of the Russian leadership about a strong Russia seem contradictory, and sometimes even ominous.

However, if the gross national product is taken as the basis for assessing Russia's prospects in the world community, then everything does not look as threatening as it seems at first glance. Things get worse when we look at our revenue structure and the short term.

Spheres in which Russia can count on a real strengthening of its positions in the world market in the next 8-10 years, in %

• 70.0 - in the fuel and energy sector (gas, oil)
• 53.3 - defense complex (MIC)
• 44.3 - extraction and processing of other natural resources (metal, timber, etc.)
• 36.7 - nuclear power
• 27.6 - science and high technology
• 18.6 - energy transport infrastructure
• 15.2 - culture and education

In recent years, along with the growth of extractive industries, the share of science-intensive production has been falling catastrophically. Russia is becoming a world leader in the production of raw materials, sledgehammers and shovels. Those types of production that are based on the use of heavy physical, unskilled labor are developing. The competitiveness of Russia is created due to low wages, the associated low production culture, and high labor intensity. The qualifications of labor and its economic quality are rapidly and steadily declining. During the years of unmanaged "reforms", the output of specialists with higher education per unit of population in Russia has decreased by ten percent, while in Europe and the United States during this time it has more than doubled. Russia in this indicator quickly fell from fifth to twenty-sixth place in the world. While in Russia the share of the population working in fundamental science has decreased by fifty percent in ten years, in advanced countries this figure has almost doubled. In the countries of Europe and America, about five percent of the budget is allocated to science today, in Russia - 1.2 percent. Japan plans to double the number of jobs for specialists with higher education in five years, America by 1.7 times, and in Russia this figure is steadily declining. The situation with science in Russia is close to disaster. We will soon have to accept backwardness.

Despite the seriousness of our country's internal problems, recent foreign policy and foreign economic strategies play an important role in Russia's loss of authority in the international arena. If the Soviet Union, as is known, had both unconditional supporters and obvious geopolitical opponents in the international arena, then at present Russia's external environment is not so unambiguous and obvious. The main diplomatic and trade partners of Russia can be divided into several groups:

The first group of "fraternal" countries include Belarus, Armenia and India.

To the second group of "friendly" - Yugoslavia, Kazakhstan, China, Iran and Germany.

The third group - countries "rather friendly". These are Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Israel, France.

The fourth group of countries can be characterized as "neutral". These are Azerbaijan, Japan, Great Britain, Czech Republic.

The fifth group - "unfriendly". These are Afghanistan, the Baltic countries and the USA. In addition, Georgia, Poland and Hungary can also be classified as "unfriendly" countries.

Russian-American relations stand out against this background. If five years ago the number of those who consider the United States a friendly country was approximately the same as now (8% and 10%, respectively), the proportion of experts who assess the United States' relations with Russia as unfriendly has now more than doubled (from 22% to 59%). There are many reasons for this, and one of them is the Balkan crisis of 1999, as a result of which a new balance of power in the world with US dominance was fixed. Among experts, the point of view that, firstly, among the European powers, the mood of distancing from the United States has increased, and, secondly, that as a result of this crisis, prerequisites have arisen for a closer political union between Russia and Europe. Another reason for the cooling of relations between Russia and the United States, according to experts, is associated with the first steps of the new American administration headed by George W. Bush. These steps give reason to believe that US foreign policy will become tougher towards Russia than the policy of the previous administration.

A directly opposite trend is observed, according to experts, in relations between Russia and Germany. Over the past five years, almost three times (from 19% to 52%) has increased the proportion of experts who classify Germany as a country friendly to Russia, while maintaining the proportion of those who classify it as an unfriendly state (10% in 1996 and 13% in 2001). As problems still complicating Russian-German relations, the following are noted:

Russia's debt to Germany.

The so-called "Kaliningrad factor".

Excessive integration of Germany into the EU and NATO.

Inconsistencies in the economic systems of Russia and Germany (imperfection of the legislative framework in Russia, lack of guarantees for the rights of owners and investors, corruption, etc.).

The problem of displaced cultural property (restitution).

There are quite a few obstacles in the way of establishing normal relations with other EU countries, moreover, most experts put some prejudice against Russia on the part of European states in the first place:

The main reasons for the difficulties in relations between Russia and the EU, in %

• 71.9 - Certain prejudices against Russia persist in the EU.
• 57.6 - The interests of Russia and the EU do not coincide for objective reasons.
• 51.9 - The EU is not interested in integrating Russia into European structures.
• 22.9 - Russia claims a special privileged status in European affairs, unacceptable to the EU.
• 21.4 - In fact, Russia simply does not seek to integrate into European structures.

There is a deep-rooted belief in the US that the day is not far off when the country will collapse.

J. Friedman, political scientist

The modern world is characterized by a significant increase in the chaos of world politics. Unpredictability in this area becomes higher than in the economy

Ya. Novikov, General Director of Concern VKO "Almaz-Antey"

In order to answer the question of the possibility of analyzing and forecasting the current international situation, it is important, first of all, to agree on what we mean by the term "international situation", i.e. about the subject of research, and try to give it at least the most general description, describe its structure, character and main modern features. In this case, the main possible directions for the analysis and forecast of MC become clear.

In this work, the term "international situation" refers to such a state of the entire system of international relations in a certain period of time, which is characterized by a number of parameters and criteria, numbering thousands of indicators:

The composition, level of development and policy of the main sovereign subjects of the Moscow Region - primarily local human civilizations, nations and states, as well as their unions, coalitions and other associations;

The composition, influence and policy of the main non-state actors of the IR - both international and national - which include the entire spectrum of such actors: humanitarian, public, religious, etc.;

The main trends in the development of mankind and its LFC, as well as in individual regions.

These trends (such as globalization) can be contradictory and have different impacts;

The influence of subjective factors, which are mainly derived from the development of national human capital and its institutions. These factors associated with the “cognitive revolution” and the politics of the ruling elites are, in fact, the area in which the most important resource of humanity and the art of using it merge;

Finally, there are relations and interactions between all these factors and trends, which create a unique international situation and the military-political, financial, economic, social, and other conditions arising from it.

Thus, the subject of analysis and strategic forecast are numerous factors and trends and their interaction and mutual influence, forming a complex dynamic and multifactorial system. So, if we consider modern defense and military defense only from the point of view of the military spending of individual countries, then the ratio of the military budgets of Russia and the United States will be 1: 12, and Russia and France, and England 1: 1.1 and 1: 1.2, respectively. If this ratio is measured by the ratio of Russian military spending and the military spending of the Western LFC and its allies, then this ratio will be already 1: 21.

Thus, in a recent RAND report on a comparison of the military potentials of China and the United States, a huge number of indicators are given - basic, additional, auxiliary, etc., and criteria. As an example, we can only compare the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) of the United States and China in terms of:

range;

type of basing;

BR types;

Years of testing;

warheads;

Numbers, etc., as well as a short-term forecast of their condition for 2017.

But the analysis of MD and HPE presupposes not only quantitative, but also qualitative comparison and comparison of a wide variety of parameters, including, for example, such complex ones as the survivability of nuclear forces after the use of a counterforce nuclear strike. Thus, in 1996, such a US attack against China was assessed as the almost complete destruction of China's strategic nuclear forces.

It is hard to imagine that such a volume of work is being done in Russia today, anywhere. If there are forecasts for the development of individual countries and regions (by no means all, and far from all, and far from all the main parameters), if there are some forecasts for the development of world trends, then there is no general, systemic forecast for the development of the IR, and hence, HPE. This means that when assessing Russia's necessary defense spending, for example, on the State Armaments Program (SAP) for the period 2018-2025, the approaches of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Defense differ by 100% (12 and 24 trillion rubles), which from the military-political point of view vision requires the most serious justification.

Considering that in the same years, the GDP growth in the country, according to the Ministry of Finance, will not be significant, and the share of military spending in GDP (4.15%) will remain at the same level, this means that the country's financial capabilities are severely limited: it is necessary either to increase the share of military spending in GDP to the level of the warring countries (Israel ~ 7% or Iraq ~ more than 20%), either reduce spending on social needs and development, or - which is the most difficult, but also the most effective - to increase the efficiency of military spending, revisiting priorities. At the same time, we already have examples of such an approach: in 2014, the military themselves said that they managed to reduce SAP-2025 from 55 trillion to 35 trillion rubles due to the unification of products.

Thus, the determination of resources and the implementation of other measures to counter external challenges and threats are largely predetermined by the most accurate analysis and forecast of the future MD and HPE that form these challenges. When in the mid-30s of the 20th century in the USSR, and especially after 1938, a course was taken to maximize the pace of military construction, the share of military spending and the degree of militarization of the country obviously exceeded all peaceful norms. Naturally, such political decisions were made primarily on the basis of an assessment of the future state of the MOD and HPE in the world.

In order to try to visualize and more simply imagine the complexity and scope of such an analysis, it is necessary to try to understand what MO is even in the most general terms. To do this, you can use the technique of drawing up a connection diagram (sometimes called a “mind map” - “mind map”, which was made popular by the English psychologist Tony Buzan) - an associative map, which is a method of structuring the state of individual systems and concepts ( rice. 7 ). In it, in the most general approximation, an idea is given of the state of abstract MO in a certain period of time. Naturally, the dynamics and scale of changes occurring in all groups of factors, actors and trends and between them, turns this state into a kind of temporary “episode” of life that requires constant dynamic adjustment.

Rice. 7. The abstract structure of ML in the 21st century

It is obvious that the positions of not only individual actors and states, but also the LSF can change, and tendencies can accelerate, slow down or die off.

On this “thought map” of ideas about the Defense Ministry in the 21st century, only the main groups of factors and trends that shape the Defense Ministry and - as part of it and its consequence - the military-political situation, as well as other areas of the Defense Ministry - socio-cultural, financial, economic, trade , industrial, etc., which are a specific consequence and result of the development of IR.

The international situation is developing according to a variety of scenarios, which are realized in one or another specific scenario. Thus, the Defense Ministry of 1946–1990 was characterized by its development according to the “cold war” scenario, although there were periods when, within the framework of this scenario, it developed according to the “detente” option (1972–1979), or the “exacerbation of the Defense Ministry” option. None of these options completely denied the peculiarities of the development of the indicated scenario of the MD (“cold war”), but in their specific versions, of course, it had an impact on the formation of HPE and SO.

Accordingly, if we want to analyze the current state, and even more so to make a strategic forecast for the development of the IR, then we must take into account not only the current state of (at least the main) factors and trends, but also the degree of mutual influence and interaction between them, the possibility and the probability of development of MO according to one or another scenario.

Obviously, such a huge informational and analytical work can only be done by a fairly large and qualified team, bringing together specialists in various fields - from "regionalists" and "country experts" to experts in the field of science, technology, technology, psychology, finance, etc. . It is very important that this team has not only the appropriate information capabilities and tools, but also a sufficiently deep theoretical base, methodology and specific techniques.

So, in this case, in recent years, the method of strategic forecasting of scenarios and options for their development of the LFC, MO, VPO and SO has been widely used at the MGIMO Center for Strategic Studies, which has been the subject of quite a lot of work.

Based on this experience, we can say that our team was only at the very beginning of the development of the theoretical and methodological foundations for the development of IR. It is also necessary to recognize that various scientific teams are currently undertaking a variety of attempts at such strategic analysis and forecasting. In some cases (as in the United States, for example), there are huge combined teams of intelligence services, corporations, and individual efforts of university scientists. In other examples (as in Russia), relatively small teams of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other departments are used, working, as a rule, in accordance with the allocated grants on a medium-term basis.

In any case, it should be recognized that due to the crisis in the departmental and academic humanities - international and military - science, the quality of analysis and forecasting of the development of the MOD and HPE has sharply decreased. A vivid example is the absence of a well-known intelligible forecast of the real nature of relations with the West in 1985–2015, when the authors of such well-known (it should be admitted, few and private) forecasts noted the “prosperous development of the Moscow Region”. In many respects, this, as well as the lack of professionalism of the political elites, led to major foreign policy mistakes comparable to the crimes that were the result of the foreign policy of M. Gorbachev, E. Shevardnadze, A. Yakovlev and B. Yeltsin. This course led to the collapse of the world socialist system - in fact, a local human civilization headed by the "Russian core" of the USSR - as well as the Warsaw Pact, the Comecon and, ultimately, the USSR, and then underestimation of the real intentions of the West towards Russia.

Another strategic failure in foreign policy (now Russia) was its naive orientation towards “Western partners” to the detriment of its national interests and the interests of the remaining friends and allies in the 90s of the XX century and at the beginning of the new century, partly preserved today.

Finally, the most important mistake, not only foreign policy, but also civilizational, was a one-sided orientation towards the Western system of values, norms and rules, which were originally created as unequal and unfair - whether in finance or sports - for other countries. This mistake led to catastrophic consequences for the Russian humanities, in fact, depriving it of its theoretical and methodological foundations, scientific personnel, and social and political "interest" (need). Only in the most recent years have some old institutions begun to be revived and new ones (the Russian Historical and Geographical Society, for example) institutes to be created.

Thus, the Soviet-Russian politics and diplomacy made at least several strategic mistakes on a global scale over 30 years, some of which even led to a “geopolitical catastrophe”. This was largely due to the fact that there was no political and scientific mechanism for their prevention, as, however, it has not been fully created even today. Moreover, it is very likely that such scientific schools were deliberately liquidated in the 80s and 90s so that the policy had no national scientific basis.

At present, the situation in the field of analysis and strategic forecasting in the international and military-political spheres looks even less satisfactory than before (when the ruling elite of the USSR often simply ignored the opinion of experts from the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Staff and part of the teams of the Russian Academy of Sciences) due to the general degradation of scientific schools and declining research levels. At the same time, for some reason, some experts state that “Over the twenty years of practical implementation in our country of the American theory of ensuring national security in the Russian Federation, a fairly extensive network of forces and means has been created to analytically support decision-making by government bodies in the field of national security (Fig. 8 ) . As proof, they cite the classical scheme, which in fact has little content and, in my opinion, is the most general, poorly developed and interconnected, unsystematic and extremely ineffective. This, of course, inevitably affects the quality of forecasts, planning and implementation of the decisions made. In its most general form, this system is as follows.