Military-industrial complex of the USSR in 1964 1991. The development of the military-industrial complex of the Russian Empire during the years of WWI

The question is legitimate: how the USSR, which began industrialization only in the 30s, and was also ruined in World War II, was able to make a breakthrough in the formation and development of the military-industrial complex, despite the limited time and secondary resources (personnel, equipment, technologies, etc.) .)?

Oleg Dmitrievich Baklanov, Oleg Konstantinovich Rogozin

In the 1950s, the leadership of the USSR tried in various ways to solve the problem of coordinating extensive work on revolutionary areas of development of weapons, primarily nuclear weapons and rocket technology. On March 16, 1953, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the management of special work" was issued, which created a Special Committee to manage work on the nuclear industry and rocket technology.

However, already on June 26, 1953, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU at its meeting decides “On the formation of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building of the USSR”, with the inclusion of the 1st and 3rd Main Directorates in its composition, in connection with which the Special Committee created three months earlier is liquidated under Council of Ministers of the USSR. This decision is formalized on the same day by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The enterprises of the Ministry were engaged in the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons, the design and construction of vehicles with nuclear propulsion systems: icebreakers, submarines, military ships, space rockets and aircraft, as well as the production of radioisotope instruments and equipment, and the construction of nuclear power plants.

Meanwhile, the task of coordinating work on the entire subject of military production was never solved, although the new stage of the scientific and technological revolution required a significant increase in the efficiency of managing the development and production of equipment and weapons.

December 6, 1957 issued a resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the establishment of the Commission on military-industrial issues under the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In 1957, in addition to the Ministry of Defense of the USSR and the Ministry of Defense Industry of the USSR, the Ministry of Aviation Industry of the USSR, the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry of the USSR, the Ministry of the Radio Engineering Industry of the USSR, the Ministry of Medium Machine Building of the USSR, the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the State Committee for the use of atomic energy, the Main Directorate of State Material Reserves, the Main Engineering Directorate of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, Glavspetsstroy at Gosmontazhspetsstroy, the organization of mailbox No. 10, -DOSAAF, the Central Committee "Dynamo" and the All-Army Military Hunting Society.

Largely thanks to the activities of the Military-Industrial Commission, the Soviet Union after the Second World War managed to create a number of advanced models of weapons and military equipment in the most high-tech areas of weapons systems.

Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 697-355ss / op
"On the management of special works"

Moscow, Kremlin

The Council of Ministers of the USSR DECIDES:

I. About the Special Committee

1. To form a special committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR consisting of comrades:

1. Beria L.P. - Chairman
2. Vannikov B.L. - First Deputy Chairman
3. Klochkov I.M. - vice-chairman
4. Vladimirsky S.M. — - "-
5. Bulganin N.A. - committee member
6. Zavenyagin A.P. — - "-
7. Ryabikov V.M. — - "-
8. Makhnev V.A. — - "-

2. Assign to the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR the management of all special work (on the nuclear industry, the Berkut and Kometa systems, long-range missiles (...)) carried out by the First and Third Main Directorates under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and others ministries and departments.

Determine that the Special Committee:

- determines plans for the development of special works, the amount of financial allocations and material and technical resources required for the implementation of these plans, and submits them for approval by the Government;

— monitors the progress of special works and takes measures to ensure the implementation of established plans;

- makes operational decisions concerning special work, binding on ministries and departments, and in cases requiring the approval of the Government, submits its proposals to the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

To carry out the tasks assigned to it, the Special Committee has its own apparatus.

II. On the First and Second Main Directorates under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

1. Combine the First and Second Main Directorates under the Council of Ministers of the USSR into one Main Directorate—the First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

2. To release Comrade B.L. Vannikov. from the duties of the head of the First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR in connection with his transfer to work in the Special Committee.

3. Appoint Comrade Zavenyagin A.P. Head of the First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

4. Assign:

Comrade Slavsky E.P. - First Deputy Head of the Main Directorate

Comrade Pavlova N.I. - Deputy Head of the Headquarters

Comrade Antropova P.Ya. — - " - - " -

Comrade Emelyanova V.S. - Member of the Board of Directors

Comrade Kandaritsky V.S. — - " - - " -

Comrade Komarovsky A.N. — - " - - " -

Comrade Polyakova V.P. — - " - - " -

Comrade Petrosyants A.M. — - " - - " -

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR G. Malenkov
Manager of Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the USSR M. Pomaznev

AP RF. F. 93, a collection of resolutions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for 1953. A certified copy.

Background of the military industry authorities

The Russian historical traditions of managing the military industry from a single center date back to the beginning of the 20th century, when, under the conditions of the First World War, special bodies were created to manage the military economy - special meetings. The main one - "Special Meeting to Discuss Measures for the Defense of the State" - was headed by the Minister of War, it was attended by representatives of state bodies (the State Duma, the State Council, etc.), industrialists and entrepreneurs. The tasks of the Special Meeting included the distribution of military orders and control over their implementation at enterprises that produced military products, issues of supplying the army. Public control bodies, the military-industrial committees, became a kind of intermediary between the state and private industry in distributing military orders and issuing advances. At the end of May 1915 on the 9th All-Russian Congress Representatives of trade and industry were elected by the Central Military-Industrial Committee, headed by the leader of the Octobrist Party A. Guchkov and the progressive A. Konovalov.

After the total mobilization of the country's military resources during the First World War, the revolution of 1917 and the Civil War, under the NEP, there was a sharp, almost landslide reduction in military spending, the number of armed forces and the defense potential of the country as a whole.

As a result, at the turn of the 20-30s of the twentieth century, the USSR had a limited system of "personnel" military enterprises, assembled into trusts and associations under the general leadership of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh).

After the liquidation of the Supreme Council of National Economy from January 1932, defense enterprises were transferred to the system of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry (NKTP). Since the end of 1936, the period of creation of a specialized defense industry within the framework of the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry (NKOP) began. In connection with the outbreak of World War II on September 1, 1939, in the face of a direct military threat, the USSR began accelerated preparations for war, the growth of the armed forces and the increase in the production of weapons. The sign of the new period was such facts as the adoption of an emergency mobilization plan - MP-1 for the "special" IV quarter of 1939, the reorganization of management carried out in the same year - the division of the NKOP into specialized people's commissariats: aviation industry, weapons, ammunition, shipbuilding industry.

The military-industrial complex as an organ for the mobilization of industry

Mobilization work related to preparations for war was a "bottleneck" in the system of Soviet defense construction in the 1930s. The leaders of the military and industrial departments advocated the creation of a single "mobilization" body that would concentrate the functions of preparing industry and the economy as a whole for war. Such a governing body was the Permanent Mobilization Commission under the Defense Committee of the Council of People's Commissars. At its first meeting, on May 4, 1938, K. E. Voroshilov, N. I. Yezhov, L. M. Kaganovich, P. I. Smirnov, N. A. Voznesensky (Chairman of the State Planning Commission), B. M. Shaposhnikov, M. I. Kulik, I. F. Tevosyan and others. Thus, the commission included representatives of the military leadership, industry leaders, and security agencies.

On June 14, 1938, a meeting of the commission took place under its new name - the Military Industrial Commission. At the meeting, among other issues, it was decided to adopt the draft proposed by L. M. Kaganovich "On the tasks of the Military-Industrial Commission under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and on the construction of its apparatus."

Construction of the artillery railway transporter TM-1-14 with a 356-mm gun at the Leningrad Metal Plant (1932)

According to this document, the Military-Industrial Commission was the working body of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. The military-industrial complex had the main task of "mobilizing and preparing the industry, both defense and non-defense, to fully ensure the implementation of the plans and tasks of the Defense Committee for the production and supply of weapons to the Red Army and the Navy."

The functions of the VPK included:

• consideration of mobilization applications;
• verification of calculations of needs and norms of consumption according to mob orders;
• distribution of mobilization tasks among the people's commissariats of the Union and union republics and verification of the correctness of the distribution of orders between enterprises;
• drawing up a consolidated mobilization plan for industry in all its sections;
• coordination of the mobilization-industrial plan with the national economic plan (together with the Mobsector of the State Planning Committee of the USSR);
• examination production capacity enterprises, determining their mobilization purpose, developing measures to increase new production capacities, assimilate civilian industries and their correct implementation;
• verification of the fulfillment of the mobilization plan and the program of current military orders by enterprises and people's commissariats;
• development of plans for logistics, mobilization tasks for all major types of supply (equipment, raw materials, tools, semi-finished products, etc.);
• establishment of a production zoning system to reduce transportation and achieve completeness of production;
• development of measures to increase output by the main enterprises through their cooperation with allied enterprises;
• development of a plan and measures to provide the mobilized industry with manpower and engineering and technical personnel in wartime;
• development of norms for the accumulation of industrial mobile stocks, checking their availability and quality, establishing rules for the storage and refreshment of mobile stocks;
• conducting, by special decision of the CO, experimental mobilizations of individual industrial enterprises or entire industrial sectors;
• development of questions of application in the military industry of any technical inventions, in particular, the replacement of acutely scarce materials in the production of weapons;
• development of instructions on military mobilization work in people's commissariats, main departments, trusts and enterprises; control over the work of military departments in the above bodies, setting up the selection and training of personnel of moborgans and maintaining military-industrial secrets.

The military-industrial complex consisted of the chairman of the commission with the rank of deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (L. M. Kaganovich became the chairman), two of his deputies and a secretary, as well as seventeen permanent members of the commission. The latter included representatives of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the NKVD (as the main customers of military products) - People's Commissar of Defense, People's Commissar of the Navy, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, heads of: the General Staff of the Red Army, the Main Naval Staff, the Red Army Air Force, Artillery Directorate Red Army, Armored Directorate of the Red Army; leaders of the defense and heavy industries: people's commissars for the aviation industry, shipbuilding, ammunition, armaments, the chemical industry, heavy engineering, medium engineering, general engineering; as well as the chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR.

The decisions of the Military-Industrial Commission needed the approval of the chairman of the Defense Committee and only after that were they binding. For execution daily work within the military-industrial complex, a secretariat was allocated, consisting of an organizational and planning sector, industry sectors and the general part of the secretariat.

The organizational and planning sector of the military-industrial complex was responsible for "the study of historical and modern foreign experience industrial mobilization and, on this basis, finding the most rational organizational forms of mobilization training for industry, developing instructions and regulations for mob work, developing the structure and staff of moborgans, ensuring the preservation of military-industrial secrets, conclusion on mob applications of military people's commissariats, distribution of mob applications by industry sectors, generalization of summary data according to the mobilization plan, the issuance of mob assignments to people's commissariats and other organizations and applications for raw materials and semi-finished products, the identification of production capacities, the supply of "labor technical power", etc.

The secretariat of the military-industrial complex also included sectoral sectors responsible for the mobilization training of the relevant sectors: 1) weapons, with groups of small arms, artillery materiel, military devices; 2) ammunition, as part of groups of cases, tubes, fuses, shells, gunpowder, explosives, equipment and closures; 3) aviation; 4) armored vehicle; 5) military chemical; 6) shipbuilding; 7) engineering property and communications.

The functions of the sectoral sectors included the development of the entire range of issues related to the mobilization preparation of a given branch of production, and in particular:

• taking into account and identifying the existing production capacities of the relevant industry and comparing them with the volume of the mob application for this type of weapon;
• preparation of conclusions on a mob application for a given type of weapon;
• finding additional production capacities and developing measures to increase new capacities;
• development of issues of production cooperation of enterprises;
• placing a mob application and checking the mob readiness of enterprises;
• generalization of the summary need for equipment, raw materials, tools, labor, etc.;
• introduction of new technical improvements and highly profitable technological processes into production, as well as the development of issues related to the replacement of acutely scarce and imported materials;
• determination of the norms for the accumulation of mobile reserves and control over their creation and refreshment;
• preparation of decisions on the given branch of production and control over the timeliness and quality of their execution;
• monitoring and ensuring the implementation of the program of current military orders in the given branch of production;
• monitoring the development of issues of unloading and evacuation of industrial enterprises stationed in threatened zones.

The procedure for developing a mobilization plan was also established. Within the deadlines set by the Defense Committee, the military people's commissariats (NPO, NKVMF, NKVD) were supposed to submit to the military-industrial complex mob applications for the war year for "weapons and military equipment." The consolidated mobilization plan for industry was developed in stages by the military-industrial complex in one copy and consisted of the following sections: supply plan, production cooperation plan, logistics plan, capacity increase plan, plan for providing manpower and engineering and technical personnel, plan for the accumulation of mobile stocks, financial plan, transportation plan.

The sectors of the military-industrial complex were obliged to monitor the readiness of enterprises and people's commissariats and, in accordance with the changes taking place, make the necessary adjustments to the mobile plan.

In addition, the military-industrial complex as a whole was supposed to act as an "arbitrator" in resolving disputes between departments. In the decision of the military-industrial complex of September 27 on the issue of "On the complete set of artillery rounds", in particular, it was stated: "If there are disagreements on the supply issues between the people's commissar of the defense industry and the people's commissars of other supplying people's commissariats, disputes are resolved by the military-industrial complex."

Thus, the military-industrial complex did a great job of preparing the national economy for a future war. All issues of adopting new models of weapons and military equipment, their development in mass production were under the personal control of I.V. Stalin, who headed the USSR Defense Committee for the last two pre-war years. According to the memoirs of the People's Commissar of Armaments of the USSR B.L. Vannikov, “Stalin studied daily reports on the production of aircraft and aircraft engines, demanding explanations and measures in each case of deviation from the schedule ... The same can be said about his participation in the consideration of issues of the tank industry and military shipbuilding.

Stalin also demanded daily attention to the development of the defense industry from his inner circle. According to the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of September 10, 1939, the Economic Council (chairman A. I. Mikoyan, deputy N. A. Bulganin, members: S. M. Budyonny, E. A. Shchadenko, L. Z Mehlis) and the Defense Committee (chairman I. V. Stalin, first deputies V. M. Molotov and N. A. Voznesensky, members: N. G. Kuznetsov, A. A. Zhdanov, A. I. Mikoyan, L. P. Beria, B. M. Shaposhnikov, G. I. Kulik, F. I. Golikov) were obliged to “meet daily”.

At the same time, according to the experts of the First Department of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, who in the late 1950s were engaged in summarizing the experience of deploying the military-industrial base of the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War: “... we started military mobilization training of our industry too late. Our country essentially did not have a comprehensive mobilization plan for preparing the entire national economy for the needs of the war, which was, of course, a major shortcoming and was largely due to the untimely organization of mobilization planning.

During the war years, all the functions of managing the defense industry were transferred to the State Defense Committee (GKO), formed on June 30, 1941 by a joint resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The need to create a State Defense Committee as the highest governing body was motivated by the difficult situation at the front, which required that the leadership of the country be centralized to the maximum extent. The aforementioned resolution states that all orders of the State Defense Committee must be unquestioningly carried out by citizens and any authorities.

On December 8, 1942, an Operations Bureau was created under the State Defense Committee, consisting of: V. M. Molotov, L. P. Beria, G. M. Malenkov and A. I. Mikoyan, to control and monitor the work of the people's commissariats of the military industry, development and submission for consideration by the Chairman of the State Defense Committee of draft decisions on certain issues of the development of industry and transport. On the basis of applications from NGOs, the NKVMF, the NKVD and the NKGB, the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee, with the participation of departments of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, compiled monthly and quarterly plans for the production of "military" and "civilian" industrial products and material and technical supply of the most important sectors of the national economy. On May 18, 1944, the Operational Bureau was approved in a new composition: L.P. Beria (chairman), G.M. Malenkov, A.I. Mikoyan, N.A. Voznesensky and K.E. Voroshilov.

During the 50 months of its existence, the State Defense Committee adopted 9,971 resolutions, of which about two-thirds dealt with the problems of the military economy and the organization of the production of military-industrial products. In the localities, local Party and Soviet bodies were responsible for the implementation of the GKO resolutions. Particularly responsible tasks were under the control of authorized GKOs.

Military Industry Coordination Center

In the first post-war years, there was no single body for managing military-industrial affairs. By a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of Ministers of the USSR in February 1947, branch bureaus for industry and agriculture were created under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Nine industry bureaus, including those for mechanical engineering and shipbuilding, headed by V. A. Malyshev, were engaged in defense industries. Supervision of the Ministry of the Armed Forces was carried out directly by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and from April 1949 this work was entrusted to N. A. Bulganin, including responsibility for the work of the ministries of the aviation industry and weapons, removed from the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mechanical Engineering and Shipbuilding.

In May 1948, the leaders of the defense industry, D. F. Ustinov and M. Z. Saburov, took the initiative to create a single center for military and military-industrial affairs in the government. The authority of this body was to include the current issues of the military industry, the development and maintenance of mobilization plans, the creation of new types of weapons, and the coordination of the work of the defense industries. According to the leaders of the defense industry, the need to create such a body is long overdue.

These actions were a sign of the formation of a community of interests among the leaders of the military-industrial complex. In practice, this resulted in the creation in 1951 under the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of the Bureau for Military and Military-Industrial Issues, chaired by N.A. Bulganin, which operated from February 1951 to October 1952. The members of the bureau were A.M. Vasilevsky - Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR, D.F. Ustinov - Minister of Armaments of the USSR, M.V. Khrunichev - Minister of the Aviation Industry of the USSR, I.S. Yumashev - Naval Minister of the USSR.

Assembly of T-34 tanks at the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant, 1943

The Bureau dealt with the consideration of plans for military orders, research work on military equipment, the adoption of new models and the decommissioning of obsolete ones and other issues related to providing the army and navy with weapons and military equipment. Fundamental questions on military equipment were considered and approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The bureau did not have a special apparatus (with the exception of a small secretariat), the functions of the apparatus were performed by sectoral groups of the Administrative Department of the USSR Council of Ministers.

In 1953, the branch bureaus under the Council of Ministers of the USSR were abolished. In 1953-56. N. A. Bulganin, V. A. Malyshev, M. Z. Saburov, and M. V. Khrunichev, Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, were in charge of coordinating the activities of the defense industries. The Bureau of the USSR Council of Ministers carried out general supervision and resolution of fundamental and intersectoral issues of the defense industries and the Ministry of Defense.

In December 1956, the functions of managing the defense industries were transferred to the State Economic Commission. She prepared proposals on issues of military equipment, carried out operational management of the defense industries. The Commission was given the right to issue orders and resolutions in the field of industry, binding. In December 1957, the State Economic Commission was liquidated. On December 6, 1957, the Commission on Military-Industrial Issues was established under the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The role of the commission as a coordinator was especially high under the conditions of N. S. Khrushchev's reform of 1957-1958. on the decentralization of economic management through the system of "sovnarkhozes". However, even after the restoration of the ministries in 1965, the commission retained its functions and became the most stable organizational form for coordinating the multifaceted activities of the country's military-industrial complex, right up to the end of the Soviet period.

The main tasks of the Military Industrial Commission were:

• organization and coordination of work on the creation of modern types of weapons and military equipment;
• coordinating the work of the defense industries and other ministries and departments of the USSR involved in the creation and production of weapons and military equipment;
• provision together with the State Planning Committee of the USSR integrated development defense industries;
• raising the technical level of production, quality and reliability of weapons and military equipment;
• operational management and control over the activities of defense industries, including in terms of the creation, production and supply of weapons and military equipment, the production of consumer goods and other civilian products in volumes equal in value to the wage fund of enterprises in the industry, as well as control over the activities other industries on these issues;
• preparation, together with the USSR State Planning Committee and the USSR Ministry of Defense, of armament programs, five-year and annual plans for the creation, production and production of weapons and military equipment and their submission for consideration and approval;
• preparation and submission, jointly with the State Planning Committee of the USSR, the ministries of defense and finance, for consideration by the USSR Defense Council and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, proposals on the target figures for the country's expenditures on the creation and production of weapons, military and other special equipment defense value in the relevant planning periods;
• coordination of foreign economic relations of defense industries for military-technical cooperation.

Due to the reduction in military spending in the 1980s. The military-industrial complex was entrusted with the task of coordinating and carrying out work in the field of military production conversion. In this regard, the military-industrial complex was entrusted with a number of important operational tasks for the development of the civilian sector of the national economy:

• organization of development and production of equipment for the processing industries of the agro-industrial complex, light industry and trade;
• organization of development and production of non-food consumer goods; organization of technical means and works in the field of communications; coordination of work on the creation of nuclear power facilities;
• management of the implementation of programs for the electronization of the national economy; coordination of work in the field of air, cargo and passenger transportation and other tasks.

In different periods of the work of the military-industrial complex, as a rule, it included the deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers - chairman of the military-industrial complex, first deputy chairman of the military-industrial complex - in the rank of minister of the USSR, deputy chairmen of the military-industrial complex, first deputy chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, in charge of defense industry, ministers of defense industries industry, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR - Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR for armaments, as well as well-known and authoritative scientists and organizers of industry.

Ustinov D.F. - First Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

Since the formation of the Military-Industrial Commission in 1957, during the Soviet period, it was successively headed by Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov (1957-1963), Leonid Vasilyevich Smirnov (1963-1985), Yuri Dmitrievich Maslyukov (1985-1988), Igor Sergeevich Belousov (1988-1991).

By the mid 1980s. the military-industrial complex had 15 departments involved in the creation of weapons and military equipment, analysis of the production activities of ministries and the economic efficiency of the military-industrial complex, the introduction into production of the achievements of scientific and technological progress, advanced technologies, military-technical cooperation with foreign countries.

The employees of the military-industrial complex apparatus included representatives of the main branches of the complex: 50% came from ministries from senior positions, 10% from the USSR State Planning Committee, 6% from the USSR Ministry of Defense, 34% from research institutes, design bureaus and factories. The most numerous were the leaders of the defense industry and the scientific and technical elite, the smallest percentage came from people from the military department. Scientific and technical personnel, including prominent scientists, participated in the work of the Scientific and Technical Council, which operated under the military-industrial complex.

The procedure for making decisions on military-industrial issues, mainly established since the 1960s, demonstrated unity and joint work all the main divisions of the Soviet military-industrial complex. The final decisions usually came out in the form of joint resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which carried various classifications of secrecy and were secretly sent to the interested departments. The same special decisions of the highest authorities formalized any changes in policy related to the activities of the military-industrial complex. However, this was preceded by a long work of a number of departments.

Draft decisions were developed at the initial stage by those scientific and production units that were engaged in the development of a particular weapon system (some technical orders were also developed by scientific and technical organizations of the military department). Then all interested ministries submitted their project proposals to the Military Industrial Commission, which was the main coordinating body of the entire complex. The Commission made a lot of efforts, trying to harmonize the provisions of the document with the interests and capabilities of all interested departments, scientific and technical and scientific and production organizations. The final version of the project prepared by the commission was then sent to the Defense Industry Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, where it was subjected to additions and adjustments and issued in the form of a joint directive of the main organs of the party and state leadership. Such was the general pattern of decision-making in this area during the period of the “developed military-industrial complex”, when the latter occupied a leading position in the economy of the USSR.

Reusable rocket and space system "Energia-Buran" at the Baikonur Cosmodrome (1988)

The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a very important decision for the work on endowing the military-industrial complex from the moment it was formed with the powers of a government body. The authorized functions of the military-industrial complex manifested themselves in cases of disagreement between the ministries of defense industries (MOOP) and the State Planning Committee of the USSR; MOOP and the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, the State Planning Committee of the USSR and the Ministry of Defense of the USSR when considering the current annual plans for the production and supply of weapons and military equipment, plans and programs for weapons, research and development work on weapons and military equipment, the creation of mobilization capacities, and also in the development of these plans, taking into account their implementation. The decision of the military-industrial complex in the event of disagreement was, as a rule, final. Sometimes the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU made the final decision on fundamental issues of a financial and material-resource nature.

Many large and important state events took place with the participation and under the control of the Military Industrial Commission over the long years of its existence.

Thus, a network of institutes, design bureaus and factories has been formed, covering all areas of rocket science (design bureaus and institutes: B. V. Gidaspova, V. P. Glushko, B. P. Zhukov, S. P. Korolev, V. P. Makeeva, A. D. Nadiradze, M. F. Reshetneva, V. N. Chelomeya, M. K. Yangelya and others), the largest enterprises and production associations: the plant named after. Khrunichev, Yuzhmashzavod, Krasnoyarsk Machine-Building Plant, Leninets, Omsk Aviation Plant, Fazotron, Zlatoust Machine-Building Plant, Votkinsk Machine-Building Plant, Orenburg Aircraft Plant, Biysk Chemical Combine and many others.

Manned and unmanned space systems for various purposes have been created. Combat missile systems of the Strategic Missile Forces, the basis of the country's nuclear missile shield, have been deployed. A missile-carrying submarine fleet and long-range aviation equipped with cruise missiles have been created and have become a formidable force.

During the same period, strategic nuclear-missile parity was achieved with the United States and NATO countries, ensuring long-term strategic stability, and simply a world without nuclear wars. This world has been conquered by the enormous work of the workers of the defense industry, which has created strategic nuclear forces.

Today it has become clear to everyone that only the strategic nuclear-missile parity achieved through the efforts of our entire country made possible the transition to a policy of reducing and limiting nuclear weapons, only this parity put world politicians at the negotiating table.

The formation of a systemic organization for the development of weapons also belongs to the same period. In order to emphasize the breadth and responsibility of the tasks solved under the auspices and with the participation of the military-industrial complex, it is enough to recall the comprehensive programs created on the basis of deep scientific research of the most important types of rocket and space, aviation, anti-missile and other weapons systems.

The military-industrial complex and the ministries of defense industries have fulfilled the main task set by the state to ensure a high scientific and technical level of weapons and military equipment - so that the armament of the army and navy in terms of its tactical and technical parameters is not inferior or exceeds the level of military equipment of foreign countries. With the constant control of the Military Industrial Commission, the army and navy were promptly equipped with the latest weapons in the shortest possible time and in the required quantity.

Military-industrial complex workers have always highly appreciated the contribution of the command and personnel of the USSR Ministry of Defense to the development of new equipment that enters service with the Soviet army and navy.

After the collapse Soviet Union in December 1991, centralized management of industry, including its military-industrial complex, was abolished, the State Commission of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on military-industrial issues and the ministries of defense industries of the USSR were liquidated, defense industry enterprises entered a phase of deep crisis, military the power of the country and its defense capability decreased from year to year.

Today, all Russian citizens should remember that thanks to the centralized management of the defense and other sectors of the national economy, which made it possible to concentrate production, material and intellectual resources on providing the front with everything necessary, the Soviet Union won the Great Patriotic War, and in the period 1957-1991 created a strategic nuclear-missile parity with the United States and NATO countries, which prevented a new war against global destruction and ensured 60 years of peace on our soil.

The re-establishment of the Military-Industrial Commission in the Russian Federation in 2006, along with other steps in the field of ensuring the country's military security, testifies to the revival of the attention of the Russian state and society to military-industrial issues and serves as a necessary prerequisite for the development of the domestic military-industrial complex.

The question of which event should be considered a symbol of the emergence of a central government body coordinating the tasks of building the armed forces and the work of the military industry is still open and requires further historical research. The historical process of the development of Russian statehood is in fact not determined, and therefore the events of 1938, 1953, and 1957 can serve as equally symbolic for the issue under consideration.

This article discusses some economic aspects of the development of the domestic military-industrial complex during the Soviet period in the history of the 20th century. In our work, we rely heavily on archival data.

During the years of the Civil War and "war communism", in conditions of international isolation, all weapons had to be produced within the country, relying on domestic resources. Since 1919, enterprises that served artillery, navy, aviation, sapper troops and commissariats were removed from the jurisdiction of various departments and transferred to the Council of the Military Industry of the All-Russian Council of the National Economy (VSNKh).

With the transition to the New Economic Policy, the reorganization of the management of the national economy began. In the state industry, including the military, group associations began to be created - trusts, which were supposed to work on the principles of cost accounting. In accordance with the decree on trusts of April 10, 1923, the Main Directorate of the Military Industry of the USSR was created as part of the Supreme Council of National Economy, to which weapons, cartridge, gun, gunpowder, aviation and other factories of a military profile were subordinate; Aviatrust existed independently. In 1925, the military industry was transferred to the Military Industrial Directorate of the Supreme Council of National Economy, consisting of 4 trusts - weapons and arsenal, cartridge and tube, military chemical and rifle and machine gun.

In general, the military industry since the mid-20s. began to be transferred to the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies of the state, self-supporting principles in this area turned out to be unviable. With the onset of accelerated industrialization, there was a transition to a more rigid system of state planning and industrial management, first through the system of sectoral central administrations, and then sectoral ministries 1 .
Bystrova Irina Vladimirovna - Doctor of Historical Sciences (Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences).

The starting point for a new round of militarization and the creation of a military industry can be considered the so-called period of the "military threat" of 1926-1927. and the subsequent rejection of the NEP - the “great turning point” of 1929. By the decision of the Administrative Meeting of the Council of Labor and Defense (RZ STO) of June 25, 1927, the Mobilization and Planning Directorate of the Supreme Economic Council was created, which was supposed to lead the preparation of industry for war. The main "working apparatus" of the RZ STO in matters of preparation for war were the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, which was responsible for preparing the army, and the State Planning Committee of the USSR, which was in charge of developing control figures for the national economy "in case of war." The People's Commissariat of Finance, in turn, had to consider "estimated emergency expenses for the first month of the war" 2 .

In the specially developed resolutions of the State Planning Commission and the RZ STO, according to the control figures for the 1927/28 financial year, this time period was considered as “a conditional period when the main processes of transition to working conditions during the war (mobilization) are taking place in the national economy”, and the entire next year - as the period when "the main transient processes have already been completed." In the context of the "military threat" most of these plans had a paper-declarative character. Military spending has not yet grown significantly: the main funds were directed to the preparation of the "industrial leap", and the defense industry has not yet been allocated organizationally.

This period includes the emergence of secret, numbered factories. At the end of the 20s. "Personnel" military factories began to be assigned numbers, behind which the former names were hidden. In 1927, there were 56 such factories, and by April 1934, the list of "personnel" military factories approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks included 68 enterprises. The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 13, 1934 established a special regime and benefits for defense enterprises - the so-called special regime plants.

The main task of the secrecy regime was "to ensure the greatest safety of factories of defense importance, to create strong guarantees against the penetration of class-hostile, counter-revolutionary and hostile elements into them, as well as to prevent their actions aimed at disrupting or weakening the production activities of factories" 3 . This system was greatly strengthened and expanded in the post-war "nuclear" era of the development of the defense industry.

In order to finance the so-called special work of a narrowly defensive nature at civil industry enterprises, special loans were allocated from the budget, which had the intended purpose of ensuring the independence of defense work from the general financial condition of the enterprise 4 . The figures for the actual military expenditures of the state were allocated in the budget as a separate line and were kept secret.

The emergence of specific defense industries became possible only on the basis of accelerated industrialization and the creation of heavy industry. After the liquidation of the Supreme Council of National Economy in 1932, the defense industry passed into the system of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry. Since the mid 30s. the process of organizational isolation of the defense industry from the basic branches of heavy industry began. In 1936, military production was allocated to the People's Commissariat for Defense Industry (NKOP). This was the stage of "quantitative accumulation". The growth rate of the military industry, according to official data, noticeably outpaced the development of industry as a whole. So, if the total volume of industrial production for the second five-year period increased by 120%, then defense - by 286%. During the three pre-war years, this advance was already threefold 5 .

1939-1941 (before the start of the war) were a special period when the foundations of the economic structure of the military-industrial complex (MIC) were fixed. The restructuring of the national economy had a pronounced militaristic character. During these years, a system of defense industry management bodies was formed. General management of the development of mobilization planning in 1938-1941, as well as supervision of the activities of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat navy was carried out by the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, whose chairman was I.V. Stalin. The Economic Council of the Council of People's Commissars oversaw the activities of the defense industry. During the war years, all the functions of managing the defense industry were transferred to the State Defense Committee (GKO).

In 1939, the NKOP was divided into specialized defense people's commissariats: weapons, ammunition, aviation, shipbuilding industries. To coordinate the mobilization plan of industry in 1938, an interdepartmental Military-Industrial Commission was created. Military departments - the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy, as well as the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) were the main customers and consumers of military products. A characteristic feature of the period of the first five-year plans was the significant role of the military in the formation of the defense industry, which increased even more in the prewar years. So, from 1938 to 1940. The contingent of military representatives of NGOs at defense industry enterprises increased one and a half times and amounted to 20,281 people. 6

For our study, this period is especially important as the experience of the functioning of the military mobilization model of the Soviet economy, the essential features of which manifested themselves in the subsequent stages of the history of the USSR and became the foundation of the Soviet military-industrial complex. Among these features was the subordination of the interests of the civilian consumer to the solution of military tasks. One of the main tasks of the third five-year plan, the government considered strengthening the defense capability of the USSR "on such a scale that would provide a decisive advantage for the USSR in any coalition of attacking capitalist countries." In this regard, according to the third five-year plan, compared with 1937, spending on the national economy as a whole increased by 34.1%, on social and cultural events - by 72.1%, and on defense - by 321.1% . Military spending was to amount to 252 billion rubles, or 30.2% of all state budget expenditures 7 .

A characteristic feature of the Soviet mobilization model was the attraction of funds from the population through the so-called state loans (many of which the state was not going to return). In 1937, a special loan for strengthening the defense of the USSR was issued for 4 billion rubles, however, according to the People's Commissariat of Finance (NKF), the subscription to this loan was even higher - 4916 million rubles. (most of it was urban population). As stated in the NKF circular of April 9, 1938, in accordance with the "great growth in current year fund of wages and incomes of the collective-farm village" there were opportunities "in the current year to significantly exceed the amount of the loan" 8 . This practice became an integral feature of the Soviet economic system.

Even sharper shifts towards militarization were outlined in the so-called Special Quarter IV of 1939, when the mobilization plan - MP-1 - was put into effect for arming the army, which required the restructuring of the entire industry. It provided for the establishment of a list of construction projects, for the development of which funds were allocated in excess of the established limits, and the military departments received priority over civilian consumers. Of the total investment in construction of 5.46 billion rubles. investments in defense construction projects and enterprises amounted to 3.2 billion rubles, i.e. more than half 9 .

Emergency mobilization plans were adopted in 1940-1941. In connection with the introduction of mobilization plans, military orders were placed at enterprises in all sectors, up to factories for the production of children's toys and musical instruments. Often, the implementation of these plans required a complete change in their production profile from civilian to military. At the same time, the process of transferring enterprises from civilian departments to military departments, which then assumed a massive character during the war years, began. In total, in 1940 more than 40 enterprises were transferred to the defense departments 10 .

The actual average annual growth rate of defense production for the first two years of the pre-war five-year plan was 143.1%, for three years - 141%, against 127.3% of the average annual rate established by the third five-year plan. The volume of gross output of the people's commissariats of the defense industry increased 2.8 times in three years 11 . An even more strenuous program was planned for 1941. The industrial authorities were obliged to ensure that military orders for aviation, armaments, ammunition, military shipbuilding and tanks were fulfilled as a matter of priority before all consumers.

In the prewar years, a new military-industrial base began to be created in the east of the country. The idea of ​​developing the eastern regions from the very beginning of its inception was strategically linked to the growth of the country's military potential and the solution of defense tasks. Even before the war, the Urals became a new center of military production, and the development of the Far East began from this point of view. However, a decisive shift in this respect occurred during the war years, which was associated primarily with the occupation or threat of the enemy seizing most of the European territory of the USSR.

During the war period, there was a massive movement of industry to the eastern regions: in total, more than 1,300 enterprises were evacuated and restored in the east, most of which were under the jurisdiction of the defense people's commissariats. For 4/5 they produced military products.

The structure of industrial production has also changed radically, and it is mandatory that it be transferred to meet military needs. According to rough estimates, military consumables accounted for about 65-68% of all industrial output produced in the USSR during the war years 12 . Its main producers were the people's commissariats of the military industry: aviation, weapons, ammunition, mortar weapons, shipbuilding and tank industries. At the same time, other basic branches of heavy industry were also engaged in providing military orders: metallurgy, fuel and energy, as well as the People's Commissariats of light and food industries. Thus, the development of the economic structure of the military-industrial complex during the war years was in the nature of total militarization.

During the Great Patriotic War, the country lost three-quarters of its national wealth. The industry was severely destroyed in the territories that were under occupation, and in the rest of the territories it was almost completely transferred to the production of military products. Total population The population of the USSR decreased from 196 million people. in 1941 to 170 million in 1946, i.e. for 26 million people 13

One of the main tasks in the first post-war years for the USSR was the restoration and further build-up of the country's military-economic base. To solve it in the conditions of economic ruin, it was first of all necessary to find new sources of restoration and development of priority sectors of the national economy. According to the official Soviet propaganda, this process was supposed to be designed for "internal resources", for delivering the country from economic dependence on a hostile capitalist environment.

Meanwhile, this dependence by the end of the war remained very significant. An analysis carried out by Soviet economists of the ratio of imports of the most important types of equipment and materials and their domestic production for 1944 showed that, for example, imports of machine tools amounted to 58%, universal machines - up to 80%, crawler cranes (their domestic industry did not manufacture) - 287%. The situation with non-ferrous metals was similar: lead - 146%, tin - 170%. Particular difficulties arose with the need to develop domestic production of goods that were supplied during the war years under Lend-Lease (for many types of raw materials, materials and foodstuffs, the share of these deliveries ranged from 30 to 80%) 14 .

In the first post-war years, one of the most important sources of resources was the export of materials and equipment for the so-called special deliveries - captured, as well as under reparations and agreements from Germany, Japan, Korea, Romania, Finland, Hungary. The Commission for the Compensation of Damage Caused by the Hitlerite Invaders, established at the beginning of 1945, made a general assessment of the human and material losses of the USSR during the war years, developed a plan for the military and economic disarmament of Germany, and discussed the problem of reparations on an international scale.

The Special Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, as well as special commissions from representatives of economic departments, were engaged in the practical activities for the export of equipment. They compiled lists of enterprises and equipment, laboratories and research institutes that were subject to "withdrawal" and send to the USSR on account of reparations. By the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On the dismantling and export to the Soviet Union of equipment from Japanese power plants, industrial enterprises and railways located on the territory of Manchuria," the management of this work was entrusted to the authorized Special Committee under the Council of People's Commissars M.Z. Saburov. By December 1, 1946, 305,000 tons of equipment from Manchuria had arrived in the USSR with a total value of 116.3 million US dollars. Altogether, during the two years of the work of the Special Committee, about 1 million wagons of various equipment were exported to the USSR from 4,786 German and Japanese enterprises, including 655 enterprises of the military industry 15 . At the same time, the Soviet side was most interested in German developments in the field of the latest types of weapons of mass destruction.

By the summer of 1946, there were about two million prisoners of war in the USSR - a huge reserve of labor. The labor of prisoners of war was widely used in the Soviet national economy (especially in construction) during the years of the first post-war five-year plan. German technical groundwork and the labor of specialists were actively used at the initial stages of domestic rocket science, nuclear project, in military shipbuilding.

Eastern European countries also played the role of suppliers of strategic raw materials at the early stage of the creation of the nuclear industry in the USSR, especially in 1944-1946. As uranium deposits were explored in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, the Soviet authorities followed the path of creating joint joint-stock companies for their development under the guise of mining companies. In order to develop the Bukovskoye deposit in Bulgaria, the Soviet-Bulgarian Mining Society was created in early 1945 under the auspices of the NKVD of the USSR 16 . The deposit became the main source of raw materials for the first Soviet reactor.

The countries of the Eastern bloc continued to be the most important source of uranium until the early 1950s. As N.A. Bulganin emphasized in his speech at the “Anti-Beria” Plenum of the Central Committee of July 3, 1953, the state was “well provided with uranium raw materials”, and a lot of uranium was mined on the territory of the GDR - “maybe no less than they have in Americans at their disposal" 17 .

The most important resource for the post-war reconstruction and buildup of the economic and defense power of the USSR was the mobilization potential of the centrally planned economy for concentrating forces and resources in the most priority areas from the point of view of the country's leadership. One of the traditional levers of forced mobilization was the financial and tax policy of the state. At the end of the war, in the fourth quarter of 1945, the state, it would seem, gave relief to the population, reducing the military tax by 180 million rubles, but at the same time a war loan was organized (subscribed by the peasants) for 400 million rubles. 18 Food prices were raised in September 1946 by 2-2.5 times. In 1948, the size of the agricultural tax increased by 30% compared with 1947, and in 1950 by 2.5 times.

In general, the course taken by the leadership of the USSR towards military-economic competition with the West, and above all with the much more economically and technologically advanced United States, was carried out at the cost of considerable hardship for the majority of the country's population. At the same time, it should be noted that the implementation of the Soviet atomic and other programs for the creation of the latest weapons in general corresponded in the post-war years to the mass mood of the Soviet people, who were willing to endure hardships and hardships in the name of preventing a new war.

One of the resources of economic mobilization was massive forced labor. The NKVD camp system became the basis for the creation of the nuclear and other branches of the military industry. In addition to the labor of imprisoned compatriots, in the late 40s. the labor of prisoners of war was widely used and a system of organized recruitment of labor from various segments of the population was used. A peculiar semi-compulsory form was the work of military builders and specialists, the importance of which especially increased after the abolition of the system of mass camps in the mid-1950s.

In the early post-war years, it was impossible to maintain the size of the armed forces and the size of defense production on a wartime scale, and therefore a number of measures were taken to reduce the military potential. In this regard, two stages are outwardly distinguished in the military-economic policy of the Stalinist leadership: 1945-1948. and late 40s - early 50s. The first was characterized by tendencies towards the demilitarization of the Soviet economy, the reduction of the armed forces and military spending. A real indicator of these trends was the demobilization of the army, carried out in several stages from June 1945 to the beginning of 1949. In general, by the end of 1948 - the beginning of 1949, the Soviet Army was generally reduced from more than 11 million people. up to 2.8 million people twenty

In the first post-war years, the country's leadership also proclaimed a policy of restructuring industry for civilian production. After the reorganization of the management system in May 1945, the number of defense people's commissariats decreased, and military production was concentrated in the people's commissariats for armaments, aviation, shipbuilding, agricultural and transport engineering (in March 1946 they were renamed ministries).

The implementation of the policy of reducing military production and increasing the output of civilian products began already at the end of 1945 and was under the personal control of the Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee (after the war - Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers) L.P. Beria, who concentrated control over heavy industry. However, his instructions on the "conversion" of enterprises to civilian production were rather contradictory. On the one hand, he urged the directors of enterprises in every possible way, who were accustomed to working in emergency military conditions, to drive defense products and experienced great difficulties in switching to civilian production. On the other hand, Beria ordered to maintain and increase the production of a wide range of military products - gunpowder, explosives, chemical munitions, etc. 21

In 1946-1947. the production of a number of types of conventional weapons - tanks and aircraft - was significantly reduced. The heads of the military-industrial departments actively resisted the policy of "conversion": ministers D.F. Ustinov, M.V. Khrunichev, M.G. on increasing the production of new types of defense products. Attempts to demilitarize industry led to a deterioration in the state of the industrial sector of the economy, already destroyed by the war. Within 6-9 months from the beginning of the restructuring of industry, the output of civilian products only to an insignificant extent compensated for the decline in military production. This led to a decrease in the total volume of production, a deterioration in quality indicators, and a reduction in the number of workers. Only in the second quarter of 1946 did the volume of military output stabilize, while civilian output increased, and a gradual increase in production began.
According to official sources, the post-war restructuring of industry was completed already in 1947, as evidenced by the following figures22:

According to official data, military production in 1940 amounted to 24 billion rubles, in 1944 - 74 billion, in 1945 - 50.5 billion, in 1946 - 14.5 billion, in 1947 the level 1946. However, these figures must be treated with a certain degree of conventionality: they rather show the general dynamics than are reliable in absolute terms, since prices for military products have been falling repeatedly since 1941. 23

The dynamics of military spending of the state budget was as follows: in 1940 - 56.7 billion rubles, in 1944 - 137.7 billion, in 1945 - 128.7 billion, in 1946 - 73.7 billion, in 1947, the level of 1946 was preserved. Thus, even according to official statistics, state spending on military needs by the end of the “conversion” period exceeded the pre-war figures of 1940.

In general, the process of reducing military production mainly affected rapidly obsolete weapons. last war which were not required in previous quantities. In 1946-1947. the share of civilian and military products has stabilized.

However, as early as 1947, a decrease in plans for the production of civilian products began in a number of ministries of the defense profile (shipbuilding, aviation industry), and from 1949 there was a sharp increase in military orders. During the first post-war five-year plan, the nomenclature of "special products" was almost completely updated, i.e. military products, which paved the way for what began in the 50s. rearmament of the army and navy.

At the end of the 40s. a long-term plan for the production of armored vehicles was developed up to 1970. After the failure of the tank production program in 1946-1947, a sharp drop in their production in 1948, starting from 1949, a constant and steady increase in the production of this industry was planned. In connection with the war in Korea, since 1950, the volume of production of aviation equipment has sharply increased 24 .

In general, behind the external "demilitarization" was hiding a new round of the arms race. Already in 1946, the Council of Ministers adopted a number of resolutions on the development of the latest weapons, decisions on developments in the field of jet and radar technology. The construction of warships, mothballed during the war, resumed: a ten-year military shipbuilding program was adopted, and the construction of 40 naval bases was planned. Emergency measures were taken to accelerate the creation of the Soviet atomic bomb.

Along with the traditional defense ministries, emergency bodies were created under the Council of People's Commissars (since March 1946 - the Council of Ministers of the USSR) to manage the new programs: the Special Committee and the First Main Directorate (on the atomic problem), Committee No. 2 (on jet technology), the Committee No. 3 (by radar). The extraordinary, mobilization and experimental nature of these programs has necessitated the concentration of resources of various departments in special supra-ministerial governing bodies.

In general, "demilitarization" was rather a sideline of the post-war restructuring of industry, the main strategic direction of development of which was the development and build-up of the latest types of weapons. Plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR for 1951-1955. for the military and special industries provided for a significant volume of supplies of all types of military equipment, which increased from year to year, with special attention paid to the preparation of capacities for the production of new types of military equipment and strategic raw materials, the replenishment of special production facilities switched after the end of the war to other sectors of the national economy.

For six defense-industrial ministries (aeronautical industry, armaments, agricultural engineering, transport engineering, communications industry, auto-tractor industry), the average output of military products over the five-year period was to increase by 2.5 times. However, for some types of military equipment, a significantly greater growth was planned: for radar and armored vehicles - by 4.5 times. On a larger scale, the production of atomic "products" increased, which was planned separately even from all other types of military products. To eliminate "bottlenecks" and disproportions in the national economy and to create new industries for the production of weapons - jet technology and radar equipment - the plan outlined the volume of capital investments in the main sectors of the defense industry in the amount of 27,892 million rubles.

Moreover, in the early 1950s this plan has been repeatedly adjusted upwards. In March 1952, the size of capital investments in the military and defense-industrial departments was noticeably increased. Arbitrary adjustment of plans in general was a characteristic feature of the Soviet planning system. Another long-term trend, with the exception of certain periods, was the predominant growth in investments in the defense sector compared to other industries. During the period under review, a kind of military-industrial revolution began in the country, accompanied by a sharp increase in military spending, the expansion of defense programs and the simultaneous strengthening of the influence of the professional military elite on the decision-making process on defense issues. From the beginning of the 1950s plans for the production of various types of modernized conventional weapons - tanks, artillery self-propelled guns, aircraft - increased; forced rearmament of the army began.

According to official data, the strength of the USSR Armed Forces increased in the early 1950s. up to almost 6 million people. According to recently declassified information from the archives, the quantitative composition of the central apparatus of the War Ministry as of September 1, 1952 increased by 242% compared to the pre-war figure - as of January 1, 1941: 23,075 people. against 9525 25 . The unwinding of a new spiral of arms race and confrontation was partly due to the aggravation of the international situation in the late 1940s and early 1950s. (Berlin crisis, the creation of NATO, the war in Korea, etc.), partly with the strengthening of the role of the military machine in the life of Soviet society and the state.

Despite the new growth of the military programs of the USSR in the early 1950s, by that time the military-industrial complex had not yet gained the political weight that would allow it to decisively influence the policy of the Soviet leadership. In 1953-1954. a steady course towards the deployment of a military confrontation with the West gave way to a controversial period in economic and military policy. 1954-1958 became a rare period in Soviet history of a decrease in military spending and an increase in the share of the consumption sector in the gross national product.

In contrast to the growth of military programs in the preceding 1950-1952, the second half of 1953 and 1954 were already marked by some shift towards civilian production and consumerism. For example, a survey and design work according to the Military Ministry for 1953, it initially amounted to 43225 million rubles, and then it was reduced to 40049 million, i.e. more than 3 million rubles. The plan for the military and special industries for 1954 was also adjusted downward: the growth in production in 1954 compared to 1953, instead of 107% according to the plan and 108.8% at the request of the War Ministry, was reduced to 106.9 %.

When evaluating the dynamics of the gross national product, one should take into account the 5% reduction in wholesale prices for military products from January 1, 1953, as well as the growth in the output of civilian products. The decline in the gross output of a number of ministries in 1953 and according to the draft plan for 1954 was also explained by a decrease in the output of defense products and an increase in the output of consumer goods, which had lower wholesale prices. In general, the output of consumer goods in 1953 and 1954 significantly exceeded the volume of production provided for these years according to the five-year plan for 1951-1955. 26

The trend towards a reduction in military spending continued in subsequent years, when the influence of N.S. Khrushchev in the top leadership increased, until the establishment of his autocracy in the summer of 1957. The military spending of the USSR was reduced by a total of one billion rubles. By the middle of 1957, the size of the army and navy had decreased by 1.2 million people. - up to about 3 million people. - due to the program announced by Khrushchev to reduce the traditional types of the Armed Forces (in particular, this concerned Stalin's plans for the deployment of conventional naval forces and weapons) and a shift in priorities towards missiles, electronics and nuclear weapons.

According to some Western estimates, during the first three years of Khrushchev's rule, the share of military spending in the country's gross national product (GNP) decreased from 12% to 9%, while the share of the consumption sector increased from 60% to 62% 27 . In 1959, the growth in the cost of manufacturing the latest weapons reversed this trend, and the military spending of the USSR again increased to the level of 1955, although due to the rapid growth of the gross national product during this period, the percentage of military spending in GNP remained the same. After 1959, their share in GNP began to slowly but steadily increase. Military spending again took a priority place in the economic policy of the Soviet leadership. According to Western estimates, in the time interval from 1952 to 1970. 1961-1965 became the period of the highest growth rates in the USSR's military expenditures, when their average growth rates reached 7.6% 28 .

At the same time, the lion's share of military spending was precisely the cost of the production and operation of the latest weapons and their systems, and not the maintenance of troops. This trend of predominant growth in the cost of military equipment developed more and more noticeably in the conditions of the scientific and technological revolution.

The period of the late 1950s - early 1960s. characterized by the search for new principles for organizing the management of the national economy of the USSR, including the defense industry. By the time of the reorganization of the management of the national economy undertaken by N.S. Khrushchev in 1957-1958. the main armaments production programs were concentrated in the Ministry of Medium Machine Building (atomic program), the Ministry of Defense Industry (renamed in 1953 from the Ministry of Armaments), the Ministry of Radio Engineering Industry (created in 1954), as well as in the Ministries of Aviation and Shipbuilding Industry. As is known, in the late 1950s the system of sectoral ministries was abolished, and defense industry enterprises, like other sectors of the economy, were transferred to the jurisdiction of local economic councils. To organize research and development work on the creation of weapons, the State Committees for Aviation Technology, Defense Technology, Shipbuilding and Radio Electronics, and the Use of Atomic Energy were created.

In general, the Khrushchev reform led to a certain decentralization and the establishment of links between defense and civilian enterprises, the expansion of the geographical and social boundaries of the Soviet military-industrial complex. According to N.S.Simonov, enterprises for the serial production of defense products were included in the system of regional economic relations, leaving the state of production and technological isolation. Local economic management bodies were able to place orders for them that met local needs. Enterprises of the military-industrial complex (DIC) even began to show a tendency towards economic independence, which manifested itself in the establishment of real contractual relations with the customer - the Ministry of Defense - in matters of pricing 29 .

At the same time, in the context of decentralization of defense industry management, the coordinating role of the most important state body at the supra-ministerial level, recreated in the late 1950s, increased. Military Industrial Commission under the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. It was headed in turn by the largest leaders of the Soviet military-industrial complex D.F. Ustinov, V.M. Ryabikov, L.N. Smirnov. The commission became the main governing body of the defense industry in the period of the 1960s - 1980s.

The return to the ministerial system after the dismissal of N.S. Khrushchev at the end of 1964 contributed to the strengthening of the centralized planning principle in the management of the defense industry. Another “gathering” of military enterprises into centralized sectoral ministries began. In particular, in 1965, the Ministry of General Machine Building was created, which concentrated work on rocket and space technology (previously, these developments were scattered among the enterprises of a number of ministries). As a result of the reform of 1965, the so-called "nine" defense industry ministries were finally formed, in which military production was mainly concentrated (Ministries of the aviation industry, defense industry, general engineering, radio industry, medium engineering, shipbuilding industry, chemical industry, electronic industry, electrical industry). They were joined by 10 allied ministries, which were also engaged in the production of military and civilian products.

The economic structure of the military-industrial complex was actually the supporting structure of the entire socio-economic system of the USSR. As of the end of the 1980s, defense industry enterprises produced 20-25% of the gross domestic product (GDP), absorbing the lion's share of the country's resources. The best scientific and technical developments and personnel were concentrated in the defense industry: up to 3/4 of all research and development work (R&D) was carried out in the defense industry. The enterprises of the defense complex produced most of the civilian electrical products: 90% of televisions, refrigerators, radios, 50% of vacuum cleaners, motorcycles, electric stoves. About Uz of the country's population lived in the area where the OPK enterprises were located 30 . All this, at the same time, led to an excessive inflation of the zone of "unproductive" expenditures on the production of weapons to the detriment of the sphere of consumption.
The Soviet military-industrial complex became the most important supplier of weapons for the countries of the "third world" and the "socialist camp". In the early 1980s 25% of weapons and military equipment produced in the USSR were exported abroad. The size of military supplies for many years was considered top secret information, which was partially revealed to the Russian public only in the early 1990s. During the post-war period, the USSR participated in armed conflicts and wars in more than 15 countries (by sending military specialists and contingents, as well as supplying weapons and military equipment in order to provide "international assistance"), including 31:

In general, by the beginning of the 1980s. The USSR became the world's first supplier of weapons (in terms of supply), ahead of even the United States in this respect. The Soviet military-industrial complex went beyond the boundaries of one state, becoming the most important force in the world economy and international relations. At the same time, it became an increasingly heavy burden on the country's economy and an obstacle to raising the standard of living of the Soviet people.

1 For more details, see: Simonov N.S. Military-industrial complex of the USSR in the 1920-1950s: economic growth rates, structure, organization of production and management. M., 1996. Ch. 2; Mukhin M.Yu. The evolution of the management system of the Soviet defense industry in 1921-1941 and the change in the priorities of the "defense industry" // Otechestvennaya istoriya. 2000. No. 3. S. 3-15. On the structure of the defense industry in the late 20s - early 30s. see also: Russian State Archive of Economics (hereinafter - RGAE). F. 3429. Op. 16.
2 See: RGAE. F. 7733. Op. 36. D. 164.
3 See: ibid. D. 186. L. 107.
4 Ibid. F. 3429. Op. 16. D. 179. L. 238.
5 See: Lagovsky A. Economy and military power of the state // Krasnaya Zvezda. 1969. October 25.
6 Simonov N.S. Decree. op. S. 132.
7 RGAE. F. 4372. Op. 92. D. 173. L. 115.
8 Ibid. F. 7733. Op. 36. D. 67. L. 45.
9 See: ibid. D. 158. L. 29-34.
10 Ibid. D. 310. L. 37.
11 Ibid. F. 4372. Op. 92. D. 265. L. 4.
12 Simonov N.S. Decree. op. S. 152.
13 See: The USSR and the Cold War / Ed. V.S. Lelchuk, E.I. Pivovar. M „ 1995. S. 146.
14 Based on documents from the RGAE funds.
15 For more details, see: The State Archive of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the GA RF). F. 5446. Op. 52. D. 2. L. 45-116.
16 See: GA RF. F. 9401. On. 1. D. 92. L. 166-174.
17 See: Case of Beria // Izv. Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 169-170.
18 See: RGAE. F. 1562. Op. 329. D. 2261. L. 21-22.
19 The USSR and the Cold War. S. 156.
20 See: Evangelista M. Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised // Soviet Military Policy Since World War II / Ed. by W.T.Lee, KF.Staar. Stanford, 1986. P. 281-311.
21 For more details, see: Postwar Conversion: On the History of the Cold War, Ed. ed. V.SLelchuk. M., 1998.
22 See: GA RF. F. 5446. Op. 5. D. 2162. L. 176.
23 See: RGAE. F. 7733. Op. 36. D. 687.
24 For more details, see: Bystrova I.V. Development of the military-industrial complex // USSR and cold war. pp. 176-179.
25 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 164. D. 710. L. 31.
26 According to the RGAE documents.
27 See: Soviet Military Policy... P. 21-22.
28 See: Bezborodov A.B. Power and the military-industrial complex in the USSR in the mid-40s - mid-70s // Soviet society: weekdays of the cold war. M.; Arzamas, 2000, p. 108.
29 See: Simonov N.S. Decree. op. pp. 288-291.
30 See: Zaleschansky B. Restructuring of military-industrial complex enterprises: from conservatism to adequacy // Chelovek i trud. 1998. No. 2. S. 80-83.
31 Red star. 1991. May 21.

Plan
Introduction
1 Structure
2 Geography of the military-industrial complex
3 Military-industrial complex and technology development
4 Estimates and opinions

Bibliography Introduction The military-industrial complex of the USSR (military-industrial complex of the USSR) is a constantly operating system of interconnections between the subjects of the economic and socio-political structure of Soviet society, connected with ensuring the military security of the USSR. It was formed in the post-war years, in the conditions of the Cold War. More than ⅓ of all material, financial, scientific and technical resources of the country went to the development of the military-industrial complex in the USSR. 1. Structure In different historical conditions, the composition of institutions responsible for the formation of the Soviet military-industrial complex was different. In 1927, in addition to the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR and the Main Directorate of the Military Industry of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR, the following were considered to perform "defense" functions: Air-Chemical Defense. The single center of their strategic and operational management was the Council of Labor and Defense under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Thirty years later, in 1957, in addition to the Ministry of Defense of the USSR and the Ministry of Defense Industry of the USSR, the Ministry of Aviation Industry of the USSR, the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry of the USSR, the Ministry of the Radio Engineering Industry of the USSR, the Ministry of Medium Machine Building of the USSR, the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR were considered to directly perform "defense" functions , the State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy, the Main Directorate of State Material Reserves, the Main Engineering Directorate of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, Glavspetsstroy at Gosmontazhspetsstroy, the organization of mailbox No. 10, DOSAAF, the Central Committee "Dynamo" and the All-Army Military Hunting Society. The centers of their strategic and operational management were the USSR Defense Council and the Commission on Military Industrial Issues under the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. 2. Geography of the military-industrial complex The Soviet military-industrial complex had a vast geography. In various parts of the country, there was an intensive extraction of raw materials necessary for the production of atomic and nuclear weapons, the production of small arms and artillery weapons, ammunition, the production of tanks, aircraft and helicopters, shipbuilding, research and development work was carried out:

Before the collapse of the Soviet Union uranium mining was conducted in many republics (RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, Kazakh SSR, Uzbek SSR). Uranium nitrous oxide was produced by enterprises in the cities of Zhovti Vody (Ukraine, Dnepropetrovsk region), Stepnogorsk (Kazakhstan, Akmola region, Tselinny mining and chemical plant), Chkalovsk (Tajikistan, Khujand region). Of the rather numerous uranium ore deposits in Russia, only one is currently being developed - in the area of ​​​​the city of Krasnokamensk in the Chita region. Here, at the Priargunsky Mining and Chemical Production Association, uranium concentrate is also produced. Uranium enrichment conducted in Zelenogorsk, Novouralsk, Seversk and Angarsk. Centers for production and separation of weapons-grade plutonium are Zheleznogorsk ( Krasnoyarsk region), Ozyorsk and Seversk. nuclear munitions gather in several cities (Zarechny, Lesnoy, Sarov, Tryokhgorny). the largest research and production centers of the nuclear complex are Sarov [Note. 1] and Snezhinsk. Finally, nuclear waste disposal- another branch of specialization of Snezhinsk. Soviet atomic and hydrogen bombs were tested at the Semipalatinsk test site (modern Kazakhstan) and at the Novaya Zemlya test site (archipelago New Earth). Aviation industry enterprises There are practically in all economic regions of the country, but they are most powerfully concentrated in Moscow and the Moscow region. Among major centers industry, we can distinguish Moscow (aircraft of the MiG, Su and Yak series, helicopters of the Mi series), Arsenyev (An-74 aircraft, helicopters of the Ka series), Irkutsk and Komsomolsk-on-Amur (Su aircraft), Kazan (Tu-160 aircraft, helicopters Mi), Lyubertsy (Ka helicopters), Saratov (Yak aircraft), Taganrog (A and Be seaplanes), Ulan-Ude (Su and MiG aircraft, Mi helicopters). aircraft engines produced by enterprises of Kaluga, Moscow, Rybinsk, Perm, St. Petersburg, Ufa and other cities. Production of rocket and space technology is one of the most important branches of the military-industrial complex. The largest research and design organizations industries are concentrated in Moscow, the Moscow region (Dubna, Korolev, Reutov, Khimki), Miass and Zheleznogorsk. Moscow and the Moscow region are also important production centers rocket and space technology. So, in Moscow, ballistic missiles were created, long-term orbital stations; in Korolev - ballistic missiles, artificial earth satellites, spaceships; air-to-surface aircraft missiles, in Zhukovsky - anti-aircraft missile systems medium range, in Dubna - anti-ship supersonic missiles, in Khimki - rocket engines for space systems (NPO Energomash). Rocket propulsion systems are produced in Voronezh, Perm, Nizhnyaya Salda and Kazan; various spacecraft - in Zheleznogorsk, Omsk, Samara. Unique launch equipment for rocket and space complexes is manufactured in Yurga. ballistic missiles produced by the enterprises of Votkinsk (Topol-M), Zlatoust and Krasnoyarsk (for submarines). The largest Russian cosmodrome is the Plesetsk cosmodrome in the Arkhangelsk region. Since 1966, more than one and a half thousand launches of various spacecraft have been made at the cosmodrome. In addition, it is also a military training ground. Leading control centers space flights located in the Moscow region; in Korolev is the famous Mission Control Center (MCC). Artillery weapon systems and spare parts for them are produced by enterprises in Volgograd, Yekaterinburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Perm (Grad, Uragan, Smerch), Podolsk and other cities. His small arms Izhevsk, Kovrov, Tula are world famous (AK-74 assault rifle, SVD sniper rifle, AGS grenade launcher"Flame", smoothbore weapon), Vyatskiye Polyany. The development of unique small arms is carried out in Klimovsk. Among the main centers armored industry we can name Nizhny Tagil (T-72 T-90 tanks) and Omsk (T-80UM tanks), Volgograd (armored personnel carriers), Kurgan (infantry fighting vehicles) and Arzamas (armored vehicles). Military shipbuilding to date, it is concentrated in St. Petersburg (submarines, nuclear missile cruisers), Severodvinsk (nuclear submarines), Nizhny Novgorod and Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Ammunition production mainly concentrated in numerous factories of the Central, Volga-Vyatka, Volga, Ural and West Siberian regions. Chemical weapon produced in the USSR since the 1920s. long time it was produced by the enterprises of Berezniki, Volgograd, Dzerzhinsk, Novocheboksarsk and Chapaevsk. At present, the destruction of the gigantic arsenal of accumulated chemical weapons is an exceptionally difficult problem for the Russian Federation. The main storage bases for chemical weapons are Gorny (Saratov region), Kambarka and Kizner (Udmurtia), Leonidovka (Penza region), Maradykovsky (Kirov region), Pochep (Bryansk region), Shchuchye (Kurgan region).

Bibliography:

It was in this city that the first Soviet atomic and hydrogen bombs were created.

Introduction

Relevance of the topic. The sixties became a turning point in the history of Soviet society. The objective need for cardinal, revolutionary, and not evolutionary changes in the Soviet economy was already ripe by the beginning of the 1960s. Isolation of planning from life, sectoral management from the regional, the monopoly of the manufacturer in conditions of general shortages, the lack of interest of enterprises in scientific and technological progress - all this required radical changes even then.

The period from the mid-60s to the mid-80s, when the political leadership of the country was headed by L.I. Brezhnev is called the time of stagnation - the time of missed opportunities. It began with rather bold reforms in the field of the economy, it ended with an increase in negative trends in all spheres of public life, stagnation in the economy, and a crisis in the socio-political system.

Objective. In my abstract, I would like to consider the problem of conversion not from an economic-theoretical point of view, although I will also focus on this, but from an economic-historical point of view. The main goal is to show the military strength and analyze the conversion of the military-industrial complex of the USSR, and also have to consider the positive and negative consequences of this process.

Tasks. The goal is to solve the following tasks:

· show the scale of the military-industrial complex of the 60-80s;

Give a theoretical justification for the conversion;

Analyze two paragraphs.

Structure. This abstract consists of an introduction, two paragraphs, a conclusion and a list of references.

The state of the military-industrial complex of the USSR in the 60s, the first half of the 80s of the XX century.

By the beginning of the Second World War, 1000 tanks will be produced, crude but effective. At that time, Stalin abandoned the project of the S-7 tank, which was considered the tank of a new era. He thought about atomic bomb, the creation of which required resources and forces. This bomb was tested in August 1949. In 1947, work was completed on the creation of the first R1 combat missile. In the 50s. R2 missiles appear, and then ballistic ones. The military-industrial complex was created at the expense of the hardships of the Soviet people, agriculture was ruined. The military-industrial complex in a certain way influenced all the economic parameters of the country's development. In 1961, the first manned spacecraft was launched from the Baikonur Cosmodrome. 1961 "Vostok" with a man on board was put into orbit around the Earth. Since that time, the Soviet doctrine has been changing See: Gorbachev M.S. Perestroika and new thinking for our country and for the whole world. M., 1988. - S.23..

It proceeds from the fact that the West is preparing a new war: a nuclear missile war. On November 7, 1967, the USSR demonstrated its ballistic missiles to the world for the first time. The development of rocket technology in the 1950s and 1960s led to the creation of the fifth branch of the Soviet armed forces: the Strategic Missile Forces. The decision to establish them was made in December 1959.

The 1950s and 1960s are marked by the rapid development of science and technology in the USSR, as well as throughout the world. The first nuclear power plants, a nuclear-powered ship, an artificial earth satellite appeared in the USSR, which gave grounds for believing in their invincibility. The 1960s-1980s are marked by an arms race. By the end of the 1980s, the military-industrial complex occupied a leading position in the economy of the USSR. According to some estimates, military-industrial complex enterprises produced 20-25% of GDP, while absorbing the largest part of the country's resources (for example, for certain types of metal products and plastics - from 30 to 50%).

The need to constantly improve the technical level of products produced by this huge sector of the economy also led to the deformation of government spending: for example, in 1988, 3/4 of all funds allocated from the state budget for research and development were spent on the needs of the defense industry. . The total number of personnel of defense research institutes and design bureaus exceeded 1.8 million people, which turned this area into the largest branch of intellectual labor application. It should be noted that the majority of military-industrial complex enterprises had a "double profile", producing many types of civilian products.

The term conversion appears in the second half of the 80s. The Soviet military-industrial complex requested 60 billion rubles for its implementation (13 billion for conversion, and the rest for the development of new capacities of the national economy). The real structure of the USSR's economy, inherited by Russia, was characterized by two essential features: the predominant mass of resources (and the best ones) were directed to the production of weapons and components for them; a significant proportion of civilian products (almost all durable goods) were produced at military-industrial complex enterprises. By 1990, they produced: over 90% of radio receivers, televisions, refrigerators; more than 50% of motorcycles, vacuum cleaners, electric stoves and other complex technical products. True, the quality of these goods was below world standards, and the production costs were higher. Therefore, sales were possible only under the conditions of a planned distribution system with an appropriate pricing mechanism See: V.A. Pechenev on the causes of the collapse of the USSR // www.yandex.ru. August 2, 2003. .

Even in St. Petersburg, every fourth employee was engaged in the production of military products. Further preservation of the structure of the economy has lost all meaning, since the political situation has fundamentally changed. Lack of reasonable public policy in relation to the military-industrial complex led to the fact that, as a result of the transition to market relations, many enterprises. The military-industrial complex literally collapsed. This also affected those enterprises that produced products that were competitive in the foreign and domestic markets.

But there was no conversion plan. Military-industrial complex facilities have been privatized, and qualified workers are gradually dispersing. In 1992, it was possible to stop the departure of specialists in the field of rocket science to Korea. One of the results of the conversion initiated by Gorbachev was the loss of high-tech branches of science and technology. Instead of transferring technology to the West and receiving additional finance, defense enterprises were stopped, unloaded by the state. orders. Russia supplied weapons to those countries that could become potential adversaries. They were armed. Modern technology while growing up. troops were equipped old technology. Russian army was unable to purchase samples of modern technology See: M.V. Khodyakov. Modern history of Russia. 1914 - 2005: studies. allowance / ed. - M .: Higher education, 2007.- S. 27 ..

Western financial and industrial groups do not seek to invest in the Russian economy. It is much easier to buy ideas in Russia, which is always rich and impoverished. The situation in Russia is aggravated by the fact that in the USSR the best raw materials and labor resources were directed to the development of the defense industry, and the civilian sector was content with what was left of the defense industry. The absence of any competition among producers, and hence incentives to improve the quality of products, provided an opportunity only for the extensive development of civilian sectors of the national economy. As a result, there was a chronic lag in the quality of domestic civilian products from the world level, although for military products this difference was minimal.

During the years of stagnation in our country, the policy was aimed at a general arms race associated with the period of the “cold war” between our country and the West. The bulk of our industry was aimed at increasing the country's military base. And so the state spared no funds for the development of this industry. The entire scientific and technical potential of the country was directed to the development and improvement of the military-industrial complex. But times went on. Comparing the economies of Western countries and the USSR, it was easy to see what kind of economic crisis such a political orientation led to. Our country was the best in the military field, it showed its power to everyone, but at the same time it was a shame to turn the other side - the socio-economic situation of society. Our country faced the question of how to most effectively rebuild a large part of the military-industrial complex on a peaceful basis, so that it bears a peacekeeping character.

In the West, the question of disarmament arose long ago. In this regard, it is worth recalling the famous manifesto of B. Russell and A. Einstein (1955), who called for unity in order to save the human race, the reports of the Club of Rome, reports of the commission of the Socialist International.

Refusal from pressure, from the use of military force in interstate relations must be replaced by something, linked with positive proposals See: Rakovsky SA, The collapse of the USSR: causes and consequences. Formation of a new Russian state // www.history.perm.ru (historical portal). January 22, 2008..

International interaction can be raised to a new level by improving the practice of political negotiations, gradually moving away from the principle of balance of power towards finding an acceptable balance of partners' interests See: PS Samygin, tutor in the history of Russia. Series "Textbooks and teaching aids". Rostov n / a: "Phoenix", 2002. - S. 116. .

Those facing the army of a militarily developed country will entail a change in the quality level of products manufactured in the military-industrial complex. The cessation of the nuclear arms race on a global scale between the two superpowers, the USSR and the USA, as well as the elimination of the "Iron Curtain" led to the fact that the possibility of global military operations has noticeably decreased. Therefore, the main task of the armed forces at the new stage will be participation in local conflicts without the use of weapons of mass destruction. According to Pentagon military analysts, the US Armed Forces should in the future have the strength and means to conduct more than one global war, but two local military conflicts.

armed forces military industrial

MAINTENANCE.

CHAPTER FIRST

Problems of methodology and source study of the history of the formation of the Soviet military-industrial complex

I. Subject of study.С.25.

II. Historical Features organization of production in the USSR of weapons systems and military equipment. P.48.

III. Criteria for periodization of the history of the formation of the Soviet

IV. Problems of economic analysis of the main production activities of enterprises and organizations of the Soviet

CHAPTER TWO.S.81.

Soviet military industry in the 1920s: from restoration to reconstruction

I. Restoration of large-scale industry of the USSR and the state of military-industrial production. P.85.

II. "Military alarm" of 1927 and its consequences.S. 101.

III. Military-strategic aspects of the militarization of Soviet industry in the late 1920s and early 1930s.S. 109.

IV. The Soviet military industry in the year of the "great turning point". P.117.

CHAPTER THREE

Soviet military industry in the 1930s: development of production capacities and issues of mobilization training

I. Results of the first five-year plan for the military industry. 131.

II. The results of the second five-year plan for the military industry. P. 144.

III. Military mobilization training of the Soviet industry.S. 171.

IV. The relationship between the military industry and the NKVD.S. 188.

V. The military industry of the USSR in 1939-1941 p.203.

CHAPTER FOUR

Soviet military-industrial complex during the Great Patriotic War and post-war restoration of the national economy (1941-1950).

I. Problems of organizing the production of military products in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. P.222.

I. The structure of the military-industrial complex of the USSR in 1941-1945. P.243.

III. Indicators of production and economic activities of the military-industrial people's commissariats.S.269.

IV. The influence of military consumption on the proportions of the distribution of national income and gross domestic product of the USSR in 1941-1945. and the implementation of the plan for the conversion of the Soviet military industry in 1945-1950, p.285.

CHAPTER FIVE.S.317.

Creation of new branches of the Soviet military-industrial complex in the first post-war decade

I. "Uranium project" and its implementation. С.318.

II. Organization of work on the design and production of jet aviation and rocket technology. С.351.

III. Soviet nuclear missile shield: costs and results. P.392.

IV. Creation of the Soviet radio-electronic industry. P. 419.

CHAPTER SIX.S.443.

The military-industrial complex of the USSR during the period of economic reforms by N.S. Khrushchev

I. The structure of the military-industrial complex of the USSR in the late 1950s and early 1960s. P. 449.

II. Search for optimal management methods for defense industries. С.470.

III. Growth rates of military production in the USSR in the second half of the 1950s-early 1960s. P. 495.

IV. The influence of the military-industrial complex on the proportions of the economic development of the USSR in the 1950s. P. 514.

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