A picture of the military council in Fili where it is located. Short Course in History

) Kutuzov remained on the battlefield and, to the general joy of the troops, gave the order to attack the enemy the next day. But the information he collected on the same night about the great loss of people, especially on the left flank, convinced him of the need to retreat beyond Mozhaisk in order to put the army in order and get closer to the reserves that were supposed to reinforce it. At dawn on August 27, he left the fields of Borodino and went along the Moscow road; Napoleon followed him. Kutuzov walked for five days, waiting in vain for the arrival of fresh troops: they were still far away.

Near Moscow itself, between the village of Fili and the Sparrow Hills, the army stopped with the idea of ​​winning or falling under the walls of the capital. Field Marshal, looking around the position previously chosen Bennigsen, recognized it as inconvenient for the battle, gathered on September 1 (13), 1812, a military council in the village of Fili and proposed the question of whether to expect an enemy attack in a disadvantageous place or to save the army to leave Moscow without a fight and retreat further? Opinions were divided. Bennigsen said that it was a shame to leave Moscow without a shot, that the occupation of the capital by the French would make an unfavorable impression in Russia and Europe, that one should not yet despair of victory, and for better success he suggested: by concentrating the main forces on the left flank, move forward at night and attack the center the enemy, already weakened by the separation of many detachments to bypass the Russian army. Barclay de Tolly recognized this measure as too brave: he found that the army was not able to wait for the enemy in the position it occupied, and even more so to meet him, and advised, leaving Moscow without a fight, to retreat along the Vladimir road. After a heated debate, the council in Fili was divided into two halves: they agreed with Bennigsen Dokhturov, Uvarov, Konovnitsyn and Ermolov; with Barclay Count Osterman and Toll; the latter with the only important difference that he considered it best to go not to the Vladimir road, but to the Kaluga road. Raevsky also joined the side of Barclay, leaving, however, the field marshal himself to judge what action he would take in politically news of the capture of Moscow. “With the loss of Moscow,” Kutuzov objected, “Russia is not lost as long as the army is preserved. By surrendering the capital, we will prepare the death of the enemy. I intend to go to the Ryazan road; I know that all responsibility will fall on me; but I sacrifice myself for the good of the fatherland. The commanding word of the field marshal "I order to retreat" stopped all disputes.

Council in Fili September 1, 1812. Artist Alexei Kivshenko, 1880. Kutuzov is sitting on the left. Yermolov stands on the opposite side of the table. Next to him, under the icons - Dokhturov, Uvarov and Barclay (from right to left). At the window with his head slightly tilted down - Raevsky. Against him, on the other side of the table - Bennigsen

The next day after the council in Fili, early in the morning the Russian army left the camp. The soldiers thought that they were going around, for a decisive battle, but soon the matter was explained. With gloomy silence, with inexpressible grief in the soul, but without murmuring and despondency, regiments after regiments entered the Dorogomilovskaya outpost in strict order and among the astonished people, along the winding streets of the capital, with considerable difficulty went out onto the Ryazan road, while Miloradovich, commanding the rearguard, kept the swift pressure of the enemies.

Based on the works of the outstanding pre-revolutionary historian N. G. Ustryalov.

After Battle of Borodino the Russian army withdrew to Moscow and in the early morning of September 1 (13) settled down near the small village of Fili near Moscow at a position chosen by the chief of staff of the Russian army, Bennigsen. The terrain turned out to be extremely unfavorable. “In case of failure, the entire army would be destroyed before last person", - subsequently wrote the Russian General M.B. Barclay de Tolly.

In the evening of the same day, a military council headed by the commander of the Russian army gathered in the hut of the peasant FrolovM. I. Kutuzovwhere it was necessary to decide the fate of Moscow. Barclay de Tolly advocated the need for a retreat, justifying this by the "danger of the position" and the "superior forces" of the enemy, as well as the impossibility of "defending such a vast city with such insignificant forces." Generals D. S. Dokhturov, N. N. Raevsky and A. P. Ermolovsupported the retreat, P.P. Konovnitsyn and L.L. Bennigsen spoke in favor of the battle, the rest took a wait and see attitude. last word expected from M.I. Kutuzova. After listening to all those present, the commander-in-chief decided to retreat. “With the loss of Moscow, Russia has not yet been lost,” he said.

This was the last retreat of the Russian army in the Patriotic War of 1812. G.

During the retreat, an order was given to destroy ammunition depots and provisions. A fire broke out in the city, destroying more than 70% of the buildings, all food supplies and weapons. 2(14) September Napoleon entered Moscow. Torn off from their rear, the French were actually locked in a devastated city. In October 1812The French army left Moscow and began to retreat along the Kaluga road. ButMaloyaroslavetsKutuzov blocked Napoleon's path, forcing him to retreat along the Smolensk road devastated by the war. Constant blows of the Cossack detachments of the atamanD. V. Davydovaand partisans, as well as hunger and severe frosts, turned the retreat of the French army into a rout. In the battle at the riverBerezina, Napoleon suffered a crushing defeat and fled, leaving the remnants of his army.

The hut of the peasant Frolov began to be called the Kutuzov hut and they tried to preserve it as a historical monument. However, in 1868it was almost completely destroyed by fire. In 1887According to the plans and drawings of the old hut, a new one was recreated. In the room of the military council placed a museum dedicated to 1812city, and in the other half of the hut they settled veteran soldiers of the Pskov Infantry named after Field Marshal Kutuzov Regiment.

After 1917 Kutuzovskaya hut was turned into a residential building.

In 1939 It was decided to open the historical monument "Kutuzovskaya izba in Fili".

Since 1962 Kutuzovskaya izba is a branch of the Borodino Battle panorama museum.

Lit.: Berezin N. Patriotic War of 1812City: Military Council in Fili. M., 1912; Official site of the Museum-panorama "Battle of Borodino". B.d.URL:

After the Battle of Borodino, the Russian army continued to retreat, every day intensely pursued by Murat's vanguard. From the rescript of Alexander I, Kutuzov learned that there would be no reinforcements before Moscow, which he needed so much. However, he constantly said that there would be a battle at the walls of the city. After Borodin, the troops wanted a new battle, not even allowing the thought that Moscow could be left without a fight. Kutuzov could not but reckon with this, but he could not but understand that the disposition proposed by General L.L. Bennigsen, was extremely unsuccessful, the troops would most likely have been defeated at the walls of the Mother See.

To resolve the most painful issue, Kutuzov convened a military council in the village of Fili, in the hut of the peasant Mikhail Frolov. By 4 pm on September 1 (13), members of the council began to arrive at the hut where Kutuzov had already settled down: M.B. Barclay de Tolly, D.S. Dokhturov, F.P. Uvarov, A.P. Ermolov, A.I. Osterman-Tolstoy, P.P. Konovnitsyn and K.F. Tol. A little later they were joined by L.L. Bennigsen and M.I. Platov. Miloradovich was not there - he was in the rearguard.

Council House in Fili, A.K. Savrasov

The only ally of Kutuzov
Kutuzov understood that most of generals who came to the council, shares the opinion of the soldiers about the need to give another battle to Napoleon. Therefore, the commander-in-chief broke the tradition, according to which the right to speak first is given to the junior in rank, and immediately asked the opinion of Barclay de Tolly. Barclay de Tolly was practically the only ally of Kutuzov. The commander of the first Western army, like no one else, had personal reasons not to support Kutuzov, but Barclay, as before, spoke out in favor of continuing the retreat.

“Having saved Moscow, Russia will not survive the war, cruel, devastating. But having saved the army, the hopes of the fatherland are not yet destroyed, ”- Barclay de Tolly began his speech with these words, and Kutuzov hoped to hear just that. When the council began, almost all the generals supported Bennigsen, who of all those present was the most ardent supporter of a new battle, but the words of Barclay de Tolly persuaded Raevsky, Osterman-Tolstoy and Toll to the side of the retreat.

Military council in Fili. HELL. Kivshenko

Leave Moscow or fight under its walls?
Kutuzov immediately outlined his position, expected for the generals and unexpected for the soldiers - at the military council, Kutuzov spoke in favor of a retreat without a fight. He tried to frame the matter as if this decision was not his own, but caused by momentary necessity. He expressed his thought in the following words: “As long as the army exists and is able to resist the enemy, until then we will retain the hope of successfully completing the war, but when the army is destroyed, both Moscow and Russia will perish.”

Bennigsen was outraged by this idea, and continued to criticize the retreat in a harsh manner, insisting on the need to fight in the position he had chosen. Kutuzov caustically reminded him of the battle of Friedland, which took place in the campaign of 1807. Then the Russian troops suffered a crushing defeat, being surrounded. This defeat led to the shameful Peace of Tilsit, the conclusion of which the Russian nobility could not forgive Alexander I for a long time. Bennigsen commanded the troops near Friedland, and in the army he was constantly reminded of this defeat, although a few days before he defeated Napoleon in the battle of Heilsberg.

The debate became more and more heated, and the question was one of principle. It soon became clear that the generals were divided in opinion, and the final decision would have to be made by Kutuzov. By this time, Kutuzov had already firmly decided that the city should be left, it was a necessary sacrifice that had to be made to defeat the enemy. But most of all at that moment he was afraid of a drop in morale in the troops, he was afraid of repeating the fate of Barclay de Tolly.

"I order you to retreat"
When it became clear that the discussion would not produce results, Kutuzov quite unexpectedly interrupted the council, which lasted a little over an hour with the words: “Napoleon is a turbulent stream that we cannot stop yet. Moscow will be the sponge that will suck it up.” One of the generals tried to object, but Kutuzov closed the meeting with the words: "I order you to retreat."

Pyotr Petrovich Konovnitsyn recalled that such a decision made all the generals' hair stand on end. All the time after the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov explained the retreat as a search for a new convenient position for another battle. And now he ordered to surrender the capital without a fight.

On the evening of September 13, the soldiers also learned about this decision of the commander-in-chief. They were even more shocked than the generals. It seemed that they shed blood in vain in a general battle. They fought for Moscow, the officers told them about this, and so did Kutuzov, who even received the rank of field marshal these days, which was another indication that the French offensive would soon be stopped.

But the fate of the 250,000th Moscow has already been decided. The inhabitants of the city themselves were shocked to learn about the decision of the army, although they assumed such an outcome of events. It was one of the most difficult days in the entire campaign of 1812. As one of the participants in the military council put it, sometimes centuries do not change the order of things, and sometimes one hour decides the fate of the fatherland.

Chronicle of the day: Military Council in Fili

On this day, a military council was held in Fili, at which the fate of Moscow was discussed. The council was attended by M.B. Barclay de Tolly, D.S. Dokhturov, F.P. Uvarov, A.P. Ermolov, A.I. Osterman-Tolstoy, P.P. Konovnitsyn and K.F. Tol, L.L. Bennigsen and M.I. Platov.

Person: Leonty Leontievich Bennigsen

Leonty Leontievich Bennigsen (1745-1826)
Leonty Leontievich B e Nnigsen, or rather, Levin August Gottlieb Behn and Gson, came from a German noble family. His father was a chamberlain and colonel of the guard in Braunschweig, and his son followed in his footsteps. From the age of 14, he served in the Hanoverian army, participated in the Seven Years' War, received promotions.

However, realizing the well-known futility of service in Hannover, in 1773 the young German Lieutenant Colonel Bennigsen was transferred to Russian service in the rank of prime minister and immediately leaves with his regiment to go to war with the Turks. During the second Russian-Turkish war (1787-1791), Bennigsen received a number of promotions for his courage, composure and enterprise: in 1787 - a colonel, in 1788 - a brigadier, in 1790 - he was appointed to be with the commander in chief G.A. Potemkin. For the Polish campaigns of 1792 and 1794. Leonty Leontievich was promoted to major general, and for the capture of Vilna he was awarded the Order of St. George, 3rd degree. In 1796, Bennigsen was one of the top commanders in the Persian campaign, for which, however, already in the rank of lieutenant general, he fell out of favor with Emperor Paul I.

In 1801, Bennigsen took part in a coup d'état that led to the assassination of Emperor Paul I and the accession of Alexander I. The new emperor reinstates Bennigsen in the service, gives him the rank of general from the cavalry, but does not invite him to the court.

During the Prussian campaign, General Bennigsen personally takes command of the entire active army, and after several successful operations receives an official appointment and the Order of St. George, 2nd degree. Under his leadership, the Russian troops for the first time managed to repel the onslaught of Napoleon in battle (the battle of Preisisch-Eylau), but were defeated at Friedland, for which the general was removed from his post, excommunicated from the court and dismissed on leave "until the disease is cured."

During the war of 1812, Bennigsen was appointed to be with the emperor, but after his departure he remained at the headquarters without any specific position. With the arrival of M.I. Kutuzov was appointed to act as Chief of the General Staff of the United Armies: he showed himself excellently at Borodino, at council in Fili advocated another general battle, in the Tarutino camp he intrigued against the commander in chief, for which he was removed from the main apartment in mid-November.

During foreign campaigns, Bennigsen commanded the Reserve Army of D.I. Lobanov-Rostovsky, the militia of P.A. Tolstoy and the troops of D.S. Dokhturova, then - Polish army, participated in the battles near Lützen, Bautzen and Leipzig (for distinction on December 29, 1813 he was elevated to the dignity of a count of the Russian Empire), for the capture of Hamburg he received the Order of St. George 1st degree, and then the post of commander-in-chief of the 2nd army.

In 1818, Bennigsen was removed from his post at the request and left for his family castle near Hannover, where he died in oblivion in 1826.

August 27 (September 8), 1812
Rearguard battle at Mozhaisk
Person: Tuchkov Nikolai Alekseevich (First)
Battle of Borodino: results

At dawn on August 27 (September 8), the Russian army left its positions at Borodino and retreated beyond Mozhaisk, settling near the village of Zhukovka. To cover the retreat of the army, Kutuzov formed a strong rearguard under the command of Platov. The rearguard included: the Cossack corps, part of the 1st cavalry corps of Uvarov, the Maslovsky detachment of General P.P. Passek, consisting of 3 chasseurs and 1 Cossack regiments (during the battle of Borodino, it was located at the tip of the right flank of the position in the flush near the village of Maslovo) , 4th infantry division from the 2nd Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Company of the Don Artillery. These forces remained at the Borodino position for several hours after the army left and began to withdraw around noon.

When Napoleon was informed about the withdrawal of the Russian army, this message did not prompt him to energetic actions. The emperor was in a state of apathy. In addition, offensive capabilities great army"were severely undermined: the best parts of the French infantry, which were part of the corps of Davout, Ney and Junot, suffered heavy losses at the Semyonov flushes. The French cavalry suffered particularly heavy losses. Only on August 31 did Napoleon decide to inform Europe of a new "brilliant victory" (the eighteenth bulletin was issued for this). He will exaggerate the scale of his “success”, declare that the Russians had a numerical superiority - 170 thousand people (later he will state that he attacked “the Russians, consisting of 250,000, armed to the teeth, and defeated them ...” ). In order to prove his success, Napoleon had to enter Moscow. Ney offered to retreat to Smolensk, replenish the army, strengthen communications. Napoleon also refused Murat's proposal to immediately resume the battle.

It was easier to deceive the European public than the army. The "Great Army" perceived the Battle of Borodino rather as a defeat, many of Napoleon's entourage noted the decline in the spirit of soldiers and officers. It was not possible to defeat the Russian army in a general battle; it retreated to in perfect order, and this threatened new battles in the near future, the losses were terrible.

Kutuzov also did not have the opportunity to immediately go on the offensive, the army was bled dry. He decided to retreat to Moscow and, having received reinforcements, to give a new battle to the enemy. Arriving in Mozhaisk, Kutuzov found no reinforcements, no ammunition, no carts, horses, trench tools, which he requested from the military governor of Moscow, Rostopchin. Kutuzov wrote a letter to the governor, where he expressed extreme surprise about this and recalled that we were talking about "saving Moscow."

On August 27-28 (September 8-9), 1812, Platov fought a rearguard action. He could not hold out west of Mozhaisk and by the end of the day began to retreat under the pressure of Murat's cavalry. He entrenched himself near the village of Modenova and Kutuzov was forced to reinforce the rearguard with two infantry brigades from the 7th and 24th divisions, three regiments of chasseurs, the rest of the 1st cavalry corps, the 2nd cavalry corps and an artillery company. Kutuzov, dissatisfied with Platov's actions, changed him to Miloradovich, who by that time was the commander of the 2nd Army instead of the retired Bagration.

August 28 (September 9) Kutuzov announced gratitude to all the troops that participated in the battle of Borodino. The order for the army spoke of love for the fatherland, the courage inherent in Russian soldiers, and expressed confidence that “having inflicted a terrible defeat on our enemy, we will give him, with the help of God, the final blow. For this, our troops are going to meet fresh troops, burning with the same zeal to fight the enemy. On August 28-29, Kutuzov distributed the militia warriors between the troops of the 1st and 2nd armies. D. I. Lobanov-Rostovsky, who, with the beginning Patriotic War In 1812, he was appointed military commander in the territory from Yaroslavl to Voronezh, the commander in chief gave the order to send all the reserves at his disposal to Moscow. A. A. Kleinmikhel was supposed to lead three regiments that were being formed in Moscow. In addition, Kutuzov sent an order to Major General Ushakov in Kaluga for the immediate dispatch of 8 infantry battalions and 12 cavalry squadrons to Moscow.

On August 29, Kutuzov informed Emperor Alexander that the battle had been won, but "extraordinary losses" and injuries to "the most needed generals" were forcing him to retreat along the Moscow road. The commander-in-chief notified the sovereign that he was forced to retreat further, since he had not received reinforcements. Kutuzov expected to increase the army by 40-45 thousand bayonets and sabers. However, he did not know that the emperor, without notifying him, forbade Lobanov-Rostovsky and Kleinmichel to transfer reserves to his disposal until a special order. Even before the start of the battle of Borodino, the emperor ordered Lobanov-Rostovsky to send the regiments formed in Tambov and Voronezh to Voronezh, and Kleinmichel to Rostov, Petrov, Pereyaslavl-Zalessky and Suzdal. In addition, the troops sent from St. Petersburg moved to Pskov and Tver, and not to Moscow. This suggests that Alexander I cared more about the fate of St. Petersburg, and not Moscow. His orders objectively led to the disruption of the defense of the ancient capital of the Russian state. Kutuzov did not know about these orders and made his plans based on the arrival of reserve troops.

On August 28, the main forces of the Russian army made the transition from the village of Zemlino to the village of Krutitsy. The rearguard fought back behind the main forces, the Russian troops fought with the vanguard of Murat. The battle lasted from dawn until 5 pm, when it became known about the successful withdrawal of the army. By August 30, the army had made new transition and stopped for the night at Nikolsky (Bolshaya Vyazema). The rearguard retreated with a fight that day. Kutuzov sent the chief of engineers of the 1st Western Army, Christian Ivanovich Trousson, with a tool for fortification work, outside the village of Mamonova (where Bennigsen chose a position for battle). Kutuzov also sent several letters to Rostopchin, repeating previous requests, the commander-in-chief demanded to immediately send all the guns that are in the Moscow arsenal, ammunition, shovels and axes.

On the same day, Kutuzov received Alexander's rescript dated August 24, where it was said that the regiments of Lobanov-Rostovsky would not be attached to the active army, they would be used to prepare a new recruit set. The emperor promised the supply of recruits as they were trained, and Moscow troops, the number of which was allegedly increased by Rostopchin to 80 thousand people. It was a serious blow to Kutuzov's plans, but he still hoped to defend the city. On August 31, the army received an order to move towards Moscow and stop, take a position three miles from it. Kutuzov informed Miloradovich that near Moscow "there must be a battle that would decide the success of the campaign and the fate of the state."

On September 1 (13), the Russian army approached Moscow and settled in the position chosen by Bennigsen. The right flank of the position rested on the bend of the Moskva River near the village of Fili, the center of the position was in front of the village of Troitskoye, and the left flank adjoined the Sparrow Hills. The length of the position was about 4 km, and its depth was 2 km. The position began to actively prepare for the upcoming battle. But when Barclay de Tolly and some other generals got acquainted with the position, they sharply criticized it. In their opinion, the position was extremely uncomfortable for battle. Kutuzov's determination to give the second battle to Napoleon's "Great Army" was shaken. In addition, news was received about the enemy's detour maneuver - significant French forces were moving towards Ruza and Medyn. The Vintzingerode detachment covering this direction, with the help of three Cossack, one dragoon and several infantry regiments, held back the enemy at Zvenigorod for several hours, then was forced to retreat.

Kutuzov, not being able to separate significant forces from the army to advance towards the enemy corps making a roundabout maneuver, waited for the approach of the promised Moscow militia (Moscow squad). However, Rostopchin sent the militias at his disposal to active army even before the Battle of Borodino, more people he did not have, the governor simply did not notify the commander-in-chief about this.

Council in Fili and leaving Moscow

On September 1 (13), a military council was assembled, which was supposed to decide the fate of Moscow. Minister of War Barclay de Tolly, Chief of the General Staff of the 1st Western Army Yermolov, Quartermaster General Tol, Generals Benningsen, Dokhturov, Uvarov, Osterman-Tolstoy, Konovnitsyn, Raevsky, Kaisarov gathered in Fili. Miloradovich was not at the meeting, because he could not leave the rearguard. Kutuzov raised the question of whether to wait for the enemy in position and give him a battle or give Moscow without a fight. Barclay de Tolly replied that it was impossible to accept the battle in the position where the army was standing, therefore it was necessary to retreat along the road to Nizhny Novgorod, where the southern and northern provinces were connected. The opinion of the commander of the 1st Army was supported by Osterman-Tolstoy, Raevsky and Tol.

General Bennigsen, who chose a position near Moscow, considered it convenient for battle and offered to wait for the enemy and give him a fight. Dokhturov supported his position. Konovnitsyn, Uvarov and Yermolov agreed with Bennigsen's opinion to fight near Moscow, but considered the chosen position unfavorable. They proposed an active combat strategy - to go to the enemy themselves and attack him on the move.

Field Marshal Kutuzov (his Serene Highness on August 30 (September 11) was promoted to field marshal general) summed up the meeting and said that with the loss of Moscow, Russia and his first duty were not lost, to save the army, to connect with reinforcements. He ordered to retreat along the Ryazan road. Kutuzov took full responsibility for this step. Considering the strategic situation and expediency, it was a difficult but sure step. Each new day led to the strengthening of the Russian army and to the weakening of Napoleon's forces.

Alexander was not satisfied with Kutuzov's decision, but he himself did not dare to remove him from the post of commander in chief. He referred the question of leaving Moscow to the Committee of Ministers. However, at the meeting of the Committee of Ministers on September 10 (22), where Kutuzov's report was discussed, none of the ministers raised the question of changing the commander-in-chief. Some generals were also unhappy with Kutuzov's actions. Bennigsen sent a letter to Arakcheev, where he expressed his disagreement with the decision of the commander in chief. He became the center of all intrigues against Kutuzov. Barclay de Tolly believed that the general battle should have been given earlier - at Tsarev-Zaimishch and was sure of victory. And in case of failure, it was necessary to withdraw troops not to Moscow, but to Kaluga. Yermolov also expressed his dissatisfaction. He accused Kutuzov of hypocrisy, believing that "Prince Kutuzov showed his intention, before reaching Moscow, to actually give another battle to save her ... in reality, he did not think about it at all." Yermolov's opinion about Kutuzov's duplicity is popular in the historical literature to this day.

On the night of September 1-2, the French avant-garde was on the outskirts of Moscow. Following him, 10-15 km away, were the main forces of the French army. The Russian rear guard at dawn on September 2 was 10 km from the old capital. At about 9 o'clock, French troops hit Miloradovich's troops and by 12 o'clock pushed him back to Poklonnaya Hill. Miloradovich occupied the line on which the main forces had previously stood. At this time, the Russian army was passing through Moscow. The first column went through the Dorogomilovsky bridge and the city center, the second - through Zamoskvorechye and Kamenny bridge. Then both columns headed for the Ryazan outpost. Together with the army, the townspeople left (out of 270 thousand of the city's population, no more than 10-12 thousand people remained), convoys with the wounded - about 25 thousand people were evacuated on five thousand carts (some of the seriously wounded did not manage to be taken out of the city). Kutuzov, through Yermolov, conveyed to Miloradovich an order to hold the enemy by all means until the wounded, convoys and artillery were taken out of Moscow.

The rearguard had difficulty holding back the enemy. Miloradovich was especially worried about the fact that the Winzingerode detachment could not hold the troops of General Beauharnais and the enemy went to the Moscow River and could be in the city earlier than the Russian rearguard. Having received an order from Kutuzov to restrain the enemy, Miloradovich sent a truce envoy to Murat - the headquarters captain Akinfov. He proposed to the King of the Kingdom of Naples to stop the advance of the French avant-garde for four hours in order to enable the Russian troops and the population to leave the city. Otherwise, Miloradovich promised to lead fighting in the city itself, which could lead to severe destruction and fire. Murat accepted Miloradovich's condition and stopped the offensive. Miloradovich informed Kutuzov about this and suggested that Murat extend the truce until 7 am on September 3. The French agreed to this condition. Apparently, the enemy did not want to destroy the city, where he was going to stop at long time and cause unnecessary irritation among the Russians on the eve of peace (Napoleon was sure that peace negotiations would soon begin). As a result, the Russian army was able to calmly complete the withdrawal.

On September 2 (14), Napoleon arrived at Poklonnaya Gora and looked at the city for a long time through a telescope. Then he gave the order for the troops to enter the city. The French emperor stopped at the Kamer-kollezhsky shaft in anticipation of a delegation of citizens with the keys to Moscow. However, he was soon informed that the city was empty. This greatly surprised the emperor. He perfectly remembered the meetings (similar to a holiday) that were arranged for him in Milan, Vienna, Berlin, Warsaw and other European cities. The deathly silence and the emptiness of the vast city were a sign that foreshadowed the terrible end of the "Great Army".

The French vanguard entered the city at the same time as the Russian rearguard. At the same time, the last units of the main forces of the Russian army were leaving the city. At that moment, people heard several artillery shots in the city. These shots were fired at the gates of the Kremlin on the orders of Murat - a handful of Russian patriots settled in the fortress and fired on the French. The French gunners broke through the gates, the nameless defenders perished. By the end of the day, all city outposts were occupied by the enemy.

Rostopchin and the Russian command did not have time to take out huge stocks of ammunition and food from the city. We were able to evacuate only a small part. They managed to burn up to half of all the gunpowder and blow up artillery ammunition, the cartridges were drowned in the river. Warehouses with food and fodder were also destroyed (the barges with bread were drowned). Military property was liquidated for a huge amount - 4.8 million rubles. Worst of all, almost all the stocks of weapons that were in the Kremlin arsenal, the arsenal, were left to the enemy. The French got 156 guns, about 40 thousand good guns and other weapons and ammunition. This allowed the French army to replenish the lack of weapons and ammunition that they experienced after the Battle of Borodino.

In Europe, the news of the entry of the "Great Army" into Moscow was perceived as sure sign defeat Russian Empire in the war with Napoleonic France. Some of the courtiers began to advocate for peace with Napoleon. In particular, he advocated for peace Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich.

After the battle of Borodino, the Russian army retreated to Moscow on September 1 due to heavy losses, encamped: the right flank in front of the village of Fili, the center between the villages of Troitsky and Volynsky, and the left flank in front of the village of Vorobyov; the rearguard of the army at the village of Setun.
In the village of Fili at four o'clock in the afternoon, His Serene Highness Prince M. I. Kutuzov appointed Military council. The council was held in the new, thatched hut of the Frolovs. In the hut near the stove there was a camp bed of the commander-in-chief. Thick oak benches stood along the walls and an equally solid oak table in the red corner. He, like a tablecloth, was covered with a map.
The commander-in-chief was sitting on a bench under icons. The generals were seated on both sides of the table. At the military council, the fate of Moscow was to be decided: whether to give a battle near Moscow or leave the city without a fight. The council of war went on for a long time...
The council was held in secrecy, without keeping minutes, so the number of participants is unknown (from 10 to 15 people). It is precisely established that M. I. Kutuzov, M. B. Barclay de Tolly, L. L. Bennigsen, D. S. Dokhturov, A. P. Ermolov, N. N. Raevsky, P. P. Konovnitsyn were present , A. I. Osterman-Tolstoy, K. F. Tol. Based on the testimonies of participants in the Patriotic War of 1813, it can be assumed that M. I. Platov, K. F. Baggovut, F. P. Uvarov, P. S. Kaisarov, V. S. Lanskoy were also present at the council.
There was no unanimity among the military leaders gathered at the council. General M. B. Barclay de Tolly substantiated the point of view on the need to leave Moscow to save the army. His opponent was L. L. Bennigsen, who insisted on fighting to defend Moscow in order to avoid a negative moral impact on the army and society. Some of the generals were inclined to think of a counter attack against Napoleon's army, but this idea, after criticism, did not receive support. Raevsky was for retreat. He said: “Save the army, leave the capital without a fight. I speak as a soldier, not a diplomat: we must retreat!” Karl Fedorovich Baggovut also spoke in favor of retreat. Thus, in addition to Bennigsen, Dokhturov, Konovnitsyn, Uvarov, Platov, Yermolov spoke in favor of fighting. The opposite point of view was supported by Barclay de Tolly, Raevsky, Osterman, Tol and Baggovut.
The final decision was made by M. I. Kutuzov. Mikhail Illarionovich patiently listened to everyone, and then stood up and said: “With the loss of Moscow, Russia has not yet been lost. I make it my first duty to preserve the army, to get closer to those troops that go to reinforce it, and by the very concession of Moscow to prepare for the inevitable death of the enemy. Therefore, I intend, after passing through Moscow, to retreat along the Ryazan road. Gentlemen, I see that I have to pay for everything. I sacrifice myself for the good of the fatherland. As the commander-in-chief - I order: to retreat!
The hut of the peasant A. Frolov, in which the council took place, burned down in 1868, but was restored in 1887, since 1962 it has become a branch of the panorama museum " Battle of Borodino.