Border tank battle 1941. The beginning of the war and the first border battles

The stubborn resistance of the Russians makes us
fight according to all the rules of our combat regulations.
In Poland and in the West we could afford
known liberties and deviations from the statutory principles;
this is now unacceptable.

Inspector General of the Infantry Ott

The war was expected and unexpected. Intelligence data came in, even the exact time of the outbreak of the War was transmitted, and yet the Soviet Union lived in hope for peace. The formations of the military districts were not deployed at the defense lines in time, and were put on full combat readiness. By the time of the attack, only separate battalions were located 3-5 kilometers from the border. The divisions of the first cover echelons were located 8-20 kilometers from the lines assigned to them, the mechanized corps stood several tens of kilometers from the border. The total length of the western border that was attacked was over 2,000 km. It was covered by the Leningradsky troops (commanded by Lieutenant General M.M.Popov), Baltic Special (commanded by Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov), Western Special (commanding General of the Army D.G. Pavlov), Kyiv special (commanded by Colonel General M.P. Kirponos), Odessa (commanded by Colonel General Ya.T.Cherevichenko) military districts. In the first days of the War, they were renamed the Northern (from June 24), North-Western (from June 22), Western (from June 22), South-Western (from June 22) and Southern (from June 25) fronts, respectively.

Before dawn 22nd of June in all the western border districts, communication between the headquarters of the districts and the troops was disrupted, which greatly complicates the interaction. Before the war, the command relied on wire communications to the detriment of radio communications. Such a decision did not justify itself. Enemy agents and sabotage groups thrown into the territory of the Soviet Union violated wire communications and killed couriers.

The headquarters of the districts from various sources began to receive sometimes the most contradictory, often provocative information. But, even without communication with the headquarters and without receiving clear orders from the command, without having information about the situation, each connection stood to the death at its turn.

The first to take on the entire blow of the Nazi troops in the early morning of June 22, 1941, were the Soviet border guards and border aviation.

A rifle and 4 RGD grenades are the standard weapons of the border defender. Additionally, for the entire outpost (42 or 64 people) - 1-2 heavy and 3-4 light machine guns and a total of 10 anti-tank grenades. With such weapons, the border guards opposed the well-armed, having considerable combat experience, the enemy troops, many times outnumbering the defenders of the border. Neither to offer serious resistance to the advancing enemy tank columns, nor even to undermine the bridges leading across the border, the border guards had no opportunity.

They could not stop the enemy either. The enemy simply bypassed the pockets of resistance, leaving part of the troops to eliminate them. Hitler's plan for the destruction of outposts was given 20-30 minutes. But most often this task stretched for hours, or even days. Already in the first hours of the attack, the enemy was able to convince himself of the courage and stamina of the Soviet border guards. They preferred to die than to surrender. The most difficult was the border guards, who were in the direction of the main attack of the aggressor. They had to take on the main force of the attack. And, nevertheless, the outposts stood, most often to the last man. In the first days of the war, the irretrievable losses of border guards amounted to 90%. But their death was not in vain. At the cost of their lives, time was won to reach the defensive positions of the border cover units, which ensured the deployment of the main army forces for their further actions.

Defense of the Brest Fortress

military operation

Treacherous attack

Inspector General of the Infantry Ott

Molotov's speech

In Leningrad, the first air alert was announced already on the night of June 23. The battery, commanded by a junior lieutenant, showed itself worthy A.T. Pimchenkov. Her crew shot down the first Junkers-88. The crew of the enemy aircraft, consisting of 4 officers, was captured. Valuable documents were found with them.

For the accurate fire of the battery and the downed Junkers-88, Junior Lieutenant Alexei Titovich Pimchenkov was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

First attacks and counterattacks

Until June 29, in the Leningrad Military District, fighting took place on the border, for a week German troops could not enter the territory of the district. On June 29, 1941, the situation changed dramatically. Along the entire length of the USSR border with Finland, the German-Finnish troops, with the support of aviation, tried to break through the security zone of the USSR state border.

In those days, to the headquarters of the 5th border detachment one after another came reports of the courage and stamina of soldiers in green caps.

On June 30, the outpost received information that the enemy battalion had broken through in the sector of the neighboring outpost. At night, along the forest paths, the machine-gun squad, commanded by Sergeant A.F. Busalov, imperceptibly approached the besieged. Well-aimed fire opened on the flank of the Nazis forced them to retreat.

Several attacks of border violators bogged down tripping over machine gun fire. The border guard chose a firing position between large boulders and maneuvered all the time. When the enemy opened heavy fire, the fighter took cover behind one or another boulder. Attack followed attack. Being wounded several times, Busalov fought until an enemy bullet hit him in the heart, breaking through his Komsomol ticket.

For courage and courage shown in this battle, twenty border guards were awarded military orders. Andrei Fedorovich Busalov was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Now the outpost where he met War bears his name.

On the evening of June 22, the commanders of three fronts (North-Western, Western and South-Western) received Directive No. 3, ordering them to launch a counteroffensive and take the Polish cities of Suwalki and Lublin by June 24. At the same time, with a relatively weak center, the German command planned to reach the rear of the troops of the Western Front with powerful flank attacks, encircle and defeat them in the area of Bialystok and Minsk. Soviet counterattacks failed. The German troops, having taken Volkovysk on July 28, cut off the escape routes of the 3rd and 10th armies. On the same day, the enemy broke into Minsk. As a result of the encirclement by German tank groups, units of four armies found themselves surrounded in Nalibokskaya Pushcha. For catastrophic failures in the battles, the commander of the Western Front, General of the Army D.G. Pavlov, was arrested and shot along with a number of other high-ranking officers.

At the same time, it should be noted counterattack of the North-Western Front of the district near Siauliai, in which one of the future famous commanders took part Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky. As a result of the counterattack, it was possible to delay the advance of the enemy and to withdraw troops in an organized manner to a new line of defense, avoiding boilers and encirclements.

The first pockets of resistance

The most striking example of courage and heroism Soviet border guards and soldiers of the Red Army is the defense of the Brest Fortress. Its defenders also included border guards of the 9th outpost of Lieutenant A.M. Kizhevatova. The fate of the lieutenant is still unknown. According to some reports, he died on June 29, 1941. The fate of his family was also tragic: the Nazis shot their mother, wife and three children 15, 11 and 2 years old in the fall of 1942.

Andrei Mitrofanovich Kizhevatov was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union in 1965.

Contrary to the plans of the German command, the organized defense of the Brest Fortress continued until June 29, 1941. But even a month later, separate pockets of resistance remained in it..

A hard fate befell one of the leaders of the defense of the Brest Fortress, Major Peter Mikhailovich Gavrilov. In the past at private trader of the Civil War, he was one of the last defenders of the fortress.

Release from captivity came only in May 1945. Then Gavrilov was reinstated in the rank, but a year later he was transferred to the reserve, and for the loss of the party card was expelled from the party.

Exclusion from the party and being in captivity had a negative impact on the fate of the retired major. A person who had been in captivity for a long time, and even expelled from the party, could not hold leadership positions. Therefore, after his dismissal from the army, he did not stay long as the director of a brick factory. Gavrilov was forced to accept the most unskilled work. He worked as a worker at a container base, then as a freight forwarder at an instrument-making plant. In 1955, he found a wife and son, with whom he parted in the first hours of the War. In 1956, after the publication of the book "Brest Fortress", Pyotr Mikhailovich was reinstated in the party. And the following year he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Speaking of border battles, one cannot but recall the very first tank battle of the War in the Dubno-Lutsk-Brody region.

By the beginning of the war, the USSR had about 10,000 serviceable tanks in its five western military districts. At the same time, the German army, along with captured and allied ones, officially had about 5-6 thousand tanks. Of these, 17 tank divisions were concentrated on the Soviet border, in which there were approximately 3,350 combat vehicles.

In the battle, 2500-2800 tanks collided as part of 5 Soviet mechanized corps, which accounted for more than a quarter of all tank forces concentrated in the western districts, which were opposed by about 700-800 tanks of the 4th German tank divisions. However, almost half of the Soviet tanks were lost on the marches as a result of breakdowns, bogging down in swamps and enemy air strikes. The chief of staff of the Southwestern Front, General M.A. Purkaev, proposed to withdraw troops and create a continuous line of defense. However, his proposal did not find support, and under the pressure of G.K. Zhukov, a fatal decision was made to launch a counterattack by all mechanized corps with the support of three rifle corps. The fact that the units were only advancing to the front was not taken into account, they entered the battle separately and without mutual coordination of actions. Zhukov subsequently made exactly the same mistake on November 16 near Moscow. Eventually, by July 1, the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front were practically destroyed. In their composition, from 10 to 30 percent of the tanks from the original number remained. The only positive thing was that, unlike other fronts, with their mechanized corps troops of the Southwestern front inflicted significant losses on the Germans and delayed the offensive for at least a week the enemy to Kyiv, preventing the encirclement of part of the Soviet troops.

On the sector of the Southern Front on June 22-23, the most intense battles flared up in the area of Ungheni, Skulyany. On the night of June 22-23 and June 23-24, 1941, following the combat order of the regiment commander, a group of Red Army men under the command of the deputy commander of a sapper company for political affairs, political instructor Kemal Kasumov, under a hurricane of machine-gun and mortar fire from the enemy blew up two bridges over the Prut River.

Political instructor Kemal Kasumov called volunteers for this operation, and each fighter said: “I am!”. Kasumov selected six people: Petr Sotnikov, Yakov Markutsu, Alexander Tsedin, Semyon Artamonov, Nikolai Bukhtiyarov, Vasily Khrestichenkov.

Before the first bridge, under continuous enemy fire, two and a half hours covered a distance of 300 steps, while dragging three-pound boxes of explosives. The sappers crawled across the bridge without any cover but darkness to the Romanian guard post. Having completed the preparatory work, Kasumov led the people away, the bridge was blown up.

On the night of June 23-24, the second bridge was blown up. When the Red Army began to retreat, the Nazis opened continuous fire, wanting to take revenge at all costs. Our fighters hid, and the enemy stopped firing, waiting for them to move. But the Red Army survived for two hours and then returned safely.

The blown up bridges were the main means for the transfer of troops, both by rail and by highway. Undermining the bridges disrupted the enemy's crossing in this area.

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 19, 1941, the commander of the squad of the sapper company of the 241st regiment of the 95th rifle division, Sergeant Pyotr Vasilyevich Sotnikov, the Red Army sappers Yakov Dmitrievich Markutsa, Alexander Leontyevich Tsedin, Vasily Ivanovich Khrestichenkov, Nikolai Sergeevich Bukhtiyarov, Semyon Nikolaevich Artamonov were awarded medals "For Courage".

At the maritime borders, meanwhile, things were much better. This was due to the fact that Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, People's Commissar of the USSR Navy, appointed in 1939, from the very beginning of his activity was preparing the fleet for the War. Back in January 1941, he signed an order according to which anti-aircraft batteries were required to open fire when foreign aircraft appeared over our bases. Already in March, German reconnaissance aircraft were fired on by anti-aircraft artillery in the sky over Polyarny, Libava and Liepaja. However, the People's Commissar was reprimanded for his vigilance while guarding the border. Nevertheless, the first hours of the War justified the system of operational readiness of fleets and flotillas, developed by N.G. Kuznetsov at the direction of the People's Commissar of the Navy and put into effect in 1940-1941, which allows, in the shortest possible time, with observance of the necessary secrecy measures, to transfer the forces of the fleet to a state of immediate readiness to repulse a surprise enemy attack.

In the very first hours of the War, in order to block our fleets by German aircraft, magnetic mines were dropped on the entrance fairways in the area of the main bases of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol and Izmail. In the Baltic, Liepaja and Riga naval bases were subjected to air attacks, mines were also dropped on Polyarny, the main base of the Northern Fleet. Having reported on the raids to the Kremlin, without waiting for instructions from above, Admiral Kuznetsov ordered all fleets to immediately begin laying minefields in accordance with the cover plan. Thus, our naval bases, protected by mine rings, were not taken by surprise by the German attack. The enemy was opposed by the high degree of combat readiness of the Soviet Navy. On June 22, 1941, we did not lose a single ship, not a single aircraft of the naval aviation.

We fought for Tallinn

Those sunny June days, when the Great Patriotic War began, when the whole bristling formidable Tallinn still lived an almost peaceful life, seem infinitely far away. The days of heroic defense were just beginning. The main enemy forces were far away. The heavily battered German fleet did not even try to attack Tallinn from the sea. On the very first night of the war, the Germans tried to carry out a massive air raid on the city. Barrage fire from ships, islands and shores became a deadly wall. Enemy planes could not approach either the raid or the city.
A few days later the Nazis changed their tactics. They switched to the method of individual bandit raids. Day or night, separate enemy vehicles appeared from behind the clouds, from behind the hills overgrown with forests. But this tactic was completely ineffective. The air defense of Tallinn worked exceptionally accurately, harmoniously, and in an organized manner. VNOS posts, observers, rangefinders, glorious Baltic anti-aircraft gunners from afar, 40-50 kilometers away, detected and identified enemy aircraft. They were always met in time by the deadly anti-aircraft fire of our cannons and machine guns. The shelling of the Junkers and the Messerschmitts immediately began to change courses, wag from side to side, hide in the clouds. Many found their grave at the bottom of the sea, many fell on the shore, burned down, died. As a rule, anti-aircraft gunners began combat work, fighter pilots completed it. Armored fascist planes, hit by our fire, slowed down and began to smoke. It was then that they were finished off by the red-star hawks. In early August, the Germans decided to bomb our airfield. A large group - over 20 - "Junkers" and "Messerschmitts" at about 7 pm suddenly emerged from behind the clouds. Anti-aircraft guns and machine guns opened devastating fire on her. One enemy aircraft was shot down. The formation of the German cars was broken. Some of them still tried to dive into the airfield and drop bombs. They fell into an open field, into a swamp.
From the sea, Tallinn was absolutely impregnable. After the fascists were convinced that they would not frighten, not bomb Tallinn from the air, that the sky over the city and the raid was in our hands, they decided to act more actively on the ground. They threw their motorized mechanized columns, their motorcyclists and machine gunners towards Tallinn. On the outskirts of Tallinn, the Nazis captured the town of Märjamaa. Our Marines went on the offensive, kicked them out of there. The Germans fled at full speed. They left looted shops and houses, they devastated wine stocks, they mocked civilians to their fullest. But the holiday of the enemy is over.
Then he began to try to advance in other directions. Every day brought news that separate groups of enemy vehicles and infantry had leaked here and there. We fought with them on the outskirts of Tallinn in all directions.
The Baltics fought for every inch of Estonian land, they piled mountains of fascist corpses around Tallinn. Do not forget the feat of the Red Navy Komsomol member Kutsenko, who destroyed seven fascist bandits in one battle. Do not forget the nameless hero of the Red Navy, who was crawling along a ditch with a grenade in his hand and suddenly saw that Nazi rifles were aimed at him from all sides:
- Give up, Russ!
But the hero did not give up. He threw a grenade and died himself, destroying eight Nazis with him.
His comrade, his fighting friend, was also taken by the Nazis in pincers. Enemies approached him from two sides and offered to surrender. He calmly rose to his full height, pulled his peakless cap.
“Well, it’s possible,” he said smiling and with a swift lightning gesture plunged the bayonet into the belly of one of the Germans and at the same second, with a reverse movement, hit the other enemy with all his strength with the butt. This is how the Baltics fought on the outskirts of Tallinn.
Our warships provided detachments of volunteers. They armed themselves with rifles, machine guns, grenades and went into battle against the enemy. From everywhere, where it was possible, we took people and sent them to the front lines, to the trenches. The anti-aircraft gunners continued to guard the city and the raid from the air, but at any moment they were ready to fire direct fire from their cannons and machine guns at the crossroads, at the enemy's manpower. And they beat! They beat so that the advancing German columns turned into a bloody mess. They beat until the last shell, to the last bullet.
The Marine Corps fought wonderfully. The German drunken rabble went on a psychic attack. The Nazis stripped naked to make it easier for them to move. In only shorts, with wild drunken cries, they tried to go down the hill. No, the psychic attack failed! Drunken thugs lay down for eternal sleep near the banks of the small river Pirita.
More and more forces threw the enemy into battle. Shrapnel is already tearing over the very command post of the defense headquarters, hidden in an earthen pillbox. Explosions of German shrapnel knock down leaves and branches in the forest that surrounds the command post. Staff workers, commanders and commissars run under the gaps, continuing their combat work.
Unforgettable hours, unforgettable minutes!
Night. The outskirts of the city set on fire by the Germans are burning, the artillery of our ships has been continuously hitting the enemy’s manpower for many tens of hours, the Baltics are heroically resisting. Here and there they turn into counterattacks, destroying the enemy's manpower. In response, the Germans opened deadly mortar fire. They don't care where to hit, just to hit, just to create the illusion of "powerful" artillery preparation.
Heroically behaved our commissars, our political workers. Never forget our old friend Orest Tsekhnevitser, professor at Leningrad University, literary scholar. When the war began, he went to the fleet, to commissar work. During the days of the heroic defense of Tallinn, he spent all the time at the forefront. He appeared where the enemy's fire was deadly - under fire he inspired the fighters with a short word of the Bolshevik, helped them to dig in, infected by personal example. Writer V. Vishnevsky, journalist N. Danilov, under heavy mortar fire, stood at the monument "Mermaid" and, forming new detachments, sent them to the enemy.
Who are you, comrade? Staff worker? Journalist? Commissioner? Quartermaster? It doesn't matter, your place is in the battle, in the battle for Tallinn, in the battle for our city.
Comrade Noselev from Pubalt and others, you covered yourself with glory in battles. Secretary of the Air Defense Party Commission comrade. Evseev, do not forget how you led your people to battle with the enemy. Comrade Zharkov, you took time off from headquarters, you left your desk and went into open battle against the enemy.
Do not find, do not collect now the names of our heroes. Maybe later, when we write a chapter of the history of the Great Patriotic War, a chapter on the heroic defense of Tallinn, we will find all the lists, remember all the names, ask all the witnesses, establish who died the death of a hero, who, wounded by bullets and shrapnel, was still found in yourself the courage and strength to continue the battle, who remained alive and unharmed and emerged victorious. Now, in the hot pursuit of events, only individual names are remembered, but there are hundreds and thousands of them.
Do you remember the night reconnaissance, Commissar Strukov, when at dusk you crawled along a stone fence across an empty, dead field to establish whether any of the wounded were left on the dead battery? Do you remember, Sergeant Bardash, do you remember, comrades of the Red Navy Yeremadze and Yeplatov, how difficult it was under enemy mortar fire, how you held out until the last minute?
Here is a short phrase from yesterday's report of the Soviet Information Bureau of September 2:
"After fierce fighting, our troops evacuated Tallinn."
This phrase is stingy. But behind it lies a meaning full of great glory, great heroism.
Here is the eve of our departure from Tallinn. The defense command post is already in the city itself. The streets are already pitted with trenches. Staff workers, compositors of the printing house, the guard team of the headquarters hold the defense until the last moment. With a well-aimed sniper shot, Major S. shoots a fascist intelligence officer who climbed onto the roof of a neighboring house. The battle is already in a few meters. And people hold on to the last. For every street intersection, for every quarter of the city, we fought. Glory to you, heroes of the rearguard battles, vols. F. Loknayuk, Mikhaltsev. Fascist planes rushed around the city and mowed down people with machine-gun bursts. Everything was already tightening the ring of fire around the harbor, the houses, plants and factories set on fire by the Nazis were burning.
And we know that no one will forget the heroic defense of Tallinn, which will go down in the history of the Patriotic War. The Baltics fought like lions.
In the old days, there was a stupid officer concept: "the honor of the uniform, the honor of the uniform." It was an "imaginary" honor, tinsel, more related to epaulettes and stripes than to the spirit of war. In the battles for Tallinn, a new concept of the honor of the uniform of the red sailor was born. It often happened that, going into battle, the Red Army soldiers of the infantry units and fighter battalions asked the Red Navy men to lend them vests and peakless caps.
“The enemy is afraid of even one kind of marine form,” they said.
Yes, the “form” of the Baltics turned out to be formidable for the enemy. The old traditions of the Russian fleet, Russian sailors, we supported with honor and dignity.

An. Tarasenko
(From the newspaper "Red Baltic Fleet" dated September 6, 1941)

Now there are many different theories, both blaming and justifying leadership. But it remains an indisputable fact that the German troops failed to break the resistance of the Red Army and the Navy. Retreating, getting surrounded, losing battles, the Soviet soldiers still found many opportunities to continue the fight, and were not going to easily give up their positions. The resistance of the civilian population also came as a surprise to the invaders.

Fates and deeds

Air rams of the first days of the War

“In the history of aviation, a ram is completely
new and by no one and never, in no country
no pilots except Russians
untested combat technique ... Soviet pilots
nature itself pushes for this, the psychology of the Russian
winged warrior, perseverance,
hatred of the enemy, courage, falconry
prowess and fiery patriotism ... "

There are different opinions about what pushed military pilots to ram an enemy aircraft. What forced the pilots to sacrifice not only the winged machine, but, in many cases, their own lives? At first glance, it may seem that an air ram is an act of despair and hopelessness. That the pilot commits this act under the influence of emotions, at a time when, due to circumstances, he cannot take deliberate actions. However, in fact, going for a ram, a person made an informed decision in a split second. The pilot did this only when he failure to act in the current situation could lead to very serious consequences.

It is no coincidence that a ram, as a form of Russian air combat, was recorded already in the first hours of the War. The glory of Talalikhin and Gastello had not yet thundered - they accomplished their immortal feats a little later - and Soviet pilots, often sacrificing their own lives, defended their native sky from the treacherously attacked enemy and went to ram.

The first air ram of the Great Patriotic War was committed at its 25th minute in the Rivne region by senior lieutenant Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov.

In the early morning of June 22, 1941, on alarm, a trio of our I-16s under the command of the deputy squadron commander of the 46th Fighter Aviation Regiment, Senior Lieutenant Ivanov, took off into the sky to destroy a group of Xe-111 enemy bombers that had invaded the airspace of the Soviet Union. The enemy flew to bomb our cities. Soviet planes swooped down on the enemy, attack followed attack. One of the enemy vehicles was hit, others randomly dropped their deadly cargo, never reaching their intended goal. When the Soviet pilots completed the task assigned to them, Ivanov, the leader of the group, sent his link to the airfield, continuing to monitor the airspace. In battle, the crews shot almost the entire supply of shells, and there was not much fuel left. Two planes from the group landed successfully, and Senior Lieutenant Ivanov had already turned his plane to land when he noticed an enemy bomber approaching the airfield. The decision came instantly: Ivanov soared up sharply and attacked the enemy. He fired his last rounds at the enemy aircraft. By that time, the fuel was almost used up, and the enemy was still not defeated.

Eyewitnesses claimed that Ivan Ivanov's watch, which stopped from hitting the ground, showed exactly this time - 4 hours 25 minutes.

And ten minutes later (according to other sources, 10 minutes earlier) another air ram was made by a junior lieutenant Dmitry Vasilyevich Kokorev.

At dawn on June 22, 1941, returning from a reconnaissance mission on a MiG-3 aircraft, junior lieutenant Dmitry Kokorev discovered that his native border airfield Vysoko-Mazovetsk, located in Western Ukraine near the city of Zambrov, was badly damaged by an enemy air raid. At the same time, a German Me-110 reconnaissance aircraft was moving away from the Soviet airfield in the direction of the state border, which, apparently, controlled the results of the strike. Without hesitation, junior lieutenant Kokorev rushed after the enemy - the enemy must not leave. Our pilot carried out several unsuccessful attacks, the German fired back without ceasing. Approaching the enemy car at close range and pressing the trigger, Kokorev found that there were no more shells.

On the night of June 25, 1941, enemy bombers raided a Soviet airfield located near the regional center of Tarutino in the Odessa region, where the 146th Fighter Aviation Regiment was based. To repel the attack, three Soviet aircraft took off into the sky: two MiG-3 and I-16 fighters. One of the "MiG-3" was controlled by Senior Lieutenant Konstantin Petrovich Oborin. In total darkness, focusing only on the traces of tracer bullets, the senior lieutenant overtook the enemy. In the midst of the battle, the machine gun of our aircraft jammed. Then Oborin did the only thing he could do in such a situation. The pilot decided to ram the enemy plane. Acting boldly and competently, Konstantin Oborin brought his car close to the enemy and struck with a propeller on the left plane of the enemy aircraft. The enemy's car with a severed wing fell to the ground.

It is known from various sources that only on the first day of the war rams committed junior lieutenants L.G. Butelin and E. Panfilov, lieutenants P.S. Ryabtsev and I.I. Kovtun, senior lieutenant A.I. Moklyak, captain A.I. Protasov, senior. political instructor A.S. Danilov. The years have not preserved for the descendants of military documents describing their feat. But maybe they just haven't been found yet.

On June 22, the War began. The most bloody for our people. We then won, having paid an incredibly high price for the Victory: the lives of the Sons of the Fatherland and unprecedentedly high material costs.

Glory to the Heroes of the front and rear! And shame on us, the miserable, who blew this Great Country!

combat operations of the Soviet covering troops and border troops on June 22-29 in the border regions of the USSR in the territory of Lithuania, Western Belarus and Western Ukraine against the troops of Nazi Germany during the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-45 (See. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-45 ); on the border with Finland, enemy troops went on the offensive on June 29, and on the border with Romania - on July 1.

Preparing for a war against the USSR, fascist Germany concentrated powerful strike groups near the borders of the USSR and deployed them: Army Group North - in Leningrad, Army Group Center - in Moscow, Army Group South - in Kiev directions (for more details, see. "Barbarossa plan").

The western borders of the USSR with Germany, where border crossings took place at the beginning of the war, were covered by special Baltic (commanded by Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov), Western (commanded by General of the Army D. G. Pavlov), Kyiv (commanded by Colonel General M. . P. Kirponos) of the military district, transformed on the first day of the war into the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts. In 1940-41 the Communist Party and the Soviet government did a great job of increasing the country's defense capability. However, many events could not be completed due to lack of time. Mistakes were also made in determining the time of a possible attack by fascist Germany on the USSR. The troops of the western border districts were not put on alert by the beginning of the enemy attack. Many formations and units were in places of permanent quartering or in camps, their staffing was 60-70% of the wartime states, there were not enough means of communication, ammunition, fuel.

Covering armies of the North-Western Front (8th and 11th, commander Major General P.P. Sobennikov and Lieutenant General V.I. Morozov) at the front of 300 km had 19 divisions of the Western Front (3rd, 10th and 4th, commander Lieutenant General V. I. Kuznetsov, Major Generals K. D. Golubev and A. A. Korobkov) at the front in 470 km - 27 divisions and the Southwestern Front (5th, 6th and 26th, commander Major General M. I. Potapov, Lieutenant General I. N. Muzychenko and F. Ya. Kostenko) at the front in 480 km - 25 divisions, but these formations did not manage to occupy the lines indicated by him. The divisions of the first echelon were at 8-20 km, and the second echelon at 50-100 km from the border. Directly near the border, at 3-5 km behind the line of border outposts, only separate companies and battalions were located.

On June 22, at about 4 o'clock in the morning, the fascist German troops began military operations against the USSR, which turned out to be sudden for the Soviet ground forces and aviation. Soviet aviation suffered heavy losses, and the enemy managed to gain air supremacy. After a strong artillery preparation, the forward units, and then the main enemy forces, went over to the offensive. The frontier troops and battalions of the fortified regions were the first to engage in battles with the enemy. Intense battles went on for crossings and bridges across the border rivers, for strongholds of outposts. The soldiers and commanders of the outposts of the Augustow, Brest, Vladimir-Volynsky, Przemysl, Rava-Russky and other frontier detachments showed the greatest stamina and selflessness. Some outposts and garrisons of the fortified areas successfully repulsed all attacks of the advanced German fascist units, but, being outflanked, were forced to break through to join with their units or go over to partisan operations. Many outposts died heroically in repelling the enemy. Despite the dominance of enemy aircraft and multiple superiority in infantry, tanks, artillery, Soviet troops offered fierce resistance to the enemy; battles for the surviving fortifications, settlements, for advantageous frontiers were of a focal nature. The entry of the covering troops into battles in parts and the absence of strong reserves did not allow the creation of a continuous front of defense. The enemy bypassed the Soviet troops from the flanks, broke through to their rear. Having lost contact with their neighbors, parts of the Soviet troops were forced to resist in the environment or retreat to the rear defensive lines. The command and staffs of the fronts and many armies were unable to organize command and control of the troops due to the disruption of communications. By the end of the first day of the war, the enemy managed to advance 35-50 km, on the Southwestern Front - by 10-20 km.

The maritime borders in the west were maintained by the Northern Fleet (commanded by Rear Admiral A. G. Golovko), the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (commanded by Vice Admiral V. F. Tributs), the Black Sea Fleet (commanded by Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky), and the Pinsk and Danube military flotilla. With the beginning of the war, fascist aviation attacked the naval bases of Kronstadt, Libava (Liepaja), Vindava (Ventspils), Sevastopol, but was met by air defense fire and did not achieve significant results. The main enemy of the Soviet Navy was not the German Navy, but its ground forces and air force. The first blow was taken by the naval base of Libava (Liepaja), whose garrison heroically fought surrounded on June 24-27. Submarines were deployed on the sea lanes of the Baltic and Black Seas, and minefields were laid. Almost all aviation of the Baltic Fleet acted against enemy ground forces. On June 23-25, the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet carried out bombing attacks on the objects of Sulina and Constanta; On June 26, the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, together with aircraft, attacked Constanta.

On the evening of June 22, the Main Military Council sent directives to the Military Councils of the North-Western and South-Western Fronts demanding decisive counterattacks on the enemy groupings that had broken through on the morning of June 23. However, only one night was allotted for the preparation of counterattacks, and already on June 22 the troops intended for them were involved in battles or were in 200-400 km from deployment lines. Despite the complexity of the situation, in the zone of the North-Western Front in the Šiauliai direction on June 23-25, a counterattack was carried out on the troops of the 4th German tank group by the forces of the 3rd and 12th incomplete mechanized corps. The fighting was stubborn. The enemy advance was delayed for two days, but it was not possible to stop his advance. By the end of June 25, the motorized corps of the 4th German Panzer Group advanced 120 meters towards Daugavpils. km. On the Western Front, the troops of the 4th Army, covering the Brest-Baranovichi direction, by June 25 were forced to retreat to a depth of 200 km. In the Grodno direction against the 3rd Panzer Group and the 9th Army of the enemy on June 23-24, a counterattack was carried out by the forces of the 6th and 11th mechanized corps and part of the forces of the 3rd Army. All the divisions of these corps and the 6th cavalry corps allocated for the counterattack did not have time to concentrate in the starting areas. The simultaneity of the strike did not work out, therefore, during the two-day fierce battles, the Soviet troops failed to detain the enemy. The 3rd German tank group in the Vilnius-Minsk direction by the end of June 25 advanced 230 km. On June 25, at the direction of the Headquarters of the High Command, the troops began to withdraw from the Bialystok ledge to the East. On the Southwestern Front, by June 24, in the Rovno direction at the junction of the 5th and 6th armies, a gap about 50 wide km, in which the troops of the 1st German rushed. Panzer Group and 6th Army. There was a threat that the main forces of the front would be covered from the north. To conduct a counterattack on the enemy tank group that had broken through, the front attracted the 4th, 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th and 22nd mechanized corps, 31st, 36 th and 37th Rifle Corps, but could not bring them into battle at the same time.

On June 24, a major tank battle unfolded in the region of Lutsk, Brod, Rivne, Dubno, which lasted until June 29. About 1.5 thousand tanks participated in it from both sides. The troops of the front delayed the enemy’s offensive for a week, which suffered heavy losses, thwarted his attempt to break through to Kyiv and the plan of the command of the German Army Group South to encircle the main forces of the Southwestern Front. P. s. ended with the withdrawal of the troops of the North-Western Front to the Western Dvina from Riga to Daugavpils, the Western Front - to the Minsk fortified area and to Bobruisk and the South-Western Front - to the line of Dubno, Ostrov, Kremenets, Lvov. On June 30, after the enemy brought additional forces into the battle, at the direction of the Headquarters of the High Command, the Southwestern Front began to withdraw troops to the line of old fortified areas along the state border of 1939. Behind enemy lines in the area of Volkovysk and Nalibokskaya Pushcha, they fought surrounded by 11 divisions Western Front, pinning down about 25 divisions of the German Army Group Center. On the border, the defenders of the Brest Fortress continued their heroic struggle. Despite the fact that the main task of the covering armies turned out to be unfulfilled, their heroic struggle against the enemy's strike groups in the first week of the war frustrated his plan, which provided for the destruction of the main forces of the Soviet troops in the border areas.

Lit.: World War II 1939-1945. Military-historical essay, M., 1958; History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945, v. 2, M., 1963; History of the Second World War, vol. 4, M., 1975.

K. A. Cheryomukhin.

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“- Comrade Commander! - I have long ceased to twitch from such treatment. A little over a year. Stalin, Timoshenko, Zhukov. Order on the appointment of the commander of the Belarusian Special Military District. It seemed that I would wake up and everything would be over. Not over. There is only one thing left - to live and comply. When you do not have military leadership talents and a brilliant mind, you have to start from the ABC. PU-39, field charter of the Red Army in 1939. The same stove from which they dance. His own knowledge and knowledge of the general, instructions, directives and orders lay on him as a foundation. Moreover, the former knowledge of the past has not now become absolute knowledge of the future. If you are here, the past has already changed, and there is no guarantee that everything will be exactly as you remember it. Truly, Russia is a country with an unpredictable past.

The head of the UNKGB for the Bialystok region, Major of State Security Belchenko Sergey Savvich, and the head of all my aviation, Major General Kopets Ivan Ivanovich, descended into the dugout of the field command post of the now Western Front. The latter is only thirty-two years old. In that past life, he was assigned to the Zap.OVO only at the beginning of 1941, here I met him immediately upon arrival in the district in June 1940. A good man, and you can’t say that he is a big boss. In my heart, I remained a captain and commander. And the same indifference - captain's. When we talked with him in July last year about the state of the Air Force of the district, he answered my question “what will you do if you are all burned on the ground?” answered with the expected phrase: “I will shoot myself!” His reaction is good, after all, a fighter pilot. Managed to get out the door. The paperweight almost broke through that very door. But he's not a fool. If you properly take a tender soul, shake it up and give out the exact direction, mountains will turn. And now the Air Force of the front is ready to fulfill any assigned task.

Comrade commander! Both of those who entered simply radiated legitimate pride. Kopets unrolled a map on the table. - According to the latest air reconnaissance data at 21:00 on June 21, the enemy completed the concentration of large tank forces in the areas of Suwalki and Brest. On the adjacent bank of the Bug, pontoon parts and watercraft are deployed.

According to our information, units of the 4th field army and the 2nd tank group are in the Brest area. Units of the 9th Army and the 3rd Panzer Group are concentrated on the Suvalkovsky ledge. - Belchenko finally made me happy. Apparently my face somehow changed badly, and he hurried to “comfort” me - Sufficiently reliable information suggests that the main attack of the 3rd Panzer Group will be directed to the Vilnius region.

OK it's all over Now. We were preparing for the deployment of such a powerful enemy grouping. But in the depths of my soul there was hope that there would be no war. Or, to be completely honest, the Kyiv district will take the main blow. Did not happen. Tymoshenko will call in a couple of hours. What he will say, I already know. Or maybe it would be better to withdraw troops from the Bialystok ledge in advance? But what then is the army for, if not for the protection of borders and territorial integrity? This is already when there is a war, you can maneuver, leave territories in order to gain time, etc. What will the people, whom the army is called upon to protect, say if it begins to leave vast areas of the country in peacetime. ... At 0203 hours on June 22, 1941, a short message was received at the command posts of the army groups of the Western Front: “Attention! Thunderstorm".

“I am guilty and must bear responsibility for my guilt, but I am not a traitor or a traitor. They will shoot me, I know Stalin well, he will not forgive me for what happened. I ask you to report to our government that there was no treason or betrayal on the Western Special Front. Everyone worked under great pressure. We are currently sitting in the dock not because we committed a crime during the period of hostilities, but because we did not prepare enough for war in peacetime.

Pavlov D.G. knew what he was saying, and there was no point in lying before the last line.

Pavlov Dmitry Grigorievich - was born on November 4, 1897 in the village of Vonyukh, Kostroma Region, in a peasant family. Russian. Member of the Communist Party since 1919. Graduated from the 4th grade. Participated in the First World War and the Civil War. In the Red Army since 1919. He commanded a platoon and a squadron, was an assistant commander of a cavalry regiment. In 1920 he graduated from command courses, in 1922 - the Omsk Higher Cavalry School, in 1928 - the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze. Participated in the battles on the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929 and the Spanish Civil War in 1936-1939. Commander of a tank brigade. For heroism and courage shown in battles, 06/21/1937 was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Since 1937 - Head of the Armored Directorate of the Red Army, participated in the Soviet-Finnish war. Komkor. Candidate member of the Central Committee of the CPSU since 1939, deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 1st convocation. From June 1940 he commanded the troops of the Belarusian Special Military District, Colonel General. Since 1941 - General of the Army. In July 1941 he was removed from his post and convicted. Awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, 2 Orders of the Red Banner.

As you can see, Comrade Pavlov purposefully went to leading positions in the Red Army. He was not an accidental nominee and was aware of what position he occupies and what responsibility he bears. Now let's go back a little and try to replay everything in accordance with regulations and orders.

“The chief - leader, senior comrade and friend - experiences with the troops all the hardships and difficulties of combat life. Maintaining the strictest discipline, he must know his subordinates perfectly, have constant personal communication with them, show special attention to their needs and be an example in everything. ... The readiness to take responsibility for a bold decision and persistently carry it out to the end is the basis for the actions of all commanders in battle. The commander and commissar bear full responsibility for the condition and combat capability of the military unit and for the success of its actions in battle. The commander is solely responsible for the operational leadership of the troops. PU-39 Red Army.

Assuming the post of commander of the Western OVO in June 1940, Pavlov had to understand that for the troops subordinate to him he becomes “king, god and military commander” and now bears responsibility for everything that happens on this particular section of Soviet territory. It now has combat training for units, the recruitment of units with personnel and materiel, reconnaissance and combat planning. “The main task for us this year and the duty of each of us is the task of raising and making omnipotent a platoon, company, battalion and regiment. If this link really gets on its feet in all parts and acquires a culture of military affairs in the full sense of the word, then in a combat situation our units and formations will operate without shedding much blood. It is in small units that the foundation for future victory on the battlefield is laid. The success of the battle depends on the degree of training of each soldier, on his readiness, on the initiative and skill of the commander of a company, battalion, regiment. FROM THE REPORT OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION S. K. TIMOSHENKO ON THE COMMERCIAL TRAINING OF THE RED ARMY ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SOVIET-FINNISH WAR AT THE MEETING OF THE HIGHEST MANAGEMENT STAFF OF THE RKKA. The new commander of the Western Special Military District had a whole year ahead of him to restore order in the units entrusted to him. “Troops that can quickly execute orders, quickly regroup in a changed situation, quickly get up from rest, quickly make marching movements, quickly deploy in battle formation and open fire, quickly advance and pursue the enemy, can always count on success.”

In the field manual of the Red Army in 1939, despite the widespread belief to the contrary, defense is given no less space than offensive combat. “Defense will be needed whenever inflicting defeat on the enemy by an offensive in a given situation is impossible or impractical.” Despite the agreements concluded, no one in the country had any doubts that sooner or later they would have to face bosom friends “from across the river”. Conducting offensive operations against the "Wehrmacht" in 1940 and early 1941 was both "impossible and inexpedient." And if such a need arises, then, in accordance with the accepted doctrine, you will first have to repel a "treacherous blow." So defensive lines are needed in any case. Combat training plans that provide for training in offensive combat also provide for a line that will have to be attacked.

The preparation of a company defensive post with full-profile trenches, machine-gun emplacements, a dugout, a command post, an OP, cracks and communication passages by the forces of the unit itself takes about 12-16 hours. When breaking this event into a chain of separate, but interconnected exercises in the process of general combat training, we stretch the pleasure for one to two weeks. Verified by the author on his own skin. In the same area, we are conducting exercises of an engineer-sapper company, with separation in time. Education of this level does not require significant material and technical costs and significant effort of the entire district. According to the results of planned exercises with personnel (company - battalion - regiment) at the end of two to three months in the summer-autumn of 1940 and the same time in the spring-summer of 1941, we get a strip of defensive structures corresponding to the charter (and even in excess). "105. The defense must be deep. The depth of defense is the main condition for its success. The width of the front of the battle order of defense is determined by the width of the front of the holding group. The division can defend a strip along the front 8-12 km and in depth 4-6 km. The regiment can defend a sector along a front of 3-5 km and a depth of 2.5-3 km. The battalion can defend the area along a front of 1.5-2 km and the same depth. When defending the SD, the fronts can be wider, reaching up to 3-5 km per battalion. In important areas, the fronts of defense can be narrower, reaching up to 6 km per division. At the same time, we do not attract close attention from the neighboring side. The training is still planned, the scale is appropriate due to the spread in time, the pace is not panicky, and the location is not at the very border in the infantry filling zone for URs (planned construction is already underway there), but in the area of natural natural obstacles. If you look at the map, you can see that there are many natural defense lines on the Belostok ledge, but there are not so many places where the enemy can strike and successfully develop the offensive. And it is the direct duty of the commander to determine these places and give instructions, first of all, in these areas to carry out activities according to combat training plans.

Here it is worth remembering the Kursk Bulge. Commander of the Voronezh Front Vatutin N.F. evenly stretched the troops along the entire perimeter of its defense. As a result, the front was broken through to a considerable depth, and subunits intended for the subsequent offensive had to be brought in to eliminate the breakthrough. Commander of the Central Front Rokossovsky K.K. deployed its forces targeted and the enemy got bogged down in a powerful anti-tank missile defense in the direction of the main strikes.

« Each commander, without waiting for instructions from a superior and regardless of whether reconnaissance was sent last in a given lane (direction) or not, he is obliged to organize reconnaissance with his own forces and means and conduct it continuously.

Apparently, there were no special problems with this in Zap.OVO. During the military game of December 1940, it was assumed that at the first stage the probable enemy would have an advantage in forces and means. The commander of the Belarusian (Western) district admitted that he had lost. But he learned from it. And already on February 18, 1941, Pavlov sent report N867 to Stalin, Molotov and Timoshenko, in which, in particular, there is such a proposal: “It is necessary to truly bring the Western theater of operations into a truly defensive state by creating a number of defensive zones to a depth of 300 km, having built anti-tank ditches, gouges, bogging dams, scarps, field defenses. It seems that by this time the comrade commander had no doubts that in the near future he, together with the district entrusted to him, would begin to be wound on tracks by German tanks and. Only now the reaction is more like a quiet hysteria, turning into undisguised panic. As for the panic in Moscow, they reacted to it. Until April, Pavlov regularly reported to the General Staff on the active preparation of the German units concentrated near our borders and their readiness to attack the USSR, and continued to actively engage in combat training of the troops. And then, he waited.

“No. 425. DIRECTIVE OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR AND THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE REGION TO COLONEL GENERAL D. G. PAVLOV. w/n, [April 1941] Top secret. Of particular importance. In one copy.

The deployment of the main forces of the German army is most likely in the South-East, in order to seize Ukraine with a blow to Berdichev, Kyiv. This strike will presumably be accompanied by an auxiliary strike from East Prussia against Dvinsk and Riga, or concentric strikes from Suwalki and Brest on Volkovysk, Baranovichi. In this case, against the troops of our North-Western and Western fronts, we should expect the Germans to deploy up to 40 infantry divisions, 3-4 tank divisions and 2-4 motorized divisions. The possibility is not ruled out that the Germans will concentrate their main forces in East Prussia and in the direction of Warsaw in order to strike and develop a blow to Riga or Kovno, Dvinsk through the Lithuanian SSR. At the same time, it is necessary to expect auxiliary, strong blows from Lomzha and Brest, with a subsequent desire to develop them in the direction of Baranovichi, Minsk. With this variant of Germany's actions, we must expect that the Germans will deploy up to 130 divisions and most of their aviation against our North-Western and Western fronts.

2. By 1941, the Military Council and Headquarters of the Western Special Military District should develop in the General Staff of the SC: a) a cover and defense plan for the entire period of concentration; b) a plan for the concentration and deployment of front troops; c) the plan for the implementation of the first operation of the 13th and 4th armies and the defense plan of the 3rd and 10th armies; d) plan for the use and combat operations of aviation; e) a plan for organizing the rear and material support, sanitary and veterinary evacuation for the first month of the war; f) a communication plan for the period of cover, concentration and deployment of front troops; g) air defense plan; h) engineering support plan”.

Moscow indicated the most probable directions of the “Wehrmacht” strikes in the district’s defense zone, which coincides with the data of human and aviation intelligence of the district, as well as with information received from the border guards. True, there is a high probability that the strike will not be “auxiliary” at all, but when planning defense, you still have to proceed from your own forces and means. So it is necessary not to disturb the capital over trifles, but to move the earth at an accelerated pace. It will turn out, of course, not “200-300 km deep”, but in total, in six months, three armies will dig into the ground so that, under the most favorable circumstances, Army Group Center will pick them out for at least a month. Even now, to attack the enemy who occupied the field fortifications, a 3x-4x superiority in forces is required, and the “gloomy Teutonic geniuses” will have to try hard.

In addition, there are four fortified areas in the Zap.OVO defense zone: Grodno, Osovetsky, Zambrovsky and Brest. UR programs 1940-41. differed from the previous ones in a more thoughtful line of defense, the design of the DOS, and the large proportion of anti-tank defense artillery installations.

Increased the depth of SD. The facilities had more advanced means of chemical protection, ventilation, water supply and electrification. Fortification anti-tank barriers were erected along the front edge, and anti-personnel barriers were erected on the approaches to the DOS. If the comrade commander does not separate himself from the personnel and " caring for a human fighter and all his subordinates is the first duty and direct duty"him as a commander, then Pavlov will take personal control over the construction of the URs and will "to demand full exertion of forces from subordinates." It will not be possible to fully complete the work by June 1941, but the number of combat-ready structures will not be 7-8%, but at least twice as much. And these are 332 long-term firing structures, about 600 machine guns of various systems, 160 barrels of 45-mm and 40 barrels of 76-mm guns, as well as special DOT-3 installations and heavy machine guns with optical sights.

And about the same number of DOS armed with machine guns "maxim" on field machines and guns of regimental and battalion artillery. According to the plan for covering the state border, the field troops were allocated specific lanes and positions that needed to be taken and held with the start of hostilities. The "Urovsky" units consisted of the office of the commandant of the UR and three separate machine-gun battalions (OPB), a communications company, and a sapper company. In addition, in separate URs there were artillery regiments (of three divisions) and up to 6 platoons of caponier artillery. It was established by the exercises that it takes from 4 to 6 hours to occupy the DOS and deliver ammunition there. According to the results of the exercises at the end of May, permanent garrisons received long-term firing structures.

And in general, by May, there were no longer any doubts about the war and its nature.

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE WESTERN SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on May 14, 1941, No. 503859 / ss / s. 2) by stubborn defense of fortifications along the line of the state border, to firmly cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of district troops; 4) by all types of reconnaissance of the district in a timely manner to determine the nature of the concentration and grouping of enemy troops; ... 4) to reconnoiter and prepare rear lines for the entire depth of defense, incl. R. Berezina. In the event of a forced withdrawal, develop a plan for creating anti-tank barriers to the full depth and a plan for mining bridges, railway junctions and points of possible concentration of the enemy (troops, headquarters, hospitals, etc.); 5) to develop a plan for bringing the fortified areas on the former state border within the district to full combat readiness; ... The defense should be based on the stubborn defense of fortified areas and field fortifications created along the state border using all forces and opportunities for their further development. To give the character of active actions to the defense. Any attempts by the enemy to break through the defense should be immediately eliminated by counterattacks of the corps and army reserves ... ".

The forces of the 13th Army began restoration work in the fortification zone of the old border. The fortified areas of Polotsk, Minsk, Mozyr, Sebezh and Slutsk were reactivated and put in relative order by June 17. DOS equipment was returned from warehouses and mounted, incomplete firing points were armed with machine guns and guns on field machines. The forefield was equipped, field-type fortifications were erected in the infantry filling zone. Bridges on the rivers in the area of the district are prepared for an immediate explosion, they are protected by mobile mechanized groups of NKVD troops.

« The defense pursues the goal of stubborn resistance to break up or tie up the offensive of superior enemy forces with smaller forces in a given direction in order to ensure freedom of action for friendly troops in other directions or in the same direction, but at a different time. This is achieved by fighting to hold a certain territory (line, strip, object) for the required time. The defense must be invincible and insurmountable for the enemy, no matter how strong he may be in a given direction. It should consist in stubborn resistance, exhausting the physical and moral strength of the enemy, and in a decisive counterattack, inflicting complete defeat on him. Thus, the defense must achieve victory with small forces over a numerically superior enemy.

"104. order of battledefense consists of holding down and shock groups.

shackling groupconstitutes the first echelon of defense and is intended to firmly hold the area given to it. It must, by its stubborn resistance, inflict such a defeat on the enemy that it will completely exhaust its offensive power. In the event of a breakthrough of enemy tanks and infantry into the depths of the defense, the pinning group must, by a skillful combination of fire damage and partial counterattacks, stop the advance of the enemy and make him incapable of continuing the offensive. The main part of the forces and means is included in the holding group in defense.

strike group The combat order of defense is the second echelon, located behind the holding group and has the purpose of a decisive counterattack to destroy the enemy breaking through and restore the situation. Under favorable conditions, the successful development of a strike group counterattack should develop into a general counteroffensive against a weakened and upset enemy.

On the basis of the directive of the NPO, the commander of the Zap.OVO prepared the relevant documents for the armies of the district “.. No. 468. DIRECTIVE OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 3rd ARMY. No. 002140/ss/s 14 May 1941 Top secret. Of particular importance. Ex. No. 2. The specified plan is given the name: "The area of covering the state border No. 1." ... The cipher telegram of the Military Council of the District on the commissioning of this cover plan will be as follows: “To the Commander of the 3rd Army. I declare an alarm for GRODNO 1941. Signatures.” For the 4th army - Kobrin 41. For the 10th army - Bialystok 41.

The shackling groups are burrowing into the planet at a Stakhanovite pace and equipping positions for artillery. We have already dealt with aviation. It remains to take care of "strike groups of battle order in the second echelon." This role is played by six mechanized corps - No. 6,11,13,14,17 and 20. Stop! In this case, the expression "should act" is more appropriate.

In fact, we only have one mechanized corps №6.

4th etc. : KV - 63, T-34 - 160, BT-7 - 26, T-26 -73, BA-10 - 54, BA-20 - 36. Other material and technical part is provided by 85%.

7th etc. : KV - 51, T-34 - 78, BT-7 - 26, T-26 -54, BA-10 - 56, BA-20 - 24. Other material and technical part is provided by 85%.

29th m.d. : BT-7 - 238, BA-10 - 18, BA-20 - 22, 100% equipped with vehicles. The other material and technical part is provided by 70-85%.

Above the staff, the corps has 58 T-28s, 50 BT-7s, 67 BT-5s and 53 BT-2s.

13th mechanized corps began to form in the spring of 1941. 25th and 31st etc. and 208th m.d. 263 T-26, 15 BT, 29 BA-10, 5 BA-20, 800 trucks. The other material and technical part is provided by 50-85%. The 25th tank division was formed on the basis of the 44th light tank brigade. She had well-trained personnel, and the bulk of the equipment of the corps was in her. Due to the excess equipment in the 6th mechanized corps, we are bringing the 31st, etc. to an acceptable state. and 208th m.d.

As a result, we have two full-fledged armored mechanized units in the 10th Army. Comrade Pavlov tank is a true and well aware of the value of such a powerful and well-trained formation as the 6th mechanized corps, and, after the formation of the 13th MK, in the spring of 1941, its gradual transfer to the Slonim-Baranovichi area begins. By June 11, the corps completed its concentration in the specified area.

As part of the 3rd Army in March 1941 began to form 11th mechanized corps: 44 BT-5, 301 T-26, 59 BA-10, 25 BA-20, 752 trucks. The other material and technical part of the building is provided by 30-55%. The first regiments 29 and 33, etc., are completed with tanks to an acceptable state. The second regiments of the tank divisions and the tank regiment of the motorized rifle division, due to the lack of materiel, are each armed with 24 76-mm F-22 USV guns and 24 machine guns. One of the reconnaissance battalions receives 18 45-mm guns. The offensive capabilities of the corps are limited, but as a mobile anti-tank defense line, it will significantly strengthen the defensive orders of the army.

As part of the 4th Army in the spring of 1941, began to form 14th mechanized corps. By the beginning of the war, the corps had 534 light tanks, including 10 T-37A and T-38, 16 twin-turret T-26 and 6 BT. The rest is single-turret tanks and T-26s of various modifications. 998 trucks. The other material and technical part of the body is provided by 35-60%. Tank divisions and howitzer regiments are well prepared. The level of combat readiness of the motorized division was low.

17 mechanized corps. It began to form in March 1941. By the beginning of the war, the corps had 24 BT, 37 T-26, and 33 BA-10 armored vehicles. 498 trucks and 40 tractors. In addition, the corps was armed with 163 guns (including 37-mm anti-aircraft guns - 12, howitzers - 54). Regiments of tank divisions, due to the lack of materiel, are armed with 24 76-mm F-22 USV guns and 24 machine guns. While providing personnel with small arms, we have a rifle division somewhat reinforced at the expense of foot tankers and a reinforced tank battalion. You can still defend, but you can't attack.

Despite all the shortcomings in the configuration of units, ZapOVO was one of the strongest military districts in the Soviet Armed Forces. In its composition, it was second only to the Kyiv Special Military District. It had about 672 thousand people, 10,087 guns and mortars (without 50-mm mortars), 2201 tanks (including 383 KV and T-34) and 1909 aircraft (of which 424 were new).

10th Army formed in the Belarusian Special Military District in 1939. With the outbreak of World War II, it was included in the Western Front. The army included the 1st (2, 8 sd) and 5th (13, 86, 113 sd) rifle, 6th (4, 7 TD; 29 md; 4mtsp) and 13th (25, 31 TD ; 208 md; 18 mtsp) mechanized corps, 6th cavalry corps (6.36kd), 155th rifle division, 66th fortified (Osovetsky) area, several artillery and other units (6th artillery anti-tank brigade; 130, 156, 262, 315 caps; 311 paps; 124, 375 gaps RGC; 38.71 ozad). Army Commander - Major General K. D. Golubev (March - July 1941). Member of the Military Council of the Army - Divisional Commissar Dubrovsky D. G. (June - July 1941). Army Chief of Staff - Major General Lyapin P.I. (1940 - July 1941). Cover area No. 2. Shtarm - Bialystok.

4th Army It was formed in September 1939 as part of the Belarusian Special Military District on the basis of the Bobruisk Army Group. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the army administration united the 28th rifle (6, 42, 49, 75 rifle divisions) and the 14th mechanized corps (22, 30 TD; 205 md; 20mtsp), 62nd fortified (Brest-Litovsky) district, a number of artillery and other units (447,455,462 cap; 120 ran b / m RGK; 12 ozad). Commander Major General Korobkov A.A. (January-July 1941). Member of the Military Council: Divisional Commissar Shlykov F.I (June-July 1941). Chief of Staff Colonel Sandalov L.M. (August 1940 - July 1941). Cover area No. 4. Shtam - Kobrin.

3rd Army formed on September 1, 1939 as part of the Belarusian Special Military District on the basis of the Vitebsk Army Group of Forces: 4th Rifle Corps (27, 56, 85 rifle divisions) and 11 mechanized corps (29, ZZtd; 204 md; 16 mtsp), 68 -th fortified (Grodno) region, 7th anti-tank artillery brigade, a number of artillery and other units (152, 444 cap; 16 ozad). Army commanders: Lieutenant General V. I. Kuznetsov (June 1939 - August 1941). Cover area No. 1. Shtam - Grodno.

Cover area No. 3 - Belsky, 13th Army.

“The following remain at the direct disposal of the district command:

a) the 21st Corps, consisting of the 17th and 37th divisions, which, with M-3, is concentrated in the Radun-Voronovo-Lida region and prepares a defensive line before receiving a combat mission;

b) the 47th building corps, consisting of the 55th, 121st and 155th divisions, which from M -3 to M -10 by road, march and railway. the road is concentrated in the area of Pruzhany, Zapruda, Bereza-Kartuska, Bluden and, before receiving a combat mission, prepares a defensive line on the front of Murava, Pruzhany, the Dnieper-Bug Canal to Gorodets;

At 03:15 on June 22, 1941, German assault groups attempted to capture the bridges across the Bug, but ran into organized resistance. A fierce battle went on for about twenty minutes. At 3:25 a.m., German artillery began artillery preparation against pre-determined targets. At 03:35, five of the six bridges collapsed, unable to withstand the tension of the first moments of the war and the detonation of long-laid land mines.

“The railway bridge in the Brest region continued to stand, although it was also supposed to collapse. There was no one to understand the reasons, and there were no opportunities. The group covering the bridge was actually destroyed. Lying on the rails, the lieutenant fired his "tar" in short bursts along the bridge and heard nothing from the shell shock. He did not complete the task, and from this it was disgusting in his soul. Silently, a German tank crawled out onto the bridge, crawled about ten meters and, also jumping silently, stopped. The barrel of the cannon slid down, and crimson flames spilled from the open hatches of the tower. Feeling the vibration of the railway track, the lieutenant rolled to the side. An armored train slowly crawled out onto the bridge. Eyes involuntarily caught on the white inscription running along the camouflage side: "The East is a delicate matter, Herr Peter!".

The control platform ran into the tank and moved it out of the way. Conducting continuous fire from cannons and machine guns, the armored train threw out troops from two sapper groups and a cover group and remained standing on the bridge, clogging it with its carcass. Ten minutes later, the steel monster, having squeezed the maximum out of its steam engine, rolled towards the hub, continuing to work on the adjacent coast with all available weapons. The explosion that thundered after this not only blew out the central support of the bridge, but turned both spans into a knot. The Bug river is not wide - where it is 50, and where it is 300 meters. Not so much. Let the “comerades” not look for easy ways.”

And at about six o'clock in the morning, bridges across the Neman in the Druskeniki region were destroyed. In this section, the Neman breaks through the Grodno Upland and the Baltic terminal moraine ridge. In places of breakthrough, its valley becomes deep and narrow. Above the city of Grodno, the width of the valley in some places does not exceed 300-400 m, and the depth reaches 35-45 m. The river here resembles a fast mountain stream. Its banks are dotted with pebbles and large boulders. In the channel, boulders often form real rapids. The slopes of the valley are cut by numerous deep ravines.

“Because of the grove, about eight hundred meters from the bridge, a column appeared. Four armored vehicles and three GAZ-AA trucks. Hidden behind the parapet of the ramp, the BA-10 turret turned ten degrees with a distinctly audible buzz, catching the lead vehicle in sight.

Set aside. Svoi.- the group commander identified the approaching unit.

The leading BTR-20 turned off the road near the bridge, letting the BA-6s and trucks following it pass. The right side of the brand new armored car was cut with shrapnel, there was a strong dent in the turret area, the second of the four side wheels was missing. An elderly border guard captain with a fresh bloody bandage on his head jumped off the armor:

Kuzmich, turn the shop. The guests are following me.

There was a head patrol five kilometers away. Judging by the documents - the 161st Infantry Division.

I say it was."

Field Marshal Fyodor von Bock had a bad day, as they say. Luftwaffe strike groups bombed peacefully sleeping airfields, but on the way out they were hit by Russian fighters. And then a "courtesy call" followed - the Russians launched a bombing and assault attack on the airfields of the second air fleet and units of the "Wehrmacht" that began crossing the Bug and attacking the Grodno fortified area. Over Brest and Grodno, roaring engines and cutting the sky with tracers of cannons and machine guns, a giant carousel of air combat was spinning. The absence of bridges was not a fatal surprise, but without air supremacy, the very idea of a blitzkrieg became irrelevant. The second component of the "blitzkrieg" was inactive behind such a narrow Bug. By the evening of June 22, at the cost of enormous efforts and losses, they managed to take a bridgehead south of Brest, pushing the 75th Russian division. On the left flank of Army Group Center, the 12th Panzer Division, which had about 40 Pz-IVs, thrown into battle, forced the 85th Division of the 3rd Army to retreat.

However, although she suffered losses, she remained quite combat-ready and, having fenced herself off from the tanks by the Augustow Canal, turned around at a new line of defense. And from somewhere behind the Neman, heavy artillery began to work measuredly and methodically at the "panzers". The only really good news was the capture of bridges across the Neman in the area of Merkin and Alytus.

Under cover of night, from 22 to 23 June, units of the 8th and 42nd Army Corps of the 9th Field Army were deployed in the direction of Merkine-Varena, covering the right flank of the Western Front.

On the bridgehead south of Brest, the transfer of parts of the 2nd tank group of Colonel-General Heinz Guderian began. Parts of the 75th division of General S.I. Nedvigin withdrew to the Priluki-Gershany-Mukhavets line and entrenched themselves on pre-prepared defense lines. At the disposal of the "fast Heinz" was not very wide, but, nevertheless, sufficient for the deployment of the corridor between the positions of the 42nd and 75th divisions of the 28th rifle corps of the 4th army. By 5 o'clock on June 23, having completed the concentration of the 24th and 47th tank corps of the group on the bridgehead of the "papatank of the Reich troops", he moved towards his fate. Four tank, one motorized and one cavalry divisions. Pz.II-397, Pz.III -240, Pz.IV-75.

The fifth outpost fought to the last
After 75 years, the real details of the first battle on the border of the USSR, which was accepted by the NKVD troops, became known.

Exactly 30 years this year marks the feature film by Vyacheslav Nikiforov "Year forty-first" - the fifth film in the television series "State Border". The outpost of Lieutenant Sushentsov, who died almost entirely, is, of course, a collective image, but it should be noted that the picture was filmed at the location of the 86th Brest border detachment - on the same section of the border where 75 years ago, on June 22, 1941, it took the first blow the legendary 17th Red Banner Border Detachment. On what, on what - and in those days they tried not to save on consultants. More about

On the first day of the war, the Germans did not have an easy walk

Turning to the same archival sources 30 years later, we can safely say that the outpost, which in the film is being ironed by German tanks, had real prototypes. The documentary materials of the Central Border Museum of the FSB of Russia are, in a sense, even scarier than the cinema. They contain all the ambiguous truth of that war and its first day.
On the Belarusian section of the State Border, they were ready for war already on the evening of June 21. On the border itself, the highest military authorities of the union and republican departments of the border troops of the NKVD met the war, representatives of detachments and commandant's offices arrived to reinforce the outposts.

So it was at the fifth outpost of the 17th Red Banner Border Detachment, where the head of the 1st department of the headquarters, Captain Semyon Grinenko, as well as the instructor of the political propaganda department, senior political instructor Andrey Grechukhin, were seconded from Brest. The head of the outpost was junior lieutenant Pyotr Bogomaz, his assistant was lieutenant Konstantin Georgievsky, and his deputy for political affairs was political instructor Ivan Sorokin.

For many years, the name of its chief was erased from the history of the outpost's battle with German mobile units on the morning of June 22. The reason for this was that Bogomaz, who survived the battle, ended up in the occupation due to a serious wound, and, having healed, embarked on the path of cooperation with the Nazi regime, for which he subsequently suffered an unfairly mild, according to many, punishment.

The first to tell a wide audience about the 5th outpost was Sergei Smirnov, the author of the famous Brest Fortress. In his account, the events of the morning of June 22 are as follows: “Several times chains of submachine gunners went up to attack this line: 300-400 people against 60. The machine guns of the border guards invariably laid them on the meadow, and many were laid down forever. Then a German tank came forward, but the soldiers of the outpost blew it up with grenades. Then the Germans brought the civilians of Chileev to the meadow, driving in front of them crying women, children, old people: they advanced under the cover of this human chain - four tanks and more than 200 machine gunners. The border guards knew by sight every inhabitant of the village, every child, and they ceased fire. So, after a five-hour battle, under the caterpillars of tanks, under the bullets of submachine gunners, almost the entire outpost died.

Fragment of the outpost defense scheme

The words of Sergei Smirnov that a single tank was destroyed are not confirmed in a letter from the wife of the political commissar Maria Sorokina, written in 1956 to the museum of the border troops: “After shelling from guns, the German infantry went. But the fighters of the outpost with well-aimed fire ... mowed them down like grass. After that, the Germans abandoned the tank, but it was met by a bunch of grenades ... and returned back. At this time, the Germans abandoned 3 tanks ... "Sorokina's words that the tank was not irretrievably lost by the Germans are also confirmed by the materials of their own study of the border guards in 1944, signed by the head of the new, restored, frontier outpost in this area, Lieutenant Petushkov:" The first wave in several hundreds of people were beaten off by grenades and machine-gun fire. The approaching German tank was bombarded with grenades and retreated.

By the way, there is also an oddity with the story about the local residents who were hiding behind the Germans: everything seems to be so, but not quite. Having made the episode with the "live chain" the culmination of the battle, Sergei Smirnov, unfortunately, exaggerated some things, and simplified and smoothed out others. At that time, his undoubtedly innovative research prose could not be free from propaganda canons. A resident of the village of Chileevo Alexandra Skovorodko, like many of her fellow villagers, hid in the cellar during the battle: “... We heard shooting from rifles in the village. They also shot at the outpost. My son Vladimir now and then climbed outside and watched what was happening there ... The Germans, it was, poked their head in there, but burned themselves. Many of them were laid down by our border guards. Especially on a flat meadow, when the Germans ran from the ditch to the outpost with hostility. And the border guards started firing at them with machine guns. The Germans fell - neither back nor forward they can not. Then they, the beasts, gathered several of our village people. Everyone who got caught: old people, women, and children were there. They drove them out onto the lawn in front of the border guards and their soldiers, so that their soldiers could run back ... ”That’s “run away”, and not “advance”.

The Germans attacked the border guards from three sides

Probably based primarily on the material collected by Lieutenant Petushkov, Smirnov used it very selectively. For example, he (and any researcher) could not help but notice a strange gap in the place where, after indicating the rank and position of the head of the outpost, there should have been a surname. Obviously, even during the “thaw”, its mention in official historiography was taboo. Moreover, not because of the fact that Bogomaz was working for the Germans, which Petushkov might not have known about. The reason was different: Bogomaz ordered to open fire ... on the inhabitants of Chileev and the Germans hiding behind them! Perhaps it was then that a certain breakdown occurred in him. And what about the fighters?

“The border guards, despite the order of the head of the outpost, did not open fire, because the inhabitants would be killed,” Lieutenant Petushkov writes, while correlating the “human chain” with the decisive assault on the outpost, which contradicts other documentary sources. Nevertheless, Sergei Smirnov uses this version in his book. And it couldn't have been otherwise. As a result, the tendency inherent in the historiography of the Soviet period to exaggerate the feat against the background, at best, glossing over everything that did not fit into its ideological canons, was also reflected in the fundamental assessment of this battle. As you can easily see by looking at the diagram, there was no encirclement of the outpost, just as there were no attacks from the northern direction - the Germans took it in pincers from three sides. The enemy's plans included, first of all, the neutralization of possible attempts by the border guards to prevent the construction of a pontoon bridge across the Bug and the subsequent advance deep into Soviet territory. And, if you look closely, the approaches to the northern front of the perimeter were swampy and inconvenient for an attack. This way, apparently, part of the border guards escaped, and those who remained to cover the retreat remained forever. But it is important to remember that everyone who was at the outpost could retreat at any moment - due to the current operational situation and the threat of encirclement. How many units in the 41st left their positions only when they saw tanks with crosses? The 5th outpost fought. Historical truth does not detract from the feat of the border guards.

The drawings were provided by the FSB Center of Management of Russia