1319 rifle regiment of the 185th division. Book of Memory and Glory - Kalinin defensive operation

In Turginovo, by order of the commander of the troops of the Western Front, the brigade was again reassigned to the 30th Army, the commander of which specified its task. It consisted in moving along the Volokolamsk highway to destroy enemy reserves in the area of ​​​​the villages of Krivtsovo, Nikulino, Mamulino and, together with units of the 5th Infantry Division, to capture Kalinin.

On the morning of October 17, the tank regiment of the brigade, consisting of 27 T-34 tanks and eight T-60 tanks, headed for Kalinin. The tankers met stubborn resistance from the enemy in Efremov and Pushkin. Along the entire route from Pushkin to Kalinin, the tanks were subjected to continuous bombardment from the air, and when approaching Troyanov and Kalinin, they were met by powerful fire from anti-tank guns. Only eight tanks managed to reach the southern outskirts of Kalinin, and only one T-34 tank (commander senior sergeant S. Kh. Gorobets) broke into the city and made a heroic raid on it. The rest of the surviving tanks went to the Pokrovsky area on the Turginovskoye highway.

The brigade inflicted some damage on the enemy and sowed panic. But the task assigned to the brigade turned out to be impossible. In the Kalinin area, the Germans had two tank divisions, one motorized division, and one motorized brigade. Our tank regiment was thrown into battle without infantry support and air cover. The territory captured by tankers was not secured by infantry. In addition, the brigade's offensive was not supported by the active actions of other formations of the 30th Army. The operational report of the army headquarters at 17.00 on October 17 indicated that the 5th Infantry Division was still regrouping forces during the day. In this battle, the brigade lost 11 T-34 tanks and 35 people killed and wounded. The commander of the regiment, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major M.A. Lukin, and the commander of the tank battalion, Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain M.P. Agibalov, were killed.

Attaching exceptional importance to the Kalinin operational direction, on October 17, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decides to create the Kalinin Front.

STATE DIRECTIVE ON THE CREATION OF THE KALININ FRONT
Commander of the North-Western, Western Fronts
Deputy Commander of the Western Front Comrade KONEV
October 17, 41 6 p.m. 30 minutes.
For the convenience of command and control of troops in the Kalinin direction, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:
1. Troops operating in the Ostashkovsky, Rzhev directions and in the Kalinin region, to separate into an independent Kalinin Front with direct subordination to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
2. Include in the troops of the Kalinin Front 22, 29 and 30 A Zap. fr., 183, 185 and 246 sd, 46 and 54 cd, 46 motorcycle regiment and 8 brigade North-West. front.
3. Appoint Colonel-General Konev as Commander of the Kalinin Front. To strengthen the headquarters of the front, turn the headquarters of the 10th army. Deploy the front headquarters in the Bezhetsk area.
4. Demarcation lines: from the North-West. fr. - Poshekhonye - Volodarsk, st. Ostolopovo, st. Academic, oz. Istochino, all for the Kalinin Front inclusive; with Zap. front - st. Berendeyevo, st. Verbilki, st. Reshetnikov, Art. Knyazhy Gory, Sychevka, all for the West. fr. inclusive.
5. The next task of the front is to clear the Kalinin region of enemy troops and liquidate, in cooperation with the Western and North-West. fronts of the enemy's attempts to bypass Moscow from the north.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
Stalin
Vasilevsky

In total, the front included 16 rifle and two cavalry divisions, one motorized rifle and two tank brigades. The troops of the front operated in a strip of 220 km. By October 17, superiority in forces was on the side of the enemy: in infantry - 1.9 times, in tanks - 2.8 times, in guns - 3.3 times, in machine guns - 3.2 times.

The creation of the Kalinin Front was timely and corresponded to the prevailing situation. This made it possible to reliably fortify the central sector of our strategic front, firmly linking it with the northwestern direction.

The Kalinin Front did not receive aviation. Applications for air support were to be carried out by the aviation of the North-Western Front. Significant difficulties arose due to the fact that at first the front did not have its own rear. In this extremely difficult situation, local Soviet and party bodies, and above all the regional committee of the party, headed by First Secretary I.P. Boitsov, rendered enormous assistance to the troops of the front.

Simultaneously with the creation of the Kalinin Front, it was decided to unify the command and control of the troops operating in the Torzhok and Kalinin directions, to restore the field command of the 31st Army. Major General V. A. Yushkevich was appointed commander of the army. It included formations of the operational group of General Vatutin, as well as the 119th and 133rd rifle divisions. However, in the following days, part of the formations of the task force is transferred to the 29th and 30th armies and withdrawn to the front reserve.

In this regard, it should be noted that the command of the Kalinin Front made a mistake by undertaking the disbandment of the task force of General Vatutin at a crucial moment in the defensive operation. It was a real effective strike force of five formations. The transfer of these formations to the armies disrupted the established administration. The opportunity for immediate action to liberate the city of Kalinin was missed.

Here is how General Vatutin pointed out this in the report on the combat operations of the task force:

“10/17/41, the Kalinin Front is being created. The troops of the operational group are included in the troops of the Kalinin Front. On October 18, Colonel-General Konev issues combat order No. 00122, instructing the troops to encircle and destroy the enemy's Kalinin grouping.
The main blow was to be delivered by the troops of the operational group of the North-Western Front, with the crossing of the Volga River and actions in general directions: Mednoye - Kalinin; Stanishino, Danilovskoe, Kalinin. However, this order arrived at the group late and without taking into account the element of time for the liquidation of the enemy's Mednovskaya grouping and the concentration of troops. Despite this, the situation in the Kalinin area still favored the implementation of this order. The enemy has not yet brought up fresh reserves to the area of ​​the alleged crossings of the operational group of the North-Western Front.
On the most crucial days, the troops of the operational group are transferred to the 31st Army, which could not quickly establish contact with the troops. In the following days, new orders from the Kalinin Front for the army follow, according to which the entire grouping of troops of the operational group is distributed among the armies and part of the divisions is withdrawn to the front reserve ...
Thus, the troops of the operational group of the North-Western Front, as a single organism, were gone. The only strike force in the Kalinin region was dispersed among the armies.
This was a mistake by the command of the Kalinin Front, since while the divisions were being regrouped among the armies, the enemy, anticipating a possible crossing of our troops at Nesterov and Akishev, throws a fresh 6th Infantry Division here, forestalls us and disrupts the planned active operations of the 46th, 54 th cavalry and 183rd rifle divisions.

The 20th of October the front commander gives the troops a directive in which the armies are tasked with encircling the enemy grouping in the Kalinin area. 22nd Army - to firmly defend the line of Lake. Seliger - r. Volga to Staritsa, preventing the enemy from breaking through to Torzhok from the south and southwest. The 29th Army, defending on the right flank in the area of ​​​​Staritsa, Akishev, on the night of October 20-21, with the main forces to force the Volga in the Izbrizhye-Danilovskoye sector. By the end of the day, capture Nekrasov and Danilovsky, cut off the enemy's escape route to the southwest, and establish cooperation with the 21st Tank Brigade (30th Army) in the Negotino area. The 31st Army will advance from the northwest and north to Kalinin and, in cooperation with the 30th Army, by the end of October 21, capture the northwestern and southern parts of the city of Kalinin. The 30th Army will advance from the northeast and southeast to Kalinin and by the end of October 21, capture the southern and northeastern parts of the city, preventing the enemy from retreating to the south and southeast.

In view of the fact that part of the formations of the 29th Army (commanded by Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov) fought fierce battles with the enemy grouping retreating from the Maryino-Copper region, the task set in the directive of the front commander of October 20 was not it at the specified time completed. Only 22 of October The 246th Rifle Division of this army crossed the Volga in the Khvastovo, Chapaevka sector and captured a bridgehead on the right bank in the Putilov area. Within two days, units of the 246th and 119th rifle divisions were transferred here. By October 25 they managed to significantly expand the bridgehead and cut the main transport route of the enemy Staritsa - Kalinin in the area of ​​​​Talutin, Danilovsky. There was a real threat of encirclement of the enemy's Kalinin grouping.

In order to eliminate the bridgehead, the Nazi command was forced to transfer two new divisions (14th motorized and 161st infantry) to this area. At the same time, the Nazi troops began a new operation to capture Torzhok with the further development of the offensive on Vyshny Volochek. For its implementation, the 23rd and 6th army corps of the 9th army were involved, reinforced by two motorized divisions of the 3rd tank group.

October 24 the enemy managed to cross over to the left bank of the Volga in the Staritsa - Brody section and launch an offensive on Struzhnya - Torzhok.

Through the efforts of the troops of the 22nd and 29th armies, the enemy offensive by the end of October was stopped. But at the same time, the 29th Army had to leave the bridgehead in the area of ​​​​Putilov, Talutin, Danilovsky and retreat to the line of the river. Darkness.

In the offensive zone of the 31st Army, the fighting took on a stubborn and tense character. Parts of the 133rd Rifle Division liberated the village of Kiselevo (0.5 km north of Kalinin) and captured several blocks on the northern outskirts of the city.

Formations of the 30th Army were the first to enter the battle for Kalinin. In five days (from 14 to 19 October) they lost over 1,600 men and 25 tanks. In the 256th Rifle Division, 400 people were killed and wounded, in the 5th Rifle Division - 525 people, the 21st Tank Brigade lost 450 people, 21 T-34 tanks, three BT tanks and one T-60 tank. Ho, despite this, the army fought fierce battles on the eastern and southeastern outskirts of the city. Large and Small Peremerki, Elevator, Koltsovo, Vlas'evo several times passed from hand to hand.

The fighting at the end of October did not bring victory to our troops, but in the end the enemy abandoned attempts to attack and was forced to go on the defensive. In the Kalinin area, the front has stabilized.

The statement of the former commander of the 3rd tank group, General G. Goth, is interesting:

“The 3rd tank group, due to a lack of fuel, stretched out between Vyazma and Kalinin and got stuck in this area, getting involved in heavy battles near Kalinin, and already lacked ammunition. Large in number, combat-ready enemy forces, concentrated on the left bank of the Volga and north-west of Rzhev, hung over its flank. Thus, the chances of bypassing Moscow simultaneously from the north and south were very small.

The bridges across the Volga in Kalinin that had not been destroyed during the retreat were of particular concern to Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin. He demanded from Konev:

"Destroy by means of aviation the railway and highway bridges in the city of Kalinin."

At that time, the Kalinin Front did not yet have its own aviation, and this task was assigned to long-range aviation.

Here is what Nikolai Bogdanov, the former commander of the 12th Guards Long-Range Aviation Bomber Aviation Regiment, writes about this in his book “Gatchinsky Guards in the Sky”:

“The most difficult task for us was the destruction of the Kalinin railway and highway bridges. And not only for us. They turned out to be a tough nut to crack, which the crews of other units could not “split” either.

The Nazis reliably covered the approaches to the bridges, concentrated on both banks of the river a large number of anti-aircraft artillery of various calibers and anti-aircraft machine guns. In addition, fighter aircraft were also involved in protecting the bridges.

Starting from October 16, 1941, our pilots regularly bombed the bridges. A variety of bombing methods were used. However, the bridges remained intact.

It should be noted that at the beginning of the war, the bombing of bridges was usually carried out with 100-kilogram high-explosive bombs. Some of them flew through the openwork trusses of the railway bridge and burst in the water without causing him any harm. In one of the raids on the railway bridge, the crew of Lieutenant Koryakin repeated the feat of Captain Gastello. In the book “Gatchinsky Guards in the Sky”, Nikolai Bogdanov writes:

“On the day of departure for the mission on November 12, the weather was cloudy ... The flight promised to be difficult. At the target, anti-aircraft artillery and machine guns of the enemy met us with a hurricane of fire. I concentrate all my attention on the exact keeping of the course set by the navigator. Due to the dense anti-aircraft fire, this was very difficult to do. Finally, out of the darkness, behind the bright bursts of exploding anti-aircraft shells, large, at an acute angle, as if floating on us, a bridge appeared, for a few more seconds, and bombs flew at it from the hatches of our vehicles from a height of six hundred meters.
At this time, Koryakin's plane caught fire to my right. Shells, apparently, hit the cockpit and gas tanks. In a fraction of a second, the entire plane was engulfed in flames. I managed to see only the pilot's head, bowed to the dashboard; I could not see the gunner-radio operator because of the thick black smoke that enveloped the fuselage.
The plane went into a dive. But this was not an arbitrary fall, it was clear that the pilot's hand was still controlling the machine. In obedience to her, the plane turned sharply towards the group of guns, which were still splashing flames with their long muzzles, and, as if covering us with a sprawling steel body from their destructive shells, fell on the battery and at the same moment exploded, blazed with a huge fire. Thus, our young comrades died as heroes - crew commander Koryakin, navigator Belov, gunner-radio operator Shilenko and gunner Vishnevsky.

It was decided to destroy the Kalinin railway bridge with the help of a radio guidance system for an aircraft filled with explosives. For this, a design bureau was involved, developing a radio control system for unmanned aircraft.

Two bombers were allocated for the experiment: TB-3, intended to be a torpedo aircraft, and DB-ZF, from which they were supposed to control it by radio. While test flights were going on, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive near Moscow, liberated Kalinin, and the need to destroy the bridges disappeared.

Having occupied Kalinin, the Nazi troops turned it into a major stronghold. They concentrated here a large amount of equipment, manpower. Every effort was made to keep the city. From here, the Nazis supported their hordes advancing on Moscow, guarding their left flank. Here, in warm apartments, they hoped to restore the strength of their battle-weary divisions.

By the end of October the front had stabilized and passed along the line: Selizharovo, the rivers Bolshaya Kosha and Darkness, the northern and eastern outskirts of Kalinin, Small Peremerka, Cherry, Turginovo, Dorino, Sintsovo. The total length of the front line reached 270 km.

In October, the Kalinin Front managed to solve the problem: to repel the enemy offensive on Torzhok, Vyshny Volochek and prevent it from advancing around Moscow from the northwest.

At the end of October, the front commander issues a directive on the transition to defense and on the construction of front-line rear and intermediate army lines of defense.

The weakest was the defense zone of the 30th Army, which covered the Klinsko-Solnechnogorsk direction. By mid-November, its combat strength included rifle and motorized rifle divisions, a tank brigade, motorized and reserve regiments. With these forces, the army defended itself on a front of about 70 km. There were no second echelons and reserves. The defense was of a focal nature, the gaps between the strongholds reached four kilometers.

Back in late October, the commander of the 30th Army reported to the front commander that "the army does not have sufficient numbers of combat personnel and equipment, few mining equipment ... The left flank of the army is a particularly weak spot." At the same time, according to information received from local residents and from a survey of prisoners, it was already known that the fascist command was concentrating troops and preparing a new offensive against Moscow in the defense zone of the 30th Army.

Reliable defense and preventing the enemy troops from breaking through to Moscow from the north-west, according to the plan of the Supreme Command Headquarters, was one of the main tasks of the troops of the Kalinin Front. However, the commander and his staff did not take the necessary measures to strengthen the combat strength of the 30th Army and strengthen its defenses. On it, the Nazi troops dealt the main blow in November 1941.

By the middle of November against the left flank of the 30th Army, the fascist command concentrated a strike force as part of the 27th Army Corps of the 9th Army and part of the forces of the 41st and 56th Motorized Corps of the 3rd Tank Group.

"I was killed near Rzhev." The tragedy of the Monchalovsky "cauldron" Gerasimova Svetlana Aleksandrovna

January 21–23, 1942

By this time, the capabilities of the armies of the Kalinin Front, including the 29th, were very limited: the numerical strength of the divisions was small, the available materiel did not allow them to fully fulfill the assigned tasks. The formations and units of the army were exhausted and bled dry by constant attacks on the villages occupied by the enemy, and "night attacks were not successful due to the low training of the troops."

Replenishment of personnel was minimal. So, on January 21, 1942, the head of the army staffing department received a report that replenishment was accepted from the 115th reserve rifle regiment: junior command staff 110 people, privates 923 people. “Replenishment arrived without weapons. Outfit according to the winter plan. There are no Red Army books. For an army conducting active offensive operations, this was extremely small.

The situation with the materiel in the army on January 21, 1942 was as follows: 45-mm guns - 37; 76 mm PA - 18; 76 mm YES - 66; 122-mm howitzers - 33; 152 mm - 41; 85 mm - 29; installations M-13–6; installations M-8–7. One KV tank and three T-60 tanks, as well as the 24th and 39th separate guards mortar battalions that arrived to reinforce the army, the installations of which have already been mentioned above, could not change the situation. The tanks turned out to be technically out of order and remained in the area of ​​the Monchalovo station, and the mortar divisions "had one volley each." There was no oats left for the horses in the army. To solve the problem, it took an order from a member of the Front's Military Council to put the entire political apparatus on the roads to push through the transport with oats more quickly.

The situation in the formations allows us to present excerpts from the resolution of the Military Council of the 29th Army of January 22, 1942 on the situation in the 381st Rifle Division: barely 60 remained. Of the available 200-240 light machine guns, no more than 7-10 pieces remained in service with each joint venture ... ”The disdainful attitude in the division to camouflage“ led to heavy losses in the human, especially in the horse composition. About 300 horses were retired, which put artillery and transport in an extremely difficult position ... ". The resolution noted “unacceptable carelessness when moving units from one place to another” and cited the fact that “a group of German machine gunners, dressed in Red Army uniforms, managed to attack the battery, kill and injure 15 people. and put out of action the entire horse composition. The decree also spoke about the shortcomings of reconnaissance, the inept organization of the battle, when the actions of the infantry were not always supported by artillery. Particularly emphasized was the "unacceptably high loss" of private, junior, middle and senior command personnel. During the 20-day participation in the battles, the division lost 90 percent of junior commanders, 75-80 percent of the rest of the command staff. The new division commander, who replaced Colonel A. Tolstov at this post, against whom the case was opened, Lieutenant Colonel V. Shulga, was reprimanded.

The figures from the documents of the 185th Rifle Division are no less indicative: on January 20-21, reinforcements arrived in the division - 240 people “without weapons”; the losses of the division during these days amounted to 184 killed, 670 wounded. By the middle of the day on January 23, the division had 76-mm shells - 802 pcs., 122-mm - 143 pcs., 37-mm - 147 pcs., 120-mm mines - 16 pcs.

It is unlikely that the front commander did not know about the real state of the army. Rather, he did not want to notice him, since he did not have the opportunity to change something for the better. The front continued to fulfill the task set by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to destroy the Mozhaisk-Gzhatsk-Vyazma grouping of the enemy. Before the 29th Army, consisting of eight divisions, the task was again set "to capture Rzhev with the previous reinforcement units on 22.1 and to reach the Osuga, Ignatovo, Shchekoldino area on 24.1."

At the same time, as noted above, the enemy was concentrating new additional forces to the breakthrough site, which was confirmed by intelligence data. Thus, the reconnaissance department of the 29th Army in a generalized summary for January 11–20 stated: “The enemy, the remnants of units 256, 26 infantry division, 84 division 8 division, 135 division 45 division, 145 division, 3/396 division, special airborne battalion, battalion avishkola and, presumably, 216 subsection 86 pd, putting up strong resistance with fire and counterattacks, stubbornly defends the approaches to Rzhev, pinning down army troops in order to secure the flank of the retreating units of the Moscow grouping of their troops; at the same time, it continues to pull up reserves to Rzhev of hastily recruited reserve battalions from the depths to replenish the bloodless formations ... ”The intelligence department of the front confirmed the pulling up of reserves at the expense of other sectors of the front, stating the enemy’s retreat in the Oleninsky and burned-Gorodishchensky directions.

Intelligence data also recorded the state of the enemy’s defensive line: “The line to the north. - zap., sowing. and sowing - east. approaches to Rzhev prepared in advance, where the improvement of defensive structures is still ongoing. Bunkers, dugouts and shelters for housing are mainly built on road junctions and sectors that are inaccessible to cross-fire machine guns from settlements. In some areas, a wire fence of 2 stakes and snow blockages up to 1 meter high were noted.

On the morning of January 21, the divisions of the right flank of the army again went on the offensive to complete the task. A rather revealing record was preserved in the combat report of shtadiva 183 at 10 o’clock that day: “The tanks did not go into battle due to a malfunction. An investigation is underway."

At the same time, on the morning of January 21, the German offensive began. According to the report of the chief of staff of the 29th Army, V.M. Sharapov, the enemy, with a strength of up to a full-blooded regiment with 13 tanks, began an offensive in the morning at the junction between the 246th and 174th rifle divisions and along the road to Selizharovo, and on the right flank of 915- th rifle regiment - along the Volga with a force of up to a battalion. Old Korostelevo and other villages were captured.

On January 21, I. S. Konev had a telegraph conversation with a member of the Military Council of the Kalinin Front, Corps Commissar D. S. Leonov [the record of the conversation is undated; date determined by content. . – S.G.]: “... The returned Smokachev [divisional commissar P. E. Smokachev is a member of the Military Council of the front. . – S.G.] from Shvetsov also confirms the small number of active bayonets ... The use of 365 rifle divisions by Shvetsov must be delayed ... It is planned to transfer Lelyushenko ... Shvetsov has enough strength to take Rzhev, the trouble is that there is no decisiveness. This is the main thing. Polenov, without removing 243 from the division, temporarily send to carry out the operation to capture Rzhev at 369th division, leave the current commander of 369th division as Polenov's deputy. Make Polenov Shvetsov’s deputy with the right to give orders to two right-flank divisions ... Warn Shvetsov that he will be tried for failure to complete the task of capturing Rzhev ... It seems to me that Shvetsov’s business is going badly because Shvetsov personally speaks a lot himself, is not sure of his actions and does not require this from subordinates ... His hand is not strong enough, everything slips out of his hands ... ”D.S. Leonov replied that he would send Polenov today to speed up the capture of Rzhev and support the army command. Konev ordered him to find out more precisely, “when Shvetsov nevertheless plans to take Rzhev ... If he succeeds before January 24, then you can risk giving him 365 rifle divisions ... The argument you made about the small number of Shvetsov’s troops is very easy to break, you just need to carefully calculate, and he will receive triple superiority over the enemy with these so-called small divisions ... About 365 ... For the time being, it will not be put forward anywhere. I have in mind the previous outline of an advance to the Osuyskoye region.

Let us pay attention to the mention in the conversation of the 365th Infantry Division, which in February 1942 will have a tragic fate, as well as to the name of Major General Polenov, who will also have to play an important role in subsequent events.

The exact time when this conversation took place is not indicated, but it most likely was even before the commander was informed of the start of the German offensive and the capture of the village of Star west of Rzhev. Korostelevo. From that moment on, events in the Rzhev direction began to develop extremely negatively for the 29th, 39th armies and the 11th cavalry corps.

The maps show that Old Korostelevo was located almost in the center of the breakthrough, but "behind" the divisions advancing on Rzhev. It was impossible to urgently turn these divisions. The front command initially hoped to restore the situation in this area through partial regroupings, by bringing the 243rd Rifle Division into battle from the reserve. The front command tried to convince the chief of staff of the 29th Army that “the enemy’s attack on St. Korostelevo is just a diversion to divert our forces from the south [from Sychevka. . – S.G.] and west [from Rzhev. . – S.G.] ... Any major offensive is out of the question. The enemy undertook sabotage in order to violate our rear ... ".

It is not clear whether this was an attempt to reassure the command of the army or there was not yet a complete understanding of the danger of the enemy's actions. But probably, having analyzed the situation in detail, the front commander recognized the urgent need to transfer larger additional forces to this sector, regrouping the 30th Army into the zone of operations of the 29th Army. At the very beginning of the day on January 22, the commander of the 30th Army was ordered to surrender the front of the 31st Army, the commander of which was to receive him by 1800 on January 22.

With such a decision, the Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General D. D. Lelyushenko, the commander of the 30th Army, did not agree. He sent a report of disagreement with the order of his commander to a superior commander, who in this situation was the chief of the General Staff. D. D. Lelyushenko, but turned to the most popular commissar of defense, who was during the war years the Supreme Commander I. V. Stalin, which is very reminiscent of an act in a similar situation by V. Model, who turned to Hitler through the head of his immediate superior.

The report said: “At 00.45 22.1, an order was received from Comrade. Konev about the transfer of the 30th Army with all its rear from the left flank of the Kalinin Front to its right flank, to the Olenino region (50 km west of the city of Rzhev), while crossing the front of three armies (31st, 29th and 39th). The concentration period for the army headquarters is by the end of the day on 23.1 and the last division on 26.1. Distance 140–160 km. Movement is given on one road. I consider it my duty to report to you:

1. The timing of the concentration of the army is thought out frivolously - unrealistic.

2. With its movement, the army, crossing the communications of the three armies, will inevitably cause confusion and interruptions in the supply of the armies of the front.

3. In addition, the 30th Army does not represent any strike force at the moment. The front has lately taken six of the best divisions and one tank brigade from the army. In the remaining four divisions in most regiments, due to continuous fierce battles during the crescent, there are 80-120 active bayonets. The army fought 180-220 km (from the Volga-Moscow canal to Pogorely Gorodishche).

In connection with the above, I report:

1. I consider it inappropriate to transfer 30 A in this state to the right flank of the Kalinin Front, since it is expected by Comrade. Konev cannot give any effect under the indicated circumstances.

2. In our opinion, this task of the front had to be solved not by transferring the army from one flank to the other, but by consolidating the armies on the right flank on [perhaps a typo or misprint; more logical "for". . – S.G.] by increasing the front of the left-flank armies. It will be much faster and more accurate.

3. I ask you to complete our army and assign it any combat mission.

4. I'm waiting for an answer.

D. S. Leonov - member of the Military Council of the Kalinin Front in 1941

Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General (since 01/2/1942) D. D. Lelyushenko - commander of the 30th Army. 1941

The report was written on behalf of one person, but signed by members of the Military Council of the 30th Army: "Lelyushenko, Abramov, Khetagurov" and dated 9 o'clock on January 22, 1942.

The reasons for the unwillingness of D. D. Lelyushenko to redeploy the army to another sector of the front can probably be attributed to the successful pursuit of enemy troops by divisions of the army, which withdrew its troops on Hitler's orders. The Journal of Combat Operations of the 30th Army for January 22 records that it handed over its combat sector during the period of "the most successful development of the offensive in the direction of Pogorely Gorodishche." In our opinion, success in advancing the formations of the 30th Army would hardly have been long-lasting: having reached a certain prepared line, the Wehrmacht units consolidated and strengthened their defenses, which it would be problematic to break through by the army forces named in the report.

The answer to the report of Lieutenant General D. D. Lelyushenko was the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, signed by I. V. Stalin about a day later - on January 23 at 3 hours and 15 minutes: “In the current situation, the Rzhev-Vyazma direction is of primary importance, from quick success to the success of the operation as a whole depends on it, and vice versa, the real direction of the 30th Army has become secondary. Hence I consider the decision of comrade. Konev is correct, it is necessary to make every effort to implement it as soon as possible. Probably, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief needed a day to discuss the issue with the high command of the Red Army.

Looking ahead, let's say that D. D. Lelyushenko turned out to be right: it was no longer possible to change the situation on the front of the 29th Army. When units and formations of the 30th Army began to arrive at the breakthrough site, it was already closed by Wehrmacht units. The army got involved in fierce battles with the German troops, first west of Rzhev, then directly behind Rzhev. At the end of September 1942, its divisions managed to enter the city and recapture several northeastern quarters from the enemy, but Rzhev became completely free only after the Wehrmacht troops left the city. D. D. Lelyushenko in November 1942 was appointed commander of the 1st Guards Army and distinguished himself in the battles near Stalingrad. After him, Major General V. Ya. Kolpakchi was appointed commander of the 30th Army. In April 1943, the army was awarded the title of Guards, and it became known as the 10th Guards Army.

On the morning of January 22, in a telegram to inform the "comfront", Major General Shvetsov suggested that "a breakthrough of the enemy's Rzhev grouping to the northwest and west is possible," and he turned out to be right. On the morning of January 22, German troops with forces up to an infantry regiment, as recorded in the "Journal of Combat Operations" of the front [in the military history literature, there is information about two regiments of the 6th Army Corps. . – S.G.], with tanks went on the offensive in a northwestern direction along the Rzhev-Yeltsy road [in other documents - along the Selizharovsky highway, which is the same . – S.G.]. The offensive was supported by bomber and fighter aircraft from the Rzhev airfield.

While the divisions of the right-flank grouping of the 29th Army - 185, 381, 369, 183rd continued the offensive in the Rzhev direction, which the Germans reinforced with tanks, cavalrymen, skiers, divisions of the center and left flank of the army - 246, 375, 174, 220th - fought defensive battles, holding back the offensive of the enemy infantry, supported by tanks. All units of the divisions participated in repelling enemy attacks.

So, in the operational report of the 246th Infantry Division it is written: “... The barrage detachment and the communications battalion defended Malakhovo-Volzhskoye, Litvinovo. United group of 35 people. from 6.00 they attacked the lime plant. Before reaching the plant 200 m, the group was subjected to heavy machine-gun and mortar fire and counterattacked. She retreated with heavy losses ... ”Together with units and subunits of the 246th Infantry Division, the 87th Ski Battalion also fought. In order to stop the advance of the enemy in the place of the breakthrough, the army command began to collect "all rears: one and a half hundred from the engineering battalion, hundreds of all those lagging behind in the villages, set in motion all special divisions [probably all divisional special units .. - S.G.] ... 70 signalmen, a replenishment company for the 39th Army. In a conversation with the commander of the front, Major General Sharapov said: "With the available forces, I think it is possible to contain the spread of the enemy further, but we will not be able to restore the situation with these forces." In response, Colonel General Konev ordered "to stop the panic, to stop the enemy's advance and to destroy the units that had broken through, not a step back, to shoot the departing on the spot." Major General Sharapov was given personal responsibility as the commander of the "Northern Group of Forces of the 29th Army" for restoring the situation, he was ordered to take command of the 375th, 174th, 220th, 243rd rifle divisions and army reinforcement units located north of the Volga.

By 18 o'clock the enemy occupied Nozhkino, Petelino, Nov. Korostelevo, Bukhavino, Filkino, that is, settlements on the northern side of the Volga, cutting off the communications of the 29th, 39th armies. In a telegram in cipher to I. S. Konev on January 22, Major General Shvetsov reported: “From 12.00 on January 22, the supply of all types of supplies ceased.”

It should be clarified that from the beginning of the offensive of the army, its administration was divided. Army Commander Major General V. I. Shvetsov, Brigade Commissar N. N. Savkov, a member of the Military Council of the Army, and some chiefs of the army headquarters units were in the advancing troops of the right-flank group. The chief of staff of the army, Major General V. M. Sharapov, with part of the administration, was on the northern bank of the Volga. In the Spravka, which summarizes intelligence data for the end of January - the beginning of February 1942, this part of the headquarters was called "sev. [true] KP". Communication between the front headquarters and Major General Shvetsov was carried out not directly, but through the headquarters of the 29th Army, that is, through Major General Sharapov. All reports, telegrams, ciphers that came to the army headquarters from the semi-encircled, and then surrounded, group of troops of the 29th Army were immediately transferred to the front headquarters. At the same time, in some cases, the reaction of the front command, a number of orders from the front commander, Colonel General Konev, suggest that he was not personally familiar with all the incoming documents.

The chief of staff V. M. Sharapov had radio contact with the army commander almost all the time, but sometimes the information was delayed. The first entry in the "Journal of Combat Operations" of the army about the lack of information "on the actions of the right-flank grouping (381, 185, 369 and 183 sd, tank group, 24 and 39 Ogmd)" was made on January 23. Major General Shvetsov also did not always have information “on the position of units north of the river. Volga. Telegrams from the troops located south of the Volga are almost always signed by the commander of the 29th Army, Major General Shvetsov and a member of the Military Council, Brigadier Commissar Savkov; battalion commissar Chepurnykh. Sometimes the communication of the army headquarters with the army headquarters in the encirclement was carried out by communications aircraft and messengers. But “in the first days of February, the exchange of mail ceased. Aerial reconnaissance data on the regroupings of the pr-ka were reported by us in cipher, ”the reference mentioned above said. Later, when leaving the encirclement, radio communications will be interrupted for several days.

Below, in order to avoid complex proposals overloaded with information, we will name only the name of the commander or political worker without indicating ranks and positions, as in documents.

Early in the morning - at 05.50-23 January, a cipher signed by Konev and Zakharov left the front headquarters for General Shvetsov: “The enemy is apparently trying to break out of Rzhev to the west. I order: to take all measures to prevent the enemy from breaking through to the west in the direction of Bakhmatovo, Solomino. You received 365 sd, 375 sd. With the forces of your army and the two divisions transferred, organize a strike to destroy the enemy group that has broken through. 646 AP RGK has been transferred to you ... ”At the same time, the front command did not remove the task of capturing Rzhev by the army. The encryption ended with the following words: “The owner [I. Stalin . – S.G.] is extremely dissatisfied and does not allow the thought of how it could happen that the enemy regiment pushed back our two divisions.

The dissatisfaction of the owner is understandable. Cut off from the main front was a grouping of troops numbering, according to the most conservative estimates, from 50 to 60 thousand people. The reasons for this situation are obvious: the extreme small number of the 174th and 246th rifle divisions, which fell on the main blow of the enemy, the fatigue of people, and the lack of ammunition.

The situation with the "transferred divisions" is not very clear. According to entries in the 29th Army's Combat Action Journal for January 22, the 375th Rifle Division was already part of the army and resisted enemy attacks in the direction of Nozhkino, Petelino, Nov. Filkino, and interacting with the 174th Infantry Division - at the turn of Ilyino, Kolesnikovo, Bukhanino. On January 23, parts of the division also fought at the Timontsevo line.

The 365th rifle division was the very one that the front commander I.S. Konev discussed in a conversation with D.S. Leonov on January 21, not wanting to give it to Shvetsov. The front headquarters in the evening of the same day - at 22.40 - decided that she, along with the 375th Infantry Division, from January 23, was to become part of the 30th Army. But the events of this and the following days forced the front command to change its mind, and on January 22 the divisions were transferred to the 29th Army. But if the 375th Rifle Division was already engaged in defensive battles that day, as mentioned above, then the situation with the 365th Rifle Division unfolded much more complicated.

Probably, between the two named orders of January 21 and 22, there was another order in which the division, most likely, was transferred to the 39th Army. At the time of writing, this order could not be found. A confirmation of this fact may be a message from Major General Sharapov to the chief of staff of the front M.V. Zakharov, probably on the evening of January 22: “About the 365th division. Shvetsov tried to detain her, but by the end of the day, when the division commander raised the question: “What to do?”, Shvetsov, not having the right to keep the division any longer, answered the commander: “Act at your own discretion,” but warned that he could return back " . Probably, at the very end of the day on January 22, the front headquarters signed an order to transfer the 365th rifle division to the 29th army. Sharapov reported to Zakharov [a record of negotiations without fixing the date and time. - C.G.], most likely, either at the end of the day on January 22, or at the very beginning of January 23: “The order to put the 365th rifle division into action immediately upon receipt from you was transmitted by radio to Shvetsov. Order accepted... No response received. Delegates sent - liaison officers do not return.

Thus, despite the words about the "transferred" divisions, by the morning of January 23, the 29th Army did not have additional forces. With the beginning of the day, the divisions of the right-flank grouping of the army continued their attack on Rzhev. The divisions of the center and the left flank "went on the offensive with the task of encircling and destroying the enemy, who had broken through to Timontsevo, Bukhavino." But the enemy, advancing "with a force of up to 5 battalions with 6 tanks," occupied Usovo and Vorobyevo by 14 o'clock. By 20.00, the enemy managed to "connect the eastern and western groupings and finally cut communications 29 and 39A." Recall that, according to German data, the connection of the advancing eastern and western German groups occurred at 12.45.

From that moment on, the troops of the two armies and the 11th Cavalry Corps of the Kalinin Front were cut off from the main front, and their struggle with the enemy began in a semi-encirclement.

In the meantime, the 365th Rifle Division at 06:00 on January 23 had already “reached the Osuyskoye area”, which is 14 km south of Okorokovo, where the commander of the 29th Army met with its commander. The division was ordered to concentrate in the Karpovo area. Deputy battalion commander of the 433rd separate sapper battalion of the 365th rifle division G. I. Kravchenko after the war recalled: “... North-west of Rzhev, the division entered the gap through the corridor pierced by the troops of the 39th army. We walked rapidly, in three days we walked about 200 km. The rear units (medical battalion, economic unit, etc.) lagged far behind, did not enter the breakthrough, and then they were generally detained. Near the villages of Solomino - Kokoshkino, our units crossed the Volga (known places for subsequent battles) and then rushed to the southwest, following the formations of the 39th Army, which had already started fighting for Sychevka ...

The days of mid-January were clear, frosty, boundless snow all around, sparkling in the sun, and German planes above us. They bombed, shelled, burned villages. To the right and left of the breakthrough corridor there were fierce battles. We have almost reached the source of the Dnieper.

All day on January 23, Sharapov received requests from Zakharov demanding information about the division: “365th Rifle Division ... immediately turn north”, “... Get Shvetsov: is 365th Rifle Division turned north ...”, “... Is 365th Rifle Division turned north and where is it is it now?.. ”We note that on that day negotiations with the 29th Army were conducted only by the chief of staff of the front, M.V. Zakharov. Perhaps the front commander I.S. Konev went to the troops.

By 10 pm on January 23, Shvetsov in the document “The situation on the right flank of 29 A” addressed to I. S. Konev reported: “365 rifle division in the Karpovo area. An order was given by radio and communications officers to return to the Okorokovo area for an offensive in the general direction of Kokoshkino. In the "Journal of Combat Operations" of the front for January 24, it is recorded that the 365th Infantry Division left the Karpov area at 2.00 to the north with the task of advancing from the Brekhovo area already at 16.00 in the direction of Kokoshkino, Star. Korostelevo. According to updated data, the division left the Karpovo area only on January 25 at 3.30 and, according to information at 4 p.m., was already advancing in the direction of Kokoshkino, Spas-Mitkovo.

Thus, from the available information about the 365th Rifle Division, it follows that on January 22, at the moment of the urgent need for additional forces to contain the German offensive in the breakthrough area, the 365th Rifle Division went south, then in extreme haste returned to the breakthrough site, but it was already closed by the Wehrmacht. And after this three-day, almost thirty-kilometer "walk" on the road in severe frosts and high snow, the division entered the battle by the end of the day on January 25. Later, in the “Report on the combat activities of the Southern Group of the 29th Army,” Major General V.I. did not take part in the most decisive period of participation in the battle. The march to the south and the return to the 29th Army to the north took 3 days. The division returned exhausted and almost incompetent, without rears. Remember the last phrase, you will need it later.

It should be added that during the German offensive on January 22–23, a part of the 178th Rifle Division of the 22nd Army was also cut off from the main front (Scheme 7). The division carried out the task of liberating the village of Olenino to the west of the breakthrough site of the Soviet troops. In the “Historical Form of the Division”, the events of these days are described as follows: “On January 22–23, the enemy, with a massive simultaneous attack from the east (Rzhev) and from the west (Urdom, Molodoy Tud), using aviation and tanks, liquidated the 39A breakthrough and occupied the solid defense of Rzhev - Young Tud.

Scheme 7. A fragment of the report map of the 29th Army. February 1942

To restore the situation, the commander of the 22nd ordered to remove 386 joint ventures from the approaches to Olenino and advance from the Chertolino area in order to eliminate the enemy's breakthrough. 386 SP instead of participating in the attack on Olenino moved in the direction of Mal. Nikulino - Zaitsevo, but com. ordered the front to return the regiment, occupy the former sector and, in cooperation with the 298th joint venture and the cavalry detachment, drive the enemy out of Olenino.

The enemy took advantage of the retreat of the 386th regiment, the weakening of the southern group [division . – S.G.] and led the offensive by units of 235 paragraphs and cavalry. SS brigades from Gorenka and the line ... [illegible . – S.G.] on the right flank of the southern group, pushing the divisions of the cavalry. detachment. At the same time, with a force of up to one point, the enemy launched an offensive from the Pogorelka, Glyadovo area in the direction of Zaitsevo - Chertolino, creating a threat to the rear of 39 A and intending to cut off our southern group from units of the 29th and 39th armies. The question of mastering Olenino disappeared.

The southern group was in an exceptionally difficult situation. The supply routes for ammunition and food were also cut off. There was no connection with the 39th and 29th armies. Ammunition and food are running out. There is nowhere to evacuate the wounded. I had to create management and supply bodies, switch to local food procurement.

So, by the evening of January 23, 1942, the troops of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps were cut off from the main front. The 29th Army was cut in two. The 174th, 220th, 243rd and 375th rifle divisions remained on the northern bank of the Volga. The 183rd, 185th, 246th, 365th, 369th, 381st rifle divisions, a tank group, part of the 510th artillery regiment of the RGK, the 24th and 39th separate guards mortar battalions and some other units remained south of the Volga, in a semi-encirclement. During the period from 16 to 24 January, the losses of the army amounted to 1,500 people killed and up to 3,000 wounded.

No. 95 Information on the composition of prisoners held in the NKVD camps on January 1, 1942 To the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Commissar of State Security 3rd rank Comrade Kruglov I present statistical information on the composition of prisoners held in