What is a collective system. The struggle of the USSR for the creation of a system of collective security in Europe
Back to Collective Security
In the 1930s Soviet diplomacy sought, on the one hand, to implement a plan for collective security in Europe, to prevent the creation of a broad united anti-Soviet front, to exercise maximum caution and not succumb to enemy provocations, and on the other hand, to take all necessary measures to strengthen the country's defense.
In April 1939, the Soviet government came up with a proposal to conclude an agreement on mutual assistance between the USSR, Britain and France, according to which, in the event of fascist aggression against a number of European states, the three powers would jointly come to their aid. Foreign Secretary Chamberlain said he would "rather resign than sign an alliance with the Soviets".
At the same time, the partners of England and France - Romania, Poland and the Baltic countries - reacted negatively to the proposal of the Soviet Union: to send troops to the territories of these countries in the event of a German attack. They feared that later the USSR would not want to withdraw its troops.
In June, delegations from England and France arrived in Moscow, having no authority to make any decisions. They were instructed to conduct "negotiations for the sake of negotiations." There were 12 meetings that did not lead to a concrete result.
On August 15, D. Shaposhnikov, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, announced that the USSR was ready to field 136 divisions against the aggressor in Europe. At the same time, he outlined options for joint actions and noted that the USSR, with the outbreak of war, "does not intend to adhere to defensive tactics." However, the Soviet proposals did not find support.
In the meantime, secret negotiations were underway between representatives of England, France and Germany, aimed at pushing Nazi Germany into war against the USSR. In conditions when the negotiations of the USSR with England and France in 1939 reached an impasse, the Soviet leadership accepted Germany's proposal for peace negotiations, as a result of which on August 23, 1939, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) was signed in Moscow ) for a period of 10 years.
At the same time, an additional secret protocol was signed, which delimited the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR. The sphere of interests of the USSR included the eastern part of Poland, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania and Bessarabia (now Moldova).
This protocol implemented Stalin's idea of returning to the USSR the lands ceded to Poland under the Riga Treaty of 1921.
Was the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Germany the best solution to the problems facing the Soviet government?
There are different points of view of historians on this matter. The USSR was faced with a choice: either reach an agreement with Britain and France and create a system of collective security in Europe, or conclude a pact with Germany, or remain alone.
Some experts view the conclusion of a treaty with Germany as the worst option, arguing that the pact provoked the Second World War. Another point of view boils down to an attempt to view it as an example of a compromise, the ability to use inter-imperialist contradictions. What prompted Germany and the USSR to agree to an alliance?
For Hitler, this was a tactical move: initially, he needed to guarantee the unhindered capture of Poland, and then other states. The Soviet Union, signing the treaty, sought, on the one hand, to protect itself on the eve of the German war against Poland by limiting the advance of German troops and Germany's refusal to use the Baltic states for anti-Soviet purposes, and on the other hand, to secure the Far Eastern borders of the USSR from Japanese attacks.
Thus, by concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1939, the USSR avoided a war on two fronts.
You can speculate as much as you want on the Soviet-German pact of 1939, portray it as a conspiracy of two totalitarian monsters, but for people who have any sense of reality, it is clear that the pact is a mutual ploy to buy time before the main fight.
In general, this pact did not allow the creation of a united anti-Soviet front in Europe, delayed the start of hostilities for a while, and allowed the USSR to move its borders away from the vital centers of the country. However, the USSR used the delay received less effectively than its partner in the pact.
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Toland J. - American journalist, winner of the Pulitzer Prize:
“Both Stalin and Hitler believed that they could use each other for their own purposes. Both dictators were, of course, wrong, but in that turbulent summer of 1939 there was not a single country that did not act on one or the other erroneous concept.
Europe was the center of mistrust, deceit and double-dealing. Even as Ribbentrop prepared to go to Moscow, Stalin did not lose hope for an Anglo-French Soviet alliance against Hitler. And the British, reluctantly leaning towards such an alliance, secretly invited Goering to England.
Bullock A. - famous English historian:
“The inability of the governments of England and France to take effective measures to conclude an alliance with the Russians was then sharply criticized; subsequently, it was rightly stated by everyone who wondered about the causes of the war.
Fest I.K. - German journalist:
“However, now that, after the Moscow Pact, all her policies were defeated, England realized what she would have to fight and die for under any circumstances. The policy of appeasement was not least based on the bourgeois world's fear of a communist revolution. According to the ideas of British statesmen, Hitler played the role of a militant defender against this threat ... "
⦁Explain why the idea of collective security was not implemented. Who won and who lost in the end?
From the memoirs of a repressed resident of Bessarabia, Euphrosyne Kersnovskaya, "How Much a Man Worth". Ed. 2001 - 2002
The first of January 1941. Day of the plebiscite.
Judgments of foreign historians and journalists about the failure of the idea of collective security in 1939
Election Day! I have always believed that a plebiscite is a free expression of the will of the people. Elections are a civic duty, obliging each person to choose from several possible best, and if there is no best, to abstain. In both cases, a person should be calm and free. No coercion, no fear! There is no need to talk about the fact that secrecy must be observed. Not a plebiscite, but a props. I'm ashamed…<…>Long hall. Everywhere are portraits of Stalin and many more subjects unfamiliar to me. I only recognized Voroshilov.<…>Putting the ballots in an envelope, I went to the ballot box, but before I had time to lower the envelope, the chairman took it very unceremoniously from my hands ... But before he had time to unfold it, I tore the envelope out of his hands and managed to put it in the ballot box ... The next day ... one of the heads of the NKVD entered the room ... Leaning on the table with his fists, he said: “The counting of votes ended at night: 35,000 -“ for ”and one -“ against ”...” I had no idea that I was playing with fire, although ... nowhere from fate you won’t leave ... It’s not important what your fate is, but how you meet it!
⦁Why was it possible to achieve universal support for the proposed project during the plebiscites? How objective could the results of such elections be?
§ 36. Soviet economic policy: plans, difficulties, results. Materials for the lesson-practice
Here is a selection of documents from the times of the first five-year plans. Based on these texts and the documentary fragments given at the end of the paragraphs, write a short work "Catch up and overtake ..." followed by a discussion in the practical lesson.
1. Formation of the initial contradiction and statement of the problem. Do you see a problematic contradiction that is already reflected in the topic of the workshop lesson?
2. Brief description of the historical moment. In what historical situation were the cited documents created?
3. Characteristics of the sources and their possibilities for highlighting the problem.
4. Comparative analysis of documentary material from the point of view of the problem under study.
5. Conclusion and conclusions.
It is necessary to indicate with numbers the parts of the work corresponding to the points of this plan.
It is very important at the same time to demonstrate the ability to clearly formulate the provisions and argue them with the help of the source.
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Samara College of Finance and Economics
(Samara branch of the Financial University)
Lecture notes
in the discipline "History"
specialties
38.02.01 "Economics and accounting" (by industry)
38.02.06 "Finance"
(basic training)
Explanatory note
Lecture notes in the discipline "History" are intended for students with a complete secondary education based on 11 classes, studying in the following specialties: 02.38.01 "Economics and Accounting" (by industry), 02.38.06 "Finance", 02.38. a business".
The purpose of these abstracts is to summarize the knowledge previously acquired by students in the discipline "History" with a deeper understanding of general issues.
The academic discipline "History" is a discipline of the humanitarian and socio-economic cycle in the structure of the main professional educational program.
As a result of studying the discipline, the student must
know:
— The main directions of development of key regions of the world at the turn of the century;
— The essence and causes of local, regional, interstate conflicts in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries;
– The main integration, multicultural, migration and other processes of political and economic development of the leading states and regions of the world;
- Appointment of the UN, NATO, EU and other organizations and the main directions of their activities;
— On the role of science, culture, and religion in the preservation and strengthening of national and state traditions;
be able to:
- navigate the current economic, political and cultural situation in Russia and the world;
- analyze historical facts and events, give them their own assessment;
– to reveal the main directions of development of the regions of the world at the turn of the century;
- to identify the relationship of domestic, regional, global socio-economic, political and cultural problems;
- methodologically competently analyze various historical facts;
— to understand in general the current political situation in Russia and the world, to compare political and economic problems in different regions of the world, using theoretical knowledge;
This lecture notes consist of the main topics and concepts of the course.
As a result of studying the topic: “Post-war peace settlement in Europe”, the student should know the features and patterns of the post-war political development of the countries of Europe and America, be able to trace the stages of the formation of the Cold War.
In the topic: "The First Conflicts and Crises of the Cold War", the student should know the main political conflicts between the two superpowers and the countries of the Asia-Pacific region.
Section II "The main socio-economic and political trends in the development of countries in the second half of the 20th century" is aimed at generating knowledge about the socio-political and economic development of the developed and developing countries of the world after the Second World War, understanding the specifics of their domestic political relations and the features of their foreign policy.
This section studies the political development of such states as the USA, Germany, Japan, China, India, countries of Eastern Europe, countries of Latin America. This section also draws attention to the international relations of the second half of the twentieth century. The student can use the lecture material to study the missed topics or to prepare for the test and in independent work on the educational material.
The final form of discipline control is a test.
Section 1. Post-war peace settlement in Europe
Topic 1. Post-war peace settlement
1. Consequences of the Second World War. Interests of the leading world powers in Europe.
2. Allied policy towards Germany.
3. Ideas of collective security in Europe.
4. Speech by Winston Churchill in Fulton.
5. The Marshall Plan and the beginning of the Cold War.
Consequences of the Second World War. Interests of the leading world powers in Europe
World War II left its mark on the entire history of mankind in the second half of the 20th century. Only in the USSR, 27 million died (a total of 54 million). 46% of cities, villages, buildings were destroyed. 10 million people became refugees. Almost every country participating in the war was subjected to hunger, losses and had serious material, economic difficulties and losses. The main task of the post-war period is to restore the destroyed economy and improve life. The main countries that declared after the war claims to world domination were the USSR, Great Britain, and France. Each of them had its own national claims and interests that it would like to dictate to the whole world. A situation of international tension and misunderstanding arose, which resulted in the Cold War.
The United States was the least affected side in the war and managed to keep most of its national wealth, therefore, claimed world leadership. Britain and France competed economically and militarily and tried to turn the world towards democracy and capitalism. The USSR sought to win more allies and turn world politics towards the socialist order.
Allied policy towards Germany.
All the most important agreements in post-war problems were reached by the Allies at the Crimean Conference (February 1945) between the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and the Potsdam Conference (July - August 1945). After the war, Germany was to be divided into four occupation territories, each of which was controlled by one of the victorious countries. The eastern zone was under the control of the USSR, in the three western zones the control was exercised by the USA, Great Britain and France. Berlin was also divided into four zones. In Germany, the following measures were taken to restore peaceful life and destroy the remnants of fascism:
1) demilitarization - the elimination of all military production and complete disarmament.
2) the dissolution of all military fascist organizations, institutions, the fascist party, the arrest of war criminals and fascist leaders.
3) the destruction of cartels and syndicates that produced military products.
4) denomination - carrying out a monetary reform.
5) permission to establish any public, civil unions and associations of civilians, granting them democratic freedoms for the speedy restoration of normal life in Germany.
Conclusion: instead of creating a united Germany, the country split into two systems. In 1949, the western state of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the eastern German Democratic Republic (GDR) were created.
Ideas of collective security in Europe.
The idea of national security evolved gradually and in stages.
In February 1947 at the Paris Peace Conference, peace treaties were signed with the parties of the former Nazi coalition (Finland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Italy). The issue of a peace treaty with Austria was postponed because of the disagreement between the USSR and the USA on the domestic and foreign policy of Austria and the demand of the USSR to prohibit the creation of military-political alliances in Austria.
September 2, 1945 the war with Japan ended and the positions of the two states (USSR and USA) finally diverged. The USSR wanted to withdraw all troops from Japan and insisted on forbidding Japan to enter into various alliances, while America wanted the opposite, so the USA concluded a peace treaty with Japan, and the USSR and some other countries refused to join the international treaty. The world was in a precarious position. The idea of collective security was primarily to unite all states against the new military threat and against the resurgence of fascism. In 1949, an international organization of the United Nations was formed, which has two main goals:
1) ensuring and protecting global security
2) development of interethnic friendly contacts and international cooperation between countries and states.
First, five permanent members united in the UN, then the number of UN members increased at the expense of non-permanent members.
Today the UN has five permanent members, including the Russian Federation. The structure of the UN includes such international organizations as the General Assembly, the Secretariat, the Economic and Social Union, the International Court of Justice and the UN Security Council.
4. Winston Churchill's speech at Fulton.
March 5, 1946 British Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivered his famous speech on the Fulton campus, in which he called on all the peoples of Europe to freedom and democracy through unity and protection from the main enemy of democracy, communism and totalitarianism. He pointed out that the United States today is at the pinnacle of world glory, and it has the power to unite all free peoples around itself in order to protect itself from war and tyranny. The only salvation from Bolshevism and Communism is the fraternal association of English-speaking peoples, that is, the union of the USA, Great Britain and France, Switzerland, Luxembourg and others who have joined them. It is necessary to prevent the influence of the USSR, which can, like a plague, infect Europe with communism.
Conclusion: After Churchill's speech, Western countries called on the peoples of Europe to unite and cooperate, and Russia and, in particular, Stalin accused Churchill of racism and inciting war. The creation of military-political blocs of the allied countries began in order to strengthen their positions. In the West, NATO was created in 1949, the USSR, in turn, created the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1949, and in 1955 the Warsaw Pact Organization (OVD).
The Marshall Plan and the Beginning of the Cold War.
March 12, 1947 American President Harry Truman announced a new political direction for the United States, which was called the Truman Doctrine. The essence of the Truman Doctrine was as follows: the United States would consistently and steadily interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and peoples in order to protect them from the negative influence of the USSR. Truman believed that it was necessary to secure the borders of European states and provide assistance to Greece and Turkey, whose borders were in danger, in order to enlist their support in the fight against the USSR. It is also necessary to develop international diplomacy and intelligence in order to be ready for aggression and attack.
Attempts to create a system of collective security in Europe and the reasons for their failure.
A continuation of the Truman Doctrine was the plan of the American Secretary of State Marshall, according to which the United States would provide assistance to European countries wishing to join their alliance. It was planned to allocate about 13 billion US dollars.
The main shares of appropriations fell on England, France, Spain, West Germany and Holland. A total of 16 countries signed the Marshall Plan. As a necessary condition for providing assistance, the United States demanded that the Communists be removed from the government of the countries that signed the treaty. Thus, the United States secured the image of the world leader of the country, which was considered a stronghold of democracy, freedom and liberalism.
In the 1930s The Soviet leadership also launched political activity in the international arena. Thus, on the initiative of the USSR, in May 1935, the Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak pacts on mutual assistance against aggression were signed. This could be a serious step towards curbing the aggressive policy of Nazi Germany and its allies and serve as the basis for creating a collective security system in Europe. The Soviet Union strongly condemned the aggressive actions of Germany and proposed holding an international conference to organize a system of collective security and protect the independence of countries threatened aggression. However, the ruling circles of the Western states did not express the necessary interest in its creation.
In 1939, the USSR continued active steps to induce the governments of Great Britain and France to create a system of collective security in Europe. The Soviet government came up with a specific proposal for the conclusion between the USSR, Great Britain and France of an agreement on mutual assistance in the event of aggression against any of the countries participating in the agreement. In the summer of 1939, tripartite negotiations were held in Moscow on the creation of a collective security system.
By the end of July, some progress was nevertheless made in the negotiations: the parties agreed to the simultaneous signing of a political and military agreement (previously, England proposed signing a political treaty first, and then negotiating a military convention).
Towards the Second World War: the failure of the idea of collective security. Annexation of the Czech Republic
From the Soviet Union they were led by the People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov, from England - Admiral Drax, from France - General Dumenk. The governments of England and France did not appreciate the Red Army and considered it incapable of active offensive operations. In this regard, they did not believe in the effectiveness of the union with the USSR. Both Western delegations were instructed to drag out the negotiations as much as possible, hoping that the very fact of their holding would have a psychological impact on Hitler.
The main stumbling block in the negotiations was the question of the consent of Poland and Romania to the passage of Soviet troops through their territory in the event of war (the USSR did not have a common border with Germany). The Poles and Romanians categorically refused to agree to this, fearing the Soviet occupation.
Only on August 23 did the Polish government soften its position somewhat. Thus, the possibility of obtaining from Poland consent to the passage of Soviet troops through its territory has not yet been irretrievably lost. It is also clear that the Poles were gradually inclined to make concessions under the pressure of Western diplomacy. With good will, the negotiations could probably still be brought to a successful conclusion. However, the mutual distrust of the parties destroyed this possibility.
The English and French military missions were not empowered to make decisions. For the Soviet leadership, it became obvious that the leadership of the Western states did not want to quickly achieve positive results. The negotiations stalled.
3 Soviet-German relations and the conclusion of the non-aggression pact The position of the West, which constantly made concessions to Germany and rejected an alliance with the USSR, caused the strongest irritation in the Kremlin from the mid-1930s. It especially intensified in connection with the conclusion of the Munich Agreement, which Moscow regarded as a conspiracy directed not only against Czechoslovakia, but also against the Soviet Union, to whose borders the German threat approached.
Since the autumn of 1938, Germany and the USSR began to gradually establish contacts in order to develop trade between the two countries. True, no real agreement could be reached at that time, since Germany, which had embarked on the path of accelerated militarization, did not have a sufficient amount of goods that could be supplied to the USSR in exchange for raw materials and fuel.
Nevertheless, Stalin, speaking in March 1939 at the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, made it clear that a new rapprochement with Berlin was not excluded. Stalin formulated the goals of the foreign policy of the USSR as follows:
1 Continue to pursue a policy of peace and strengthen business ties with all countries;
2 Do not let our country be drawn into conflicts by provocateurs of war, who are accustomed to rake in the heat with the wrong hands.
In such a difficult situation, the USSR was forced to negotiate with Nazi Germany. It should be noted that the initiative to conclude the German-Soviet pact belonged to the German side. So, on August 20, 1939, A. Hitler sent a telegram to I.V. Stalin, in which he proposed to conclude a non-aggression pact: “... I once again propose that you receive my Minister of Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, August 22, at the latest on Wednesday, August 23. The Imperial Foreign Minister will be given all the necessary powers to draw up and sign a non-aggression pact."
Consent was received August 23, 1939 Minister of Foreign Affairs I. Ribbentrop flew to Moscow. After negotiations on the evening of August 23, 1939, a German-Soviet non-aggression pact (Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact) was signed for a period of 10 years. At the same time, a "secret additional protocol" was signed.
As can be seen, in August 1939 the situation in Europe reached the highest tension. Nazi Germany made no secret of its intention to start military operations against Poland. After the signing of the German-Soviet treaty, the USSR could not fundamentally influence the aggressive actions of the Berlin authorities.
Lecture 3 The beginning of World War II and events in Belarus
1 Unleashing the war, its causes and nature.
2 Accession of Western Belarus to the BSSR.
3 Germany's preparation for war against the USSR. Plan Barbarossa.
COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM - a state of international relations that excludes the violation of world peace or the creation of a threat to the security of peoples in any form and is realized by the efforts of states on a global or regional scale.
Ensuring collective security is based on the principles of peaceful coexistence, equality and equal security, respect for the sovereignty and borders of states, mutually beneficial cooperation and military detente.
The question of creating a collective security system was first raised in 1933-1934. at the negotiations of the USSR and France on the conclusion of a multilateral regional European treaty of mutual assistance (later called the Eastern Pact) and the negotiations of the USSR with the US government on the conclusion of a regional Pacific pact with the participation of the USSR, the USA, China, Japan and other states.
However, in Europe, the persistent opposition of Great Britain, the maneuvers of the French government, which was trying to negotiate with Germany, and the tricks of A. Hitler, who demanded equal rights for Germany in the field of armaments - all this thwarted the conclusion of a regional pact and the discussion of the issue of collective security resulted in a fruitless discussion.
The growing threat of aggression from Nazi Germany forced the USSR and France to start creating a collective security system with the conclusion of the Soviet-French Mutual Assistance Treaty (May 2, 1935). Although it did not provide for the automaticity of mutual assistance obligations in the event of an unprovoked attack by any European state and was not accompanied by a military convention on specific forms, conditions and amounts of military assistance, nevertheless it was the first step in organizing a collective security system.
On May 16, 1935, a Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement on mutual assistance was signed. However, in it the possibility of rendering assistance to Czechoslovakia by the USSR, as well as Czechoslovak assistance to the Soviet Union, was limited by an indispensable condition for extending a similar obligation to France.
In the Far East, the USSR proposed to conclude a Pacific regional pact between the USSR, the USA, China and Japan in order to prevent the aggressive designs of Japanese militarism. It was supposed to sign a non-aggression pact and non-assistance to the aggressor. Initially, the United States positively welcomed this project, but, in turn, proposed expanding the list of participants in the pact, including Great Britain, France and Holland.
However, the British government evaded a clear answer on the creation of a Pacific regional security pact, as it connived at the Japanese aggression. The Kuomintang government of China did not show sufficient activity in supporting the Soviet proposal, as it hoped for an agreement with Japan. Given the growth of Japanese armaments, the United States embarked on the path of a naval arms race, declaring that "there is no faith pact" and that only a strong navy is an effective guarantor of security. As a result, by 1937 negotiations on concluding a regional pact to collectively secure peace in the Far East had stalled.
In the second half of the 1930s. the issue of a collective security system was discussed more than once at the Council of the League of Nations in connection with the Italian attack on Ethiopia (1935), the entry of German troops into the demilitarized Rhineland (1936), the discussion on changing the regime of the Black Sea straits (1936) and the safety of navigation in the Mediterranean Sea ( 1937).
Pursuance by the Western powers of the policy of "appeasement" of Germany and inciting it against the USSR on the eve of the Second World War of 1939-1945. led to the delay by the British and French governments of negotiations on concluding an agreement with the USSR on mutual assistance and on a military convention in the event of an attack on one of the three countries. Poland and Romania also showed an unwillingness to help organize a collective rebuff to fascist aggression. The fruitless negotiations of the military missions of the USSR, Great Britain and France (Moscow, August 13-17, 1939) became the last attempt in the interwar period to create a system of collective security in Europe.
In the post-war period, the United Nations was created to maintain peace and international security. However, the achievement of a collective security system was hampered by the unfolding of the Cold War and the creation of two opposing military-political groups - NATO and the Warsaw Pact. At the Geneva meeting in 1955, the USSR submitted a draft of the All-European Treaty on Collective Security, which provided that the states participating in military-political blocs would undertake obligations not to use armed force against each other. However, the Western powers rejected this proposal.
The relaxation of international tension, achieved in the second half of the 1960s - the first half of the 1970s, contributed to the creation of political guarantees of international security. In August 1975, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, since 1990 - ). The “Final Act…” of the CSCE included the Declaration of Principles of Relations between States: sovereign equality; non-use of force or threat of force; territorial integrity of states; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; development of mutually beneficial cooperation in the political, economic, cultural and humanitarian spheres. The implementation of these principles in practice opens up wide opportunities for solving the most important international task - the strengthening of peace and the security of peoples.
Orlov A.S., Georgiev N.G., Georgiev V.A. Historical dictionary. 2nd ed. M., 2012, p. 228-229.
After the end of the First World War, the issues of peaceful coexistence worried many countries, primarily the European powers, which suffered incalculable victims and losses as a result of the war. In order to prevent the threat of a new similar war and create a system of international law that regulates relations between states at a fundamentally different level than it was before, the first international organization in the history of Europe, the League of Nations, was created.
Attempts to find a definition of the attacking side began almost from the moment the League of Nations was created. The Charter of the League of Nations uses the concept of aggression and aggressor, however, the concept itself is not deciphered. So, for example, Art. 16
The Charter of the League speaks of international sanctions against the attacking side, but does not give the very definition of the attacking side. During a number of years of the existence of the League, various commissions worked, which unsuccessfully tried to define the concept of the attacking side. In the absence of a generally accepted definition, the right to determine the attacking side in each individual conflict belonged to the Council of the League of Nations.
In the early 1930s The USSR was not a member of the League and had no reason to trust the objectivity of the Council of the League in the event of this or that conflict between the USSR and any other country. Proceeding from these considerations, already during this period the Soviet Union put forward proposals to a number of European states for the conclusion of non-aggression pacts, with the aim of
"strengthening the cause of peace and relations between countries" in the conditions of "the deep world crisis now being experienced." Soviet proposals to conclude a non-aggression pact and peaceful settlement of conflicts are accepted and implemented at this time by far not by all countries (among the countries that accepted this proposal were Germany, France, Finland, Turkey,
Baltic states, Romania, Persia and Afghanistan). All these treaties were identical and guaranteed the mutual inviolability of the borders and territories of both states; an obligation not to participate in any treaties, agreements and conventions that are clearly hostile to the other party, etc.
Over time, given the strengthening of aggressive tendencies in international politics, the question arises of the need to define the concepts of aggression and the attacking side. For the first time, the Soviet delegation raised the issue of the need to conclude a special convention to determine the attacking side at the disarmament conference in December 1932. The Soviet draft definition of the attacking side provided for the recognition of such a state in an international conflict as “the first to declare war on another state; whose armed forces, even without a declaration of war, invade the territory of another state; whose land, sea or air forces will land or enter within the borders of another state or knowingly attack the ships or aircraft of the latter without the permission of its government or violate the conditions of such permission; which will establish a naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state,
"no consideration of a political, strategic or economic order, as well as reference to a significant amount of invested capital or other special interests that may be present in this territory, nor the denial of its distinctive features of the state, can serve as a justification for an attack."
On February 6, 1933, the Soviet draft convention was formally included in
Conference Bureau. By decision of the General Commission, the conference was formed under the chairmanship of a Greek delegate of a well-known jurist
Politis, a special subcommittee, which worked in May 1933. The Soviet draft, with some relatively minor amendments, was adopted by this subcommittee on May 24, 1933. The Soviet government decided to use the stay in London during the Economic Conference of a number of foreign ministers and offered to sign the said convention. On July 3 and 4, 1933, an identical convention was signed between the USSR and Lithuania. Finland later joined the convention of July 3, 1933. Thus, eleven states accepted the definition of aggression proposed by the Soviet Union.
The participation of Turkey and Romania in two conventions of identical content is explained by the desire of the countries that were part of the Balkan Entente (Turkey,
Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece) and the Little Entente (Romania, Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia), to sign a special convention as a single complex of states. This was another step in an attempt to create an effective security system in Europe.
However, at this time there is an increasing destabilization of the situation and the growth of aggressive tendencies in international relations. It takes very little time for totalitarian fascist regimes to be established in Italy and Germany. Under these conditions, the topic of creating a new system of international security, which could prevent the already quite real threat of war, acquires particular relevance.
For the first time, a proposal on the need to fight for collective security was put forward in a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in December 1933.
December 29, 1933 in a speech at the IV session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR
M. Litvinov outlined the new directions of Soviet foreign policy for the coming years, the essence of which was as follows:
1. non-aggression and neutrality in any conflict. For Soviet
Union of 1933, broken by a terrible famine, the passive resistance of tens of millions of peasants (a conscription contingent in case of war), purges of the party, the prospect of being drawn into the war would mean, as Litvinov made it clear, a real catastrophe;
2. appeasement policy towards Germany and Japan, despite the aggressive and anti-Soviet course of their foreign policy in previous years. This policy was to be pursued until it became evidence of weakness; in any case, state interests should have prevailed over ideological solidarity: “We, of course, have our own opinion about the German regime, we, of course, are sensitive to the suffering of our German comrades, but we Marxists can least of all be reproached for allowing the feeling of dominating our politics"
3. unillusioned participation in efforts to create a system of collective security, with the hope that the League of Nations "will be able to play its role more effectively than in previous years in preventing or localizing conflicts";
4. openness towards Western democracies - also without any particular illusions, given that in these countries, due to the frequent change of governments, there is no continuity in the field of foreign policy; in addition, the presence of strong pacifist and defeatist currents, reflecting the distrust of the working people of these countries in the ruling classes and politicians, was fraught with the fact that these countries could "sacrifice their national interests to please the private interests of the ruling classes."
The collective security project was based on the equality of all participants in the proposed regional agreement and on universalism, which consisted in the fact that the system being created included all the states of the covered region without exception. The parties to the pact were to enjoy equal rights and guarantees, while rejecting the idea of any opposition of some countries to others, the exclusion of anyone from the collective security system, or the receipt by any of the participating countries of advantages over other states at their expense.
The Soviet Union, in fulfillment of its idea of collective security, came up with a proposal to conclude an Eastern Pact, which would give security guarantees to all European countries and would eliminate "the feeling of uncertainty about security experienced everywhere, uncertainty about non-violation of peace in general and in particular in Europe." The Eastern Pact was to include Germany, the USSR, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,
Finland and Czechoslovakia. All participants in the pact, in the event of an attack on one of them, were supposed to automatically provide military assistance to the side that was attacked. France, without signing the Eastern Pact, took upon itself the guarantee of its implementation. This meant that if any of the parties to the pact were to comply with the decision to help the side that was attacked, France would be obliged to act itself. At the same time, the USSR assumed the obligation to guarantee the Locarno Pact, in which it did not participate. This meant that in the event of its violation (meaning a violation by Germany) and the refusal of any of the guarantors of the Locarno Pact (Great Britain and Italy) to come to the aid of the side that was attacked, the USSR had to come out on its own. Thus, the shortcomings and one-sidedness of the Locarno Treaties were "corrected". With such a system in place, it would be difficult for Germany to attempt to violate both its western and eastern borders.
The Soviet proposals also provided for the holding of mutual consultations between the participants in the pact in the event of a threat of attack on any of the participants.
The political atmosphere at the beginning of 1934, in connection with the continuous growth of Nazi aggression, gave a significant amount of reason to fear that the independence of the Baltic states might be threatened by Germany. The Soviet proposal of 27 April on commitments to "constantly take into account in its foreign policy the obligation to preserve the independence and inviolability of the Baltic republics and to refrain from any action that could prejudice this independence" was thus aimed at creating a calmer atmosphere in Eastern Europe and at the same time to reveal the real intentions of Nazi Germany. These intentions, in particular, were revealed in the Hugenberg memorandum, announced at the world economic conference in London in 1933. The refusal of the German government to accept the proposal of the USSR on the grounds that there was no need to protect these states in the absence of such a threat revealed Hitler's true goals in relation to the Baltic countries.
The draft Eastern Regional Pact is also related to the declarations of the Soviet government on the consent to guarantee the borders
Germany, made in London and Berlin. The proposal made by Germany in the spring of 1934 received a response only on September 12, 1934. Germany categorically refused to take part in the projected pact, referring to its unequal position on the question of armaments. Two days after the German refusal, Poland refused. Of the participants in the projected pact, only Czechoslovakia unconditionally joined this project. As for Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, they took a vacillating position, while Finland generally evaded any answer to the Franco-Soviet proposal. The negative position of Germany and Poland disrupted the signing of the Eastern Pact. In this disruption, an active role was played by
Laval, who inherited the portfolio of the French Foreign Minister after Barthou's assassination.
Laval's foreign policy was quite different from that of his predecessor. On the question of the Eastern Pact, Laval's tactics were as follows: in view of the mood of French public opinion, which at that moment was in the vast majority in favor of bringing the negotiations on the Eastern Pact to a conclusion, Laval continued to make reassuring public assurances in this direction. At the same time, he made it clear to Germany that he was ready to make a direct agreement with her and at the same time with Poland. One of the options for such an agreement was Laval's project on a tripartite guarantee pact (France, Poland, Germany).
It goes without saying that such a guarantee pact would be directed against the USSR. The intentions of the French Foreign Minister were clear
To the Soviet Union, which aimed to neutralize such intrigues: December 11, 1934 to the Franco-Soviet agreement of December 5
Czechoslovakia joined in 1934. This agreement involved informing the other parties to the agreement about any proposals from other states to negotiate "which could prejudice the preparation and conclusion of the Eastern Regional Pact, or an agreement contrary to the spirit that guides both governments."
According to the plan for the Eastern Pact, the security system created by it was also to be supplemented by the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations. Position
The USSR in this matter was determined in a conversation with I.V. Stalin with the American correspondent Duranty, which took place on December 25, 1933. Despite the colossal shortcomings of the League of Nations, the USSR, in principle, did not object to its support, because, as Stalin said in the conversation, “The League can turn out to be a kind of hillock on the way to at least somewhat complicating the cause of war and facilitating to some extent the cause of peace” .
The entry of the USSR into the League of Nations acquired a special character, due to the fact that in 1933 two aggressive states left the League -
Germany and Japan.
The usual procedure for the entry of individual states into the League, namely the request of the respective government for admission to the League, was naturally unacceptable to the Soviet Union as a great power. That is why from the very beginning, in the relevant negotiations, it was agreed that the USSR could enter the League of Nations only as a result of the request of the Assembly addressed to the Soviet Union.
Union. In order to be sure of the subsequent vote, it was necessary that this invitation be signed by at least two-thirds of the members of the League of Nations, for admission to the League requires a two-thirds majority. In view of the fact that the League at that time consisted of 51 states, it was necessary, therefore, that the invitation be signed by 34 states. As a result of negotiations conducted by French Foreign Minister Barthou and Foreign Minister
Czechoslovakia Benes, an invitation signed by representatives of 30 states was sent.
The governments of Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland, referring to their position of neutrality, evaded signing a general invitation sent to the USSR, and limited themselves to a statement that their delegates to the League would vote for the admission of the USSR to the League, and separate notices expressing their benevolent attitude to the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations. In this case, the reference to the position of neutrality covered the fear of these countries
Germany, which might consider the invitation of the USSR to join the League of Nations after Germany itself had withdrawn from the League, as a step unfriendly towards her. In September 1934, the USSR was officially admitted to
League of Nations. At the same time, during the negotiations, the question of granting the USSR a permanent seat in the Council of the League, which did not raise doubts, was resolved.
In parallel with the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations, the so-called
"streak of diplomatic recognition" of the Soviet Union. During this period, the USSR establishes diplomatic relations with a number of states. On November 16, 1933, normal diplomatic relations are established with the United States, in 1934 - with Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and other countries.
This was the direct result of both the general international situation in 1934 and the growing role and importance of the Soviet Union as a factor in peace. One of the immediate reasons that influenced, for example, the decision of Romania and Czechoslovakia to establish normal relations with the USSR, was the Franco-Soviet rapprochement of 1933-1934. For a number of years
France not only did not contribute to the normalization of relations between the USSR and the countries of the Little Entente, but, on the contrary, in every way prevented any attempts to achieve this normalization. In 1934, France was interested not only in its own rapprochement with the Soviet Union, but also in creating an entire security system, a system that would include both France's allies in the person of the Little Entente and the USSR. Under these conditions, French diplomacy not only does not prevent the normalization of relations between the countries of the Little Entente and the USSR, but, on the contrary, in every possible way activates these relations. Under the direct influence of French diplomacy, the conference of foreign ministers of the countries of the Little Entente, which took place in
Zagreb (Yugoslavia) on January 22, 1934, issued a decision "on the timeliness of the resumption by the member states of the Little Entente of normal diplomatic relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as soon as the necessary diplomatic and political conditions are available."
Despite the fact that the consent of some participating countries to conclude an Eastern Regional Pact was obtained, as a result of the open opposition of Germany, the objections of Poland and the maneuvers of England, which continued the policy of German aspirations to the East, this idea in 1933-1935. failed to implement.
Meanwhile, having become convinced of the reluctance of a number of Western countries to conclude an Eastern Pact, the Soviet Union, in addition to the idea of a multilateral regional agreement, attempted to sign bilateral agreements on mutual assistance with a number of states. The significance of these treaties in terms of combating the threat of war in Europe was great.
In 1933, in parallel with the negotiations on the Eastern Pact and the question of the USSR's entry into the League of Nations, negotiations began on the conclusion of a Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance. The TASS report on the conversations between the Soviet leaders and the French Foreign Minister stated that the efforts of both countries are directed "toward one essential goal - to maintain peace through the organization of collective security."
Unlike Barthou, his successor, the new foreign minister
France, who took office in October 1934, Laval by no means sought to ensure collective security and looked at the Franco-Soviet pact only as an instrument in his policy of making a deal with the aggressor. After his visit to Moscow during the passage of Warsaw, Laval explained to the Polish Foreign Minister Beck that "The Franco-Soviet pact aims not so much to attract help from the Soviet Union or to help it against possible aggression, but to prevent a rapprochement between Germany and the Soviet
Union." Laval needed this in order to scare Hitler with rapprochement with
USSR, to force him to an agreement with France.
During the negotiations conducted by Laval (October 1934 - May 1935), the latter tried in every possible way to eliminate the automaticity of mutual assistance (in the event of aggression), which the USSR insisted on, and to subordinate this assistance to the complex and intricate procedure of the League of Nations. The result of such lengthy negotiations was the signing of the Mutual Assistance Treaty on May 2, 1935. The text of the treaty provided for the need “to start immediate consultations with a view to taking measures in the event that the USSR or France would be the subject of a threat or danger of attack by any European state; provide mutual assistance and support to each other in the event that the USSR or France would be the subject of an unprovoked attack by any European state.
However, Laval's true policy was also revealed in his systematic avoidance of concluding a military convention, without which the pact on mutual assistance would lose its concrete content and would have stumbled upon a number of significant obstacles in its application. Such a convention was not signed either at the time of the conclusion of the pact, or during the entire period of its validity. Finally, it is important to note that by signing the Mutual Assistance Pact,
Laval was in no hurry to ratify it. He made the ratification of the Franco-Soviet pact itself a new means of blackmail in an attempt to reach an agreement with Nazi Germany. The pact was ratified after Laval's resignation by Sarro's cabinet (the Chamber of Deputies ratified the Franco-Soviet pact on February 27, 1936, and the Senate on March 12, 1936).
In connection with the conclusion of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs said in June 1935 that “we can, not without a sense of pride, congratulate ourselves that we were the first to fully implement and complete one of those measures of collective security, without which peace cannot be secured in Europe at the present time.
The Soviet-Czechoslovak Mutual Assistance Treaty of May 16, 1935 was completely identical to the Soviet-French Pact of May 2, 1935, with the exception of Art. 2, introduced at the request of the Czechoslovak side, which stated that the parties to the treaty would come to the aid of each other only if France came to the aid of a state that had become a victim of aggression. Thus, the operation of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty was made dependent on the behavior of France. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, Benes, sincerely sought rapprochement with the USSR and believed that such rapprochement was entirely in the fundamental interests of security.
Czechoslovakia. That is why, unlike the Franco-Soviet pact, the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty was almost immediately ratified and the exchange of instruments of ratification took place in Moscow on June 9, 1935, during Beneš's visit to the capital of the USSR.
Mutual assistance treaties represented a further stage (compared to non-aggression treaties) in the implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence of states in different social systems and could become important elements in the creation of a collective security system aimed at preserving European peace. Unfortunately, however, these treaties failed to play their part in preventing war. The Soviet-French treaty was not supplemented by an appropriate military convention that would have made it possible to ensure military cooperation between the two countries.
The treaty also did not provide for automatic actions, which significantly reduced its capabilities and effectiveness.
As for the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, its implementation was hampered by a clause that made the entry into force of the mutual obligations of both parties dependent on the actions of France. In France in the late 1930s the tendency to strive not to organize a collective rebuff to the aggressor, but to conciliation with it, to the connivance of the actions of German fascism, was becoming more and more fixed.
Equally unsuccessful were the attempts of the Soviet Union to reach an agreement with England and mobilize the League of Nations. Already at the beginning of 1935
Germany violated the Treaty of Versailles (clause on the prohibition of weapons), which did not lead to any serious consequences for her. On the issue of the Italian attack on Abyssinia at the end of 1934-1935, although an urgent conference of the League of Nations was convened, it also did not decide anything. Adopted later, at the insistence of several countries, the sanctions against the aggression of Italy, provided for in Art. 16 of the League Charter were too lenient, and in July 1936 they were canceled. A number of other incidents also remained virtually unnoticed.
As a result of these illegal actions of the aggressor countries and the lack of a corresponding reaction to them, the entire Versailles-Washington system of international relations was actually destroyed. All attempts by the USSR to influence the course of events in any way did not lead to anything. So,
Litvinov made a number of accusatory speeches at the conferences of the League of Nations, which stated that “although the Soviet Union is formally not interested in cases of violation of international agreements by Germany and Italy due to its non-participation in the violated treaties, these circumstances do not prevent it from finding its place among those members of the Council who record their indignation at the violation of international obligations in the strongest possible terms, condemn it and join in the most effective means of preventing such violations in the future. The USSR thus expressed its disagreement with the attempts
“fight for peace without at the same time upholding the inviolability of international obligations; fight for a collective security organization without taking collective measures against the violation of these obligations” and disagreement with the possibility of preserving the League of Nations “if it does not comply with its own decisions, but teaches the aggressors not to reckon with any of its recommendations, any of its warnings, with any of her threats" and "passing by violations of these treaties or getting off with verbal protests and not taking more effective measures." But that didn't have any effect either. It was obvious that the League of Nations had already ended its existence as any effective instrument of international politics.
The pinnacle of the policy of condoning aggression was the Munich Pact between the leaders of Britain and France and the leaders of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.
The text of the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938 established certain methods and conditions for the rejection of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia in favor of Germany "according to the agreement in principle" reached by the heads of four states: Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy. Each of the parties "declared itself responsible for taking the necessary measures" to fulfill the contract. The list of these measures included the immediate evacuation of the Sudetenland from October 1 to 10, the release of all Sudeten Germans from military and police duties for four weeks, etc.
In September 1938, taking advantage of the difficult situation of Czechoslovakia, during the so-called Sudeten crisis, the Polish government decided to seize some areas of Czechoslovakia. On September 21, 1938, the Polish envoy in Prague presented the Czechoslovak government with demands to break away from Czechoslovakia and annex to Poland areas that the Polish government considered Polish. On September 23, the Polish envoy demanded an immediate response from the Czechoslovak government to this demand. On September 24, railway communication between Poland and Czechoslovakia was completely stopped.
The action of the Soviet government was aimed at providing diplomatic support to the Czech government. Despite the defiant tone of the Polish government's response to the submissions of the USSR government,
Poland did not dare to immediately attack Czechoslovakia. Only after the Munich Conference, namely on October 2, Poland seized
Teshensky district. This was done due to the fact that at the Munich Conference Chamberlain and Daladier completely "surrendered" to Hitler.
The inevitable immediate result of the Munich Agreement was Hitler's takeover of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. On March 14, with the help of Hitler, an "independent" Slovak state was created. Czech troops were removed from the territory of Slovakia. On the same day, the Hungarian government announced that it insisted on the annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine to Hungary.
(by the beginning of 1939, Hungary had completely entered the fairway of foreign policy
Germany and Italy, having completely lost the independence of their policy).
Germany demanded that the Czechoslovak government recognize the secession
Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine, the dissolution of the Czechoslovak army, the abolition of the post of president of the republic and the establishment of a regent-ruler in her place.
March 15 President of Czechoslovakia Hakh (replacing the resigned
Benes) and Foreign Minister Khvalkovsky were summoned to Berlin to
Hitler. While they were driving there, German troops crossed the border
Czechoslovakia began to occupy one city after another. When Gakh and Khvalkovsky came to Hitler, the latter, in the presence of Ribbentrop, suggested that they sign an agreement on the accession of the Czech Republic to Germany.
On March 16, 1939, the Slovak Prime Minister Tissot sent a telegram to Hitler asking him to take Slovakia under his protection. Except
The USSR and the USA all countries recognized the accession of Czechoslovakia to Germany.
The capture of Czechoslovakia by Hitler on March 15, 1939, the sharp aggravation of Polish-German relations and the economic agreement imposed on Romania, which turned Romania into a virtual vassal of Germany, led to some change in the position of Chamberlain, and after him Daladier. In the preceding period, stubbornly refusing negotiations repeatedly proposed by the Soviet government on the issue of strengthening the collective security system, the governments of Chamberlain and Daladier in mid-April 1939 themselves made the USSR an offer to start negotiations on the creation of a tripartite peace front. The Soviet government accepted this proposal. In May 1939, negotiations began in Moscow between representatives of the USSR, Great Britain and
France. These negotiations continued until August 23, 1939, with no results. The failure of these negotiations was caused by the position of the governments of Chamberlain and Daladier, who in reality did not at all seek to create a peace front directed against the German aggressor. With the help of Moscow negotiations, Chamberlain and Daladier intended to put political pressure on non-Hitler and force him to compromise with Britain and France. Therefore, the negotiations started in
Moscow in May 1939, dragged on for so long and in the end ended unsuccessfully. Specifically, the negotiations ran into certain difficulties, namely, Great Britain and France demanded that the USSR participate in treaties that provided for the immediate entry into the war of the Soviet Union in the event of aggression against these two countries and did not at all imply their mandatory assistance in the event of an attack on the allies of the USSR - the Baltic states . And this despite the fact that Chamberlain, in his speech on June 8, admitted that "the demands of the Russians that these states be included in the tripartite guarantee are well founded." Further, it was strange that Poland, which could be the direct object of German aggression and whose security guarantees were discussed during the negotiations, itself stubbornly refused to participate in these negotiations, and the governments of Chamberlain and Daladier did nothing to get her to them attract.
The position of the USSR during the negotiations in Moscow was determined and recorded in the speech of V.M. Molotov at the Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
May 31, 1939. These terms remained unchanged throughout the negotiation process and were as follows: “The conclusion between
Britain, France and the USSR an effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression, which is exclusively defensive in nature; guarantee from
England, France and the USSR of the states of Central and Eastern Europe, including without exception all the European countries bordering the USSR, from an attack by an aggressor; conclusion of a specific agreement between England,
France and the USSR on the forms and amounts of immediate and effective assistance rendered to each other and to guaranteed states in the event of an attack by an aggressor.
In the second stage of the negotiations, Chamberlain and Daladier were forced to make concessions and agree to a guarantee against Hitler's possible aggression against the Baltic countries. However, in making this concession, they agreed only to a guarantee against direct aggression, i.e. Germany's direct armed attack on the Baltic countries, while at the same time refusing any guarantees in the event of the so-called "indirect aggression", that is, a pro-Hitler coup, as a result of which the actual capture of the Baltic countries by "peaceful" means could take place.
It should be noted that while during the negotiations with Hitler in 1938 Chamberlain traveled to Germany three times, negotiations in Moscow on the part of England and France were entrusted only to the respective ambassadors. This could not but affect the nature of the negotiations, as well as their pace. This suggests that the British and French did not want an agreement with the USSR based on the principle of equality and reciprocity, that is, the entire burden of obligations was formed on the USSR.
When, during the last stage of the negotiations, at the suggestion of the Soviet side, special negotiations were launched in parallel on the question of a military convention between the three states, then on the part of England and France they were entrusted to military representatives of little authority, who either did not have mandates to sign a military convention at all. or their mandates were manifestly inadequate.
All these and a number of other circumstances led to the fact that the negotiations in
In Moscow in the spring and summer of 1939 - the last attempt to create a system that would guarantee European countries from the aggression of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy - ended in failure.
Thus, the period 1933–1938. passed under the sign of aspiration
the Soviet Union to implement a system of collective security as a whole or for individual elements in order to prevent the outbreak of war.
The appeasement policy of the fascist government of the aggressor countries, pursued by the governments of England and France, their fears and unwillingness to reach an agreement with a country based on a fundamentally different system of government, an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust led to the failure of plans to create a collective security system in
Europe. As a result, fascist Germany, together with its allies, plunged the world into a terrible and devastating World War II.
In general, the proposals for the creation of a collective security system were a significant contribution to the development of theory and to the establishment in practice of the principles of peaceful coexistence, because the very essence of collective security is conditioned and determined by the principles of peaceful coexistence, involves the collective cooperation of states with different social systems in the name of preventing war and the preservation of the world.
The development and adoption of joint collective measures to ensure security turned out to be a much deeper and more complex element of peaceful coexistence than the establishment of diplomatic relations between countries with different social systems and even the development of trade and economic ties between them.
Bibliography.
1. Foreign policy of the USSR, collection of documents, M, 1946, vols. 3-4
2. Chubaryan A.O. Peaceful coexistence: theory and practice, M, 1976
-----------------------
Foreign policy of the USSR, collection of documents. People's Statement
Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov to the representatives of the press in Berlin, vol. 3, p. 504
Foreign policy of the USSR, collection of documents. Definition of an attacker, draft declaration, vol. 3, p. 582
Foreign policy of Russia, a collection of documents. Litvinov's conversation with a French journalist on the issue of regional pacts, vol. 3, p. 722
There. Exchange of memorandums with Germany on the guarantee of the borders of the Baltic States, v.3, p. 709
Foreign policy of the USSR, collection of documents. Franco-Soviet agreement signed in Geneva, vol. 3, p. 761
Foreign policy of the USSR, collection of documents. Soviet-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance, vol. 4, pp. 30-31
M. Litvinov. Foreign policy of the USSR, p. 382.
Foreign policy of the USSR, collection of documents. Speech by M.M. Litvinov at the plenum of the League of Nations, vol. 4, p. 60
There. Munich Agreement, vol. 4, pp. 593-594
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Growing military danger in the world (1933-1939)
In December 1933, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution on the development of the struggle for collective security. It determined the main direction of the foreign policy activity of the USSR on the eve of the Second World War. The government of the USSR saw the real way to ensure peace in the creation of regional pacts of mutual assistance. It declared its readiness to take part in such a pact with the broad involvement of European states. In 1933, the USSR put forward a proposal for a legal definition of the aggressor, which would create grounds for legal sanctions, and in September 1943 the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations.
The idea of collective security was embodied in the Eastern Pact project initiated by French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou. L. Bartu actively supported the admission of the USSR to the League of Nations, used all his influence to speed up the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Czechoslovakia, Romania, and overcome anti-Soviet speeches in Yugoslavia.
As envisaged, the pact participants, in addition to the USSR and France, were to become the states of Central and Eastern Europe - Poland, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland. In addition, it was decided to invite Germany to join the pact. In this case, it would inevitably find itself in line with the Soviet-French policy. The project assumed, firstly, a regional agreement on the guarantee of borders and mutual assistance between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (“Eastern Locarno”) and, secondly, a separate Soviet-French pact on mutual assistance against aggression. The Soviet Union became the guarantor of the Locarno Agreement (October 1925), and France - the mentioned regional agreement.
However, after the assassination of L. Barthou in October 1934, the position of French diplomacy becomes more moderate. 1 On December 5, 1934, the Franco-Soviet Accords were signed, whereby both countries refused to take further steps to prepare a regional Eastern European guarantee treaty. It was partially replaced by an agreement signed in May 1935 on mutual assistance between France and the USSR in the event of an attack by any third party. However, the treaty was not supplemented by a military convention.
In the face of the growing threat from Germany, the countries of South-Eastern Europe also tried to consolidate their forces. With the support of France and Great Britain, on February 9, 1934, an agreement was signed in Africa between four Balkan countries - Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia. The Balkan Pact obligated the countries that signed it to jointly protect their intra-Balkan borders and coordinate their foreign policy.
1. Louis Barthou was killed in Marseille on October 9, 1934 during a meeting between the Yugoslav king Alexander the Great and Croatian nationalists. King Alexander was also killed.
Of the Balkan countries, the pact was not signed, under the influence of Germany and Italy, Bulgaria and Albania.
The created Balkan Entente supplemented the Little Entente, an organization that had existed since April 1921 and united Czechoslovakia, Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.
Change in the tactics of the Comintern. With the transition of the Soviet government to the tactics of cooperation with all anti-fascist forces, the policy of the Comintern and the RSI (Workers' Socialist International) also changes. Back in the 1920s, the leadership of the Communist International made a major strategic mistake when they concluded that after the economic upsurge, the time for a world socialist revolution would come. From this error followed a tactical error. In preparation for the world revolution, the leaders of the Comintern (Stalin, Zinoviev, Bukharin) saw their main enemy in the Social Democrats, who allegedly divert the attention of the working people from the revolution. At the 6th Congress of the Comintern (1928), the "class against class" tactic was adopted, which involved the refusal of the communists to cooperate with other parties, both left and right.
In the 1920s, the communist parties launched an active struggle against the social democrats, calling them social fascists. In response, the RSI called the communists a leftist form of fascism and forbade the social democratic parties to cooperate with the communists.
After the Nazis came to power in Germany, the Cominterns and the RSI realized the need to change their tactics. In October 1934, the leadership of the RSI allowed the Social Democratic parties to cooperate with the communists. A turn in the position of the Comintern took place at its 7th Congress in August 1935. At this Congress, the Communists stopped calling the Social Democrats “Social Fascists” and called the main task the struggle for democracy, and not the victory of the world revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
This turn in the positions of the Comintern and the RSI allowed the creation of popular fronts in France and Spain, and in 1937 the union of communist and social democratic trade unions took place. However, the RSI leadership rejected all calls for CI to unite.
This position of the leadership of the RSI was largely due to the actions of Stalin, who after the death of Lenin became the de facto leader of the CI. For Stalin, the decisions of the 7th Congress of the Comintern meant a personal defeat, since they, in fact, recognized that the leadership of the CI in the 1920s pursued an erroneous course. That is why Stalin was not going to implement the decisions of the 7th Congress. In the 1930s, many prominent figures of the CI who lived in the USSR were repressed. In 1938-39. Under pressure from Stalin, the CI dissolved the Communist Parties of Latvia, Poland, Western Belorussia, and Western Ukraine.
The signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact in 1939 was regarded by the Social Democrats as a conspiracy between the communists and the fascists. Relations between the RSI and CI became tense again. On the eve of the war, it was again not possible to achieve unity of the labor movement.
Aggravation of the international situation in the mid-1930s. Regarding the creation of the Balkan Entente, the European press expressed doubts that the new treaty would contribute to general appeasement. These fears were justified. In July 1934, the Austrian Nazis attempted an armed coup. Dressed in the uniform of the federal army and police, the putschists entered the residence of the federal chancellor and seized the building of the radio station. They announced on the radio the alleged resignation of Chancellor Dollfuss, which became a signal for a revolt in other cities of the country. The putschists acted under the slogan of the annexation of Austria to Germany.
Dollfuss was badly wounded and died by the end of the day. The coup attempt was liquidated everywhere within two or three days. And only the tough actions of Mussolini, who gave the order to send four divisions to the borders of Austria, forced Hitler then to abandon direct aggression.
It should be noted that the relations of the fascist regimes in Italy and Austria with Nazi Germany were initially very tense. The reason for this was the ideological differences between National Socialism and fascism, and the negative reaction of Austria and Italy to the possibility of the Anschluss, which Hitler demanded. It was the drastic measures of Italy, more than the diplomatic measures of Great Britain and France, that forced the Nazis to temporarily suspend pressure on Australia.
On March 1, 1935, as a result of a plebiscite, the Samara region again became part of Germany. Having returned the Samara region, Nazi Germany strengthened its position in the international arena (since 1929, the Saar was under the control of the League of Nations).
The solemn action of the transition of the Saar under the jurisdiction of Germany took place in the presence of Hitler. The decision to change the status was made on January 13, 1935 during a plebiscite. 91% of the population of the Saar was in favor of joining Germany. Taking advantage of the nationalist sentiments that prevailed in the country, Hitler announced the introduction of universal military service, which was contrary to the main provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty.
All this caused especially great alarm in French diplomacy and the tightening of its position on the German question. On the initiative of France and with the full support of Italy, on April 11, 1935, an international conference on the German question opened in the Italian city of Stresa. Its participants condemned the unilateral violation of the Treaty of Versailles. Despite the fact that the adopted resolutions were of a very general nature, the political significance of the conference was exceptionally great. France demonstrated at it its readiness to move away from the unconditional pursuit of the course of appeasement and join the tough position of Italy.
But the prospects for a Franco-Italian alliance alarmed British diplomacy. Following the traditional policy of "balance of power", London in June 1935 goes to the signing of a sensational Anglo-German treaty on naval armaments. According to him, a ratio of 100:35 was introduced between the navies of Great Britain and Germany (with equality in submarines). British politicians considered the conclusion of this agreement as an important step towards further limiting naval armaments and a timely addition to similar articles of the "Treaty of Five" of the Washington Conference. However, in practice, Nazi Germany received the right to unhindered expansion of naval construction, since the difference in the level of naval armaments made it possible to provide work for all the Reik shipyards for ten years, without violating the “letter of the contract”.
Immediately after coming to power, Hitler's government began the economic transformation of those sectors of the economy that produced weapons. The economic policy of the National Socialists was primarily aimed at the development of "national" weapons.
In September 1936, the government announced the introduction of a 4-year plan. It was assumed that during this period German industry would achieve independence in the provision of raw materials. At the same time, weapons production will be modernized. Hitler's remarks to the plan stated: “We are overpopulated and therefore cannot feed ourselves on our own territory. The final solution to this problem is connected with the expansion of living space, that is, the raw material and food base for the existence of our people ... For this, I have set the following tasks: 1. The German army will have to become combat-ready in 4 years. 2. The German economy must ensure the possibility of waging war in 4 years.
As can be seen, the Anglo-German agreement was fully in line with Hitler's plan for economic development.
The perniciousness of the British strategy became obvious in the near future, when the strategic alliance of Italy and Germany was formed. The reason for this unexpected turn was the Italian aggression in Abyssinia (Ethiopia), which Italy unsuccessfully tried to conquer in 1896, since the African continent was already mostly “divided”, independent Abyssinia remained the only possible object of expansion.
On October 3, 1935, a six hundred thousandth Italian army invaded Ethiopia. The company against the weak Ethiopian army turned out to be fleeting and victorious. On October 7, the Council of the League of Nations recognized Italy as an aggressor and imposed economic sanctions against it. But these sanctions did not affect the outcome of the case. On May 5, 1936, Italian troops entered Addis Ababa, the capital of Abyssinia, and in July the League of Nations stopped the application of sanctions, believing that they would not be effective without military measures.
Taking advantage of the tension between the leaders of the League of Nations and Italy, the German Wehrmacht occupied the demilitarized Rhineland on March 7, 1936. Hitler violated not only the Treaty of Versailles, but also trampled on Germany's obligations under the Locarno Accords. As Hitler later admitted, this was a pure adventure, since at that time Germany had neither the strength nor the means to resist a possible response from, first of all, France. But neither France nor the League of Nations even condemned this step, only stating the fact of violation of the Treaty of Versailles.
At the same time, Italy, being in diplomatic isolation, was forced to seek support from its former enemy. In July 1936, Austria signed an agreement with Germany under which it actually committed itself to follow German policy. Italy, under an agreement with Germany, pledged not to interfere in German-Austrian relations.
Then, in July 1936, a fascist military rebellion broke out in Spain, led by General Franco. From August 1936, first Germany and then Italy began to provide military assistance to Franco: in 3 years, 300 thousand Italian and German soldiers and officers were sent to Spain.
In August 1936, at the suggestion of French Socialist Prime Minister Léon Blum, a Non-Intervention Committee was set up in London.
Formation of hotbeds of a new world war. Gradually, Germany and Italy began to move closer to each other. In October 1936, an Italo-German protocol was signed, according to which Germany recognized the capture of Ethiopia by Italy. Both sides recognized the Franco government and agreed to adhere to a common line of conduct in the Non-Intervention Committee. This protocol formalized the Berlin-Rome Axis.
On November 25, 1936, Germany and Japan signed the so-called "Anti-Comintern Pact" for a period of 5 years. The parties pledged to jointly fight against the Comintern and invited third countries to join the pact. On November 6, 1937, Italy joined the pact, and in December it withdrew from the League of Nations. An aggressive bloc Berlin-Rome-Tokyo was formed, which opposed itself to the League of Nations and the entire established international legal order. In the next two years, Hungary, Manchukuo, Bulgaria, Romania, and others joined the pact. In May 1939, Germany and Italy signed an agreement on a military-political alliance (“Pact of Steel”). This agreement contained the obligations of the parties on mutual assistance and alliance in the event of hostilities.
The policy of appeasing the fascist aggressors. The actions of Japan and Germany led to the collapse of the Versailles-Washington system, as its main treaties were violated. However, England, France and the United States did not take any retaliatory steps, although they had every opportunity to stop the aggressive countries. In the leadership of the United States, a group of isolationists occupied a strong position, believing that the United States should concentrate all its attention on the American continent and not interfere in the situation in other regions of the planet. The governments of England and France did not want to start a war with Germany, because. they were afraid that the population of their countries would not support such a war. Therefore, the governments of Britain and France chose a policy of "appeasement" towards the aggressors, which involved partial concessions to the aggressors in the hope of preventing a new world war. The governments of England and France hoped that Germany and Italy would calm down after the elimination of those provisions of the Versailles system that caused their discontent. Lord Lothian's article in the London "Secret" of February 1, 1935 became a kind of manifesto for the policy of "appeasement". He wrote: "Germany wants equality, not war; it is ready to absolutely renounce war; she signed a treaty with Poland,* which removes from the sphere of war for 10 years the most painful element of the Treaty of Versailles - the Corridor; she finally and forever recognizes the incorporation of Alsace-Lorraine into France, and finally (this is the most important) she is ready to pledge that she will not interfere by force in the affairs of her beloved Austria, provided that all her neighbors do the same. He (Hitler) goes even further and says that he is ready to sign non-aggression pacts with all Germany's neighbors to prove the sincerity of his desire for peace, and in the field of armaments he does not demand anything but "equality of rights", and he agrees to accept international control, if this other parties to the treaty will follow.
I have not the slightest doubt that this position is sincere. Germany does not want war...
Documents from the secret archives of Berlin and Roim show how quickly the intentional inaction of the Western powers gave rise to a sense of complete impunity among the aggressors, how disastrous was the refusal of England and France to use the League of Nations as an instrument to counter aggression. Interesting in this connection is the recording of Mussolini's conversation with Garing, who visited Rome in January 1937 in order to demonstrate the strength of the newly created "axis". Among other problems, the interlocutors also touched upon Spanish. Answering Goering's question about the possible reaction of the Western powers, Mussolini expressed his conviction that there was no danger from this side: “There is no ... reason for concern,” he said, “since there is no reason for the mechanism created by the League, which in three cases it was inactive,* suddenly came into action for the fourth time .... The English conservatives are very afraid of Bolshevism, and this fear can very well be used for political purposes.
Goering shared this point of view: “Conservative circles (England. - Auth.), True, are very concerned about the power of Germany, but most of all they are afraid of Bolshevism, and this makes it possible to consider them almost completely ready for cooperation with Germany.”
And this was fully taken into account by Hitler, who called the USSR the main enemy, quite successfully influenced the position of England and France. Already at the beginning of 1938 it was clear that Europe was on the verge of war. Hitlerite Germany mobilized and kept its entire military apparatus in combat readiness. From the leadership of the German army, all persons who showed indecision or dissatisfaction with the course pursued by Hitler were removed. Field Marshal von Blomberg was forced to resign. General Keitel was appointed in his place. Gerang was elevated to the rank of Field Marshal. Hitler himself declared himself supreme commander of the German armed forces.
- this refers to the German-Polish declaration of 1934 on the non-use of force (also known as the non-aggression pact) signed on January 26, 1934 in Berlin; concluded for 10 years.
- Obviously, this refers to the aggression of Japan in Northeast China, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the remilitarization of the Rhineland by Germany.
On February 20, 1938, Hitler delivered a threatening speech to the Reichstag. He declared that Germany could not remain indifferent to the fate of the 10 million Germans living in two neighboring countries and that she would strive for the unification of the entire German people. It was clear that we were talking about Austria and Czechoslovakia.
On March 12, 1938, Germany, with the support of the Austrian fascists, carried out the Anschluss (annexation) of Austria under the pretext of the reunification of the two German states. Since the feudal chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg refused to hold a referendum on the independence of Austria, Germany on March 11 demanded his resignation in an ultimatum form. The Austrian Minister of the Interior Seyss-Inquart formed the National Socialist government.
After the Anschluss, the persecution of Jews and political opponents of Nazism began.
Hitler's next step was to demand that Czechoslovakia transfer the Judicial Region, where many Germans lived. The Sudetenland operated in the Sudetenland - the German party, which demanded that the Sudeten Germans be granted national autonomy, freedom of the "German worldview" (more precisely, Nazism), the "reconstruction" of the Czechoslovak state and a change in its foreign policy.
Czechoslovakia had a developed military industry and a strong army, and since 1935 it had mutual assistance treaties with France and the USSR. All this allowed Czechoslovakia to repulse Germany, especially since Germany did not yet have the strength to start a war.
However, at this decisive moment, the governments of England and France decided to follow a policy of "appeasement". On September 26, Hitler issued an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia demanding that the Sudetenland be handed over to Germany. In September-October 1938, a conference of the leaders of England, France, Germany and Italy was held in Munich. At it, the leaders of England and France (Chamberlain and Daladier) in fact, in an ultimatum form, demanded that Czechoslovakia meet Hitler's demands. In return, Hitler promised to respect Germany's new borders. It is noteworthy that no one asked the opinion of Czechoslovakia itself. Moreover, its representative was not even invited to the conference.
The USSR offered military assistance to Czechoslovakia without the participation of France (which was stipulated by the 1935 treaty) and even concentrated military forces in Ukraine. But the Czechoslovak government refused this assistance, fearing that the USSR would occupy the country. As a result, Czechoslovakia obeyed the Munich decisions.
However, having received the Sudetenland, Hitler did not stop there. On March 15, 1939, Germany occupied the entire territory of Czechoslovakia, using as a pretext the intensification of separatist movements in Czechoslovakia and the introduction of martial law in Slovakia. The Czech Republic was annexed to Germany, and in Slovakia the Germans created a Puppet State. Between Germany and Slovakia, a so-called security contract was concluded, according to which Germany took over the protection of the internal order and territorial integration of Slovakia for 20 years.
In March 1939, Germany demanded that Poland hand over the city of Gdansk to it and provide railways and roads for communication with it. Then Germany annulled the non-aggression pact with Poland, signed in 1934. Hitler also demanded that England and France return her colonies to Germany.
March 23, 1939 German troops invaded the area of Slaipeda (Lithuania). Standing on the deck of the battleship Germania, Hitler announced the annexation of Klaipeda to Germany.
Following Germany, Italy stepped up. April 7, 1939 she came to Albania and quickly captured it. The Albanian king Ahmed Zogu emigrated. The National Assembly approved on 12 April the union with Italy. After that, Mussolini put forward territorial claims to France.
In Asia, Japan attacked China in 1937 and by the end of 1938 captured its coastal part. In the summer of 1938, Japanese troops attacked the territory of the USSR in the area of Lake Khasan with the aim of capturing the USSR to stop aid to China. The fighting lasted about a month and ended with the defeat of the Japanese troops. In May 1939, Japanese troops began military operations against Mongolia in the region of the Khalkin-Gol River. Soviet troops came to the aid of Mongolia, who in August 1939 defeated the Japanese and drove them back from the territory of Mongolia.
Seeing that the policy of "appeasement" had failed, the governments of England and France changed their strategy. They set out to create a system of collective security in Europe in order to form an anti-German coalition and stop German aggression. This was the second attempt to create such a system. The first was undertaken by the USSR and France in 1934-1935. in the form of the idea of creating a multilateral mutual assistance treaty (Eastern Pact). But then Germany managed to thwart the conclusion of such an agreement.
In March 1939, Britain and France provided security and independence guarantees to Poland. On April 19 they were extended to Romania and Greece, and in May-June 1939 they signed mutual assistance treaties with Turkey.
In March 1939, Britain and France proposed to the Soviet Union that they sign a joint declaration by the governments of Britain, France, the USSR, and Poland against aggression and provide for the obligations of consultation between these countries in it. The USSR government replied that "such a declaration does not resolve the issue." However, it did not object to the declaration either.
On March 23, 1939, Britain and France began negotiations with the USSR on the creation of an alliance against Germany. These negotiations proceeded slowly, as both sides did not trust each other. England and France doubted the combat effectiveness of the Red Army, weakened by repressions against the commanding staff, and sought, first of all, to frighten Hitler by the very fact of negotiations. That is why Britain and France were in no hurry to conclude a military agreement with the USSR, although the Soviet Union made specific proposals on this issue. Negotiations on the part of England and France took place only at the level of ambassadors, and not at the level of heads of government or diplomatic departments. The task of the Western powers in these negotiations was to prevent Russia from establishing any ties with Germany. Moreover, since June 1939 Britain itself has been conducting secret negotiations with Germany.
For his part, Stalin was suspicious of England and France, believing that they wanted to draw the USSR into a war with Germany and at the same time remain on the sidelines.
The refusal of England and France to conclude a military agreement with the USSR led to Stalin's reorientation towards concluding an agreement with Germany. This was taken into account by Hitler, who offered Moscow to conclude a non-aggression pact. On August 21, 1939, the USSR stopped negotiations with Britain and France and on August 23, 1939 signed a non-aggression pact with Germany for a period of 10 years. This document, known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, was signed in Moscow by the heads of the foreign ministries of the two countries. The extremely important secret protocol to the treaty became known only after the end of the war.
The Soviet-German pact concluded for a period of 10 years included the following points:
Refusal of mutual violence
Observance of neutrality in the event of the participation of one of the parties in the war, subject to the aggressive nature of the war.
The secret annex demarcated the spheres of interest of the two countries in Eastern Europe: Finland, Latvia, Bessarabia and Poland east of the rivers Narva, Vistula and San fell into the Soviet sphere of influence, the territory to the west of this line was declared a sphere of German interests.
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact meant a political death sentence for Poland. It became the final chord in Hitler's preparations for the war with Poland, which began on September 1, 1939. The signing of this treaty ended Stalin's long-term efforts to expand communist influence in the Balkans and the Baltic states. Hitler managed to win the diplomatic duel with the Western powers on Stalin's political sympathies at the last moment. During 1939, after the capture of the Czech Republic and the annexation of Klaipeda, France and Great Britain negotiated with Stalin for a mutual support pact against Nazi Germany. At the same time, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had in mind Soviet guarantees for Poland, similar to those declared by Great Britain already on March 31. Stalin insisted on signing an agreement on mutual support, which would include the problem of the Baltic countries and Finland. However, these countries, fearing communist influence, rejected Stalin's proposal. Poland overestimated its own strength and, fearing to lose its independence, also refused to sign the Soviet version of the treaty. She counted on the military and political support of Western states. Mutual distrust and protracted negotiations made it impossible to sign political and military agreements between the USSR, Great Britain and France. Hitler took advantage of this and achieved the conclusion of an agreement with the USSR, freeing his hands to start a war against Poland.
Chamberlain reacted strongly to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Two days after its signing (August 25), Great Britain concluded an agreement with Poland on mutual assistance in case of war. Disheartened by the British decisive move, Hitler was forced to postpone his planned attack on Poland from August 26 to September 1, 1939.
Hitler's expansionist policy led to the fact that the results of the Munich Agreement turned out to be zero.
The 1939 pact was a serious mistake in Soviet diplomacy. It undermined the international prestige of the USSR and led to the aggravation of relations between the USSR and Western countries. But most importantly, the 1939 pact hastened the start of the Second World War, because. saved Germany from the threat of war on two fronts.
After the end of the First World War, the issues of peaceful coexistence worried many countries, primarily the European powers, which suffered incalculable victims and losses as a result of the war. In order to prevent the threat of a new similar war and create a system of international law that regulates relations between states on
on a fundamentally different level than it was before, and the first international organization in the history of Europe, the League of Nations, was created.
In the early 1930s The USSR was not a member of the League and had no reason to trust the objectivity of the Council of the League in the event of this or that conflict between the USSR and any other country. Proceeding from these considerations, already during this period the Soviet Union put forward proposals to a number of European states for the conclusion of non-aggression pacts, with the aim of
"strengthening the cause of peace and relations between countries" in the conditions of "the deep world crisis now being experienced."
For the first time, the Soviet delegation raised the issue of the need to conclude a special convention to determine the attacking side at the disarmament conference in December 1932. On February 6, 1933, the Soviet draft convention was formally submitted to the Conference Bureau.
However, at this time there is an increasing destabilization of the situation and the growth of aggressive tendencies in international relations. It takes very little time for totalitarian fascist regimes to be established in Italy and Germany. Under these conditions, the topic of creating a new system of international security, which could prevent the already quite real threat of war, acquires particular relevance.
For the first time, a proposal on the need to fight for collective security was put forward in a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in December 1933. The collective security project was based on the equality of all participants in the proposed regional agreement and on universalism, which consisted in the fact that the system being created included all the states of the covered region without exception. The parties to the pact were to enjoy equal rights and guarantees, while rejecting the idea of any opposition of some countries to others, the exclusion of anyone from the collective security system, or the receipt by any of the participating countries of advantages over other states at their expense.
Thus, the period 1933–1938. passed under the sign of the desire of the Soviet Union to implement a collective security system as a whole or for individual elements in order to prevent the outbreak of war.
The appeasement policy of the fascist government of the aggressor countries, pursued by the governments of England and France, their fears and unwillingness to reach an agreement with a country based on a fundamentally different system of government, an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust led to the failure of plans to create a collective security system in Europe. As a result, fascist Germany, together with its allies, plunged the world into a terrible and devastating World War II.
In general, the proposals for the creation of a collective security system were a significant contribution to the development of theory and to the establishment in practice of the principles of peaceful coexistence, because the very essence of collective security is conditioned and determined by the principles of peaceful coexistence, involves the collective cooperation of states with different social systems in the name of preventing war and the preservation of the world.
The development and adoption of joint collective measures to ensure security turned out to be a much deeper and more complex element of peaceful coexistence than the establishment of diplomatic relations between countries with different social systems and even the development of trade and economic ties between them.
20. The main stages in the formation of a bloc of aggressive states. Axis "Berlin-Rome-Tokyo".
Francoist support was the first instance of Italian partnership with Germany. It helped bring them closer. However, complete reconciliation was not possible apart from a compromise on the question of Austria. The situation was made easier when, in July 1936, Germany and Austria signed a treaty under which Berlin promised to respect Austrian sovereignty and the Austrian government confirmed that Austria recognized itself as a German state. The Italian government expressed satisfaction with the found formula. The German-Austrian agreement removed an important obstacle to the Italo-German rapprochement.
Two days after the USSR refused to comply with the arms embargo against the Madrid government, on October 25, 1936, Mussolini's son-in-law, Count Galeazzo Ciano, who had just been appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, arrived in Berlin. On the same day, a German-Italian protocol of understanding was signed. Germany recognized the existing situation in Ethiopia, the parties agreed on the lines of demarcation of their economic interests in the Danube basin, and, most importantly, Germany and Italy agreed to draw an agreed line in the Spanish question - in fact, it was a agreed military intervention. The Berlin Protocol formalized the partnership between Germany and Italy without establishing a formal union between them. The Berlin-Rome Axis was created.
In November 1936, Italian and German military contingents began to arrive in Spain. These were not regular troops, but the so-called legionnaires. At the same time, international brigades were formed from among the volunteers of different nationalities who sympathized with him to assist the Madrid government, which also took part in the civil war.
In November 1936, Germany and Italy, and in December - Japan recognized the government of Franco (Spanish statesman). With the advent of Italian and German soldiers in Spain, the balance of power began to change in favor of the Francoists. Neither the USSR nor the Euro-Atlantic powers were prepared to take the risk of countering the Italo-German intervention by force. By the end of 1937, Franco had a clear military predominance. Republican forces continued to resist. But they were split. In Madrid, the situation was kept by the communists, who were helped by the USSR. In Barcelona and throughout Catalonia, the Francoists were held back by anarchists and Trotskyists, who themselves called for the overthrow of the government in Madrid. In March 1939, the anti-Franco forces suffered a final defeat in Spain. Dictatorship was restored in the country.
The countries of the Nazi bloc, the countries (powers) of the "axis", the Nazi coalition is an aggressive military alliance of Germany, Italy, Japan and other states, which was opposed during the Second World War by the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.
The Axis Union was originally based on the German-Japanese-Italian-Spanish Anti-Comintern Pact and the German-Italian Steel Pact, and fully took shape on September 27, 1940, when Germany, Italy and Japan signed the Tripartite Pact on the delimitation of zones of influence while establishing "new order" and mutual military assistance.
This is an alliance before the 2nd World War of fascist Italy with Nazi Germany, which was subsequently joined by militaristic Japan. It was created in opposition to the Soviet Comintern, which sought to destroy the capitalist countries from within through the subversive activities of the communist parties.
21. The development of German aggression in Europe and the policy of "appeasement" of Germany. Anschluss of Austria. Munich agreement and its consequences.
Germany began preparing for war immediately after Hitler came to power. The Hitler regime was created by the German monopoly circles with the full approval of the ruling camp of England, France and the United States.
It is known that the post-Versailles period was marked for Germany by a whole system of measures aimed at restoring German heavy industry, in particular, the German military-industrial potential. An enormous role in this matter was played by the so-called Dawes reparations plan for Germany, with the help of which the USA and Britain hoped to make German industry dependent on American and British monopolies. The Dawes Plan cleared the way for an increased influx and introduction of foreign, predominantly American, capital into German industry.
The first and most important prerequisite for Hitler's aggression was the revival and renewal of heavy industry and the military industry in Germany, which became possible only due to the direct and broad financial support of the ruling circles of the United States of America.
Another decisive circumstance that contributed to the unleashing of Hitler's aggression was the policy of the ruling circles of Britain and France, which is known as the policy of "appeasement" of Nazi Germany, the policy of renouncing collective security. It was precisely this policy of the Anglo-French ruling circles, which was expressed in the rejection of collective security, in the rejection of rebuffing German aggression, in indulging the aggressive demands of Nazi Germany, that led to the Second World War.
Soon after Hitler came to power, as a result of the efforts of the British and French Governments, in 1933, the "Pact of Accord and Cooperation" of the four powers - Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy - was signed in Rome. This pact signified the collusion of the British and French Governments with German and Italian fascism, which even then made no secret of its aggressive intentions. At the same time, this pact with the fascist states meant a rejection of the policy of strengthening the united front of the peace-loving powers against the aggressive states. By conspiring with Germany and Italy, bypassing the other powers - participants in the then ongoing disarmament conference, which discussed the Soviet proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact and a pact on determining the attacking side - Great Britain and France dealt a blow to the cause of ensuring the peace and security of peoples.
Following that, in 1934, England and France helped Hitler to use the hostile position of the allied panorama of Poland against the USSR, as a result of which the German-Polish non-aggression pact was concluded, which was one of the most important stages in the preparation of German aggression. Hitler needed this pact in order to upset the ranks of the supporters of collective security and to show by this example that Europe does not need collective security, but bilateral agreements. This made it possible for German aggression to decide for itself with whom and when to conclude an agreement, against whom and when to attack. There is no doubt that the German-Polish pact was the first serious breach in the building of collective security.
Emboldened, Hitler took a number of measures to openly restore the armed forces of Germany, which did not cause any opposition from the British and French rulers.
The Soviet Union did everything possible to block the path of the fascist aggressors. The Soviet Union acted as the initiator and champion of collective security.
Anschluss (German Anschluss (inf.) - accession, union) - the inclusion of Austria into Germany, which took place on March 12-13, 1938. The independence of Austria was restored in April 1945, after its occupation by the Allied forces during the Second World War, and legalized by the State Treaty of 1955, prohibiting the Anschluss.
Hitler decided to act. He started in Austria. Ethnically and culturally close to Germany, independent Austria seemed to the Fuhrer, who was born and spent his youth there, an integral part of Greater Germany. The Nazi movement flourished in Austria, and this guaranteed the ease of transferring the German order to Austrian soil. Already in the secret annex to the German-Austrian agreement of July 11, 1936, the Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg agreed to concessions to the Nazi movement in Austria, although formally Germany pledged not to interfere in the affairs of Austria.
Hitler demanded that Schuschnigg immediately sign a new agreement with Germany. Schuschnigg's two-page document instructed Austria to lift the ban on the activities of the Austrian Nazi Party, grant amnesty to imprisoned Nazis (who were in large part arrested for terrorist activities), appoint Seyss-Inquart, one of the Austrian Nazi leaders, as Minister of the Interior, and another Nazi, Gleiss-Horstenau, Minister of War. It was not an agreement, but an ultimatum, and, in fact, it meant the Nazisification of Austria and its imminent and imminent absorption by the Reich.
Under pressure from Hitler, Ribbentrop, and the German ambassador to Vienna, Franz von Papen, Schuschnigg surrendered. He made only one reservation: according to the Austrian constitution, only the president of the republic could approve such an agreement. Hitler, pretending that his patience had run out, flung open the doors and shouted: "General Keitel!" (Wilhelm Keitel was the chief of the general staff of the German troops). Winking at Keitel and leaving Schuschnigg, who suspected that he was about to be shot, for thirty minutes, Hitler again called on the Austrian chancellor and said that he was ready for the only concession - to delay the execution of the "agreement" for three days. Austria's death warrant was signed.
This was followed by "four weeks of agony" lasting until March 11, during which the Nazis prepared for the Anschluss with little effort from the Austrian Social Democrats to resist it. On March 11, under the threat of a German military invasion, Schuschnigg resigned. Berlin (the operation was led by Hermann Goering) presented an ultimatum to Austrian President Miklas: appoint Seyss-Inquart chancellor or German troops would enter Austria. Seyss-Inquart, the "head of the provisional government" of Austria, under dictation from Berlin, sent a desperate telegram to Berlin with a request to send German troops to Austria to prevent bloodshed. Already on March 12, Hitler was in Austrian Linz (where he spent his school years), and on March 13, 1938, he signed a document on the complete Anschluss of Austria. Austria became a "province of the German Reich".
Munich agreement. From the spring of 1938, the Nazis launched a campaign of unprecedented blackmail and provocation against Czechoslovakia, demanding the transfer of the original Czech lands to Germany. The ruling circles of the West “went open with the Nazis, they decided to betray Czechoslovakia in the interests of unleashing a war between Germany and the USSR. Under these conditions, only aid from the East could save Czechoslovakia. But the Czech bourgeoisie committed an unheard-of national betrayal: on December 16, 1937, President Beneš assured the German envoy in Prague that the mutual assistance treaty with the USSR was “a product of a bygone era, but it cannot be thrown into the wastebasket so easily.”
Meanwhile, the Soviet government during this critical period for Czechoslovakia firmly declared its readiness to come to its aid.
All international reaction did not want a war in defense of Czechoslovakia, in which the Soviet Union would inevitably take part. According to N. Chamberlain's trusted adviser, G. Wilson, “only Bolshevism would profit from this. This should be prevented. It is necessary to recognize the right of the Germans to expand to the South-East.
On September 29 - 30, 1938, a meeting of the heads of governments of England, France, Germany and Italy was held in Munich, convened with the active support of the United States. Representatives of Czechoslovakia and the USSR were excluded from participation in the meeting. It decided the fate of Czechoslovakia. The Sudetenland was transferred to Germany within ten days, in the near future some areas were captured by Poland and Hungary.
On September 30, a declaration of mutual non-aggression was signed between Britain and Germany; a similar declaration by Germany and France was signed a little later.
22. Political crisis in Europe in 1939. Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations and the reasons for their failure. The development of the international situation in Europe at the end of the 1930s led inexorably to a new armed clash between the great powers. By the end of 1938, the Versailles system in Europe practically ceased to exist, and the Munich Agreement significantly strengthened Germany. Under these conditions, the German leadership set itself a new foreign policy goal - to achieve hegemony in Europe, securing the role of a great world power. As a result of the aggressive actions of Germany and Italy in March-April 1939, a pre-war political crisis began in Europe - a period of direct alignment of military-political forces in anticipation of a probable war.
Although the Munich Agreement created a new political environment in Europe, it was seen by all the great powers as the next stage in their relationship. Situation in autumn 1938 - summer 1939 in Europe was a tangled tangle of diplomatic activities of the great powers, each of which sought to achieve its own goals.
Germany did not yet set as its goal a war with the USSR, but, preparing for the capture of Czechoslovakia, was interested in the neutralization of Poland and the non-intervention of England and France. To this end, Germany proposed to Poland to settle the problems of Danzig and the "Polish Corridor" on the basis of cooperation within the framework of the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Polish leadership agreed to certain concessions on the issue of Danzig only in exchange for Germany's retaliatory steps. The intransigence of Poland led to the fact that the German leadership began to lean towards the idea of the need for a military solution to the Polish problem under certain conditions.
Anglo-German and Franco-German relations were somewhat overshadowed by the November pogroms in Germany and the rumors that appeared in January 1939 about the preparation of a German attack on Holland. All this forced Britain and France to coordinate their policies, speed up the modernization of their armed forces, maintain contacts with the USSR and at the same time seek a comprehensive agreement with Germany in the spirit of Munich.
Since the autumn of 1938, the German leadership began to gradually seek the normalization of relations with the USSR. On December 19, 1938, without any delay, it was extended for 1939. Soviet-German trade agreement.
In mid-March 1939, the USA, the USSR, England and France had information about Germany's preparations for the occupation of Czecho-Slovakia, but the powers - guarantors of the Munich Agreement did not provide for any countermeasures. In addition, formally, the Munich guarantees of the Czechoslovak borders were not violated by Germany's actions. On March 14, Slovakia, under pressure from Germany, declared independence, and the president of Czechoslovakia left for Berlin, where, in the course of "negotiations," he agreed to the political reorganization of his country. On March 15, German troops entered the Czech Republic, on whose territory the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was created. Initially, the reaction of England and France was rather restrained, but as public opinion aroused, London and Paris toughened their position and on March 18, like the USSR, they protested the actions of Germany, and the British and French ambassadors were recalled from Berlin "for consultations".
On April 17, 1939, the Soviet government proposed to the Western powers that they conclude a tripartite mutual assistance treaty based on equality of obligations and a military convention.
This provided for the provision of assistance to the states located between the Baltic and Black Seas in the event of aggression against them. England, however, had no intention of concluding a mutual assistance pact and tried to enlist unilateral commitments from the USSR to Poland and Rumania. Only after Hitler and Mussolini signed the Steel Pact in May on a military-political alliance did tripartite negotiations begin in Moscow.
Negotiations progressed extremely slowly. England and France, having accepted the principle of mutual assistance in words, in fact did not want to observe the reciprocity of obligations. And although the text of the treaty was basically worked out by the end of July, the British government instructed its diplomats not to allow an agreement to be reached with Moscow. Proceeding from narrowly selfish considerations and distrust of Stalin's policy, it preferred to give Germany the opportunity to develop aggression in the East, and to put pressure on Germany through tripartite negotiations and at the same time hinder Soviet-German rapprochement. At the same time, from May 1939, England was conducting secret negotiations with Germany, probing the ground for a deal on the division of the world into spheres of influence and cooperation in the markets.
At the end of July, the Western powers accepted the Soviet proposal to start negotiations on military issues, but did not show promptness. Delegations were instructed to drag out negotiations. Only towards the end of their stay in Moscow did the English mission receive the authority to conduct them. Both delegations were not authorized to sign the military convention.
In an effort to achieve cooperation with Britain and France, the Soviet side put forward lethal proposals developed by the General Staff of the Red Army on the number of troops and weapons put up by the USSR, and on their participation in repelling aggression in Europe, taking into account three options for the possible development of military events. The British and French missions shied away from discussing specific issues and led the negotiations to an impasse. The Polish government rejected a proposal to allow Soviet troops to pass through its territory in the event of German aggression. England and France were unable to exert the necessary influence on Warsaw, devaluing the Moscow negotiations as a result.
The triple military alliance, if concluded in August 1939, could become a real barrier capable of preventing the German invasion of Poland and war in Europe. But that did not happen. The desire of the Western powers to resolve their contradictions with Germany at the expense of other countries, especially at the expense of the USSR, prevailed.
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