February Revolution. Literary and historical notes of a young technician What happened on March 3, 1917

A year will come, a black year for Russia,
When the kings crown will fall;
The mob will forget their former love for them,
And the food of many will be death and blood...

M.Yu. Lermontov

On March 2, 1917, Emperor Nicholas II Alexandrovich Romanov abdicated for himself and for his son Alexei in favor of his younger brother, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich. On March 3, Mikhail Aleksandrovich signed an act of non-acceptance of the throne, thereby confirming the legitimacy of the newly created Provisional Government. The rule of the Romanov dynasty, as well as the monarchy in Russia, was over. The country plunged into chaos.

For a hundred years in Russian historiography, as well as in the historiography of the Russian abroad, ambiguous assessments were given to the event that occurred on March 2, 1917.

Soviet historians diligently ignored the true circumstances of the last Romanov's abdication, as well as the personalities of the people who, one might say, took a direct part in deciding the fate of a vast country. And this is not surprising. According to the Marxist-Leninist view of the historical process, when one formation replaces another as a result of a revolution, the monarchy must withdraw itself, otherwise it will be swept away in righteous anger by the revolutionary masses. In this situation, it does not matter at all what, where, when and why the debunked monarch signed. His further fate was also hushed up or justified by the interests of the revolution.

Russian foreign historiography of a liberal persuasion, which shared the views of those who handed the emperor the act of abdication on March 2, 1917, also believed that the monarchy in Russia was doomed. The departure of the emperor was seen as a moment, of course, a positive one. Since such a monarch as Nicholas II could not change anything in the current situation, he only prevented the new "saviors" of Russia from saving her. The physical, even more violent removal of an emperor or a dynasty could give an extra trump card to the opposition. But the public discredit (from the rostrum of the State Duma) of a useless ruler with his subsequent self-denial looked quite decent.

Monarchist emigre historiography, on the contrary, considered the abdication of Nicholas II to be the very key moment when the political Rubicon was crossed between order and anarchy. Monarchists, of course, could not blame the tsar himself (otherwise they would not have been monarchists), and therefore brought down all their anger on the generals who betrayed Nicholas II and the liberal public.

The attitude of historiographers of all stripes to the personality and deeds of the last Russian emperor throughout the 20th century also constantly changed from complete rejection and contempt to exaltation, idealization and even canonization. In the 1990s, yesterday's Istpartists in numerous monographs began vying to praise the human qualities of the last Romanov, his devotion to duty, family, and Russia. It was proposed to consider the fact of the martyrdom of Nicholas II and his entire family at the hands of the Bolsheviks as an atonement for the fatal miscalculations and mediocre policy that brought the country to a revolution and a bloody civil war.

Thus, in the view of living people, Nicholas II appears as a kind of meek, frightened martyr who, during his 23-year reign, made a number of irreparable mistakes, both in foreign and domestic policy. Then, a weak but very good man, Nikolai Alexandrovich Romanov, along the way, the All-Russian Emperor, did not find the strength to resist the circumstances. Like a true martyr, he was vilely deceived, betrayed by his own generals and relatives, driven into a trap at the Dno station, and then went to the slaughter. And all this happened almost on the eve of the victory of Russia and its allies in the First World War.

This touching version continues to be served to the general public, albeit under different sauces, to this day.

But practically none of the historians has asked and is not asking the question: did not an ordinary person and the father of a family, but the Emperor of All Russia, the anointed of God, even being in such difficult circumstances, have the right to resign? Did he have the right to brush aside the responsibility assigned to him from birth for the fate of one-sixth of the entire Earth?

No matter how painful it is to realize, Nicholas II renounced Russia much earlier than he waved in Pskov the Manifesto already prepared for him. He renounced, deciding for himself that state power was not up to him. A conscious rejection of radical reforms in domestic politics, a tough fight against revolutionary terrorism, dialogue and interaction with that part of society that was waiting and wanting change, rejection of the country's national interests and entry into the world war - all this led to the fact that Russia by 1917 she herself renounced Nicholas II, and indeed the entire dynasty.

Nikolai Alexandrovich Romanov was neither a bloody tyrant, nor an insane holy fool, nor a frightened fool. He perfectly understood what people could offer in return for the “rotten monarchical system”, who suddenly imagined themselves to be the “color of the nation”. And although Nicholas II himself could not offer the country anything either, he still had the prerogative to retain the honor of a soldier who had not completely left his post.

By the act of his renunciation, the emperor abandoned this honor, trying to buy life and freedom for himself and his family, and again lost. He lost not only his life and the life of his own children, but also the lives of many millions of Russian people who lost their faith, the tsar, and the Fatherland at the same time.

How it was

Conspiracy theory

In modern studies, near-historical literature. as well as in the domestic media, the version of the Judeo-Masonic conspiracy against the Romanov dynasty and personally Nicholas II appears more and more often. The purpose of this conspiracy was to weaken Russia as a world player, to appropriate its victories and remove it from the clan of victorious powers in the First World War.

The initiator of the conspiracy, of course, is some hypothetical "world government" acting through representatives of the Entente powers. The Duma liberals and oligarchs (Milyukov, Guchkov, Rodzianko, etc.) became the theorists and implementers of the conspiracy, and the highest generals (Alekseev, Ruzsky) and even members of the royal family (VKN Nikolai Nikolaevich) became the direct executors.

The murder of Grigory Rasputin by the conspirators, a court psychic who is able not only to treat the heir to the crown prince, but also to foresee the future, fits perfectly into this theory. Throughout 1916, Rasputin and the tsarina stubbornly "shuffled" the highest government officials, trying to get rid of traitorous conspirators. At the suggestion of Rasputin, the tsarina repeatedly demanded that the sovereign "disperse the Duma", which was engaged in stubborn discrediting of the monarchy.

However, the king, who allegedly “trusted only his wife,” did not heed the warnings. He appointed himself Supreme Commander, having offended his uncle, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (who later joined the conspirators), spent all the time at Headquarters, where he felt safe in the company of his adjutant generals. As a result, the generals also betrayed him, lured him into a trap, threatened and blackmailed him into signing an act of renunciation, which legalized the Provisional Government created by Rodzianko.

In fact, everyone knew that the Duma members were preparing some kind of coup d'état at the turn of 1916-1917. Guchkov and Milyukov discussed their plans almost daily in the lobby of the Duma. Nicholas II was well aware of this. Thus, the forthcoming "coup" was given a certain operetta character - and no one believed in its seriousness. It must be said that the "conspirators" did not initially plan to eliminate or completely abdicate the emperor, and even more so - to cause any harm to his family. In the most radical version, only isolation from the state affairs of the queen was assumed. They wanted to send her away - to the Crimea, for the treatment of upset nerves.

The main mistake of Nicholas II at this stage was his absolute confidence in the loyalty of the army and military leadership to him personally. The emperor naively believed that if he, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, victoriously ended the war, all internal problems would disappear by themselves.

Today, the connections of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General M.I. Alekseev with the leaders of the Duma "Progressive Bloc" Guchkov, Lvov and Rodzianko. However, as A.I. Denikin, M.I. Alekseev rejected the idea of ​​any coups and political upheavals in the rear during the period of hostilities. He understood that the implementation of even very moderate plans of the liberal opposition would inevitably lead to anarchy, the collapse of the army and, as a result, to defeat in the war.

The commanders-in-chief of the Southwestern and Northern fronts, Generals Brusilov, Ruzsky and a number of other adjutant generals, did not share this opinion, insisting on immediate action until, as it seemed to them, the inevitable victory of the Russian army on all fronts.

If we put aside the theory of the Jewish-Masonic conspiracy, which, by the way, was invented by emigre historiography in the 1920s and 30s, and take a sober look at the current situation of 1916-1917, then we can say with confidence that the “conspiracy” against there was undoubtedly a monarchy, since there were still sane and decent people in the country. Changes in the country at that time were long overdue, and the war, the problems associated with it in the economy, dissatisfaction with the monarch and his entourage, the threat of revolutionary terror and ministerial leapfrog only contributed to the overall political destabilization. Was it a "conspiracy of adjutant generals" who suddenly began to hate the mediocre commander in chief? Or a revolutionary situation, when the monarchist “tops” could no longer do anything and did not want anything, the proletarian “lower classes” were not ready, and the liberal opposition wanted something, but could not decide: sturgeon with horseradish or a constitution?

Only one thing can be said with certainty: a way out of the current political impasse was needed, but complete confusion reigned in the heads of the so-called "conspirators". Some believed that they themselves were quite capable of bringing the war to a victorious end and they absolutely did not need a monarchy for this, a military dictatorship was enough; others were going to keep the monarchy as a factor that unites the nation, but remove Nicholas II and his "advisors"; still others simply rushed to power, completely unaware of what they would do when they received it. And “when there is no agreement among the comrades”, then the result of their actions is usually very, very unpredictable ...

Trap for the Emperor

The beginning of the February events in Petrograd found Nicholas II at Headquarters in Mogilev. He left there on February 22, 1917, at the urgent request of General M.I., who had just returned from Sevastopol. Alekseev. What was the very "urgent matter" about which the chief of staff wanted to talk with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, is not clear to historians to this day.

Supporters of the "conspiracy" claim that Alekseev deliberately lured the sovereign to Mogilev on the eve of the uprising in the capital. Thus, the plan of the conspirators to isolate the emperor from his family and force him to abdicate was to be realized.

But here it is worth noting that even the most persistent request of the general could not have had any effect on the still Emperor Nicholas II. And if the sovereign had not gone to Mogilev, would all the plans of the conspirators have collapsed?

In addition, Alekseev, as we remember, until the evening of March 1, was a resolute opponent of any changes in domestic policy until the end of hostilities, and even more so - the abdication of the emperor.

Perhaps Nicholas II himself suspected that something was being started again in the army, and not in Petrograd, or he decided, as always, that in the event of unrest, he, as emperor, would be better off with loyal troops than among traitorous courtiers.

And then, the emperor did not need to look for a special reason to leave Petrograd. From the moment Nikolai Nikolaevich was removed from the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the emperor spent almost all his time at the Headquarters, leaving only Alexandra Feodorovna “on the farm”. His visits to Mogilev were more like escapes from internal problems than they were caused by an urgent need.

News of the uprising in the capital reached Headquarters only 2 days after the events began - on February 25, and even then in a very distorted form.

According to eyewitnesses, Nicholas II brushed aside reports of unrest for several days, considering them another "bakers' strike", which could be suppressed in a few days.

On February 26, the State Duma ceased its work. The Provisional Committee of the State Duma was elected under the chairmanship of Rodzianko. Representatives of the Provisional Committee understood that if they did nothing, all power in the country would pass to the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (Petrosoviet), which led the uprising.

Rodzianko began bombarding the Headquarters with panic telegrams. They clearly spoke of the need for decisive action, namely: the choice of a new government accountable to the State Duma, that is, it turned out that he personally, A.I. Rodzianko, because the Duma was dissolved.

Nicholas II considered all Rodzianko's telegrams to be complete nonsense. He did not want to answer them, feeling himself still under the protection of Alekseev. The only thing that interested the sovereign in those days was the fate of the family that remained in Tsarskoye Selo.

General Alekseev was ordered to withdraw loyal troops from the front and send them to Petrograd. The expedition was led by General N.I., loyal to the emperor. Ivanov. But according to the testimony of Colonel A. A. Mordvinov, who was on the royal train, General Alekseev immediately ordered that the allocated troops be concentrated in Tsarskoye Selo and only after that be sent to Petrograd. That is, Ivanov's primary task was to be the protection (or capture?) of the royal family, and the very suppression of unrest in Petrograd faded into the background.

On February 27, Nicholas II talked with the Empress by telegraph for several hours, after which he suddenly broke loose in the evening and announced his departure to Tsarskoye.

General Alekseev tried in vain to dissuade him from this trip. Alekseev, like no one else, knew how it could end for the emperor, and for all of Russia.

The emperor and his retinue left on two letter trains. They had to overcome about 950 miles along the route Mogilev - Orsha - Vyazma - Likhoslavl - Tosno - Gatchina - Tsarskoe Selo, but, as subsequent events showed, the trains were not destined to reach their destination. By the morning of March 1, the trains were able to get through Bologoye only to Malaya Vishera, where they were forced to turn around and go back to Bologoye. By order of the Commissioner of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma A. A. Bublikov, the emperor's train was stopped at the Dno station (not far from Pskov).

While the emperor was there, Rodzianko actively processed Alekseev and the commander of the Northern Front, General N.V. Ruzsky, assuring that Petrograd is completely under his control.

Alekseev, still apparently doubting the need for a coup d'état, decided to submit to the inevitable.

After this excellent work done by Rodzianko, by the evening of March 1, both letter trains arrived in Pskov, where the headquarters of the Northern Front was located.

March 1. Pskov.

Arriving in Pskov, the sovereign naively hoped that he had finally found himself in a territory with firm military power, and that they would help him get to Tsarskoe Selo.

But it was not there! There was no talk of moving the train to Tsarskoye Selo at all.

Commander of the Northern Front, General N.V. Ruzsky, one of the supporters of the "most decisive changes," began to ardently prove to the emperor the need for a responsible ministry, that is, changing the existing system to a constitutional monarchy. Nicholas II undertook to object, pointing out that he did not understand the position of a constitutional monarch, since such a monarch reigns, but does not govern. Assuming supreme power as an autocrat, he simultaneously accepted, as a duty to God, the responsibility for managing state affairs. By agreeing to transfer his rights to others, he deprives himself of the power to control events without getting rid of responsibility for them. In other words, the transfer of power to the government, which will be responsible to the parliament, will in no way relieve it of responsibility for the actions of this government.

The only thing the emperor was willing to do was to agree to the appointment of Rodzianko as prime minister and give him the choice of some members of the cabinet.

The negotiations dragged on until late at night and were interrupted several times.

The turning point was the receipt at 10:20 pm of a draft of a proposed manifesto on the establishment of a responsible government, which was prepared at Headquarters and sent to Pskov signed by General Alekseev. According to the project, Rodzianko was instructed to form a Provisional Government.

Alekseev's telegram was the decisive moment of the action aimed at breaking the will of the emperor. It showed that the chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the actual commander-in-chief of the army in the field unconditionally supported the decision proposed by Ruzsky.

Obviously, at that moment, Nicholas II realized that he had finally fallen into a trap, and the door slammed shut behind him. In the presence of only Count Fredericks, the Minister of the Court, as a witness, he signed a telegram authorizing the publication of the manifesto proposed by Alekseev.

Later, Nicholas II, in communication with relatives, complained about the rudeness and pressure from General Ruzsky. According to the emperor, it was he who forced him to change his moral and religious convictions and agree to concessions that he was not going to make. The story of how Ruzsky, having lost patience, began to impolitely insist on the need for an immediate decision, came from the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna. It was to her that Nicholas II, after his abdication, told in detail about everything that happened in Pskov.

General A. I. Spiridovich wrote in his memoirs:

That evening the Emperor was defeated. Ruzsky broke the exhausted, morally torn Sovereign, who did not find serious support around him in those days. The sovereign passed morally. He succumbed to strength, assertiveness, rudeness, which for a moment reached the stamping of his feet and the pounding of his hand on the table. The Tsar spoke of this rudeness later with bitterness to his August mother and could not forget her even in Tobolsk.

On March 2, at one in the morning, signed by Nicholas II, a telegram was sent to General Ivanov: “I hope you arrived safely. I ask you not to take any measures until my arrival and report to me. At the same time, General Ruzsky orders to stop the advance of the troops allocated by him to Petrograd, return them to the front and telegraph to the Headquarters about the recall of the troops sent from the Western Front. The armed suppression of the rebellion in the capital did not take place.

On the night of March 1-2, Ruzsky informed Rodzianko that he had "put the pressure" on the tsar to agree to the formation of a government responsible "to the legislative chambers," and offered to give him the text of the corresponding tsar's manifesto. In response, Rodzianko declared that the situation in Petrograd had changed radically, that the demand of a responsible ministry had already outlived itself. Renunciation is needed.

Ruzsky realized that his work had not yet been completed and that he could not do without assistants, so he immediately telegraphed to Headquarters.

Then Alekseev, on his own initiative, compiled and sent a summary of the conversation between Ruzsky and Rodzianko to all the commanders-in-chief of the fronts: Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich to the Caucasian Front, General Sakharov to the Romanian Front, General Brusilov to the Southwestern Front, General Evert to the Western Front. Alekseev asked the commanders-in-chief to urgently prepare and send to the Headquarters their opinion on the abdication of the sovereign.

Alekseev's telegram to the commander-in-chief was worded in such a way that they had no choice but to speak in favor of abdication. It said that if the commanders-in-chief share the views of Alekseev and Rodzianko, then they should “very hastily telegraph their loyal request to His Majesty” for abdication. At the same time, not a word was mentioned about what should be done if they do not share this view.

On the morning of March 2, Ruzsky also received the text of a telegram sent by General Alekseev to the commanders-in-chief of the fronts and read it to the tsar. It became clear that Alekseev fully supported Rodzianko's positions.

Renunciation. Option 1.

The emperor's mood changed greatly by morning. In this situation, abdication attracted him as a more worthy solution than the position of a constitutional monarch. This exit gave him the opportunity to relieve himself of all responsibility for what happened, what is happening and the inevitable future of Russia under the rule of people who, as they themselves assured, "enjoy the people's trust." At lunchtime, walking along the platform, Nicholas II met with Ruzsky and told him that he was inclined to abdicate.

At 14-14:30, answers began to come to the Headquarters from the commanders-in-chief of the fronts.

Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (the Tsar's uncle) stated that “as a loyal subject, I consider, by the duty of the oath and by the spirit of the oath, to kneel to pray to the sovereign to renounce the crown in order to save Russia and the dynasty”.

Generals A.E. spoke for the abdication. Evert (Western Front), A.A. Brusilov (South-Western Front), V.V. Sakharov (Romanian Front), as well as the commander of the Baltic Fleet, Admiral Nepenin A.I. (on his own initiative). The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral A.V. Kolchak, did not send any answer.

Between two and three o'clock in the afternoon, Ruzsky entered the tsar, taking with him the texts of the telegrams of the commanders-in-chief, received from the Headquarters. Nicholas II read them and asked the generals present to also express their opinion. All of them were in favor of renunciation.

At about three o'clock the tsar announced his decision in two brief telegrams, one of which was addressed to the chairman of the Duma, the other to Alekseev. The abdication was in favor of the heir-prince, and Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich was appointed regent.

Undoubtedly, this was a step back in comparison with the concessions of the previous night, since not a word was said about the transition to a parliamentary system and a government accountable to the Duma. Ruzsky intended to immediately send telegrams, but for the members of the imperial retinue, the renunciation came as a complete surprise, and they considered that this step was taken with excessive haste. The tsar was immediately persuaded to stop the telegrams. Ruzsky had to return to the tsar a telegram addressed to Rodzianko.

At this time, Ruzsky was informed that representatives of the State Duma A.I. were leaving for Pskov. Guchkov and V.V. Shulgin.

While the representatives of the Duma were driving, the members of the retinue asked what the abdicated monarch was going to do next. How does citizen Nikolai Romanov generally think of his continued existence in Russia? He said that he would go abroad and live there until the end of hostilities, and then return, settle in the Crimea and devote himself entirely to raising his son. Some of his interlocutors expressed doubts that he would be allowed to do this, but Nikolai replied that parents were not forbidden anywhere to take care of their children. Nevertheless, some doubts arose in him, and for the first time he frankly turned to the personal doctor S.P. Fedorov about the health of the prince. The king asked him sincerely to answer whether it was possible to heal the heir, to which he received the answer that “miracles do not happen in nature” and that in the event of a renunciation, the heir would most likely have to live in the family of the regent. After that, Nikolai decided to abdicate immediately for his son, in order to leave Alexei with him.

Renunciation. Option 2.

Representatives of the Duma arrived on the royal train at 21:45. Before their arrival, General Ruzsky received information that "armed trucks" with revolutionary soldiers sent from Petrograd were moving towards the tsar's train. According to Colonel A. A. Mordvinov, Shulgin told him about the strong friction between the State Duma and the Petrograd Soviet: “Something unimaginable is happening in Petrograd, we are entirely in their hands, and we will probably be arrested when we return.”

Guchkov told Nicholas II that they had come to report on what had happened in Petrograd and to discuss the measures necessary to save the situation, as it continues to be formidable: no one planned or prepared the popular movement, it flared up spontaneously and turned into anarchy . There is a danger that unrest will spread to the troops at the front. The only measure that can save the situation is the renunciation in favor of the infant heir to the crown prince under the regency of Grand Duke Michael, who will form the new government. This is the only way to save Russia, the dynasty and the monarchical principle.

After listening to Guchkov, the tsar uttered a phrase that, according to G. M. Katkov, produced the effect of an exploding bomb. He said that in the afternoon he decided to abdicate in favor of his son. But now, realizing that he cannot agree to be separated from his son, he will deny both himself and his son.

Guchkov said that they should respect the tsar's paternal feelings and accept his decision. Representatives of the Duma proposed a draft act of renunciation, which they brought with them. The emperor, however, said that he had his own version, and showed the text, which, on his instructions, was compiled at Headquarters. He has already made changes to it regarding the successor; the phrase about the oath of the new emperor was immediately agreed upon and also included in the text.

On March 2 (15), 1917, at 23:40, Nikolai handed Guchkov and Shulgin the Act of Abdication, which, in particular, read: “We command our brother to manage the affairs of the state in full and indestructible unity with the representatives of the people in legislative institutions, on the basis that they will establish, taking an inviolable oath to that. »

In addition to the Act of Abdication, Nicholas II signed a decree on the dismissal of the former composition of the Council of Ministers and on the appointment of Prince G.E. Lvov as chairman of the Council of Ministers, an order for the Army and Navy on the appointment of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich as Supreme Commander.

In order not to create the impression that the abdication took place under pressure from the Duma delegates, it was officially indicated that the abdication took place on March 2 at 3 pm, that is, exactly at the moment when the decision on it was actually made. The appointment decrees were timed as 2:00 pm so that they would have legal force as having been made by the rightful emperor until the moment of abdication and to comply with the principle of succession of power.

The entire protocol of negotiations between Nicholas II and representatives of the Duma was recorded by the head of the field office, General Naryshkin, under the title "Protocol of Abdication."

At the end of the audience, Guchkov got out of the car and shouted into the crowd:

“Russian people, bare your heads, cross yourself, pray to God… Sovereign Emperor, for the sake of saving Russia, withdrew from his royal service. Russia is embarking on a new path!”

In the morning Ruzsky came and read his long conversation on the phone with Rodzianko. According to him, the situation in Petrograd is such that now the ministry from the Duma seems to be powerless to do anything, since the Socialist-Democratic Party represented by the workers' committee is fighting against it. I need my renunciation. Ruzsky passed this conversation on to the headquarters, and Alekseev to all the commanders-in-chief. By 2? h. came the answers from everyone. The bottom line is that in the name of saving Russia and keeping the army at the front in peace, you need to decide on this step. I agreed. From the rate sent a draft manifesto. In the evening, Guchkov and Shulgin arrived from Petrograd, with whom I spoke and gave them a signed and revised manifesto. At one o'clock in the morning I left Pskov with a heavy sense of experience. Around treason, and cowardice, and deceit!

What's next?

The royal train departed from Pskov back to Mogilev shortly after midnight on March 2-3, 1917. The former emperor wanted to say goodbye to the generals and meet with his mother, who came from Kyiv especially for this. He was never allowed to join his family in Tsarskoye Selo.

Before the train departed, Nicholas II gave the palace commandant V.N. Voeikov a telegram for Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich:

"Petrograd. His Imperial Majesty Michael II. The events of recent days forced me to decide irrevocably on this extreme step. Forgive me if I upset you and that I did not have time to warn you. I will forever remain a faithful and devoted brother. I fervently pray to God to help you and your Motherland. Nicky."

The telegram was sent from the Sirotino railway station (45 km west of Vitebsk) in the afternoon. According to the wife of the Grand Duke N. Brasova, Mikhail Alexandrovich never received this telegram.

The abdication in favor of Mikhail was an unpleasant surprise, both for the Grand Duke himself and for the revolutionaries. The members of the Provisional Government decided not to publish the manifesto on the abdication of Nicholas II yet, and immediately sent their representatives to Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich.

According to A.F. Kerensky, he was completely shocked by the decision of his older brother. While Tsarevich Alexei was alive, Michael, who was in a morganatic marriage, had no right to the throne and was not going to reign.

After a three-hour meeting with members of the Provisional Government, who (except for Milyukov and Guchkov) advised the Grand Duke to abdicate, Mikhail Alexandrovich signed the following document:

“A heavy burden has been placed on me by the will of my brother, who handed over the Imperial All-Russian Throne to me in a time of unprecedented war and unrest of the people.

Encouraged by the same thought with all the people that the good of our Motherland is above all, I made a firm decision in that case to accept the Supreme Power, if such is the will of our great people, who should by popular vote, through their representatives in the Constituent Assembly, establish a form of government and new fundamental laws of the Russian State. Therefore, invoking the blessing of God, I ask all citizens of the Russian State to submit to the Provisional Government, which, at the initiative of the State Duma, has arisen and is vested with full power, until the Constituent Assembly, convened as soon as possible on the basis of a universal, direct, equal and secret vote, by its decision about the form of government will express the will of the people. 3/III - 1917 Mikhail.

Petrograd."

He later wrote in his diary:

“Alekseev came with the latest news from Rodzianko. It turns out that Misha renounced. His manifesto ends with a four tail for elections in 6 months of the Constituent Assembly. God knows who advised him to sign such a disgusting thing! In Petrograd, the riots have ceased - if only this continues.”

The next morning, the usual conference with Alekseev took place at Headquarters. After him, Alekseev conveyed to the Provisional Government the “request” or “wishes” of the emperor to be allowed to return to Tsarskoye Selo, wait for the children who had measles to recover there, and then leave with the whole family for England through Murmansk.

As you know, the plans of the ex-emperor were not destined to come true. By signing the abdication, Nicholas II did not stipulate any mandatory conditions or security guarantees for himself and his family. What, in fact, he did not know to negotiate: there were no precedents for the voluntary abdication of the monarch in Russia. And is it really a royal business to bargain with conspirators, revolutionaries, rebels? ..

The abdication of the tsar was perceived by the officers in the troops without enthusiasm, but almost everyone was silent (single riots of Colonel of the Preobrazhensky Regiment A.P. Kutepov and the “first checker of Russia” General A.F. Keller do not count).

Almost immediately after the abdication of the king, the army began to collapse. The mortal blow was dealt to her by "Order No. 1" on the Petrograd garrison, issued by the Petrograd Soviet on March 1, 1917 (that is, even before the abdication). The order ordered the immediate creation of elected committees of representatives of the lower ranks in all military units, divisions and services, as well as on ships. The main point in Order No. 1 was the third point, according to which, in all political speeches, military units were no longer subordinate to officers, but to their own elected committees and the Council. All weapons were transferred under the control of the soldiers' committees. The order introduced the equality of rights of the "lower ranks" with other citizens in political, general civil and private life, the titles of officers were abolished. Subsequently, with the connivance of the new Minister of War A. Guchkov, this order was extended to the entire army and led to its complete disintegration.

Order No. 1 buried the hopes of the highest Russian generals to bring the war to a victorious end. It was not possible to achieve its cancellation in May 1917, before the planned offensive on the Western Front, either by the “conspirator” Alekseev, who had already bitten all his elbows, or by his associates in the Provisional Government, Milyukov and Guchkov.

“With the fall of the Tsar,” wrote General P.N. Wrangel, - the very idea of ​​power has fallen, in the concept of the Russian people all the obligations that bind it have disappeared. At the same time, power and these obligations could not be replaced by anything.”

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Today it is difficult to imagine what would have happened if General Alekseev in those fateful days of March 1917 had been ajar, even for a moment, his very near future. What would happen if he suddenly saw how, together with Denikin, Kornilov, Markov, he was walking or riding in a miserable wagon along the snow-covered Kuban steppe, how the officers of the Kornilov regiment unarmed rushed into a “psychic attack” near Yekaterinodar, how they were fighting for their lives and honor the remnants of the Russian army near the village of Dmitrovskaya already in February of the next, 1918? ...

It is possible that Alekseev, Ruzsky, Milyukov, Guchkov and other “saviors” would all at once have stopped rocking the already flimsy edifice of Russian statehood, stopped on the edge, imbued with loyal feelings for their monarch, and really saved the country from the impending catastrophe. Perhaps not.

Unfortunately or fortunately (?), no one can foresee even the very near future. It is no coincidence that various kinds of "prophets" were persecuted and killed at all times.

However, the reign of the last Russian Tsar Nicholas II passed under the sign of the most vulgar mysticism. The royal couple, as you know, did not shy away from prophets, or soothsayers, or notorious charlatans. The legend is also known about the prophecies of the monk Abel, received by Nicholas and Alexandra Feodorovna on the centenary of the death of Paul I (1901), and the predictions of the English astrologer Cairo (1907), and the prophecy of Seraphim of Sarov, allegedly accidentally falling into the hands of the emperor, the ominous predictions of Rasputin, etc. .. etc.

If we assume that Nicholas II was the only emperor in history who knew his fate, knew the year of his death and the death of his entire family, then it is precisely this mystical knowledge, and not "weakness", that explains many facts of his reign. It is known that several times he tried to change his fate, and especially decisively in March 1905, trying to abdicate the throne and become a monk, but could not. The entire second half of his reign (after March 1905) passed under an invisible sign to no one else (except Alexandra Feodorovna) of fatal prophecies raining down on him from all sides.

All of the above allows you to look at the life and fate of the royal couple more objectively, but does not exclude the new "conspiracy theory".

Playing on the inclination of Nicholas II (and especially Alexandra Feodorovna) to mysticism, "slipping" predictions, prophecies and the prophets themselves to them - all this could be a multi-way combination for the collapse of the country and the elimination of the ruling dynasty.

The authorship of this operation, which was too long, but very effective in its results, could belong to British intelligence. From the end of the 19th century, Great Britain only dreamed of eliminating Russia from the political arena - its main rival on the continent and in the eastern possessions.

The mystic king, Job the Long-suffering, armed, but rather disarmed by numerous prophecies about his unfortunate fate - what could be worse for a country drawn into a world slaughter? And its elimination on the eve of victory and the collapse of the state turned out to be in the hands not so much of the opponents in the war as of yesterday's allies in the Entente, who rushed under the guise of help to rob an already torn by civil strife, bleeding Russia.

A. Razumov's version

At present, the version of A. Razumov, supported by some representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church and the historian and publicist N. Starikov, has also gained great popularity among the jingoistic patriots, denying the very fact of the abdication of Nicholas II from the throne.

Razumov compared the published text of the Manifesto on the renunciation and the text of the telegram of General Alekseev No. 1865 dated March 1, 1917, addressed to Nicholas II, found a number of coincidences in them and came to the conclusion that all known witnesses of the abdication (Shulgin, Guchkov, Rodzianko, Fredericks and others ) made up a conspiracy of liars. For many years they unanimously lied that on March 2, Nicholas II himself drafted the text of his abdication in favor of his brother Mikhail and signed it himself voluntarily. The conspirators needed a living and independently abdicated monarch to cut the ground from under the feet of pro-monarchist patriots who were supposedly able to prevent the rapid collapse of the army and the country.

As a key argument, Starikov cites the complete coincidence of individual fragments of the text, as well as the signature of Nicholas II, put for some reason in pencil.

Meanwhile, there is nothing surprising or sensational in the coincidence of the texts of the telegram and the Manifesto.

Judging by the diaries and letters of Nicholas II that have come down to us, the last emperor did not differ in the special briskness of his pen. It is unlikely that he had a skill in drafting official documents. As you know, during the days of the sovereign's stay in Pskov, more than a dozen different telegrams were drawn up on his behalf at Headquarters, as well as several options for abdication (including in favor of his son). Standard clerical turns could have been used by one of the adjutants or by the same Lukomsky and Basili, who prepared the texts of telegrams and draft versions of the Manifesto of Abdication for Nicholas II. He, in turn, simply made his own changes to the finished text sent from the Headquarters and signed the Manifesto, like a telegram - with a pencil.

Of course, for all sorts of conspiracy theorists, the version of the intentional use of a pencil when signing such an important document looks much more attractive. Say, the unfortunate emperor wanted to show his subjects that violence had been committed against him, and this document cannot be trusted. But the subjects did not understand this or did not want to understand. The last senseless protest of the last emperor could not cross out either 23 years of mediocre rule, or return lost opportunities, or correct fatal mistakes that had already become history.

Elena Shirokova

Sources and literature:

Spiridovich A.I. The Great War and the February Revolution of 1914-1917

Shulgin V. V. Days. 1925.

Multatuli P.V. “God bless my decision ...” - St. Petersburg: Satis, 2002.

He is. Nicholas II. The renunciation that was not. - M.: AST, Astrel. 2010. - 640 p.

Formation of Soviets throughout Russia

Elections to the Council were held in Ivanovo-Voznesensk workers' deputies in factories. At the call of the Bolsheviks, the workers went to the barracks and suggested that the soldiers also elect their deputies to the Soviet. 12 deputies were elected from the soldiers. In Ivanovo-Voznesensk, famous for its revolutionary traditions (it was there that the Soviets were born during the revolution of 1905), the Bolsheviks dominated the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies from the very beginning, unlike most other cities, where the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks initially had the majority .

Central Committee of the RSDLP(b), taking into account the resolution on the Provisional Government adopted by the Council of R. and S. D., decided not to oppose the power of the Provisional Government insofar as its actions correspond to the interests of the proletariat and the broad democratic masses of the people and to announce its decision to wage the most ruthless struggle against any attempts Governments to restore in whatever form the monarchical form of government.

At general meetings printers and woodworkers, where elections to the St. Petersburg Soviet took place, a resolution was adopted expressing confidence only in the Council. The meeting proposed to the Council to closely monitor the activities of the Provisional Government, for which purpose to form a staff of propagandists and commissioners to explain current events to the people. In the event that the Provisional Government fails to fulfill these promises, call on the workers and soldiers to fight against it.

Afternoon in Moscow there was a rally on Theater Square, to which some of the demonstrators came with posters "Down with the war." In the Zamoskvoretsky district, at a rally of workers, soldiers and students, in the presence of 2,000 people, a resolution was adopted that ended with the words: "Long live the Constituent Assembly, long live the 3rd International, long live the RSDLP."

Group of Trudoviks issued an appeal, and the Moscow conference of the Socialist Revolutionary Party adopted a resolution - both documents call for support for the Provisional Government.

A temporary organizational committee of the Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies was set up in Moscow. The organization of the committee was reported to the military units, which began the election of soldiers' deputies - one from the company. The Committee unanimously decided to work together with the Soviet of Workers' Deputies The new commander of the troops of the Moscow Military District, Lieutenant Colonel Gruzinov, after negotiations with the Soviet of Workers and the Organizing Committee of Soldiers' Deputies, issued an order giving the soldiers the right to elect their representatives to public organizations.

In a number of provincial cities there was an accession to the revolution. In Sestroretsk, a revolutionary committee of workers and soldiers was formed, which staged rallies and organized a people's militia and a food commission. Elections were held in Yamburg for delegates to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. In Kineshma (Kostroma Province) a meeting of 15,000 people was held, convened by the union of cooperatives. The Council of Workers' Deputies was elected and organized by the Revolutionary Committee. In Rodniki (Kostroma province), 6,000 workers at the Krasilshchikov factory swore allegiance to the new government and are waiting for a complete constitution, amnesty, universal suffrage, freedom of speech, conscience and assembly from it. (N. Avdeev. "Revolution of 1917. Chronicle of events")

Dear A.M.!
We have now received the second government telegrams about the revolution 1 (4) in St. Petersburg. A week of bloody battles between the workers and Milyukov+Guchkov+Kerensky in power!! According to the "old" European pattern ...
Well! This "first stage of the first revolution (of those generated by the war)" will not be the last, nor will it be only Russian. Of course, we will remain ... against the imperialist massacre led by Shingarev + Kerensky and Co.
All our slogans are the same. In the last issue of Sotsial-Demokrat we spoke directly about the possibility of a government of "Milyukov with Guchkov, if not Milyukov with Kerensky." It turned out and - and: all three together. Premilo! Let's see, somehow the party of people's freedom ... will give the people freedom, bread, peace ... "

Admiral Nepenin to Admiral Rusin

“There was a riot on the Andrey, Pavel and Glory. Admiral Nebolsin is killed. The Baltic Fleet as a military force does not exist now. What can I do? Addition. Riot on almost all ships "( N. Starilov. "CHRONICLES OF RED OCTOBER")

Chronicle of revolutionary events in Primorye

The news of the abdication of Nicholas II from the throne came to Vladivostok at night with a great delay due to a breakdown in the telegraph. Morning in Vladivostok turned out to be unfriendly. Wet snow fell and quickly melted. The long horns of the workshops of the military port, the ships of the Volunteer Fleet, the car assembly workshops and the power station called the workers to a meeting. At 8:30 a.m., a meeting of workers took place on the square in front of the mechanical workshops. The port captain read the telegram about the king's abdication. The workers adopted a resolution in support of revolutionary Petrograd.

At 12 o'clock, intellectuals, raznochintsy, philistines, housewives and students came to the monument to Admiral Gennady Nevelsky on Svetlanskaya. Lined up in columns with red bows and bandages on their sleeves, workers, sailors, and soldiers arrived to the sounds of a military band. After the meeting, the workers of the workshops of the military port and merchant sailors, armed soldiers and sailors, went to the prison. “Freedom to the prisoners of tsarism!”, “Long live the revolution!” - these exclamations caused the jailers to tremble. Under the onslaught of the crowd, they were forced to open the gates, and a stream of people rushed into the prison yard. The revolutionary workers smashed the cell doors and freed political prisoners one by one.

The Vladivostok City Duma immediately gathered for a meeting. The executive body of the Duma, the Committee of Public Security (CSS), was elected. On behalf of the City Duma, the COB adopted an appeal:

“The greatest event in the life of the Russian people has happened. The sun of freedom, truth and justice rises over the delivered Russia. The government that had oppressed the people for centuries has passed into eternity.”

The military governor appeared at the COB and reported:

“I act in solidarity with the City Duma and await orders from the Provisional Government.”

The district court and prosecutor's supervision stated:

We welcome the Provisional Government, and at the dawn of the court of the people's conscience and a free prosecutor's office, we testify to our full readiness to serve with all our might for the glory and good of our dear Motherland.

Eleanor Prey, the wife of a businessman, an American living in Vladivostok, wrote in the hot pursuit of the events:

The telegram was published yesterday at the end of the day, and Aleutskaya around the editorial office of the Far Outskirts was packed with people waiting for the leaflet to come out. I was so tired when I got home that I lay down for a couple of hours without undressing, and while I was sleeping Ted came in and taped a large sheet of telegram to the mirror.

The mood of the day is conveyed by the poem of the Vladivostok writer N.P. Matveev (Amursky) “To Fighters for the Motherland”:

Brothers! Let's raise an exalted temple
Forces calling for Freedom.
Eternal memory to the fallen fighters!
Eternal glory to the living!…
Bent forever, forever gone
Terrible terrible years,
And over the expanse of native land
The sun shines on freedom...

Reference:
Matveev Nikolay Petrovich. Hereditary worker, son of a shipbuilding plant modeller. He graduated from the Personnel School of the Vladivostok Port and began working as a craftsman in the foundry shop of the military port workshops. Subsequently, a professional writer, poet, journalist, publisher, local historian, owner of a printing house. During the First Russian Revolution, he was a Social Democrat. In 1906, he was arrested for revolutionary publications, spent a year in prison, and after his release from active political activity, he retired. In March 1919 he emigrated to Japan.

If you find an error, please highlight a piece of text and click Ctrl+Enter .

Still not found. External criticism of the original declaration of the Provisional Government of 3 March is therefore impossible. But the published text itself and the memoirs of the direct authors of the declaration provide sufficient material for source studies.

The circumstances of the February Revolution led to the fact that in the Taurida Palace - the seat of the State Duma - the center of the revolutionary workers and soldiers masses, the Petrograd Soviet, appeared without permission. By the evening of February 27, the Provisional Committee of Members of the State Duma was operating in the right roof of the Tauride Palace, and the Provisional Executive Committee of the Council of Workers' Deputies was operating in the left roof. Each of these organizations set its own goals and tried to use the rapidly developing popular movement for its own purposes. The Duma Committee, composed mainly of members of the Presidium of the Progressive Bloc from a number of factions of the State Duma, fought for the implementation of the program of this bloc. Moreover, the growing nature of the movement made it possible to hope for the maximum satisfaction of the requirements of the bloc: the creation of a government from its leaders, the introduction of a constitutional monarchy with the removal of Nicholas II from supreme power, the proclamation of the emperor of the minor Alexei Nikolayevich and the regent of Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich. In the field of domestic policy, it was supposed to fulfill the requirements of the Progressive Bloc program: to conduct an amnesty for political and religious crimes, to abolish national restrictions, to reform local government, to expand the rights of zemstvos and city dumas. The leaders of the Progressive Bloc had been fighting for this program for more than a year and a half, at first they intended to achieve its implementation through a deal with the tsarist government (July-August 1915), and then they hoped to wrest it out by organized public pressure on the authorities.

Thus, both the program of the future cabinet and its composition were planned many months and weeks before the February coup. We must add to this that the possibility of a popular, spontaneous revolution was well recognized by the leaders of the Progressive Bloc and the radical circles of the bourgeoisie. The revolution was predicted with great accuracy, and yet its actual beginning was unexpected for the bourgeois leaders, and the very course of the revolution from the first day confused many of the carefully worked out plans.

The main surprise was the organization of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, and even here, in the Tauride Palace, in the closest neighborhood to the State Duma. Those of the leaders of the bourgeois opposition who had the opportunity to come into close contact with the workers understood that the organizations on which the bourgeoisie relies in its struggle for power - the State Duma, the Zemsky and City Unions, the Military Industrial Committees cover only a small layer. the qualified, bourgeois public and partly the radical intelligentsia. The main anti-government force, the working class, is outside these organizations. Attempts to influence the workers through the Military Industrial Committees were not particularly successful, since the majority of the workers did not support the Menshevik defencists like Gvozdev and Broido, who headed the working group of the Central Military Industrial Committee. Therefore, in the spring of 1916, A.I. Konovalov, deputy chairman of the Central Military Commission, put forward the idea of ​​an all-Russian workers' congress, which would create a Soviet of workers' deputies or a union of workers' deputies under bourgeois influence. The tsarist government forbade the convening of such a congress. And although some conspiratorial connections between the leaders of the liberal opposition and representatives of the revolutionary parties were established and maintained, the opposition as a whole refused to try to extend its influence to the workers.

And in the army, the Progressive Bloc had supporters primarily among the officers, while among the soldiers, the revolutionaries carried out intensive work. And in the plans for a military coup, which were developed by the circle of A.I. Guchkov, it was specifically stipulated how to carry it out, isolating the masses of soldiers from direct actions.

That is why the workers and soldiers appeared to the Duma Committee as two elements, formidable and anarchic, whose movement must be brought into the strict framework of laws as soon as possible. Instead, a center of representatives of the revolutionary parties arose in the State Duma, who claimed to lead precisely these masses of workers and soldiers and took up their special organization. And despite the fact that the goals of the Menshevik leaders of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies did not go beyond an ordinary bourgeois-democratic republic, they still differed significantly from the goals of the leaders of the Progressive Bloc. In the very first appeal to the population of Petrograd, the Soviet declared that the goal of the struggle was "people's rule" and the creation of "their own power organization" of the people. The Council called: “All together, with common forces, we will fight for the complete elimination of the old government and the convocation of a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage.”

This could not please the members of the Duma Committee, since this document unequivocally proclaimed an application for the introduction of a republican form of government in the country. Meanwhile, there were no direct contacts between the Council and the Committee, except for the special position of A.F. Kerensky, invited to the Council for the post of Deputy Chairman. At the meetings of the Council, especially at the evening general meeting on February 28, 1917, a very critical mood was revealed in relation to the Provisional Committee of the State Duma. The members of the Council were inspired by their real strength, demanded to “dictate the terms to the Duma Committee”, called the Committee a “gang of politicians” who wanted to take advantage of the blood shed by the people, demanded the arrest of Duma Chairman M.V. Rod- zyanko. In any case, the desire was definitely stated to "appear at the Provisional Committee of the State Duma" with their demands.

For its part, the Provisional Committee could no longer ignore the Soviet, since their representatives constantly clashed with each other, and dual power became an accomplished fact. Therefore, when compiling a possible list of ministers, proposals were made: A.F. Kerensky - Comrade Chairman of the Council - to take the post of Minister of Justice, and N.S. Chkheidze - Chairman of the Council - to take the post of Minister of Labor. It must be said that the tsarist government [was not] the Ministry of Labor, but the possibility of its formation when a "government of trust" from the leaders of the progressive bloc came to power was considered even before the revolution. So, at a meeting with E.D. Kuskova on April 6, 1916, in the list worked out for discussion at the Congress of the Cadet Party, was the Ministry of Labor, the head of which [was] the “non-party left” L.I. Lutugin. The Cadets assumed that in order to satisfy the demands of the "socialists" and to tame them, the creation of such a ministry would be expedient.

If it were possible to get the chairman of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies into the government, then the Soviet itself would no longer be so terrible for the bourgeoisie. But N.S. Chkheidze immediately refused this offer. Kerensky, however, seeing in this the satisfaction of his ambitious plans, decided to agree and therefore began to indoctrinate individual members of the Executive Committee of the Soviet in the spirit that was desirable for him and the Duma Committee.

On the morning of March 1, 1917, the Executive Committee of the Council decided to discuss the issue of attitudes towards the question of power and the formation of a government, as well as the requirements or conditions for the Duma Committee. The mood of the majority of the members of the Executive Committee was expressed by N. Sukhanov, who said that "it was necessary to put the licensing power in such conditions in which it would be manual." In the Committee itself, and indeed in the camp of revolutionary democracy, there were at that moment three currents. The first, represented by the Bolsheviks and some Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, demanded not to recognize the power of the bourgeoisie and to fight for the creation by the Soviet of a Provisional Revolutionary Government. The second - from the right-wing Menshevik-defencists - called for the transfer of power to the bourgeoisie without any conditions and support for this power. Finally, the third, to which the majority adjoined, believed that in connection with the bourgeois character of the revolution that Russia was experiencing, the government, of course, should be made up of the bourgeoisie, but at the same time conditions should be put forward that would make it possible to complete the bourgeois-democratic -tic revolution and to carry out the minimum programs of the Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries. The Mensheviks from the Executive Committee considered themselves great tricksters and believed that the bourgeoisie needed to be "forced" to take power, and this could be done by appearing to them very accommodating and not making demands that could "frighten" the bourgeoisie. “We must not deprive the bourgeoisie of the hope of winning this struggle,” Sukhanov explained this plan in his memoirs.

“What specific conditions for the transfer of power,” he recalled, “could create the kind of status necessary for revolution and democracy? That is, under what specific conditions should power be handed over to the Milyukov government? In essence, I considered one such condition: "to ensure complete political freedom in the country, absolute freedom of organization and agitation." On the other hand, this condition could not but be accepted by the other side. Any other requirements, no doubt, less essential, could "break the combination"! Many of them Milyukov and Co. could not have agreed to in the face of their class, group personal position, in the face of European public opinion. But this demand - not to encroach on the principles of freedom - they could not but accept, if at all they were ready to accept power in the given circumstances with the permission of Soviet democracy.

Sukhanov also formulated two other demands or conditions: an amnesty and an early convocation of the Constituent Assembly. “These three conditions: a declaration of complete political freedom, an amnesty, and immediate measures to convene a Constituent Assembly, seemed to me absolutely necessary, but at the same time, exhaustive tasks of democracy in transferring government functions into the hands of the census bourgeoisie. Everything else will apply, ”Sukhanov concluded.

The discussion of the issue of power began at about 12 noon in the 13th room of the Tauride Palace, but was soon interrupted in connection with the “Rodzianko incident”, his attempt to go to the tsar when he could not get a train due to opposition from So -veta of workers' and soldiers' deputies. At the general meeting of the Council on March 1, where this incident was discussed, N.D. Sokolov, whom, as Sukhanov points out, he had already won over to his side, called on him to be moderate towards the Cadets in order to carry the fight against tsarism to the end. But here, too, a fierce intensity of struggle and sharp anti-officer sentiments manifested themselves in the debate. F. Linde, for example, declared: “We have achieved certain freedoms with the blood, we will not let ourselves be bypassed. They will give you the minimum, we want the most.”

At six o'clock in the evening the debate on the question of the organization of power resumed in the Executive Committee. Sukhanov made his points. They were recorded by Yu.M. Steklov on a separate sheet of paper. Immediately, the demands were supplemented by representatives of the soldiers' deputies that political freedoms be extended to the soldiers, that the troops of the Petrograd garrison who took part in the revolutionary movement should not be withdrawn from Petrograd. Of particular importance was the inclusion in the text of the conditions of the requirement that the government "take no other steps prejudging the future form of government." By including this item, the leaders of the Council intended to promote the republican form of government on its basis.

The Executive Committee rejected the proposal of the Duma Committee to send its representatives to the government, and the question of the personnel of the future ministry was entirely left to the discretion of the "bourgeoisie". By 12 o'clock in the morning on March 2, the text of the terms had been worked out and [elected] a delegation consisting of Chkhei-dze, Sokolov, Sukhanov, Steklov and Filippovsky. The text of the conditions, written down on a separate sheet of paper, carried Steklov with him.

The delegation moved to the right roof of the Taurida Palace and announced its desire to enter into negotiations with the Provisional Committee of the State Duma. The committee agreed, and negotiations began. Steklov made a report on the content of the conditions of the Petrograd Soviet, after which "Milyukov asked me to give him a paper where our program was outlined and, rewriting it, made his comments."

What did P.N. see in front of him? Milyukov? As far as can be judged from the published text of the declaration of the Provisional Government of March 3, the memoirs of Sukhanov and Milyukov himself, as well as other sources, the initial draft that was brought by Steklov did not differ much from the final text. It contained eight items. The first demanded a complete and immediate amnesty for political and religious matters. The second demanded freedom of speech, press, unions, meetings and strikes, with the extension of political freedoms to military personnel. The third paragraph spoke of the abolition of all class, religious and national restrictions. The fourth point was devoted to the speedy convocation of the Constituent Assembly and contained a statement that "the question of the form of government remains open" (Milyukov's wording). The fifth point required the replacement of the police by the people's militia with elected authorities. The sixth point contained the demand for re-elections of local self-government bodies on the basis of universal suffrage. In the seventh, the rights of the soldiers of the Petrograd garrison were stipulated not to withdraw the units that took part in the revolution from Petrograd. And, finally, the last paragraph again spoke about the granting of all civil rights to soldiers and contained a requirement for the election of command personnel in the army.

Milyukov was very pleased with the modesty of these demands, which did not affect social questions at all and for the most part repeated the program of the Progressive Bloc! One cannot read Sukhanov's self-satisfied remarks without smiling: "Amnesty, of course, comes naturally." Milyukov, without actively taking a single step and only yielding, did not consider it proper to argue against the amnesty and endured it to the end, not very willingly, but quite obediently, writing down: "for all crimes: agrarian, military, terrorist." The same thing happened with the second point - political freedoms, the abolition of class, religious restrictions, etc. "They demanded from Milyukov, and he yielded." Naive "tricks"! They "demanded" from Milyukov what was written down in the program of his party, which he had to put into practice anyway. Moreover, they demanded from the "bourgeoisie" what its representatives only yesterday demanded from the tsarist government.

Here is the text of the “Program of the Ministry of Public Trust” written by Milyukov in mid-August 1915: “1. Amnesty for persons convicted of political and religious crimes, return of the S.-D. deputies. 2. A radical change in management practices, including the abolition of national restrictions. 3. The legislative program of the organization of the country for victory. 4. Measures to maintain social peace".

And although in the program of the Progressive Bloc some of these demands turned out to be curtailed, Miliukov's own views did not change from this. As for the program of the Cadet Party, a special section of eight points was devoted to the rights of citizens. Even in the program of the Octobrists, civil liberties and the abolition of restrictions were declared.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Milyukov, who was “yielding,” evaluated the project presented to him as follows:

“With the exception of paragraph 7, which was obviously temporary, and the application of the beginning of the choice to the police authorities in paragraph 5, everything else in this project (Milyukov means its second edition, which will be discussed a little later) was not only quite acceptable or allowed for an acceptable interpretation, but also directly followed from the newly formed government's own views on its tasks. On the other hand, it should be noted that there was nothing here that was subsequently introduced by the socialist parties into the understanding of the tasks of revolutionary power, and that served as the subject of long debates and repeated breaks between the socialist and non-socialist part of the coalition cabinets of the following compositions.

This appraisal of the conditions of the Soviet as very acceptable remained with Miliukov for many years. In his memoirs, he also wrote about the delegation of the Executive Committee:

“They also brought the finished text of these conditions, which were to be published on behalf of the government. For the left side of the block, most of these conditions were quite acceptable, since they were part of her own program. These included: all civil liberties, the abolition of all class, religious and national restrictions, the convening of the Constituent Assembly, which will establish the form of government, elections to self-government bodies on the basis of universal suffrage, a complete amnesty. But there were also points of significant disagreement, on which a long dispute ensued, ending with an agreement only at four o'clock in the morning.

On what issues did the dispute take place and what was agreed as a result? The first point that caused controversy was the fourth, on the future form of government. Miliukov refused to bind the government with a promise not to undertake "anything that would predetermine the future form of government" (Sukhanov's edition). Recall that the position of the majority of the Duma Committee was to achieve the abdication of Nicholas II in favor of his son and appoint Mikhail Aleksandrovich as regent, that is, to preserve the constitutional monarchy. We also recall that no steps had yet been taken to induce Nicholas II, and the situation in this sense was not yet clear. After much debate, the following wording was agreed: "Immediate preparations for the convening<...>Constituent Assembly, which will establish the form of government and the constitution of the country.

The results of the rest of the disputes are reflected in the memoirs of Milyukov:

“They also agreed to strike out the requirement for the election of officers. I limited the “limits permitted by military-technical conditions” to the exercise of “civil liberties” by soldiers and defended “the maintenance of strict military discipline in the ranks and in the performance of military service”, while introducing equality of soldiers “in the enjoyment of public rights”. But I could not object to the non-disarmament and non-withdrawal from Petrograd of the military units that had taken part in the "revolutionary movement" and had just ensured our victory. After all, it was not known at that moment whether they would have to fight further with the “faithful” units sent to the capital.

So, Milyukov was very pleased with the results of the negotiations and believed that he had achieved a lot. Sukhanov was also pleased: the trick was a success, the government agreed to accept power on these conditions, “he read the entire program to the end, accepting both municipal elections and the abolition of the police, and the Constituent Assembly with its real name and all the proper attributes.” And Milyukov consoled himself with these words: “We were magnanimously granted a respite, and the whole question was for us how to use it. I myself shared this opinion about the psychology of all revolutions. I just didn't intend to fold my hands while waiting for the next stage to come." Thus, the leaders of the Soviet did not alienate the bourgeoisie, did not "frighten them with exorbitant demands." On the contrary, they inspired even Miliukov with the illusion that the bourgeoisie would be able to win in this struggle.

But then, at 4 am on March 2, 1917, the agreement was not yet destined to take place. Although the members of the Soviet delegation left the right wing of the Tauride Palace in full confidence that the agreement had already been concluded, events occurred in their absence that effectively put a stop to the progress of the negotiations. A.I. arrived at the meeting of the Committee of the State Duma. Guchkov and began to sharply criticize the draft government declaration. “I remember that I objected to certain questions concerning the army and the death penalty,” Guchkov said during interrogation at the Extraordinary Investigative Commission exactly five months after the events described. About the death penalty, neither in the conditions worked out by the Council, nor in the objections of P.N. Miliukov did not speak. Perhaps A.I. Guchkov confused, or maybe he proposed to introduce or retain the death penalty at the front? But the question of the army, that is, the rights of soldiers, was indeed discussed and, as mentioned above, was included in the draft declaration. Guchkov was chairman of the Military Commission of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma, he came into close contact with the situation in the troops of the Petrograd garrison, he saw all the hatred of the soldiers for the officers, which had already manifested itself in a number of murders. And everywhere he saw the enormous authority of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. And here, it turns out, it is still necessary to agree with this Council on the program and personnel of the government: “It was a surprise for me that when creating this new combination, another third factor was the Executive Committee of R. and S. Deputies.” The situation was portrayed by Guchkov as "hopeless."

Therefore, he sharply opposed the draft agreed with the Council, and as a result of this, the State Duma Committee as a whole decided to consider the question of the agreement and the text of the program open.

As can be seen from Sukhanov's memoirs, Kerensky told him about this fact in passing, but apparently the members of the Executive Committee did not get the impression that the negotiations had broken down. Moreover, since the morning of March 2, at the insistence of M.V. Rod-Zianko Milyukov began to suggest that the members of the Executive Committee continue to work on the development of a government statement.

Soon the general meeting of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies began its work, at which Yu.M. Steklov. He characterized the Committee's acceptance of the conditions of the Petrograd Soviet as a "colossal historical achievement" and declared that the delegation of the executive committee had succeeded in "binding these people with a solemn declaration." Thus, the self-deception in which the members of the delegation found themselves, imagining that they were setting impossible conditions for the "bourgeoisie", continued. Those reforms that the members of the Provisional Government were going to carry out, true to their party program, were portrayed by the Menshevik leaders of the Soviet as concessions wrested from "these people." Next, Steklov listed the points of the declaration, accompanying them with his own comments. They also emphasized the role of the Soviet, whose representatives imposed their will on the censers. Steklov stated that the delegation was confident that the Committee would reject the idea of ​​convening a Constituent Assembly and the demand for universal suffrage. But "no one objected, except for Shulgin." And although Steklov was forced to say that "they" rejected the demand for a democratic republic, he noted that "what we have achieved is not the maximum. These are the smallest conquests, ”and we must continue to fight for all further demands. This persistence stemmed from a firm awareness of the real strength of the Soviet and the weakness of the Provisional Committee of the Soviet, which was expressed in such words: three-quarters of the soldiers are "ours", one-quarter - "theirs".

All the party currents in the Soviet were reflected in the debate. The Bolsheviks criticized the delegation and demanded the creation of a Provisional Revolutionary Government. Critics on the left also suggested insisting on the inclusion in the declaration of the requirements of the minimum program of social democracy. Although some deputies condemned Kerensky for agreeing to join the Provisional Government - the latter had just received a vote of confidence to enter the ministry directly from the majority of the members of the Soviet despite the opposition of the executive committee - there were other voices: that half of the seats in the -lyam Council. There were harsh condemnations of Miliukov and "Guchkov's anti-popular circles." But in the end, by an overwhelming majority against 14 votes, the line of conduct of the delegation of the Executive Committee of the Council and the conditions proposed by it were approved.

The Council decided to demand the inclusion in the government declaration of a special clause stating that the government should not rely on wartime conditions and delay in implementing the forms listed in the declaration. And the offensive spirit that manifested itself in Steklov's report, and the demand to supplement the declaration, as well as the decision made to seek the signing of all the ministers of the Provisional Government and the chairman of the State Duma under the declaration - all this made the delegation face the need to take a tougher position in the new negotiations.

Milyukov met with this increased pressure on the government that was being organized when he spoke at a huge impromptu meeting in the Tauride Palace on the afternoon of March 2. “Three days ago we were in modest opposition, and the Russian government seemed all-powerful,” he said. “Now this government has collapsed into the mud with which it has become related, and we and our friends on the left have been nominated by the revolution, the army and the people to the place of honor of members of the first Russian public cabinet.” If these words were covered with "noisy prolonged applause", then indignant cries soon began. "Who chose you?" - they asked Milyukov, and to his words that Prince Lvov represented the organized Russian public, they objected - “qualified!”. He said the following about the program: “I am very sorry that in answer to this question I cannot read you the papers on which this program is presented. But the fact is that the only copy of the program discussed yesterday at a long night meeting with representatives of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies is now under their final consideration. And I hope that in a few hours you will know about this program.

And if at the meeting of the Petrograd Soviet Steklov called for fighting for the republic, then Milyukov here just as fervently agitated for the preservation of the monarchy. He directly stated that Nicholas II would voluntarily renounce the throne or be deposed, Alexei would be the heir, and Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich would be regent. The state system of Russia, according to Milyukov, was to be a "parliamentary constitutional monarchy." The final right to decide on the form of government should belong to the Constituent Assembly. “In our program,” continued Milyukov, “you will find a point according to which, as soon as the danger has passed and stable order has been restored, we will begin preparations for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly (loud applause), assembled on the basis of a universal, direct, equal and secret vote. niya. A freely elected people's representation will decide who will more accurately express the general opinion of Russia - we or our opponents. It is important to note in this connection that the consent of the delegation of the Petrograd Soviet to this most important point in the government's declaration that the Constituent Assembly "will establish the form of government and the constitution of the country" meant, in the conditions of March 2 and even the night of March 3, consent to a constitutional monarchy . Nothing was known about the position of the king. Until three in the afternoon on March 2, Guchkov and Shulgin, delegated by the Provisional Committee of the State Duma to visit the tsar, were still in Petrograd. They had firm instructions to get Nicholas II to abdicate in favor of their son. And the combination - Emperor Alexei and Regent Michael - seemed to be ninety percent already implemented.

No one yet knew that the renunciation would be in favor of Mikhail Alexandrovich himself, and he, in turn, would also renounce the supreme power in favor of ... the Provisional Government! Therefore, we repeat, the postponement of the decision on the form of government until the Constituent Assembly meant on March 2, 1917, only that until the decision of the Constituent Assembly of this issue in Russia there would be a constitutional (still without a constitution!) Monarchy.

Sukhanov, who expected disputes on the question of universal suffrage and the Constituent Assembly, wondered why Miliukov was so insistent on the monarchy. However, if freedom is already today, if there is a Constituent Assembly, then it doesn't matter, he reasoned. Only many months later did he realize that Milyukov's actions had been directed by a long-range calculation. The preservation of the dynasty was an important trump card of the Provisional Government both within the country and in the international arena. It gave the illusion of preserving national unity, responded to the monarchical survivals in the psychology of the backward sections of the people, allowed us to hope for a greater stability of the internal situation in the country and in the army.

On the evening of March 2, the joint work of the delegation of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Committee of the State Duma resumed. “With the decision of the “third point,” all discussion of questions of “high politics” was already over, and all that remained was to edit, put in order and put into print the first constitution of the Great Russian Revolution,” recalled Sukhanov. “It was necessary to stick a declaration to the finished piece of paper with a list of ministers, and then collect the signatures of cabinet members for it.” A surprise and, moreover, an unpleasant surprise for Milyukov was the demand of the Soviet to add a new clause to the declaration about "military circumstances", which should not be an obstacle to democratic reforms.

Another trouble was the altered text of the declaration of the Petrograd Soviet itself. The fact is that even at the first joint meeting of P.N. Milyukov, on behalf of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma, asked the delegation of the Council to draw up their own declaration calling on the population to support the government. The draft of such a document was immediately drawn up by N.D. Sokolov. But Milyukov found it unsatisfactory and composed his own text, in which the soldiers were urged to be calm and orderly, to obey their officers. This text was accepted by the delegation of the Council. But on March 2, to two paragraphs written by N.D. Sokolov and P.N. Milyukov, added one more, introductory. It was written by Yu.M. Steklov. It noted that the Provisional Government was created from moderate bourgeois circles, that support for it, in essence, could only be provided conditionally. This provision was developed by the decision of the general meeting of the Petrograd Soviet of March 2, 1917, which later became very famous, that the Provisional Government should be supported “insofar as it goes along the line of implementing the planned tasks” .

The General Assembly instructed the delegation to introduce the following new items into the declaration of the Provisional Government: “1. The provisional government stipulates that all planned activities will be carried out, despite the martial law. 2. The manifesto of the Provisional Government must be simultaneously signed by M. Rodzianko and the Provisional Government. 3. Include in the program of the Provisional Government an item on granting all nationalities the rights of national and cultural self-determination.

As far as can be judged from the published text of the declaration and memoirs, the last point was not discussed at the evening meeting on March 2 and was not included in any way in the adopted text. As for the first, its final text was worked out by Sukhanov, Milyukov and Steklov in the following form: “The Provisional Government considers it its duty to add that it does not at all intend to take advantage of military circumstances for any delay in the implementation of the above reforms and measures".

If Miliukov assessed the results of the negotiations on the night of March 1-2 positively for the interests of the Provisional Government, then the new negotiations, in his opinion, revised these results in favor of the Soviet, which was now becoming a controller from an equal partner. Recall that at the general meeting on March 2, it was also decided to "form a monitoring committee for the actions of the Provisional Government." In his History of the Second Russian Revolution, Milyukov commented on the results of the negotiations on the evening of March 2:

“Here, as we see, not only did not reflect the fact that the text of government obligations was basically compiled by the delegates of the Council themselves, and the text of their declaration by the Provisional Committee of the State Duma, but also that famous formula “in so far as” was adopted for the first time which in advance weakened the authority of the first revolutionary power among the population. He was expressed even more decisively in subsequent memoirs: “The whole correlation between our obligations, formulated by them and voluntarily accepted by us - their obligations, formulated by me and accepted by them, was thus obscured and changed towards class suspicion.”

One way or another, but by the beginning of the night of March 3, the text of the declaration had been finally edited. You need to sign it. The first signature, at the request of the Council, was put by the Chairman of the State Duma M.V. Rodzianko. Then the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Prince G.E. Lvov. It must be said, by the way, that Prince Lvov was not present at the first part of the negotiations with the delegation of the Executive Committee, and was mostly silent during the second part. After the signature of Lvov, the signatures of the ministers followed: P.N. Milyukov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, N.V. Nekrasov, Minister of Communications, Minister of Education A.A. Manuilov, trade and industry - A.I. Konovalov, Finance - M.I. Tereshchenko, chief pro-curator of the Synod V.N. Lvov, Minister of Agriculture A.I. Shingarev, Minister of Justice A.F. Kerensky.

Under the declaration there was no signature of A.I. Guchkov - military and naval minister. At that time he was in Pskov together with V.V. Shulgin, where he expected the act of abdication from Nicholas II. But he would hardly have signed this declaration, since it did not differ in any way from the project he had seen, especially in the area that was especially close to him, in the area of ​​​​the internal life of the army. In any case, the absence of Guchkov clearly facilitated Miliukov's task of finding a form of agreement with the Petrograd Soviet. The Octobrist I.V. did not sign the declaration. Godnev, who was invited to the post of State Comptroller. In this regard, his name was not mentioned in the list of ministers either.

The declaration was immediately retyped in the Soviet on a typewriter and handed over to the printer along with the appeal of the Petrograd Soviet. The original of the government program and one copy of N.N. Sukhanov gave P.N. Milyukov. In the morning, the declaration of the Provisional Government, together with the appeal of the Petrograd Soviet to the population, printed on one sheet, were pasted up in the form of posters all over the city. A.I. Guchkov, returning from Pskov, and driving along the streets of Petrograd, had already seen these documents and learned with amazement from them that, in addition to the post of Minister of War, about which they had previously spoken to him, he was also awarded the post of Minister of the Navy. At the same time, the declaration was published in Izvestia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

What did its final text look like? First of all, it should be noted that the program of government measures, which was mentioned earlier, by no means exhausted the entire content of the declaration. It begins with a rather extensive introductory part, in the development of which, as it seems to us, the members of the delegation of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet did not participate. The first phrase of the introduction emphasized the role and significance of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma in the revolution: “The Provisional Committee of the members of the State Duma, with the assistance and sympathy of the capital’s troops and the population, has now achieved such a degree of success over the dark forces of the old regime, which allows it to proceed to a more stable executive power". This phrase is composed in the accustomed style of diatribes of the leaders of the Progressive Bloc. It promotes the State Duma to the place of the only organized center in the revolution, while the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies is discerned only in the indefinite word "population". Let us also note that the Provisional Committee spoke of a “more durable structure” precisely of the executive branch, that is, only of the government. About the rights of the supreme power, the power of the monarch, nothing is said here.

“For this purpose,” the declaration goes on to say, “the Provisional Committee of the State Duma appoints the following persons as ministers of the first public cabinet, the confidence in which the country has been ensured by their past social and political activities.” And here we already see verbatim coincidences with the program of the Progressive Bloc: "creation of a united government from persons enjoying the confidence of the country." The use of this terminology also points us to the author of the above-mentioned phrases: he was most likely Milyukov, who also carried out the general revision of the document. And, in fact, the Provisional Government was the practical implementation of the idea of ​​a “ministry of trust” that Milyukov put forward in the summer of 1915 as the slogan of the Progressive Bloc. It was not a "responsible government", since there was no parliament yet, the State Duma was already hanging in the air, and the question of the monarchy had not been resolved. No one elected a provisional government. It chose itself. That influential group of public bourgeois-liberal figures, which had taken shape in Russia by the beginning of the First World War and which already in 1915 tried to come to power through negotiations with the tsarist government, now, in the exceptional conditions of the people's revolution, finally saw a real opportunity. opportunity to achieve your goal.

This was followed by a list of the ministers of the Provisional Government themselves. Moreover, it is interesting that the name of the government is preserved here still old: "Council of Ministers", as can be seen from the title of the post of Prince Lvov: "Chairman of the Council of Ministers." The term "Provisional Government", as a name for the executive branch, was first used in the Declaration only in its very last paragraph, where it refers to "military circumstances", and which was added only on the evening of March 2, 1917. In this connection, one can assume that the entire introduction and the list of ministers had been drawn up earlier, in general, even before the start of negotiations with the delegation of the Petrograd Soviet, since the documents of the Soviet for March 1 say that its representatives saw the list of ministers. The personal composition of the government was also discussed at the evening meeting of the Executive Committee on March 1. “It was known,” Sukhanov recalled, “that a zemstvo member, Lvov, an ordinary candidate for premier even in the era of His Majesty’s opposition,” was designated as the formal head.

A study of the list of ministers itself shows an even greater connection between the members of the Provisional Government and the projects of the "Ministry of Trust", which were drawn up in 1915 and 1916. Of the 10 ministries of the “first public cabinet”, 6 were mentioned in the well-known list of the “defence cabinet”, published by the newspaper “Morning of Russia” on August 13, 1915. And almost in the same positions: Milyukov - Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nekrasov - Minister of Communications, Konovalov - trade and industry, V.N. Lvov - chief prosecutor of the Synod. Both Guchkov and Shingarev were called there.

In another list, which was compiled on April 6, 1916, at a meeting arranged at the apartment of S.N. Prokopovich and E.D. Kuskova with representatives of the "left currents", also mentioned the book. Lvov as a candidate for prime minister, Milyukov as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Konovalov as a possible Minister of Trade and Industry, and Guchkov and Shingarev are already directly as Ministers of War and Ministers of Agriculture.

After the list of ministers, eight points of the government program followed, which were preceded by the following words: "In its present activity, the cabinet will be guided by the following grounds." The document ended with a special paragraph on "military circumstances" that should not be used by the government to delay reforms, and with the signatures of the ministers.

Thus, the first declaration of the Provisional Government was not the result of the individual creativity of the ministers. In its most important program part, it expressed an agreement between the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Provisional Committee of the State Duma on the conditions on the basis of which the Council recognized the Provisional Government created by the committee. The initial text of these conditions was drawn up by members of the delegation of the Executive Committee of the Council, and after negotiations they were adopted by the Duma Committee, since their content corresponded to the views and party guidelines of the majority of the latter.

At the same time, the introductory part of the document and the list of ministers were drawn up, in all likelihood, even before the negotiations with the Petrograd Soviet and testify to the intention of the Duma Committee to form the Council of Ministers (Provisional Government) independently of the Petrograd Soviet. The program coordinated with the Petrograd Soviet proclaimed the complete democratization of the country and the broadest political freedoms, while at the same time keeping silent about the need for social transformations. At the time the declaration was drawn up, its authors, both members of the Petrograd Soviet and the Duma Committee, assumed that the state system of Russia until the Constituent Assembly would be a constitutional monarchy. The guarantee of the promised freedoms was the real armed force, which was at the disposal of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

IN AND. Startsev

From the collection "Between two revolutions 1905-1917" (Quarterly journal of the history and culture of Russia and Eastern Europe "NESTOR" No. 3, 2000)

The text of the declaration is reprinted in the collection of documents and materials "The Revolutionary Movement in Russia after the Overthrow of the Autocracy". M., 1957. S. 419-420.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich (November 22, 1878, Anichkov Palace, St. Petersburg - June 13, 1918, near Perm) - the fourth son of Alexander III, the younger brother of Nicholas II; Russian military leader, lieutenant general (1916), adjutant general; member of the State Council (1901-1917).

From 1899 (from the date of the death of Grand Duke Georgy Alexandrovich) until August 1904 (the birth of Emperor Nicholas II's son Alexei) - heir to the throne of the Russian Empire.

During the First World War, from August 23, 1914, he commanded the Caucasian native cavalry division, and from February 4, 1916, the 2nd Cavalry Corps.
From January 19, 1917 - inspector general of the cavalry.

On March 3 (16), 1917, during the February Revolution, Emperor Nicholas II abdicated the throne, and a few hours later he decided to abdicate also for the heir, Tsarevich Alexei, in favor of Mikhail Alexandrovich, but after lengthy negotiations with representatives of the State Duma, he announced that will accept supreme power only if the will of the whole people is expressed (through the Constituent Assembly):14, and called for submission to the Provisional Government.

After the revolutionary events of February-March 1917, Mikhail was exiled to Gatchina and no longer took part in the political life of the country. From August 1917 he was under house arrest. The Bolsheviks who came to power left Mikhail Alexandrovich in Gatchina until March 1918, when it was decided to send him to the Perm province. On the night of June 12-13, 1918, Mikhail Alexandrovich was abducted and killed by a group of local Cheka and police officers, which served as a kind of signal to start killing representatives of the Romanov family who remained in Russia.

Abdication of Nicholas II

On March 2 (15), Nicholas II, under pressure from the commanders of the fronts and his entourage, decided to abdicate in favor of his heir, Tsarevich Alexei, under the regency of Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich. During the day, the king decided to abdicate also for the heir.

The renunciation manifesto ended with the words:<…>in agreement with the State Duma, We recognized it as a blessing to abdicate the Throne of the Russian State and lay down the supreme power from Ourself. Not wanting to part with Our beloved Son, We pass on Our heritage to Our Brother, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich and bless Him to ascend the Throne of the State of Russia<…>».

From the telegram of Nicholas II:

March 3, 1917
Petrograd.
His Imperial Majesty Michael II. The events of recent days forced me to decide irrevocably on this extreme step. Forgive me if I upset you and that I did not have time to warn you. I remain forever faithful and devoted brother. I fervently pray to God to help you and your Motherland.
Nicky.

Abdication of Mikhail Alexandrovich

The candidacy of Mikhail Alexandrovich to the Russian throne when establishing a system of constitutional monarchy seemed to many contemporaries the only option for the evolutionary development of Russia. In the active army at dawn on March 3, 1917, many military units began to swear allegiance to Emperor Michael II.
P. N. Krasnov recalled that when, in his 4th Cavalry Division, he announced the accession to the throne of Mikhail, the answer to him was the thousands of “Hurrah!” lined up for the announcement of this news parts.

Mikhail Alexandrovich, however, did not dare to take the throne, since he did not have any real power. His hesitations finally ended after negotiations with representatives of the State Duma headed by M. V. Rodzianko, who directly stated that if he assumed the throne, a new uprising would break out in the capital and the Duma could not guarantee his safety. At the same time, during the negotiations, P. N. Milyukov tried to persuade the Grand Duke not to abdicate the throne and even suggested that all the monarchical forces leave Petrograd and group in a more conservative Moscow, but the prospect of a civil war that opened up extremely frightened everyone present.

On March 3 (16) in response to the Manifesto of the abdication of Nicholas II, the “Michael Manifesto” was drawn up (published on March 4 (17)). In it, Mikhail Alexandrovich asked all citizens of Russia to submit to the Provisional Government and announced that he would accept supreme power only if the people expressed their will to do so through a popular vote in the election of representatives to the Constituent Assembly, which was supposed to decide the issue of the “form of government” by the state . Thus, the return of the monarchy (in its constitutional form) was not excluded:14.

According to a number of historians:14 and biographers of Mikhail Alexandrovich, the latter, from the moment of signing the Manifesto on the abdication of Nicholas II and until the signing of his own manifesto (less than a day), de jure was the Emperor of All Russia - Mikhail II. In his Manifesto, he, remaining emperor, gave the Constituent Assembly, duly elected by the people, the right to decide on the form of government. A number of modern encyclopedic publications also adhere to a similar interpretation. According to the historian L.A. Lykova, from a legal point of view, Mikhail remained emperor until his death in June 1918:14.

Watch in advance "Logicology - about the fate of man".

Consider the FULL NAME code tables. \If there is a shift in numbers and letters on your screen, adjust the image scale\.

17 32 45 46 60 75 78 91 101 123 124 134 146 147 159 165 176 194 195 209 214 231 246 249 259 283
R O M A N O V M I K H A I L A L E X A N D R O V I C
283 266 251 238 237 223 208 205 192 182 160 159 149 137 136 124 118 107 89 88 74 69 52 37 34 24

13 23 45 46 56 68 69 81 87 98 116 117 131 136 153 168 171 181 205 222 237 250 251 265 280 283
M I H A I L A L E X A N D R O V I C R O M A N O V
283 270 260 238 237 227 215 214 202 196 185 167 166 152 147 130 115 112 102 78 61 46 33 32 18 3

ROMANOV MIKHAIL ALEKSANDROVICH \u003d 283 \u003d 102-SHOT + 181-SHOT IN THE HEART.

283 = 205-\ 102-SHOT + 103-SHOT \ + 78-HEART.

283 = 208-\ 102-SHOT + 106-SHOT IN... \ + 75-HEART.

283 \u003d 56-DIED + 227-DEATH FROM A SHOT.

283 \u003d 89-DEATH + 194-FROM THE SHOT DIED.

283 = 123-DEATH FROM... + 160-SHOT DIED.

Consider the table, taking once the letters included in the FULL NAME code:

17 32 45 46 60 63 73 95 107 113 124 142 147 171
R O M A N V I C H L E X S D C
171 154 139 126 125 111 108 98 76 64 58 47 29 24

171 \u003d 154-SHOT + 17-R \ shot \.

171 \u003d 63-DEATH + 108-SHOOTING.

73 = DIST\ rel \
__________________
108 = SHOOTING

283 \u003d 171-\ 63-DEATH + 108-SHOOTING \ + 112- \ 108-SHOOTING + 4-G (ibel) \.

Code DATE OF DEATH: 06/13/1918. This = 13 + 06 + 19 + 18 = 56 = EXECUTED = DIED.

Code of the full DATE OF DEATH \u003d 217-THIRTEENTH OF JUNE + 37-\ 19 + 18 \- (code of the YEAR OF DEATH) \u003d 254.

254 = 102-SHOT + 152-SHOT IN THE HEART \ tse \.

Code for the number of full YEARS OF LIFE = 123-THIRTY + 94-NINE = 217 = JUNE THIRTEENTH.

283 = 217-THIRTY-NINE + 66-KILL.

217 - 66 = 151 = SHOT IN THE HEART.

Look at the top table:

134 = THIRTY NINE
________________________________________________
159 = 108-SHOT + 51-KILL

147 = SHOT TO THE HEART \ = END OF LIFE
_____________________________________________________
137 = THIRTY NINE \ yat \ = END OF LIFE \ and \

The real revolution took place on March 2-3 (15-16), when the monarchical power and the renewed order of government associated with it collapsed: we must not forget that on the night of March 1 (14) to March 2 (15), Nicholas II granted the State Duma the right to form the Council ministers, and Russia became a constitutional monarchy. With the collapse of the throne, the national symbol, the usual political rite for the masses, disappeared, and, most perniciously, the multimillion-strong army was instantly released from the oath to the legitimate heir to the throne, Tsarevich Alexei Nikolayevich. Now the fate of the Russian state and society depended on the will and activities of the newborn holders of power - the Provisional Government, the Soviets, and in the future - on the decisions of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, which was not provided for by the code of laws.

Drama Discussion: Sad Conclusions

The riots and the soldiers' revolt of the "reserves" that broke out in Petrograd on February 23-27 (March 8-12, NS) in 1917 were not the result of any conspiracy, the activities of the political underground or German agents. None of these reasons could bring hundreds of thousands of people to the streets, much less provoke a spontaneous revolt of the huge Petrograd garrison deep in the rear of the armies of the Northern Front. The scope of the metropolitan unrest turned out to be complete surprise even for professional revolutionaries - according to one of his contemporaries, February found them "sleeping like foolish gospel virgins."

On February 28-March 2 (March 13-15), the unrest grew rapidly and spilled out beyond the borders of Petrograd: a bloody sailor riot in Kronstadt and on the ships of the Baltic Fleet, unrest in Moscow and the transfer of the Moscow garrison to the side of opponents of the autocracy, unrest in Nizhny Novgorod and Tver. .. A social explosion in one city took on the character of a landslide state crisis in war conditions.

However, until 2-3 (15-16) March, only the rebellion of the rear garrisons won, primarily in Petrograd and Moscow. The real revolution took place on March 2-3 (15-16), when the monarchical power and the renewed order of government associated with it collapsed: we must not forget that on the night of March 1 (14) to March 2 (15), Nicholas II granted the State Duma the right to form the Council ministers, and Russia became a constitutional monarchy. With the collapse of the throne disappeared national symbol, habitual political practice for the masses of the people, and what is most pernicious - the multimillion-strong army was instantly released from the oath to the legitimate heir to the throne, Tsarevich Alexei Nikolaevich. Now the fate of the Russian state and society depended on the will and activities of the newborn holders of power - the Provisional Government, the Soviets, and in the future - on the decisions of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, which was not provided for by the code of laws.

So, why did the monarchical power collapse so rapidly?.. But a single and monosyllabic answer is inappropriate here.

1. The Great War demanded huge sacrifices: the regular army and officer corps of the imperial infantry died on the battlefields. For the lack of ammunition, technical means of combat and managerial mistakes at the front, one had to pay with their lives the best soldiers and officers. According to the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Nikolai Golovin, "like a very rich man, our command staff is accustomed to pouring officers' and soldiers' blood too recklessly." As a result, for 27 months of the war there was qualitative thinning the civil stratum of Russian society, and the composition of the multi-million army has irreversibly changed and deteriorated. Therefore, her senior commanders were tormented by the inevitable question - is it possible to rely on such an army to protect the vacillating throne and unpopular supreme power without the risk of disintegration of the troops? .. The revolution came to Russia in the form of a ferocious revolt of soldiers in the capital's garrison, which consisted in the absolute majority of yesterday's peasants in gray overcoats.

2. All the warring peoples were tired of the hardships and losses of the Great War, but our uncultured people were tired of military hardships and became impatiently irritated. earlier than others due to deep social backwardness - the pernicious legacy of the Petrine state. Hidden Bolshevism, as natural as obscenity, hooliganism and swearing, was born and spilled over into the “God-bearing people” long before February. Healthy Christian preaching in Russia failed, as the Church, captivated by the state, experienced a deep crisis. The most important institutions of civil freedom - peasant property, self-government, public education and world courts - only strengthened in Russia.

The February riot of 1917 was largely born out of a spontaneous rear protest against the war: incomprehensible, meaningless and painful for that time for the dense majority of the people. February made the "God-bearing people": hundreds of thousands of striking workers and the murderers of their officers - the ranks of the reserve battalions of the Petrograd garrison and the sailors of the Baltic Fleet. It was they who became the main participants, extras and the driving force of the revolution.

3. The revolutionaries were not ready for the Petrograd turmoil. But half a century of underground socialist preaching - against the backdrop of half-hearted and sluggish reforms - was not in vain. Therefore, February quickly received its socialist leaders, confident in the grandiosity and magic of the coming rule of the people. The activism of the Russian revolutionaries, who had been fighting against tsarist power for almost a century, created the Petrograd Soviet, based on a rebellious force that the State Duma did not have. The Duma gave birth to power without force, and the socialist Petrograd Soviet headed a spontaneous force without formal power.

4. Neither the old Russian power, in the person of the monarch and the government, nor society, in the person of its representatives, knew how to talk to each other: they simply did not have such historical experience. For two hundred imperial years, the authorities did not take care to create representative bodies and accustom society to a calm dialogue within the framework of the law. When the Duma was established in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century, it turned out that neither the Duma members nor the authorities were accustomed to hear and listen each other, unable to limit their claims and ambitions, unable to find a compromise and use a legal platform for discussion.

Probably, in the conditions of peaceful development of the country - with sin in half - they would have learned. But in the conditions of the protracted war, the Duma turned not only into the headquarters of the liberal opposition, but also into the center for the interception of power, which from the autumn of 1915 became increasingly weak and unattractive. Neither the Duma members, who dreamed of gaining the right to appoint the Council of Ministers (a “responsible ministry”), nor Emperor Nicholas II, who did not want to sacrifice autocracy “saving as of old,” categorically did not want even a modest compromise (option: appoints several ministers Duma, and the key members of the cabinet - the sovereign). From the sharp confrontation between the tsarist government and the Duma, the political February was born.

5. The irresponsibility of the Duma opposition is striking and depressing. Milyukov's unscrupulous speech on November 1, 1916, which served as a signal to "storm the government," became its vivid symbol. The uncompromising struggle for a "responsible ministry", which the Duma members stubbornly waged in the midst of a difficult war, pushed Russia towards February.

6. In turn, the government itself diligently weakened the vertical of government. Issues of supplying Petrograd were not resolved, the discontent of the population accumulated. During the February riots in the capital, all the responsible persons appointed by Nicholas II to key posts turned out to be completely unsuitable for their positions: Chairman of the Council of Ministers Prince Golitsyn, Minister of the Interior Protopopov, Commander of the Petrograd Military District of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Khabalov, Minister of War General of Infantry Belyaev. Their confusion and unprofessionalism allowed the Petrograd riots to gain momentum on February 23-25.

On the evening of February 27, the tsarist ministers turned to the sovereign with a request to grant Russia a "responsible ministry" and, without any Highest command, actually resigned their powers. The self-liquidation of the Council of Ministers was the culmination of the impotence and irresponsibility of the supreme executive power.

7. The "Rasputin story" discredited the Empress Alexandra Feodorovna, and with her the Emperor Nicholas II. “The cunning, swindling man,” as Major General Batyushin called Rasputin, dishonored and compromised the royal family in a monstrous form of false sanctity. The conflict over Rasputin broke the unity in the House of Romanov as well, and Grand Duchess Elizaveta Feodorovna sent a telegram of congratulations to Princess Yusupova, the mother of one of the murderers of the ill-fated "old man": "All my deep and fervent prayers surround you all for the patriotic act of your dear son ". The murder of Rasputin became a crude and cynical crime. But an even worse event was the apparent impotence of the tsarist government, which refused to punish the murderers.

8. "Guchkov's conspiracy" existed on the eve of February. A small group of monarchist conspirators planned to carry out a behind-the-scenes palace coup and enthrone Tsarevich Alexei Nikolaevich under a regent from the House of Romanov in order to prevent, as they thought, an inevitable revolutionary explosion, the collapse of the throne and dynasty. Nicholas II and Alexandra Fedorovna, as Guchkov sincerely believed, provoked the revolution with their "mediocre management", so the transition to a constitutional monarchy was necessary. But in practice, the preparations for the coup were not completed: riots and a soldier's revolt broke out in Petrograd before the conspirators had finished planning their actions - very chaotic, judging by fragmentary testimonies and testimonies.

The question of the extent to which Guchkov's intentions could become a reality will forever remain open, since none of the representatives of the highest generals and army command sympathized with the idea of ​​a palace coup. Any conspiracy theories on this matter remain only unprovable assumptions. However, rumors and gossip about the upcoming "palace coup" created a nervous atmosphere on the eve of February, contributed to the decline in the prestige of the royal name, the disintegration of power and the elite.

9. There was no “conspiracy of generals” who allegedly wanted to achieve the abdication of Nicholas II in favor of Tsarevich Alexei - this is a legend composed by unscrupulous emigre publicists who suffered from incontinence of monarchical feelings.

The terrible fate of the last Russian emperor and members of his family made such a heavy impression on his contemporaries that any attempts to take an unbiased look at the political activities of Nicholas II and his administrative decisions seemed an insult to the memory of the royal martyrs. At the end of 1915, the Russian political elite needed a "scapegoat" who would take on the thankless task of restoring the bloodless army after the "Great Retreat" - having completed his mission, this person had to hand over the army to the victorious tsar and go into the shadows. Such a general was found in the person of Alekseev. And in emigration they decided to posthumously make him a "scapegoat" - the main culprit of February and the collapse of the monarchical power, so as not to place any responsibility on the executed emperor.

Joint participation in any conspiracy implies a necessary degree of personal trust: however, Generals Alekseev and Ruzsky had been so hostile to each other since 1914 that any conspiracy between them looked incredible. Since 1915, Ruzsky had been intriguing against Alekseev and wanted him removed from the post of Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. No less cool relations existed between Generals Alekseev and Lukomsky since the pre-war period. The decision to send tsarist trains from Malaya Vishera to Pskov, where the headquarters of the armies of the Northern Front was located, was made on the night of March 1 not by Alekseev, not Ruzsky, but by the sovereign himself and the ranks of his retinue.

Correspondence and telegrams from the Headquarters during the days of the February Revolution show how stunned Alekseev and other generals were by the speed of events and the transformation of the anarchist revolt in Petrograd into all-Russian turmoil. The position of Alekseev himself changed as the situation in Russia worsened and threats to the rear of the Army in the field increased: on February 27-28, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief agreed only with the need to replace the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and moderate concessions to the Duma on the principles of government formation. Only late in the evening of March 1 did Alekseev consider it necessary, as a concession, to give the Duma the right to form a cabinet of ministers - and the emperor eventually agreed to his request. Only on the morning of March 2, having become acquainted with the content of the night negotiations between Rodzianko and Ruzsky, Alekseev considered lesser evil — compared to the real risks of civil war in metropolitan centers- the transfer of the throne from Nicholas II to Tsarevich Alexei Nikolaevich, but at the same time he expressed his personal opinion about the abdication to the king vaguely.

In the context of spontaneous social upheavals that swept the country, the main task of the generals and moderate public and political figures was to keep the front from rebellion and collapse, to preserve the dynasty, the throne and the renewed political system. army of millions was bound by an oath not only to NicholasII, but also to Tsarevich Alexei Nikolaevich, whose accession to the throne would become a positive and pacifying factor in stabilizing the upset situation. Therefore, the transfer of the throne to the fully capable Tsarevich Alexei Nikolayevich, regardless of his age, health and position of his parents, seemed the only reasonable way out of the acute dynastic crisis that had been brewing since the autumn of 1915 and culminated in a revolutionary explosion in Petrograd.

10. To a much greater extent than the mythical "generals' conspiracy", the spread of rebellion and unrest, as well as the negotiations between the generals and the Duma members, was facilitated by the political incapacity of Nicholas II. The autocrat in Russia existed, but the events of February 27 - March 1 showed a complete lack of autocracy- that is, a system for making clear, responsible and individual decisions by the emperor, who was at the top of the management vertical.

Before leaving Headquarters on the morning of February 28, the sovereign gave only two orders: to suppress the unrest in Petrograd and send front-line units to the Petrograd region at the disposal of General Ivanov. Unfortunately, being the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Nicholas II was guided in that situation to a greater extent by anxiety for the fate of the family, and not by the interests of the Army. Against the advice of Alekseev, Nicholas II decided to leave Headquarters and left Mogilev for Tsarskoye Selo.

Empress Alexandra Feodorovna and Chief Marshal Benkendorf offered to take the August family out of Tsarskoye Selo. It was a reasonable and sensible proposal - the emperor and the heir to the throne would be at Headquarters. However, Nicholas II did not want to disturb sick children. Instead of creating an alternative center of power and control under security conditions, subordinating all structures and departments outside the capital to it, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief left the Army and went to the revolutionary region with a small retinue, having lost contact with the Headquarters and the ability to respond to events.

At the same time, the sovereign did not hide his peace-loving moods. If Alekseev considered it necessary to concentrate a strong detachment in the area of ​​Tsarskoye Selo before the evening of February 28 and advance on Petrograd, then Nicholas II and General Ivanov still days earlier refused to send troops to the capital, not wanting to arrange a bloody assault on the city and provoke civil strife. They hoped to limit themselves to a demonstration of soft power and negotiations with the Duma. Thus, neither Nicholas II nor General Ivanov, appointed commander-in-chief of the Petrograd military district, wanted to take responsibility for the inevitable and massive bloodshed in the suppression of the Petrograd riots.

11. After the disappearance of the legitimate government of Prince Golitsyn, a huge warring empire - with chaos and a riot of soldiers in the capital - was left without control. Yes, it can be said that the Provisional Committee of the State Duma (VKGD), headed by Rodzianko, picked up - or ambitiously claimed - the power that had fallen from the hands of the Golitsyn government. But what did the Emperor of All Russia and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief do in response when he found out about this on the way to Tsarskoye Selo in the afternoon of February 28?.. Nothing.

Nicholas II had to immediately recognize the unauthorized VKGD rebellious body, appoint a new cabinet in any Russian city and declare all the orders of the VKGD invalid, demanding that the local authorities stop relations with Petrograd. Corresponding orders had to be sent to Headquarters, commanders of military districts and governors. Thus, the monarch would disavow any statements by Rodzianko. As Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Nicholas II should have immediately subordinated the entire transport network of the empire to the Headquarters, and then, ex officio, returned to the command center of the Active Army in order to lead the fight against the rebellious capital. But nothing of this was done, and the attitude of the monarch to the VKGD is not defined.

To the main question - was contact allowed with the interim government body created by the Duma to replace the disappeared Council of Ministers Golitsyn- Nicholas II did not answer. Throughout the journey to Pskov, the sovereign "sleep, ate and even occupied the closest persons of the Retinue with conversations." On the evening of February 28, he only sent a reassuring telegram from Likhoslavl to the Empress, forgetting that he was in command of a multimillion-strong army, and the Headquarters had not received any orders from him for 16 hours during the crisis, which was growing from the capital to the state. As a result, apathy and inaction reigned at the top of the Russian power vertical. Thus, Nicholas II actually tacitly acknowledged the claims of the VKGD, headed by Rodzianko, for the temporary performance of government functions. As a result of the absolute absence of any orders from the autocrat, contacts between the VKGD and the highest generals became inevitable, since in the end it was about whether the army would be able to continue the armed struggle at the front.

12. Abdication of the throne of Nicholas II on March 2 (15), 1917 was evil but lesser evil, compared with the possible consequences of the civil war. At the same time, the emperor himself did not want a bloody suppression of a new turmoil and civil strife, so the loyal telegrams of Khan of Nakhichevan and Count Keller were not only hopelessly late, but also did not make much sense. Out of a sense of duty and subordination, Nicholas II would never have approved the rebellion of individual chiefs of the Army in action against Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (the Younger), whom he himself had appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief before his abdication.

The sovereign made a sacrifice for the sake of Russia and the successful continuation of the war with an external enemy. But the sacrifice can only be voluntary: consequently, Nicholas II had a choice - to abdicate or not to abdicate. All popular versions that Nicholas II signed a “different” act of renunciation or did not sign it at all are nothing more than legends. There are more than enough documents and evidence of the renunciation from contemporaries and participants in the events, including Nicholas II himself and his mother, Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna.

However, during his abdication, Nicholas II made the most serious political mistake of his reign, illegally depriving the throne of the heir Alexei Nikolayevich. "Father's feelings" again turned out to be above the interests of the motherland and the army, which was instantly released from the oath to the Tsarevich - and the Russian Tsar as a national symbol. The decision of the sovereign to leave the boy to the family, and not to Russia, had devastating consequences.

The revocation of the oath to Alexei Nikolayevich was a huge blow to the consciousness of the uncultured soldier masses of the Army in the Field, who at that moment more or less retained discipline. The pacifying image of a child, reminiscent of the young Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich, disappeared. No longer a regent, but a new sovereign, the Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich became, who did not yet know about it, and was not flawless in the eyes of many monarchists because of his problematic marriage. If Alexei Nikolaevich, due to his age, could not abdicate, then Mikhail Alexandrovich could well do it. Therefore, the abdication for the crown prince created a direct threat to the monarchical power.

The saddest thing in this story is that both the father of the heir and the adult politicians completely ignored the opinion of Alexei Nikolayevich himself - a lively, developed, proud and fully capable boy, despite his illness.

13. Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich, despite the insistence of Guchkov and Milyukov, who belatedly assessed the danger of the situation, refused to accept power not only because of the dangerous situation in Petrograd and hidden distrust of the members of the new government of Prince Lvov. Any member of the House of Romanov who ascended the throne under such circumstances would have felt the precariousness of his position on the throne, since the violation of the legal rights of Alexei Nikolayevich by his father was beyond doubt among sane monarchists and honest lawyers. Unfortunately, Guchkov's compromise proposal to keep the throne open under the protection of the regent-protector - until the passions were appeased - was not heard and supported.

Thus, the real collapse of the monarchical power in Russia and the state order on March 2-3, 1917 did not occur as a result of the abdication of Nicholas II, but after the illegal deprivation of the rights of Tsarevich Alexei Nikolaevich, and the refusal of Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich from the perception of supreme power until the decision of the All-Russian Constituent The assembly, which was dispersed by the Bolsheviks.

The February Revolution was the result of a deep crisis of the Russian autocracy, as well as centuries-old socio-political and spiritual-religious contradictions that aggravated under the influence of the Great War. Therefore, the conclusion of General Golovin should be recognized as fair: "The old regime was so psychologically undermined that the birth of a counter-revolutionary movement could not occur in the name of any restoration ideas."