The policy of war communism is the introduction of surplus appropriation. Royal surplus

Such a phenomenon as the food appropriation, also known under the abbreviated name of the surplus appraisal, took place in Russia in the period from 1919 to 1921. At this time, the government decided to establish certain norms for bread and other products that the peasants could store, and they had to sell all the surplus to the state at minimum prices. Food brigades and regional councils took part in the surplus appropriation, forcibly forcing the peasants to hand over their stocks.

Impact on the population

The introduction of surplus appropriation further exacerbated the already difficult situation of the ordinary population. The norms for the delivery of bread, which were distributed or allocated as a tribute, very often exceeded the actual reserves of the inhabitants.

Many peasants attempted to hide their products, but the food detachments quickly found everything and even punished the malicious "concealers".

Surplus appraisal results

Already during the first year of the food terror and the beginning of food distribution, about 44.6 million poods of grain were purchased from the population. The second year marked a serious increase in indicators and brought the state 113.9 million pounds. The sharp increase in indicators was provoked by the invasion of whites, since part of the ordinary population agreed to support the communists in order to avoid the victory of enemy forces. Therefore, in November 1917 alone, about 33.7 million poods were handed over, but this became possible only thanks to the Provisional Government's food reserves apparatus, which was then functioning, with the help of which the surplus was carried out.

This phenomenon, the purpose of which was to provide the armed forces, had a number of disadvantages. The main problem here was poor organization, due to which a large part of the collected stocks never reached their destinations on time, but simply deteriorated from time to time. For the needs of the army, 60% of meat and fish, 100% of tobacco and 40% of bread, which were collected according to the surplus appropriation, were used. The peasants and ordinary workers were forced to starve, while the food taken from them, reaching the big cities, was very often stolen and divided into rations.

What was the surplus for?

The definition of limits for the amount of products of the peasants made it possible to keep workers and employees at least half-starved. The soldiers were a little more lucky, and the state leadership was on the best conditions, which was provided with regular meals. The surplus appropriation became the reason for the lack of desire among the peasants to work, since the entire crop was taken away from them anyway. This was one of the main factors that led to the complete ruin of agriculture by 1921. Mass uprisings of peasants began throughout the country, demanding the abolition of such procedures.

During this period, the surplus appropriation was replaced by a tax in kind, which was the first and most important step for

Advantages and disadvantages

Despite the fact that this process was able to relatively stabilize the food situation in the country, it also brought many negative consequences. Officially, the surplus appraisal was introduced on January 11, 1919, in a very difficult period for the Soviet government, when the country needed support.

According to the official version, the peasants had to hand over the surplus of their products, which exceeded the norms that were established by the government, but did the surplus take place? It is quite difficult to establish now, almost a century later, but still some authentic information has been preserved. Sometimes ordinary peasants were also taken away from what was supposed to remain for the personal needs of the population, and the money they were supposed to receive was replaced by various kinds of receipts for which nothing could be purchased. This led to bloodshed, arrests and uprisings. Therefore, from a historical point of view, this is a twofold process.

Data

• The first stages of surplus appropriation in the slowly collapsing Russian Empire began as early as December 1916. But this, like many other undertakings of the government, only contributed to the imminent collapse of the state.
• which also resorted to food revisions, was able to succeed in replenishing food stocks, collecting 280 million poods of grain out of a planned 650.

• Prodrazverstka, officially introduced at the beginning of 1919, became part of the Bolsheviks' food terror during which it took place during the time of "war communism".
• For the Bolsheviks, the surplus appraisal (this has been officially proven) was rather difficult. Its implementation was initially impossible in some territories, so it was carried out only in the central region of the country.
• Initially, the surplus appraisal applied exclusively to grain, but at the end of 1920, measures were already applied to all existing agricultural products.
• Initially, the peasants were going to be paid for the collected products, but the delivery of goods turned out to be practically free of charge, because the money was depreciated, and the industry was in complete decline - there was nothing to change for.

• Naturally, the peasants did not always agree to voluntarily part with their belongings, so there were special armed detachments, committees of the poor and Red Army units.
• When the peasants no longer had the desire or the ability to resist the measures of the government, they began to hide food and grow bread no more than the norm.
• Even taking into account that the food dictatorship led to the deprivation of the peasants, there is no doubt that only the surplus appropriation could feed the army. This phenomenon also helped to save the urban proletariat.
• Between 1918 and 1920, the head of the Russian food detachment was a communist who later became a member. It was Roland Freisler.

Outcome

The phenomenon of food distribution, like many other initiatives introduced by the Bolsheviks, had both a number of advantages and many shortcomings. Although this process helped provide the military with the necessary products, most of the goods simply disappeared, although they were taken from the people who needed them - this is how the surplus was actually carried out. The year when it began was the beginning of stability and the beginning of everything that would lead to a serious crisis in the future.

On January 11, 1919, by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars, food distribution was introduced throughout the territory of Soviet Russia. It consisted in the obligatory delivery by the peasants to the state at fixed prices of all surplus grain and other agricultural products in excess of the established minimum norms provided for satisfying personal and economic needs. Thus, the Soviet state resumed in an expanded version the policy of forced withdrawal of food products, which was used by the tsarist, and then by the Provisional government, to maintain the efficiency of industrial centers in conditions of war and economic disruption.

V. I. Lenin considered the surplus appraisal to be the most important element and the basis of the entire policy of “war communism”. In his work “On the food tax,” he wrote: “A kind of “war communism” consisted in the fact that we actually took from the peasants all the surpluses and sometimes not even surpluses, but part of the food necessary for the peasant, took to cover the costs of the army and maintenance workers. They took mostly on credit, for paper money. Otherwise, we could not defeat the landowners and capitalists in a devastated petty-bourgeois country.

The collection of products was carried out by the bodies of the People's Commissariat for Food (Narkomprod), food detachments with the active assistance of the committees of the poor (kombeds) and local Soviets. At the initial stage, in the second half of 1918 - early 1919, the surplus appraisal captured only a part of the provinces of Central Russia and extended to bread and grain fodder. During the procurement campaign of 1919-1920, it operated throughout the entire territory of the RSFSR, Soviet Ukraine and Belarus, Turkestan and Siberia, and also covered potatoes, meat, and by the end of 1920, almost all agricultural products.

Food was confiscated from the peasants virtually free of charge, since the banknotes that were issued as compensation were almost completely depreciated, and the state could not offer industrial goods in return for the seized grain due to the fall in industrial production during the war and intervention.

The discontent and active resistance of the peasants during the seizure of products were suppressed by the armed detachments of the commanders, as well as by special forces of the Red Army and detachments of the Prodarmia. In response, the peasants switched to passive methods of struggle: they hid bread, refused to accept money that had lost its ability to pay, reduced acreage and production so as not to create useless surpluses for themselves, and produced products only based on the needs of their own families.

The surplus appraisal led to serious consequences both in the economic and social spheres. There was a sharp narrowing of the sphere of commodity-money relations: trade was curtailed, in particular, the free sale of bread and grain was prohibited, the depreciation of money accelerated, and the wages of workers were naturalized. All this made it impossible to restore the national economy. In addition, relations between the city and the countryside, between peasants and representatives of the Soviet government, deteriorated significantly, peasant uprisings broke out everywhere. Therefore, in March 1921, the surplus was replaced by a clearly fixed food tax.

A little about surplus

Prodrazverstka (in other words, the state monopoly on bread) is not an "invention" of the Bolsheviks.

For the first time, the surplus appraisal was introduced in the Russian Empire back in 1916, when, during the First World War, surplus food was confiscated from the peasants to supply the Russian army and industrial workers working for defense. On November 29, 1916, a decree on the grain apportionment was signed, and on December 7, the norms of provincial supplies were determined, followed by the calculation of the surplus appraisal for counties and volosts.

After the February Revolution, on March 25, 1917, the Provisional Government adopted a law on the grain monopoly: "It is an inevitable, bitter, sad measure to take the distribution of grain stocks into the hands of the state. It is impossible to do without this measure." The food program was based on the active intervention of the state in the economy: the establishment of fixed prices, the distribution of products, and the regulation of production.

But the Provisional Government had neither the strength nor the will to implement these plans. But the Bolsheviks had enough, although not immediately and as a necessary measure (one of the Bolshevik slogans with which they came to power: "Land to the peasants!").

During the Civil War, the surplus appraisal was introduced on January 11, 1919 ("Decree on the introduction of the surplus for bread"), when the Soviet government, being in the ring of fronts, was deprived of the most important sources of raw materials and food, Donetsk coal, Baku and Grozny oil, southern and Ural metal, Siberian, Kuban and Ukrainian bread, Turkestan cotton, in connection with which in the economy it was forced to pursue the mobilization policy of war communism, part of which was the surplus appropriation.

Initially, the surplus appraisal extended to bread and grain fodder. During the procurement campaign (1919-20) it also covered potatoes, meat, and by the end of 1920 almost all agricultural products.

Food was confiscated from the peasants virtually free of charge, since the banknotes that were offered as payment were almost completely depreciated, and the state could not offer industrial goods in return for the seized grain due to the fall in industrial production during the war and intervention.

In addition, when determining the size of the distribution, they often proceeded not from the actual food surpluses of the peasants, but from the food needs of the army and the urban population, therefore, not only the available surpluses, but very often the entire seed fund and agricultural products needed to feed the peasant himself, were confiscated on the ground.

The discontent and resistance of the peasants during the seizure of products was suppressed by the armed detachments of the committees of the poor, as well as by the special forces of the Red Army (CHON).

It can be argued with a high degree of certainty that, without using the surplus appropriation, the Bolshevik government (like any other) in its place would not have been able to stay in power. It is impossible not to mention that all other armies, forces and governments that took place on the territory of Russia during the civil war also confiscated food from the rural population.

Nevertheless, the authorities had to suppress the active resistance of the peasants to the surplus appropriation. This led to their passive resistance: the peasants hid bread, refused to accept money that had lost its ability to pay, reduced acreage and production so as not to create useless surpluses for themselves, and produced products only in accordance with the consumer norm for their families.

Many people tried to feed themselves during the famine through petty trade (the so-called "sacks"). They boarded freight trains (passenger trains did not run during the civil war), went to the village and bought bread and other food from the peasants or exchanged for valuable goods, which they then either consumed themselves or sold in the city at the flea market and black markets. Sackers were persecuted by the Soviet authorities as "speculators", they were rounded up.

RODINA magazine, April 2016 (number four)

Nikolai Zayats, postgraduate student

Royal surplus
How bread was confiscated from the peasants of the Voronezh province during the First World War

"Wheat and flour crisis"

With the outbreak of the First World War in Russia, essential necessities rose in price, the prices for which by 1916 had increased two to three times. The governors' ban on the export of food from the provinces, the introduction of fixed prices, the distribution of cards and purchases by local authorities did not improve the situation. Cities suffered severely from food shortages and high prices. The essence of the crisis was clearly presented in the memorandum of the Voronezh Stock Exchange Committee to the meeting at the Moscow Stock Exchange in September 1916. She stated that market relations had penetrated the countryside. The peasantry was able to sell less important items of production for a higher price and at the same time hold back bread for a rainy day due to the uncertainty of the outcome of the war and increasing mobilizations.

At the same time, the urban population suffered. “We consider it necessary to pay special attention to the fact that the wheat and flour crisis would have come much earlier if trade and industry had not had some untouchable stock of wheat in the form of another cargo that had been lying at railway stations, waiting for loading since 1915, at the disposal of trade and industry. and even since 1914, - wrote the stockbrokers, - and if the Ministry of Agriculture had not released wheat from its stock to mills in 1916 ... and destined in a timely manner not at all for food of the population, but for other purposes. The note firmly expressed the conviction that the solution to the crisis that threatened the whole country could be found only in a complete change in the country's economic policy and the mobilization of the national economy. Such plans have been repeatedly expressed by various public and state organizations. The situation required radical economic centralization and the involvement of all public organizations in the work.

The introduction of the surplus

However, at the end of 1916, the authorities, not daring to change, limited themselves to a plan of mass requisition of grain. The free purchase of bread was replaced by a surplus appraisal between producers. The size of the outfit was set by the chairman of the special meeting in accordance with the harvest and the size of the reserves, as well as the consumption norms of the province. Responsibility for the collection of grain was assigned to the provincial and district zemstvo councils. Through local surveys, it was necessary to find out the required amount of bread, subtract it from the general attire for the county, and distribute the remainder between the volosts, which were supposed to bring the amount of the attire to each rural community. The councils were supposed to distribute outfits among counties by December 14, by December 20 to develop outfits for volosts, by December 24, for rural communities, and, finally, by December 31, every householder had to know about his outfit. The confiscation was assigned to the zemstvo bodies together with the food procurement commissioners.

Having received the circular, the Voronezh provincial government convened on December 6-7, 1916, a meeting of the chairmen of the zemstvo councils, at which a layout scheme was developed and outfits for counties were calculated. The council was instructed to develop schemes and volost apportionments. At the same time, the question of the unfeasibility of the outfit was raised. According to a telegram from the Ministry of Agriculture, an allotment of 46,951 thousand poods was imposed on the province: 36,470 thousand rye, 3,882 thousand wheat, 2,43 thousand millet, and 4,169 thousand oats. I present to you now to increase the number of grains assigned by paragraph 1 in the allocation, and in the event of an increase of not less than 10%, I undertake by no means to include your province in a possible additional allocation. This meant that the plan was raised to 51 million poods.

The calculations carried out by the zemstvos showed that the full implementation of the apportionment was associated with the seizure of almost all grain from the peasants: at that time only 1.79 million poods of rye remained in the province, and wheat was threatened with a deficit of 5 million. This amount could hardly be enough for consumption and new sowing bread, not to mention the feeding of livestock, which in the province, according to a rough estimate, there were more than 1.3 million heads. Zemstvos noted: “In record years, the province gave 30 million throughout the year, and now it is planned to take 50 million within 8 months, moreover, in a year with a crop below average and on the condition that the population, not confident in sowing and harvesting the future harvest, cannot but strive to stockpile. Given that the railroad lacked 20% of the wagons, and this problem could not be solved in any way, the meeting considered: “All these considerations lead to the conclusion that the recovery of the above amount of grain is in fact unfeasible.” The zemstvo noted that the ministry had calculated the apportionment, obviously not based on the statistical data presented to it. Of course, this was not an accidental bad luck of the province - such a rough calculation, not taking into account the real state of affairs, concerned the whole country. As it was found out from a survey of the Union of Cities in January 1917: “the distribution of grain was carried out in the provinces for no one knows what, sometimes inconsistently, placing on some provinces a completely unbearable burden for them.” This alone indicated that the plan would fail. At the December meeting in Kharkov, the head of the provincial council V.N. Tomanovsky tried to prove this to the Minister of Agriculture A.A. Rittikh, to which he replied: “Yes, all this may be true, but such an amount of bread is needed for the army and for factories working for defense, since this allocation covers exclusively these two needs ... this must be given and we must give it obliged."

The meeting also informed the ministry that “the administrations have neither material means nor means of influencing those who do not want to obey the terms of the apportionment”, so the meeting requested to give them the right to open bulk points and requisition premises for them. In addition, in order to save fodder for the army, the meeting asked to cancel the provincial outfits for cake. These considerations were sent to the authorities, but had no effect. As a result, the allocation was distributed by the Voronezh residents, and even with the recommended increase of 10%.

The deployment will be done!

The Voronezh provincial zemstvo assembly, due to the busyness of the chairmen of the district councils who were engaged in the collection of bread in the villages, was postponed from January 15, 1917 to February 5, and then to February 26. But even this number the quorum did not take place, instead of 30 people. 18 gathered. 10 people sent a telegram that they could not come to the congress. Chairman of the Zemstvo Assembly A.I. Alekhin was forced to ask those who came not to leave Voronezh, hoping that a quorum would be gathered. It was only at the meeting on March 1 that it was decided "immediately" to start collecting. This meeting also behaved ambivalently. After an exchange of views on the proposal of the representative of the Valuysky district, S.A. The Blinov Assembly drafted a resolution to report to the government, in which it actually recognized its requirements as unrealistic: “The size of the outfit given to the Voronezh province is without a doubt excessively exaggerated and practically unfeasible ... since its implementation in full should have led to the removal of all bread without a trace. The meeting again pointed out the lack of fuel for grinding bread, bread bags, the collapse of the railway. However, references to all these obstacles ended with the fact that the assembly, having submitted to the highest authority, promised that “by the common friendly efforts of the population and its representatives - in the person of zemstvo figures” the apportionment would be carried out. Thus, contrary to the facts, those “extremely resolute, optimistic statements of the official and semi-official press” were supported, which, according to contemporaries, accompanied the campaign.

However, it is difficult to say how real the Zemstvos' assurances about the seizure of "all grain without a trace" were in the event of a complete implementation of the apportionment. It was no secret to anyone that there was bread in the province. But its exact amount was unknown - as a result, the Zemstvos were forced to derive figures from the data of the agricultural census, consumption and sowing rates, farm productivity, etc. At the same time, the bread of previous harvests was not taken into account, since, according to the councils, it had already gone for consumption. Although this opinion seems debatable, given that many contemporaries mention the grain reserves of the peasants and the markedly increased level of their well-being during the war, other facts confirm that there was a clear shortage of bread in the countryside. The city shops of Voronezh were regularly besieged by poor peasants from the suburbs and even other volosts. In the Korotoyaksky district, according to reports, the peasants said: “We ourselves can hardly get bread, but the lords [landlords] have a lot of bread and a lot of cattle, but they have few requisitioned cattle, and therefore it is necessary to requisition both bread and cattle.” Even the most prosperous Valuysky uyezd provided for itself largely through the delivery of grain from the Kharkov and Kursk provinces. When deliveries from there were banned, the situation in the county deteriorated noticeably. Obviously, the point is the social stratification of the village, in which the poor of the village suffered no less than the poor of the city. In any case, the fulfillment of the government's allocation plan was impossible: there was no organized apparatus for collecting and accounting for grain, the allocation was arbitrary, there was not enough material base for the collection and storage of grain, and the railway crisis was not resolved. Moreover, the surplus appropriation, aimed at supplying the army and factories, did not solve the problem of supplying cities, which, with a decrease in grain supplies in the province, was only to become aggravated.

According to the plan, in January 1917 the province was to hand over 13.45 million poods of grain: of which 10 million poods of rye, 1.25 of wheat, 1.4 of oats, 0.8 of millet; the same amount was supposed to be prepared in February. To collect grain, the provincial zemstvo organized 120 reference points, 10 per county, located 50-60 miles from each other, and most of them were supposed to open in February. Difficulties began already during the apportionment: Zadonsky district took over only part of the order (instead of 2.5 million only 0.5 mln. The apportionment of the attire by the volosts was released from the control of the administrations due to the lack of reliable communication with the villages, so the matter there dragged on for a long time.

“A whole number of volosts completely refuses ... apportionment”

Already during the period of preparations, the zemstvos were skeptical about their result: “At least, the reports that have already arrived from some districts convince us of this, firstly, that a number of volosts completely refuse any appropriation, and, secondly, that and in those volosts where the apportionment was made by the volost gatherings in full - later, during the settled and economic apportionment, it is found that it is impossible to carry it out”16. The sale didn't go well. Even in Valuysky uyezd, which was subject to the smallest apportionment, and the population was in the best position, things were going badly - many peasants assured that they did not have so much bread17. Where there was bread, speculation dictated the laws. In one village, the peasants agreed to sell wheat at a price of 1.9 rubles. per pood, but soon tacitly refused this: “Then it happened that those who responded to the proposal of the authorities had not yet had time to receive money for the supplied bread, when they heard that the fixed price of wheat had risen from 1 ruble 40 kopecks. up to 2 rub. 50 kop. Thus, the more patriotic peasants will receive less for their bread than those who keep it for themselves. Now such a conviction reigns among the peasants that the more they hold back grain, the more the government will increase fixed prices, and the zemstvo chiefs do not need to be trusted, since they only deceive the people.

The procurement campaign was not supported by real means of implementation. The government tried to overcome this with threats. On February 24, Rittikh sent a telegram to Voronezh, in which he ordered, first of all, to proceed with the requisition of grain in the villages, most stubbornly unwilling to carry out the apportionment. At the same time, it was necessary to leave one pood of grain per capita on the farm until the harvest of a new crop, but no later than the first of September, as well as for the spring seeding of fields according to the norms established by the zemstvo council and for feeding livestock - according to the norms established by the authorized (even this manifested itself inconsistency). Governor M.D. Ershov, fulfilling the requirements of the authorities, on the same day sent telegrams to the county zemstvo councils, in which he demanded that they immediately start deliveries of bread. If the delivery does not begin within three days, the authorities were instructed to proceed with requisitions "with a decrease in the fixed price by 15 percent and, in case of non-delivery by the owners [of bread] to the receiving point, with a deduction in addition to the cost of transportation" . The government has not provided any specific directives for the implementation of these instructions. Meanwhile, such actions required providing them with an extensive network of executive apparatus, which the zemstvos did not have. It is not surprising that they, for their part, did not try to be zealous in carrying out an obviously hopeless enterprise. Ershov's order of December 6 to provide the police with "every possible assistance" in the collection of bread did not help much. V.N. Tomanovsky, who was usually very strict about state interests, took a moderate tone at the March 1 meeting: “From my point of view, we need to collect grain as much as possible, without resorting to any drastic measures, this will be some plus to the amount of stocks which we have. It is possible that the movement of the railway will improve, more cars will appear ... it would seem inappropriate to take drastic measures in the sense that “come on, carry it at all costs.”

“The apportionment undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture definitely failed”

M.V. Rodzianko wrote to the emperor just before the revolution: “The apportionment undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture definitely failed. Here are the figures characterizing the course of the latter. It was supposed to deploy 772 million pounds. Of these, up to January 23, it was theoretically distributed: 1) by the provincial zemstvos 643 million poods, that is, 129 million poods less than expected, 2) by the district zemstvos 228 million poods. and, finally, 3) volosts only 4 million poods. These figures testify to the complete collapse of the apportionment ... ".

By the end of February 1917, the province not only did not fulfill the plan, but also did not deliver 20 million poods of grain. The collected bread, as was obvious from the very beginning, could not be taken out. As a result, 5.5 million poods of grain accumulated on the railway, which the regional committee undertook to take out no earlier than in two and a half months. There were no wagons for unloading, no fuel for locomotives. It was impossible even to transport flour to dryers or grain for grinding, since the committee did not deal with domestic flights. And there was also no fuel for the mills, which is why many of them were idle or were preparing to stop working. The last attempt of the autocracy to solve the food problem failed due to the inability and unwillingness to solve the complex of real economic problems in the country and the lack of state centralization of economic management necessary in military conditions.

This problem was inherited by the Provisional Government, which followed the old path. Already after the revolution, at a meeting of the Voronezh Food Committee on May 12, Minister of Agriculture A.I. Shingarev stated that the province was short of 17 out of 30 million poods of grain: “It is necessary to decide: how right is the central administration ... and how successful will the execution of the order be, and can there be a significant excess of the order?” This time, the members of the council, clearly falling into the optimism of the first revolutionary months, assured the minister that "the mood of the population had already been determined in terms of the delivery of bread" and "with the active participation" of the food agencies, the order would be fulfilled. In July 1917, the orders were completed by 47%, in August - by 17%. There is no reason to suspect the local figures loyal to the revolution of lack of zeal. But the future showed that this time, too, the Zemstvo promise was not fulfilled. The objectively prevailing situation in the country - the exit of the economy from state control and the inability to regulate processes in the countryside - put an end to the well-intentioned efforts of local authorities.

Literature:

2 Journals of the Voronezh Provincial Zemstvo Assembly of the regular session of 1916 (February 28 ~ March 4, 1917). Voronezh, 1917. L.34-34ob.

3 State Archive of the Voronezh Region (GDVO). F.I-21. Op.1. D.2323. Sheet 23v.-25.

4 Journals of the Voronezh Provincial Zemstvo Assembly. L. 43v.

5 Sidorov D.L. The economic situation in Russia during the First World War. M, 1973. S.489.

6 GAVO. F. I-21. Op.1. D.2225. L. 14v.

7 Journals of the Voronezh Provincial Zemstvo Assembly. L. 35, 44-44v.

10 Sidorov A.L. Decree. op. P.493.

11 Popov P.A. City government of Voronezh. 1870-1918. Voronezh, 2006, p. 315.

12 GAVO. F. I-1. Op. 1. D.1249. L.7

16 GAVO. F. I-21. Op.1. D.2323. Sheet 23v.-25.

18 GAVO. F. I-1. Op. 2.D. 1138. L.419.

19 GAVO. F. I-6. Op. 1. D. 2084. L.95-97.

20 GAVO. F. I-6. Op.1. D. 2084. L.9.

21 GAVO. F. I-21. Op.1. D. 2323. Sheet 15ob.

22 Note by M.V. Rodzyanki // Red archive. 1925. V.3. P.69.

24 GAVO. F. I-21. Op.1. D.2323. L.15.

Prodrazvyorstka, food distribution- system of preparations of agricultural products. It consisted in the obligatory delivery by the peasants to the state at fixed prices of all surpluses (in excess of the established norms for personal and household needs) of bread and other products. It was used by the Soviet state during the period.

Reasons for the introduction

In 1918, the center of Soviet Russia was cut off from the most important agricultural regions of the country. Stocks of bread ran out. The urban and poorest rural populations were starving. To meet the minimum requirements, the Soviet government was forced to introduce the strictest accounting of food surpluses, mainly from the prosperous part of the village, which sought to disrupt the state grain monopoly and preserve freedom of trade. In those conditions, the surplus appraisal was the only possible form of grain procurement.

The apportionment was the most accessible measure for an insufficiently organized state to hold out in an unheard of difficult war against the landowners.

Implementation

Surplus appropriation was carried out in the 2nd half of 1918 in the provinces: Tula, Vyatka, Kaluga, Vitebsk and others.

By decree of the Council of People's Commissars from the surplus was introduced throughout the territory of Soviet Russia, later - in Ukraine and Belarus (1919), Turkestan and Siberia (1920). In accordance with the decision of the People's Commissariat of Food of 1919 on the procedure for deploying state planning targets, they were calculated on the basis of provincial data on the size of sown areas, yields, and stocks of previous years. In the provinces, the apportionment was carried out by counties, volosts, villages, and then between individual peasant farms. The collection of products was carried out by the bodies of the People's Commissariat of Food, food detachments with the active assistance of the committees and local Soviets. The surplus appraisal was an expression of the food dictatorship of the working class and the poorest peasantry.

Initially, the surplus appraisal extended to bread and grain fodder. During the procurement campaign (1919-1920), it also covered potatoes, meat, and by the end of 1920, almost all agricultural products. In 1918-1919. 107.9 million poods of grain and grain fodder were collected, in 1919-1920. 212.5 million pounds, in 1920-1921. 367 million pounds. The surplus allowed the Soviet state to solve the vital problem of planned food supply, urban workers, and the provision of raw materials for industry. Commodity-money relations narrowed with the increase in surplus-appropriation procurements (the free sale of bread and grain was prohibited). The surplus appraisal left its mark on all aspects of economic relations between the city and the countryside, becoming one of the most important elements of the "" system. With the end of the Civil War, the surplus appropriation no longer met the interests of socialist construction, hindered the restoration of the national economy, and hindered the rise of productive forces. In agriculture, sown areas were reduced, yields and gross harvests were reduced. The further preservation of the surplus appraisal caused dissatisfaction among the peasants, and in some areas, kulak-Socialist-Revolutionary revolts. With the transition of the Soviet country to

For the first time A.A. Bogdanov used the term war communism in relation to building a new type of army even before the October Revolution of 1917. Other theorists understood war communism as a complex of economic, administrative and repressive measures aimed at the total centralization of resources in the country.

- War communism is the economic policy of the state in conditions of economic ruin and civil war, the mobilization of all forces and resources for the defense of the country in the period from 1918 to 1920.

The need to pursue such a policy was dictated by the complex military situation (civil war, the need to fight intervention and counter-revolution). At the same time, the Bolsheviks had scarce resources: no more than a third of the country's military factories, controlled areas that produced no more than 10% of coal, iron and steel, and had almost no oil.

The measures of war communism are largely forced: this is clearly a decision that could not become popular with the people. The Bolsheviks took risks, but they simply had no other way to gather strength to defend the country.

The economic essence of the state policy of war communism consisted of the following measures:

• complete nationalization of all industrial enterprises and the banking sector, private property was eliminated;
• the establishment of the dictatorship of the Bolshevik Party, including on financial matters;
• the development of the institution of surplus appropriation introduced in tsarist Russia (food dictatorship);
• the introduction of universal military and labor duties (other duties: wood, underwater and horse-drawn);
• a gradual transition from commodity-money relations to barter with the ultimate goal of eliminating and liquidating the market, the transition to.

War communism mobilized the country, subordinated it to the Bolsheviks.

The disadvantages of this policy: the lack of non-violent incentives for economic growth, the discontent of the population.

In November-December 1920, decrees were adopted on the nationalization of small industry, on the abolition of payments for food and fuel, and utilities.

surplus appropriation

The state formed a plan for food, but in the current conditions there was not enough food (the problem is not new, the Provisional Government also faced it). The working class, the backbone of the Bolsheviks, was starving in large cities, and many dispersed to the villages for food. The proletariat was "eroded", the Bolsheviks were losing their human resources.

The working class must be fed in order to keep it in the cities, so pressure was put on the "village".

Surplus appropriation is understood as a forced, forcible seizure by the state with the help of food orders of surplus food from the population.

There were excesses, sometimes not surpluses were confiscated, but also the food necessary for the family, the families were starving.

Results of war communism

With the end of the war, military-communist methods have exhausted themselves: indeed, if there is no threat, why torture the population? It is time for peaceful development. But first we need to sum up.

At first glance, we got an extremely unpleasant situation: a serious decline in production. The following data are given in the literature: in 1921, the volume of industrial production amounted to 12% of the pre-war level, the state treasury was replenished by 80% due to surplus appropriation.

However, the main goal was achieved: socio-economic conditions were created for the victory over the interventionists and the White Guards. The Red Army was provided with weapons, uniforms, food.

On January 11, 1919, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a decree, which introduced food allocation throughout the entire territory of the RSFSR. The essence of the surplus was the forced surrender by all peasants of all "surplus" food products that exceeded the minimum norms for a family, to the state, which bought them at fixed prices.
Despite the fact that the surplus appraisal is usually associated with the Bolsheviks, in fact, this practice was used before.
For the first time, the phenomenon of surplus appropriation became known back in the Russian Empire during the First World War, when the army and industry working for the military were provided with such a forced retention of bread. A resolution similar to the Soviet decree was signed on November 29, 1916.
In addition, the Provisional Government also supported this practice by passing a law on the state monopoly on bread, although it recognized the harshness of these measures, they were nevertheless considered necessary. The essence of this law was a significant state intervention in the economy, in particular in the approval of fixed prices, regulation of the distribution of products and their production.
Despite the existence of the law, it was never destined to be realized, as the influence of the Provisional Government was fading more and more. So the surplus appraisal was destined to become famous for the next successors - the Bolsheviks. Despite the slogans “Land to the peasants!”, the Bolsheviks, like all their predecessors, declared the need for surplus-appropriation measures.
Personally, Lenin spoke of the surplus appraisal as the basis on which the entire policy of war communism was built. As he wrote in one of his works, the essence of war communism was that "surplus" food was taken from the peasants in exchange for depreciating money, to maintain the military-industrial complex. At the same time, Lenin admitted that in some cases the peasants were deprived not even of surpluses, but of part of the food necessary for living, since the calculations were carried out on the basis of the immediate needs of the army, and were regulated by plans for surplus appropriations. All this was justified by the need for the victory of the revolution, come what may.
It would be fair to note that all the political and military forces that took part in the civil war on the territory of the former Russian Empire carried out such a practice of confiscating food from the people.
The apportionment was carried out by the bodies of the People's Commissariat for Food, the so-called food detachments, with the assistance of the committees of the poor and local authorities. At the first stage, in late 1918 - early 1919, the surplus appraisal actually took place only in those areas where Soviet power was already firmly held, namely in the regions of Central Russia, while covering only bread and grain. However, a year later, the surplus appraisal became a harsh reality throughout the entire territory of the Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian and several other Soviet republics, and covered almost all products.
The bottom line is that, despite the formal "purchase" of surplus from the peasants, in fact, the allocation was carried out free of charge, since the money was completely depreciated, and there were simply no manufactured goods for exchange.
The resistance of the peasants was suppressed with the help of weapons both by the commanders and detachments of the Prodarmia, and by special units of the Red Army. With the impossibility of forceful resistance, it acquired the character of "partisan", i.e., passive struggle. So the peasants hid food, reduced crops, leaving just enough to feed themselves and their families, and did not have to work on the surplus, which would be taken away anyway.
The essence of the surplus was to feed the army and the proletariat at the expense of the peasants, thus, figuratively speaking, to sacrifice agriculture in order to preserve the gains of the Bolsheviks and industry. The policy of war communism and the surplus in particular, led to terrible consequences in the economy and in the social sphere. Due to the rapid depreciation of money, the ban on the trade in bread and the naturalization of wages, there was a sharp narrowing of economic interaction in society, commodity-money relations were replaced by barter and degraded. Thus, instead of the planned restoration of the national economy, there was a systematic elimination of it. Not only economic and trade, but also social ties were violated - as a result of multiple uprisings, any trust of the peasants in the Soviet government was lost, and relations in general between peasants and workers deteriorated sharply. All this led to the fact that in the spring of 1921 the surplus appropriation campaign was terminated and replaced by a fixed tax in kind - these were the first steps towards the implementation of the next stage in the formation of the USSR - the NEP period.