Borodino battle year. Battle of Borodino between Russia and France

Napoleon Bonaparte had huge plans for Russia. The French emperor already imagined himself as the master of the world, saying: “There is only Russia left, but I will crush it.”

He went to crush Russia with an army of 600,000, which, indeed, moved quite confidently into the interior of the country. But the so-called peasant war significantly undermined the health and strength of Napoleon’s troops. But the conquerors walked, leaving a trail of ashes behind them. Moscow was ahead.

The French emperor hoped that he would conquer the country with one powerful blow in a short time, but the tactics of the Russian commanders were different: strangle them with small battles, and then attack like that! And Borodino became a turning point in the history of the war of 1812.

Hundred per minute

There is so much talk about the Battle of Borodino and its significance that it seems like it was protracted. But the battle of Borodino was included in the list of the most striking, important, bloody one-day battles.

On September 7, near the village of Borodino, 125 km west of Moscow, at 5.30 am the French began shelling and then launched an attack. The battle lasted about 12 hours. During this time, according to various sources, from 80 to 100 thousand French and Russians went to the next world. If you count, it turns out that a hundred soldiers were dying per minute.

Heroes

The Battle of Borodino brought fame to Russian commanders, who masterfully coped with their task. The names of Kutuzov, Raevsky, Ermolov, Bagration, Barclay de Tolly were included in the history books. By the way, Barclay de Tolly was not so favored in the army, although it was he who proposed waging a guerrilla war against the French, which significantly reduced their numbers. Near Borodino, the general changed his horse three times - bullets and shells killed three animals, but the general himself was not injured.

And, of course, Kutuzov became famous. Surely you immediately imagined a gray-haired old man with a closed eye. Nothing like this! Kutuzov at that time was a fairly active elderly man, and did not wear an eye patch. A real eagle! By the way, about eagles. There is a legend that during the battle an eagle soared above Kutuzov. Boris Golitsyn wrote about this in his memoirs.

French cavalry grave

This is exactly what they called Raevsky’s battery. The French could not take it for seven hours. It was there that the largest number of Napoleonic cavalrymen died. Historians still argue why Russian troops abandoned the Shevardinsky redoubt. It can be assumed that Kutuzov, as it were, deliberately exposed his left flank, weakened, open. He strengthened it with flushes, for which a battle broke out and the French and Russians lost a lot there. Kutuzov was very afraid for his rightist flag, for the new Smolensk road. After all, it was a direct short route to Mozhaisk, and, accordingly, to Moscow.

By the way, the terrain also helped to conduct a competent battle. This is one of the few areas near Moscow that is more like open fields. This, according to Kutuzov, was a significant advantage for the Russian army. The Russians appeared on the Borodino field 4 days before the battle. Kutuzov wrote to Alexander the First that “the position near the village of Borodino is one of the best that can be found in these flat places. I will try to correct the weak point of this position with art. But if the enemy maneuvers, then I will have to retreat again.”

Who wins?

This is perhaps the main question so far. We are used to thinking that battle of Borodino, of course, the Russians won. The French believe that victory is theirs. In terms of fortitude, power, and perseverance, victory is, of course, on the side of the Russians. Napoleon was extremely disappointed when he listened to the reports of his generals: there were only a few prisoners, guns were captured once, twice - and he was wrong. The positions they had so hard to gain as they moved forward towards Moscow brought him no prisoners. The Russians did not throw the wounded onto the field, taking them with them if they had to retreat. The morale of the Russian army crushed Napoleon. He couldn’t understand, and besides, with a clear disadvantage in numbers, he managed to hold on like this. But, the next day, Kutuzov ordered a retreat in order to replenish the ranks with new fighters and accumulate strength.

Each of the commanders chalked up the victory to his own account. It is known that Napoleon said about the battle: “The French showed themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians earned the right not to consider themselves defeated.”

But Russian Emperor Alexander I understood that the spirit of the people needed to be raised, and he declared the Battle of Borodino as an unconditional victory for the Russians, and made Kutuzov a field marshal general.

Hussar ballad

After the end of the Patriotic War of 1812, people felt that they had touched history. There was a creative explosion: artists, writers, poets, professionals, amateurs - everyone decided to depict this bloody battle. There was even a special alphabet with illustrations and short poems about that battle for children.

Many books have been written and films made about Borodino. But, perhaps, the most favorite picture will remain “The Hussar Ballad”. And the story underlying this picture is quite real.

Indeed, the Battle of Borodino could not have happened without women. Nadezhda Durova took part in it. Having cut off her hair and put on a uniform, Durova ran away from her parents and devoted herself to military affairs, even joining the Ulan Regiment. There is an opinion that it was from her that the author of the play “A Long Time Ago” and the script for the film “The Hussar Ballad”, Alexander Gladkov, copied the main character Shurochka.

According to all documents, Nadezhda was Alexander Andreevich Alexandrov, she was even promoted to officer. Near Borodino she was shell-shocked, a cannonball hit her in the leg, but the woman remained alive.

A love for military affairs was instilled in Nadyusha as a child, but not intentionally. Her mother refused to raise her - she wanted a boy-heir, not a girl - and she was raised by the hussar Astakhov. And at the age of 12, the girl was already deftly sitting in the saddle and bravely handling a horse. All these skills were useful to her during the war.

Continued after 100 years

In 1912, a French ship sank. It was used to transport an 8-meter red granite pillar to Russia. It had the inscription "Dead" Great Army"(that's what Napoleon's army was called). It was supposed to be installed on the Borodino field. But despite the fact that the first monument never reached Russia, a year later another one was installed.

But in Russia, for the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the end of the Patriotic War of 1812, one of its participants was still alive. Pavel Yakovlevich Tolstoguzov was 117 years old!

Unique panorama

In Russia there is a unique panorama museum, which is located in Moscow on Kutuzovsky Prospekt. The building was erected for the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Borodino. It is there that the panorama of Franz Alekseevich Roubaud is exhibited, which the artist, by the way, with French roots, painted for the 100th anniversary.

The artist depicts the climax of the battle. The artist worked on the Panorama for almost three years. A special building was built for this panorama, but after the October Revolution it was given over to a technical school, and the painting was rolled up. It is clear that no one really cared about its safety. They forgot about her for 40 years. But in the fifties, the canvas was still able to be restored, and in 1962 it was placed in the rebuilt building of the Battle of Borodino panorama museum.

Another panorama was recently completed by the Englishman Jerry West. he made it for 40 years. West made a special trip to Russia, visited the Borodino field, and attended reconstructions. The battle model is made on a scale of 1 to 72. It includes 21 thousand figures, their average height is only 25 millimeters.

Despite the fact that Napoleon considered this battle a success, it became fundamental for the Russian army, which, although it suffered huge losses, retained the spirit of the winner, began to “squeeze” the French out of Russia.

The Battle of Borodino or the Battle of Borodino is the largest battle of the Patriotic War between Russia and Napoleonic France, which took place on September 7, 1812 near the village of Borodino.
The army of the Russian Empire was commanded by General M. Kutuzov, and the French army was led by the Emperor of France Napoleon Bonaparte himself. It is still not clear who won this battle. The Battle of Borodino is rightfully considered the bloodiest one-day battle.

Causes of the Battle of Borodino

Emperor Napoleon with a huge French army invaded the territory of the Russian Empire. At the same time, the Russian army was constantly retreating; panic in the ranks and a hasty retreat could not allow organizing the army for a decisive defense. Then the emperor assigns command of the Russian army to Kutuzov. He decided to continue retreating, hoping to exhaust the French army and receive reinforcements.
Deciding that there was no longer time to postpone the battle, Kutuzov decided to position his troops near Borodino. The Emperor demanded that Napoleon be stopped in front of Moscow, and only this area made it possible to do this. Before Napoleon's troops arrived, the Russian army managed to build the necessary fortifications.

Number of opponents

The Russian army in total consisted of about 120 thousand soldiers and more than six hundred artillery pieces. Among them there were also about 7-8 thousand Cossacks.
The French slightly defeated the Russian army in the number of troops, they had approximately 130-140 thousand soldiers, but a slightly smaller number of artillery pieces, no more than 600.

Progress of the Battle of Borodino

The Battle of Borodino began with French artillery shelling of Russian army positions at half past six in the morning. At the same time, Napoleon ordered General Delzon's division to go into battle under the cover of fog. They went to the very center of Russian positions - the village of Borodino. This position was defended by a corps of rangers. The French were significantly outnumbered, but the rangers retreated only when there was a threat of encirclement. The rangers retreated across the Kolocha River, followed by Delzon's division. Having crossed the river, he tried to take up positions, but having received reinforcements, the rangers were able to repel the attacks of the French.
Then Napoleon, following the flank, began an attack on the Bagration flushes (fleshes are field fortifications, sometimes they can be long-term). First came the artillery bombardment, and then the attack began. The first attack was successful, and the Russian rangers retreated, but after coming under fire from grapeshot, the French army was forced to retreat.
At eight o'clock in the morning the attack on the southern flush was repeated and ended in success for the French army. Then General Bagration decides to make an attempt to knock the French out of their positions. Having gathered impressive forces for a counterattack, the Russian army manages to push back the enemy. The French retreated with heavy losses, many officers were wounded.
Napoleon decided to make the third attack more massive. The attacking forces were reinforced by Marshal Ney's three infantry divisions, Murat's cavalry and a large amount of artillery (about 160 guns).
Having learned about Napoleon's intentions, General Bagration decided to further strengthen the flushes.
Napoleon launched a third attack with a powerful artillery barrage, after which the French successfully occupied the southern flush. A bayonet battle ensued, as a result of which two Russian generals were wounded. The Russian army launched a counterattack with three cuirassier regiments and practically pushed the French back, but the French cavalry that arrived in time repelled the attack of the cuirassiers (heavy cavalry) and completely occupied the flush by ten o'clock in the morning.
Napoleon concentrated about 40 thousand soldiers and 400 guns in flushes. Bagration had to stop the French, but could not do this, since he had only 20 thousand soldiers, then he decides to counterattack on the left wing. This attack was stopped and ensued hand-to-hand combat, which lasted about an hour. The Russian army gained an advantage, but when Bagration himself was wounded by a random shrapnel, the Russian army lost morale and began to retreat. Bagration was slightly wounded; he was hit by a shrapnel in the thigh and was carried away from the battlefield.
The flushes were abandoned, and the Russian army retreated beyond the Semenovsky Creek. There were still untouched reserves here, and Russian artillery numbering 300 guns well controlled the approaches to the stream. The French, seeing such a defense, decided not to attack for now.
Napoleon continued to attack the left flank of the Russian army, but ordered the main attack on the center of the Russian positions. A bloody battle ensued, which resulted in the withdrawal of the French troops; they never managed to dislodge the Russian army from the position of Semenovsky Creek. Here they remained until the very end of the Battle of Borodino.
At that moment, when the French army was fighting for the flushes, Napoleon ordered to bypass the Russian positions in the Utitsky forest area. The French managed to push the Russian army back from the Utitsky heights and placed artillery there. The French then launched a massive artillery attack. The Russian army was forced to retreat to the Utitsky Kurgan. But the massive fire of French artillery and a decisive assault allowed the French to push back the Russians and occupy the mound.
General Tuchkov tried to retake the mound and personally led the attack. In this battle, the mound was returned, but the general himself was mortally wounded. Kurgan was abandoned by the Russians when the main forces retreated beyond Semenovsky Creek.
The Battle of Borodino was not going in favor of the Russian army, and then Kutuzov attempted a cavalry raid into the rear of the French army. At first, the raid was successful, the cavalry managed to push back the French left flank, but after receiving reinforcements, the cavalry was driven back. This raid was successful in one thing: the enemy’s decisive strike was delayed for two hours, during which the Russian army was able to regroup.
In the center of the Russian positions there was a high mound on which an artillery battery was located, defended by the forces of General Raevsky.
Napoleon's army continued to attack, even despite heavy artillery fire. The French managed to occupy the redoubt, but the Russian army soon recaptured it. The French suffered serious losses. By this point, Raevsky’s troops were exhausted, and Kutuzov ordered him to retreat to the second line. Instead, General Likhachev was ordered to defend the artillery battery.
Noticing that the situation in the center of the Russian army was going badly for the Russians, he decided to concentrate the attack on the Raevsky battery, protected by Likhachev.
At about three o'clock in the afternoon, Napoleon began a powerful artillery barrage with more than 100 guns and then went on the attack. The French cavalry successfully bypassed the mound and attacked Raevsky's battery. The cavalry was forced to retreat. But the Russian army, distracted by the cavalry attack, left the front and flank uncovered, and it was there that the French delivered a crushing blow. The bloodiest clash of the Battle of Borodino ensued. General Likhachev, who was defending the battery, was seriously wounded and captured. An hour later the battery was broken.
This success did not force Napoleon to continue the offensive against the center of the Russian army, since he believed that its defenses were still strong. And after the capture of Raevsky’s battery, the Battle of Borodino began to gradually slow down. The artillery exchange continued, but Napoleon decided not to launch a new attack. The Russian army also decided to retreat to make up for their losses.

Results of the Battle of Borodino

Grand total

The Battle of Borodino went down in history as the bloodiest one-day battle until the end of the nineteenth century. Before this, there was nothing like this in world history that could happen in one day. The total number of those killed in battle, as well as those who died from wounds, reached approximately 50 thousand. The Russian army lost almost a third of its entire army, while Napoleon lost 1/5 of his entire army.
It remains interesting that both commanders (Napoleon and Kutuzov) attribute the victory in the Battle of Borodino to their own account. Modern Russian historians assess the result of the Battle of Borodino as uncertain, but Western historians say that it was a decisive victory for Napoleon, because the entire Russian army was forced to retreat from its position near Borodino. Napoleon failed to completely break the Russian army, and it did not lose its fighting spirit.
The fact remains that Napoleon was unable to completely defeat the Russians, a decisive victory was not achieved, and later, due to the crisis of Napoleon’s strategy, his defeat followed. If Napoleon had completely defeated the Russians at Borodino, this would have been a decisive and crushing defeat for the Russian Empire, on the basis of which Napoleon would have been able to sign a peace beneficial to France. The Russian army, having retained its strength, was able to prepare for subsequent battles.

The Battle of Borodino (in French history - the Battle of the Moscow River, French Bataille de la Moskova) is the largest battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 between the Russian army under the command of General M. I. Kutuzov and the French army of Napoleon I Bonaparte. It took place on August 26 (September 7), 1812 near the village of Borodino, 125 km west of Moscow.

During the 12-hour battle, the French army managed to capture the positions of the Russian army in the center and on the left wing, but after the cessation of hostilities, the French army retreated to its original positions. Thus, in Russian historiography it is believed that the Russian troops won, but the next day the commander-in-chief of the Russian army M.I. Kutuzov gave the order to retreat due to heavy losses and because Emperor Napoleon had large reserves that were rushing to the aid of the French army.

The Russian historian Mikhnevich reported the following review of Emperor Napoleon about the battle:

“Of all my battles, the most terrible is the one I fought near Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of victory in it, and the Russians acquired the right to be invincible... Of the fifty battles I gave, in the battle of Moscow [the French] showed the most valor and achieved the least success.”

According to the memoirs of French General Pele, a participant in the Battle of Borodino, Napoleon often repeated a similar phrase: “The Battle of Borodino was the most beautiful and most formidable, the French showed themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians deserved to be invincible.”

It is considered the bloodiest one-day battle in history.

September 8 is the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the Borodino battle of the Russian army under the command of M.I. Kutuzov with the French army (this date was obtained by erroneous conversion from the Julian calendar to the Gregorian calendar; in fact, the day of the battle is September 7).

Background

Since the beginning of the invasion of the French army into the territory of the Russian Empire in June 1812, Russian troops have been constantly retreating. The rapid advance and overwhelming numerical superiority of the French deprived the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, General of Infantry Barclay de Tolly, of the opportunity to prepare troops for battle. The prolonged retreat caused public discontent, so Emperor Alexander I dismissed Barclay de Tolly and appointed Infantry General Kutuzov as commander-in-chief. However, the new commander-in-chief chose the path of retreat. The strategy chosen by Kutuzov was based, on the one hand, on exhausting the enemy, on the other, on waiting for reinforcements sufficient for a decisive battle with Napoleon's army.

On August 22 (September 3), the Russian army, retreating from Smolensk, settled down near the village of Borodina, 125 km from Moscow, where Kutuzov decided to give a general battle; it was impossible to postpone it further, since Emperor Alexander demanded that Kutuzov stop the advance of Emperor Napoleon towards Moscow.

On August 24 (September 5) the battle took place at the Shevardinsky redoubt, which delayed the French troops and gave the Russians the opportunity to build fortifications in the main positions.

Alignment of forces at the beginning of the battle

Number of troops

The total number of the Russian army is determined at 112-120 thousand people:

historian Bogdanovich: 103 thousand regular troops (72 thousand infantry, 17 thousand cavalry, 14 thousand artillerymen), 7 thousand Cossacks and 10 thousand militia warriors, 640 guns. Total 120 thousand people.

from the memoirs of General Tol: 95 thousand regular troops, 7 thousand Cossacks and 10 thousand militia warriors. In total there are 112 thousand people under arms, “with this army there are 640 artillery pieces.”

The size of the French army is estimated at about 138 thousand soldiers and 587 guns:

According to the Marquis of Chambray, a roll call held on August 21 (September 2) showed the presence of 133,815 combat ranks in the French army (for some of the lagging soldiers, their comrades responded “in absentia”, hoping that they would catch up with the army). However, this number does not take into account the 1,500 sabers of the cavalry brigade of divisional general Pajol, who arrived later, and the 3 thousand combat ranks of the main apartment.

In addition, taking into account the militias in the Russian army implies adding to the regular French army numerous non-combatants (15 thousand) who were present in the French camp and whose combat effectiveness corresponded to the Russian militias. That is, the size of the French army is also increasing. Like Russian militias, French non-combatants performed auxiliary functions - they carried out the wounded, carried water, etc.

For military history it is important to distinguish between the total size of the army on the battlefield and the troops that were committed to battle. However, in terms of the balance of forces that took direct part in the battle of August 26 (September 7), 1812, the French army also had a numerical superiority. According to the encyclopedia " Patriotic War 1812,” at the end of the battle, Napoleon had 18 thousand left in reserve, and Kutuzov had 8-9 thousand regular troops (in particular, the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky guards regiments). At the same time, Kutuzov said that the Russians brought into the battle “every last reserve, even the guard by evening,” “all reserves are already in action.”

If we evaluate the qualitative composition of the two armies, we can turn to the opinion of the Marquis of Chambray, a participant in the events, who noted that the French army had superiority, since its infantry consisted mainly of experienced soldiers, while the Russians had many recruits. In addition, the French had a significant superiority in heavy cavalry.

Battle for Shevardinsky redoubt

The idea of ​​the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Kutuzov, was to inflict as many losses as possible on the French troops through active defense, change the balance of forces, preserve Russian troops for further battles and for the complete defeat of the French army. In accordance with this plan, the battle formation of the Russian troops was built.

The position chosen by Kutuzov looked like a straight line running from the Shevardinsky redoubt on the left flank through the large battery on Red Hill, later called the Raevsky battery, the village of Borodino in the center, to the village of Maslovo on the right flank.

On the eve of the main battle, in the early morning of August 24 (September 5), the Russian rearguard under the command of Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn, located at the Kolotsky Monastery 8 km west of the location of the main forces, was attacked by the enemy vanguard. A stubborn battle ensued, lasting several hours. After news was received of the enemy's encircling movement, Konovnitsyn withdrew his troops across the Kolocha River and joined the corps occupying a position in the area of ​​the village of Shevardino.

A detachment of Lieutenant General Gorchakov was stationed near the Shevardinsky redoubt. In total, Gorchakov commanded 11 thousand troops and 46 guns. To cover the Old Smolensk Road, 6 Cossack regiments of Major General Karpov remained.

Napoleon's Grand Army approached Borodino in three columns. The main forces: 3 cavalry corps of Marshal Murat, infantry corps of Marshals Davout, Ney, division general Junot and the guard - moved along the New Smolensk road. To the north they were advancing by the infantry corps of the Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais and the cavalry corps of divisional general Grusha. The corps of Divisional General Poniatovsky was approaching along the Old Smolensk Road. 35 thousand infantry and cavalry, 180 guns were sent against the defenders of the fortification.

The enemy, covering the Shevardinsky redoubt from the north and south, tried to encircle the troops of Lieutenant General Gorchakov.

The French broke into the redoubt twice, and each time the infantry of Lieutenant General Neverovsky knocked them out. Dusk was falling on the Borodino field when the enemy once again managed to capture the redoubt and break into the village of Shevardino, but the approaching Russian reserves from the 2nd Grenadier and 2nd Combined Grenadier Divisions recaptured the redoubt.

The battle gradually weakened and finally stopped. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Kutuzov, ordered Lieutenant General Gorchakov to withdraw his troops to the main forces beyond the Semenovsky ravine.

Starting position

All day on August 25 (September 6), the troops of both sides prepared for the upcoming battle. The Shevardino battle made it possible for Russian troops to gain time to complete defensive work on the Borodino position, and made it possible to clarify the grouping of forces of the French troops and the direction of their main attack. Leaving the Shevardinsky redoubt, the 2nd Army bent its left flank beyond the Kamenka River, and the army’s battle formation took the form of an obtuse angle. Both flanks of the Russian position occupied 4 km, but were unequal. The right flank was formed by the 1st Army of Infantry General Barclay de Tolly, consisting of 3 infantry, 3 cavalry corps and reserves (76 thousand people, 480 guns), the front of its position was covered by the Kolocha River. The left flank was formed by the smaller 2nd Army of Infantry General Bagration (34 thousand people, 156 guns). In addition, the left flank did not have such strong natural obstacles in front of the front as the right.

After the loss of the Shevardinsky redoubt on August 24 (September 5), the position of the left flank became even more vulnerable and relied only on 3 unfinished flushes.

Thus, in the center and on the right wing of the Russian position, Kutuzov placed 4 infantry corps out of 7, as well as 3 cavalry corps and Platov’s Cossack corps. According to Kutuzov’s plan, such a powerful group of troops would reliably cover the Moscow direction and at the same time allow, if necessary, to strike the flank and rear of the French troops. The battle formation of the Russian army was deep and allowed for wide maneuvers of forces on the battlefield. The first line of battle formation of the Russian troops consisted of infantry corps, the second line - cavalry corps, and the third - reserves. Kutuzov highly appreciated the role of the reserves, pointing out in the disposition for the battle: “The reserves should be protected as long as possible, because the general who still retains the reserve will not be defeated.”

Emperor Napoleon, having discovered the weakness of the left flank of the Russian army during a reconnaissance on August 25 (September 6), decided to strike the main blow against it. Accordingly, he developed a battle plan. First of all, the task was to capture the left bank of the Kolocha River, for which it was necessary to capture the village of Borodino in the center of the Russian position. This maneuver, according to Napoleon, was supposed to divert the attention of the Russians from the direction of the main attack. Then transfer the main forces of the French army to the right bank of the Kolocha and, relying on Borodino, which has become like an axis of approach, push Kutuzov’s army with the right wing into the corner formed by the confluence of the Kolocha with the Moscow River and destroy it.

To accomplish the task, Napoleon began to concentrate his main forces (up to 95 thousand) in the area of ​​the Shevardinsky redoubt on the evening of August 25 (September 6). The total number of French troops in front of the 2nd Army front reached 115 thousand. For diversionary actions during the battle in the center and against the right flank, Napoleon allocated no more than 20 thousand soldiers.

Napoleon understood that enveloping Russian troops from the flanks was difficult, so he was forced to resort to a frontal attack in order to break through the defenses of the Russian army in a relatively narrow area near the Bagration flushes, go to the rear of the Russian troops, press them to the Moscow River, destroy them and open up for himself way to Moscow. In the direction of the main attack in the area from the Raevsky battery to the Bagration flashes, which had a length of 2.5 kilometers, the bulk of the French troops were concentrated: the corps of Marshals Davout, Ney, Murat, division general Junot, as well as the guard. To divert the attention of Russian troops, the French planned to carry out auxiliary attacks on Utitsa and Borodino. The French army had a deep formation of its battle formation, which allowed it to build up its striking force from the depths.

Sources point to Kutuzov’s special plan, which forced Napoleon to attack the left flank. Kutuzov’s task was to determine for the left flank the necessary number of troops that would prevent a breakthrough of his positions. The historian Tarle quotes the exact words of Kutuzov: “When the enemy... uses his last reserves on Bagration’s left flank, then I will send a hidden army to his flank and rear.”

On the night of August 26 (September 7), 1812, based on data obtained during the Battle of Shevardin, Kutuzov decided to strengthen the left flank of the Russian troops, for which he ordered the 3rd Infantry Corps to be transferred from reserve and transferred to the commander of the 2nd Army Bagration Lieutenant General Tuchkov 1st, as well as an artillery reserve of 168 guns, placing it near Psarev. According to Kutuzov's plan, the 3rd Corps was to be ready to act on the flank and rear of the French troops. However, Kutuzov's chief of staff, General Bennigsen, withdrew the 3rd Corps from the ambush and placed it in front of the French troops, which did not correspond to Kutuzov's plan. Bennigsen's actions are justified by his intention to follow the formal battle plan.

The regrouping of part of the Russian forces to the left flank reduced the disproportion of forces and turned the frontal attack, which according to Napoleon's plan led to the rapid defeat of the Russian army, into a bloody frontal battle.

Progress of the battle

Start of the battle

At five thirty minutes in the morning on August 26 (September 7), 1812, more than 100 French guns began shelling the positions of the left flank. Simultaneously with the start of the shelling, General Delzon’s division from the corps of the Viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, moved towards the center of the Russian position, the village of Borodino, under the cover of morning fog. The village was defended by the Life Guards Jaeger Regiment under the command of Colonel Bistrom. For about an hour, the rangers fought off a four-fold superior enemy, but under the threat of being outflanked, they were forced to retreat across the bridge across the Kolocha River. The 106th line regiment of the French, encouraged by the occupation of the village of Borodino, followed the rangers across the river. But the guards rangers, having received reinforcements, repelled all the enemy’s attempts to break through the Russian defenses here:

“The French, encouraged by the occupation of Borodin, rushed after the rangers and almost crossed the river with them, but the guards rangers, reinforced by the regiments that came with Colonel Manakhtin and the rangers brigade of the 24th division under the command of Colonel Vuich, suddenly turned on the enemy and, together with those who came to They came to their aid with bayonets, and all the French who were on our shore were victims of their daring enterprise. The bridge on the Koloche River was completely destroyed, despite strong enemy fire, and for a whole day the French did not dare to make attempts at the crossing and were content with a shootout with our rangers.”

Bagration's flushes

On the eve of the battle, the flushes were occupied by the 2nd Combined Grenadier Division under the command of General Vorontsov. At 6 o'clock in the morning, after a short cannonade, the French began an attack on Bagration's flushes. In the first attack, the French divisions of generals Dessay and Compan, overcoming the resistance of the rangers, made their way through the Utitsky forest, but, barely starting to build on the edge opposite the southernmost flush, they came under grapeshot fire and were overturned by a flank attack of the rangers.

At 8 o'clock in the morning the French repeated the attack and captured the southern flush. Bagration sent the 27th Infantry Division of General Neverovsky, as well as the Akhtyrsky Hussars and Novorossiysk Dragoons to attack the flank, to the aid of the 2nd Consolidated Grenadier Division. The French left flushes, suffering heavy losses. Both division generals Dessay and Compan were wounded, the corps commander, Marshal Davout, was shell-shocked when he fell from a dead horse, and almost all the brigade commanders were wounded.

For the 3rd attack, Napoleon reinforced the attacking forces with 3 more infantry divisions from Marshal Ney's corps, 3 cavalry corps of Marshal Murat and artillery, bringing its number to 160 guns.

Bagration, having determined the direction of the main attack chosen by Napoleon, ordered General Raevsky, who occupied the central battery, to immediately move the entire second line of troops of his 7th Infantry Corps to the flushes, and General Tuchkov 1st to send the 3rd Infantry Division of General Konovnitsyn to the defenders of the flushes . At the same time, in response to the demand for reinforcements, Kutuzov sent to Bagration from the Life Guards reserve the Lithuanian and Izmailovsky regiments, the 1st Combined Grenadier Division, 7 regiments of the 3rd Cavalry Corps and the 1st Cuirassier Division. Additionally, the 2nd Infantry Corps of Lieutenant General Baggovut began moving from the far right to the left flag.

After strong artillery preparation, the French managed to break into the southern flush and into the gaps between the flushes. In the bayonet battle, the division commanders, generals Neverovsky (27th Infantry) and Vorontsov (2nd Grenadier) were seriously wounded and carried away from the battlefield.

The French were counterattacked by 3 cuirassier regiments, and Marshal Murat was almost captured by the Russian cuirassiers, barely managing to hide in the ranks of the Württemberg infantry. Individual parts of the French were forced to retreat, but the cuirassiers, not supported by infantry, were counterattacked by the French cavalry and repulsed. At about 10 o'clock in the morning the flushes remained in the hands of the French.

Counterattack of the arriving 3rd infantry division Konovnitsyna corrected the situation. Major General Tuchkov 4th, who led the attack of the Revel and Murom regiments, died in the battle.

Around the same time, the French 8th Westphalian Corps of Divisional General Junot made its way through the Utitsky forest to the rear of the flushes. The situation was saved by the 1st cavalry battery of Captain Zakharov, which at that time was heading to the flash area. Zakharov, seeing a threat to the flushes from the rear, hastily turned his guns around and opened fire on the enemy, who was forming up to attack. The 4 infantry regiments of Baggovut's 2nd Corps arrived in time and pushed Junot's corps into the Utitsky forest, inflicting significant losses on it. Russian historians claim that during the second offensive, Junot's corps was defeated in a bayonet counterattack, but Westphalian and French sources completely refute this. According to the recollections of direct participants, Junot’s 8th Corps participated in the battle until the evening.

By the 4th attack at 11 o'clock in the morning, Napoleon had concentrated about 45 thousand infantry and cavalry, and almost 400 guns, against the flushes. Russian historiography calls this decisive attack the 8th, taking into account the attacks of Junot’s corps on the flushes (6th and 7th). Bagration, seeing that the artillery of the flushes could not stop the movement of the French columns, led a general counterattack of the left wing, the total number of troops of which was approximately only 20 thousand people. The onslaught of the first ranks of the Russians was stopped and a fierce hand-to-hand battle ensued, lasting more than an hour. The advantage leaned towards the side of the Russian troops, but during the transition to a counterattack, Bagration, wounded by a fragment of a cannonball in the thigh, fell from his horse and was taken from the battlefield. The news of Bagration's wound instantly swept through the ranks of the Russian troops and had a huge impact on the Russian soldiers. Russian troops began to retreat.

General Konovnitsyn took command of the 2nd Army and was forced to finally leave the flushes to the French. The remnants of the troops, having almost lost control, were withdrawn to a new defensive line behind the Semenovsky ravine, through which the stream of the same name flowed. On the same side of the ravine there were untouched reserves - the Lithuanian and Izmailovsky Life Guards regiments. Russian batteries of 300 guns kept the entire Semenovsky stream under fire. The French, seeing the solid wall of the Russians, did not dare to attack on the move.

The direction of the main attack of the French shifted from the left flank to the center, towards the Raevsky battery. At the same time, Napoleon did not stop attacking the left flank of the Russian army. Nansouty's cavalry corps advanced south of the village of Semyonovskoye, north of Latour-Maubourg, while General Friant's infantry division rushed from the front to Semyonovskoye. At this time, Kutuzov appointed the commander of the 6th Corps, Infantry General Dokhturov, as the commander of the troops of the entire left flank instead of Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn. The Life Guards lined up in a square and for several hours repelled the attacks of Napoleon’s “iron horsemen”. To help the guard, the cuirassier division of Duki was sent to the south, the cuirassier brigade of Borozdin and the 4th cavalry corps of Sivers to the north. The bloody battle ended in the defeat of the French troops, who were thrown back beyond the Semenovsky Creek ravine.

Russian troops were never completely driven out of Semenovskoe until the end of the battle.

Battle for Utitsky Kurgan

On the eve of the battle on August 25 (September 6), by order of Kutuzov, the 3rd Infantry Corps of General Tuchkov 1st and up to 10 thousand warriors of the Moscow and Smolensk militias were sent to the area of ​​​​the Old Smolensk Road. On the same day, 2 more Cossack regiments of Karpov joined the troops. To communicate with the flashes in the Utitsky forest, the Jaeger regiments of Major General Shakhovsky took up a position.

According to Kutuzov's plan, Tuchkov's corps was supposed to suddenly attack the flank and rear of the enemy from an ambush, fighting for Bagration's flushes. However, early in the morning, Chief of Staff Bennigsen advanced Tuchkov's detachment from an ambush.

On August 26 (September 7), the 5th Corps of the French Army, consisting of Poles under the command of General Poniatowski, moved around the left flank of the Russian position. The troops met in front of Utitsa at about 8 o'clock in the morning, at the moment when General Tuchkov 1st, by order of Bagration, had already sent Konovnitsyn's division at his disposal. The enemy, coming out of the forest and pushing the Russian rangers away from the village of Utitsa, found himself on the heights. Having installed 24 guns on them, the enemy opened hurricane fire. Tuchkov 1st was forced to retreat to the Utitsky Kurgan - a more advantageous line for himself. Poniatowski's attempts to advance and capture the mound were unsuccessful.

At about 11 am, Poniatowski, having received support from the 8th Infantry Corps of Junot on the left, concentrated fire from 40 guns against the Utitsky mound and captured it by storm. This gave him the opportunity to act around the Russian position.

Tuchkov 1st, trying to eliminate the danger, took decisive measures to return the mound. He personally organized a counterattack at the head of a regiment of Pavlovsk grenadiers. The mound was returned, but Lieutenant General Tuchkov 1st himself received a mortal wound. He was replaced by Lieutenant General Baggovut, commander of the 2nd Infantry Corps.

Baggovut left the Utitsky Kurgan only after the defenders of the Bagration flushes retreated beyond the Semenovsky ravine, which made his position vulnerable to flank attacks. He retreated to the new line of the 2nd Army.

Raid of the Cossacks Platov and Uvarov

At a critical moment in the battle, Kutuzov decided to launch a cavalry raid by generals from the cavalry of Uvarov and Platov into the enemy’s rear and flank. By 12 o'clock in the afternoon, Uvarov's 1st Cavalry Corps (28 squadrons, 12 guns, a total of 2,500 horsemen) and Platov's Cossacks (8 regiments) crossed the Kolocha River near the village of Malaya. Uvarov's corps attacked the French infantry regiment and the Italian cavalry brigade of General Ornano in the area of ​​​​the crossing of the Voyna River near the village of Bezzubovo. Platov crossed the Voina River to the north and, going to the rear, forced the enemy to change position.

The simultaneous attack by Uvarov and Platov caused confusion in the enemy camp and forced troops to be pulled to the left flank, which stormed Raevsky’s battery on Kurgan Heights. Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais with the Italian Guard and Grouchy's corps were sent by Napoleon against the new threat. Uvarov and Platov returned to the Russian army by 4 o'clock in the afternoon.

The raid by Uvarov and Platov delayed the decisive enemy attack for 2 hours, which made it possible to regroup the Russian troops. It was because of this raid that Napoleon did not dare to send his guard into battle. The cavalry sabotage, although it did not cause much damage to the French, made Napoleon feel insecure about his own rear.

“Those who were in the Battle of Borodino, of course, remember that moment when the tenacity of attacks decreased along the entire enemy line, and we... could breathe more freely,” wrote the military historian, General Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky.

Battery Raevsky

The high mound, located in the center of the Russian position, dominated the surrounding area. A battery was installed on it, which at the beginning of the battle had 18 guns. The defense of the battery was entrusted to the 7th Infantry Corps under Lieutenant General Raevsky.

At about 9 o'clock in the morning, in the midst of the battle for Bagration's flushes, the French launched the first attack on the battery with the forces of the 4th Corps of the Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais, as well as the divisions of Generals Morand and Gerard from the 1st Corps of Marshal Davout. By influencing the center of the Russian army, Napoleon hoped to complicate the transfer of troops from the right wing of the Russian army to Bagration's flushes and thereby ensure his main forces a quick defeat of the left wing of the Russian army. By the time of the attack, the entire second line of troops of Lieutenant General Raevsky, by order of Infantry General Bagration, had been withdrawn to protect the flushes. Despite this, the attack was repulsed by artillery fire.

Almost immediately, the Viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, re-attacked the mound. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Kutuzov, at that moment brought into battle for the Raevsky battery the entire horse artillery reserve in the amount of 60 guns and part of the light artillery of the 1st Army. However, despite the dense artillery fire, the French of the 30th regiment of Brigadier General Bonamy managed to break into the redoubt.

At that moment, the chief of staff of the 1st Army, Ermolov, and the chief of artillery, Kutaisov, were near the Kurgan Heights, following Kutuzov’s orders to the left flank. Having led the battalion of the Ufa Infantry Regiment and joining it with the 18th Jaeger Regiment, Ermolov and Kutaisov attacked with bayonets directly at the redoubt. At the same time, the regiments of Major Generals Paskevich and Vasilchikov attacked from the flanks. The redoubt was recaptured and Brigadier General Bonamy was captured. Of the entire French regiment of 4,100 men under Bonami's command, only about 300 soldiers remained in service. Artillery Major General Kutaisov died in the battle for the battery.

Despite the steepness of the sunrise, I ordered the Jaeger regiments and the 3rd battalion of the Ufa Regiment to attack with bayonets, the favorite weapon of the Russian soldier. The fierce and terrible battle did not last more than half an hour: desperate resistance was met, the high ground was taken away, the guns were returned. Brigadier General Bonamy, wounded by bayonets, was spared [captured], and there were no prisoners. The damage from our side is very great and is far from commensurate with the number of attacking battalions.

Chief of Staff of the 1st Army Ermolov

Kutuzov, noticing the complete exhaustion of Raevsky’s corps, withdrew his troops to the second line. Barclay de Tolly sent the 24th Infantry Division of Major General Likhachev to the battery to defend the battery.

After the fall of Bagration's flushes, Napoleon abandoned the development of an offensive against the left wing of the Russian army. The initial plan to break through the defense on this wing in order to reach the rear of the main forces of the Russian army became meaningless, since a significant part of these troops fell out of action in the battles for the flushes themselves, while the defense on the left wing, despite the loss of the flushes, remained undefeated . Noticing that the situation in the center of the Russian troops had worsened, Napoleon decided to redirect his forces to the Raevsky battery. However, the next attack was delayed for 2 hours, since at that time Russian cavalry and Cossacks appeared in the rear of the French.

Taking advantage of the respite, Kutuzov moved the 4th Infantry Corps of Lieutenant General Osterman-Tolstoy and the 2nd Cavalry Corps of Major General Korf from the right flank to the center. Napoleon ordered increased fire on the infantry of the 4th Corps. According to eyewitnesses, the Russians moved like machines, closing ranks as they moved. The path of the 4th Corps could be traced by a trail of bodies of the dead.

General Miloradovich, commander of the center of Russian troops, ordered Adjutant Bibikov to find Evgeniy of Württemberg and tell him to go to Miloradovich. Bibikov found Yevgeny, but because of the roar of the cannonade, no words could be heard, and the adjutant waved his hand, indicating the location of Miloradovich. At that moment, a flying cannonball tore off his hand. Bibikov, falling from his horse, again pointed in the direction with his other hand.

According to the memoirs of the commander of the 4th Infantry Division,

General Eugene of Württemberg

The troops of Lieutenant General Osterman-Tolstoy joined the left flank of the Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky Guards regiments, located south of the battery. Behind them were the cavalrymen of the 2nd Corps and the approaching Cavalry and Cavalry guards regiments.

At about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the French opened crossfire from the front and flashes of 150 guns at Raevsky's battery and began an attack. 34 cavalry regiments were concentrated to attack against the 24th Division. The first to attack was the 2nd Cavalry Corps under the command of Divisional General Auguste Caulaincourt (the corps commander, Divisional General Montbrun, had been killed by this time). Caulaincourt broke through the hellish fire, went around the Kurgan Heights on the left and rushed to Raevsky’s battery. Met from the front, flanks and rear by persistent fire from the defenders, the cuirassiers were driven back with huge losses (Raevsky’s battery received the nickname “the grave of the French cavalry” from the French for these losses). General Auguste Caulaincourt, like many of his comrades, found death on the slopes of the mound. Meanwhile, the troops of the Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais, taking advantage of Caulaincourt's attack, which fettered the actions of the 24th division, broke into the battery from the front and flank. A bloody battle took place at the battery. The wounded General Likhachev was captured. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Raevsky's battery fell.

Having received news of the fall of Raevsky's battery, Napoleon moved to the center of the Russian army and came to the conclusion that its center, despite the retreat and contrary to the assurances of his retinue, had not been shaken. After this, he refused requests to bring the guard into the battle. The French offensive on the center of the Russian army stopped.

As of 6 p.m., the Russian army was still firmly located in the Borodino position, and the French troops failed to achieve decisive success in any of the directions. Napoleon, who believed that “a general who does not maintain fresh troops on the day following the battle will almost always be beaten,” never brought his guard into the battle. Napoleon, as a rule, brought the guard into battle at the very last moment, when victory was prepared by his other troops and when it was necessary to deliver the final decisive blow to the enemy. However, assessing the situation at the end of the Battle of Borodino, Napoleon saw no signs of victory, so he did not take the risk of bringing his last reserve into battle.

End of the battle

After the French troops occupied the Raevsky battery, the battle began to subside. On the left flank, Divisional General Poniatovsky carried out ineffective attacks against the 2nd Army under the command of General Dokhturov (the commander of the 2nd Army, General Bagration, was by that time seriously wounded). In the center and on the right flank, matters were limited to artillery fire until 7 p.m. Following Kutuzov's report, they claimed that Napoleon retreated, withdrawing troops from captured positions. Having retreated to Gorki (where another fortification remained), the Russians began to prepare for a new battle. However, at 12 o'clock at night Kutuzov's order arrived, canceling preparations for the battle scheduled for the next day. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army decided to withdraw the army beyond Mozhaisk in order to make up for human losses and better prepare for new battles. Napoleon, faced with the fortitude of the enemy, was in a depressed and anxious mood, as evidenced by his adjutant Armand Caulaincourt (brother of the deceased General Auguste Caulaincourt):

The Emperor repeated many times that he could not understand how the redoubts and positions which had been captured with such courage and which we had so stubbornly defended gave us only a small number of prisoners. He asked many times the officers who arrived with reports where the prisoners who were supposed to be taken were. He even sent to the appropriate points to make sure that no other prisoners had been taken. These successes without prisoners, without trophies did not satisfy him...

The enemy carried off the vast majority of their wounded, and we only got those prisoners that I already mentioned, 12 guns of the redoubt ... and three or four others taken in the first attacks.

General Armand Caulaincourt

Result of the battle

Russian casualty estimates

The number of losses of the Russian army has been repeatedly revised by historians. Different sources give different numbers:

According to the 18th Bulletin of the Grand Army (dated September 10, 1812), 12-13 thousand killed, 5 thousand prisoners, 40 generals killed, wounded or captured, 60 captured guns. Total losses are estimated at approximately 40-50 thousand.

F. Segur, who was at Napoleon's headquarters, gives completely different data on the trophies: from 700 to 800 prisoners and about 20 guns.

A document entitled “Description of the battle near the village of Borodino, which took place on August 26, 1812” (presumably compiled by K. F. Tol), which in many sources is called “Kutuzov’s report to Alexander I” and dates back to August 1812, indicates a total of 25,000 people losses, including 13 killed and wounded generals.

38-45 thousand people, including 23 generals. The inscription “45 thousand” is engraved on the Main Monument on the Borodino Field, erected in 1839, and is also indicated on the 15th wall of the gallery of military glory of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior.

58 thousand killed and wounded, up to 1000 prisoners, from 13 to 15 guns. Data on losses are given here based on the report of the general on duty of the 1st Army immediately after the battle; the losses of the 2nd Army were estimated by historians of the 19th century, completely arbitrarily, at 20 thousand. These data were no longer considered reliable at the end of the 19th century; they were not taken into account in the ESBE, which indicated the number of losses “up to 40 thousand.” Modern historians believe that the report on the 1st Army also contained information about the losses of the 2nd Army, since there were no officers left in the 2nd Army responsible for the reports.

42.5 thousand people - losses of the Russian army in the book by S. P. Mikheev, published in 1911.

According to the surviving reports from the RGVIA archive, the Russian army lost 39,300 people killed, wounded and missing (21,766 in the 1st Army, 17,445 in the 2nd Army), but taking into account the fact that the data in the reports for various reasons is incomplete (do not include losses of the militia and Cossacks), historians usually increase this number to 44-45 thousand people. According to Troitsky, data from the Military Registration Archive of the General Staff gives a figure of 45.6 thousand people.

French casualty estimates

A significant part of the documentation of the Grand Army was lost during the retreat, so assessing French losses is extremely difficult. The question of the total losses of the French army remains open.

According to the 18th Bulletin of the Grande Armée, the French lost 2,500 killed and about 7,500 wounded, 6 generals killed (2 divisional, 4 brigade) and 7-8 wounded. Total losses are estimated at approximately 10 thousand people. Subsequently, these data were repeatedly questioned, and at present none of the researchers consider them to be reliable.

“Description of the Battle of Borodino,” written on behalf of M. I. Kutuzov (presumably by K. F. Tol) and dated August 1812, indicates more than 40,000 total casualties, including 42 killed and wounded generals .

The most common figure in French historiography for the losses of the Napoleonic army of 30 thousand is based on the calculations of the French officer Denier, who served as an inspector at Napoleon’s General Staff, who determined the total losses of the French for 3 days of the battle of Borodino at 49 generals, 37 colonels and 28 thousand lower ranks, from 6,550 of them were killed and 21,450 were wounded. These figures were classified by order of Marshal Berthier due to a discrepancy with the data in Napoleon's bulletin about losses of 8-10 thousand and were published for the first time in 1842. The figure of 30 thousand given in the literature was obtained by rounding Denier’s data (taking into account the fact that Denier did not take into account 1,176 soldiers of the Grande Armée who were captured).

Later studies showed that Denier's data were greatly underestimated. Thus, Denier gives the number of 269 killed officers of the Grand Army. However, in 1899, the French historian Martinien, based on surviving documents, established that at least 460 officers, known by name, were killed. Subsequent studies increased this number to 480. Even French historians admit that “since the information given in the statement about the generals and colonels who were out of action at Borodino is inaccurate and underestimated, it can be assumed that the rest of Denier’s figures are based on incomplete data.”

The retired Napoleonic general Segur estimated the French losses at Borodino at 40 thousand soldiers and officers. A. Vasiliev considers Segur’s assessment tendentiously overestimated, pointing out that the general wrote during the reign of the Bourbons, without denying her some objectivity.

In Russian literature, the number of French casualties was often given as 58,478. This number is based on false information from the defector Alexander Schmidt, who allegedly served in the office of Marshal Berthier. Subsequently, this figure was picked up by patriotic researchers and indicated on the Main Monument.

For modern French historiography, the traditional estimate of French losses is 30 thousand with 9-10 thousand killed. Russian historian A. Vasiliev points out, in particular, that the number of losses of 30 thousand is achieved by the following calculation methods: a) by comparing data on the personnel of the surviving statements for September 2 and 20 (deducting one from the other gives a loss of 45.7 thousand) with the deduction losses in vanguard affairs and the approximate number of sick and retarded and b) indirectly - by comparison with the Battle of Wagram, equal in number and in the approximate number of losses among the command staff, despite the fact that the total number of French losses in it, according to Vasiliev, is precisely known (33,854 people, including 42 generals and 1,820 officers; under Borodin, according to Vasiliev, the loss of command personnel is 1,792 people, of which 49 generals).

The French lost 49 generals in killed and wounded, including 8 killed: 2 divisional (Auguste Caulaincourt and Montbrun) and 6 brigade. The Russians had 26 generals out of action, but it should be noted that only 73 active Russian generals took part in the battle, while in the French army there were 70 generals in the cavalry alone. The French brigadier general was closer to a Russian colonel than to a major general.

However, V.N. Zemtsov showed that Vasiliev’s calculations are unreliable, since they are based on inaccurate data. Thus, according to the lists compiled by Zemtsov, “during September 5-7, 1,928 officers and 49 generals were killed and wounded,” that is, the total loss of command personnel amounted to 1,977 people, and not 1,792, as Vasiliev believed. Vasilyev’s comparison of data on the personnel of the Great Army for September 2 and 20 also, according to Zemtsov, gave incorrect results, since the wounded who returned to duty in the time elapsed after the battle were not taken into account. In addition, Vasiliev did not take into account all parts of the French army. Zemtsov himself, using a technique similar to that used by Vasiliev, estimated French losses for September 5-7 at 38.5 thousand people. Also controversial is the figure used by Vasiliev for the losses of French troops at Wagram, 33,854 people - for example, the English researcher Chandler estimated them at 40 thousand people.

It should be noted that to the several thousand killed should be added those who died from wounds, and their number was enormous. In the Kolotsky monastery, where the main military hospital of the French army was located, according to the testimony of the captain of the 30th linear regiment, Ch. Francois, in the 10 days following the battle, 3/4 of the wounded died. French encyclopedias believe that among Borodin's 30 thousand victims, 20.5 thousand died or died from their wounds.

Overall result of the battle

The Battle of Borodino is one of the bloodiest battles of the 19th century and the bloodiest of all that came before it. According to the most conservative estimates of total losses, about 6,000 people were killed or injured on the field every hour, the French army lost about 25% of its strength, the Russian - about 30%. The French fired 60 thousand cannon shots, and the Russian side - 50 thousand. It is no coincidence that Napoleon called the Battle of Borodino his greatest battle, although its results were more than modest for a great commander accustomed to victories.

The death toll, counting those who died from wounds, was much higher than the official number killed on the battlefield; The casualties of the battle should also include the wounded and later those who died. In the fall of 1812 - spring of 1813, the Russians burned and buried the bodies that remained unburied in the field. According to military historian General Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, a total of 58,521 bodies of those killed were buried and burned. Russian historians and, in particular, employees of the museum-reserve on the Borodino Field, estimate the number of people buried on the field at 48-50 thousand people. According to A. Sukhanov, 49,887 dead were buried on the Borodino field and in the surrounding villages (without including the French burials in the Kolotsky Monastery).

Both commanders chalked up victory. Napoleon's point of view was expressed in his memoirs:

The Battle of Moscow is my greatest battle: it is a clash of giants. The Russians had 170 thousand people under arms; they had all the advantages: numerical superiority in infantry, cavalry, artillery, excellent position. They were defeated! Undaunted heroes, Ney, Murat, Poniatovsky - that’s who owned the glory of this battle. How many great, how many beautiful historical deeds will be noted in it! She will tell how these brave cuirassiers captured the redoubts, cutting down the gunners on their guns; she will tell about the heroic self-sacrifice of Montbrun and Caulaincourt, who met death at the height of their glory; it will tell how our gunners, exposed on a level field, fired against more numerous and well-fortified batteries, and about these fearless infantrymen who, at the most critical moment, when the general who commanded them wanted to encourage them, shouted to him: “Calm, all your soldiers decided to win today, and they will win!”

This paragraph was dictated in 1816. A year later, in 1817, Napoleon described the Battle of Borodino as follows:

With an army of 80,000, I rushed at the Russians, who were 250,000 strong, armed to the teeth and defeated them...

Kutuzov in his report to Emperor Alexander I wrote:

The battle on the 26th was the bloodiest of all those known in modern times. We completely won the battlefield, and the enemy then retreated to the position in which he came to attack us.

Emperor Alexander I was not deceived about the actual state of affairs, but in order to support the people's hopes for a speedy end to the war, he declared the Battle of Borodino as a victory. Prince Kutuzov was promoted to field marshal general with an award of 100 thousand rubles. Barclay de Tolly received the Order of St. George, 2nd degree, Prince Bagration - 50 thousand rubles. Fourteen generals received the Order of St. George, 3rd degree. All lower ranks who were in the battle were granted 5 rubles each.

Since then, in Russian, and after it in Soviet (except for the period of the 1920-1930s) historiography, an attitude has been established towards the Battle of Borodino as an actual victory of the Russian army. In our time, a number of Russian historians also traditionally insist that the outcome of the Battle of Borodino was uncertain, and the Russian army won a “moral victory” in it.

Foreign historians, who have now been joined by a number of their Russian colleagues, view Borodino as an undoubted victory for Napoleon. As a result of the battle, the French occupied some of the forward positions and fortifications of the Russian army, while maintaining reserves, pushed the Russians from the battlefield, and ultimately forced them to retreat and leave Moscow. At the same time, no one disputes that the Russian army retained its combat effectiveness and morale, that is, Napoleon never achieved his goal - the complete defeat of the Russian army.

The main achievement of the general battle of Borodino was that Napoleon failed to defeat the Russian army, and in the objective conditions of the entire Russian campaign of 1812, the lack of a decisive victory predetermined Napoleon’s final defeat.

The Battle of Borodino marked a crisis in the French strategy for the decisive general battle. During the battle, the French failed to destroy the Russian army, force Russia to capitulate and dictate peace terms. Russian troops inflicted significant damage on the enemy army and were able to conserve strength for future battles.

Memory

Borodino field

The widow of one of the generals who died in the battle founded a women’s monastery on the territory of the Bagration flashes, in which the charter prescribed “to offer prayers ... for the Orthodox leaders and warriors who in these places laid down their lives for the faith, the sovereign and the fatherland in battle in the summer of 1812.” . On the eighth anniversary of the battle on August 26, 1820, the first church of the monastery was consecrated. The temple was erected as a monument to military glory.

By 1839, the lands in the central part of the Borodino field were purchased by Emperor Nicholas I. In 1839, at Kurgan Heights, on the site of Raevsky’s battery, a monument was inaugurated, and Bagration’s ashes were reburied at its base. Opposite the Raevsky Battery, a guardhouse was built for veterans, who were supposed to look after the monument and grave of Bagration, keep the Visitor's Book of Records, and show visitors the battle plan and finds from the battlefield.

In the year of celebrating the 100th anniversary of the battle, the gatehouse was rebuilt, and 33 monuments to corps, divisions, and regiments of the Russian army were erected on the territory of the Borodino field.

On the territory of the modern museum-reserve with an area of ​​110 km² there are more than 200 monuments and memorable places. Every year on the first Sunday of September on the Borodino field, more than a thousand participants recreate episodes of the Battle of Borodino during a military-historical reconstruction.

The Russian people are rightly proud of the military valor of their sons shown in the Battle of Borodino. This battle took place during the Patriotic War - September 7 (August 26, old style) 1812 on the Borodino field, 12 kilometers west of the city of Mozhaisk, 110 kilometers from Moscow.

On the Borodino field, the Russian army, defending the national independence of its people, fought to the death with the army of the French Emperor Napoleon I Bonaparte. By 1812, Napoleon had conquered almost all of Europe. Using the conquered peoples, he organized a huge army, moved it to the East in order to defeat Russia and then conquer world domination.

The Russian army was three times smaller than Napoleon's army, and it had to retreat deep into its country, exhausting and bleeding Napoleon's troops with brutal battles.

WHAT IS WONDERFUL ABOUT THE BATTLE OF BORODINO

The enemy passed over 800 kilometers across Russian soil. There were only 110 kilometers left to Moscow. Napoleon hoped to occupy Moscow and dictate enslaving peace terms to the Russians.

But the Russians did not even think of laying down their arms. Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov, appointed as commander-in-chief, a talented military general, a favorite of soldiers and officers, decided to block Napoleon’s path to Moscow and give a general battle to the French on the Borodino field.

Russian troops were waiting for this battle during their long retreat. They were determined to measure their strength with the enemy and were ready to die rather than let the enemy pass. An ardent patriot and skilled commander, Kutuzov skillfully organized the battle on the Borodino field. On September 7, 1812, from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., numerically superior French forces continuously attacked the Russians. For twelve hours, almost non-stop, there were fierce hand-to-hand battles, with up to 1,000 guns fired from both sides. The Russian and French regiments completely died in battle, without yielding a single step to each other. Napoleon did not take losses into account and threw more and more units of his formidable infantry and cavalry into the attack, but he failed to achieve success in the Battle of Borodino. The French army crashed here against the indestructible force of the Russian troops.

On the Borodino field, the Russians dealt Napoleon's army a blow of such force that this army could no longer recover. The Battle of Borodino marked the beginning of the defeat of Napoleon's “grand army”. By the end of 1812, the war ended with the almost complete extermination of the enemy. The remnants of Napoleon's defeated army were expelled from Russia. In 1813-1815 Napoleon was completely defeated. His empire collapsed, and Napoleon himself died a prisoner on the deserted island of Saint Helena. The peoples of Europe enslaved by him restored their national independence with the help of Russia.

THE SITUATION ON THE EVE OF THE PATRIOTIC WAR OF 1812

As a result of the revolution of 1789 in France, the bourgeoisie came to power. Napoleon Bonaparte, a talented, energetic general and outstanding politician, seized supreme power in 1799, and in 1804 declared himself “emperor of all the French.” In fact, he consolidated the dominant position of the bourgeoisie in France and therefore initially enjoyed the support of not only the big, but also the middle and petty bourgeoisie and the French peasantry. Napoleon waged continuous wars with England and the feudal states of Europe - Prussia, Austria, Spain, Russia and a number of small German states. Initially, these states tried to suppress the French Revolution by force of arms and restore the power of the king and nobility in France. The main role in this struggle belonged to England, which, however, took very little part in it with its troops, but skillfully set the Russian Prussians, Austrians, and Spaniards against France.

Back in 1793, the French revolutionary army not only defended the independence of France, but also went on the offensive against feudal countries Europe. Napoleon appeared in the eyes of the French as the continuer of these revolutionary wars. This gave Napoleon the aura of a national hero, although in fact he strangled the revolution and subsequently waged purely wars of aggression. These wars invariably ended in French victories. Napoleon's victories expanded the territory of the French empire and opened up new markets and new sources of raw materials for the French bourgeoisie. During 1796-1809 Napoleon utterly defeated the Austrians, Prussians, Italians, and British many times and clashed with the Russians twice - in 1805 and 1807. By 1807, Napoleon had conquered Austria, Prussia, Holland, Belgium, Italy and the small German states. After the Peace of Tilsit in 1807, Russia became an ally of France.

England remained invulnerable to Napoleon's ground forces. She continued to fight him. The powerful commercial and industrial bourgeoisie of England successfully competed with the French bourgeoisie.

England's economic power was based on developed industry and extensive maritime trade. Napoleon decided to strike at English trade by introducing the so-called continental blockade1. He prohibited all European states from conducting maritime trade with England, buying its goods and loading their goods onto English ships. Special controllers-consuls of the French Empire were sent to the seaports of Germany, Austria, Belgium, Holland, France, and Italy, who monitored the exact implementation of the Napoleonic order on the continental blockade and confiscated English goods.

If the continental blockade had actually been fully implemented over a number of years, England would have suffered economic collapse. But the fact is that it was impossible to implement a complete blockade. Napoleon had to immediately give separate permissions for the import of English goods (mainly raw materials) even to France. The blockade so significantly affected the interests of all states and had such a detrimental effect on their economies that all sorts of attempts immediately began to circumvent the harsh demands of Napoleon and his controllers. Bribes, bribes, smuggling, etc. were used.

The continental blockade also hit Russia hard. Russian bread and all types of raw materials were largely bought by the British and exported on English ships. From England, Russia received good quality industrial goods. The blockade broke through these established connections. The dominant class of noble landowners in Russia at that time had nowhere to sell their grain. Merchants trading with England were threatened with ruin. This caused acute discontent among the ruling classes of Russia not only with the policies of France, but also with the policies of their Tsar Alexander I, an ally of Napoleon. Smuggling trade with the British began to be established on a large scale through Russian ports.

Napoleon, who knew from his agents that the Russians were not complying with the demands of the blockade, came more and more to the conclusion that in order to deal a serious blow to England, it was necessary to first conquer Russia, seize its rich resources, and then wage a fight with England. Napoleon dreamed of world domination. He wanted to go through the territory of conquered Russia to India and expel the British from there.

Since 1810, Napoleon gradually began to prepare for a campaign against Russia. In 1811, this preparation was already in full swing. Napoleon either assured Alexander I of friendship, or threatened him, but continued to assure that the movements of troops to the Russian border did not at all mean that war was imminent.

However, it was already clear to the Russian government, including Tsar Alexander I, that war with Napoleon was inevitable. Therefore, the Russians were preparing for war. The armament of the army was improved, its organization and tactics were improved, supplies were prepared, and money was found to wage the war.

Having completed preparations for war, Napoleon, at the head of his troops, crossed the Neman River on June 24, 1812, along which the western border of Russia then passed. The Patriotic War of 1812 began.

NAPOLEON'S ARMY

The French army was led by Napoleon Bonaparte, who seized supreme power in France during the bourgeois revolution.

Napoleon was boundlessly ambitious, richly gifted with natural abilities, brave, calculating and calm at the most critical moments. He was distinguished by his rare ability to work and read a lot. He was never a revolutionary, but he used the revolutionary situation for his personal interests.

In the revolutionary army, Napoleon began to quickly advance in the ranks and for outstanding services in the defeat of the British in the city of Toulon, he received the rank of brigadier general at the age of twenty-three. In 1795, he distinguished himself in suppressing an uprising of noble aristocrats in Paris against the government of the big bourgeoisie - the so-called “Directory”. He shot down huge crowds of nobles trying to seize government offices in the narrow streets of the city with grapeshot guns. This made the name of Napoleon known to all French people, made him popular among the broad masses and, especially among soldiers and young officers of the French armies.

As a reward for defeating the noble uprising, Napoleon asked the government to give him the position of commander of one of the armies. The government, which was already beginning to be afraid of the formidable general, sent him to command the army in Northern Italy. This French army was in the most difficult situation. Small in number, poorly equipped, robbed by quartermasters and suppliers, it could hardly hold out on the southern slopes of the Alps against the superior forces of the Austrians, who then owned Northern Italy. The government sent Napoleon here with the secret hope that the Austrians would certainly defeat his weak army and the defeated Napoleon would lose his glory and popularity among the French people, which was dangerous for the government.

But it turned out just the opposite. Having received an army, Napoleon deployed his military skill to its full extent, his ability to control troops and subjugate them to his will. Having brutally dealt with the thieving quartermasters and improved the supply of the army, he finally won the trust of soldiers and officers. In 1796, Napoleon completely defeated the Austrians within a few months, expelled them from Italy and forced them to conclude a peace beneficial to France.

From 1796 until 1812, Napoleon fought almost continuous wars and did not know a single defeat. His troops crossed almost all the states of Western Europe. The army of the largest feudal powers in Europe obediently bowed before the bayonets of his grenadiers and the blades of his cavalry.

These wars of Napoleon were aggressive. Napoleon placed the conquered countries in heavy economic dependence on France, removed princes, dukes and kings, and in their place put his relatives or marshals of his army. At the same time, Napoleon no longer cared about changing the feudal order in the conquered country, but carried out the ruthless exploitation of the conquered people in favor of France.

It was with these goals that Napoleon went to Russia in 1812. He wanted to use Russia in his own interests, without changing its political system, maintaining serfdom. When the Russian people understood Napoleon's aggressive goals, they rose up to fight for national independence.

What was Napoleon's strength? What explained his many years of victories in wars? What constituted the formidable danger hanging over Russia in 1812?

As a master of military affairs, who had supreme power and enormous material capabilities, Napoleon highly raised the combat effectiveness of the army. With his victories, he managed to captivate the French soldiers with him, managed to convince them that he, Napoleon, was only “the first soldier of France.” Always being among the soldiers on campaigns, riding around their ranks under fire and personally leading them into the attack, he achieved great popularity.

Napoleon waged the war differently from the way the armies of the feudal powers of Europe waged it. Using the experience of the revolutionary wars of France, he made his large army light and mobile, freeing it from large convoys. He said that the war should feed itself, and supported the army at the expense of the local population. He created in his army permanent formations of infantry, cavalry and artillery - divisions and corps - while his opponents, just before the battle, formed detachments from various parts of the troops. This gave Napoleon enormous advantages in maneuverability.

Finally, Napoleon was by far the most educated and intelligent monarch of his time, and he most fully and purposefully used all the resources of the state for the war. He went into every detail state life, knew them well, and during the war he personally commanded his troops.

Napoleon's main strength was his army. With soldiers' bayonets, he created a French empire that included almost all of Western Europe. His army was a formidable, hitherto unprecedented force, the largest in Europe. In France, the revolutionary government introduced universal conscription in 1793. In the rest of the countries of Western Europe, there were still mercenary recruited armies, recruited from declassed elements of the population. In Russia there was a national army, recruited from the tax-paying classes, that is, from peasants and townspeople.

France under Napoleon was a rich country. Napoleon took large indemnities from the conquered countries. This allowed him to provide the army well.

In numerous wars, the French army accumulated rich combat experience. Constant victories gave rise to special confidence in her strength and invincibility. Gradually, Napoleon's army created a cadre of experienced war professionals - officers and soldiers. However, these cadres constituted only the basis, the skeleton of the army. For his campaign in Russia, Napoleon assembled the so-called “grand army” of about 600,000 people. In this army, the French, including recruits, made up only about 30%. The rest were “allied contingents,” that is, troops deployed by the countries of Europe conquered by Napoleon. There were Germans, Italians, Austrians, Poles, Belgians, Dutch, etc. The Russian people called the invasion of the “great army” the invasion of “twelve languages.”

The “allied contingents” were far inferior to the French in their combat effectiveness. When Napoleon's army entered Russia and had to fight the Russians, who offered fierce resistance, desertion began to develop among the “allies”, and many sick and lagging behind appeared. The same was true among French recruits.

Only Napoleonic guards maintained exemplary order. These were selected units. The “Old Guard” consisted entirely of veterans of the Napoleonic wars. Napoleon knew almost every soldier here by sight. He kept them in a particularly privileged position. The "Young Guard" was staffed by the bravest soldiers and capable officers from the combat units of the army. She was also noted for her high combat efficiency. Napoleon threw his guards into the attack at the turning point of the battle, when it was necessary to stun the enemy with a formidable blow and complete his defeat.

The French army under the command of Napoleon, which entered Russia in June 1812, was formidable in numbers, a highly combat-ready armed force, its officers and soldiers had rich combat experience.

M.I. KUTUZOV AND THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN 1812

At the head of the Russian army in the decisive period of the war of 1812. there was an old fighting Russian general Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov. Kutuzov served in the Russian army for over fifty years. He was born in 1745 to the family of an educated general of the engineering troops in his time. Mikhail Illarionovich studied in the engineering and artillery corps in St. Petersburg, which he graduated in 1761. From that moment, Kutuzov’s service in command positions began. He went all the way career ladder- from a junior officer of an infantry company to the commander-in-chief of the army. This long service gave Kutuzov a wealth of combat experience, brought him closer to the Russian soldier and officer, and taught him to appreciate the Russian soldier.

Kutuzov was a participant in many wars, in which he proved himself not only an outstanding military leader, but also an exceptional brave man. In 1764, Kutuzov, as a company commander, took part in a campaign in Poland. During the Russian-Turkish War of 1768-1774. Kutuzov was first in the Danube Army under Field Marshal Rumyantsev, and then in the Crimean Army. Then he served in Crimea in the army of the great commander Suvorov. Under the command of Suvorov, he fought in the Russian-Turkish War of 1787-1791. and took part in the assault on the Izmail fortress. In 1805, Kutuzov, already in the position of commander-in-chief, made a campaign in Austria against Napoleon. After Napoleon defeated the Austrians at Ulm, he turned his army of two hundred thousand against Kutuzov, who had only 50,000 people. Skillfully maneuvering and steadfastly repelling Napoleon's advancing army with rearguard battles, Kutuzov safely withdrew his troops to the area of ​​the city of Olmutz. But here Tsar Alexander I intervened in the matter, who decided to command the troops himself, give Napoleon a battle, defeat him and achieve the glory of the winner. Kutuzov proposed to refrain from a decisive battle until the situation and the arrival of reinforcements from Russia, as well as Austrian units, were clarified. Contrary to Kutuzov's warnings, Alexander I gave Napoleon the battle of Austerlitz and suffered a severe defeat.

An attempt to blame Kutuzov for the defeat at Austerlitz on Alexander I failed. For this, he especially hated Kutuzov and fired him from the army.

In 1811, Alexander I appointed Kutuzov commander-in-chief Moldavian army, which since 1806 waged a continuous war with the Turks. The Turks had to be defeated as soon as possible and forced to make peace, since a war with Napoleon was imminent.

Despite his hostility towards Kutuzov, Alexander I knew that only Kutuzov would be able to quickly defeat the Turks.

Kutuzov brutally defeated the Turks twice and forced them to sign peace in May 1812, just a month before Napoleon's invasion, thereby saving Russia from the need to fight on two fronts.

Kutuzov not only had extensive combat experience, but was a richly gifted, talented commander, an ardent Russian patriot and a deeply educated person, well versed not only in military affairs, but also in politics. He went through combat school under the guidance of the great Russian commanders - Field Marshal Pyotr Aleksandrovich Rumyantsev and Generalissimo Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov. He mastered their brilliant martial arts, brought into it a lot of his own, new things that corresponded to the new conditions of the war, studied the combat experience of his enemy Napoleon. Kutuzov knew the Russian soldier deeply, appreciated and loved him. Russian soldiers also knew, loved and trusted Kutuzov unlimitedly. They knew that Kutuzov was the favorite student and comrade-in-arms of the great Suvorov, whom the entire Russian army revered as an invincible hero and father of soldiers. In 1812, due to long periods of service in the ranks of the Russian army, especially in non-commissioned officer positions2, veterans who fought under the command of Suvorov still served.

Among them were those who served under the command of Kutuzov, who saw him in battle - always ahead, calm, brave. There were those who saw how Kutuzov, seriously wounded in the head, was carried out from the battlefield - near Alushta in the Crimea and near the Turkish fortress Ochakov. Doctors considered the second wound to the head fatal for Kutuzov. But Kutuzov said that he “cheated death and survived.” Subsequently, from wounds to the head, Kutuzov became blind in his right eye. Old soldiers, eyewitnesses of Kutuzov's exploits, passed them on to new recruits, and thus the entire mass of soldiers was imbued with complete confidence in their remarkable commander.

Military officers also loved Kutuzov. They knew how brilliantly Kutuzov acted in 1805 against Napoleon in 1811 against the Turks on the Danube, they knew and believed in Kutuzov’s high skill as a commander.

Kutuzov was always well aware of the enemy's condition. His teacher, Suvorov, spoke about Kutuzov: “Smart, smart, cunning, cunning.” Indeed, none of the opponents could ever deceive Kutuzov. Kutuzov himself deceived his opponents many times. In 1805, saving his army from defeat by Napoleon's superior forces, he brilliantly deceived the French Emperor and especially his Marshal Murat several times and escaped the attack. In 1811, Kutuzov outwitted the Turkish commander-in-chief, lured him to the northern bank of the Danube, and defeated him piecemeal with a skillful maneuver.

Napoleon knew Kutuzov's high leadership qualities, and for his cunning he called him “the old fox of the North.” And Kutuzov himself attached military significance to his cunning. They say that when in August 1812 he was leaving for the active army and saying goodbye to his family in St. Petersburg, a young nephew asked him: “Do you, uncle, really hope to defeat Napoleon?” - “Break? No, I don't hope to break it! And I hope to deceive!” These words cannot, of course, be understood in the sense that Kutuzov defeated his opponents only by deception and cunning. Kutuzov's cunning was one of the elements of his military leadership.

The most important thing that helped Kutuzov save Russia in 1812 and expel Napoleon was a correct understanding of the nature of the struggle against the formidable conqueror. Kutuzov highly and objectively appreciated Napoleon's military leadership and knew the power of his army. He also knew the formidable strength and iron stamina of the Russian soldier. Kutuzov was one of the few in Russia who understood that only a people's war could break Napoleon. He contributed in every possible way to the outbreak of this nationwide war. He issued weapons to peasants, led the partisan movement, trying to achieve interaction between the partisans and army units. Kutuzov did this against the will of the tsar, amid the frightened cries of the noble landowners, who feared the armed peasants more than the French. Denunciations rained down on Kutuzov to the tsar that, by arming the serfs, he was preparing a “second Pugachevshchina.” But the old commander calmly did his job. He himself was a noble landowner, but at the same time he was an ardent Russian patriot. He put the interests of the Motherland above the interests of his class, which Tsar Alexander, “the first landowner of Russia,” failed to do.

Alexander I constantly harmed Kutuzov and removed him from service more than once. But Kutuzov, as a commander, was so great and skilled that Alexander, against his will, had to resort to Kutuzov’s help in difficult moments. This happened in 1805, in 1811 and, finally, in August 1812. Entrusting Kutuzov with the main command of the army, Tsar Alexander always assigned his spies and informers to him, who slandered Kutuzov. And in 1812, Alexander assigned such a spy to Kutuzov in the role of chief of staff, the arrogant German General Bennigsen.

In 1812, Kutuzov opposed Napoleon, being sixty-seven years old. A brilliant commander, an ardent patriot and a favorite of soldiers and officers, who had rich combat experience - such was Napoleon’s opponent

The Russian army in 1812 was numerically significantly inferior to Napoleonic army. On the western border, Russia was able to field only about 200,000 soldiers against Napoleon's army of six hundred thousand.

In terms of fighting qualities, the Russian army was not inferior to Napoleon's army. The Russians had already fought the French three times. The first time was in 1799 in Northern Italy and Switzerland. The Russians, in alliance with the Austrians under the command of Suvorov, then inflicted a number of defeats on the French.

The second meeting took place in 1805 near Austerlitz, which ended in the victory of Napoleon and the shameful defeat of Tsar Alexander, namely Tsar Alexander, but not the defeat of the Russian army. The fighting spirit of the Russian soldiers was by no means broken. They remembered well that shortly before Austerlitz: a six-thousand-strong Russian detachment under the command of General Bagration fought stubbornly all day long with the thirty-thousand-strong French vanguard, and with the onset of darkness, with bayonets, they paved the way for themselves and left the encirclement, capturing prisoners and the French banner. The French themselves called Bagration’s detachment “a squad of heroes.”

In 1807, the Russians had two major battles with the French - near Preussisch-Eylau and near Friedland in East Prussia. At Preussisch-Eylau, Napoleon failed to break the Russians. His army, numerically equal to the Russians, suffered huge losses in fruitless attacks, which were all repulsed by the Russians.

At Friedland, Napoleon defeated the Russians, thanks to the incompetent leadership of the commander-in-chief, General Bennigsen.

Thus, the French won two victories over the Russians and suffered several defeats from the Russians. But this was when the French had a great advantage over the Russians in organizing the army.

Between 1806 and 1811 the Russian army was reorganized and partially rearmed with better weapons. At the same time, the experience of Suvorov’s wars, the French revolutionary wars and the Napoleonic wars was taken into account. Following the example of the French, the Russian army had infantry and cavalry divisions and corps that had a permanent composition, formed in peacetime. People knew each other, knew their bosses.

Thus, by 1812 the Russian army was not inferior to the French in organization and armament. The Russians did not believe in the invincibility of the French, since they themselves had beaten them more than once under the leadership of Suvorov, Kutuzov, and Bagration.

In the wars preceding the Patriotic War of 1812, the Russian army acquired extensive combat experience. There were many capable military generals and officers and fired soldiers.

When Napoleon sent his troops across the Neman River near the city of Kovno on June 24, 1812, two Russian armies were deployed in the path of the advance of his main forces, numbering almost 400,000 people. The first - about 110,000 people - was located in the Vilna region. The second consisted of 50,000 people and was located in the Volkovysk region. Thus, Napoleon had a two and a half times numerical superiority in the main direction of his offensive. The position of the Russians was further complicated by the fact that a unified command had not been established. The first army was commanded by General Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly, and the second by General Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration. Both of these commanders were experienced generals.

At first, Alexander I was at the headquarters of the 1st Army. But given his failure at Austerlitz, he did not dare to command the troops himself, but he intervened in everything and interfered with everyone. The smartest people from his courtiers managed to persuade the tsar to leave the army for Moscow, and then to St. Petersburg in order (as he was told) “with his high presence to support the spirit of the people in a difficult struggle.”

Soon after the start of the war, he left the army without uniting the command of the 1st and 2nd armies in the same hands.

Given the current situation, the Russian army was forced to retreat. But it was very difficult for two separate armies to retreat in full view of the superior French forces. Napoleon threw his corps at the Russians in such a way as to separate both Russian armies and destroy them separately. With heavy rearguard battles, the Russian armies began to retreat to general direction to Smolensk, in order to unite there and with common forces repulse the enemy.

The French pursued the Russians, tried to cut off their escape routes, and draw the main Russian forces into a decisive battle, but they did not succeed. The Russians, maintaining their strength, continued to retreat without engaging in a decisive battle.

Battles with Russian rearguards, impassability, lagging convoys, difficulties with food and fodder and, most importantly, the actions of Russian partisans in the rear and on the flanks exhausted and bled the French army. The Russian population began to burn everything in the path of the French movement and went into the forests and deep into Russia.

But their forced retreat was also difficult for the Russians. Heavy marches under the constant threat of being cut off, the sight of burning villages and cities, the devastation of their native land both physically and morally oppressed the Russian troops. In separate rearguard battles, the Russians inflicted defeats on the French. These private successes could not yet change general position affairs, but the soldiers understood the matter in their own way. They reasoned like this: “After all, we are beating the French. Why retreat, why give up our native land for destruction? We all need to stand up strong, fight and not let the French go further, because we are strong.”

The great Russian poet Mikhail Yuryevich Lermontov in his poem “Borodino” very well conveys these sentiments of Russian soldiers. In this poem the old soldier says:

“We retreated silently for a long time.

It was a shame - they were expecting a fight.

The old people grumbled:

Why should we go to winter quarters?

Don't the commanders dare?

Aliens tear up their uniforms

About Russian bayonets?

Both Russian armies managed to avoid defeat and unite in Smolensk on August 3. Now not only the soldiers, but also the majority of the officers and generals were waiting for a decisive battle.

But General Barclay de Tolly knew that Napoleon’s forces were still too superior to those of the Russian army, that there was little hope of winning a decisive battle. Therefore, he ordered to continue the retreat to Vyazma and Gzhatsk.

This caused open murmur in the army and in the rear. General Barclay was accused of treason, they said that he was leading Napoleon straight to Moscow, that there was nothing else to expect from the “German”. By the way, Barclay was not a German, but a descendant of a Scotsman who switched to Russian service. Accusing him of treason or bad actions was completely unfair. As Minister of War, he did a lot to strengthen the Russian army. He also acted correctly against Napoleon. And, nevertheless, he was completely unsuited to the role of commander-in-chief in the Patriotic War of 1812. He, an honest and knowledgeable general, did not know how to approach the heart of a soldier and an officer. He could honestly fulfill his duty, but he could not and did not know how to lead the masses.

The war was acquiring a nationwide character, and therefore a leader was required who was close in spirit to the Russian soldier and the Russian people, a leader whom everyone would certainly trust. And the Russian people found such a leader in the person of General Kutuzov.

After the conclusion of a peace treaty with Turkey in May 1812 in Bucharest, Alexander I dismissed Kutuzov from service. When the French invasion began, Kutuzov came to St. Petersburg. At this time, by order of Tsar Alexander I, the nobles formed a militia, and Kutuzov was elected head of the St. Petersburg and Moscow militias. Meanwhile, the mood of the retreating army was falling, and rumors of Barclay's treason were spreading.

All segments of the population asked the tsar to immediately appoint Kutuzov as commander-in-chief of the Russian army.

Very reluctantly, under pressure from public opinion, Alexander I appointed Kutuzov as commander-in-chief of all Russian troops on August 203.

Kutuzov immediately left for the active army, arrived in Gzhatsk on August 29, and on August 30 issued an order to take command.

The army greeted Kutuzov with delight. “Kutuzov has come to beat the French,” the soldiers said, hinting that Kutuzov would not retreat, but would give battle to Napoleon. The army expected a decisive battle and hoped that Kutuzov would give this battle immediately. Kutuzov himself also perfectly understood what was expected of him. He considered it necessary to give a decisive battle on the roads to Moscow, using that mighty spirit, that anger and resentment with which the Russian people were full, to inflict a cruel blow on Napoleon.

However, Kutuzov also well understood that General Barclay de Tolly was right in continuing the retreat, that Napoleon’s forces were still too great, that it was necessary to further increase the Russian army through suitable reinforcements. In addition, Kutuzov had just arrived and was not up to date; he needed to look around. Therefore, he rejected the position planned for battle in the area of ​​​​the city of Gzhatsk and ordered a retreat further to the east. At the same time, he sent to reconnoiter the position for the battle in the area of ​​​​the village of Borodino.

The troops were somewhat disappointed that Kutuzov was continuing his retreat, but they believed him and believed that this was the last retreat. Kutuzov skillfully supported this belief. So, upon his arrival, greeting the troops, he said: “With such and such fellows, let’s retreat!” - and the soldiers were convinced that the retreat would soon really come to an end.

Meanwhile, Kutuzov’s position was very difficult. According to intelligence data from the headquarters, Napoleon's forces directly pursuing the Russians in the Moscow direction were estimated at 186,000 people. Kutuzov had about 110,000 people. In addition, he knew that the enemy forces were highly combative. To decide to fight in these conditions required great courage. The commander had a huge responsibility, because the fate of the Motherland largely depended on the outcome of the battle.

Kutuzov decided to give Napoleon's army a general battle on the Borodino field.

What did Kutuzov hope for when making his decision?

It has already been said above that the Russian army was not inferior in quality to the French. The question of quantitative superiority remained. Kutuzov knew that reinforcements were coming to him and at Borodin he would have 120,000 people. He mistakenly counted Napoleon's forces at 186,000 people (in fact, Napoleon brought only 130,000 people to Borodin). Kutuzov decided to balance the inequality of forces by choosing a position so that Napoleon could not, due to the nature of the terrain, immediately deploy his superior forces, so that he would have to attack on a narrow front and bring his troops into battle in parts under the brutal fire of Russian guns. Kutuzov correctly believed that if he had 40,000 men under the command of the fearless General Bagration on the left flank of the Borodino position, they would be able to hold off an enemy twice their size.

When making a responsible decision on the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov counted on the courage of the Russian troops, the high combat skill of their commanders and the skillful use of the terrain.

RUSSIAN AND FRENCH FORCES IN THE BATTLE OF BORODINO

Napoleon launched an offensive on the main direction Vitebsk-Smolensk-Moscow, with 400,000 soldiers. He brought only 130,000 to Borodin. Thus, having traveled about 800 kilometers through Russian territory, Napoleon lost almost 70% of his army. Some died in battle, many fell ill, fell behind, and deserted. Napoleon had to allocate many troops to guard the supply routes and flanks of the advancing army.

At Borodino, 120,000 Russians fought against a French army of 130,000.

The balance of forces by combat branch before the Battle of Borodino was as follows:

The French - The Russians

Infantry 86,000 - 72,000

Regular cavalry 28,000 - 17,000

Cossacks - 7000

Artillerymen 16000 - 14000

Militia - 10,000

Guns 587 - 640

Total: 130,000 and 587 guns. - 120,000 and 640 guns.

The French had an advantage in infantry and regular cavalry, while the Russians had an advantage in artillery. The Russian militias were poorly trained and insufficiently armed, their combat value was low.

The armament of the Russian and French armies was equivalent in combat qualities.

The infantry was armed with a smooth-bore, muzzle-loading rifle with an attached bayonet. The gun had a flintlock and a shelf on which gunpowder was poured. When the trigger was pulled, the flintlock would create a spark that would hit the gunpowder on the shelf. The latter flared up and through the seed slit transferred the fire to the powder charge - this is how the shot was fired. In wet weather the gun misfired a lot, and in the rain it was impossible to shoot at all. Black smoky powder was used for both rifles and cannons, and therefore, with the opening of fire, the battlefield was clouded with thick smoke, interfering with observation.

The gun fired only at 200-220 meters, but a well-aimed shot could be fired at 60-70 meters. The infantry fired in volleys - in platoons, companies and battalions. Single fire was fired only by the rangers, scattered in a chain in front of their units.

The main strength of the infantry lay not in fire, but in the bayonet strike of infantry units and units formed in columns.

The artillery was armed with smooth-bore guns loaded from the muzzle on wheeled carriages. These cannons fired round cast-iron cannonballs and explosive grenades at a distance of up to 2 kilometers, and with grapeshot up to 500 meters. The rate of fire of the guns was insignificant, since loading from the muzzle required a lot of time. To ensure continuity of artillery fire from this point, a battery of a very large number of guns was installed. Batteries of several dozen guns were not uncommon; Napoleon used batteries of 100 guns. In such a battery, the firing order was established, and the fire was carried out continuously.

In the Battle of Borodino, the French had more mobile 3-pound (i.e. 70 mm) and 4-pound (i.e. 80 mm) guns. The Russians have heavier 6-pounder (95 mm) and 12-pounder (120 mm) guns. The artillery maintained the closest cooperation with the infantry and cavalry. It was located with the infantry not only in defense, but accompanied it in the attack, moving on the flanks of infantry columns. Horse artillery worked in the same way with cavalry.

Grapeshot artillery fire significantly supported the infantry. This fire caused great losses to the enemy, since one was not supposed to apply oneself to the terrain or take cover from fire - it was considered shameful. Even reserves that came under enemy artillery cannon fire remained in place in close formation and suffered losses.

Regular cavalry was then divided into light cavalry - hussars, lancers, dragoons and heavy cavalry - cuirassiers. Light cavalry were armed with sabers or broadswords and pistols. The light horsemen did not have protective weapons to protect them from attacks with cold steel.

The heavy cavalry was made up of tall, strong men and selected large horses. The horsemen had protective weapons (metal cuirasses), which covered the chest and partly the shoulders from chopping and piercing blows. For weapons they had heavy broadswords and pistols. The cavalry attacked in battle in a closed two-rank formation, falling on the enemy in the quarry. In such battles, heavy cavalry, of course, had an advantage.

Cossacks were called irregular or irregular cavalry. They were armed, in addition to pistols and sabers, with pikes. If it was possible to get a gun in battle, the Cossack took it with him. They attacked not only with a deployed front, like regular cavalry, but also with a lava, that is, in a loose formation, trying to cover the enemy’s flanks. In battle, they sometimes used very cunning techniques, luring the enemy into an ambush, bringing him under grapeshot fire, etc.

BORODIN POSITION OF THE RUSSIANS AND ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT

The position near the village of Borodino, where Kutuzov gave a decisive battle to Napoleon, was chosen by the Quartermaster General of the Russian Army4 Colonel Tol on the instructions of Kutuzov himself. The right flank of the position abutted the Moscow River near the village of Maslovo, and the left flank abutted the wooded area south of the village of Utitsa. The Moscow River, which has steep banks here, and the dense forest south of the village of Utitsa were difficult to pass obstacles for the troops, who had to fight in dense, dense battle formations (columns and deployed formations). Thus, both flanks of the position were covered by natural obstacles. The front of the position stretched from the village of Maslovo, through Gorki, Borodino, Semenovskaya, to the village of Utitsa (see diagram) - for about 8 kilometers. The terrain of the entire battlefield from the village of Maslovo to the village of Utitsa is open, slightly hilly, cut here and there by shallow ravines and covered with bushes. From the front of the position (“the front line,” as we say now) and in its depth right up to the city of Mozhaisk, for 12 kilometers, the terrain was passable everywhere for troops and convoys. This was of great importance for the Russians in the event of a forced retreat.

As for the front of the position, it was not everywhere accessible for attacks by large forces. The position chosen by Kutuzov put the enemy at a disadvantage, since he could not immediately send large forces against the Russians. West of the village of Maslovo, the small river Kolocha flows into the Moscow River, which stretches in front of the front of the position to the village of Borodino, and then deviates to the west. This river flows along steep and partly swampy banks and at that time represented a serious tactical obstacle to the crossing of large masses of troops under fire. And since Kutuzov occupied the eastern bank of the Kolocha River and moved the rangers (combat guard) to its very bed, this section of the position became inaccessible for the actions of large forces.

The area south of the village of Borodino and up to the village of Utitsa was everywhere accessible for operations of all types of troops in compact formations. The front of this section was about 3.5 kilometers.

Thus, by skillful choice of terrain, Kutuzov greatly limited the ability of enemy troops to maneuver.

The Borodino field is cut from west to east by two roads. The first was called the New Smolensk Road. She walked through the villages of Valuevo, Borodino, Gorki and further to the city of Mozhaisk. It was a “highway” (not a highway, but a good, wide dirt road), along which Napoleon’s main forces advanced towards Moscow. The second road was called Old Smolenskaya. It passed south of Novaya through the villages of Elnya, Utitsa and further to the city of Mozhaisk. Napoleon's large forces also advanced along this road.

Kutuzov, having occupied the Borodino position with Russian troops, cut both roads and blocked Napoleon’s path to Moscow. Napoleon could not bypass the Borodino position, since he was hampered in the north by the Moscow River, and in the south by forests and impassable roads. He was forced to attack the Russians where Kutuzov wanted it, and not where Napoleon himself was more profitable. In this case, Kutuzov sought the same thing that Russian commanders achieved in the past: Alexander Nevsky - in the battle with the Germans on Lake Peipus, Dmitry Donskoy - in the battle with the Tatars on the Kulikovo Field, Peter the Great - in the battle with the Swedes near Poltava. These Russian commanders also prepared their defenses so skillfully that they forced their opponents to attack in a strictly defined direction and thus achieved victory.

Of the two roads on the Borodino field, Novaya Smolenskaya, which was better and shorter to Mozhaisk than the Old one, was of greater importance. Kutuzov paid special attention to firmly maintaining the New Smolensk Road.

During September 4-6, 1812, by order of Kutuzov, the position chosen for the battle was hastily equipped with engineering structures. Trenches for infantry and artificial obstacles were not built in front of them then, since the infantry repelled attacks by standing tall in deployed formation. Only the rangers, scattered in a chain in front, prepared for themselves a sheltered, convenient place for shooting - either by tearing off single trenches, or by adapting local objects.

The fortifications were built mainly for the installation of artillery. If possible, abatis were built in front of these fortifications. Part of the infantry was also placed in the fortifications for the guns, which covered the guns from being captured by the enemy.

This is how the Borodino position was strengthened. The Russians built the following structures on it (see diagram).

1. South of the village of Maslovo there are three so-called “flashes”5, that is, three arrow-shaped trenches for cannons. These flushes contained 26 guns. From the front, the Maslovsky flushes were covered with an abatis. Artillery from these flashes covered with fire the approaches to the Moscow River and the Kolocha River in its lower reaches.

2. Between the Maslovsky flashes and the village of Borodino, five separate fortifications were built, in which 37 guns were installed, covering the approaches to the Kolocha River with their fire.

3. Near the village of Borodino, a continuous trench was dug for rangers and a fortification for four guns.

4. South of Borodino, on the so-called “Kurgan Heights,” a fortification with 18 guns was built. This fortification was called the “Raevsky battery”.

5. South-west of the village of Semenovskaya, three flashes were built, each of which was equipped with 12 guns. These flashes were first called “Semyonov flashes”, and then were renamed “Bagration flashes”, since they were heroically defended and General Bagration was mortally wounded here.

6. South of the village of Shevardino, on a hill that dominated the entire surrounding area, a closed earthen fortification was built - the “Shevardino Redoubt”. 12 guns were installed in the redoubt and infantry were stationed for its stubborn defense. The Shevardinsky redoubt played the role of a “forward position”6.

The Russian fortifications on the Borodino field were of great importance. Especially big role The Shevardinsky redoubt, the Semenovsky (Bagrationovsky) flushes and the Raevsky battery played, around which the most fierce battles took place. the main position of the Russians. But since it was strongly advanced and could easily be bypassed from the south, Kutuzov, after personal reconnaissance, pushed the left flank of the main position to the village of Utitsa, and ordered the Shevardinsky redoubt to be defended as a forward fortification.

PLANS OF THE PARTIES

Napoleon was aware of the danger for his army of going deeper into the boundless expanses of Russia, especially when he was convinced that the people were beginning to take part in the war. The difficulties of fighting a “warring people” were known to Napoleon from the experience of the war in Spain, where for several years his troops could not break the partisans and suffered huge losses under their blows.

Therefore, from the very beginning of the campaign, Napoleon sought to force the Russians to a decisive battle, defeat the Russian army in this battle and force Tsar Alexander I to make peace. Napoleon hoped to defeat the Russians in Lithuania and Belarus, but the Russians left, exhausting the French with rearguard battles. He hoped for a decisive battle near Smolensk, but the Russians continued to retreat. In burnt Smolensk, Napoleon felt the mortal danger of a further offensive and was inclined to stop and settle into winter quarters west of the Dnieper River. But shame for the fruitless campaign and passion for the pursuit prompted Napoleon to move on. He decided to dictate peace to Alexander I in Moscow, as he had already dictated his terms many times in the defeated capitals of Europe.

Napoleon still considered his army stronger than the Russian one and was confident that in a decisive battle he would completely crush the Russians. Therefore, when he was convinced that the Russians had finally settled on the Borodino position, he said: “Now they are caught.”

However, despite his confidence in his abilities, Napoleon was very wary of Kutuzov’s actions. The appointment of the latter as commander-in-chief of the Russian armies made Napoleon think twice. He remembered the brilliant maneuvering of Kutuzov in 1805, when Napoleon was unable to defeat the Russian army, having a fourfold superiority in forces. Now Napoleon did not have such superiority. Napoleon understood perfectly well that in Kutuzov he had a strong and dangerous enemy. When Napoleon learned of Kutuzov's appointment as commander-in-chief, he said: "Let's see what this old fox of the North will do." When these words became known to Kutuzov, he modestly remarked: “I will try to justify the opinion of the great commander.”

The tenacity and activity of the Russian army, led by Kutuzov, forced Napoleon to exercise great caution and avoid complex maneuvers in the Battle of Borodino. This was reflected in the battle plan drawn up by Napoleon.

Having familiarized himself with the Borodino position occupied by the Russians and the grouping of their forces, Napoleon drew up the following plan for September 7:

1. Deliver the main blow with a mass of infantry and cavalry, with powerful artillery support, on the Russian left flank in the Semyonovsky flushes, Raevsky’s battery.

2. Break through the Russian position here and introduce strong reserves into the breakthrough.

3. The attack of these reserves should be turned north to the flank and rear of Kutuzov’s main forces, which were covering the New Smolensk road. Pin the Russians to the Moscow River and then destroy them.

This plan involved the French in a brutal frontal battle with the Russians along a narrow front. But the Russians have always been distinguished by their iron staunchness, and breaking through their position was extremely difficult. Napoleon's marshals knew this and, for their part, offered Napoleon another plan - to allocate a detachment of 40,000 people and send it around the forests south of the village of Utitsa, take this detachment deep into the flank and rear of the Russians and crush their position with an unexpected blow. In previous wars with the Austrians, Italians, and Prussians, Napoleon was very fond of such detours, which always led to the complete defeat of the enemy. Here, to the surprise of the marshals, Napoleon categorically rejected this plan. The marshals did not understand what was going on. Many of them began to say that “the emperor began to forget his craft,” that is, he forgot how to fight.

But Napoleon was right. He knew that the outflanking detachment would need many hours before it would pass through the roadless thicket of the forest and be able to take part in the battle. And during this time, Kutuzov, having discovered the weakening of the French front, himself will go on the offensive and defeat the weakened French troops. Napoleon knew the Russian “Instructions for Officers”, which stated that “wherever the enemy appears, you must turn your chest towards him, go towards him and defeat him.” Napoleon knew that the Russians acted according to these “Instructions”.

That is why Napoleon did not accept the plan of his marshals, abandoned complex maneuvers and settled on the simplest of them - a frontal attack followed by the introduction of fresh units into the breakthrough.

What was Kutuzov’s plan in the Battle of Borodino?

Kutuzov always had to fight with numerically superior enemy forces. Given such an unfavorable balance of forces, he also had a good, reliable method for achieving success. This technique consisted of stubborn defense in the first part of the battle, and then, when the enemy weakened, an unexpected transition to the offensive with the reserves saved until that moment of the battle.

Kutuzov prepared the Battle of Borodino primarily as a defensive one, but with the possibility of a subsequent transition to the offensive. The goal of the battle was to inflict a serious defeat on Napoleon's army and prevent it from entering Moscow.

Thus, Kutuzov’s plan included solving two problems:

the first task is to inflict the greatest possible losses on the enemy with a stubborn defense of limited forces, bleed him dry and confuse him;

the second task is to go on the offensive with fresh forces that did not take part in the first stage of the battle and defeat the enemy.

Both commanders - Napoleon and Kutuzov - managed to half fulfill their plans in the Battle of Borodino. Napoleon managed to break through the left flank of the Russian position, but there were not enough reserves to enter the breakthrough, since they were defeated during the breakthrough itself. With stubborn defense, Kutuzov managed to severely weaken the French army, but he did not have enough strength to go on the offensive.

What were the moods of the soldiers and officers in the Battle of Borodino and how were they supposed to influence the course of the battle?

Of the soldiers of Napoleon's army, the physically and morally most resilient, well-trained, and drawn into the field and combat life came to Borodin. Among them were many veterans who had fought in countless battles.

Why did they fight to the death with the Russians on the Borodino field?

They sought to achieve peace as quickly as possible, since Napoleon assured them that if they only defeated the Russians here, peace would be concluded. They sought to quickly reach Moscow, take possession of rich booty, plunder, receive generous rewards from the emperor and return home with glory.

The courage of Russian soldiers in the Battle of Borodino was based on something completely different. The enemy has invaded our native land; ruined it, threatened to enslave the Russian people. It is necessary, without sparing your life, to defeat the enemy and expel him from his native land. Before the Battle of Borodino, Russian soldiers and officers were filled with the deepest patriotic impulse. Everyone was ready to accept death in battle, but not to disgrace the title of a Russian warrior. On the eve of the battle, fellow countrymen from different regiments visited each other, wrote letters, and bequeathed what to convey to their relatives in the event of death in battle. The soldiers understood the significance of the upcoming battle. Everyone was in a solemnly elated mood. Before the battle, they cleaned and repaired uniforms, shoes, equipment, sharpened weapons, and put on clean linen.

The officers asked Kutuzov for permission to fight on the Borodino field in ceremonial uniforms, with all orders. Kutuzov allowed. This is how the army of heroes prepared for the decisive battle for the independence of Russia.

Tens of thousands of glorious exploits of nameless heroes, soldiers and officers, were seen on the Borodino field on September 7, 1812. Very few of the names of these heroes were preserved for posterity.

Old sergeant major7 Ivan Ivanovich Brezgun is a veteran of the Suvorov and Kutuzov campaigns. In 1805, he took part in a campaign in Austria and was part of Bagration’s “team of heroes”, which lost half of its strength in battle, but saved the main forces of the Russian army. In the battle near Shengraben, Brezgun received his seventh wound and was promoted to non-commissioned officer for the courage shown in battle. After recovering from his wound, he took part in the 1807 campaign against the French. He was also in the unsuccessful battle for the Russians near Friedland, and understood that the culprit of the Russian defeat was the then commander-in-chief, General Bennigsen.

In the Battle of Borodino, Brezgun spent the whole day in the most terrible sector - near the Bagration flushes. Many times that day he and his company stubbornly fought with bayonets against the French infantry and repelled cavalry attacks. He encouraged young soldiers by word and example of personal courage; he emerged from the Battle of Borodino unharmed and continued his military service.

Young soldiers, recruits of 1812, were not inferior in courage to veterans. Conscription soldier in 1812 Maxim Starynchuk was an ardent patriot. Along with all the other soldiers, he was dissatisfied with the retreat and was firmly convinced that the retreat was explained by the “treason” of General Barclay de Tolly. While others were only silently grumbling, Starynchuk loudly, in front of everyone, threw the word “traitor” into the suspect general’s face. This was a serious violation of discipline, and a military court sentenced Starynchuk to death. Thanks to the efforts of General Bagration, Starynchuk was saved from execution. In the Battle of Borodino, Starynchuk, distinguished by his enormous strength, brutally fought the French with a bayonet and butt. Many enemies fell under his powerful blows. But then a flying bullet hit Starynchuk in the forehead and lodged deep in the bones. Starynchuk fell and lost consciousness. A few moments later he woke up again and stood on his feet. The hand-to-hand fight continued, and two Frenchmen rushed at Starynchuk with guns at the ready. Starynchuk did not have a weapon, but he still went to meet the attackers, grabbed the bayonets with his hands and pulled them off the guns. Armed in this way, Starynchuk again rushed into the thick of the battle, striking with bayonets right and left. However, the head wound eventually weakened the hero, and he again lost consciousness, falling onto a pile of enemies struck to death.

When Starynchuk was brought to the dressing station, he came to his senses again. The doctor began to remove the bullet from the bone, but could not remove it. At that time, sedatives were not yet known, and surgical instruments were primitive. The doctor picked at Starynchuk’s forehead with an awl for a long time, exhausted himself and tormented the wounded man. Finally, Starynchuk said to the doctor: “I’m tired, rest, and I’ll live with the pig!”

Cuirassier Adrianov was a liaison officer under General Bagration in the Battle of Borodino. He carried a telescope for the general (there were no binoculars then), provided him with minor services and could not take personal part in hand-to-hand combat with the French. When Bagration was wounded and was being taken to the dressing station, Adrianov ran up to the stretcher and said: “Your Excellency, they are taking you to treatment, you no longer need me!” Following this, Adrianov jumped into the saddle and, drawing his broadsword, rushed into the thick of the battle. As if trying to reward himself for lost time, Adrianov alone plunged into the crowd of French horsemen upset by the battle; Having defeated many enemies, he died the death of a hero.

On the Borodino field, all Russians behaved like heroes. It should be noted that in addition to patriotism, in addition to ardent hatred of the enemy invader and the desire to expel him from the borders of one’s country, military traditions were also of great importance. Since the time of Peter the Great, the Russian army has hardly known defeat. Many regiments had distinctions on their banners and in their uniforms for feats accomplished in the past. Thus, the Absheron infantry regiment wore red gaiters in memory of the fact that in the battle with the Prussians at Zorndorf in East Prussia in 1758 during the Seven Years' War, this regiment repelled attacks while standing in blood. The regiment lost almost all its officers, but retained its position. It was already mentioned above that veterans of Suvorov’s campaigns, accustomed only to winning, took part in the Battle of Borodino. They fought stubbornly and brilliantly with the French in Italy, Switzerland, and Austria, when the goal of the war was not particularly close and clear to them. Fighting on the Borodino field, for Russia, for Moscow, for their families and property, they showed iron courage.

Napoleon underestimated the high morale of the Russian army, but Kutuzov took it well into account.

BATTLE FOR THE SHEVARDINSKY REDOUBTE

On September 5, 1812, around noon, Napoleon's army began to approach the Borodino position in three columns. The main forces, which included Napoleon himself, marched in the center along the New Smolensk road to the villages of Valuevo and Borodino. The right column approached along the Old Smolensk Road, through the village of Yelnya. The left column walked along the country roads to the village of Bezzubovo (see diagram).

At this time, Kutuzov had already decided to push the left flank of the position to the line of heights west of the village of Semenovskaya, the village of Utitsa. Work was underway on the construction of Semenov flashes.

The Shevardinsky redoubt remained ahead of the main position at a distance of 1,300 meters. It was impossible to support this redoubt even with artillery fire from the main position.

The redoubt was basically ready, and the troops for its defense were in place. In total, 3,000 people were concentrated here. infantry, 4,000 people. cavalry and 36 guns. In the redoubt itself, 12 guns were installed - one artillery company. All other troops stood behind and on the flanks of the redoubt, since there was no more room in it. To the right of the redoubt, 18 guns took up a position. Behind the redoubt stood infantry in two lines in battalion columns. To the left of the infantry, with a ledge back, stood the cuirassiers (heavy cavalry) in regimental columns.

In addition, two regiments of dragoons (light cavalry) stood on the flanks of the entire battle formation - to the right of the artillery and to the left of the cuirassiers. From the front, the battle formation was guarded by rangers scattered in a chain in front of the redoubt.

The position of the detachment at the Shevardinsky redoubt was very dangerous. However, Kutuzov ordered General Bagration, who commanded the 2nd Army, which occupied the left flank of the Borodino position, to defend the redoubt. When making this decision, Kutuzov was guided by two considerations. Firstly, it was necessary to find out Napoleon’s plan through battle and establish the main direction of his attacks. Secondly, it was impossible to withdraw troops from the redoubt during the day, in full view of Napoleon’s superior forces, without heavy losses. With successful pursuit, the enemy could have broken into the main position on the shoulders of those retreating, thereby disrupting the preparations for a decisive battle by Kutuzov.

Napoleon strove to quickly take the Shevardinsky redoubt from a raid in order to deploy his forces in front of the main Russian position and quickly attack it before the Russians had time to strongly strengthen themselves.

Therefore, Napoleon immediately sent huge forces to attack the Shevardinsky redoubt: 30,000 people. infantry, 10,000 people. cavalry and 186 guns. Napoleon assigned troops to attack the redoubt from the right and central columns. This allowed the French to attack the redoubt from three sides: from the north and west by the troops of the central column, and from the south by the troops of the right column.

On September 5, at about 4 p.m., after a series of minor skirmishes, the French deployed all forces assigned to attack the redoubt. Two infantry divisions moved in from the north; from the west - two infantry divisions and two cavalry corps; from the south - two infantry divisions and one cavalry division.

The French came almost close to the redoubt. After brutal canister artillery fire and point-blank rifle fire, a brutal hand-to-hand fight began. The redoubt changed hands several times. But under the pressure of superior enemy forces, the Russians retreated, and the redoubt remained in the hands of the French. The Russians, moving back a little, reorganized and prepared to repel further enemy attacks. It was clear that the French would now try to completely encircle the Russian detachment and destroy it.

General Bagration knew about the difficult situation of the Shevardinsky detachment, but did not give the order for its withdrawal to the main position, since this was still premature and dangerous. Bagration moved about 6,000 people from the main position from the village of Semenovskaya to help the Shevardinsky detachment. infantry of the 2nd Grenadier Division. This made the situation easier, but the French still retained an overwhelming numerical superiority.

Around 17:00 a fierce battle began again. The French launched an attack on the Russian detachment from three sides in order to encircle and crush it. They failed. The Russians not only did not yield a single step, but they themselves launched a counterattack and sought to reoccupy the redoubt. Infantry and cavalry were mixed up, hand-to-hand combat was in full swing everywhere. Entire units on both sides fell under the blows of bayonets and broadswords, but the French and Russians continued to fight steadfastly.

But then help came to the Russians. To the north of the redoubt a thunderous “hurray!” rang out. It was Bagration who personally led the regiments of the 2nd Grenadier Division into the attack. The French wavered and rolled back behind the redoubt. The redoubt was reoccupied by the Russians.

But not for long. The French put the disordered regiments in order, and the battle began to boil again. The redoubt again began to change hands. Attacks from both sides followed one after another.

Only with the onset of darkness did the battle begin to subside. The Shevardinsky redoubt remained in Russian hands. They defended it against the French forces three times superior. Late in the evening of September 5, Bagration received an order from Kutuzov to leave the redoubt and withdraw troops to the main position. The redoubt played its role. Napoleon's plan was clarified, Russian troops were concentrated at the main position.

In the battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt, the Russians lost about 6,000 people, the French - 5,000. The French were discouraged by the iron resistance of the Russians at the Shevardinsky redoubt.

Napoleon had something to think about before the decisive battle. When he asked how many Russian prisoners were taken at the Shevardinsky redoubt, he was told that there were no prisoners at all. To the menacing question “why?” - the emperor was told that “the Russians are dying, but they are not surrendering.”

The tenacity of the battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt is evidenced, by the way, by the following fact. On September 6, the day after the battle for the redoubt, Napoleon met the 61st French infantry regiment and noticed that there was no third battalion. To the question “where is the third battalion?” The regiment commander answered the emperor: “Everyone remained at the redoubt!”

Around midnight on September 6, when the Russians were retreating from the Shevardinsky redoubt, the French Marshal Murat, the commander of the entire French cavalry, who unsuccessfully attacked the redoubt during the day, decided to disrupt the systematic retreat of the Russians. He moved a detachment of 4,000 people. cavalry to attack the retreating Russians and cause confusion in their ranks. Most of the Russian infantry had already retreated by this time. The cuirassier division was retreating, and behind it, at a considerable distance from it, the last battalion of the Odessa infantry regiment, consisting of about 250 people, was retreating. This battalion could easily have been destroyed by Murat's cavalry before the cuirassiers could arrive.

However, the battalion escaped by using military stratagem. Having learned from intelligence about the movement of the French cavalry, the battalion stopped. The drummers began to beat the march, and the soldiers began to shout “Hurray!” At the same time, the cuirassiers, notified of the danger, turned back and galloped to the aid of the battalion.

The beating of drums, shouts and the trampling of horses brought confusion to the ranks of the French. They were late with the attack, the Russian cuirassiers arrived in time to help their infantry, and Murat’s plan failed.

Thus, the Russians defending the Shevardinsky redoubt, having completed their task, retreated in an organized manner to the main forces of their army.

BATTLE ORDERS OF THE RUSSIANS AND FRENCH AT THE BATTLE OF BORODINO AND COMBAT METHODS

During September 6, there were no major military clashes on the Borodino field. Reconnaissance was carried out, commanders studied the battlefield, final orders were drawn up, and the troops took their places in the army's battle order. As a result of reconnaissance and personal observations, Napoleon came to the conclusion that the area north of the village of Borodino (obstacle - the Kolocha River) and south of the village of Utitsa (forest) was difficult to pass, and therefore decided to deliver the main blow in the Semyonovsky flushes section, Raevsky’s battery (see diagram) .

Kutuzov, for his part, having assessed the progress of the battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt and the deployment of the French army, built his army into a deep battle formation for stubborn defense. There were three lines in this battle order:

The first line consisted of infantry corps.

In the second line are cavalry corps.

The third line contains reserves (infantry, cavalry and artillery).

The entire combat position of the army was covered from the front by a combat guard of rangers. The flanks were guarded by Cossack cavalry.

The artillery was partly installed in fortifications dug for it, and partly it was attached to its own divisions (each division had an artillery company, some had two companies). In addition, Kutuzov ordered part of the artillery to be left in reserve near the village of Psarevo.

If we look at the diagram, we will notice that the Russian battle formation is denser on the right flank and in the center and less dense on the left flank. Many military writers blamed Kutuzov for this arrangement of the army; they said that Napoleon was going to deliver the main blow on the left flank, and it was necessary to build the battle formation on the left flank more densely than on the right. The first to attack Kutuzov was his former chief of staff, General Benningsen, an enemy and envious of Kutuzov.

These attacks on Kutuzov are completely unfair. It is known that it is more profitable to counterattack an enemy who has broken through not in the front, but in the flank. Kutuzov's battle formation provided precisely such a maneuver. In addition, Kutuzov hoped, having exhausted the enemy, to go on the offensive, bringing his reserves into battle. He kept these troops away from the direction of the enemy’s main attacks, so as not to draw them into battle prematurely.

Napoleon deployed the main forces of his troops south of the Kolocha River and sent up to 86,000 soldiers and over 450 guns to attack Bagration's flushes and Raevsky's battery. Napoleon aimed auxiliary attacks at the village of Utitsa and the village of Borodino.

Thus, the Russians had more forces in the direction of the New Smolensk road, and the French - to the south of it. At the same time, Napoleon was very worried about this arrangement of the Russians. He feared their advance along the New Smolensk road, on which his convoys were located. Napoleon was generally afraid of any unexpected, cunning maneuver by Kutuzov.

It was already said above that the front of the Borodino position had a length of about 8 kilometers. 250,000 soldiers (130,000 French and 120,000 Russians) had to fight on such a narrow front on both sides. This is a very high density. In our time, in such a position, the defender would deploy one division - up to 10,000 soldiers, and the attacker - a corps, up to 30,000 soldiers. In total, this means that there would be about 40,000 manpower, i.e., six times less than in 1812. But that’s not all. In our time, both sides would echelon their forces 10-12 kilometers deep. Then the total (for both sides) depth of the battlefield would be about 25 kilometers, and its area would be 200 square kilometers (8X25). And in 1812, the French and Russians were separated by only 3-3.5 kilometers in depth. The total depth of the battlefield was 7 kilometers, and the area was 56 square kilometers.

The artillery density was also high. In the direction of the main French attack, it reached 200 guns per kilometer of front.

How was this placed? a large number of troops in the Battle of Borodino, in what formations and formations did they operate?

Before the start of the battle on the Borodino field, massive walls of people and horses stood at a distance of about one kilometer from each other. The infantry and horse units were arranged in regular quadrangular columns. The infantrymen stood with their guns at their feet. The cavalrymen stood dismounted, holding their horses by the bridle, ready to jump into their saddles on command and gallop towards the enemy.

The defending infantry lined up in a two-ranked close formation (as they do in modern times) and met the attacker with rifle fire. The infantry attacked in battalion columns, with up to 50 people along the front and 16 people in depth. The regiments formed their battalions in one or two lines. They attacked with an entire division at once. At the same time, the front of the attack was extremely narrow - for a battalion 30-40 meters, for a regiment 100-120. Such infantry columns with guns “on hand” went on the attack with a quick gymnastic step, maintaining alignment and closing ranks when the dead and wounded fell, to the sound of drums beating the “attack”, with banners flying. When approaching several tens of meters, they rushed with bayonets.

Since a decisive attack in columns often broke through the deployed formation of the defending infantry, the defender’s reserves usually also stood in columns and immediately launched a counterattack.

To repel cavalry attacks, the infantry was built in a square, i.e. into a square column, each side of which was a front. No matter from which side the cavalry attacked the infantry square, it met rifle fire and bayonet bristles everywhere. An entire infantry regiment was usually formed in a square, and if it did not have time, then battalion squares were formed. Disordered infantry was usually easily destroyed by cavalry. Therefore, the ability to quickly build a square was very important for the infantry. In the Battle of Borodino, the Russian infantry used a very interesting technique to combat the cavalry attack. When the French cavalry rushed at our infantry and the latter did not have time to form a square, the infantrymen lay down on the ground. The cavalry rushed past. And while it was being built for a new attack, our infantry managed to form into a square.

The cavalry fought, as a general rule, only in mounted formation with edged weapons - they attacked or counterattacked in a deployed two-rank formation.

Before the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov specifically instructed the infantry not to be particularly distracted by shooting, but to quickly move on to a bayonet strike. He assigned the cavalry the task of supporting the infantry everywhere and immediately. These instructions of the commander-in-chief in the Battle of Borodino were well carried out not only by the infantry and cavalry, but also by the artillery.

The Russian artillery, installed in the fortifications on the Borodino field, remained in place during the battle, and the damaged guns were replaced by others from the reserve. The guns operating with the divisions maneuvered on the battlefield along with the infantry and cavalry. At the same time, the guns were moved both by horse-drawn teams and rolled by people on their hands under enemy fire. Thus, the artillery did not leave its infantry and cavalry without fire support in the Battle of Borodino.

The high density of saturation of the Borodino field with manpower created great crowding in the battle. Forced to attack on a narrow front, the French were deprived of the possibility of wide maneuver; they had to attack several times in the same place.

Short action, mixing of units in constant hand-to-hand combat, and gunpowder smoke covering the battlefield made it very difficult to control the battle. The only means of communication that senior commanders could then use were mounted messengers. Officers - orderlies and adjutants - were sent to verbally transmit important orders. The commanders-in-chief could influence the course of the battle by sending reserves to where it was especially necessary. The reasonable initiative of private bosses was of great importance for success. This is important even now, with rich and varied means of communication. This was especially important in 1812. Kutuzov, in his combat order before the Battle of Borodino, specifically drew the attention of unit commanders to this.

Kutuzov chose a command post at a height near the villages of Gorki, and Napoleon chose the Shevardinsky redoubt. Both of these points are located about 1.5 kilometers from the battle line. Both are located at heights from which the battlefield is clearly visible when gunpowder smoke does not interfere. Both commanders sat at their command posts on camp stools, listened to the noise of the battle, observed, listened to reports and reports, and gave orders. A battle is not only a competition of troops, but also a competition of the minds and will of commanders.

BATTLE OF BORODINO

The Battle of Borodino lasted from 5 hours 30 minutes to 18 hours on September 7, 1812. During the day, fighting took place in different parts of the Russian Borodino position, on the front from the village of Maloe in the north to the village of Utitsa in the south. The longest and most intense battles took place for Bagration's flushes and for Raevsky's battery (see diagram). It was said above that Napoleon’s plan was to break through the Russian position in the Bagrationov flushes sector, Raevsky’s battery, and then introduce reserves into the breakthrough and push them to the north to press the Russian army to the Moscow River and destroy it. Napoleon had to attack Bagration's flushes eight times before finally, at the cost of horrific losses, he managed to take them around noon. However, the approaching Russian reserves stopped the enemy, forming east of the village of Semenovskaya.

The French attacked Raevsky’s battery three times, also suffered very heavy losses here and were able to take it only after 15 hours.

In the attacks of Bagration's flushes and Raevsky's battery, the French suffered such heavy losses that they had nothing to build on the success they had achieved. The troops were frayed and battle-weary. True, Napoleon’s old and young guard remained intact, but he did not risk throwing this last reserve of his into the fire, being deep in the enemy’s country.

Napoleon and his troops lost faith in the possibility of defeating the Russians. The Russians, after the loss of Bagration's flushes and Raevsky's battery, retreated back 1-1.5 kilometers, reorganized and were again ready to repel the enemy. However, the French no longer decided on a general attack on the new Russian location. After taking Raevsky's battery, they carried out only a few private attacks, and continued artillery fire until dusk.

The Battle of Borodino breaks up into a series of battles.

Battle for the village of Borodino

The diagram shows that the northern section of the Russian position was located along the eastern bank of the Kolocha River. On the western bank of the Kolocha River, the Russians occupied only the village of Borodino.

On the morning of September 7, the village of Borodino was occupied by one battalion of Russian guards rangers with four guns. To the west of the village there was a military guard consisting of rangers from army regiments. The bridge over the Kolocha River east of Borodino was guarded by a special team of 30 sailors from the guards crew, who were supposed to destroy the bridge after the Russians retreated to the eastern bank.

The occupation of the village of Borodino was important for the French. They expected to install artillery here and support attacks on Raevsky's battery with flanking fire.

Against Borodin and to observe the area north of it to the Moscow River, Napoleon allocated one corps, commanded by his stepson Eugene Beauharnais. Borodino's attack by units of this corps began the Battle of Borodino. Beauharnais moved parts of two divisions to attack Borodino at once - one from the north, the other from the west. The French began moving at 5 o'clock and quietly, under the cover of the morning fog, approached Borodino. At 5 o'clock 30 minutes they were noticed by Russian artillerymen, who opened fire. The French cannons, deployed west of Borodino to support the attack of their infantry, also began firing. Following this, Russian rangers opened rifle fire, and artillery thundered on Bagration's flashes. The field began to become clouded with thick gunpowder smoke.

The French rushed to attack Borodino from two sides. The guards rangers met them with bayonets. However, the forces were disproportionate. Many Russian rangers were stabbed to death on the spot, the rest began to retreat to the bridge over the Kolocha River, forming a square and stubbornly fighting off the advancing avalanche of French with bayonets. A handful of brave men managed to retreat across the river, but a significant part of the French also broke through the bridge.

The French who had broken through were already approaching the village of Gorki, where Kutuzov was driving up to his command post. At the battery near the village of Gorki at that time there was the commander of the 1st Army, General Barclay de Tolly, who commanded the troops of the Russian right flank in the Battle of Borodino.

Barclay de Tolly sent three regiments of chasseurs against the French. The rangers quickly struck, enveloped the enemy from the south and drove him back. Most of the French who broke through were cut down, the rest retreated to Borodino. The Russians did not pursue the French beyond the Kolocha River. A team of sailors dismantled the wooden bridge.

Borodino remained in the hands of the French, who immediately installed a strong artillery battery southeast of the village. Fire from this battery was fired not only at Raevsky’s battery, but also at the Russian battery near the village of Gorki. Individual cannonballs flew into Kutuzov’s command post more than once.

After the capture of Borodino, the French no longer advanced against the northern section of the Russian position. All further French attacks took place south of Borodino, against the Bagration flushes, the Raevsky battery and the village of Utitsa.

Battles for Bagration's flushes

Before the start of the battle, Bagration allocated about 8,000 soldiers with 50 guns to defend the flushes. To strike the flushes and develop the success of which he had no doubt, Napoleon allocated 43,000 people and over 200 guns - seven infantry and eight cavalry divisions under the command of Marshals Davout, Murat, Ney and General Junot.

However, Napoleon did not at all imagine that all these huge forces would have to be brought into battle for the very flushes. He believed that the main core of these forces would go into battle when the flushes had already been taken, when the Russian position was broken through and the French would drive the Russians north, to the Moscow River, where the Russians would lay down their arms. For the first attack of the flushes, from this entire mass of troops, Napoleon appointed only two infantry divisions under the overall command of Marshal Davout. Napoleon knew that the Russian forces defending the flushes were very small. The 8,000 soldiers who defended the flushes belonged to two heroic divisions - the 27th Infantry Division of General Neverovsky and the Combined Grenadier Division of General Vorontsov. Both of these divisions fought for the Shevardinsky redoubt on September 5 and suffered heavy losses there.

But Napoleon cruelly miscalculated. In fact, 43,000 soldiers and 200 guns were not enough to capture the Bagration flushes. He had to take troops from the reserve. Up to 50,000 Napoleon's foot and horse soldiers and 400 guns took part in the battles for the flushes and the village of Semenovskaya located behind them.

The Russians, too, during the stubborn six-hour battle, gradually brought reinforcements to the flushes. In total, up to 30,000 foot and mounted Russian soldiers with 300 guns took part in the battles in this direction.

The French launched only eight attacks on Bagration's flushes. Only as a result of the eighth attack, when the wounded General Bagration was out of action, did the French manage to occupy the flushes.

Let's look at fights for flushes in more detail.

The first and second attacks of Bagration's flushes. The battles for Bagration's flashes began almost simultaneously with the French attack on the village of Borodino - at about 6 o'clock.

About 500 meters southwest of the flashes there was a forest (Utitsa forest), which stretched far to the south, beyond the village of Utitsa. The edge of the forest skirted the flushes from the southwest and south. The Russians defending the flushes positioned themselves partly on the flushes, and partly to the north and south of them. The gap between the left flank of the troops on the flushes and the Russian troops near the village of Utitsa was occupied by rangers scattered in the forest.

At about 6 o'clock, Marshal Davout led two infantry DIVISIONS with 30 guns to the edge of the Utitsky forest and began to form them into columns for attack. Russian artillery opened fire on the French with cannonballs from a distance of 500 meters. The French, despite the losses, completed the formation, and their columns moved to the flushes to the sound of drums. At the same time, to the west of the flushes, the French installed three strong batteries - a total of 102 guns - and opened fire on the flushes from a distance of about 1,000 meters.

When the French columns approached the flushes at 200 meters, the Russian artillery switched to frequent fire with grapeshot. A shower of lead mowed down the dense columns of the French, many officers were killed and wounded. The French hesitated. At this time, Russian rangers moving forward from the forest opened rifle fire on their right flank. Hit by buckshot and rifle fire, the French could not stand it and fled back into the forest. Having reformed, they again moved to attack, but again unsuccessfully. The Russians again drove them back with friendly fire. The French retreated, leaving many dead and wounded.

The battered French divisions, shocked by losses, reorganized, rested, and the artillery that had moved forward hit the flushes. The Russian artillery successfully responded to the French, and the Russian infantry was full of courage after successfully repelling the first enemy attack.

But Davout was in a hurry to take flushes and soon launched a second attack. The French rushed forward furiously again. The commander of the right flank division that attacked the southern flush, General Compan, was mortally wounded by grapeshot, and his division fell into confusion. Marshal Davout, who was watching the battle, quickly galloped up to the division, stopped it and, at the head of the 57th French regiment, burst into the southern flush.

But General Bagration also vigilantly followed the battle. Seeing that the French had occupied the southern flush, Bagration immediately launched several infantry battalions into a counterattack. The Russian drums beat the “attack” menacingly, and from the gunpowder smoke that enveloped the flashes, battalion columns of Russian infantry rushed towards the French with bayonets at the ready. Bagration knew that the French could not withstand this counterattack. Therefore, following the infantry, he immediately sent cavalry to pursue the French as they retreated from the flushes.

The Russian bayonet attack was indeed successful. The French fled from the flushes, pursued by the Russian cavalry. The cavalry galloped to the edge of the forest, cut down many French and captured 12 French guns. However, the Russians failed to take away the guns. The French, in turn, threw their cavalry forward to help the frustrated infantry. After a brutal slaughter, the Russian cavalry retreated behind the flushes.

The first two attacks on the flushes were repulsed. The French suffered heavy losses. Among those killed was one general; four generals were wounded. Marshal Davout himself was shell-shocked, but remained in service.

Third attack of Bagration's flushes. The unsuccessful outcome of the first two attacks showed Napoleon that flushes could not be taken with two divisions. He sent Ney's corps to help Marshal Davout's corps. The forces of the advancing French against the flushes were brought to 30,500 bayonets and sabers with powerful artillery.

Bagration noticed the movement of French units to the west of the flushes and assessed the formidable danger hanging over them. He decided to bring to the flushes everything that was possible from the 2nd Army, which he led. He pulled up not only his reserve consisting of one infantry and one cavalry divisions, he removed another infantry division from the left flank from the village of Utitsa and placed it behind the village of Semenovsaya.

As a result of these movements, Bagration managed to concentrate about 15,000 bayonets and sabers and up to 120 guns for the defense of the flashes.

Kutuzov also assessed the great danger threatening the left flank of the Borodino position and, above all, the Bagration flushes. He gave the order to move large forces to help Bagration, namely:

1. 100 guns from the artillery reserve stationed near the village of Psarevo.

2. Three cuirassier regiments from their cavalry reserve.

3. The entire 2nd Infantry Corps, which stood on the right flank, where the French did not attack. In place of the 2nd Corps, a chain of rangers was moved to monitor the French.

4. Three guards infantry regiments from their reserve - Izmailovsky, Lithuanian and Finnish.

In total, Kutuzov decided to send over 14,000 people with 180 guns to support Bagration. With the arrival of these reserves, Bagration could already deploy 29,000 soldiers and 300 guns to defend the flushes. However, the bulk of Kutuzov’s reinforcements could take their places only after 1.5-2 hours, at about 10 o’clock. In the meantime, 15,000 Russians were holding back 30,000 French. For the third attack, the French deployed four infantry divisions - two that had already attacked the flushes twice, and two fresh ones from Marshal Ney's corps. The French decided to crush the Russians with their numbers and lined up their troops for the attack in unprecedentedly dense battle formations even for that time. One of the fresh divisions formed in four lines. Three regiments marched one after the other in a deployed front of battalion columns (battalions side by side), and the fourth came from behind, having battalions also in columns, but built behind each other. This whole mass of people went on an attack on the flushes around 8 o'clock. From a distance of 200 meters, the Russians met the attack with grapeshot. The French suffered huge losses, but a powerful stream of people rolled forward uncontrollably. The left and right flushes were occupied by the French after a fierce bayonet battle. On the middle flush the fight was still going on. But Bagration did not allow the enemy to gain a foothold in the flushes they occupied. He quickly launched infantry and cavalry into a counterattack. A brutal bayonet fight and cutting with sabers began again. The French were thrown out of flushes. At about 9 o'clock the Russians again occupied the flushes and began to put them in order and replace the damaged guns with new ones.

The fourth attack of Bagratnon's flushes. Marshals Davout, Murat and Ney, accustomed to victories, driven by Napoleon, became furious with failures and losses. By 9:30 a.m. they launched a new, fourth attack on the flushes. They have now deployed five infantry divisions. In addition, Murat moved up part of his cavalry in order to penetrate deep into the Russian rear after defeating them on flushes.

This time the blow of the superior French forces was so friendly and swift that they managed to capture all three flushes. About two regiments of French infantry broke through deeper and even captured the village of Semyonovskaya for a while, but at that time reinforcements were already approaching Bagration. He sent about two divisions into a counterattack under the command of the commander of the 8th Russian Infantry Corps, General Borozdin. Borozdin's swift counterattack quickly crushed the French and put them to flight. The Russians pursued the fleeing people and killed many of them. Murat, who rushed with the cavalry to cover the retreat of his infantry, was almost captured. He was forced to abandon his horse and take refuge in the ranks of the infantry, with whom he retreated from the flashes. By 10 o'clock the Russians had completely cleared the flushes from the French. The tenacity and ferocity of the battle grew. Subsequently, the French said that the tenacity and resilience of the Russians began to acquire a “sinister” (of course, for the French) character. French General Pele, a participant in the Battle of Borodino, describes the Russian counterattacks at Bagration’s flushes this way: “As reinforcements approached Bagration’s troops, they walked forward with the greatest courage over the corpses of the fallen to take possession of the lost points. Before our eyes, Russian columns moved at the command of their commanders, like moving entrenchments (fortifications), sparkling with steel and flame. In open areas, hit by our grapeshot, attacked either by cavalry or infantry, they suffered enormous losses. But these brave warriors, having gathered their last strength, attacked us as before.”9

Fifth attack of Bagration's flushes. Despite the heavy losses, the available French forces in front of Bagratnon's flushes were still very large. Murat gradually strengthened the battered five infantry divisions from the three cavalry corps under his command. True, according to Napoleon’s plan, these corps were supposed to build on their success and not attack flushes. Murat spent them prematurely - but what could be done? After all, Napoleon himself, through the adjutants he sent, hurried the marshals to quickly take the flashes.

All three marshals - Davout, Murat and Ney - were constantly under fire, stopping the fleeing French, rebuilding broken units and throwing them into battle again. Immediately after repelling the fourth attack, the marshals reorganized the mixed troops, Murat threw up several fresh cavalry regiments, and the French again launched a fifth attack on the flushes. The Russians, frustrated by the counterattack and pursuit, were overwhelmed, and all three flushes were occupied by the French. But it was already eleven o'clock. The reinforcements sent by Kutuzov were already taking their places. The French, who burst into the flushes, were immediately counterattacked not only from the front, but also on both flanks. This counterattack was attended by troops of the 2nd Russian Infantry Corps, sent by Kutuzov from the right flank. The French were thrown off the flushes and retreated with heavy losses. Thousands of corpses lay in heaps in front of the flushes, on the flushes themselves, around them - but the French had not yet achieved anything. Thus the fifth enemy attack was repulsed.

Sixth attack of Bagration's flushes. Napoleon, watching the progress of the battle from the Shevardinsky redoubt and receiving reports from the marshals, was shocked by the inhuman tenacity of the Russians and the huge losses of his troops. He had already received reports of the death of many of his favorite generals. Gloomy, menacing, upset, he sat with a telescope in his hands. Behind him a silent retinue crowded, and even further away stood the columns of the old and young guards - the emperor's reserve. . Observing the reflection of the fifth attack on the flushes and the approach of Russian reserves to the left flank of the Russian position, Napoleon came to the conclusion that it would not be possible to take the flushes head-on with attacks only from the west. He decided to throw two more infantry divisions of Junot's corps onto the flushes, sending them to bypass the flushes from the south. Junot's corps was originally intended for action against the village of Utitsa. Now Napoleon ordered him to turn and take part in the sixth attack of the flushes, bypassing them from the south. The sixth attack began. Five infantry divisions of Davout and Ney moved from the west, two infantry divisions under the command of Junot - from the south.

But reinforcements approached the Russians in the flush area, which allowed Bagration to maneuver against the flanks of the advancing French. Holding back the attack of the columns of Davout and Ney from the front, Bagration simultaneously counterattacked them from the north and threw them back from the flushes. Junot's divisions, turning to the north, tried to attack the flushes in the flank and rear. But unexpectedly they themselves were attacked from the east on their right flank by a fresh Russian infantry division and three cuirassier regiments. After a stubborn battle, Junot's divisions were driven back, and the danger of bypassing the flushes from the south was over.

Seventh attack of Bagration's flushes. All seven infantry divisions, appointed by Napoleon not only to master the flushes, but also to develop success, took part in the sixth attack of the flushes. The marshals understood that it was useless to ask Napoleon for new reinforcements, since their forces were already significantly superior to the Russians. Therefore, with frantic energy, they organized the seventh attack of the flushes with the same seven divisions. The troops of Davout and Ney again attacked the Russians head-on, walking over the piles of their dead comrades, and Junot deployed from the south and led his columns in such a way as to go deeper around not only the flushes, but also the Russian troops stationed southeast of the flushes. But this attack was repulsed. The remnants of the defenders of the flushes again drove back the columns of Davout and Ney with grapeshot fire and bayonets. Junot's columns, before reaching the flushes, were quickly attacked by Russian infantry regiments transferred by Kutuzov from the village of Maslovo. Junot's divisions suffered heavy losses under Russian bayonets and rolled back.

It was already about half past eleven. The battle, unprecedented in its intensity, raged for six hours. The day was sunny and hot. But the battlefield was dark with smoke and dust. The roar of artillery echoed for tens of kilometers. The Russians have already repulsed five frontal attacks on flushes and two strong attacks covering the flank. Despite the great numerical superiority of their forces, the French were not successful. The marshals were discouraged, Napoleon was greatly depressed and worried, and his troops were losing courage and self-confidence. And the Russians continued to hold their positions.

Eighth attack of Bagration's flushes. Then Napoleon decided to break the Russian resistance with artillery fire of unprecedented force. He concentrated 400 guns against the flashes - on a front of about 1.5-2 kilometers. While these guns were destroying the Russian position, the eighth attack of the flushes was being prepared. This time up to 45,000 infantry and cavalry soldiers were concentrated against them. Bagration could oppose the eighth attack of the flushes with about 15,000-18,000 soldiers with 300 guns. Kutuzov knew that the critical moment of the battle was approaching. He decided to transfer some more troops from his right flank to the left flank. But this transfer took time - again 1.5 - 2 hours. And the French attack was about to begin. Kutuzov was worried not only about the attack itself, but also about the impact of Napoleon’s reserves on the depth of the Russian position if the attack was successful. The Russian commander decided to tie up the French reserves at all costs, divert Napoleon's attention and gain time for regrouping. To this end, he ordered the Russian cavalry, standing on the right flank, to cross the Kolocha River, go around the left flank of the French and hit them in the rear. Kutuzov gave this order at about 11:30 am. Below we will see what a big role this raid of the Russian cavalry on the rear of the French played. Around noon the French launched their eighth flush attack. Supported by the fire of their artillery, units of Davout, Ney and Junot in dense columns rushed towards the flushes. Russian grapeshot mercilessly mowed them down, but triple superiority in forces allowed the French to quickly capture the flushes. Then Bagration launched a counterattack with all his available forces. A brutal hand-to-hand fight began. The Russians fought fiercely and were not inferior to the French. But at this time the Russians suffered a great misfortune. General Bagration was seriously wounded. This legendary comrade-in-arms of Suvorov and Kutuzov had an exceptional influence on the soldiers, who believed in his outstanding combat skills and admired his courage and heroism. Bagration's wound made a depressing impression on the soldiers. They still fought stubbornly, but fatigue from the long battle was already beginning to take its toll. And the superior French forces continued to advance furiously. The Russians began to feel confused in some places. However, thanks to Suvorov’s school of education, there were many enterprising, capable generals in the Russian army. One of them, the commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn, took command of the troops instead of Bagration. He restored order and withdrew the troops from the flushes to the eastern bank of the Semenovsky ravine (600 meters away).

Here he quickly installed artillery, built up infantry and cavalry, and delayed further French advances. Despite their great numerical superiority, the French were so exhausted by the battle that they did not immediately launch an attack on the Russians beyond the Semenovsky ravine. They urgently asked Napoleon for reinforcements, but received nothing. This short pause allowed the Russians to more firmly organize resistance at the Semyonov position.

Fights for Semenovskaya position

Behind the Semenovsky ravine, the Russians gathered up to 10,000 soldiers with strong artillery. With these forces it was necessary to delay the further advance of the French and close the breakthrough that formed after the occupation of the Bagration flushes. The position of the Russians here was difficult. At the Semenovskaya position, the remnants of the troops were gathered, stubbornly fighting for flushes for several hours. Only on the left flank were three fresh guards infantry regiments that arrived from the reserve - Lithuanian, Izmailovsky and Finland. These regiments stood in a square, with regimental banners in the center. Having received no reinforcements from Napoleon, the marshals organized an attack with available forces. They recruited up to 25,000 bayonets and sabers and powerful artillery. Having installed strong batteries on flashes, the French began shelling the Russians beyond the Semenovsky ravine. Russian artillery responded energetically. To attack, the French built their superior forces in such a way as to envelop the Russians on both flanks and hit them with cross-fire from artillery. Infantry columns of the corps of Ney and Davout were formed in the center, and strong cavalry units were formed on the flanks. On the right flank, south of the cavalry, was Junot's infantry, which was supposed to bypass the Russians from the south and prevent counterattacks from the village of Utitsa.

The infantry columns of Marshal Ney were the first to attack. But they did not reach the Russian positions and were repulsed by grapeshot. Now, following this attack, the French again moved with all their might - infantry in the center, cavalry on the flanks. On the right flank, the heavy French cavalry of General Nansouty's corps moved against the Russian infantry guard regiments.

Huge horsemen, covered with shiny cuirasses (bibs), wearing high metal shakos, on huge horses rushed towards the Russian guard. In Europe, the French heavy cavalry were called "iron men". The crushing blows of their broadswords more than once brilliantly completed the defeat of Napoleon's opponents. But the Russians were by no means inclined to overestimate the fighting qualities of the French heavy cavalry. The Russians called them not iron men, but “iron pots,” mocking their tall metal shakos. It was difficult to surprise the Russians with their large stature, and especially the guard, which itself was staffed by giants. The grapeshot of Russian artillery brutally hit the French rushing into the attack. But they rushed to crash into the ranks of Russian infantry. They were accustomed to the fact that infantry squares would first shoot when they approached, then become upset and become victims of their broadswords. The Russian guards behaved differently. During the first attack, they did not shoot at all, but stood motionless with their bayonets pointed forward. Their squares froze like steel, not a single bayonet wavered. This made such an impression on the French that they turned their horses before reaching the Russian squares.

However, after this, forced by their superiors, the French again furiously rushed at the Russians. This time the Russian squares met them with point-blank fire. Hand-to-hand combat began. The French boldly cut into the Russian ranks, but died from bayonets. Several times the French rolled back into the field, fell under Russian grapeshot, again rushed to the square and rolled back again. The Russian guards suffered severe losses here. The Lithuanian regiment lost 956 people out of a total of 1740, i.e. more than a half. But the French heavy cavalry suffered even greater losses. Nansouty's corps was virtually defeated here and its remnants were driven away by a counterattack of Russian cuirassiers. The Russian guard regiments held their positions. In 1912, on the centennial anniversary of the Battle of Borodino, Russian guardsmen erected a monument in honor of their heroic ancestors. A massive granite monument stands in the place where the squares of Russian guardsmen stood on the afternoon of September 7, 1812. The indestructible monument, firmly rooted in the ground, recalls the steadfastness that the guardsmen showed. They fought to the death and found life and glory in the hearts of their descendants.

North of the village of Semenovskaya, Russian positions were attacked by another French cavalry corps. He had several fierce battles with Russian infantry and cavalry. Despite the courage shown, the Russians were pushed back here and began to retreat. In the center, the French infantry captured the village of Semenovskaya and also forced the Russians to retreat.

The Russians retreated fighting to a distance cannon shot east of the village of Semenovskaya (about 1 kilometer) and began to prepare for battle at a new line. The breakthrough of the Russian position was partially accomplished by the French. All that remained was to take Raevsky’s battery to expand the breakthrough and build on the success with reserves. But Napoleon did not have enough reserves. We have already seen that in the struggle for Bagration’s flushes, the French also expended those forces that were intended to develop success. In the battles for the Semenovskaya position, these forces finally dried up. Physical fatigue and moral shock from the losses and steely tenacity of the Russians finally broke the French. The marshals failed to move the remnants of their troops to pursue the retreating Russians. These troops did not go further than the Semenovskaya position. But success had to be developed immediately, before the Russians had time to organize resistance in a new place, otherwise everything would have to start all over again. And so the marshals began to urgently demand that Napoleon bring into action the remaining untouched reserve - the imperial guard. In total, Napoleon had up to 27,000 selected troops - the old and young guard. Napoleon valued them very much. He loved those critical moments of the battle when, according to his abrupt order, “Guard to the fire!” Shiny shelves passed him with shouts of welcome. Responding to greetings, Napoleon usually said to the guards: “Go and bring me victory!” And the guards threw themselves into the fire with crushing force. No one and nothing could resist her. But here, on the fields of Russia, the situation was different. Napoleon saw his best army regiments melt away in battle. What will happen if the same fate befalls the guard? And Napoleon answered the marshals: “I will not allow my guard to be defeated 3,000 kilometers from France.” But the marshals insisted. The whole retinue insisted, murmurs were heard, time passed, it was necessary to decide on something. And Napoleon made up his mind. He ordered the young guard to move into battle, which began moving from the Shevardinsky redoubt, but Napoleon immediately canceled his order. This forced him to make a deft maneuver by Kutuzov.

Russian cavalry raid on the French left flank and its results

At 11:30 a.m., Kutuzov gave the order for a cavalry raid on the left flank and rear of the French. The 1st Cavalry Corps of General Uvarov and the Cossacks of Ataman Platov took part in the raid - only a few thousand sabers. Around noon, this cavalry forded the Kolocha River and moved towards the French. At the same time, Uvarov’s cavalry corps went to the village of Bezzubovo, and Platov’s Cossacks bypassed Bezzubovo from the north and struck deeper into the rear of the French. Bezzubov had a French infantry regiment and an Italian cavalry division. The Italians did not accept the battle and rode away, and the French lined up in a square and blocked the Russian cavalry's road to Bezzubovo, occupying the mill dam. Uvarov's cavalry unsuccessfully attacked the French infantry several times. Finally, at the cost of significant losses, she managed to push the French back to the western outskirts of the village of Bezzubovo, but she was unable to advance further. But Platov’s Cossacks, having broken through significantly southwest of Bezzubov, began to destroy the French convoys and caused panic in Napoleon’s rear. Carts and individual transporters on horseback with their tracks cut off rushed to the south, pursued by the Cossacks. And at this time, a battle between Uvarov’s cavalry and the French infantry raged near Bezzubov. Napoleon had just given the order for the young guard to move to the Semenovskaya position of the Russians to develop the success achieved, when a wave of panic reached his command post at the Shevardinsky redoubt. Separate groups of maddened transporters with loud cries of “Cossacks! Cossacks! They galloped almost to the emperor’s command post. At the same time, reports arrived that the Russians were attacking Bezzubovo.

This made a huge impression on Napoleon. He ordered the young guard to be detained, the attack on Raevsky’s battery to be suspended, several units to be moved to his left flank, and, finally, he himself went there to personally assess the situation. Napoleon lost almost two hours of precious time until he became convinced that the forces of the Russian cavalry attacking his left flank were very small. Kutuzov ordered Uvarov and Platov not to get involved in battle with large French forces, but to retreat back beyond the Kolocha River, since Kutuzov had already achieved his goal - he had won the two hours of time he needed. The Russian troops rebuilt, regrouped and were ready to continue the stubborn battle. I wonder why the attack of small forces of Russian cavalry made such a big impression on Napoleon, which forced him to suspend the offensive on the main direction and lose a lot of time? After all, the French left flank was occupied by forces significantly superior to the Russian cavalry of Uvarov and Platov. In addition to the already mentioned Italian cavalry division and the French infantry regiment that were with Bezzubov, an entire French infantry division was stationed in Borodino. But all this seemed not enough to Napoleon. He sent new units to the left flank and went there himself. Why is this? But because Napoleon was all the time tensely waiting for some trick on the part of Kutuzov, he waited and was afraid of this trick. Even on the eve of the battle on September 6, Napoleon observed with apprehension and bewilderment a strong group of Russian troops on the New Smolensk road. Napoleon knew that Kutuzov understood his plan - to deliver the main blow to the Russian left flank. So why does Kutuzov leave such large forces on his right flank? It is clear that Kutuzov is planning some unexpected trick in the direction of the New Smolensk road. And there in the rear there were transports of the French army with ammunition, the loss of which threatened disaster. And so, when Napoleon was carried away by the fight in the main direction, when the French suffered heavy losses here and the order had already been given to move the young guard, the battle suddenly began at Bezzubov, and Russian cavalry appeared in the rear. So here it is, Kutuzov’s trick! He went on the offensive in the northern sector, his cavalry had already broken through to the rear, and the combat transports were in danger! Such thoughts flashed through Napoleon's head. They forced him to direct all his attention to his left flank.

The material damage to the French from the Russian cavalry raid was small. But Napoleon's loss of time was decisive, since he lost the initiative of the battle from his hands. Kutuzov's trick was a brilliant success.

Battles for the Raevsky battery

Raevsky's battery was built on a hill from which the Russian position was clearly visible: to the north - to the New Smolensk road, and to the south - to the Bagration flashes. Therefore, the capture of this battery was of great importance for the French. The advance of the French east of Bagration's flushes exposed the troops that had broken through to a flank attack from the battery if it was held by the Russians. For this feature, Raevsky’s battery was called the “key of the Borodino position,” the capture of which greatly complicated the defense of this entire position. There were 18 guns installed on the battery itself, and there were also guns on the sides of the fortification. A small part of the Russian troops assigned to defend the battery were located inside the fortification, the rest stood behind and on the flanks. In total there were eight Russian infantry battalions in the first line and three Jaeger regiments in reserve. The defense of this sector was led by the commander of the 7th Infantry Corps, Lieutenant General Raevsky, a courageous and skillful general, after whom the battery was named10. To the west of the Raevsky battery, a dense young forest grew a little over two hundred meters away. From the edge of this forest, the French infantry attacked the battery. Russian artillery could only fire up to the edge of the forest, since there was no further observation. After the French occupied the village of Borodino (about 6 hours), they installed strong artillery southeast of it and began flanking Raevsky’s battery. The French attacked Raevsky's battery three times and only after 15 hours did they manage to finally occupy it. The battles for Raevsky’s battery were of the same stubborn and fierce nature as for Bagration’s flushes.

The first attack of Raevsky's battery. Napoleon intended three infantry divisions to capture Raevsky's battery. But just as in the battles for Bagration’s flushes, these initially assigned forces turned out to be few. It was necessary to attract even larger cavalry units. The Russians also had to reinforce the troops defending Raevsky’s batteries during the battles. The first attack on Raevsky's battery was launched by the French at about 9 o'clock. Two enemy infantry divisions took part in it. They concentrated on the edge of the forest to the west of the battery and from here they quickly attacked the battery. The timing of this first attack by Raevsky’s battery coincided with the formidable third attack of Bagration’s flushes. At the same time, a difficult battle was going on for the Russians on their left flank near the village of Utitsa, which was attacked by Poniatowski’s Polish corps, which had a triple superiority over the Russians in infantry! Thus, on the entire section of the front south of the village of Borodino at ten o’clock the position of the Russians was very serious. Only a little over 200 meters separated the French, emerging from the forest to the west of the Raevsky battery, from the parapet of the Russian fortification and from the Russian infantry and artillery standing on its sides. Without firing, in orderly battalion columns, with fast gymnastic steps, with guns at the ready, the French moved to the attack. Russian cannons, throwing out a shower of grapeshot, hit the enemy. The French, despite heavy losses, continued to march. When the opponents were at a distance of 100-90 steps, abrupt commands of Russian officers were heard and rifle volleys began to shoot at the French columns. Entire ranks began to fall, mowed down by bullets. The French could not stand it and rushed back. A few minutes later they disappeared into the forest, leaving many corpses and wounded on the field in front of the battery. The first attack of Raevsky's battery was repulsed.

Second attack of Raevsky's battery. At about 10 o'clock the French launched a second attack on Raevsky's battery. By this time, the Russian left flank had been strengthened by arriving reserves, and the Russian position against Bagration's flushes had improved. But a critical situation had arisen at Raevsky’s battery. Three French infantry divisions took part in the second attack, but one infantry division (of General Morand) was significantly ahead of the other two divisions. Despite the frequent grapeshot fire from the Russians, the columns of this division rushed forward so quickly that they managed to hide in the thick powder smoke in front of the Russian cannons before they were shot down by grapeshot.

In the smoke, French infantry suddenly climbed over the parapet and occupied the battery. The Russians, after a short bayonet fight, having lost many officers, became confused and began to retreat. The French began to pull up their artillery to the battery in order to firmly gain a foothold in this important point for them. At this time, Kutuzov sent the chief of staff of the 1st Army, General Ermolov, to the left flank to General Bagration to clarify the situation. Ermolov was passing near Raevsky’s battery at the time when the latter was occupied by the French. Ermolov was a dashing military general of the Suvorov school. Seeing the disorderly retreat of the Russians, he drew his saber and galloped towards those retreating. With the help of the infantry battalion of the Ufa regiment, which was in reserve, Ermolov stopped the retreating Russians and, without rebuilding them, led the crowd directly into a bayonet counterattack on the battery. Three chasseur regiments, which were in reserve, also joined this counterattack. The French were swept away from the battery and rushed to the forest. The heated Russians pursued the French on their heels and stabbed them. Russian soldiers burst into the forest west of the battery. A dangerous situation has arisen. There were two French infantry divisions in the forest, which were late to launch an attack at the same time as Moran's division. They could easily destroy the pursuing Russians. Then Ermolov sent Russian dragoons after the infantry with orders to stop the infantry and return them back. This was finally done, and the Russians returned to their position and took their places. The second attack by Raevsky's battery was very costly for the French. Moran's division was virtually destroyed. The enemy lost up to 3,000 people killed and wounded, including five generals. The Russians also suffered heavy losses. Here the young twenty-eight-year-old General Kutaisov, chief of Russian artillery, was killed. Ermolov's counterattack made a strong impression on the French. Only around noon the enemy launched a third attack on Raevsky’s battery.

Third attack of Raevsky's battery. Having occupied Bagration's flushes, the French installed strong artillery on them and opened flanking fire on Raevsky's battery from the south. Now this battery was under crossfire from three directions - from the village of Borodino, from the side of the forest to the west of the battery, and from the Bagration flashes. After a brutal bombardment of the battery, the French launched a third attack at the beginning of the thirteenth hour.

But at this time, the Russian cavalry attacked the French left flank, and Napoleon ordered the third attack of Raevsky’s battery to be stopped. This attack was resumed only after 14 hours, and the resulting struggle broke up into a number of separate battles and lasted until 15 hours 30 minutes. This time, three enemy infantry and three cavalry divisions took part in the attack. Infantry columns attacked from the front, one cavalry division attacked the flank from the north and two cavalry divisions from the south. Bagration's flushes and Semenov's position at this time were already in the hands of the French, and this allowed them to deeply cover Raevsky's battery from the south. But Kutuzov also completed the regrouping by 2 p.m., using the time lost by Napoleon. The 4th Infantry Corps was placed back and south of the battery, and even deeper - two guards infantry regiments and very strong cavalry (two corps). History has not preserved for us a clear and consistent presentation of all the events that took place between 14 and 15 hours on September 7, 1812 around the Raevsky battery. The surviving documents and memories of the participants testify to the brutal tenacity of the battles, the courage and initiative of the troops and the enterprise of the private commanders who controlled individual centers of the battle. At the beginning of the fifteenth hour, after powerful artillery preparation, the French infantry and cavalry went on the attack. South of the battery, the French cavalry attacked a square of Russian infantry units. The Russians allowed the cavalry rushing in the quarry 60 steps, and then drove it back with several volleys at point-blank range. The French cavalry repeated its attacks several times, and finally, it managed to break through between the thinned squares of Russian infantry to the rear of Raevsky's battery. Some parts of the French cavalry began attacking the battery from the rear. But at this time they were attacked by the Russian cavalry, which was standing behind the infantry. After a series of battles and brutal slaughter, the French were driven back. It is interesting that the commander of the 1st Russian Army, General Barclay de Tolly, personally took part in these cavalry battles as an ordinary soldier. He was very sensitive to the fact that the army suspected him of treason, and sought death in battle in order to prove with blood his loyalty to military duty. However, although several horses were killed under General Barclay during the day of battle, he himself emerged from the battle unharmed.

The French cavalry failed to capture Raevsky's battery. French infantry, covered on the flanks by cavalry, attacked Raevsky's battery from all sides. It suffered heavy losses, but in the end, units of one of the attacking divisions managed to break into the battery from the south. A brutal hand-to-hand fight began in the cramped space inside the fortification. The Russians were led by the seriously ill General Likhachev, commander of the 24th Infantry Division. He had difficulty walking and sat on a camp stool inside the fortification throughout the battle for the battery. Now, when he saw that the French had gained the upper hand, the general got up from his stool and, having already been wounded several times, went to the French bayonets, not wanting to survive the defeat of his division. The French took the bleeding hero prisoner. At the beginning of the sixteenth hour, Raevsky's battery was finally taken by the French. The Russians retreated in battle and, joining the units that had already withdrawn from the Bagration flushes and the Semenov position, organized defense at a new line 1-1.5 kilometers east of Raevsky’s battery. The French, upset by the battle, weakly pursued the retreating Russians. By 15:30 the Russians had completed their retreat and stopped at the line designated by Kutuzov.

Fighting on the Old Smolensk Road

The battles on the Old Smolensk Road took place near the village of Utitsa and for the mound located to the east of it. Both of these points were prepared for defense by the troops of the 3rd Russian Infantry Corps of General Tuchkov after Kutuzov’s chief of staff, General Bennigsen, ordered the corps to move out of the ambush and thereby violated Kutuzov’s plan. Ahead of the 3rd Corps and behind its left flank were the Cossacks of Ataman Karpov - about 2,500 sabers, and in the rear, 1.5 kilometers east of the village of Utitsa, stood the Moscow militia - up to 7,000 people. For communication between the 3rd Corps and the Russian troops on the Bagration flushes, four Jaeger regiments were stretched out in the forest northeast of the village of Utitsa. Napoleon sent the Polish corps of General Poniatowski, consisting of over 10,000 people with 50 guns, along the Old Smolensk Road.

On September 6, Napoleon did not know about the presence of the 3rd Russian corps near the village of Utitsa, which was located “secretly” by order of Kutuzov. Therefore, Poniatowski’s corps was intended by Napoleon to attack the Bagratnonov flash from the south. Kutuzov foresaw this, which is why he placed the 3rd Corps in ambush for an unexpected attack on the enemy’s flank and rear if the latter turned north towards Bagration’s flushes. General Bennigsen, as is known, thwarted this brilliant plan of Kutuzov. On the morning of September 7, Poniatowski’s corps discovered the 3rd Russian Infantry Corps near the Utitsa villages and at 8 o’clock attacked it head-on. By this time, General Tuchkov, on the orders of General Bagration, sent one division to the Bagration flushes, where the Russians had already repulsed the first and second attacks of Marshal Davout’s troops. In the area of ​​the village of Utitsa, Tuchkov had only 10 infantry battalions with 36 guns left and the Cossacks of Ataman Karpov guarding the left flank of the entire Russian army. Poniatowski launched 28 infantry battalions into the attack, supported by 50 guns. After an unequal battle, the Russians left the village of Utitsa and retreated to the Utitsa Kurgan, which was more advantageous for stubborn defense. Having occupied the village of Utitsa, Poniatovsky for a long time did not dare to attack the Russians on the Utitsa mound. He did not know about the departure of an entire division from Tuchkov’s corps to Bagration’s flushes and was afraid of being defeated. Only at about 11 o’clock, when Junot’s French troops appeared north of the village of Utitsa, advancing on Bagratnon’s flushes from the south, Poniatovsky began an attack on the Utitsa mound. The Poles suffered heavy losses under Russian artillery fire, but thanks to their almost triple numerical superiority they managed to capture the mound from both flanks and force the Russians to abandon it at about 11:30 am. General Tuchkov withdrew the troops from the mound to in perfect order and stopped them east of the mound out of range of grapeshot fire. At this time, reinforcements sent by Kutuzov approached Bagration. In turn, Bagration sent an infantry brigade to help Tuchkov under the command of Tuchkov’s brother. The brigade arrived just at the moment when the Russian troops who had retreated from the Utitsky Kurgan stopped at a new line. The Tuchkov brothers immediately organized a counterattack. All available troops quickly formed battalion columns, the drums loudly beat the “attack”, the banners unfurled, and the Russians, without firing a shot, rushed with bayonets at a quick pace. The Poles were thrown off the mound and hastily rolled back to the village of Utitsa under heavy fire from Russian guns quickly installed on the mound. During the counterattack, Tuchkov Sr. (corps commander) was mortally wounded.

Poniatowski withdrew his troops to the village of Utitsa, stopped them and did not launch new attacks until 15:00. At about 15 o'clock, when the Russians defending Bagration's flushes were setting up on a new line, and the defenders of Raevsky's battery were fighting back to the same line, Poniatovsky again attacked the Utitsky Kurgan. The first attack (in general it was already the second, since the first one took place at 11:30 a.m.) was decisively repulsed by the Russians, who met it with a short bayonet strike. Poniatowski organized a new attack. At this time, the French troops of Junot's corps advanced east and threatened to completely cut off the Russians on the Old Smolensk Road from the main forces of the Russian army. This could only be avoided by retreating to a line to which the main forces had already retreated. General Baggovut, who took command of the Russian troops on the Old Smolensk Road after Tuchkov was wounded, did just that. He left part of Ataman Karpov’s Cossacks on the mound, and withdrew the rest of the troops and attached them to the left flank of the previously withdrawn Russian units. The Poles, who suffered heavy losses, did not pursue the retreating Russians.

The end of the Battle of Borodino

At about 15:30 the Russians retreated along the entire front. They ceded to the French a strip of terrain 1-1.5 kilometers deep, covered with piles of corpses and fragments of material, and stood firmly on a new frontier. The right flank of the Russian troops at this line was located east of the village of Gorki, the left - east of the Utitsky Kurgan. At about 4 p.m., one French cavalry division tried to attack the Russians on the line they occupied, but was decisively repulsed. The Russians hastily improved the defense of the occupied line, built fortifications, expecting attacks from large French reserves, but the French did not attack again. Only the French artillery fired frequently at the new Russian position until dusk. Russian artillery responded energetically.

What happened to the French?

After the capture of Raevsky's battery, the marshals again began to insistently demand the introduction of the guard into battle to develop the success achieved. Napoleon galloped forward with his retinue to personally assess the situation. He saw mountains of corpses of the French and Russians, and in the distance - Russian troops standing orderly in a new position, despite losses from French artillery cannonballs. And Napoleon understood what the marshals, carried away by the battle, did not understand. He realized that the French army had not won any victory, since the capture of a small section of the battlefield could not be considered a success. After all, the Russian army was not defeated, but it stood in perfect order, ready to continue the battle. Napoleon understood that the attacks of the guard would increase the number of losses, perhaps they would achieve partial success, but he still would not achieve the defeat of the Russians, especially since night was approaching. And if so, then you can’t spend your last reserves, since the Russians will still fight - maybe they’ll attack the French that same night, maybe tomorrow on the same field, or maybe they’ll retreat again and meet the French in a new position.

Having assessed the situation, Napoleon refused to send the guard into battle. He ordered the attacks to stop and artillery fire to be increased on the Russians. Following this, Napoleon went back to the Shevardinsky redoubt.

Later, Napoleon gave the order to withdraw the army for the night to its original position, since the mountains of corpses and the groans of tens of thousands of wounded made a depressing impression on the soldiers. On the Borodino field, Napoleon lost more than 58 thousand killed and wounded soldiers and 47 generals, without achieving victory in the general battle with which he sought to decide the fate of the war. The French settled down for the night, setting up a strong military guard, as Napoleon feared a night attack by the Russians.

What about the Russians? What was their mood and the mood of their leader, General Kutuzov?

The Russian troops were tired and drained of blood from the battle. Their situation was also difficult, since there were almost no fresh units that had not participated in the battle. All available troops fought and suffered heavy losses. But nevertheless, the Russians were full of vigor and readiness to continue the fight.

The soldiers and officers understood that they had completed the main combat mission: they had held the battlefield and inflicted severe losses on the French. Experienced fighters understood that an organized retreat of 1-1.5 kilometers meant absolutely nothing. Tomorrow everything can be returned with a transition to the offensive. Kutuzov skillfully maintained this high, fighting mood of his army.

When a report came from General Barclay de Tolly about heavy losses and a request to allow a retreat from the occupied line, Kutuzov replied: “They were repulsed everywhere, for which I thank God and our brave army. The enemy has been defeated, and tomorrow we will drive him out of the sacred Russian land!” Following this, Kutuzov loudly said to the adjutant: “Kaisarov!” Sit down, write an order for tomorrow. “And you,” he said to another adjutant, “go along the line and announce that tomorrow we will attack.” These orders from Kutuzov quickly became known to the troops and increased their cheerful, confident mood. The adjutants who conveyed orders were greeted and escorted by the troops with enthusiastic cries of “Hurray!” On the evening of September 7, Kutuzov began receiving reports of losses. These losses were so great that Kutuzov decided not to continue the battle on the Borodino field, so as not to expose his army to the danger of defeat. He decided to retreat to Moscow. This was a more expedient decision, which gave Kutuzov the opportunity to further strengthen his army, and, continuing the war in conditions more favorable to himself than to the enemy, to defeat him. “When it’s not just about the glory of won battles,” Kutuzov reported to Alexander I, “but the whole goal, being aimed at the destruction of the French army, I decided to retreat.” At dawn on September 8, Kutuzov gave the order to withdraw. This order did not discourage the Russian troops. They trusted their old leader. They understood and saw that this was not an escape from a victorious enemy, but a necessary maneuver to organize victory in the future. The Russians began their retreat to Mozhaisk and further to Moscow in perfect order.

The retreat was covered by a strong rearguard, which held back at a great distance the remnants of Murat's cavalry, sent by Napoleon to pursue the Russians. The French army moved towards Moscow, towards its inevitable death.

CONCLUSION

The Russian army won a major victory on the Borodino field. Napoleon, who sought to defeat the Russians in a general battle and thereby decide the fate of the war in his favor, did not achieve this goal.

The iron tenacity of the Russian soldier, who selflessly defended the independence of Russia, the will and martial art of the great Russian commander Kutuzov defeated the formidable Napoleonic army and broke the will of Napoleon. Kutuzov’s great service to the Russian people. But, assessing this merit, we must not forget what our great leaders Lenin and Stalin teach us. They teach that history is created not by individual heroes and leaders, but by the broad masses of the people; that victories are won by troops led by generals. At the same time, the organizing and mobilizing role of leaders and commanders significantly multiplies the efforts of the masses when the commander correctly understands the historical tasks facing the people and leads the masses the shortest routes to solving these problems. It is in this case that the commander achieves great success. Kutuzov's historical merit lies in the fact that he deeply understood the desire of the Russian people to defend their state independence at all costs, he was passionately imbued with this desire and led the Russian army in a decisive struggle against the formidable foreign conqueror. We saw how Kutuzov, relying on the fortitude of the Russian soldier, skillfully organized the Battle of Borodino. The Russian troops led by Kutuzov managed to defeat the main group of French troops while repelling persistent frontal attacks by Bagration's flashes and Raevsky's battery. While the Russians withdrew in order and were ready to continue the battle, the French units that took the Semyonovskaya position and the Raevsky battery could not even pursue the retreating Russians. What mattered here was not only losses, but also the complete loss of offensive impulse, and this is a moral defeat. Kutuzov failed in the Battle of Borodino to fulfill the second part of his plan, that is, to go on the offensive and finally defeat the French. For this, the Russian forces remaining by the evening of September 7 were not enough. But Kutuzov did not abandon his plan for the complete destruction of Napoleonic army. Later, Kutuzov accomplished this task perfectly.

He prepared and organized a counter-offensive and inflicted a decisive defeat on the enemy. Assessing Kutuzov’s counter-offensive, Comrade Stalin wrote: “Our brilliant commander Kutuzov, who ruined Napoleon and his army with the help of a well-prepared counter-offensive, also knew very well about this.” Napoleon's army was drained of blood in the Battle of Borodino. Particularly sensitive for Napoleon was the defeat of his cavalry. Kutuzov forced Napoleon to use superior French cavalry in frontal attacks in the terribly crowded battlefield. In this cramped environment, most of the French cavalry died under Russian grapeshot, under bullets and bayonets of Russian infantry, under the blades of Russian cavalry. The losses of the French cavalry were so great that the Battle of Borodino is called in history “the grave of the French cavalry.” IN last years During his life, as a prisoner of the British on the island of St. Helena, Napoleon often recalled the Battle of Borodino. He was aware that it was this battle that served as the beginning of the events that led him to the island. He wrote: “Of all my battles, the most terrible is the one I fought near Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians acquired the right to be invincible.” Elsewhere he wrote: “Of the fifty battles I gave, in the battle of Moscow the French showed the most valor and achieved the least success.” The result of the Battle of Borodino was briefly and energetically determined by the Russian general Ermolov, the same one who recaptured Raevsky’s battery from the French after their second, successful attack. Ermolov said: “In the Battle of Borodino, the French army crashed against the Russian army.” The Battle of Borodino was a turning point in the Patriotic War of 1812. It was of enormous international significance. It affected the future destinies of all of Europe. Weakened at Borodin, Napoleon subsequently suffered a general defeat, first in Russia and then in Europe. His empire collapsed, and the peoples he enslaved regained their national independence.

The Russian people were repeatedly invaded by foreigners who tried to enslave them. But every time he stood up to defend his homeland. During the centuries-old struggle, the Russian people have accumulated rich military traditions; its memory preserves the greatest feats of courage, valor and self-sacrifice of its faithful sons. During the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, our leader Comrade Stalin pointed out that in the fight against the German fascists, let us be inspired by the images of the great Russian commanders of the past - Alexander Nevsky, Dimitry Donskoy, Kozma Minin, Dimitry Pozharsky, Alexander Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov. This instruction from the leader emphasized the historical connection of our struggle for the honor and independence of the Soviet Motherland with the struggle of the patriots of the past. Warriors Soviet army and the Fleet, which stood to the death on the outskirts of Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sevastopol, Odessa, remembered well the heroes of 1812, who fought to the death on the Borodino field.

Colonel V.V.PRUNTSOV

Popular essay

Military Publishing House of the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR

The Battle of Borodino in 1812 is one of the most glorious pages of Russian history. A lot has been written about him, which is quite fair and deserved. Napoleon recognized the right of Russian soldiers to be considered invincible; all his life, according to the testimony of his comrades, he considered the Battle of Borodino of 1812 (in the French version Bataille de la Moskova) the most glorious of all the fifty that he fought during his military career.

"Borodino" as a poetic chronicle of events

L.N. Tolstoy and Honore de Balzac, A.S. Pushkin and Prosper Merimee (and not only French and Russian classics) wrote brilliant novels, stories, essays dedicated to this legendary battle. But the poem “Borodino” by M. Yu. Lermontov, familiar from childhood, given all its poetic genius, ease of reading and intelligibility, can rightfully be considered a chronicle of those events and be called “The Battle of Borodino 1812: a summary.”

Napoleon invaded our country on June 12 (24), 1812 in order to punish Russia for its refusal to participate in the blockade of Great Britain. “We retreated silently for a long time...” - each phrase contains a fragment of the history of this enormous national victory.

Retreat as a brilliant decision of Russian commanders

Having survived bloody and longer subsequent wars, we can say that it was not so long to retreat: the Battle of Borodino in 1812 (the month is indicated depending on the style) began at the end of August. The patriotism of the entire society was so high that the strategically justified withdrawal of troops was perceived by the majority of citizens as treason. Bagration called the then commander-in-chief a traitor right to his face. Retreating from the borders into the interior of the country, M.B. Barclay de Tolly and M.I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov, who replaced him in this post - both infantry generals - wanted to preserve the Russian army and wait for reinforcements. In addition, the French were advancing very quickly, and there was no way to prepare troops for battle. And the goal of exhausting the enemy was also present.

Aggressive discontent in society

The retreat, of course, caused discontent among both the old warriors and the civilian population of the country (“...the old men grumbled”). In order to temporarily dampen the indignation and military fervor, the talented commander Barclay de Tolly was removed from his post - as a foreigner, in the opinion of many, completely devoid of a sense of patriotism and love for Russia. But not less brilliant Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov continued his retreat, and retreated all the way to Smolensk, where the 1st and 2nd Russian armies were supposed to unite. And these pages of the war are full of exploits of both Russian military leaders, especially Bagration, and ordinary soldiers, because Napoleon did not want to allow this reunification. And the fact that it did happen can already be regarded as one of the victories in this war.

Unification of two armies

Then the united Russian army moved to the village of Borodino, which is 125 km from Moscow, where the famous Battle of Borodino of 1812 took place. It became impossible to continue further retreat; Emperor Alexander demanded to stop the advance of the French army towards Moscow. There was also the 3rd Western Army under the command of A.P. Tormasov, located significantly south of the first two (its main task was to prevent the capture of Kyiv by Austrian troops). In order to prevent the reunification of the 1st and 2nd Western armies, Napoleon sent the cavalry of the legendary Murat against Barclay de Tolly, and sent Marshal Davout, who had 3 columns of troops under his command, against Bagration. In the current situation, retreat was the most reasonable decision. By the end of June, the 1st Western Army under the command of Barclay de Tolly received reinforcements and the first rest in the Drissa camp.

Army favorite

Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration, a representative of one of the glorious military dynasties of Russia, aptly described by M. Yu. Lermontov as “a servant to the Tsar, a father to soldiers,” had a more difficult time - he fought his way through the battles, inflicting significant damage on Davout near the village of Saltanovka. He managed to cross the Dnieper and link up with the 1st Army, which was fighting tough rearguard battles with Marshal of France Joachim Murat, who was never a coward and covered himself with glory in the Battle of Borodino. The Patriotic War of 1812 named the heroes of both sides. But Russian soldiers defended their Motherland. Their fame will live forever. Even during the containment of Murat’s cavalry, General Osterman-Tolstoy ordered his soldiers to “stand and die” for Russia, for Moscow.

Legends and real exploits

Legends shrouded the names of famous commanders. One of them, passed down from mouth to mouth, says that Lieutenant General Raevsky raised his young children in his arms, leading the soldiers into the attack by personal example. But the actual fact of extraordinary courage is captured in A. Safonov’s chromolithography. Bleeding and wounded, General Likhachev, brought under the arms of Napoleon, who was able to appreciate his courage and wanted to personally hand him a sword, rejected the gift of the conqueror of Europe. What is so great about the Battle of Borodino in 1812 is that absolutely everyone - from the commander to the common soldier - performed incredible feats on that day. So, sergeant major of the Jaeger regiment Zolotov, who was on the Raevsky battery, jumped from the height of the mound onto the back of the French general Bonamy and carried him down, and the soldiers, left without a commander and confused, fled. As a result, the attack was thwarted. Moreover, the sergeant-major delivered the captive Bonami to the command post, where M.I. Kutuzov immediately promoted Zolotov to officer.

Unfairly persecuted

The Battle of Borodino (1812) can undoubtedly be called a unique battle. But there is one negative feature in this uniqueness - it is recognized as the bloodiest among one-day battles of all times: “... and a mountain of bloody bodies prevented the cannonballs from flying.” However, most importantly, none of the commanders hid behind the soldiers. So, according to some evidence, five horses were killed under the full holder of the Order of St. George, war hero Barclay de Tolly, but he never left the battlefield. But you still had to endure the dislike of society. The Battle of Borodino in 1812, where he showed personal courage, contempt for death and amazing heroism, changed the attitude of the soldiers towards him, who had previously refused to greet him. And, despite all this, the clever general, even at the council in Fili, defended the idea of ​​surrendering the current capital to Napoleon, which Kutuzov expressed with the words “let’s burn Moscow and save Russia.”

Bagration's flushes

A flash is a field fortification, similar to a redan, smaller in size, but with a large angle with its top facing the enemy. The most famous flashes in the history of wars are the Bagrationov flashes (originally “Semyonovsky”, after the name of a nearby village). The Battle of Borodino of 1812, the date of which according to the old style falls on August 26, has become famous throughout the centuries for the heroic defense of these fortifications. It was then that the legendary Bagration was mortally wounded. Refusing amputation, he died of gangrene, 17 days after the Battle of Borodino. It is said about him: “... struck down by damask steel, he sleeps in damp ground.” A warrior from God, a favorite of the entire army, he was able to raise troops to attack with one word. Even the hero’s surname was deciphered as God-rati-on. The forces of the “Grand Army” outnumbered the defenders of Russia in numbers, training, and technical equipment. An army of 25 thousand people, supported by 102 guns, was thrown onto the flushes. She was opposed by 8 thousand Russian soldiers and 50 guns. However, the fierce attacks of the French were repulsed three times.

The power of the Russian spirit

The Battle of Borodino in 1812 lasted 12 hours, the date of which rightfully became the Day of Russian Military Glory. From that moment on, the courage of the French army was lost forever, and its glory began to fade steadily. Russian soldiers, including 21 thousand unfired militias, remained undefeated for centuries by the united army of all of Europe, therefore the center and left flank occupied by the French immediately after the battle were withdrawn by Napoleon to their original positions. The entire war of 1812 (the Battle of Borodino in particular) incredibly united Russian society. In the epic of Leo Tolstoy, it is described how high society ladies, who, in principle, did not care about everything originally Russian, came to the “society” with baskets for making dressings for the wounded. The spirit of patriotism was fashionable. This battle showed how high the military art of Russia is. The choice of the battlefield was ingenious. Field fortifications were built in such a way that they could not serve the French in case of capture.

Sacramental phrase

The Shevardinsky redoubt deserves special words, the battle for which began two days earlier, not on August 26, 1812 (Battle of Borodino), but on August 24 (old style). The defenders of this forward position surprised and puzzled the French with their steadfastness and courage, because 10,000 cavalry, 30,000 infantry and 186 guns were sent to capture the redoubt. Attacked from three sides, the Russians held their positions until the start of the battle. One of the attacks on the French was led personally by Bagration, who forced the superior forces of the “invincibles” to roll back from the fortification. This is where the phrase came from in response to Emperor Napoleon’s question: “Why hasn’t the Shevardinsky redoubt been taken yet?” - “The Russians are dying, but they are not giving up!”

Heroes of War

The Battle of Borodino 1812 (September 8, new style) demonstrated to the whole world the high professionalism of Russian officers. The Winter Palace has a Military Gallery, which contains 333 portraits of heroes of the Battle of Borodino. The amazing work of the artist George Dow and his assistants V. A. Golike and A. V. Polyakov captured the color of the Russian army: the legendary Denis Davydov and A. P. Ermolov, Cossack atamans M.I. Platov and F.P. Uvarov, A.A. Tuchkov and N.N. Raevsky - all these handsome men in magnificent uniforms, with insignia, evoke admiration among museum visitors. The military gallery makes a very strong impression.

A worthy memory

The Battle of Borodino of 1812 (the month will forever remain double: Military Glory Day is celebrated in September, although the battle took place in August according to the old style) will forever remain in the memory of the descendants of those who gave their lives defending the Fatherland. Literary works and architectural masterpieces remind of him: the Triumphal Arch in Moscow, the Narva Gate and the Alexandria Column in St. Petersburg, the Cathedral of Christ the Savior and the Battle of Borodino Panorama Museum, the monument to the defenders of Smolensk and the stele on the site of the Raevsky battery, the Cavalier estate - Durova’s maidens and the immortal “War and Peace” by Leo Tolstoy... There are countless monuments throughout the country. And this is correct, because the date and month of the Battle of Borodino in 1812 changed the self-awareness of Russian society and left a mark on all its layers.