Vistula-Oder operation. Vistula-Oder operation - Ural State Military History Museum Front line by January 12

70 years ago, on January 12, 1945, the Vistula-Oder strategic offensive operation began. During this operation, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and the 1st Ukrainian Front of Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Konev broke through the enemy defenses, liberated the territory of Poland west of the Vistula and captured bridgeheads on the left bank of the Oder, creating the prerequisites for carrying out the Berlin operation.

The German troops suffered a crushing defeat: 35 divisions were completely defeated, another 25 lost from half to two-thirds of their manpower and equipment, having lost their combat effectiveness. Significant German forces were surrounded in Posen and Breslau. It became obvious that the collapse of the German war machine was near.

Residents of the Polish city of Lodz greet the Soviet soldiers of the 1st Guards Tank Army

The day before the attack. Position of Germany

By the end of 1944 - beginning of 1945. the military-political situation in the world finally developed in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. The grandiose victories of the USSR in 1944 finally undermined the power of Nazi Germany and its allies. The former allies of the German Empire - Romania, Bulgaria, Italy and Finland, not only left the Nazi bloc, but entered the war against the Third Reich. On the side of the Germans, only the Hungarians actively continued to fight.

The strategic initiative was firmly in the hands of the allies. In the summer of 1944 a second front was opened. The troops of the USA, England, France and their allies began to advance from the west. By the end of 1944, in the West, the Allied forces cleared the territory of France, Luxembourg, Belgium and part of Holland from the Nazis. The line of the Western Front ran from the mouth of the Meuse River in Holland and further along the French border to Switzerland. The allied armies had 87 full divisions, 6.5 thousand tanks and more than 10 thousand aircraft here. Allied air raids wiped entire German cities off the face of the earth. Germany had to conduct active hostilities on two fronts. In addition, the Allies were advancing on the Apennine Peninsula - 21 divisions and 9 brigades.

After the forced halt of the offensive, the Anglo-American command planned to resume it from the line of the western border of Germany and end the war with a quick strike deep into Germany. The United States and Britain hoped to preempt Soviet troops in advancing into a number of regions of Central Europe. This was facilitated by the fact that only a third of the Wehrmacht opposed the Allied forces in the West: 74 poorly equipped divisions and 3 brigades, about 1600 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1750 aircraft on the Western Front, and 31 divisions and 1 brigade in Northern Italy. The German military-political leadership kept the main and most combat-ready forces on the Eastern Front, which was still the decisive front of the Second World War. In addition, there was the possibility of an apex coup in Germany, when part of the German leadership was interested in a separate peace with England and the USA. Part of the Anglo-Saxon leadership, especially the British, also planned to conclude a separate peace with Berlin and start the Third World War - against the Soviet Union. True, the most sane people, like American President Franklin Roosevelt, were more constructive.

For the Third Reich, both the strategic, foreign policy and internal situation deteriorated catastrophically. In the titanic battles near Leningrad, Stalingrad, on the Kursk Bulge, on the Dnieper, in the Crimea, in Belarus and Right-Bank Ukraine, as well as in the Baltic states, Poland, Hungary and Romania, Germany suffered defeats from which she could no longer recover. In the summer and autumn of 1944, the Wehrmacht lost 1.6 million men, 6,700 tanks and more than 12,000 aircraft. The main strategic groupings of the German armed forces on the Eastern Front were defeated, the reserves were depleted. Germany's resources were no longer able to regularly and in the required quantities to replenish the divisions with manpower and equipment.

The military and economic potential of the Third Reich was seriously reduced. The territory was lost, and the resources of most of the satellites. Germany itself was exhausted. And although the German industry in 1944 showed a good result, releasing 17.3 thousand heavy and medium tanks, 41 thousand guns of 75 mm caliber and above, 27.6 thousand aircraft, but by the end of the year there was a drop in production, and in the first In the quarter of 1945, the fall in military production intensified even more.

The internal political situation also worsened. Although after an unsuccessful assassination attempt and a rebellion on July 20, 1944, Hitler managed to maintain power. Any resistance in the military environment was suppressed by severe terror and mass repressions. Intensified propaganda made it possible to maintain the obedience of the people, who maintained the illusion of the possibility of an "honorable peace" with the Western powers, for which it was necessary to keep the Eastern Front. Part of the military-political elite of the Reich was looking for an opportunity to conclude a separate peace with the United States and England.

However, despite all the problems and the decline in the overall military, economic and moral power of Germany, she was still a dangerous adversary. By the beginning of 1945, there were 7.5 million people in the German armed forces. The Wehrmacht consisted of 299 divisions, including 33 tank and 16 motorized divisions, and 31 brigades. The most combat-ready German formations were located on the Eastern Front: 10 field and 4 tank armies (169 divisions, including 22 tank and 9 motorized, and 20 brigades), 3 air fleets. Also, the 1st and 3rd Hungarian armies fought against the Soviet troops - 16 divisions and other units. These troops numbered 3.1 million soldiers and officers, and were armed with 28.5 thousand guns and mortars, about 4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and about 2 thousand combat aircraft. In the rear there were various reserve formations, numbering approximately 2 million people. They were armed with 2,700 guns, over 1,000 tanks and 930 aircraft. In addition, during the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, the length of the Eastern Front was seriously reduced (from 4450 to 2250 km). This allowed the German high command to condense the defensive orders along the front and in depth.

It is also worth noting that the technical equipment of the Reich was still high. German industry, despite all the problems, until the very last moment produced modernized aircraft, the latest tanks, guns and submarines. The all-out bombing of German cities by the Allied aviation claimed the lives of many thousands of civilians, but could not undermine the power of German industry. The most important defense enterprises went underground and into the mountains. The German gloomy genius continued to develop advanced types of jets and ballistic missiles at a rapid pace. The German infantry began to receive faustpatrons - the first single-shot anti-tank grenade launchers. If the war dragged on for a few more years, Germany could get nuclear weapons.

The German leadership was not going to give up. The Fuhrer and his entourage kept faith in the "miracle weapon", and in the "surprise factor", in the split of the anti-Hitler coalition. To do this, it was necessary to drag out the war, to turn Germany into a "besieged fortress". In order to maintain the morale of the Wehrmacht and the population, rumors spread about the development of an extraordinary "wonder weapon" that would save the country and destroy enemies. At the same time, total mobilization continued, and battalions of the Volkssturm (people's militia) were formed.

Members of the Volkssturm in November 1944

The plans of the German command

The German leadership understood that in terms of grand strategy, the war was lost. Plans to create a world German empire collapsed. Now the main plan was the task of preserving the Nazi regime in Germany itself, to save their own skins. The main task was to hold the Eastern Front. Here the front line in East Prussia was already passing through German soil. In the Baltics (in Courland) there were still divisions of the Army Group "North", blocked by the troops of the 1st and 2nd Baltic fronts. The defensive lines in Poland, Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia were a huge strategic base for the "German fortress". It was supposed to keep the Soviet troops away from the vital centers of the Third Reich. In addition, the countries occupied by the Germans still had extensive strategic resources needed by the Reich to continue the war.

Given all this, the German command decided to keep the Eastern Front, not reducing its length by withdrawing troops from the occupied territories. In addition, an offensive operation was planned in Hungary. In order to create a solid defense, reinforced construction of defensive structures was carried out. Particular attention was paid to the Berlin direction, seven defensive lines up to 50 km deep were built on it (between the Vistula and the Oder). At the same time, a powerful defense was created in East Prussia, as well as on the former German-Polish and southern borders of Germany.

The German command decided to use the temporary pause in hostilities to strike in the West, in the Ardennes. The Germans hoped to quickly break through the enemy defenses, cross the Meuse, bypass Brussels and reach Antwerp. Success in the operation made it possible to destroy 25-30 Anglo-American divisions and force the allies to abandon active offensive operations for 2-3 months. Adolf Hitler even hoped to start separate negotiations with the Anglo-Saxons.

On December 16, 1944, the Ardennes operation began. For the allied command, the German offensive came as a complete surprise. The defense of the allies was broken through, the situation was dangerous. However, the lack of sufficient reserves did not allow the German troops to develop success. The allies pulled up reserves, organized a counterattack and somewhat stabilized the situation. In addition, the situation on the Eastern Front did not allow the Germans to concentrate all their efforts to fight the Anglo-American troops. In December 1944, 180,000 troops were surrounded in Hungary in the Budapest region. German-Hungarian group. This forced the German command to immediately transfer part of the forces from the Western Front to the Eastern. At the same time, Hitler's headquarters learned that in the near future the Red Army would launch an offensive in East Prussia and on the Vistula. The German High Command began to hastily prepare the 6th SS Panzer Army and other large formations for the transfer to the Eastern Front.

I must say that the German command, as before, underestimated the capabilities of the Soviet armed forces. Hitler's headquarters expected that in the winter of 1945 the Soviet troops would resume their offensive. But they did not think that the Soviet troops would advance along the entire length of the front. The Germans believed that after the grandiose battles of 1944, which led to heavy losses on both sides and stretched the communications of the Red Army, the Soviet troops would not be able to resume the offensive in all strategic directions. In addition, the German high command made a mistake with the direction of the main attack in the winter campaign of 1945. The Germans believed that the main attack would be delivered in the southern strategic direction, so they kept almost half of the armored forces there. In Hungary, there were stubborn and bloody battles, the Germans tried to go on the counteroffensive, threw large masses of armored vehicles into battle ().

The position of the USSR

On the Soviet-German front, the Soviet army at the end of 1944 was preparing to deliver the last powerful blows to the Third Reich. The Red Army was tasked with the final defeat of the German armed forces and the completion of the liberation of the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe occupied by the Germans. As a result, Germany had to sign an unconditional surrender.

Contrary to the assumptions of the German command, the Soviet Union was not exhausted by the operations of 1944 and had everything necessary for the victorious end of the war. The morale of the army and the population was extremely high, the soldiers and commanders sought to finish off the fascist beast and take Berlin. The Soviet economy provided the armed forces with everything they needed. The most difficult times were in the past and the war economy showed rapid growth. In all basic indicators, the USSR showed growth: in metal smelting, coal mining, and electricity generation. Military production and military thought developed rapidly. War-torn areas were being rebuilt at an amazing pace.

The growth in the production of weapons and equipment continued. So, if in 1943 the industry produced 24 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, then in 1944 - 29 thousand, in 1943 34900 aircraft were produced, in 1944 - 40300. The Soviet military-industrial complex increased the production of weapons with high combat qualities , military equipment was actively improved. The T-34 tanks were re-equipped with 85 mm cannons, which pierced the armor of heavy German tanks at long distances. Heavy tanks IS-2, self-propelled guns ISU-122, ISU-152, Yak-3, Yak-9, La-7, Tu-2, Il-10, etc. were produced. The growth of the combat power of the Red Army was accompanied by a sharp increase in its motorization, equipping with engineering facilities and improving radio communications. The saturation of military equipment has increased. In comparison with 1944, the saturation of weapons has increased: for tanks - more than 2 times, for aircraft - 1.7 times. In this way, the Soviet socialist system showed complete superiority over the German system.

Many former allies of Germany went over to the side of the Soviet Union. Together with the Soviet troops, Polish, Czechoslovak, Romanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav troops fought against the Germans. They consisted of 29 divisions and 5 brigades.

In 1944-1945, the Soviet military art - strategy, operational art and tactics - reached its peak. The strategy was distinguished by activity and decisiveness, operational art showed classic examples of the destruction of an enemy defense well prepared in engineering terms and protected by first-class troops, rapid encirclement and destruction of powerful strategic groupings. The troops showed mature tactical skill and the former mass heroism of the troops. The Headquarters and the General Staff achieved a high degree of perfection in the planning and organization of military operations.

Thus, Soviet military prowess in this period finally surpassed the German one. Now the Soviet fronts and armies smashed the enemy, broke his defense lines, occupied one region after another and rushed to the enemy's capital.

The plans of the Soviet command

In the autumn of 1944, the Soviet command began planning an operation to finally defeat Germany. At the beginning of November 1944, the Headquarters decided on a temporary transition to the defense of the troops of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. These fronts operated in decisive directions - in Warsaw-Berlin and Silesia. Careful preparation was required for a decisive offensive. At the same time, active hostilities continued on the southern strategic flank, in the zone of the 3rd, 2nd and 4th Ukrainian fronts. This forced the German command to transfer additional forces and reserves to the south from the Berlin direction.

The strategic plan of the Soviet command was to crush Germany during one winter-spring campaign, with the support of the Western allies. The campaign was to take place in two stages. At the first stage, it was decided to maximally intensify operations not only in the southern direction, in Hungary, and then in Austria, but also in the northwestern direction, in East Prussia. This was supposed to divert German forces from the central direction, to weaken the forces of the Warsaw-Berlin grouping. This calculation is fully justified. The offensive of the Soviet troops in November - December 1944 on the flanks of the front forced the German command to throw reserves into the threatened areas, which weakened the defense in the Warsaw-Poznan direction.

At the second stage, the Soviet troops were to go on the offensive along the entire Soviet-German front and defeat the enemy groupings in East Prussia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria. Developing the offensive, the Soviet troops were supposed to take Berlin and force the German leadership to surrender.

In the first half of November 1944, a detailed discussion of the concept of the operation took place at Headquarters. Seven fronts were to take part in the final campaign. On the southern flank, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front were to carry out the West Carpathian operation. The troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts were to complete the Budapest operation. The forces of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts were preparing for the Vistula-Oder operation. The troops of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussians (with the participation of units of the 1st Baltic Front and the Baltic Fleet) were to occupy East Prussia and liberate the northern part of Poland.

The start of the operation was scheduled for January 20, 1945, but was postponed to an earlier date - to January 12 due to the difficult situation of the allied forces on the Western Front, and the readiness of the Soviet army formations to attack. As a result, the Soviet Headquarters decided to launch the offensive ahead of schedule.

The 1st Belorussian Front received the task of delivering the main blow in the general direction of Poznan. The 1st Ukrainian Front was to reach the Oder in a sector northwest of Glogau, Breslau and Ratibor. At the first stage of the offensive, Zhukov's troops were to break through the enemy's defenses in two directions and, having defeated the Warsaw-Radom group, reach the Lodz line. At the second stage, the troops were to advance in the general direction to Poznan, to the Bydgoszcz (Bromberg) - Poznan line and to the south, in order to get in touch with the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. At the same time, the 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to be ready to turn part of its formations to the north in order to support the 2nd Belorussian Front. On the 10-11th day of the operation, Konev's troops were to reach the line of Czestochowa and further develop the offensive on Breslavl.

The main blow in the Magnushevsky direction (there was a bridgehead here) was delivered by the 5th shock, 61st and 8th guards armies, 1st and 2nd guards tank armies. In addition, on the right flank of the 61st Army of Belov, they planned to bring into battle the main forces of the 1st Army of the Polish Army under the command of General Poplavsky. The Poles have earned the honor of liberating their capital Warsaw. The 61st Army was to advance around Warsaw to Sokhachev. The 5th shock army of General Berzarin, after breaking through the enemy defenses, advanced in the general direction to Ozorkow and further to Gniezno. Chuikov's 8th Guards Army advanced on the Lodz direction and further on to Poznan.

The tank armies were in the second echelon, they were planned to be brought into battle after breaking through the enemy defenses to develop the offensive. The 2nd Guards Tank Army of Bogdanov was introduced into the gap in the sector of the 5th Shock Army and was given the task of advancing into the Sokhachev area, cutting off the escape routes of the enemy’s Warsaw grouping and further advancing on Kutno and Gniezno. In addition, Kryukov's 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps advanced behind Bogdanov's army; he received the task of advancing along the Vistula in the general direction of Bydgoszcz. The 1st Guards Tank Army of Katukov was introduced into the offensive zone of the 8th Guards Army and was supposed to develop a breakthrough to Lodz and further to Poznan. The actions of the ground troops were supported by the forces of Rudenko's 16th Air Army. The 3rd shock army of General Kuznetsov was located in the second echelon of the 1st Belorussian Front.

In the Pulawy direction, the forces of the 69th and 33rd armies delivered an auxiliary strike. The offensive of these armies was strengthened by the 11th and 9th tank corps. The armies of Kolpakchi and Tsvetaev advanced in the general direction towards Radom and further to Lodz. After breaking through the enemy's defenses, the left flank of Tsvetaev's 33rd army with tank units was to advance on Skarzysko-Kamenna in order to encircle and destroy the enemy's Kielce-Radom grouping. Lelyushenko's 4th Panzer Army (1st Ukrainian Front) was to interact with units of the 33rd Army. In the second echelon there was a reserve of the front - the 7th cavalry corps of General Konstantinov.

The 47th army of General Perkhorovich launched an offensive a day later than the main forces of the front and struck northwest of Warsaw. The 2nd division of the Polish army operated in its own offensive zone. To misinform the enemy, the Soviet command tried to create the impression that the main blow of the front forces would be directed at Warsaw.

A feature of the offensive of the 1st Ukrainian fronts Ivan Konev was the need for the maximum possible preservation of the powerful industrial potential of the Dombrowo-Silesian industrial region. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, when discussing the plan of operation, designated this area very briefly and succinctly - “Gold!”. On the other hand, the Silesian industrial region, with its huge concentration of enterprises, mines, industrial infrastructure, presented a serious obstacle to a maneuverable and fast offensive. As Konev recalled, this left a certain imprint on the actions of the Soviet troops. It was necessary to preserve the industrial area, as it was to become part of the new Polish state. Therefore, according to the plan of the front command, the troops went around the area, north and south of it.

The main blow was delivered by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front from the Sandomierz bridgehead. It was the most powerful bridgehead of the Soviet troops on the Vistula, it reached about 75-80 km along the front and up to 50-60 km in depth. This made it possible to place large forces on the Sandomierz bridgehead. It is clear that the Germans also understood the importance of the bridgehead and constantly tried to push the Soviet troops off it, and also created a serious defense here and pulled up reserves. So, on the eve of the operation, the German command pulled up large reserves to the bridgehead. Moreover, some of them - the 16th and 17th tank, 10th and 20th motorized divisions, were in close proximity to the Sandomierz bridgehead.

The front command planned to create a gap up to 40 km wide and advance in the direction of Radomsko, Czestochowa and further to Breslau. Part of the forces of the front was to advance on the left flank in the Krakow direction. On the right flank, Konev's troops, in cooperation with the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, were to defeat the Kielce-Radom group of the Wehrmacht. At the second stage of the offensive, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front must cross the former German-Polish border, cross the Oder River with the main forces, and take control of the Silesian industrial region with the left wing.

To solve the assigned tasks, it was decided to break through the enemy defenses with one powerful blow. The bridgehead was, according to Konev, literally "packed with troops." The 5th Guards Zhadov, the 52nd Army of Koroteev, the 13th Army of Pukhov, the 3rd Guards Army of Gordov, the 6th Army of Gluzdovsky and two tank armies - the 3rd Guards Rybalko and the 4th Lelyushenko were located here. Kurochkin's 60th Army was advancing on the left flank of the front. Korovnikov's 59th Army and Gusev's 21st Army were in front reserve.
From the air, the ground forces were supported by the 2nd Air Army of Colonel General S. A. Krasovsky. In addition, the front included several separate tank corps, a cavalry corps, breakthrough artillery corps, and other formations.

To misinform the enemy, the front command conducted a demonstrative concentration of large mechanized forces on the left flank, in the offensive zone of the 60th Army. In the Krakow direction, work was carried out to concentrate models of tanks, self-propelled guns and guns. This imitation of the direction of the main attack played a certain role in disorienting the enemy. So, the Germans stepped up aerial reconnaissance in this direction, and on the last day before the offensive, more than 200 artillery raids were carried out at the locations of the mock-ups. The German command also regrouped the forces of the 17th Army and moved part of the forces to the southern, Krakow direction. Already during the offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the Germans did not dare to transfer part of the forces of the 17th Army from south to north, still waiting for a second strike from the positions of the 60th Army.

Side forces

By January 1945, 3 German armies held the defense in front of the two Soviet fronts: the 9th and 17th field, 4th tank armies, (30 divisions and 2 brigades, as well as dozens of separate battalions that made up the garrisons of cities and towns) groups armies "A" (since January 26, army group "Center"). In total, about 400 thousand soldiers and officers, 4.1 thousand guns and mortars, 1136 tanks and assault guns, 270 aircraft (part of the forces of the 6th Air Fleet). The German defense between the Vistula and the Oder was based on seven defensive lines. The most powerful defensive line was the Vistula.

In the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, there were 16 combined arms, 4 tank armies (1st, 2nd and 3rd guards tank and 4th tank armies), and 2 air armies. In total, about 2.2 million people, over 37 thousand guns and mortars, more than 7 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 5 thousand aircraft.

To be continued…

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Sermon

In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit!

Dear brothers and sisters, as we experience the events of this week, you and I can immerse ourselves in that state of mind that implies the need for a Christian to partake, at least to a small extent, of an event that is related to the feat of God for the sake of people.

The Path of Love presupposes a person’s readiness to learn the most complex art, the skill in which the Lord Himself showed when He came to earth, reduced Himself to a human body, put on flesh and then gave it to be crucified for human sins, showing an example of great humility. In this self-humiliation of the Lord, we see before us the amazing depth of His mercy and His readiness to show how many ways there are to the Heavenly Kingdom.

With His pure hands He washes the feet of His disciples, people of low profession, His followers, called to the apostolic service. Inviting them with Himself to a special feast, to a meal where the first Eucharist is celebrated, He, lamenting, but loving the disciple who betrays Him, wishes to save him until the last moment, but the soul that has departed from God returns with difficulty to its Savior. Here is the tragedy of a student who, in speed, is an example of despair, leading to suicide. Next, we see the example of the apostle Peter, who claims that he will not deny, but then does just that. And each of us in his life, unfortunately, repeats his path, saying one thing with his mouth, and showing another with deeds. Then a prayer sounds in the Garden of Gethsemane. The Lord three times calls the disciples to joint prayer, but the apostles are asleep… And the Savior asks the Father to grant Him the mercy that He must bear.

It must be understood that we are only partially revealed to what we can accommodate, only a part of that pain and suffering. It is about the dialogue of the Lord within Himself. After all, the Savior addresses God the Father, Who is in Him. This is one of the deepest mysteries of theology when it comes to the Holy Trinity. But at the same time, these words show us an example of what we must do in situations of special stress and trials: we must call on God for help, adding at the same time: “Thy will be done!”.

Then we hear about the betrayal that the disciple commits by kissing Christ in the Garden of Gethsemane. What was it for? It was a sign. The fact is that after Communion the apostles were transformed and became so similar to the Savior that it was difficult to determine who among these people was their Teacher. The apostle Judas points to Jesus, and He is arrested. And here mercy is shown when the Lord asks to remove the knife, saying that the one who came with a knife or a sword will perish. Both the external and the internal component of the life of a Christian are indicated here, suggesting prayer, humility and readiness to sacrifice oneself as weapons. An amazing door opens before us, difficult to pass, but the only one possible for the salvation of our soul.

Let's try, dear brothers and sisters, to be attentive to words as much as it is possible in our life. Let us learn the art of following Christ in the willingness to start small, in the determination to show our efforts in bearing our cross. Amen!

Archpriest Andrey Alekseev

January 12, 1945 - the Vistula-Oder operation began during the Great Patriotic War

The Vistula-Oder operation of 1945 is a strategic offensive operation of the Soviet troops during World War II, on the right flank of the Soviet-German front, in the area between the Vistula and the Oder. It was carried out by the forces of the 1st Belorussian (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Zhukov) and 1st Ukrainian (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Konev) fronts from January 12 to February 3, 1945 and became an integral part of the general strategic offensive Soviet troops from the Baltic to the Danube. The purpose of this operation was to defeat the fascist German army group "A" (since January 26 - "Center"), complete the liberation of Poland from the Nazi occupation and create favorable conditions for delivering a decisive blow to Berlin.

By the beginning of 1945, the military-political situation on the Soviet-German front was changed in favor of the USSR through the efforts of the Red Army. In addition, the army was replenished with new military equipment, and the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition in 1944 opened a second front in Western Europe and approached the borders of the Reich. At the same time, the German army was in a critical situation - the production of weapons fell sharply due to the destroyed factories in Europe, the manpower reserves were exhausted and the Air Force was practically destroyed.

The Soviet command planned to launch an offensive in this direction on January 20, 1945. However, in connection with the major failure of the Anglo-American troops in the Ardennes in early January, British Prime Minister W. Churchill turned to I. Stalin with a request to launch an offensive in order to divert the Nazi forces from the West. And, although the preparations for the offensive were not yet completed, the Soviet High Command postponed the start of the operation.

By this time, the balance of power was as follows: in front of the two Soviet fronts were 3 German armies (28 divisions and 2 brigades) - this is about 400 thousand people and several thousand pieces of equipment. In addition to continuous lines of defense with a total depth of up to 600 km, the Germans created several fortified areas. In the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, there were 16 combined arms, 4 tank and 2 air armies - a total of about 2 million people and more than 45 thousand pieces of equipment. It was the largest strategic grouping of Soviet troops in all the years of the war. Thus, the superiority of the Soviet troops was overwhelming in terms of forces and means, which allowed them, after careful preparation, to deliver a very powerful blow.

On January 12, 1945, the famous Vistula-Oder operation began. Early in the morning, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive, delivering the main blow from the Sandomierz bridgehead, and two days later, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front struck from the Magnushevsky and Pulavsky bridgeheads. Moreover, the offensive of the Red Army was preceded by a powerful artillery preparation, which caused great damage to the German defensive reserves.

This operation went down in military history as the most rapid offensive: having begun on the territory of Poland, it quickly moved to the territory of Germany - for 20 days, Soviet troops advanced at a distance of 20 to 30 km per day, and tank armies in some periods even up to 70 km per day. In addition, the offensive did not stop day or night. This pace was due to a powerful initial strike, great penetrating power and high mobility of the Soviet troops, wide maneuver and close interaction of troops. During this time, they overcame seven fortified enemy lines and two large water barriers.

Warsaw was liberated on January 17, by January 18 the main forces of the German armies on this front were defeated, the enemy defenses were broken through on five hundred kilometers of the front to a depth of 100-150 km. And on January 19, the advanced units of the 1st Ukrainian Front, pursuing the enemy, entered the territory of Germany, and the troops of the left wing of the front liberated Krakow and many other settlements. And although the German command began to hastily transfer troops here from other sectors of the front and from the reserve, they could not restore the broken front.

The Vistula-Oder operation, in terms of scope and results achieved, became one of the largest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War. In just 23 days, the army of G.K. Zhukov and I.S. Konev not only moved forward and liberated almost all of Poland and a significant part of Czechoslovakia from German invaders, but also surrounded a large German group in Poznan, went to the Oder and ended up 60-70 km from Berlin. Here the offensive of the Soviet troops ended and preparations for the Berlin operation began.

As a result of the Vistula-Oder operation, 35 German divisions were completely defeated, another 25 lost from 50 to 70% of their personnel, and more than 150 thousand people were taken prisoner, as well as several thousand weapons. The losses of the Soviet troops amounted, according to various sources, from 160 to 200 thousand people and more than 2 thousand pieces of equipment. For the heroism and courage shown during this operation, many units and formations of both fronts were awarded honorary titles and orders. And in honor of the liberation of the Polish capital from German troops, the medal "For the Liberation of Warsaw" was established.

The myth of the Vistula-Oder operation

One of the main myths of the Vistula-Oder operation is that, at the request of Roosevelt and Churchill, the start time of this operation was postponed from the originally scheduled January 20 to January 12, 1945, in order to help the Anglo-American troops who were in a difficult situation due to the offensive Wehrmacht in the Ardennes.

But, as evidenced by the documents and, in particular, the plan for the concentration of troops of the 1st Belorussian Front approved by Zhukov on December 29, 1944, the offensive was originally scheduled for January 8, 1945, but due to bad weather, which limited aviation operations and adjustment of artillery fire, it had to be rescheduled. In the same way, the 3rd Belorussian Front was supposed to launch an offensive on January 10, but it started on the 13th.

The 1st Ukrainian Front went forward on January 12 instead of the 9th, and the 2nd Belorussian Front on the 14th instead of January 10th. Churchill's message, which reported that "very heavy fighting is going on in the West", and spoke of "an alarming situation when you have to defend a very wide front after a temporary loss of initiative", was sent only on January 6. It contained a request for information about Soviet military plans, but nothing more. Stalin, on the other hand, decided to pretend that the Red Army was ready to accelerate its upcoming offensive for the sake of the Allies, and on January 7 answered Churchill: “We are preparing for the offensive, but the weather is now not favorable for our offensive. However, given the position of our allies on the Western Front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to complete the preparations at an accelerated pace and, regardless of the weather, open wide offensive operations against the Germans along the entire Central Front no later than the second half of January. In fact, the Soviet command was in a hurry to advance because it was too risky to keep large forces, including tank armies, inactive for several days on the bridgeheads across the Vistula. They were pulled up to the bridgeheads with a focus on the initial timing of the offensive - January 8-10. The enemy could detect the concentration of troops and inflict losses on them with the fire of his artillery, which was shooting through the bridgeheads. Therefore, the attack began when the forecasters gave a favorable weather forecast. Clear weather was promised for January 14, but they were mistaken. The good weather was established only on the 16th and lasted only a few days.

In fact, plans for a general offensive by the Soviet fronts began to be developed as early as the end of November, and were finally approved by the Headquarters on December 22, that is, even before the messages to Stalin from Roosevelt and Churchill. And even then, the offensive in Poland and East Prussia was supposed to begin on January 8-10. Therefore, Stalin, knowing full well that the offensive should begin in the region of January 10-12, but not on the 20th, openly bluffed when he wrote to Churchill. But already on January 5, that is, before Stalin's answer to Churchill, shock groups of fronts, including tank armies, concentrated on the bridgeheads beyond the Vistula. To keep such a grouping for 15 days on relatively small bridgeheads, shot through by enemy artillery, was not only risky, but, most importantly, absolutely pointless.

And the messages of Roosevelt and Churchill, sent to Stalin on December 24, were by no means panicky. The leaders of England and the United States only wanted to know the plans of the Soviet command. Roosevelt said: "The situation in Belgium is not bad, but we have entered a period when we need to talk about the next phase." Churchill also wrote about the same: "I do not consider the situation in the West to be bad, but it is quite obvious that Eisenhower cannot solve his problem without knowing what your plans are."

The Vistula-Oder operation was carried out by the 1st Belorussian Front of Marshal Zhukov and the 1st Ukrainian Front of Marshal Konev. Both fronts numbered 2,203.7 thousand people, 33.5 thousand guns and mortars, over 7 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, 5 thousand combat aircraft. The German troops of Army Group "A" of General Josef Harpe who opposed them numbered no more than 400 thousand people with 6 thousand guns, 1.2 thousand tanks and assault guns, and about 600 aircraft. They could not resist the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet troops.

Guderian stated in his memoirs: “We expected that the offensive would begin on January 12, 1945. The superiority of the Russians was expressed by the ratio: in infantry 11:1, in tanks 7:1, in artillery pieces 20:1. If we evaluate the enemy as a whole, then we could talk without any exaggeration about his 15-fold superiority on land and at least 20-fold superiority in the air.

Guderian on December 25, 1944, during a meeting with Hitler, tried to convince him to stop offensive operations on the Western Front in order to transfer divisions from there to the Eastern Front and create reserves to repel the expected Soviet offensive in Poland. However, Hitler not only did not return the divisions from the Western Front at that moment, but even transferred the 4th SS Panzer Corps, located north of Warsaw, to Hungary to try to release Budapest, which, of course, weakened the defense on the Vistula. By that time, the Fuhrer had already decided, in the event of the failure of the Ardennes offensive, to try to hold first of all the "Alpine fortress", where the last oil fields and refineries in Hungary and Austria remained. For the entire Eastern Front, the Wehrmacht had only 12.5 divisions in reserve.

During the Vistula-Oder operation, it was planned to deliver two main strikes: from the Magnushevsky bridgehead by troops in the direction of Poznan and from the Sandomierz bridgehead by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front - to Breslau (Wroclaw). In addition, Zhukov's troops from the Pulawy bridgehead delivered an auxiliary strike in the general direction to Radom, Lodz.

In itself, the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes contributed a lot to the success of the Soviet offensive on the Vistula, since the most combat-ready German divisions, including tank ones, were transferred to participate in the Ardennes offensive, and the Eastern Front was weakened.

Already on the first day of the offensive, the German defenses on the Vistula were broken through. On January 17, Harpe was removed from his post and replaced by General Scherner. The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front advanced up to 100 km in four days.

On the 1st Belorussian Front, on January 16, the 69th Army and the 11th Tank Corps captured Radom by storm. Parts of the 2nd Guards Tank and 47th Armies and the 1st Army of the Polish Army liberated Warsaw on January 17, the garrison of which preferred to retreat so as not to be surrounded.

On January 19, units of the 3rd Guards Tank, 5th Guards and 52nd Armies approached Breslau, and the troops of the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front liberated Krakow. Under the threat of encirclement by the 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, the German troops left Silesia, and Breslau was surrounded. In the period from January 23 to early February, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front reached the Oder on a wide front. Having forced the river in the areas of Olau (Olav) and northwest of Oppeln (Opole), they captured and expanded the bridgehead on its western bank in the area of ​​Steinau and Breslau.

On January 19, troops of the 1st Belorussian Front liberated Lodz. On January 22, Zhukov's troops were already near Poznan, and after another 4 days they overcame the Mezeritsky fortified area on the move, which the enemy did not have time to occupy with sufficient forces. By February 3, the 1st Belorussian Front reached the Oder and captured a bridgehead on its western bank in the Kustrin area, clearing the right bank of the river from the enemy. Occupied by a strong German garrison, the Polish fortress of Poznan held out until February 13, 1945, when it was taken by the forces of the 8th Guards Army.

In the Vistula-Oder operation, Soviet troops, according to official figures, lost 43.5 thousand killed and missing and 150.7 thousand wounded and sick. Data on irretrievable losses, most likely, are underestimated by at least three times. There is no reliable data on the losses of German troops. It is only known that in the period from January 1 to January 20, 1945, the Red Army took 67,776 prisoners, most of whom were on the front of the Vistula-Oder operation, and a smaller part - on East Prussia.