Table on the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 1905. The main events of the Russo-Japanese War

The confrontation between Russia and Japan for control over Manchuria, Korea, the ports of Port Arthur and Dalny was the main reason for the start of the tragic war for Russia.

The fighting began with an attack by the Japanese fleet, which on the night of February 9, 1904, without declaring war, launched a surprise attack on the Russian squadron near the naval base of Port Arthur.

In March 1904, the Japanese army landed in Korea, and in April - in the south of Manchuria. Under the blows of superior enemy forces, the Russian troops left the Jinzhou position in May and blocked Port Arthur 3 by the Japanese army. In the battle of June 14-15 at Vafangou, the Russian army retreated.

In early August, the Japanese landed on the Liaodong Peninsula and laid siege to the fortress of Port Arthur. On August 10, 1904, the Russian squadron made an unsuccessful attempt to break through from Port Arthur, as a result, individual escaped ships were interned in neutral ports, and the Novik cruiser near Kamchatka died in an unequal battle.

The siege of Port Arthur lasted from May 1904 and fell on January 2, 1905. The main goal of Japan was achieved. The battles in Northern Manchuria were of an auxiliary nature, because. the Japanese did not have the strength and means to occupy it and the entire Russian Far East.

The first major battle on land near Liaoyang (August 24 - September 3, 1904) led to the retreat of Russian troops to Mukden. The meeting battle on October 5-17 on the Shahe River and the attempt of the Russian troops to advance on January 24, 1905 in the Sandepu area were unsuccessful.

After the largest Mukden battle (February 19 - March 10, 1905), Russian troops withdrew to Telin, and then to Sypingai positions 175 km north of Mukden. Here they met the end of the war.

Formed after the death of the Russian fleet in Port Arthur, 2 Pacific made a six-month transition to the Far East. However, in the hours-long battle at Fr. Tsushima (May 27, 1905) she was crushed and destroyed by superior enemy forces.

Russian military losses, according to official figures, amounted to 31,630 killed, 5,514 died of wounds and 1,643 died in captivity. Russian sources estimated the losses of Japan as more significant: 47,387 people were killed, 173,425 were wounded, 11,425 died from wounds and 27,192 from diseases.

According to foreign sources, the losses in killed, wounded and sick of Japan and Russia are comparable, and Russian prisoners were several times more than Japanese.

Results of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

For Russia . She ceded to Japan the Liaodong Peninsula along with a branch of the South Manchurian Railway and the southern half of about. Sakhalin. Russian troops were withdrawn from Manchuria, and Korea was recognized as a sphere of influence of Japan.

Russia's positions in China and throughout the Far East were undermined. The country lost its position as one of the largest maritime powers, abandoned the "oceanic" strategy and returned to the "continental" strategy. Russia has reduced international trade and tightened domestic policy.

The main reason for the defeat of Russia in this war is the weakness of the fleet and poor logistics.

Defeat in the war led to military reforms and a marked improvement in combat training. The troops, especially the command staff, gained combat experience, which later proved itself in the First World War.

Losing the war was the catalyst for the first Russian revolution. Despite its suppression by 1907, the Russian empire did not recover from this blow and ceased to exist.

For Japan . Psychologically and politically, Japan's victory demonstrated to Asia the ability to defeat the Europeans. Japan has become a great power of the European level of development. It began to dominate Korea and coastal China, began active naval construction, and by the end of World War I had become the third maritime power in the world.

Geopolitical. All positions of Russia in the Pacific region were practically lost, it abandoned the eastern (southeastern) direction of expansion and turned its attention to Europe, the Middle East and the Straits zone.

Relations with England improved and an agreement was signed on the delimitation of spheres of influence in Afghanistan. The Anglo-French-Russian alliance "Entente" was finally formed. The balance of power in Europe shifted temporarily in favor of the Central Powers.

Anatoly Sokolov

At the beginning of the 20th century, active development of new lands was going on in the Far East, which provoked a war with Japan. Let's figure out what are the reasons for the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905.

Background and causes of the war

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Japan experienced a period of powerful development. Contacts with England and the USA allowed her to raise the economy to a new level, reform the army, and build a new modern fleet. The "Meiji Revolution" made the Rising Sun Empire a leading regional power.

At this time, Nicholas II came to power in Russia. His reign began with a crush on the Khodynka field, which left a negative imprint on his authority among his subjects.

Rice. 1. Portrait of Nicholas II.

To raise the authority needed a "small victorious war" or new territorial expansion to demonstrate the greatness of Russia. The Crimean War marked the territorial claims of Russia in Europe. In Central Asia, Russia ran into India, and conflict with Britain had to be avoided. Nicholas II turned his attention to China, weakened by wars and European colonization. There were also long-term plans for Korea.

In 1898, Russia leased the Liaodong Peninsula with the fortress of Port Arthur from China, and the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) began. The development of the territories of Manchuria by Russian colonists was actively going on.

The course of the war and the results

The war began with the active actions of the Japanese army and navy. First, Russian ships were attacked in Chemulpo and Port Arthur, and then the landing force was landed in Korea and on the Liaodong Peninsula.

Rice. 3. The death of the cruiser Varyag.

Russia was actively defending, waiting for the approach of reserves from Europe. However, poor infrastructure and supplies prevented Russia from turning the tide of the war. Nevertheless, the prolonged defense of Port Arthur and the victory of the Russian troops at Liaoyang could bring Russia victory in the war, since the Japanese had practically exhausted their economic and human reserves. But General Kuropatkin each time, instead of attacking and defeating the enemy army, gave orders to retreat. First, Port Arthur was lost, then the battle of Mukden took place, the Russian Second and Third Pacific squadrons were defeated. The defeat was obvious and the parties moved on to peace negotiations.

The consequence of the defeat in the war was an even greater deterioration in the authority of the king among the people. This resulted in the First Russian Revolution, which lasted until 1907 and limited the power of the tsar through the creation of the State Duma. 4.6. Total ratings received: 220.

The main reason for the outbreak of war between Japan and Russia in 1904 lies on the surface 1 . The geopolitical ambitions of these powers clashed in Northeast Asia. But, as in many other armed conflicts, the immediate causes of war are more confusing.

These are Russia's plans to build a railway in the Russian Far East, and Japan's victory in the war with China in 1895, and the project of some St. Petersburg guards officers to open a logging enterprise on the Yalu River, and Tokyo's fears about St. Petersburg's influence in Korea. Disorderly, inconsistent diplomacy also played a large role.

But, as with the outbreak of the First World War, a clear understanding of how the Russo-Japanese conflict broke out may take us beyond the scope of historical science.

The answer concerns an important but often elusive concept of diplomacy, namely honor 2 . When attempts to encroach on the international authority of a state can be considered as dangerous as a military invasion of its territory. Alexander II once said that in the life of states, as in the life of any person, there are moments when you need to forget everything except protecting your own honor 3 .

CONFUSION ON SINGING BRIDGE

Russia and Japan have been going to war since 1895, from the time the Japanese inflicted a spectacular defeat on the Chinese in a brief conflict over Korea. Russia's attempt to prevent Japan from gaining a foothold on Chinese territory caused extreme indignation in the island empire. And Russian intervention began after the conclusion of the Shimonoseki peace treaty on April 17, 1895, which marked the end of the Sino-Japanese war. Among the requirements of the Japanese side was the possession of the Liaodong Peninsula, located near Beijing, with the strategically important naval base of Port Arthur. The Qing dynasty agreed to cede the rights to the peninsula, but Petersburg enticed Berlin and Paris to jointly demand the cession of Liaodong to Russia.

The Russian demarche was made after heated debates among the dignitaries of Nicholas II, caused primarily by the proximity of Eastern Siberia to the theater of operations of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The main goal of the Romanovs was an ice-free access to the Pacific Ocean. Owning the Pacific port of Vladivostok, surrounded by freezing seas, Russia did not have a convenient harbor washed by warm waters for the terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was being built at that time. Prominent Russian naval commanders believed that the time had come to capture the port in Korea. This idea was enthusiastically shared by Nicholas II. Lacking the necessary backing to make such a move, Foreign Minister Prince Andrei Lobanov-Rostovsky proposed an agreement with Tokyo for a new port in the region.

But there was another point of view. Its most influential proponent was Finance Minister Sergei Witte, who saw good relations with China as essential to the development of the Russian Far East. He had no doubt that in time the Romanovs would dominate China. But the empire must move towards this peacefully and by economic means. Russian and Chinese railways, banks, trading houses and not troops should compete with each other. Among other things, Witte often reminded Nikolai: "...for the general state of affairs inside Russia, it is essential to avoid everything that could cause external complications" 4 .

As a result, after the Peace of Shimonoseki, Russia played more of the role of defender of Beijing. The finance minister quickly drew dividends from the goodwill of the Chinese. He secured the consent of the Zongli Yamen (Chinese Department of Foreign Affairs. - Approx. Per.) to lay the Trans-Siberian Railway through Manchuria, which significantly shortened the eastern segment of the railway. And on June 3, 1896, the two empires concluded a secret agreement on joint confrontation in the event of possible aggression from Japan 5 .

However, after only a year, Emperor Nicholas abruptly changed course. Imitating his cousin Wilhelm, who captured Qingdao, he occupied the southern part of the Liaodong Peninsula, which included Port Arthur. Three years later, the Cossacks suddenly entered the hereditary provinces of the Qing dynasty in Manchuria. Although Nicholas's diplomats officially promised to withdraw them, the military did not budge and even plotted a campaign against neighboring Korea.

Such inconsistency reflected deep divisions in the Far Eastern policy of St. Petersburg. Sergei Witte, who was supported by Count Vladimir Lamsdorf, Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1900 to 1906, remained an unshakable supporter of friendly relations with China. A coalition of "hawks" opposed at different times, including naval commanders, Lamsdorf's predecessor Count Mikhail Muravyov, a retired guard captain and the dubious businessman Alexander Bezobrazov and the imperial viceroy in the Russian Far East, Admiral Evgeny Alekseev. However, the differences did not prevent the opponents from agreeing on one thing: Russia should play an active role in Northeast Asia.

"KOREA FOR MANCHURIA"

Japanese dignitaries also agreed on one thing: the main goal of their country's geopolitics was Korea, a hermit state that had long been a tributary of the Qing dynasty. However, by the end of the 19th century, the progressive weakness of China led to the weakening of its rule on the peninsula and made it possible for stronger powers to operate here. The latter included Japan, which during the Meiji Restoration ended its medieval isolation and became a modern state with a Europeanized army and colonial aspirations of its own.

The simple logic of geography pointed to Korea as one of the main targets of the genro, the group of nine statesmen who determined the policy of the empire. At its narrowest point, only 60 kilometers separated Japan from Korea.

Already in 1875, Japanese troops clashed with the Koreans on the island of Ganghwado, and 20 years later, the empire started a war with China, weakening its influence on the hermit country. As the Western powers divided China into spheres of influence, the Genro decided they could fulfill their colonial ambitions by giving Russia a dominant role in Manchuria in exchange for their control of Korea. For the next eight years, the slogan "Man-Kan kokan" ("Korea for Manchuria") became one of the leading imperatives of Japanese foreign policy.

On April 13, 1898, Baron Rosen, the Russian envoy, and Japanese Foreign Minister Tokujiro Nishi signed a joint protocol in Tokyo recognizing Japanese economic dominance in Korea. But at the same time, both sides pledged to defend the country's political sovereignty. Rosen himself called the treaty "incomplete and meaningless", the Japanese were also not in the best opinion about it 7 .

The next four years, when Russia was increasingly moving away from Korean affairs, Japan made repeated attempts to achieve official recognition of its superiority on the peninsula. However, Russian diplomats were unable to obtain permission from the government for such a turn of policy. As Alexander Izvolsky, then envoy to Tokyo, explained, both the tsar and his admirals "were too interested in Korea" 8 . At the same time, Lamsdorf was wary of Japanese hostility, warning in letters to Witte, General Kuropatkin, and Naval Minister Tyrtov that if Russia failed to appease the new serious rival, "the clear danger of an armed clash with Japan" would remain.

When the Japanese government was headed by Marquis Hirobumi Ito, cold heads prevailed in Tokyo. From the time of the Peace of Shimonoseki in 1895, the marquis tended towards a cautious policy towards Russia. One of the most prominent statesmen of the Meiji era, Ito had great authority among both dignitaries and the emperor. But despite this, in May 1901, his cabinet lost the confidence of parliament, and a new prime minister, Prince Taro Katsura, took office. The younger members of his cabinet were much more aggressive towards Russia 10 .

True, the Marquis of Ito, who found himself outside the government, did not give up. During a private visit to St. Petersburg in November 1901, he looked for ways to carry out a policy of reconciliation. An experienced dignitary received a warm welcome in St. Petersburg and was awarded the Order of St. Nicholas II. Alexander Nevsky, and at meetings with Witte and Lamsdorf defended the Korean-Manchurian project. But while the Minister of Finance was sympathetic to this idea, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was still against it.

Most importantly, while Ito was negotiating with the tsar and his officials, the Japanese ambassador in London, Count Tadasu Hayashi, secretly concluded a defensive alliance with Great Britain 12 . Russian diplomats were taken by surprise by this news. The two main adversaries in the Far East have joined forces, changing the political landscape in the Pacific region at once.

PETERSBURG CONFUSION CONTINUES

The ministers of Nicholas II hastily assured the world that the Russian troops would leave Manchuria in the near future. However, even here opinions in St. Petersburg were sharply divided. Count Lamsdorf and Witte believed that Manchuria should be returned as soon as possible. They predicted that the unwillingness to calm the atmosphere in the region would cause new unrest there 13 . This point of view was also supported by many Russians - for the simple reason that there are at least 14 problems at home. In addition, the "Kingdom of Witte" - the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) - flourished, and the military presence in Manchuria posed a serious threat to the plans of the Minister of Finance.

However, the idea of retaining Manchuria for Russia had no less influential defenders. The military believed that Manchuria would become part of the Russian Empire, like Khiva, Kokand and Bukhara, annexed in the second half of the 19th century 15 . The most prominent "hawk" was Admiral Evgeny Alekseev, who was in Port Arthur. This naval commander had authority not only in the Pacific Fleet, but also among the garrison of the Liaodong Peninsula. His irrepressible temperament and ambitions, together with rumors that Alekseev was the illegitimate son of Alexander II, ensured the enmity of many of his contemporaries. And above all, Sergei Witte, who saw him as a dangerous rival in the Russian Far East.

The pathologically indecisive Nicholas II hesitated. The confused and unstable policy of the empire sharply increased the hostility of other powers. Nevertheless, after a year of difficult negotiations with China, on April 8, 1902, Russia signed an agreement in Beijing, according to which the withdrawal of troops from Manchuria was to take place in three stages within 18 months 16 . On October 8, 1902, the first phase of the evacuation of troops began in the southern part of Fengtian Province, including in the ancient capital of the Qing Dynasty, Mukden (modern Shenyang). But the second stage, scheduled for April 1903, did not take place, the Russian dignitaries could not agree among themselves. Petersburg did not keep its word.

"VAIN NEGOTIATIONS"

In the summer of 1903, Russia and Japan again entered into debate, wanting to resolve their differences in East Asia. Moreover, the intractable Japanese Prime Minister Taro Katsura showed the initiative. By this point, the Russian line had hardened considerably as well, as the influence of Witte, a principled defender of peace in East Asia, had plummeted at court. The tsar called the hard line adopted in the spring of 1903 the "new course" 17 . Its goal was "to prevent the penetration of foreign influence into Manchuria in any form" 18 . Russia will emphasize its decisiveness, he wrote to Alekseev, as he embarks on a military and economic presence in East Asia.

Tired of the endless bickering among the ministers, Nikolai made two important decisions in the summer. On August 12, he appointed Admiral Alekseev as viceroy in the Far East, which effectively made him the tsar's personal representative in the Pacific region with full power here 20 . And two weeks later, Nikolay removed Alekseev's main opponent, Sergei Witte, from the post of Minister of Finance 21 .

Alekseev's rise provoked a sharp reaction in Tokyo. Baron Roman Rosen, the Russian envoy, reported that in Japan the appearance of the governor of the Far East was perceived as an act of aggression 22 . The Japanese were especially offended by the fact that the appointment came two weeks after their government had proposed to start a new round of negotiations.

Throughout 1903 European foreign ministers were bewildered, alarmed, and often irritated by the constant reversals of tsarist policy that were exposing Russia to ever greater international isolation. But a compromise was still possible even at this late stage. However, the king and his governor still did not take Japan seriously.

Nikolai, of course, did not consider endless negotiations a worthy reason to interrupt his long autumn trips abroad or hunting. And he believed that "there will be no war, because I don't want it" 24 . As a result of fruitless negotiations until the very winter, the Japanese cabinet finally came to the conclusion that a peaceful resolution of the conflict was impossible. On February 6, 1904, Foreign Minister Komura summoned Baron Rosen to his office to announce that the government had lost patience with all these "vain negotiations." Therefore, it decided to end them and break off diplomatic relations with Russia 25 .

Upon returning to his residence, the Russian envoy learned from the naval attaché that earlier that day, at 6 am local time, two Japanese squadrons had weighed anchor for unknown reasons. Shortly after midnight on February 8, 1904, Japanese destroyer torpedoes hit three Russian ships in the Port Arthur roadstead. Two empires are at war...

CONCLUSION

The Russo-Japanese War is often viewed as a classic imperialist conflict. This is only partly true. Although expansionist goals have led Petersburg and Tokyo to disagree over Northeast Asia, such a rivalry is not unique in an age of aggressive colonial wars. In the decades since the 1880s and before the outbreak of the First World War, in Asia and Africa there were repeated clashes between the great states of Europe. However, none of them escalated into open war. Differences were invariably resolved by "diplomacy of imperialism," 27 an instrument for escaping colonial disputes that were gaining momentum at the end of the 19th century.

An unwritten code determined the relationship between the great powers of Europe. Although strictly fixed rules did not exist here, they were quite clear. Based on hard calculation and a sense of fair play, imperialism's diplomacy was effective. Critical to its success was the understanding by the great powers that they all had legitimate interests outside of Europe. And this line successfully saved countries from open struggle on other continents.

But the diplomacy of imperialism itself was not without flaws. Chief among these was the inability of states to recognize new developing non-European countries. Like an old-fashioned gentlemen's club, only European governments received membership. Thus, the tiny Belgian monarchy was considered a colonial power, while the ambitions of the United States or Japan were called into question. It was precisely this inability of a member of this club - Russia - to take seriously the colonial aspirations of an outsider - Japan - that on February 8, 1904, led to the outbreak of war in East Asia.

Tokyo saw how Petersburg trampled on his honor. And statesmen who do not properly respect the interests of other countries have put their own at serious risk. And more than a hundred years later, this conflict has not lost its relevance in international relations.

Translation by Evgenia Galimzyanova

Notes
1. This article is based on the chapter Russia s Relations with Japan before and after the War: An Episode in the Diplomacy of Imperialism from the book: The Treaty of Portsmouth and its Legacies. Steven Ericson and Alan Hockley, eds. Hanover, NH, 2008. P. 11-23, and also in my monograph: Schimmelpenninck van der Oye D. Toward the Rising Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan. DeKalb, 2001.
2. Honor Among Nations: Intangible Interests and Foreign Policy. Elliot Abrams, ed. Washington, DC, 1998; Tsygankov A.P. Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations. Cambridge, 2012. P. 13-27.
3. Wohlforth W. Honor as Interest in Russian Decisions for War 1600-1995 // Honor Among Nations...
4. Witte to Nicholas II, memorandum, August 11, 1900 // RGIA. F. 560. Op. 28. D. 218. L. 71.
5. Collection of treaties between Russia and other states in 1856-1917. M., 1952. S. 292-294.
6. Nish I. The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War. London, 1985. P. 45.
7. Rosen R.R. Forty Years of Diplomacy. Vol. 1. London, 1922. P. 159.
8. A.P. Izvolsky L.P. Urusov. Letter dated March 9, 1901 // Bakhmetevsky archive. Box 1.
9. V.N. Lamsdorf S.Yu. Witte, A.N. Kuropatkin and P.P. Tyrtov. Letter dated May 22, 1901 // GARF. F. 568. Op. 1. D. 175. L. 2-3.
10. Okamoto S. The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War. N.Y., 1970. P. 24-31.
11. V.N. Lamsdorf, reports 11/20/1901 // GARF. F. 568. Op. 1. D. 62. L. 43-45; V.N. Lamsdorf to Nicholas II, memorandum, 11/22/1901 // Red Archive (M.-L.). 1934. T. 63. S. 44-45; V.N. Lamsdorf A.P. Izvolsky, telegram, 11/22/1901 // Ibid. pp. 47-48.
12. Nish I. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894-1907. L., 1966. P. 143-228.
13. V.N. Lamsdorf A.N. Kuropatkin. Letter dated March 31, 1900 // RGVIA. F. 165. Op. 1. D. 759. L. 1-2. See also: A.N. Kuropatkin V.V. Sakharov. Letter dated July 1, 1901 // Ibid. D. 702. L. 2.
14. Suvorin A. Small letters. New time. 1903. February 22. S. 3; Chinese railway // New time. 1902. May 3. S. 2; Kravchenko N. From the Far East. // New time. 1902. October 22. C. 2.
15. For a good example of such opinions, see: I.P. Balashev to Nicholas II, memorandum, March 25, 1902 // GARF. F. 543. Op. 1. D. 180. L. 1-26.
16. Glinsky B.B. Prologue of the Russo-Japanese War: materials from the archive of Count S.Yu. Witte. Pg., 1916. S. 180-183.
17. Although Nikolai coined the term, B.A. Romanov popularized it among historians to describe the growing influence of Bezobrazov.
18. Romanov V.A. Russia in Manchuria. Ann Arbor, 1952. P. 284.
19. Ibidem.
20. Nicholas II E.I. Alekseev, telegram, September 10, 1903 // RGAVMF. F. 417. Op. 1. D. 2865. L. 31.
21. Nicholas II S.Yu. Witte, letter, August 16, 1903 // RGVIA. F. 1622. Op. 1. D. 34. L. 1.
22. Rosen R.R. Op. cit. Vol. 1. R. 219.
23. Gurko V.I. Facts and Features of the Past. Stanford, 1939. P. 281.
24. MacKenzie D. Imperial Dreams/Harsh Realities: Tsarist Russian Foreign Policy, 1815-1917. Fort Worth, 1994. P. 145.
25. Nish I. The Origins... P. 213.
26. Rosen R.R. Op. cit. Vol. 1. R. 231.
27. The phrase is taken from the title of William Langer's classic work on European diplomacy at the turn of the 20th century: Langer W.L. The Diplomacy of Imperialism. N.Y., 1956.

* Mikado is the oldest title of the secular supreme ruler of Japan.

The Russo-Japanese War began on January 26 (or, according to the new style, February 8) 1904. The Japanese fleet unexpectedly, before the official declaration of war, attacked ships located on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. As a result of this attack, the most powerful ships of the Russian squadron were disabled. The declaration of war took place only on 10 February.

The most important reason for the Russo-Japanese War was the expansion of Russia to the east. However, the immediate reason was the annexation of the Liaodong Peninsula, previously captured by Japan. This provoked military reform and the militarization of Japan.

About the reaction of Russian society to the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, briefly, we can say this: Japan's actions outraged Russian society. The world community reacted differently. England and the USA took a pro-Japanese position. And the tone of the press reports was distinctly anti-Russian. France, which at that time was an ally of Russia, declared neutrality - an alliance with Russia was necessary for it in order to prevent the strengthening of Germany. But, already on April 12, France concluded an agreement with England, which caused a cooling of Russian-French relations. Germany, on the other hand, declared friendly neutrality towards Russia.

The Japanese failed to capture Port Arthur, despite active actions at the beginning of the war. But, already on August 6, they made another attempt. A 45-strong army under the command of Oyama was thrown to storm the fortress. Having met the strongest resistance and having lost more than half of the soldiers, the Japanese were forced to retreat on August 11. The fortress was surrendered only after the death of General Kondratenko on December 2, 1904. Despite the fact that Port Arthur could have held out for at least another 2 months, Stessel and Reis signed an act on the surrender of the fortress, as a result of which the Russian fleet was destroyed, and 32 thousand soldiers were destroyed. man was taken prisoner.

The most significant events of 1905 were:

The Battle of Mukden (February 5 - 24), which remained the largest land battle in the history of mankind until the start of the First World War. It ended with the withdrawal of the Russian army, which lost 59 thousand killed. Japanese losses amounted to 80 thousand people.

The Battle of Tsushima (May 27-28), in which the Japanese fleet, 6 times larger than the Russian, almost completely destroyed the Russian Baltic squadron.

The course of the war was clearly in favor of Japan. However, its economy was depleted by the war. This forced Japan to enter into peace negotiations. In Portsmouth, on August 9, participants in the Russo-Japanese War began a peace conference. It should be noted that these negotiations were a major success for the Russian diplomatic delegation headed by Witte. The signed peace treaty sparked protests in Tokyo. But, nevertheless, the consequences of the Russo-Japanese war turned out to be very tangible for the country. During the conflict, the Russian Pacific Fleet was practically destroyed. The war claimed more than 100 thousand lives of soldiers heroically defending their country. The expansion of Russia to the East was stopped. Also, the defeat showed the weakness of the tsarist policy, which to a certain extent contributed to the growth of revolutionary sentiment and eventually led to the revolution of 1904-1905. Among the reasons for the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. the most important are the following:

diplomatic isolation of the Russian Empire;

unpreparedness of the Russian army for combat operations in difficult conditions;

frank betrayal of the interests of the fatherland or mediocrity of many tsarist generals;

serious superiority of Japan in the military and economic spheres.

Russo-Japanese War- This is a war that was fought between the Russian and Japanese empires for control of Manchuria and Korea. After a break of several decades, it became the first big war with the latest weapons : long-range artillery, armadillos, destroyers, wire fences under high voltage; as well as using spotlights and a field kitchen.

Reasons for the war:

Lease by Russia of the Liaodong Peninsula and Port Arthur as a naval base.
Construction of the CER and Russian economic expansion in Manchuria.
The struggle for spheres of influence in China and Kopee.
Means of distraction from the revolutionary movement in Russia ("small victorious war")
The strengthening of Russia's positions in the Far East threatened the monopolies of England and the USA and the militaristic aspirations of Japan.

The nature of war: unfair on both sides.

In 1902, England entered into a military alliance with Japan and, together with the United States, embarked on the path of its preparation for war with Russia. In a short time, Japan built an armored fleet at the shipyards of England, Italy, and the USA.

The bases of the Russian fleet in the Pacific - Port Arthur and Vladivostok - were separated by 1,100 miles and were poorly equipped. By the beginning of the war, out of 1 million 50 thousand Russian soldiers, about 100 thousand were deployed in the Far East. The Far Eastern army was removed from the main supply centers, the Siberian railway had a low capacity (3 trains per day).

COURSE OF EVENTS

January 27, 1904 Japanese attack on the Russian fleet. The death of the cruiser "Varangian" and the gunboat "Koreets" in Chemulpo Bay off the coast of Korea. Blocked in Chemulpo "Varyag" and "Korean" rejected the offer to surrender. Trying to break through to Port Arthur, two Russian ships under the command of Captain 1st Rank V.F. Rudnev entered into battle with 14 enemy ships.

January 27 - December 20, 1904. Defense of the naval fortress Port Arthur. During the siege, new types of weapons were used for the first time: quick-firing howitzers, Maxim machine guns, hand grenades, mortars.

Commander of the Pacific Fleet Vice Admiral S. O. Makarov prepared for active operations at sea and the defense of Port Arthur. On March 31, he led his squadron to the outer roadstead in order to engage the enemy and lure his ships under fire from coastal batteries. However, at the very beginning of the battle, his flagship Petropavlovsk hit a mine and sank within 2 minutes. Most of the team died, the entire headquarters of S. O. Makarov. After that, the Russian fleet went on the defensive, as the commander-in-chief of the Far Eastern forces, Admiral E. I. Alekseev, refused active operations at sea.

The ground defense of Port Arthur was headed by the head of the Kwantung Fortified Region, General A. M. Stessel. The main struggle in November unfolded over Mount Vysokaya. On December 2, the head of the land defense, its organizer and inspirer, General R. I. Kondratenko. Stessel December 20, 1904 signed capitulation . The fortress withstood 6 assaults and was surrendered only as a result of the betrayal of the commandant, General A. M. Stessel. For Russia, the fall of Port Arthur meant the loss of access to the non-freezing Yellow Sea, the deterioration of the strategic situation in Manchuria and a significant aggravation of the domestic political situation in the country.

October 1904 The defeat of Russian troops on the Shahe River.

February 25, 1905 The defeat of the Russian army near Mukden (Manchuria). The largest land battle in history before the First World War.

May 14-15, 1905 Battle in the Tsushima Strait. The defeat by the Japanese fleet of the 2nd Pacific squadron under the command of Vice Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky, sent to the Far East from the Baltic Sea. In July, the Japanese occupied Sakhalin Island.

REASONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF RUSSIA

Support for Japan from Britain and the United States.
Weak preparation of Russia for war. Military-technical superiority of Japan.
Mistakes and ill-conceived actions of the Russian command.
The inability to quickly transfer reserves to the Far East.

Russo-Japanese War. RESULTS

Korea was recognized as a sphere of influence of Japan;
Japan took possession of South Sakhalin;
Japan received the right to fish along the Russian coast;
Russia leased the Liaodong Peninsula and Port Arthur to Japan.

Russian commanders in this war: A.N. Kuropatkin, S.O. Makarov, A.M. Stessel.

Consequences of Russia's defeat in the war:

weakening of Russia's position in the Far East;
public dissatisfaction with the autocracy, which lost the war with Japan;
destabilization of the political situation in Russia, the growth of the revolutionary struggle;
active reform of the army, a significant increase in its combat capability.