thaad missile defense systems. State Department approves delivery of THAAD anti-missile systems to Saudi Arabia

4.1 Segments of the US global missile defense

Fig 1. Purpose of US missile defense elements

In 2002, the United States decided to create a national US missile defense system, the main weapon of which was to be GBI (Ground Based Interceptors) long-range interceptor missiles, and a regional missile defense system (also known as theater missile defense), which was to be based on systems designed to intercept medium and shorter range missiles.
Based on the concept of building a national missile defense system, it should include the following segments:

Fig 2. Transportation of the GBI anti-missile

First segment- defense in the middle section of the trajectory - received the name GMD (Ground Missile Defense). It should be based on anti-missile systems for exatmospheric interception of ICBM warheads based on GBI anti-missiles. It included two position areas for the deployment of GBI interceptor missiles - in Alaska and California. It was envisaged that the ground echelon would be supplemented by a third positional area located in Europe, but these plans were not destined to come true.

Figure 3. US Missile Destroyers

Second segment- defense on the ascending segment, including the active segment. Within the framework of this segment, the following is being developed: the Aegis multifunctional sea and land-based missile defense system with deployed on cruisers, destroyers of the Navy, as well as in mines, Standard interceptor missiles of various modifications, capable of intercepting both medium-range missiles, so is the ICBM. Navy ships equipped with Aegis sea-based complexes can freely navigate the World Ocean and carry on board, in fact, “forward-based missile defense systems”, blocking ballistic missiles in the middle and final stages of their flight path. Space systems are also considered - complexes based on SBL space-based lasers and Brilliant Pebbles kinetic action interceptors ("Brilliant pebbles"), as a legacy from SDI.

Fig 4. THAAD complex on a mobile platform

Third segment- ABOUT the final section. Complexes in this segment are still being developed to protect against short and medium-range ballistic missiles. These include the THAAD and Patriot PAC-3 land-based systems, as well as the Aegis sea and land-based systems. The groundwork accumulated in the field of missile defense formed the technological basis for the creation of a global layered defense system against ballistic missiles BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense), the creation of which became one of the main elements of the US military-technical policy. As a conditional starting point for the start of work on the creation of the BMD system, one can take George Bush's statement of December 17, 2002 on the beginning of its deployment, which followed the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in June 2002 and the restructuring of the program and budget of the Missile Defense Agency.

It is assumed that the presence of these three segments will make it possible to close all stages of the flight of ballistic missiles and will allow them to be intercepted at any part of the flight path. Also, many experts point out that the mega-system being created will be able not only to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles, but also to shoot down satellites, fight medium-range missiles, and also be a nuclear attack system, but more on these "charms" of the US missile defense being created a little later.

Let's take a closer look at all three segments of the system being created and start with the GBI long-range interceptors.

4.1.1 GBI long-range heavy anti-missiles for the GBMD system.

The GBMD system began to be deployed in 2005 as the first real-life anti-missile system to destroy enemy missiles and warheads in the middle section of the trajectory. Its basis is a ballistic missile with a range of 2000 - 5000 km.
A little clarification is required here: the GBI anti-missile is actually a Minuteman-2 solid-propellant ballistic missile with a kinetic interceptor installed instead of a nuclear warhead. Theoretically, it is possible to install a nuclear warhead on such an anti-missile and turn it into a means of nuclear attack.

Fig 6. Kinetic interceptor EKV of the GBI complex

A kinetic interceptor is a small spacecraft capable of targeting a warhead in space as well as maneuvering. This interceptor will destroy the warhead by direct collision with the attacked warhead. The kinetic oncoming method of defeat, when the speed of the target and the anti-missile relative to each other is 10-15 kilometers per second, in the event of a hit, it guarantees its destruction. However, this requires very precise guidance. An accuracy of 50-200 meters, as for anti-missiles with a neutron warhead, is no longer enough.

It was GBI missiles that were supposed to become the basis of Euro-ABM, which made it possible not only to destroy ICBMs launched from the European part of Russia, but also, if desired, to deliver a nuclear strike, for example, on Moscow with a flight time of about 3 minutes. however, the plans to place GBI in Europe were not destined to come true, since our country's extremely harsh reaction followed official and, probably, unofficial ones. The Obama administration has revised plans for the deployment of missile defense in Europe, replacing the GBI system with a sea and land version of the Aegis with SM-3 interceptors. In addition, the development of the EuroPRO system was somewhat stretched out in time, divided into several stages.

The plans for the period up to 2025 include the Creation of a third missile defense region of the continental territory of the United States, covering the industrial centers of the Atlantic coast;

Bringing the total number of GBMD anti-missiles in the US to 56 (28 in Alaska, 14 in California and 14 on the Atlantic coast); in the future, up to 100 anti-missiles.

Figure 7. Launch of an SM-3 rocket from a vertical cell Mk. 41

The Aegis system is a multifunctional combat information and control system (MBIUS), consisting of an integrated network of sensors and computers, as well as strike and combat assets in the form of first-generation Standard missile 2 (SM-2) interceptor missiles and more advanced Standard missile interceptor missiles missile 3 (SM-3), which are launched using universal vertical launch installations Mk 41 located under the main deck of such cruisers and destroyers. Currently, such cells for missiles are carried by the Tikanderoga missile cruiser and missile destroyers of the " "Arleigh Burke""Officially, 24 destroyers and one missile cruiser are now involved in building the Aegis system, but the launch cells Mk 41 are universal and are used for a large list of US weapons, and are also installed on a huge number of US and NATO ships, which allows you to quickly reorient ships to solve missile defense problems.

MBIUS Aegis was originally developed in the 70s. last century to destroy aircraft and anti-ship missiles. For the first time, such a system was installed on US Navy warships in 1983.

Fig 8. Universal vertical cell Mk. 41

In subsequent years, this program was repeatedly subjected to deep modernization in order to increase the effectiveness of its information-reconnaissance and strike-combat components. The implementation of a long-term program for the installation and modernization of this system is entrusted simultaneously to the Navy and the US Missile Defense Agency, which is the lead agency responsible for the development, creation and deployment of the US missile defense system on a global scale.

The EPAP program provides for the deployment of not only the sea, but also the ground version of the MBIUS Aegis - the so-called system Aegis Ashore missile defense. Such interceptors and related radars will appear by 2015 in Romania, where each division will have a 5.0 missile defense system software, a SPY-1 radar and 24 SM-3 Block IV interceptor missiles that will allow the United States to cover the southern part of the European continent. In 2018, the ground version of Aegis with 5.1 software and SM-3 Block IB and Block IIA interceptor missiles will be deployed in Poland in order to control the space of the northern part of Europe.

Figure 9. What Aegis Ashore will look like

One should also take into account the fact that ships with the Aegis system can be used not only to intercept ballistic missiles, but also be used as anti-satellite weapons, which has already been proven by the destruction of an American satellite.

Graphically, the upgrade stages of the SM-3 missile are presented in the image from the manufacturer, which shows that in the fourth phase of the upgrade of the SM-3 missile, it will be able to shoot down missiles of almost any range.

Figure 10. Stages of development of the capabilities of the SM-3 anti-missile

However, the danger of Aegis is not only that it is being actively improved, but also that the number of carriers of this system is constantly increasing.

The US Department of Defense is determined to involve NATO warships in providing missile defense in Europe. This was announced on February 28, 2012 by acting. Under Secretary of Defense for Political Affairs James Miller. "Some of our allies have a naval capability that can be upgraded and incorporated into NATO's missile defense system," he said. - The Alliance should work out the concept of international cooperation in the field of sea-based missile defense, providing for the exchange of radar data and cooperation in the destruction of missiles. This, perhaps, will become the basis for the formation of a group of countries with sea-based missile defense components. According to Miller, at the summit of the leaders of the countries-members of the North Atlantic Alliance, which is due to be held May 20-21, 2012 in Chicago, it may be "announced that a group of allies will clarify the possibility of implementing one or more initiatives in the field of missile defense."

In November 2011, plans to re-equip the air defense radar into a long-range missile defense radar on four frigates were announced Netherlands. These are the ships De Zeven Provincien (F-802), which has 32 launch silos, as well as the same type Tromp (F-803), De Ruyter (F-804) and Evertsen (F-805), which were introduced into the Netherlands Navy in 2002 -2005

The move was said to be "a national contribution to NATO's missile defense capability." Some US NATO allies also have ships equipped with a missile defense system: three ships have Germany and three - Denmark. Interest in modifying several of its ships for this system showed France. They have their own sea-based missile defense systems UK and Spain. Washington does not object to the ships of these European states being armed with SM-3 interceptor missiles.

At the same time, the anti-missile potential is also being built up in the Asia-Pacific region. They contribute to it Australia, which plans to build three Hobart-class destroyers (the first of which will be transferred to the Navy in 2013), as well as Japan - six Kongo-class destroyers will be converted to the Aegis system, although four ships were previously planned to be upgraded. South Korea's sea-based anti-missile systems (KDX-III class destroyers) have already joined this process, and participation in the US fleets' anti-missile project is not ruled out. Taiwan and Saudi Arabia.

It should be noted that Japan, seemingly neutral in words, but in reality has already become a bloc country, takes an active part in the work to improve the most promising types of SM-3 interceptor missiles. In particular, Japanese engineers have found special technical solutions that allow the rocket trajectory to be adjusted at high speeds. In essence, Tokyo is being drawn into an anti-missile arms race, which causes justified concern in many countries of the world, including in the Asia-Pacific region. Washington has achieved the creation in this region of two profile structures in the field of missile defense: "trilateral forums" with the participation of Australia, the United States and Japan, as well as the United States, South Korea and Japan. In March 2012, speaking at a political science forum in Washington, US Deputy Secretary of Defense Madeleine Creedon announced Washington's readiness to create a broad regional missile defense infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific region - similar to European missile defense. Following her, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke in favor of strengthening cooperation on the development of the US missile defense system with the states of the Persian Gulf.

4.1.3 THAAD and Patriot PAC-3 ground-based complexes

Figure 11. Anti-missile launch from the THAAD complex

These systems are designed to directly cover protected objects from warheads arriving from space at the final stage of their trajectory.

American mobile anti-missile complex (PRK) long-range interception THAAD(Theater High Altitude Area Defense) is designed to destroy operational-tactical missiles (OTR, firing range up to 1000 km) and medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBM, up to 3500 km) at altitudes of 40-150 km and ranges up to 200 km.

R&D for its creation has been carried out since 1992 by Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space with a group of industrial enterprises, among which Raytheon is responsible for the development of a multifunctional radar. They have one of the highest priorities in the theater missile defense program and are at the stage of confirming the technical feasibility of the chosen concept.

At the beginning of 1995, at the White Sands missile defense range (New Mexico), prototypes of the launcher, the GBR-T multifunctional radar station and the command post (CP) of this complex were deployed, and flight tests of experimental samples of its anti-missile (PR) began. .

Since 2000, the program has been in preparation for serial production of engineering and manufacturing development (EMD). In May 2004, the production of 16 interceptor missiles for flight tests began at the new Lockheed Martin plant in Pike County, Alabama (Pike County, Alabama).


Figure 11. THAAD Kinetic Interceptor

The anti-missile warhead is made in the form of a detachable self-guided interception stage of kinetic action, designed to hit ballistic targets by direct hit.

Anti-aircraft missile system "Patriot" PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3)- one of the latest upgrade options for the well-known Patriot air defense system and is designed to intercept warheads of tactical ballistic and cruise missiles, including those made using stealth technology.

Figure 12. Launch of an anti-aircraft missile of the Patriot complex

The first was carried out under the guidance of Ratheon and included the development of an improved MIM-109 anti-aircraft missile with an active homing head, a high-explosive fragmentation warhead and an engine length increased by 0.76 m. The dimensions and weight of the MIM-109 rocket practically corresponded to the MIM-104 rocket, and at the same time, the available overloads of the new rocket reached 40 g.

The second option, proposed by Loral Vought Systems, includes the use of a highly maneuverable ERINT (Extended Range Interceptor) direct-hit anti-missile in the Patriot PAC-3 complex.

In August 1994, the tender commission chose the second option and a contract was signed with Loral Vought Systems for $515 million. and a duration of 47 months. The ERINT SAM was designed primarily as a low-level missile defense interceptor in the theater of operations, in addition to the upper-level interceptor, the THAAD missile. The features of the RAS-3 are the use of an active homing warhead and a relatively short range - up to 15-20 km for ballistic and up to 40-60 km for aerodynamic targets. At the same time, in order to maximize the potential and minimize the cost of performing a combat mission, the PAC-3 battery includes missiles of earlier versions of the PAC-2.

These systems (THAAD and Patriot) will be deployed both in the US and Europe, and in South Korea, which suggests that the global missile defense system considers not only the Russian Federation, but also the PRC as the main adversary.

The refusal to pre-develop the missile defense architecture, as well as many years of purposeful work by the United States to create it, indicates several things:

1. US missile defense will be built regardless of any technical and technological problems
2. US missile defense has the highest priority over the development of other military systems
3. US missile defense will be implemented in any case

4.2 Phases of US global missile defense deployment

Figure 13. Four phases of development of the US global missile defense

After Barack Obama came to power, the US began to adjust its plans. It was about creating a more mobile and flexible system that would mainly provide for the interception of short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles. The main weapon is no longer the massive silo-based GBI interceptor, but the more compact and lightweight SM-3, which has one significant advantage - mobility.

In September 2009, US President B. Obama issued a special statement on missile defense. He announced the Pentagon's readiness to continue to develop the missile defense system on a global scale, as well as to adjust plans for the deployment of a third position area of ​​the missile defense system on the territory of Poland and the Czech Republic, which had previously been defended by the former US administration. At the same time, the White House announced a program for deploying missile defense facilities in Europe. It is planned that the deployment of anti-missile systems will take place in four stages.

First phase(completion scheduled for approximately 2011) provides for the deployment (in Europe) of already established and proven missile defense systems, including Aegis sea-based systems, SM-3 (Block-IA) interceptors and an AN / TPY-2 radar detection system with in order to be able to repel regional ballistic missile threats to Europe.

Second phase(completed by 2015). It is planned to deploy a more powerful modification of the SM-3 (Blok-IB) interceptor in sea and land-based versions, as well as more advanced sensors needed to expand the protected area from short-range and medium-range missile threats.

Third phase, which should end in 2018, involves the development and deployment of an improved SM-3 (Block IIA).

fourth phase The missile defense system is planned to be completed by 2020. It involves the deployment of SM-3 (Block IIB) in order to better counter medium and long-range missile threats and possible future intercontinental ballistic missile threats against the United States. It is assumed that until the first ground facilities appear, US Navy ships with interceptor missiles on board will be on combat duty off the coast of Europe.

The November 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon endorsed the US-proposed “phased adaptive approach” to the development of its anti-missile systems in Europe.

As mentioned earlier, it was decided that the NATO missile defense system will be created in the period 2011-2021, and its final configuration will be determined taking into account the reality of missile threats, the availability of technologies and other factors. It will be based on elements of the US global missile defense system (positional areas for interceptor missiles in the Czech Republic and Poland, as well as Aegis anti-missile ships in the Mediterranean, North and, not excluded, in the Black and Barents Seas).

4.3 Means of reconnaissance and target designation of the US global missile defense system. Satellites and radar

Figure 14. SBIRS satellite

SBIRS (English Space-Based Infrared System - space-based infrared system)- American two-component integrated space system for early detection of ballistic missile launches (EWS) of a new generation. In addition to controlling space launches, the system is designed to determine the trajectory of their flight, identify combat units and decoys, issue target designation for interception, and conduct reconnaissance over the territory of military operations in the infrared range.

Work on its creation began in the mid-1990s and was supposed to be completed in 2010, however, as of 2016, only three upper echelon satellites in elliptical orbits (HEO) and two geostationary satellites (GEO) were put into orbit.

In 1991, the US Department of Defense, analyzing Iraq's launches of short-range ballistic missiles during the Gulf War, concluded that the existing missile defense (ABM) and space launch warning systems needed to be improved in terms of providing operational information on missile launches. short and medium range.

In 1994, the US Department of Defense explored the possibility of combining various space-based infrared systems for missile defense needs. The result of this study was the decision to create an SBIRS system to replace the existing missile defense system - DSP (Eng. Defense Support Program - Defense Support Program). The DSP system was created in 1970 as a strategic surveillance system and an early warning system for long-range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches.

As of 2013, the US Department of Defense has five SEWS (Satellite Early Warning System) DSP satellites. The satellites are deployed in geosynchronous orbits and make it possible to register missile launches in 40-50 seconds, as well as to determine their flight trajectories on the active site.

SBIRS early warning system should replace SEWS. It will ensure the detection of missiles in less than 20 seconds after launch and will allow the identification of warheads and decoys in the middle section of the trajectory.

The SBIRS program was designed as a complex system of independent components and consists of the following systems:

SBIRS High - a constellation of satellites with infrared equipment on board in geostationary (SBIRS-GEO) and high-elliptical (SBIRS-HEO) orbits;

SBIRS Low - constellation of satellites in low Earth orbit;

Figure 15. Mobile radar SBX

radar

In August 2003, it was decided to reactivate the naval base on Adak Island in the Aleutian Ridge, closed in 1996, to support a key element of the missile defense system being created - a floating Radar SBX. A powerful phased array radar was installed on a modernized oil platform capable of moving at speeds up to 4 knots. On January 2, 2007, she began towing from the Pearl Harbor naval base to the Aleutian Islands.

According to data presented at the end of February 2007 by the director of the US Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant General Henry Obering, the US missile defense system at that time already included facilities located in North America, Western Europe and the Far East:

4 early warning radars: Cobra Dane(Shemiya Island, Aleutian Islands); Beale(California); Fylingdales(Great Britain); Thule(Greenland, Denmark);

sea-based radar SBX stationed in the Pacific Ocean in the Alaska region;

forward-based radar FBX-T on the island of Honshu (Japan);

Figure 16. Scheme of target designation and control of the American global missile defense system

On March 15, 2013, US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that the US intends to deploy a second centimeter-wave radar station in Japan. The mobile radar will become an important component not only of the defense system of the American territory, but also regional missile defense system in Asia, which the United States is creating together with Japan and South Korea.

Having briefly reviewed the elements of US missile defense, we can conclude that a global combat system is being created that can in the future solve a huge range of tasks of a defensive and offensive nature: air defense and missile defense of entire regions from aircraft and cruise missiles, protection against medium-range missiles in Europe and Southeast Asia , protection against ICBMs in all flight segments, destruction of satellites and space stations, participation in a decapitating nuclear strike, etc.

Talk about the fact that interceptors in Europe are a myth and cut budgets is completely untenable.

The US missile defense system is the most dangerous distributed combat system, the final task of which is to give the US a global advantage and the ability to dictate its will. any country on our planet.

In the last third part, we will consider how the only missile defense system of our country was built and exists now, as well as what steps our country is taking and will take in order not to burn out in an atomic flame from our "partners".

Story

THAAD missile launch

R&D to create an anti-missile complex (PRK) THAAD was launched in 1992 by Lockheed (now a division of Lockheed Martin Corporation).

In early 1995, prototypes of a mobile launcher, a GBR-T multifunctional radar and a command post were deployed at the White Sands test site in New Mexico. In the same year, flight tests of experimental samples of the anti-missile system of this complex began.

Initially, it was planned to use 20 units of experimental samples of anti-missiles for flight tests. In connection with the introduction of changes in the design of the main elements of the complex (to ensure resistance to PF nuclear explosives), which required additional costs of $ 80 million, the number of launches was reduced to 14, and 6 anti-missiles were transferred to the reserve category.

As of April 1, 1998 (see table), seven launches were carried out, and the remaining 7 launches were planned to be carried out in the period 1998-1999, in order to start full-scale development of the PRK in 1999, and put it into service in 2006.

In May 2004, the production of 16 pre-production anti-missiles began for flight tests.

In January 2006, a contract was signed with Lockheed Martin for the supply of the first 2 THAAD systems with 48 missiles for them.

At the moment, 39 test launches are known, 31 of which were considered successful. It is important to note that tests are carried out only on simulators of massive, but obsolete R-17 missiles (according to NATO classification SS-1 Scud), developed in the mid-1950s, which do not have the means to overcome missile defense. THAAD intercepted a ballistic missile target simulating a Scud-type missile at an altitude of over 50 kilometers.

On October 16, 2009, a second battery of THAAD interceptors entered service at Fort Bliss.

In March 2011, the US Missile Defense Agency signed a contract with Lockheed Martin for the supply of six THAAD mobile anti-missile systems. The 3rd and 4th batteries will be formed from the new complexes. One THAAD battery includes three launchers with 24 anti-missiles, a command center and an X-band radar.

On October 6, 2011, the 12th test of the THAAD system since the start of the program in 2005 was conducted. The first operational test of the system was carried out with the interception of missiles at high altitude at the final stage of their trajectory. One short-range missile and one medium-range ballistic missile were intercepted. The tests were carried out in the area of ​​the Hawaiian island of Kauai. The Alpha missile defense battery from the 4th Artillery Regiment of the 11th US Air Defense Artillery Brigade participated in the tests. She was transferred to the range along with her equipment from Fort Bliss, Texas. The personnel deployed equipment and provided control of the missile defense system. Control was exercised by the air defense and missile defense command of the 94th Army. To ensure greater realism of the tests, the day and time of the tests were not reported to the personnel of the brigade.

Operating principle

The THAAD complex uses the so-called "kinetic interception" concept - only the kinetic energy of the hardware unit is used to hit the target, there is no dedicated warhead. Due to the high kinetic energy of the hardware unit, the THAAD complex should be significantly more effective against the warheads of old ballistic missiles (such as R-17) than the Patriot PAC-1,2 (the fragmentation part of which could not destroy the Scud warhead). One missile can destroy only a single target, the trajectory of which is known with a given accuracy.

Some experts note that the concept of a direct hit limits the ability of this complex to counter complex ballistic targets (CBC), and the ability to counter non-ballistic (maneuvering) targets is doubtful.

Anti-missile THAAD

Anti-missile THAAD - single-stage solid propellant. Solid fuel engine designed by Pratt & Whitney. Uncooled IR seeker, operating in the middle (3.3 - 3.8 microns) and far (7 - 10 microns) sections of the infrared range, command-inertial control system.

Rocket characteristics

• Starting weight: 900 kg
• Length: 6.17 m
• Maximum case diameter: 0.37 m
• Range: up to 200 km
• Interception height: up to 150 km,
• Speed: up to 3 km/s

Radar

Price

The cost of the AN / TPY-2 radar is $574 million. In 2011, 22 missiles worth $1 billion were purchased, in 2012 - 42 anti-missiles worth $999 million, in 2013 it is planned to purchase 36 missiles at a cost of $777 million (for the United States).

In service

Potential Operators

see also

Notes

Sources

Literature

• Rudov V. American missile defense system THAAD (Russian) // Foreign military review. - M .: "Red Star", 1998. - V. 618. - No. 9. - S. 21-25. - ISSN 0134-921X.

Links

• The United States carried out a successful test of the THAAD missile defense system

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D To overcome the risks that Europe faces after the emergence of new regional conflicts, a common defense policy and common efforts in the field of defense technologies are required. A separate area in this regard is reliable air defense (AD) with such an important element as the anti-missile defense system (ABM).

Ensuring European Security - Situation and Threat Analysis

Crisis processes and new air threats have initiated a discussion in the West regarding the improvement of European air defense.

On the one hand, it is believed that the spread of tactical ballistic missiles ( Tactical Ballistic Missiles, TBM) from so-called "rogue states" such as North Korea, Iran and Syria lead to potential regional conflict situations that threaten the Old World.

On the other hand, Western experts note a clear increase in the conflict potential with Russia in recent years. The emergence of the latter was facilitated by the anti-missile defense system created by the United States in Europe and the deployment of corresponding facilities in Poland (Redzikovo) and Romania (Deveselu).

Under these conditions, Russia sees a threat to reduce the operational value of its strategic weapons systems and, as a result, carries out further modernization of offensive weapons. In turn, Moscow's policy in Ukraine, in the Arctic and the Baltic Sea region is recognized by the military-political leadership of the NATO countries as aggressive and causing concern.

The existing tools for localizing possible risks in the Euro-Atlantic region were considered at the practical conference “Aerospace Forces and Facilities” that opened on October 11, 2017 in Essen (Germany) ( Joint Air and Space Power Conference). As one of the participants stated, there are two such tools, air power ( air power) and advanced air defense ( Advanced Air Defense, in fact missile defense) are understood as "means of deterrence".

Their importance for reliable defense against tactical ballistic missiles (TBR) in Europe is growing with the level of threat from new means of attack. An understanding is being formed that only a single system, including early warning and engagement subsystems, is capable of providing adequate protection against TBRs and their warheads (warheads).

At the same time, great risks are associated with the threat of tactical and strategic aerodynamic offensive weapons (cruise missiles, KR). Experts consider the current assessment of the development and proliferation of such weapons systems insufficient. As a result, the threat posed by the CD remains largely hidden from the public.

Air defense of the ground forces - the missing potential

According to Western military experts, the absence or insufficient understanding by the leadership of most NATO countries of the need to additionally take into account the threat from cruise missiles leads to an alarming shortage of air defense. This is especially true at short and medium ranges and altitudes.

This issue was discussed at the symposium "Use of airspace by ground forces - operational and technical aspects" ( Nutzung des Luftraums durch die Landstreitkräfte – operativ und technisch). The event took place in mid-November 2017 at the Bundeswehr International Air Force Helicopter Training Center in Bückeburg.

The participants noted that short and shorter range air defense shortcomings ( SHORAD/ VSHORAD, Short-Range/Very Short-Range Air Defense) have been in place for several years. Modernization of ground air defense is considered a high priority project. In the medium term, preliminary research and initial development of a short-range anti-aircraft missile system (SAM) is estimated at 460 million euros. For the later phase of the project, an additional tranche of about two billion euros will be required. At the same time, it is not clear whether these funds will be enough and whether the European industry is able to use already developed laser technologies and additional sensor components in the interests of this air defense system.

According to publications, the IRIS-T SL / SLS anti-aircraft missile system (SAM) or the upgraded NASAMS II air defense system can become the main favorites for adoption as air defense systems for ground forces. The first is a product of the German company "Dil Defense" ( Diehl Defense), the second is the joint development of the Norwegian Konsberg ( Norwegian Kongsberg) and the American Raytheon ( Raytheon).

The IRIS-T SL / SLS complex, as part of the overall IRIS-T SLM air defense system, can be adapted for ground launch in the same way as the configuration purchased by Sweden on the Bv206 / BvS10 vehicle. For IRIS-T SL ( Surface Launched) we are talking about an extended range version of the IRIS-T guided missile. The system is designed for use at an altitude of up to five km and a range of 10 km. The NASAMS II air defense system is already being used by the armed forces of Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the United States.

Analysts note the advantages of each of the systems. There is also an opinion that it is too large to use the IRIS-T SL air defense system as a replacement for the Ozelot or Stinger systems. As a result, no decisions have been made yet.

Missile defense system - complexities and solutions

According to NATO analysts, the spread of tactical ballistic missile technology has reached a global scale. Some states of Central and Southeast Asia, as well as the Middle East, already at the beginning of the next decade will have more than 2,200 TBRs with different ranges and types of warheads. Of these, about 600 TBRs will have a range of more than 2,500 km and will be able to threaten Central Europe. In particular, North Korea's work on systems with a range of more than 9,000 km confirms this trend.

The current situation of the global spread of TBRs is aggravated by the fact that the air defense / missile defense systems currently in service are experiencing great difficulties in defeating them. At the same time, we are also talking about submunitions, which are separated from the carrier at high altitudes and enter the dense layers of the atmosphere as a combat warhead.

In NATO documents, tactical ballistic missiles approaching the target at supersonic speeds (with a high MAX number) are called extremely critical. Since their defeat is extremely difficult due to the increased range, improved accuracy, a sharp decrease in radiation indicators and relatively small areas of destruction.

Just as the interception of TBRs and their warheads in the exosphere (altitude 800-3000 km) is a technological challenge, their defeat in the lower atmosphere remains problematic. Firstly, high accuracy is required to destroy one TBR: either the electronic equipment of the missile or the warhead. Secondly, by this moment, the warheads (submunitions) that have already been separated and have fallen into the lower layers can become the target of interception.

In addition, experts note that the Western missile defense system is experiencing methodological problems. Until now, there are no uniform criteria that guarantee the safe identification of the position of the warhead in the TBR, the distinction between the approaching warhead and the decoy warhead, and the classification of the type of combat warhead.

In addition, engaging a carrier in the intercept zone should ensure, as far as possible, that collateral damage on the ground from its submunitions is prevented. In this regard, chemical and biological (bacteriological) HS have long been considered especially dangerous. Since the destruction of their carrier (or the ammunition itself) at altitudes of more than 20 km leads to a significant radius of destruction on the ground.

sea-based missile defense

Currently, the NATO missile defense system has a complex "Patriot" (Patriot PAC-3). This complex and similar to it received the designation of systems of the final phase.

According to the technology of "impact defeat" ( Hit-to-kill HTK) requires a direct hit on an approaching target. At the same time, fire control of the PAC-3 is carried out from the ground. NATO experts are aware of the insufficient capabilities of the Patriot to destroy long-range TBR in the lower atmosphere, but consider it as a significant European missile defense potential in its current state.

Naval missile defense systems, in comparison with traditional ground-based systems, have a significantly larger guaranteed zone of control, due to more advanced technical capabilities. For this reason, Germany and the Netherlands are planning to compensate for the emerging gaps in their national missile defense systems by adapting the capabilities of their shipborne detection systems. In particular, the Dutch division of the international industrial group Thales ( Thales Nederland) is preparing the SMART-L MM/N radar system ( Multi-Mission /Naval), based on gallium nitride technology.

As a variant of a typical TBR defense scenario, the use of the F124 frigate (Saxony type) of the Bundeswehr Navy is considered as a rational platform integrated into a combined arms operation. The ship is used to receive, combine (merge) and exchange detection data (formation of the so-called sensor network) with other ships and aircraft of the German Navy and allied forces.

Prerequisites for the future improvement of maritime defense in the long term include improved computer processing performance of early warning data and real-time radar. The main idea for this is proposed by the American concept of coordinated interaction ( Coordinated Engagement Concept, CEC).

According to the concept, in the interests of early warning, target data from different sensor platforms are used. Such platforms can be:

• sea-based systems such as AEGIS SPY-1 (in the future SPY-6);
• airborne equipment E-2D AHE Advanced Hawkeye or JTIDS ( unified tactical information distribution system);
• a ground-based missile defense system integrated with them into a single network on geographically distributed platforms.

The received and processed data is used to provide all consumers with a single picture of the air situation.

According to experts, from the point of view of today, early detection and destruction of TBRs and their warheads containing various submunitions is possible only with the help of CEC or a similar early warning system.

Sea-based missile defense systems, with their larger coverage areas compared to ground-based systems like the PAC-3, can make it possible to abandon ground-based early warning radars during combat operations. For example, if the phased shipborne radars are close to the positions of enemy TBRs in the coastal area. They detect a threat much earlier and can hit it in the take-off phase with their ship-based anti-missiles.

Comparative capabilities of missile defense systems

According to publications conducted in 2009, 2010 and 2012. in the West, research in the interests of missile defense gave a positive result regarding the possibility of destroying TBR in the lower atmosphere. The Patriot PAC-3 complex and the similar tactical air defense system MEADS / TLVS demonstrated a direct hit probability of more than 70 percent, and the probability of destroying a target with a double launch of PAC-3 anti-missiles was almost 90 percent.

It is noted that similar work was carried out by France and Italy. SAMP / T universal-based air defense system and the final phase system based on ASTER30 showed a predicted probability of a direct hit from 65 to 75 percent.

It has also been established that the maximum possible probability of a direct hit by these defense systems depends on the flight path and the speed of the incoming TBR. First, the vulnerability of a rocket increases after it is immersed in denser layers of the atmosphere. Secondly, the angle of such an entrance with an increase in the range of the rocket launch becomes more gentle.

It is considered confirmed that the speed of long-range TBRs, Russian ICBMs of the RS-12M1 / 2 Torol-M type, similar to North Korean, Iranian, Pakistani and Chinese developments, for example: Taepo-Dong 2, Shahab 3 or BM25 Musudan, Agni III and JL -2 (CSS-NX-5) - Slows down after reentry. For a TBR with a range of more than 2000 km, similar features are expected already at an altitude of about 30 km.

THAAD missile defense system

The defensive complex of transatmospheric interception (the level of the exosphere) is considered "Ted" ( Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, THAAD). The height of its effective use is more than 20 km. The complex uses kinetic MS ( Kinetic Kill Vehicles, KKV) with high kinetic energy (more than 200 MJ). A missile defense system based on THAAD or Patriot PAC-3 and MEADS/TLVS uses the same traditional HTK technology. But the size of the covered area varies greatly.

The long-range interception missile defense system adopted by the US Armed Forces ( Upper Layer System) THAAD must guarantee the destruction of tactical ballistic missiles approaching at various angles at high altitudes ( Upper Keep-out Altitude). The target detection range of its radar with a fixed antenna and electronic beam deflection can exceed 450 km. At the same time, the required early detection and identification of TBRs is allegedly provided, as well as the distinction between combat and false warheads, which was previously not achievable using systems of the past generation.

According to calculations using the example of Germany, if THAAD were used in Europe, compared to PAC-3 and MEADS / TLVS, many times fewer launch sites would be required to cover the entire country.

Solution of technological risks remains in question

Despite certain achievements in the field of missile defense, Western experts state that the technological assessment of the capabilities of protection against long-range missiles is extremely difficult.

Range, accuracy and reaction time will be critical indicators of future missile defense. At the same time, the modern missile defense system is based, for the most part, on the developments of the early 1960s. However, there is still no system that guarantees extremely high accuracy requirements for complete protection against the entire modern TBR spectrum.

Approaches to currently developed ground-based anti-missiles ( Ground Based Interceptor) and THAAD in the USA, Arrow 2 in Israel and S-300 in Russia are similar.

It is also noted that technologically the ability to recognize targets with low radar reflection declared for the THAAD transatmospheric interception system remains controversial ( radarCrosssections,RCS). Since it is very difficult to distinguish combat warheads from neighboring false ones.

In addition to the above, for missile defense systems like the PAC-3, which are used against a wide range of threats and, due to their mobility and autonomy, are especially suitable for participation in joint military operations, the issue of target height dominates. The question is how to make the toxic substances in the MS harmless before they reach the surface of the territory of the defended, neutral or allied state in a concentrated form.

In this regard, experts are considering systems for interception in the so-called acceleration (rise) phase. Possible solutions include either the use of directed kinetic energy or the use of laser weapons. In any case, the principle is to eliminate the TBR threat already over enemy territory. The long-term option is considered to be the destruction of the rocket during the ascent stage using airborne high-energy laser systems. Thus, the risk of residual effects from submunitions is limited to enemy territory.

BymaterialsmagazineEuropäische Sicherheit & Technik.

MOSCOW, December 27 - RIA Novosti, Vadim Saranov. Rockets began to fly into Saudi Arabia frequently. Recently, the UN Security Council condemned the Yemeni Houthis strike on Riyadh. The target of the attack was the royal palace of Al-Yamama, but nothing happened. The missile was either shot down, or it deviated from the course. Against this background, Saudi Arabia intends to significantly strengthen missile defense. The main candidates for the role of "umbrella" are the American THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) system and the Russian S-400 Triumph air defense system. About the advantages and disadvantages of competitors - in the material of RIA Novosti.

S-400 hits further, THAAD - higher

Objectively, THAAD and the S-400 Triumph air defense system are conditional competitors. "Triumph" is primarily designed to destroy aerodynamic targets: aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned vehicles. THAAD, on the other hand, is a system originally designed to combat short and medium-range ballistic missiles. "American" is capable of destroying targets at altitudes beyond the reach of conventional air defense systems - 150 kilometers, and according to some sources, even 200 kilometers. The newest anti-aircraft missile 40N6E of the Russian "Triumph" does not work above 30 kilometers. However, according to experts, the indicator of the height of the defeat, especially when it comes to the fight against operational-tactical missiles, is not critical.

"In theater missile defense, targets are destroyed on descending trajectories, not in space," Lieutenant General Aitech Bizhev, ex-deputy commander of the Air Force for the joint air defense system of the CIS member states, told RIA Novosti. "In the late 1980s, in missile defense capital, it was supposed to use two regiments of S-300V2. At the Kapustin Yar training ground, they created a model of the defense of Moscow with the same geometric dimensions and launched targets from the stratosphere. All of them were destroyed at a distance of 120 kilometers."

By the way, the main danger for Saudi Arabia today is precisely the R-17 Scud operational-tactical missiles and the Kahir and Zelzal tactical missiles, created on the basis of the Soviet Luna-M complex.

© AP Photo / U.S. Force Korea

© AP Photo / U.S. Force Korea

Another key difference between the American and Russian complexes lies in the principle of operation. If the Triumph hits targets with shrapnel after detonating the missile warhead near the target, then the THAAD, devoid of the warhead, hits the missile exactly with a kinetic block. Meanwhile, despite the apparent complexity of this decision, the Americans managed to achieve good results during the tests - the probability of destroying a target with one anti-missile is 0.9, if THAAD insures the complex more simply, this figure will be 0.96.

The main advantage of the Triumph in the case of its use as an anti-missile system is its higher range. For the 40N6E missile, it is up to 400 kilometers, while for THAAD it is 200 kilometers. Unlike the S-400, which can fire 360 ​​degrees, the deployed THAAD has a field of fire of 90 degrees horizontally and 60 degrees vertically. But at the same time, the “American” has better eyesight - the detection range of its AN / TPY-2 radar is 1000 kilometers against 600 kilometers for the Triumph.

Combine incompatible

Apparently, Saudi Arabia intends to build its missile defense on two completely different systems. This approach may seem somewhat strange, because serious compatibility problems can arise during their operation. However, according to experts, this is a completely solvable issue.

“These two systems cannot be controlled in an automated mode from a single command post,” military expert Mikhail Khodarenok told RIA Novosti. “They have completely different mathematics, completely different logic. But this does not exclude the possibility of their combat use separately. They can be deployed in different places or even within the framework of the defense of one object, if the tasks for them are divided by heights and sectors. They can just perfectly complement each other, being in the same grouping."

Saudi Arabia's desire to acquire both Russian and American systems may be dictated by other considerations. After Operation Desert Storm, during which the French anti-aircraft missile systems in service with Iraqi air defense suddenly turned out to be inoperable, potential buyers began to be more cautious about purchasing Western-made weapons.

“There may be bookmarks in American weapons,” says Mikhail Khodarenok. able to work on conventional aerodynamic targets. It is possible that this is the only reason they buy the Russian system."

The most important difference between THAAD and Triumph is the price. The cost of one THAAD battery, which consists of six launchers for eight interceptor missiles each, is about $2.3 billion. Another 574 million is the innovative AN / TPY-2 radar. The cost of the S-400 division with eight launchers of four missiles is about $500 million. The Russian complex costs almost six times less, while the benefits of THAAD, at least for now, are not obvious.

The US Army has deployed one of its seven Terminal High Altitude Anti-Missile Defense (THAAD) batteries to Romania. This deployment coincides with the closure of the Aegis Ashore ground-based missile defense system, also located in Romania, for a planned upgrade.

The installation of THAAD anti-missile battery equipment began on May 17, 2019 near the location of the Aegis Ashore ground-based anti-missile system. The U.S. Army and the U.S. Department of Defense independently posted at least one photo of the installation in preparation for combat duty, and then quickly removed it. Some websites have saved this photo.

The deployment of the THAAD missile defense system is a controversial issue. This system, in theory, has the same capabilities as the Aegis Ashore anti-missile systems and helps close the gap created during the temporary shutdown of the Aegis complex.

However, the installation of THAAD batteries provokes a hostile reaction from the Russian leadership, as was the case with the Aegis Ashore ground system. Russia “does not understand what tasks the Aegis Ashore system will perform in the anti-missile field,” Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said at the end of April 2019.

The Pentagon and NATO have repeatedly tried to explain the reasons for the deployment of the THAAD anti-missile system. “At the request of NATO, the Secretary of Defense will deploy a U.S. Army final trajectory high-altitude interception missile defense system in Romania this summer to support the NATO missile defense system,” a spokesman for the US European Command said in early April 2019.

“The THAAD missile system from the 69th Artillery Air Brigade of the 32nd Air and Missile Command will be integrated into the existing missile defense architecture for a limited period of time this summer, when the planned maintenance and modernization of the Romanian-based ground-based missile defense system will be carried out. "Aegis Ashor".

As of early 2019, the US Army received about 200 missiles for its seven THAAD batteries and approximately 40 launchers. The US Missile Defense Agency on its website calls THAAD "a ground-based element capable of shooting down ballistic missiles both in and out of the atmosphere."

The US Army has THAAD anti-missile batteries on the island of Guam, as well as in South Korea. In March 2019, the US Army deployed one THAAD battery to Israel.

Context

Uncle Sam's Hidden Intentions

Russia will wait: China will tell the USA everything

TNI: US anti-missile system heading to Europe

However, the United States anti-missile system has been causing discontent in Russia for decades. Moscow sees US anti-missile systems as a threat to the global balance of power because, in theory, they could render Russian missiles armed with nuclear warheads ineffective. In fact, most US anti-missile systems lack the speed, range, and accuracy to intercept ICBMs.

Only US ground-based mid-trajectory missile defense systems in Alaska and California, both designed to intercept North Korean missiles, have demonstrated the ability to hit some intercontinental ballistic missiles in test tests.

Many Russians mistakenly believe that Aegis Ashore ground systems can be equipped with surface-to-surface missiles and therefore can be used in a surprise first strike. Aegis Ashore missile defenses “are causing a peculiar Russian fear,” said Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear weapons expert at the Monterey-based Middlebury Institute of International Studies.

In his opinion, many Russians believe that the United States is secretly planning to equip its anti-missile installations in Poland and Romania with nuclear warheads, thus turning them into what Lewis calls a "covert" striking force whose true purpose is to launch a surprise nuclear attack. strike on Moscow in order to "decapitate" the Russian leadership.

“This is crazy, but they are 100 percent sure of it,” Lewis said, referring to the Russians.

NATO emphasizes that neither Aegis Ashore nor THAAD pose a threat to Russia. “The THAAD battery will be under the operational control of NATO and under the full political control of the North Atlantic Council,” the alliance said in a statement. - It will be in a combat state only until the Aegis Ashore complex returns to its place in Romania. As expected, the modernization and placement will continue for several weeks.

“In accordance with the NATO missile defense system, the work of THAAD batteries will be directed against potential threats that arise outside the Euro-Atlantic zone. The Aegis Ashore complexes deployed in Romania are purely defensive systems.”

David Ax is the Defense Editor for the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels (comics) War Drug (War Fix), War is Boring and Machete Squad.

The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.