Tactics Air Force types of aviation. Among the main combat missions performed by the IAP are

And its main purpose is to defeat air attack weapons (Enemy AOS) in flight in close cooperation with anti-aircraft missile forces (ZRV) and anti-aircraft artillery (ZA). With a limited composition, units and subunits of the IA can be involved in carrying out tasks to defeat enemy ground (sea) targets, as well as to conduct aerial reconnaissance.

The main purpose of the fighter aviation regiment is to carry out combat missions of air defense of the most important objects and regions of the country, fighter aviation cover for ground forces (navy forces), as well as to provide combat operations of units and units of other branches with aviation. In addition, the IAP is involved in the destruction of electronic reconnaissance aircraft, primarily from the reconnaissance and strike complexes (RUK), air control posts, specialized electronic warfare aircraft and enemy airborne assault forces in the air.

In peacetime, a fighter aviation regiment, part of the assigned forces, is on combat duty in the air defense system to protect the airspace over the territory of the Russian Federation and is prepared to perform combat missions in accordance with its intended purpose.

The main form of combat use of fighter aviation units and subunits is air combat.

The main combat missions performed by the IAP include:

Covering the most important objects, regions of the country and groupings of troops (naval forces) from enemy air attacks and air reconnaissance;

Destruction of an air enemy in air battles for air supremacy;

Ensuring combat operations of units and subunits of other branches of aviation;

Destruction of electronic intelligence aircraft, air command posts of aircraft (helicopters) - jammers;

Fighting enemy airborne assault forces in the air;

The IAP can be involved in aerial reconnaissance either with a limited staff, or conduct it along with the performance of the main combat missions.

If necessary, during separate periods of combat operations, a fighter aviation regiment may be assigned missions to destroy enemy ground (sea) targets in the area of inaccessibility of fighters.

Combat capabilities of fighter planes.

The MiG-31, Su-27, MiG-29 fighter planes in service with fighter aviation regiments, having high b / capabilities, are able to detect the enemy at a long range with the help of their electronic systems, track several air targets simultaneously and hit them from any direction in everything range of altitudes and flight speeds.

The main factors determining the b / efficiency of fighters are speed, maneuver, fire. They are in close relationship, should be in the optimal ratio.

The appearance of all-aspect missiles with TGS allows you to attack on a collision course in close combat. One of the main characteristics affecting the outcome of close air combat is the turning radius, which for fourth-generation aircraft is ≥500 m.

In modern close group air combat, it is no longer necessary for a fighter to enter a given hemisphere of the target. Now missile launches are distributed over the entire area of \u200b\u200bspace around the enemy aircraft. Missile launches in the range of heading angles of 120-60º are 48%, and in the range of -180-120º - 31%. The average duration of the battle has decreased, which requires an increase in the angular velocity and a decrease in the turning radius.

COMBAT ACTIONS OF AVIATION REGIMENTS OF STRIKING AVIATION

Purpose and tasks of FBA and SA

Front-line bomber and attack aviation constitute the main strike force of front-line aviation and are capable of delivering strikes to a depth of 250-400 km.

The main purpose of front-line bomber aviation is the destruction of objects in the operational depth of the enemy, i.e. at a depth of 300-400 km from the front line. It can also operate in the tactical and immediate operational depths, solving the tasks of air support for the Ground Forces. The main tasks of bomber aviation will be:

Destruction of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;

Defeat enemy reserves;

Defeat the means of command and control of enemy troops;

Assistance in the landing of their troops;

Obstruction of enemy maneuvers;

Based on the purpose, the main objects of strikes for front-line bomber aviation should be considered:

Airfields and aircraft on them;

Rocket launchers in positions;

Reserves in areas of concentration and on the march;

Nodes of railway stations, large bridges, crossings, sea and river ports;

Warehouses and supply bases;

Control posts and radar posts.

Assault aviation is the main means of air support for the Ground Forces. Air support for ground forces is one of the main tasks of bomber and attack aviation.

The main purpose of attack aviation is the destruction of ground-based small and mobile objects on the battlefield and in tactical depth. The objects of its actions can be located in the nearest operational depth of up to 300 km. from the front line.

Methods of b / actions and b / orders of subdivisions (parts) of the FBA and SHA.
When solving their tasks, subdivisions and units of the FBA and SA, depending on the conditions, can use the following main methods of conducting b / actions:

Simultaneous strike on predetermined targets;

Sequential strikes against predetermined targets;

Call actions;

Independent search.

Simultaneous strikes (group strikes) must be used when it is required to create a high density of a missile and bomb strike. The blow is delivered by the entire composition or most of the forces. In this case, better conditions are created for securing and overcoming the enemy's air defense system.

Sequential strikes (single) are delivered when there is not enough strength to simultaneously complete tasks, as well as when it is necessary to have a long impact on enemy targets and prevent restoration work.

Attacks on call from their command posts or senior commanders are carried out, as a rule, against newly discovered targets (rocket launchers in positions, troops on the march, etc.). This method is most often used for air support of the Ground Forces units.

Independent search is used when there is no exact information about the location of the impact objects. An independent search is carried out by a limited composition of forces (usually up to a link). If necessary, these forces can be increased.

The following attack methods are used to defeat and destroy ground objects of the FBA and SHA:

From a dive;

From level flight;

With a pitch.

A dive attack is used to destroy small moving and stationary targets. This method has the highest hit accuracy.

An attack from a pitch-up and a horizontal position is used to destroy areal and linear objects.

In difficult weather conditions, bombing and shooting at ground targets is carried out from low altitudes of 150-220 m from horizontal flight or with small dive angles. When conducting b / actions in simple weather conditions, strikes are delivered from a dive from medium heights. Attacks are carried out on the move using vigorous anti-missile and anti-aircraft maneuvers. It is advisable to strike targets from different directions, taking into account the position of the Sun.

Exploration of the radiation situation and weather;

Determining the results of missile and air strikes.

To perform these tasks, the reconnaissance aircraft has off-board reconnaissance equipment, as well as equipment for processing the results of observation, documenting and transmitting reports to the ground command post.

Types and methods of conducting aerial reconnaissance.

Air reconnaissance, depending on the scale, tasks, and also on whose interests it is carried out, is divided into three types:

strategic;

operational;

Tactical.

Strategic aerial reconnaissance is organized by the commanders-in-chief of the services of the Armed Forces or the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in the interests of the war as a whole or in the interests of operations conducted by a group of fronts, to the depth of the entire theater of operations.

Operational aerial reconnaissance is organized by front-line command and carried out to the depth of front-line, air and sea operations by front-line reconnaissance aircraft.

Tactical aerial reconnaissance is organized by the army command in the tactical depth of the enemy in the interests of formations of various branches of the armed forces in order to obtain the necessary data for organizing a battle.

In the interests of aviation operations, preliminary aerial reconnaissance is carried out (with a lack of data to make a decision on the implementation of tasks), additional reconnaissance (to clarify the position of objects, their air defense, radiation situation and weather on the route and in the area of operations), control (during or after an air strike to determine its results).

Reconnaissance aviation uses the following methods of aerial reconnaissance:

Visual observation;

Aerial photography;

Air reconnaissance with the help of electronic means.

visual observation allows you to view large areas, and is indispensable for the search and additional reconnaissance of low-observable nuclear missile systems, control and air defense systems and other moving objects. Data can be transmitted by radio immediately after the detection of targets.

aerial photography allows you to capture the most complex objects on film, to obtain fairly complete data on the groupings of enemy troops, its defensive structures, large railway junctions, airfields and positions of rocket launchers, to identify even the most insignificant changes in such large objects.

Aircraft carriers.

Command posts and radar posts, command and control centers, as well as state administration centers.

Let's consider the b / capabilities of the Tu-160, Tu-95MS, Tu-22MZ aircraft.

Tu-160 aircraft.

The Tu-160 aircraft is a multi-mode strategic missile-carrying bomber and is designed to destroy ground and sea targets from low and medium altitudes at subsonic speeds and from high altitudes at supersonic speeds using strategic cruise missiles, short-range guided missiles and aerial bombs.

The aircraft is equipped with an in-flight refueling system of the "hose-cone" type (in the non-operating position, the rod is retracted into the forward fuselage in front of the cockpit). The crew consists of 4 people and is placed in ejection seats.

The armament of the aircraft, consisting of long-range, medium-range and short-range aviation cruise missiles, aerial bombs and mines, is located in the fuselage in 2 weapons compartments. The total load of weapons is 22500 kg.

Missile weapons option may include:

Two drum launchers, each of which can carry 6 guided cruise missiles, with a launch range of up to 3000 km. (X-55 missiles);

Two drum launchers for short-range guided missiles (X-15 missiles).

The bomb variant may include thermonuclear and conventional bombs (caliber 250, 500, 1500, 3000), guided bombs, mines and other weapons.

The combat potential of the aircraft is commensurate with the potential of 2 Tu-95MS aircraft or 2 Tu-22MZ air squadrons and is equated to a missile salvo of a nuclear submarine with ballistic missiles.

Purpose of fighter aviation

The purpose of fighter aviation is to destroy enemy aircraft in air battles and at airfields, to protect friendly troops and fixed objects from an attack by an air enemy, to destroy observation and barrage balloons, to ensure combat operations of friendly aviation and, if necessary, to provide aerial photography and the work of spotters.

Fighter aircraft can also be used to attack ground troops, as well as to carry out reconnaissance missions both in the interests of the combined arms and aviation commands.

Combat use of fighter aircraft

The struggle for superiority (dominance) in the air is carried out in various ways and means, depending on the goals. A distinction is made between the struggle for operational and tactical air supremacy.

Operational air supremacy presupposes the conquest of air supremacy for the duration of an operation carried out by ground forces and requires the destruction of the enemy air force, its sources of replenishment and supply, as well as the destruction of the enemy airfield network.

The struggle for tactical dominance pursues a limited goal: to prevent enemy aircraft from working on a certain sector of the front for a time measured in hours.

The struggle for operational air supremacy is carried out by all types of combat aircraft and air defense systems, and in this case fighter aircraft are assigned the particular tasks of providing other types of aviation with combat against enemy air forces.

The capture of operational air supremacy is aimed at:

a) to protect against aerial reconnaissance and attacks the strike force of their troops in the main operational direction;

b) to ensure the work of the rear and communication lines in the main operational direction and the most important air defense points; c) ensure the freedom of action of their aviation not only on their territory and over the battlefield, but also behind enemy lines.

In this struggle, single-seat fighter aircraft will be tasked with: a) destroying, in cooperation with air defense, enemy aircraft penetrating the rear; b) the destruction of enemy aircraft in the centers of air combat formed at the front and behind enemy lines (100-150 km).

For two-seat fighter aircraft: independent combat against enemy aircraft and support for the actions of other types of combat aircraft at the entire operational depth (up to 300-500 km).

For multi-seat fighters: a) escorting their bombers to their area of operations and protecting them from enemy aircraft during the execution of the mission; b) interaction with single and double fighters in their fight both over their own territory and over enemy territory.

Two-seat and multi-seat fighters performing the tasks of escorting bombers and attack aircraft are entrusted with reconnaissance and suppression of air defense, and sometimes they are directly involved in the bombardment and shelling of terrestrial objects to be destroyed.

With the current ratio (quantitative) of the types of combat aviation, fighter aviation can achieve by its own means only tactical air supremacy over a relatively small area (20-30 km) and for a period measured by the time the fighters are in the area.

The capture of tactical air supremacy pursues the following goals:

a) protection of important groupings of troops on the battlefield and in the rear from air reconnaissance and attack;

b) protection of rear facilities;

c) ensuring the combat work of other types of aviation from an air enemy, not only over the battlefield, but also over enemy territory.

Tactical dominance for longer periods is achieved not only by the actions of fighters in the air, but also by the suppression of the enemy air force at its airfields by other branches of combat aviation. In the event of a successful raid on airfields, air supremacy will be seized for a time until the enemy concentrates fresh air forces from other areas capable of creating a balance of forces in the air.

Providing ground troops

The general tasks of fighter aviation in relation to ground troops are to ensure the concealment of the location and maneuver of ground troops and to protect enemy aircraft from attacks.

Fighter aviation belongs to the army (front, high command) aviation and is not part of military formations. Depending on the situation and combat missions, fighter aviation units will assist military formations, remaining at the disposal of the army command, and only in some cases will go over to temporary operational subordination to the command of military formations.

Fighter aviation, working on the area where its troops are located, operates in close coordination with them. This linkage is achieved by setting specific tasks, which are clearly and clearly stated in the combat order.

The necessary interaction between fighters and ground troops will be expressed in: a) linking the actions of fighters with the actions of ground troops in place and time; b) in the organization of reliable communication; c) in some cases (actions in the department, etc.) resubordination of single-seat and double-seat fighter aviation to the command of the troops in whose interests it will work; d) in the transfer of single-seat fighters to airfields located near the protected object.

The main methods of performing tasks to cover troops are: a) duty on the ground; b) duty in the air (patrolling); o) ambush in the air; d) ambushes on the ground.

Duty on the ground (at the airport) is carried out in two or three shifts. The first shift is always ready to take off; the second shift takes the place of the first in the event of its departure and has a readiness period of 5 minutes. If there is a third shift, the latter is in a state of rest and can be ready in 1-1.5 hours. In winter, the readiness period increases by 25%.

Air duty is performed by patrolling over an object that is being covered. Patrolling is carried out by groups of 3-5 aircraft at two or three altitudes.

The patrols of the lower tier keep at an altitude of 500-1,500 m and have the task of providing protection from assault attacks. Patrols of the second tier keep at a height of 3000-4000 m to protect against bombing from medium heights. The upper tier of patrols is located at 5000-6000 m to protect against high-altitude bombing. In low cloud cover, they are limited to patrols at the height of the lower and middle tiers.

The duration of each patrol is about 1 hour 15 m. The diameter of the zone patrolled by each patrol is 10-15 km.

Air ambushes are carried out by patrolling in a certain direction, mainly to intercept enemy reconnaissance.

Ambushes on the ground are carried out by small groups of fighters on duty on the ground in the most threatened areas. The fighters are located on the landing sites, using careful camouflage and stealth measures. The departure is carried out according to the reports of the VNOS posts, after the opening of fire by anti-aircraft artillery, or after personal observation by observation.

Ambushes on the ground reach their goal only if the enemy has low-speed aircraft.

Tasks of fighter aviation in a meeting battle

During the preparation of the march of their troops:

a) suppress airfields of reconnaissance, attack and light bomber aircraft of the enemy;

b) provide reconnaissance of military aviation in the zone of action of enemy fighter aircraft;

c) to secure the location of friendly troops from observation and aerial reconnaissance of the enemy.

During the march:

a) ensure the movement of columns on the march in the most dangerous places (at crossings over river barriers, when passing through gorges, narrownesses and open spaces);

b) ensure the work of reconnaissance and combat aviation.

During the period of action of the vanguards and the main forces:

a) in cooperation with anti-aircraft weapons, ensure the deployment of the main forces into battle formation from aerial reconnaissance;

b) to seize tactical air supremacy over the area of the enemy's eye forces in order to ensure the work of its own combat and military aviation.

The tasks of fighter aircraft in the attack on the defending enemy.

The main tasks of fighter aviation are solved in accordance with the three periods of this type of combat by ground troops.

During the period of preparation for the offensive, rendezvous and occupation of the starting position, fighter aviation must:

a) to ensure that strike groupings of troops occupy the starting position from aerial reconnaissance and surveillance;

b) directly ensure the work of corps and artillery aviation during the busiest and most responsible periods of their operation;

c) in the struggle for tactical air supremacy, together with attack aircraft and bombers, take part in the destruction of enemy airfields or the suppression of enemy air forces by combating his aircraft in the air.

In the period from the beginning of the attack to the development of a breakthrough:

a) to ensure tactical air supremacy over the breakthrough development echelon;

b) to ensure tactical dominance over the battlefield in the interests of the troops of the first echelon and military aviation.

During the development of a breakthrough:

a) to ensure air supremacy in the depth of the enemy’s location in the area of action of the breakthrough development echelon;

b) to provide the main grouping of artillery when it changes positions.

During the persecution:

a) ensure the operations of ground attack and light bomber aviation;

b) cover the pursuing columns from an enemy attack from the air.

The tasks of fighter aviation during an offensive overcoming a water barrier: to cover bridges and the crossing of troops over them from attacks and attacks by an air enemy.

Tasks of fighter aviation in a defensive battle.

During the period of the enemy's approach to the defensive zone:

a) ensure the combat work of their military aviation;

b) to prevent enemy short-range reconnaissance aircraft from entering our location.

During the defense of the front line:

ensure the operation of artillery and observation aircraft in the most important sectors of the battlefield.

During the battle inside your defensive zone:

a) provide decisive opposition to enemy battlefield observation aircraft;

b) ensure the operation of artillery aircraft;

c) to ensure the operations of its ground attack and light bomber aviation;

d) to protect their counterattack groups from an air attack;

e) in case of special need to attack the breaking parts of the enemy.

The tasks of fighter aviation during the withdrawal:

a) to ensure the area of convolution of its troops from air surveillance and reconnaissance, and the converging troops - from air attack;

b) ensure the work of its own reconnaissance aviation when it observes the flanks and enemy troops;

c) to provide, in cooperation with anti-aircraft weapons, crossings and gorges on the path of the retreating troops;

d) when individual enemy groups are deeply wedged into the location of the retreating troops or when a detour is discovered that threatens to cut off the withdrawal of friendly troops, by attacking from the air to delay the further advance of these enemy groups.

Special types of combat work of fighter aviation

In addition to the above tasks, fighter aircraft can be assigned to attack ground targets both in the interests of ground forces and the air force (attacking air defense firing points, attacking enemy air forces at its airfields, including the destruction of balloons and airships).

Fighter aviation is involved in the performance of these tasks:

a) with a lack of available aviation for other purposes;

b) in case of stubborn resistance of the enemy in the air, when the command decides to use all available aircraft to carry out these tasks;

c) in cases where it is difficult for aircraft of the corresponding types of aviation to cope with the task (reconnaissance of airfields guarded by fighters).

The main ground objects of attack by fighter aircraft can be:

a) infantry, cavalry, artillery and motorized units in marching columns, especially when passing through narrow spaces (crossings, difficult roads, etc.);

b) infantry, cavalry, artillery and motorized units in concentrated formations (in reserve, at rest, during loading and unloading at railway stations);

c) airplanes at the airport, balloons on the ground;

d) military trains;

e) transport units and rear establishments on the move and in place;

e) anti-aircraft batteries, searchlight stations, etc.

Means of destruction are selected depending on the nature and size of the target; mainly machine-gun fire and small fragmentation bombs are used.

The use of fighter aircraft for reconnaissance purposes

In some cases, reconnaissance tasks are also assigned to fighter aviation, both in the interests of the ground troops and especially in the interests of the Air Force.

Fighter reconnaissance is carried out in all cases when reconnaissance aircraft, due to air superiority of enemy aircraft, are unable to penetrate into the zone requiring observation.

The most characteristic case of using fighters as scouts in the interests of the Air Force is reconnaissance of enemy targets guarded by his fighters.

Fighters can, if necessary, obtain intelligence data along the way with the performance of their combat missions.

Fighter aviation is one of the main means of combating an air enemy, and its main purpose is to destroy enemy air attack weapons (AOS) in flight in close cooperation with anti-aircraft missile forces (ZRV) and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). With a limited composition, units and subunits of the IA can be involved in carrying out tasks to defeat enemy ground (sea) targets, as well as to conduct aerial reconnaissance.

The main form of combat use of fighter aviation units and subunits is air combat.

The main combat missions performed by the IAP include:

Covering the most important objects, regions of the country and groupings of troops (naval forces) from enemy air attacks and air reconnaissance;

Destruction of an air enemy in air battles for air supremacy;

Ensuring combat operations of units and subunits of other branches of aviation;

Destruction of electronic intelligence aircraft, air command posts of aircraft (helicopters) - jammers;

Fighting enemy airborne assault forces in the air;

The IAP can be involved in aerial reconnaissance either with a limited staff, or conduct it along with the performance of the main combat missions.

If necessary, during separate periods of combat operations, a fighter aviation regiment may be assigned missions to destroy enemy ground (sea) targets in the area of inaccessibility of fighters.

Combat capabilities of fighter planes.

The main factors determining the b / efficiency of fighters are speed, maneuver, fire. They are in close relationship, should be in the optimal ratio.

Fighting aviation regiments of strike aviation

Purpose and tasks of FBA and SA

Front-line bomber and attack aviation constitute the main strike force of front-line aviation and are capable of delivering strikes to a depth of 250-400 km.

The main purpose of front-line bomber aviation is the destruction of objects in the operational depth of the enemy, i.e. at a depth of 300-400 km from the front line. It can also operate in tactical and immediate operational depths, solving the tasks of air support for the Ground Forces. The main tasks of bomber aviation will be:

Destruction of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;

Defeat enemy reserves;

Defeat the means of command and control of enemy troops;

Assistance in the landing of their troops;

Obstruction of enemy maneuvers;

Based on the purpose, the main objects of strikes for front-line bomber aviation should be considered:

Airfields and aircraft on them;

Rocket launchers in positions;

Reserves in areas of concentration and on the march;

Nodes of railway stations, large bridges, crossings, sea and river ports;

Warehouses and supply bases;

Control posts and radar posts.

Assault aviation is the main means of air support for the Ground Forces. Air support for ground forces is one of the main tasks of bomber and attack aviation.

Ways b / actions and b / orders of units (parts) fba and sha.

When solving their tasks, subdivisions and units of the FBA and SA, depending on the conditions, can use the following main methods of conducting b / actions:

Simultaneous strike on predetermined targets;

Sequential strikes against predetermined targets;

Call actions;

Independent search.

The following attack methods are used to defeat and destroy ground objects of the FBA and SHA:

From a dive;

From level flight;

With a pitch.

A dive attack is used to destroy small moving and stationary targets. This method has the highest hit accuracy.

An attack from a pitch-up and a horizontal position is used to destroy areal and linear objects.

Bomber aviation, having radar sighting equipment, bombing is carried out from horizontal flight with aiming at an object or a naturally placed point. Correction of the current coordinates during the flight along the route and in the target area is carried out using RSBN, natural and radar-contrasting landmarks (bridges, railway stations, road junctions, etc.)

The distribution of air defense systems that oppose our forces can be represented by the following diagram.

Short-range air defense system division (Roland, Crotal, Rapira, Bluepipe with command radio control lines, as well as Chaparel and Stinger with infrared guidance systems) and anti-aircraft gun systems (Volcano, " Cheetah") are deployed as part of platoons (sections) and batteries. The positions of these means are located near the covered objects and in the combat formations of the troops. They move with the troops. Effective shelling of targets is carried out from the ground up to heights of 3.5 km.

Medium-range anti-aircraft missile systems (“Us.Khok”, “Patriot” with a semi-active guidance system) are located at a depth of 20-150 km. from the front line, they are shelling from heights from 0.1 to 20-30 km.

Fighter aviation operates outside the zones of the air defense system, as well as up to the front line over our territory. Interception over our territory is carried out by the method of independent search and by overflight of combat patrol zones. Fighters are of particular importance at a depth of more than 150 km. behind the front line.

The system of fire of enemy air defense systems in the zone of action of an aviation subunit (unit) is identified with spatial indicators in the vertical plane for various altitudes and in the horizontal plane for flight routes. The distribution of the intensity of fire over the covered space is not constant in different directions of aviation action. The number of air defense forces and means counteracting aviation orders is determined by the zone of action of an aviation subunit (unit). It depends on the parameters of the b / order, the number of routes, the bandwidth of the participation of air defense systems. When determining the number of air defense systems, it is also necessary to proceed from the norms for covering targets. From the considered enemy air defense grouping, it is clear that our aircraft will overcome air defense systems with different principles of operation. Their areas of operation will depend on the detection range and the direct capabilities of air defense systems to fire at aircraft in combat formations. The main characteristics of air defense systems are presented in the table:

Type of air defense	Kill zone		Control system
Type of air defense	height (max/min)	by range (max./min.)	Control system
short range air defense systems
"Chaparel"			Passive with TGS
"Rapier"			Radio command
"Roland-2"			Radio command
"Crotal"			Radio command
Portable air defense systems
"Stinger"			Passive with TGS
"Bloopipe"			Radio command, semi-active
Medium range air defense system
			Semi-active with RGS
"Patriot"			Radio command

"Volcano"			target tracking radar
"Cheetah"			target tracking radar

Luftwaffe tactics

By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the tactics of using the Luftwaffe were tested in Spain and polished during the two years of the war in Europe. The great advantage of the Luftwaffe over the Soviet Air Force was the tactical unit of fighters - a pair, to which we officially switched only at the end of 1942. The advantages of the "pair" over the "troika" appeared during the Spanish Civil War, and the initiative came from the Luftwaffe. There were discussions on this topic in the Soviet Union, but the orthodox thinking of the leadership of the Air Force did not allow the introduction of new tactics. True, from the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, flying in pairs was used, but this was more likely due to a lack of equipment and flight personnel, since this was not fixed in the charter.
The experience of the Second World War presented a number of new requirements for the formations and combat formations of fighter aircraft, related to the need to increase maneuverability, ensure timely
counterattacks in case of a sudden attack by the enemy. As a result, I had to abandon the “wedge” formation and switch to the “front” formation at open intervals.
The insufficient maneuverability of the “wedge” formation was explained by the fact that a group of aircraft flying in one formation could only make turns by “shoulder approach”. This turn could not be carried out quickly, because it is difficult to perform both for the leader, who must calculate the turning radius, taking into account the speed and number of aircraft, and for the wingmen, of which the outer one, as a rule, broke away from the formation and often became a victim of the enemy who was watching.

Fighter I-16 in flight

The internal aircraft, due to the difficulty of performing a small radius turn at minimum speed
often fell off it and, losing speed and altitude, was out of order.
In addition, the large intervals required to view the rear hemisphere made it difficult to maneuver
building a wedge. The great disadvantage of this formation was the disadvantageous position of the group commander, since he was the first to be attacked by the enemy. In addition, it was difficult to observe
actions and position of followers. The formation of the "front", devoid of these shortcomings, significantly increased the combat capability of fighter aircraft. The experience of the war showed that in this case the effectiveness of a flight of four aircraft also increased significantly. However, it was recommended to avoid the use
in the ranks of more than four cars, as the maneuverability of the group decreased. When taking off several units for the same mission, it was necessary to use battle formations in the ranks
front, echeloning them in height, distance and intervals. But we officially came to this only at the end.
1942, and, sadly, the Germans turned out to be smarter than our high-ranking bosses. In the early days of the war, the main tasks of the Luftwaffe were to achieve air supremacy by destroying aircraft on the ground and supporting ground troops, whose rapid advance forced them to abandon aircraft at airfields, even in good condition due to the lack of fuel and lubricants and inability to operate it.
Shortly before the Great Patriotic War, the Il-2 attack aircraft was created in our country, designed
for strikes against the enemy in the area of \u200b\u200bthe front line and the nearest rear. For the Germans, these tasks were solved by Ju-87 dive bombers, but the tactics were different. If the IL-2 pilots acted mainly
in areas and individual targets such as railway echelons from a gentle dive (since the safety margin of the airframe corresponded to a bomber), the crews of the Ju-87 hit pinpoint
targets from a steep dive, and this tactic was well developed by them.
With the light hand of foreign historians, a version of a sudden bombing attack on Soviet airfields by about 30 specially trained Luftwaffe crews was circulated among our "writers".
This is a legend. The main attacks on airfields were carried out by crews of dive bombers.
Ju-87 and Ju-88. Do-215 and Non-111 were used for this purpose. There are even references to the use of captured Polish vehicles. So, the crews of the KG51 squadron (V air corps of the 4th air fleet), flying on the Ju-88, delivered an initial strike on the airfields of Stry, Bushov-2, Terebovlya, Buchach, Khodorov and Lisichany, destroying, as the Germans wrote, about a hundred aircraft. On the same day, the crews of KG51 made about 80 sorties, and out of 91 aircraft (1.1 aircraft were destroyed per sortie), 15 were lost, and by June 30, only a third of the regular number of Ju-88 remained in KG51.

The losses of our aviation were really great, but the experience of the Second World War and the wars preceding it shows that bombing attacks on airfields (with rare exceptions) did not pay off the expenditure of forces on them. In this case, the German air strikes had a huge psychological effect, which forced the urgent withdrawal of troops from the border areas and the abandonment of equipment, sometimes not only requiring minor repairs, but also serviceable. In addition, the lack of interaction with ground forces did not allow competently
use units that have retained combat capability, especially in the Western Special Military District.
Thus the war began.

FW-190a9 in our time

"Donkeys" and "seagulls" dumped in a heap could not resist the aggressor.
But the main objects of the Luftwaffe bomber aircraft were still ground troops.
The true losses of aviation in the first days of the war have not yet been determined. Just one example. On May 12, 1942, by order of the People's Commissariat of Defense dated May 5, the 2nd Air Army (VA) was formed on the base of the Air Force of the Bryansk Front of the second formation.
It included the 205th, 206th and 207th iad, 208th night regiment, 223rd bbad, 225th, 226th and 227th shad, as well as two separate air regiments. In July of the same year, the Digital Material was prepared on the annual report of the 2nd VA (from June 22, 1941 to July 1, 1942). Whence it follows that at the beginning of the war (in June) in the regiments (in which it is not specified), which later became part of the army, there were four MiG-3s, 36 I-153s, 51 Pe-2s and 20 Su-2s. In the same month, three MiG-3s, 22 I-153s, 40 Pe-2s and one Su-2 were lost. A total of 59.5% of the aircraft, an average of six to seven cars a day.
True, the cover letter to this document stipulated that “the material does not reflect
the results of the work done by units of the 2nd Air Army during the first year of the war, but the army headquarters does not have other data ”(TsAMO, f. 2VA, op. 4196, d. 2)
The tactics of enemy bomber aviation consisted primarily in delivering lightning strikes with subsequent withdrawal to their own territory.
Moreover, this was recorded not only in the area of border airfields, but also in the rear. In particular, in the very first days of the war, the Borispol and Gogolev airfields in the suburbs of Kyiv, where the planes of the 14th bap were based, were discovered by enemy aircraft and on June 25 they were bombed. Above the Gogolev airfield
at about 8 o'clock at an altitude of 1500 meters, five Ju-88s passed northward, turned around and, taking combat
order, from a dive to a height of 200-300 meters, bombing and shelling were carried out. Then did
one more entry. The airfield was covered only by anti-aircraft machine guns, which began with a great delay.
shooting.
At the airfield measuring 1200x1000 meters that day there were up to 30 TB-3, and, despite the weak opposition from the ground, the effect of the bombing was insignificant. Five Ju-88s dropped 36 bombs of caliber from 36 to 250 kg and only with a direct hit ignited one TB-3 and two bombers received light damage. Why, the huge TB-3 did not succumb to disguise!
On the same day, the Boryspil airfield was attacked three times. At 7 hours 30 minutes one Ju-88,
half an hour later and at 8 hours 12 minutes - eleven Ju-88s. As a result, 23 bombers dropped 117 bombs of various calibers, and destroyed only two aircraft and several warehouses. From what has been said, the conclusion is
that the Germans bombed very badly, "thievishly stealthily, they cowardly for their skins and hastily dropped bombs without aiming."
In a brief review of the hostilities of the 14th tbap, it was noted, in particular:
“It is also characteristic to note that Borispol and Gogolev are located near Kyiv and are always reserve targets. The strong air defense systems of Kyiv did not allow the Germans to approach the bridges across the Dnieper, where
Enemy planes strove with particular stubbornness, and they were forced to go to alternate targets and drop bombs, from here the airfields were subjected to frequent raids, but the results were ineffective.
(TsAMO, 11 GV. bap dA, op. 219086, d. 1)
The dominant moment that achieved success in combat with German fighters during the second year of the Patriotic War (June 22, 1942 - June 22, 1943) was still surprise, combined with maneuver and fire. For this, the enemy made extensive use of natural conditions: the weather, the sun,
excess over our aircraft. For the most part, German fighters sought to attack the target from the least protected sides. In unfavorable positions, they sometimes attacked from the sides, covered by machine gun and cannon fire. With aircraft that were inferior in flight and tactical characteristics, they entered into battle in equal or greater numbers, and with Yak-1, Yak-7B, La-5 fighters - in most cases only when
favorable conditions. This gives grounds to believe that the pilots studied our aircraft to a sufficient extent. The main battle formation of the enemy fighters was a group of two to six aircraft in pairs.
Regardless of the importance of the object, there could be from one to four or five such groups. The enemy tried to avoid a long battle, as a rule, the battle was fleeting. The enemy used a long battle,
when it was necessary to forge our fighters in order to gain time and enable their bombers to solve their task.
Knowing the capabilities of our aircraft on the verticals, as a rule, they left a disadvantageous position by a sharp dive down and, in exceptional cases, up. The attack was carried out by the leader, and only the follower
covered from the tail. Fire on air targets in most cases was only aimed, probably in short bursts from short distances. As a rule, with the loss of one of the aircraft of a pair of the second
left the battlefield, leaving for their territory. During mass raids on our communications, the enemy sent
forward by 8-1 About km barrier groups of fighters with the task of ensuring unhindered
action to their bombers.
To counteract our aviation in the main directions, the enemy created an insignificant air barrier of fighters, dispersing it in height. In addition, depending on the nature of the actions and the purpose of our aircraft, the enemy used different tactics. So, when fighting attack aircraft, enemy fighters tried to attack them from behind from above or strictly in the tail, and also from behind from below. In the presence of cover, the enemy attacked our attack aircraft from behind from below from a strafing flight. In order to ensure secrecy, in some cases they did not even touch our "neglected" fighters.

A squadron of Soviet Pe-2 dive bombers bombing targets on the Karelian Isthmus

When fighting bombers, enemy fighters attacked them from behind from above or from behind from below,
depending on fighter cover and bomber formation. For compact structures
our bombers or attack aircraft, the enemy showed little activity, and if he suffered losses from our fighters, albeit small ones, he left the battlefield and left.
Due to the fact that the object air defense in our rear has significantly increased and the accuracy of anti-aircraft artillery has increased, the heights of battles with the enemy have reached 4000-5000 meters. At these altitudes, the maximum speeds of domestic fighters and the Bf-109F were close, but the rate of climb of the German was higher, which, coupled with the high qualification of the pilot, determined his superiority. One more thing to consider here
important circumstance. When flying at altitudes of more than 4000 meters, so that the performance does not decrease
pilot, preferably oxygen equipment. But due to the lack of oxygen stations at most, the FW-190F-8 attack aircraft taxis to the executive start, especially at field, airfields, this equipment
on Soviet fighters was an empty load. In 1942, our pilots could not impose vertical battles on the enemy or get away from him with a climb, and turns remained the only tactic. They were in no hurry to borrow the tactics of the enemy, echeloning the fighters in height, and this technique was put into practice only by the most active commanders.
The enemy built up forces in air combat by calling for help by radio, and leaving the field
they were forbidden to fight to call for reinforcements. Radio, as the main type of combat control, was given great importance in the Luftwaffe. Group control, retargeting, situation reporting and other data were transmitted by radio, which made enemy aviation sufficiently flexible and increased its effectiveness.

During the war, there were cases of using the FW-190 and B1-109 fighters for bombing certain of our targets. Repeatedly, enemy fighters bombed Leningrad from an altitude of 7000-8000 meters with bombs of caliber from 50 to 250 kg, followed by withdrawal with a decrease to their territory. There is also a case of bombing from six FW-190s of the Uglovo airfield from a height of 3800-4000 meters with 250-kg bombs.
The constant tactic of enemy fighters, as before, was to identify weaknesses in the discretion of our pilots, unorganized battle formation and destroy, first of all, detached from a group of single aircraft.

Red Army soldiers next to the downed German dive bomber Yu-87D (Ju-87D), Kursk region

By the autumn of 1941, when it became clear that the Blitzkrieg had failed, the German command regrouped the Luftwaffe. In particular, the 2nd and 8th Air Corps were excluded from the 2nd Air Fleet. The place of the 2nd Air Corps, transferred from the Eastern Front to the Mediterranean, was taken by the 10th Air Corps, previously operating
on one's own. The 8th air corps was sent to help the troops advancing on Leningrad, and after the failure of plans to take the city, they were subordinated to the high command of the Wehrmacht. It should be noted that the 8th Corps was in a special account with the German command and was headed by Richthofen. Therefore, the squadrons of this formation were equipped with selected flight personnel who had combat experience, and the number of its fleet was always close to the regular one.
In the spring of 1942, the 8th Corps was transferred to the Crimea to support the troops, first advancing on the Kerch Peninsula, and then operating against Sevastopol. At the end of the battles for the "city of Russian sailors" in the spring of the same year, the corps was transferred to Kharkov to support the German offensive that had begun.
Later, the pilots of the formation supported the 6th army of Paulus, advancing on Stalingrad.
By the beginning of 1943, the 8th Corps was again in the Crimea and passed under the control of the 4th Air Fleet.
At the same time, the 5th Corps withdrew from the 4th Air Fleet and was subordinated to the group operating
in the Central direction. In the spring of 1943, the 6th Air Fleet was created on the basis of this corps. In the summer of 1942, the Germans launched an attack on Stalingrad, creating a significant superiority
in manpower and weapons. Thus, according to air reconnaissance, in September 1942, at least 350 bombers, 250 fighters and up to 100 reconnaissance and spotter aircraft operated against the Stalingrad and South-Eastern fronts. Then we were able to oppose them with only 235 combat vehicles, including 22 fighters. This contributed to the preservation of the tactics of the Luftwaffe aviation, which dominated the air and was used in 1941. At that time, German pilots allowed chasing not only individual vehicles, but even single fighters who found themselves in open areas.

Due to the lack of fighters, we often had to cancel flights of attack aircraft (single-seat Il-2) and redirect all fighter aircraft to fight German bombers. Moreover, near Stalingrad, despite the lack of radio stations, the mass use of radio guidance of Soviet fighters on enemy aircraft began. This significantly increased the effectiveness of fighter aircraft, and by the beginning of the operation to encircle the 6th Army of Paulus, it was possible to achieve, if not supremacy, then parity in the air.
On November 8, the plane of Lieutenant Franz Zhirenburg was shot down in the Velikiye Luki region. The testimonies of the captured pilot were sent to the combat units and reserve regiments of our Air Force, including the 6th reserve air brigade. When discussing the testimony of Zhirenburg with the flight personnel of the brigade, the following conclusions were drawn:
"one. The predominant height of the action of German fighters is 1500-3000 meters.
2. The advice of a German pilot for the Pe-2 plane to go down is inappropriate, since, having a high-altitude engine, the Pe-2 loses speed.
3. The attack on IL-2 is carried out more often from above, and not from below, as the prisoner claims. At first, tailings were interrupted (due to the evacuation of industry to the east and an acute shortage of aluminum alloys in
In 1942, the tail parts of attack aircraft were made of wood. - PRIM. auth.), recently they have been firing thermite shells, which quickly ignite the aircraft, especially when they hit gas tanks.
4. German fighters do not rush at any of our aircraft as soon as they see them, they usually only engage in combat when conditions are favorable to themselves.
5. Going up on the Yak-1 can be dangerous with a loss of speed. It is permissible, in order to conquer the height, to break into two groups going one above the other at different heights. Gain altitude before the start of the battle (the Yak-1 was inferior in rate of climb to the Bf-109F by almost a minute.).
6. If necessary, make greater use of the sun, clouds and altitude for camouflage purposes, trying to approach the enemy unnoticed.
7. When escorting IL-2 and Pe-2, fighters are required to stay closer, in no case break away.
8. Attack aircraft and bombers conduct air combat in tight close formations, cases of opening them in battle were observed, which led to losses.
9. You cannot limit the actions of your fighters to a height determined by this order, having determined this height, the enemy climbs higher and succeeds by applying disguise.
10. A sharp maneuver of the group in battle splits it, and the detached aircraft are shot down.
11. You should not leave the battle at maximum speeds. Example: a group of Pe-2s, accompanied by I-16s, trying to
get away from the enemy, broke away from the I-16, the enemy took a position between the Pe-2 and I-16, easily caught up with the Pe-2 and shot down several aircraft. In addition, high speeds make it difficult to maneuver. Being hit, striving for its territory, it is necessary to use high speeds.
12. German fighters do not go on a frontal attack and do not immediately engage in combat if they see that they are detected and there is no prevailing superiority.
13. You need to get out of the attack under the enemy aircraft in the direction of the dead cones.
14. A fighter pilot should not get so caught up in the target that he forgets to be careful and sometimes to protect a comrade.
15. The shortcomings and mistakes of Soviet pilots listed by the German pilot are mostly confirmed, namely:
a) Poor discretion, especially in the rear hemisphere and when returning to home airfield after
completing the task.
b) Ignorance of enemy tactics by young flight personnel arriving at the front.
c) Poor knowledge of the flight and tactical data of enemy aircraft and even our own.
d) Fire opens from a long distance and long bursts.
e) A large distance of fighters from the bombers escorted by them is allowed.
f) Little camouflage is used to achieve surprise.

IL-2 attacking a German transport aviation airfield

In the conclusions of the captured pilot, there are no new air combat techniques unknown to our flight crew.
If the number of Soviet aircraft shot down by this pilot is close to the truth, then this could only be in the first period of the war and, mainly, due to obsolete designs (SB, R-5, U-2).
In January 1943, first in the 15th VA, and then in the 1st VA, two out of the ordinary cases occurred. In the 15th VA, a group of eight Pe-2s did not return from a combat mission, and in the 1st VA 14 dive bombers.
One gets the impression that it was not 1943, but 1941. The loss of all bombers at that time was explained not only by the lack of fighter cover, but also by the untrainedness of the flight crew to conduct active defense in a group with enemy fighters. The Germans presented it as superiority
their weapons and spirit. In that year, enemy aircraft operated mainly
during the day, and since the beginning of 1944, having suffered heavy losses, covering the withdrawal of her troops, she transferred almost half of the combat work to the dark time of the day.
So, out of 3449 enemy sorties recorded at the beginning of 1944, 1415 (41%) were made
at night.
In the first quarter of 1944, in connection with the successful offensive of the Red Army, the intensity and nature of the combat activity of German aviation changed significantly compared to the same period in 1943. The enemy, in an effort to delay the advance of our troops and save his army from a quick defeat, was forced to concentrate the main efforts of aviation on the battlefield. Aviation activity was
more defensive than offensive in nature, since the tasks of reconnaissance and
strikes against our communications, railway junctions, crossings and bridges in order to disrupt the supply of reserves and the normal supply of fighters.
At the final stage of the war, in particular, from April 1 to 13, 1945, in the combat zone of the 27th Gomel Fighter Aviation Order of the Suvorov Division (IAGOSD) of the Baranovichi Fighter Aviation Order of the Suvorov Corps "activities
enemy aviation was expressed in bombing strikes on ground troops and
crossings, in covering their troops and facilities and in conducting aerial reconnaissance.
Bombing of troops and crossings was carried out by FW-190 fighters, from 10-12 to 40 vehicles
and Ju-88 in a group of 25 aircraft in the areas: Geritz, Penzin, Gorgast, Genshmar, Kitz, Mashnov and Lebus. The use of projectiles was also noted.
The FW-190 and Bf-109 planes covered their troops and facilities in groups of eight to ten aircraft in the Berlin direction.
Aerial reconnaissance by the enemy was carried out to the meridian of Kutno and the line of contact by aircraft
FW-190s during the day and single Ju-88s at high altitudes both day and night.
The activity of countering enemy fighters was insignificant. Mostly fighter
enemy aircraft did not engage in battles with our fighters and only counteracted attack aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft. During this period, the 273rd IAD carried out 65 air battles, shooting down 1 3 enemy aircraft.
The total number of sorties during the noted period was 2090 (180-190 per day).

German dive bombers Junkers Ju-87D (Ju-87D) are flying escorted by Messerschmitt Bf.109 fighters. Eastern front.

During World War II, the tactics of the Luftwaffe practically did not change, only improved
some techniques aimed at achieving surprise strikes. Certain impact on actions
Bomber aviation was influenced by the appearance of guided weapons, which laid the foundations of missile-carrying aviation.
So, from April 1 to April 13, 1945, the Germans used projectiles six times (apparently, Hs-293) for
crossing destruction. On April 17, in addition to bombing our troops, including tank columns, Luftwaffe aircraft fired six projectiles and used one Mistel, which was a rigid bunch of a manned 8f-109 fighter and an unmanned Ju-88 filled with explosives . The air strikes were carried out in the evening twilight, when our fighters were not in the air. But this tactic, combined with the use of weapons of retaliation, did not give the desired results.

“Everything was wrong” - this note by A.I. Pokryshkina on the margins of the official publication "Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War" became a verdict on communist propaganda, which for almost half a century kept talking about the "superiority" of the red-star aviation, which "threw the Nazi vultures from the sky" and won complete air supremacy.

This sensational book, based not on agitation, but on reliable sources - combat documentation, authentic materials for recording losses, uncensored memoirs of front-line soldiers - leaves no stone unturned from Stalinist myths. After analyzing the combat work of Soviet and German aviation (fighters, dive-bombers, attack aircraft, bombers), comparing operational art and tactics, the level of qualification of command and personnel, as well as the performance characteristics of combat aircraft of the USSR and the Third Reich, the author comes to disappointing, shocking conclusions and answers the the most acute and bitter questions: why did our aviation operate much less efficiently than the German one? Whose fault is it that "Stalin's falcons" often looked almost like "whipping boys"? Why, having an overwhelming numerical superiority over the Luftwaffe, did the Soviet Air Force achieve much less success and suffer incomparably greater losses?

3. AIR COMBAT TACTICS

It is not enough, however, to get the opportunity to meet the enemy in the air and start an air battle with him - this battle must also be correctly planned and competently carried out. And another reason for the lower effectiveness of Soviet fighter aviation compared to German was the lower effectiveness of the air combat tactics used by most Soviet fighter pilots.

First, for a long time, Soviet "hawks" fought air battles with German fighters, adhering to passive, defensive tactics. Instead of attacking the enemy, they built a "defensive circle", i.e. sequentially got into a turn and flew one after another in a circle - so that the tail of each aircraft turned out to be covered by the one flying behind. If the Germans also fought in a horizontal plane, then the Soviet fighters really became hard to hit: it was impossible for them to go into the tail, and when firing at an aircraft describing a circle from the side, it was very difficult to correctly take the lead. But the circling planes practically could not bring down the enemy. Naturally, the Germans did not try to get into the "circle", but to fire at the "Messerschmitt" rushing to the side, so as not to fall out of the "circle" at the same time, it was possible only by making a small turn towards the enemy and immediately turning away back. In other words, it was possible to shoot only "offhand", almost aimlessly - i.e. conduct, in essence, only barrage fire, from which the enemy could easily evade. A similar situation is described, for example, by A.V. Vorozheykin, recalling one of the battles of the I-16 of his 728th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the 256th Fighter Aviation Division of the 3rd Air Army of the Kalinin Front with Bf109 at the end of 1942: “Our circle was like on a rapidly rotating circular saw: no matter where you turn, you won’t take it. Aircraft, changing position, stretching in the right direction, sprayed machine-gun fire and even rockets in jets. "Messers", like pikes, rushed at high speeds quite close and every time they bumped into the sharp teeth of the saw, they bounced [i.e. avoided hits. - A.S.]» 51 .

However, the Germans did not necessarily fight in a horizontal plane, i.e. hovered next to the "circle". Often they - using their favorite short blows in the vertical plane - fell on the "circle" from above. And the planes flying in a horizontal plane in a circle and not wanting to break this “circle” could not repel an attack from above in any way: for this it was necessary to make too sharp a maneuver ... In general, becoming a “defensive circle” - i.e. voluntarily refusing to maneuver in combat, Soviet fighters not only reduced their chances of shooting down an enemy aircraft, but also did not always avoid the danger of being shot down themselves. But, according to the Germans, "the defensive circle as the main tactical method of defense" was "actively used by the majority of fighter units" of the Soviet Air Force as early as 1943. 52 . According to V. Schwabedissen, the "defensive circle" was the "favorite battle formation" of Soviet fighters even in 1944-1945. (This statement strongly disagrees with the general conclusion of the German general, according to which, "usually" Soviet fighters at that time "acted skillfully" and "fought the German fighters persistently and decisively." However, Schwabedissen repeats: in the last period of the war, "Soviet fighters often formed a defensive circle before the attack "...) 53

In an offensive battle, the Soviet fighters for a long time were hampered by another tactical miscalculation - the use as the basis of the battle order of "a densely assembled link of three aircraft that performed joint maneuvering at minimum intervals and distances." "It was believed that a close battle formation better provides mutual support and allows you to deliver powerful concentrated strikes against the enemy." However, “being in such a formation, the pilots were more careful not to crash into a partner’s plane or not to fall behind and, as a rule, neglected to observe the air situation. This made them extremely vulnerable in combat. “When we sorted out the flight,” recalls the battles of early 1942 on the Western Front, G.I. German, who then commanded a link in the 42nd Fighter Aviation Regiment, “and asked the question:“ What did you see? ”, The same answer followed : "No one but you." “This,” Herman points out, “was the main reason why we were short of our wonderful comrades, as a rule, those who were in the last line [i.e. followers - closely followed the maneuvers of the commander. – A.S.]” 55 . In addition, the need to maintain a tight V-shaped formation, maintain minimum intervals and distances did not allow maneuvering at high speeds, and therefore overtaking the enemy or breaking away from him. The end result was still the same: a decrease in the number of downed German aircraft and an increase in the losses of Soviet fighters.

True, in some places - for example, on the Northern (renamed Leningrad on August 23, 1941) Front - Soviet fighter pilots, on their own initiative, already from July 1941, used a pair of aircraft as the basis of a battle order. The fighters in it flew at intervals and distances increased compared to the trio, and the risk of crashing into a neighbor became incomparably less. Thanks to this, the pilots were able to fight at high speeds - necessary to maintain the initiative in combat - and also to pay more attention to the observation of the air. In addition, open intervals allowed each of the pilots of the pair to survey a much larger space than before, behind the tail of a partner - and therefore more effectively cover each other ... However, the formation of a battle order of pairs, not triples, was legalized only in November 1942 g., but mastered in all parts - and at all only in the 43rd. According to the testimony of non-commissioned officer I. Kalba, a pilot of the 52nd Luftwaffe fighter squadron captured on September 16, 1942, in the 42nd, many Soviet pilots still flew in pairs so that they deprived themselves of the opportunity to cover each other. Two "hawks" did not fly in the "front" formation with an interval of 200-250 m, but one after the other or in the "bearing" formation (i.e., in a ledge one after the other). As a result, the leader could not cover the follower, because he did not see at all what was happening in that tail. And the Messerschmitts, calmly going into the tail of the wingman, shot down first him, and then the leader who was left without cover ... “In the tactics of our fighters,” it was stated in the already mentioned directive of the Red Army Air Force commander of July 7, 1943, there is a lack of practice in the actions of a separate pair ... 57 The Germans flew in pairs from 1938-1939, from the time of the war in Spain and the Polish campaign of the Wehrmacht. “I attribute a large number of victories to German pilots to this tactic,” H. Lange, who fought on the Eastern Front, first in the 54th and then in the 51st Fighter Squadron, wrote bluntly.

Huge advantages for German fighter pilots were also given by the fact that, unlike the Soviet ones, they "were initially focused not on maneuvering combat, but on performing surprise attacks with escape at a speed close to maximum, and mainly in a vertical plane" 59 . “[...] Their attacks,” Soviet staff officers noted in 1943, “overwhelmingly come down to a short attack from above, with a steep slide up after the attack” 60 . (G.G. Cherkashin from the 672nd assault aviation regiment and V.A. Tikhomirov from the 12th fighter aviation regiment of the Navy Air Force, who fought from the end of the 43rd until the end of the war, testify to the same: “They will jump out of the clouds in a pair or four, dive , hit, knocked down or not - it doesn’t matter, on the afterburner, and with a candle back into the clouds ";" always the same thing: an attack at speed and an attempt to go up "... 61)" This made it possible to quickly organize a new attack [i.e. . maintain the initiative in air combat. - A.S.] and minimized the likelihood of falling under return fire in the event of a miss and subsequent slipping [forward relative to the attacked aircraft. - A.S.]” 62 . Indeed, while diving, the fighters picked up such speed that at the end of the attack they could - due to the inertia of acceleration - fly up literally like a “candle”. And this not only made it easier for them to quickly take a position for a new attack from a height, but also created a large angular movement, which made it difficult for Soviet pilots to aim ... In addition, vertical maneuver, collapsing at the enemy at high speed from above, made it easier to achieve surprise strike. The Germans generally attached exceptionally great importance to the latter circumstance. They attacked, as a rule, from the side of the sun or because of the clouds, which allowed them to remain unnoticed to the last - and if it was impossible to achieve surprise, they often refused to attack at all and waited for a more favorable moment. The air battle that took place on April 23, 1942 in the area of the Vaenga airfield near Murmansk is indicative. Five Bf109F-4s from Group II of the 5th Fighter Squadron, being attacked by a flight of Hurricanes from the 2nd Guards Composite Aviation Regiment of the Air Force of the Northern Fleet, did not accept the battle and went into the clouds. The Soviet "hawks" followed her, but "during the exit from the clouds, the blinding rays of the sun hit the eyes of the Hurricanes pilots, masked by which, the invisible Messerschmitts rushed at them." As a result, two of the three Soviet fighters were shot down; the Germans suffered no losses... 63 It is also indicative that 90% of all attacks carried out by the most productive German ace of World War II - E. Hartmann from the 52nd Fighter Squadron - were, in his estimation, sudden 64 .

It is impossible not to notice that the tactics described above fit into the famous formula of A.I. Pokryshkin "height - speed - maneuver - fire." The Soviet ace based it on the same considerations: “Height is speed, speed is height. In other words, maneuvering from a height gives speed, and speed allows you to climb vigorously. A high-speed vertical maneuver ensures the suddenness of the impact, creates large angular displacements. The most advantageous vertical maneuver is the "falcon strike", sudden, fast, accurate [i.e. the German short dive attacks described above! - A.S.]» 65 . In the description of fellow soldier Alexander Ivanovich A.I. Trud, Pokryshkin’s style of air combat resembles the German one like two drops of water: “At high speed, it crashes into an enemy group from above, shoots some kind of aircraft and leaves” ... 66 However, Pokryshkin developed his formula only in 1942-1943, and the Germans acted on it from the very beginning of the war with!

For too long, Soviet fighters preferred the "falcon strike" - sudden short attacks in the vertical plane - maneuverable battle in the horizontal plane, on bends, when the planes, circling one after another, try to get into each other's tail. This not only made the Red Star Hawks more vulnerable (due to the fact that they were longer in the field of view of the enemy), but also deprived them of the initiative in battle. After all, the initiative was owned by the one who developed the greater speed (and could, therefore, quickly take a new position for the attack). But if diving from a height made it possible to quickly increase speed, then on bends - in order not to create too large overloads during turns - it inevitably had to be extinguished ... And back in 1942, there were common cases when the Messerschmitts, using a vertical maneuver, fettered a significantly larger group of Soviet "hawks" maneuvering in a horizontal plane. A typical example is the July, August and September battles on the Western Front, in the regions of Rzhev and Zhizdra. “Systematic observation from the ground on the front line,” S.A. Khudyakov, commander of the 1st Air Army of the Western Front, reported to the commander of the Red Army Air Force on September 26, 1942, “and control of the actions of our fighters, carried out by the commanders of air formations [so in the text. - A.S.] from the army up to and including the link, irrefutably indicates that German fighters, as a rule, keep the initiative of the battle in their hands, attacking only in favorable conditions [...]”. As a result, "in combat operations of recent months, our aviation has suffered heavy losses from enemy fighters" 67 . Thus, in twenty days of the first Rzhev-Sychevsk operation, the 201st Fighter Air Division lost more than 90% of its vehicles: by August 24, 1942, only five fighters remained in its three 20-aircraft regiments ... 68 And the Soviet pilots who fought in those the same days near Stalingrad, they believed that in order to achieve success in a battle with the Bf109G-2, it was necessary that for each "Messerschmitt" there were two Yak-1 or Yak-7b ... 69

It is usually believed that in the spring of 1943, during the air battles in the Kuban, the situation improved. “The great achievement of the Soviet pilots,” noted, for example, assessing the results of the Kuban battles, their participant A.I. Pokryshkin, “was a massive transition to a vertical maneuver”; "combat vertical", according to him, "firmly entered" "the daily practice of fighters" 70 . But this applied only to a few fighter regiments, such as the 16th Guards, in which Pokryshkin himself fought in the Kuban, or the 45th and 298th (later - the 100th and 104th Guards, respectively). The pilots of these "elite guard regiments equipped with allied aircraft", as the Germans also admit, were indeed "distinguished by the secrecy of maneuver [i.e. use of the element of surprise. - A.S.], they were well separated in height, which made it possible to control the air situation [due to the use of vertical maneuver. - A.S.] and minimize the risk of being attacked”; “the tactics of their military operations were based on the precise implementation of the “attack-defense” rule [i.e. "falcon strike - going up." - A.S.]"... 71 But as for the bulk of Soviet fighter pilots, the directive of the commander of the Red Army Air Force dated July 7, 1943, summing up the combat work of Soviet aviation in March-June 1943, stated that "in air combat [...] surprise and superiority in height have not become the main principles that ensure its success” 72 . And according to one of the leading aces of the Luftwaffe, H. Lipfert from Group II of the 52nd Fighter Squadron, Soviet fighter pilots demonstrated their lack of desire to be higher than the enemy even much later. Until June 1944, Lipfert noted, "it was rare to meet a Russian above 4,000 m" 73 ; German fighters approached the battlefield at both 5000 and 6000 meters. It is clear that, without having superior height, it is impossible to carry out a surprise attack in the vertical plane...

From the work of D.B. Khazanov, devoted to the air battle in the Yass region, it is clear that, thanks to the use of surprise and short attacks in the vertical plane, Soviet Messerschmitt fighters managed to dictate their will in battle as early as the end of May 1944. 74 Even in 1944-1945, the Germans noted, Soviet fighters still "relyed on maneuverable combat" (and "quite rarely" used the "advantages of foggy weather, sunrise or sunset") ... 75

In general, not only in 1941-1942, but also in 1943, according to the general opinion of German aviation commanders, Soviet fighter pilots "tactically" "were still weaker than the Germans" - although "throughout 1943 and there was an "increase in the tactical training of command and staff personnel" 76 . Moreover, for Luftwaffe commanders it was "undoubted" that even in 1944-1945, when Soviet fighters as a whole had already "adapted to the requirements of modern warfare and learned a lot", German fighter aircraft still had "more perfect tactics" 77 .

More perfect was the Germans and the defensive tactics of potential victims of fighters - bombers and attack aircraft. Accordingly, even other things being equal (and the Germans, as we have already seen and will see below, had many other advantages), it was more difficult for Soviet fighters to shoot down German attack aircraft than it was for Germans to shoot down Soviet ones. German bombers flew throughout the war in close, compact formation. This limited the number of directions from which each particular aircraft could be attacked by fighters, and also made it possible to concentrate machine-gun fire from several machines at once on the attacker and create a dense curtain of fire in front of him. Even in 1944, sums up the estimates of German pilots W. Schwabedissen, the losses of bombers flying in close formation and leading “aimed concentrated barrage fire” against Soviet fighters, “were relatively small. Under such conditions, Russian pilots, as a rule, did not launch a second attack” 78 . The same, according to the Germans, as early as 1944 was the case with the Ju87 dive bombers: “as long as the German aircraft maintained a tight formation, the successes of the Russians turned out to be more than modest” 79 (for more details, see chapters IV and VI) .

Soviet bombers and attack aircraft mastered such tactics only in 1944 - and back in 1943, instead of closing the formation and repelling attacks with concentrated fire of the entire group, they often tried to get away from German fighters at maximum speed. By this they directly helped the enemy to destroy themselves! The speed of the Bf109F and G and FW190А was still much higher - but the formation of Soviet aircraft was broken at high speeds, and the Germans easily shot down single, left without fire support of neighbors and without cover of escort fighters (which, after all, could not burst to help everyone) machines ( see chapters III and V for details).