Artillery of the First World War briefly. Field artillery before the First World War Russian artillery of the First World War

The First World War gave birth to super-heavy guns, one shell of which weighed a ton, and the firing range reached 15 kilometers. The weight of these giants reached 100 tons.

Shortage

Everyone knows the famous army joke about “crocodiles that fly, but low.” However, military men in the past were not always erudite and perspicacious. For example, General Dragomirov generally believed that the First World War would last four months. But the French military completely accepted the concept of “one gun and one shell,” intending to use it to defeat Germany in the coming European war.

Russia, following the military policy of France, also paid tribute to this doctrine. But when the war soon turned into a positional war, the troops dug into trenches, protected by many rows of barbed wire, it became clear that the Entente allies were sorely lacking heavy guns capable of operating in these conditions.

No, the troops had a certain number of relative large-caliber guns: Austria-Hungary and Germany had 100-mm and 105-mm howitzers, England and Russia had 114-mm and 122-mm howitzers. Finally, all the warring countries used 150/152 or 155 mm howitzers and mortars, but even their power was clearly insufficient. “Our dugout in three rolls,” covered on top with sandbags, protected against any light howitzer shells, and concrete was used against heavier ones.

However, Russia did not even have enough of them, and she had to purchase 114-mm, 152-mm and 203-mm and 234-mm howitzers from England. In addition to them, the heavier guns of the Russian army were the 280-mm mortar (developed by the French company Schneider, as well as the entire line of 122-152-mm howitzers and cannons) and the 305-mm howitzer 1915 from the Obukhov plant, produced during the war in Only 50 units available!

"Big Bertha"

But the Germans, preparing for offensive battles in Europe, very carefully approached the experience of the Anglo-Boer and Russian-Japanese wars and in advance created not just a heavy, but a super-heavy weapon - a 420-mm mortar called “Big Bertha” (named after the then owner of the Krupp concern), the real “witches’ hammer”.

The projectile of this super-gun weighed 810 kg, and it fired at a distance of as much as 14 km. The explosion of a high-explosive shell produced a crater 4.25 meters deep and 10.5 meters in diameter. The fragmentation scattered into 15 thousand pieces of deadly metal, which retained lethal force at a distance of up to two kilometers. However, the defenders of the same, for example, Belgian fortresses considered armor-piercing shells the most terrible, from which even two-meter ceilings made of steel and concrete could not save them.

During the First World War, the Germans successfully used Berthas to bombard well-fortified French and Belgian forts and the Verdun fortress. It was noted that in order to break the will to resist and force the fort’s garrison of a thousand people to surrender, all that was required was two such mortars, a day of time and 360 shells. No wonder our allies on the Western Front called the 420-mm mortar “fort killer.”

In the modern Russian television series “Death of the Empire”, during the siege of the Kovno fortress, the Germans fire at it from the “Big Bertha”. At least that's what the screen says about it. In fact, “Big Bertha” was “played” by the Soviet 305-mm artillery mount TM-3-12 on a railway, which was radically different from “Bertha” in all respects.

A total of nine of these guns were built, they took part in the capture of Liege in August 1914, and in the Battle of Verdun in the winter of 1916. Four guns were delivered to the Osovets fortress on February 3, 1915, so scenes of its use on the Russian-German front should have been filmed in winter, not summer!

Giants from Austria-Hungary

But on Eastern Front Russian troops more often had to deal with another 420-mm monster gun - not a German, but an Austro-Hungarian howitzer of the same caliber M14, created in 1916. Moreover, yielding German gun in the firing range (12,700 m), it surpassed him in the weight of the projectile, which weighed one ton!

Fortunately, this monster was much less transportable than the wheeled German howitzer. That one, albeit slowly, could be towed. Every time a position was changed, the Austro-Hungarian one had to be disassembled and transported using 32 trucks and trailers, and its assembly required from 12 to 40 hours.

It should be noted that in addition to the terrible destructive effect, these guns also had a relatively high rate of fire. So, “Bertha” fired one shell every eight minutes, and the Austro-Hungarian one fired 6-8 shells per hour!

Less powerful was another Austro-Hungarian howitzer, the Barbara, with a 380-mm caliber, firing 12 rounds per hour and sending its 740-kilogram shells over a distance of 15 km! However, both this gun and the 305-mm and 240-mm mortars were stationary installations that were transported in parts and installed in special positions, which required time and a lot of labor to equip. In addition, the 240-mm mortar fired only at 6500 m, that is, it was in the destruction zone of even our Russian 76.2-mm field gun! Nevertheless, all these weapons fought and fired, but we clearly did not have enough weapons to respond to them.

Entente response

How did the Entente allies respond to all this? Well, Russia had little choice: basically these were the already mentioned 305-mm howitzers, with a projectile weighing 376 kg and a range of 13448 m, firing one shot every three minutes.

But the British released a whole series of such stationary guns of ever-increasing caliber, starting with 234 mm and up to 15-inch - 381 mm siege howitzers. The latter were actively pursued by Winston Churchill himself, who achieved their release in 1916. Although the British turned out to be not very impressive with this gun, they produced only twelve of them.

It threw a projectile weighing 635 kg over a distance of only 9.87 km, while the installation itself weighed 94 tons. Moreover, it was pure weight, without ballast. The fact is that in order to give this gun greater stability (and all other guns of this type), they had a steel box under the barrel, which had to be filled with 20.3 tons of ballast, that is, simply put, filled with earth and stones.

Therefore, the 234-mm Mk I and Mk II installations became the most popular in English army(a total of 512 guns of both types were fired). At the same time, they fired a 290-kilogram projectile at 12,740 m. But... they also needed this same 20-ton box of earth, and just imagine the amount of earthwork that was required to install just a few of these guns in positions! By the way, you can see it “live” today in London at the Imperial War Museum, just like the 203-mm English howitzer displayed in the courtyard of the Artillery Museum in St. Petersburg!

The French responded to the German challenge by creating a 400-mm howitzer M 1915/16 on a railway transporter. The gun was developed by the Saint-Chamon company and, even during its first combat use on October 21–23, 1916, it showed its high efficiency. The howitzer could fire both “light” high-explosive shells weighing 641–652 kg, containing about 180 kg of explosives, respectively, and heavy ones weighing from 890 to 900 kg. At the same time, the firing range reached 16 km. Before the end of the First World War, eight 400 mm such installations were made, two more installations were assembled after the war.

The First World War was the heyday of the giant gun. Each country participating in the armed conflict sought to create its own super-heavy gun, which would be superior in all respects to the enemy’s weapon. The weight of such giants could reach up to 100 tons, and the mass of one projectile could exceed 1000 kilograms.

Background

1. Heavy 420-mm howitzer “Skoda”, Austria-Hungary

2. “Big Bertha”, Germany

3. 380 mm howitzer BL, UK

4. 370-mm mortar "Fillo", France

5. 305 mm howitzer, Russian Empire

15" gun Mk. I

Classification

Production history

Operation history

Weapon characteristics

Characteristics of projectiles

381 mm Mk I gun- British 15-inch naval gun, developed in 1912. The Mk.I was the most common and perhaps the most effective large caliber gun in the British Navy. It was installed on ships that served from 1915 to 1959 and was the main weapon of the Royal Navy during both World Wars.

H.M.S. Warspite shells the coast of Sicily, 1943

general information

The combat path of 15" guns began in 1915 during the Dardanelles operation, in which the newly built battleship Queen Elizabeth took part. Then there was the Battle of Jutland, the record hit of the Warspite on the Giulio Cesare from a distance of 24 kilometers in the battle of Calabria , the sinking of three Italian cruisers at Cape Matapan and many other battles.The last shot at the enemy was fired 30 years later, in 1945, when the same Queen Elizabeth fired at Japanese fortifications in the Andaman Islands.

Gun design and production

The design of the gun was developed on the basis of the successful 13.5"/45 gun (created for arming super-dreadnoughts of the Orion type). The "dreadnought race" that took place before the First World War increased the requirements for the tactical and technical characteristics of ships very quickly and the developers of the 15" gun took a very risky step, reducing the testing program to a minimum before launching into production. The risk paid off: the Queen Elizabeth-class battleships arrived in time for the Battle of Jutland, but their direct opponents, the German Baden-class battleships, were “late.”

The gun barrel had a “wire” design traditional for British guns of the early 20th century: a layer of steel wire was wound between the inner (tube A) and outer (tube B) supporting pipes of the gun to increase the tensile strength of the barrel. The gun was equipped with a piston-type bolt. The length of the gun barrel was 630 inches (16 meters - 42 calibers), the length of the rifled part of the barrel was 516 inches (13.1 m). The barrel life was approximately 335 shots with an armor-piercing projectile when fully charged. The gun was lined; a worn gun had its internal pipe A replaced at the factory. Interesting fact-- a gun was considered completely “shot” if its caliber increased by 0.74 inches (1.9 cm) at the beginning of the barrel rifling.

From 1912 to 1918, 186 15-inch barrels were produced. Production was carried out at several factories at once:

• Elswick Ordnance Company, Elswick, Newcastle: 34 units;
• Armstrong Whitworth, Openshaw, Manchester: 12 units;
• William Beardmore & Company, Parkhead, Glasgow: 37 units;
• Coventry Ordnance Works, Coventry: 19 units;
• Royal Gun Factory, Woolwich: 33 pieces;
• Vickers, Son and Maxim, Sheffield: 49 units.

When repairing ships, worn-out barrels were removed and immediately replaced with new ones stored in arsenals. And the removed guns were sent for repairs and then for storage. Therefore, over the course of half a century of service, a gun barrel, as a rule, ended up on several ships. For example: as you know, the turrets of the last British battleship HMS Vanguard were taken from the battlecruisers HMS Courageous and HMS converted into aircraft carriers Glorious, but of the eight main battery guns, only one began its service on these ships, and then its “previous duty station” was HMS Warspite .

List of ships

The guns were used on several types of British warships up to HMS Vanguard, the last British battleship built.

Ships armed with 15 inch Mark I guns:

• Queen Elizabeth class battleships
• Rivenge-class battleships - 5 ships with eight guns each
• Rinaun-class battlecruisers - 2 ships with six guns each
• Battlecruiser HMS Hood- 8 guns
• Glories-class battlecruisers - 2 ships with four guns each
• Erebus type monitors
• Monitors of the "Marshal Ney" type - 2 ships with two guns each
• Roberts-class monitors - 2 ships with two guns each
• HMS battleship Vanguard- 8 guns (in turrets intended for battle cruisers Coreyes And Glories)

The gun was also used in coastal defense.

Shells

What, in fact, can be seen from the following tables? The range of shells for guns was quite wide. At the same time, the mass of projectiles for different purposes was approximately the same, to simplify the operation of guidance systems. If during the First World War shells were modified frequently, because they suffered from “childhood diseases” (see replacement of explosives in armor-piercing shells), on the one hand, and were created “for the task” (long high-explosive shells for monitors, shrapnel shells to combat torpedo boats) on the other hand, the fleet approached the Second War with ammunition of an established design, with which it went through the entire war.

World War I shells

Interwar and World War II shells

Design of the APC Mk.XXIIb armor-piercing projectile

Notes

1. What does "N club" mean? British artillerymen tried to increase the range of the projectile by sharpening its head and thereby improving the flow around it. The parameter "N club" is the radius of curvature of the head of the projectile in calibers.
2. The Battle of Jutland revealed that English armor-piercing shells do not penetrate armor, since their equipment, lyddite, is prone to breaking “on the armor” from a strong blow. A new explosive, “shellite,” was developed, but shells containing it appeared in cellars only by 1918.
3. “Long” 8-caliber high-explosive shells were used only on monitors; on battleships, their dimensions did not correspond to the feed mechanisms.
4. Extended 6-caliber shells were developed in 1938 and initially could only be used on battleships that underwent modernization in the mid-1930s ( Warspite, Renown, Valiant And Queen Elizabeth). By the middle of the war (1943), the feed mechanisms had been adapted to use these shells on all surviving ships with 15" guns.
5. From the previous note, in particular, it follows that HMS Hood I never had extended shells in my ammunition load.

Ammunition

Approximately 100 shells per barrel were placed in the cellars of battleships. The Coragees-class battlecruisers were designed with 80 shells per barrel, but after the battle at the Falklands it turned out that the shell consumption was much more than planned and the capacity of the white elephant magazines was increased to 120 shells.

The ships' ammunition varied greatly depending on the current combat mission. Battleships entered service armed only with armor-piercing shells. By the end of the First World War, for example, "Rinaun" carried 72 APC, 24 CPC (for "insurance" of non-armor-penetrating APCs) and 24 HE (for shooting along the shore). During World War II, the “standard” ammunition consisted mainly of armor-piercing shells (in the magazines there were 5 high-explosive shells per barrel), for tasks of shelling the shore, armor-piercing shells were unloaded and high explosives were received. According to the project, the Vanguard carried 95 armor-piercing shells, 5 high explosives and 9 practical shells, but after the battleship served as a “royal yacht” in 1947, it spent most of its subsequent service with empty cellars.

The ammunition of monitors in the First World War consisted mainly of high-explosive shells and “several” semi-armor-piercing shells. In World War II they carried 25% of armor-piercing and 75% of landmines.

Charges

The standard charge was (approximately) 200 kg of cordite. Each charge consisted of four "quarter charges" equal mass, and it was allowed to fire a reduced (3/4) charge to increase the steepness of the trajectory or simply to reduce wear on the gun.

Between the wars, a “reinforced” 222 kg charge was developed to increase the firing range of guns. This charge, as expected, sharply increased barrel wear and was used only on ships on which the elevation angles of the guns were not increased.

Penetration table

The frontal plate of the turret of the battleship Baden, pierced by a 15" shell during a test shelling, 1921

There are many options for armor penetration tables based on different data and for different shells. This table was compiled by the British Admiralty in 1935 based on calculated data, without full-scale tests. The numbers are given for the vertical side (and the horizontal, obviously, deck)

1) This distance is beyond the range of guns mounted on ships.

Tower installations

Making a tower for the HMS monitor Abercrombie

Note. 1) It is indicated that on battleship H.M.S. Ramillies(1916) two of the four turrets were of the Mk.I* type, and on the battlecruiser HMS Renown(1916) two of the three turrets were Mk.I. The Mk.I turrets originally ordered for the Ramillies were installed on urgently constructed HMS monitors Marshal Ney(1915) and H.M.S. Marshal Soult(1915). The reasons for the appearance of Mk.I turrets on Rinaun are still unclear.

Differences in installation types

Mark I* different from Mark I the presence in the reloading compartment of the so-called. “Kenyon door” - a rotating partition that separated the turret space from the cellars and prevented the fire from breaking down down during a fire in the tower.

Installation Mark II for the cruiser "Hood" was significantly redesigned. The main external difference is the increased height of the turret, which made it possible to increase the elevation angles of the guns

Indexes Mark I/N And Mark I*/N received turrets that were modernized during the overhaul of four ships in the mid-1930s. The guns received increased elevation angles due to the expansion of the gun ports and changes in the lifting mechanisms. The sight embrasures were also moved from the roof to the front plate, and thus the problem with one turret firing on top of another was solved (see “horizontal aiming angles” below).

Tower Mark I/N RP 12 was created on the basis of the Mark I* turret and incorporated all the experience in refining 15" gun turrets over a third of a century. Enlarged gun embrasures received armored caps on top, a system was introduced remote control turning towers, etc. (see description of H.M.S. Vanguard).

A discussion of monitor towers is beyond the scope of this article.

Performance characteristics

Model of the gun turret of the battleship Queen Elizabeth

• elevation/declination angles: see table above;
• vertical aiming speed: 5 degrees/sec;
• horizontal aiming angles: -150 / +150 degrees 1) ;
• horizontal aiming speed: 2 degrees/sec;
• loading angles: from -5 to +20 degrees 2) ;
• rate of fire: 2 rounds per minute 3).

Notes

1. On the Mk.I turrets, the sight embrasures were placed very poorly, in the front of the turret roof. Therefore, on ships that had a linearly elevated arrangement of towers (i.e., on almost all ships), the upper towers could not fire over the lower ones, in the sector from -30 to +30 degrees from the center plane. This deficiency was corrected only on the Mark I/N, Mark I*/N, Mark II and Mark I/N RP 12 installations - that is, only on six ships out of all that used 15" guns.
2. Formally, the mechanisms made it possible to load the gun up to an elevation angle of +20 degrees. In practice, due to the insufficient power of the hydraulic drive of the rammer, there was a risk of “not biting” the leading belt of the projectile at the beginning of the rifling and... it falling back. Therefore, they preferred to lower the barrels for loading to an angle of +5 degrees.
3. The rate of fire of "2 rounds per minute" was achieved once on one ship. The standard for the fleet was one shot in 36 seconds.

The armor protection of the turrets varied significantly from ship to ship. Therefore, for information on armoring turret installations and turret barbettes, the reader should refer to the descriptions of individual ships.

Notes

Links

• NavWeaps.com - Britain 15"/42 (38.1 cm) Mark I (English)
• https://sergey-ilyin.livejournal.com/158698.html - “British 15" towers, determinant.”
• https://sergey-ilyin.livejournal.com/164551.html - “Migrations of British 15" towers.”

German artillery in the First World War.

As already noted, it was large-caliber artillery and the perfectly organized MANAGEMENT and ORGANIZATION of its firing that became a kind of “lifesaver” for the German army during the First World War.
German large-caliber artillery played a particularly important role on the Eastern Front, against the Russian army. The Germans drew the right conclusions from the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, understanding WHAT the strongest psychological impact the enemy's combat effectiveness is affected by intensive fire bombardment of his positions heavy artillery.

Siege artillery.

The command of the Russian army knew that Germany and Austria-Hungary had powerful and numerous heavy artillery. This is what our General E.I. subsequently wrote about this. Barsukov:

“...according to information received in 1913 from military agents and other sources, in Germany and Austria-Hungary the artillery was armed with very powerful heavy siege-type weapons.

The German 21-cm steel mortar was adopted by field heavy artillery and was intended to destroy strong fortifications; it worked well on earthen walls, brick and even concrete vaults, but provided that several shells hit one place, it was also intended to poison the enemy picrine gases of the explosive charge of a projectile with an impressive weight of 119 kg.
The German 28 cm (11 inch) mortar was wheeled, transported by two vehicles, and fired without a platform with a powerful projectile weighing 340 kg; The mortar was intended to destroy concrete vaulted and modern armored buildings.
There was information that the German army also tested mortars with calibers of 32 cm, 34.5 cm and 42 cm (16.5 dm), but detailed data on the properties of these guns was not known to Artcom.
In Austria-Hungary, a powerful 30.5 cm howitzer was introduced in 1913, transported on three vehicles (on one - a gun, on the other - a carriage, on the third - a platform). The projectile of this mortar (howitzer) weighing 390 kg had a strong explosive charge of 30 kg. The mortar was intended to arm the advanced echelon of the siege park, which followed directly behind the field army, in order to support it in a timely manner when attacking heavily fortified positions. The firing range of a 30.5 cm mortar is, according to some sources, about 7 1/2 km, according to others - up to 9 1/2 km (according to later data - up to 11 km).
The Austrian 24-cm mortar was transported, like the 30.5-cm, on road trains..."
The Germans conducted a thorough analysis combat use their powerful siege weapons and, if necessary, modernized them.
“The main striking force of the German fire hammer were the notorious “Big Berthas.” These mortars, with a caliber of 420 mm and a weight of 42.6 tons, produced in 1909, were among the largest siege weapons at the beginning of the war. Their barrel length was 12 calibers, the firing range was 14 km, and the projectile weight was 900 kg.” The best Krupp designers sought to combine the impressive dimensions of the gun with its fairly high mobility, which allowed the Germans to transfer them, if necessary, to different sectors of the front.
Due to the enormous weight of the system, transportation was carried out by broad gauge railway to the position itself; installation and bringing into position for battle required a lot of time, up to 36 hours. In order to facilitate and achieve quicker readiness for battle, a different design of the gun was developed (42-cm mortar L-12"); the length of the gun of the second design was 16 calibers, the reach did not exceed 9,300 m, i.e. it was reduced by almost 5 km "

All these powerful weapons, by the beginning of the First World War, had already been adopted and entered into service with the troops of the opponents of the Russian Empire. We had no trace of anything like this.

Russian industry did not produce guns with a caliber of 42 cm (16.5 dm) at all (and was never able to do so during all the years of the World War). 12 dm caliber guns were produced in extremely limited quantities according to orders from the naval department. We had quite a few fortress guns with a caliber of 9 to 12 dm, but they were all inactive and required special machines and conditions for firing. Most of them were unsuitable for shooting in the field.
“In the Russian fortresses there were about 1,200 outdated guns, received there from disbanded siege artillery regiments. These guns are 42-lin. (107 mm) guns mod. 1877, 6-in. (152-mm) guns of 120 and 190 poods. also arr. 1877, 6-in. (152 mm) guns of 200 pounds. arr. 1904, like some other fortress artillery guns, for example, 11-dm. (280 mm) coastal mortars mod. 1877, - served during the war, due to the lack of modern guns, in heavy field and siege artillery,” noted General E.I. Barsukov.
Of course, most of these guns were outdated both morally and physically by 1914. When they tried (under the influence of the example of the German army) to use them in the field, it turned out that neither the artillerymen nor the guns themselves were completely prepared for this. It even went so far as to refuse to use these guns at the front. This is what E.I. wrote. Barsukov about this:
“Cases of abandonment of heavy field batteries armed with 152-mm cannons of 120 poods. and 107-mm guns of 1877, visited more than once. So, for example, the commander-in-chief of the Western Front asked the commander in chief (in April 1916) not to transfer the 12th field heavy artillery brigade to the front, since the 152-mm cannons were 120 pounds. and 107-mm cannons of 1877, with which this brigade was armed, “have limited fire and a difficult supply of shells to be replenished, and 152-mm cannons have 120 pounds. generally unsuitable for offensive actions.”

Coastal 11-dm. (280-mm) mortars were intended to be allocated with personnel for the siege of enemy fortresses...
For the purpose of using 11-dm. coastal mortars mod. In 1877, as a siege weapon, Durlyakhov, a member of the Art Committee of the GAU, developed a special device in the carriage of this mortar (11-inch coastal mortars with carriages converted according to Durlyakhov’s design were used during the second siege of Przemysl).

According to the list of armaments of Russian fortresses, it was supposed to have 4,998 fortress and coastal guns of 16 different newer systems, which by February 1913 included and ordered 2,813 guns, i.e., about 40% of the guns were missing; If we take into account that not all of the ordered guns were manufactured, then by the beginning of the war the actual shortage of fortress and coastal guns was expressed in a much higher percentage.”

The commandant of the Ivangorod fortress, General A.V., recalled the condition in which these fortress guns ACTUALLY were. Schwartz:
““...the war found Ivangorod in the most pitiful state - weapons - 8 fortress cannons, four of which did not fire...
The citadel contained two powder magazines, both concrete, but with very thin vaults. When the fortresses of Warsaw and Zegrza were disarmed in 1911
and Dubno, it was ordered that all the old black gunpowder be sent from there to Ivangorod, where it was loaded into these powder magazines. There were about 20 thousand poods of it.”
The fact is that some Russian guns were created to fire old black powder. It was COMPLETELY not needed in a modern war, but its huge reserves were stored in Ivangorod and could, if fired by the enemy, explode.
A. V. Schwartz writes:
“There was only one thing left: to destroy the gunpowder. So I did. He ordered that a small amount needed for engineering work be left in one cellar, and the rest be drowned in the Vistula. And so it was done. After the end of hostilities near Ivangorod, I was asked by the Main Artillery Directorate, on what basis was the gunpowder sunk? I explained and that was the end of the matter.”
Even in Port Arthur, Schwartz noticed how little suitable the old models of our fortress artillery were for the successful defense of a fortress. The reason for this was their complete immobility.
“Then the enormous role of mobile fortress artillery became fully clear, that is, guns that can fire without platforms, without requiring the construction of special batteries, and that can be easily moved from place to place. After Port Arthur, as a professor at the Nikolaev Engineering Academy and Officer Artillery School, I very strongly promoted this idea.
In 1910, the Artillery Department developed an excellent example of such guns in the form of 6 dm. fortress howitzers, and by the beginning of the war there were already about sixty of these howitzers in the Brest warehouse. That is why in Ivangorod I made every effort to obtain as many of these weapons as possible for the fortress. I managed to get them - 36 pieces. To make them fully mobile, I ordered the formation of 9 batteries, 4 guns in each, horses for transportation were taken from the convoys of infantry regiments, I bought harness, and appointed officers and soldiers from the fortress artillery.”
It’s good that during the war the commandant in the Ivangorod fortress was such a highly trained artilleryman as General Schwartz. He managed to “knock out” 36 new howitzers from the rear of Brest and ORGANIZE them efficient use during the defense of the fortress.
Alas, this was a positive isolated example, against the background of the general deplorable state of affairs with Russian heavy artillery...

However, our commanders did not particularly care about this huge lag in the quantity and quality of siege artillery. It was assumed that the war would be maneuverable and fleeting. By the end of autumn it was planned to be already in Berlin (which was only 300 miles away across the plain). Many guard officers even took their ceremonial uniforms with them on the campaign in order to look appropriate there at the victory ceremonies...
Our military leaders did not really think about the fact that before this parade the Russian army would inevitably have to besiege and storm powerful German fortresses (Koenigsberg, Breslau, Posern, etc.).
It is no coincidence that the 1st Army of Rennenkampf in August 1914 tried to begin the investment of the Königsberg fortress, simply without having ANY siege artillery in its composition.
The same thing happened with the attempt to siege our 2nd army corps small German fortress Lötzen, in East Prussia. On August 24, units of the 26th and 43rd Russian infantry. divisions surrounded Lötzen, in which there was a Bosse detachment consisting of 4.5 battalions. At 5:40 am a proposal was sent to the commandant of the fortress to surrender the Lötzen fortress.

The commandant of the fortress, Colonel Bosse, responded to the offer to surrender and replied that it was rejected. The Lötzen fortress will surrender only in the form of a pile of ruins...
Lötzen's capitulation did not take place, nor did its destruction, which was threatened by the Russians. The fortress withstood the siege without having any influence on the course of the battle of Samsonov’s 2nd Army, except for the fact that the Russians diverted the 1st brigade of the 43rd infantry to blockade the 1st brigade. divisions. The remaining troops of the 2nd Army. The corps, having captured the area north of the Masurian Lakes and Johannisburg, from August 23 joined the left flank of the 1st Army and from the same date were transferred to the subordination of the 1st Army General. Rennenkampf. The latter, having received this corps to strengthen the army, extended his entire decision to it, according to which two corps were to blockade Koenigsberg, and the other troops of the army at that time were to assist in the operation to invest the fortress.
As a result, these two of our divisions, during the death of Samsonov’s 2nd Army, were engaged in a strange siege of the small German fortress of Lötzen, the intended capture of which had absolutely NO significance for the outcome of the entire battle. At first, as many as TWO full-blooded Russian divisions (32 battalions) attracted 4.5 German battalions located in the fortress to the blockade. Then only one brigade (8 battalions) was left for this purpose. However, not having siege weapons, these troops only wasted time on the approaches to the fortress. Our troops failed to take it or destroy it.

And here is how German troops, armed with the latest siege weapons, acted when capturing powerful Belgian fortresses:
“... the forts of Liege during the period from August 6 to 12 did not stop firing at German troops passing within the firing range of guns (12 cm, 15 cm cannon and 21 cm gaub.), but 12 On the 2nd, around noon, the attacker began a brutal bombardment with large-caliber guns: 30.5 cm Austrian howitzers and 42 cm new German mortars, and thus showed a clear intention to capture the fortress, which was impeding the freedom of movement of the German masses, for Liege covered 10 bridges. On the forts of Liege, built according to the Brialmont type, this bombardment had a devastating effect, which nothing prevented. The artillery of the Germans, who surrounded the forts with troops, each individually... could even be positioned against the Gorzh, very weakly armed, fronts and act concentrically and concentratedly. The small number of powerful guns forced the bombardment of one fort after another, and only on August 17th the last one, Fort Lonsen, fell due to the explosion of a powder magazine. The entire garrison of 500 people perished under the ruins of the fort. - 350 were killed, the rest were seriously wounded.

Commandant of the fortress, gen. Leman, crushed by debris and poisoned by asphyxiating gases, was captured. During the 2 days of bombing, the garrison behaved with selflessness and, despite the losses and suffering from asphyxiating gases, was ready to repel the assault, but the indicated explosion decided the matter.
So, the complete capture of Liege required, from August 5th to 17th, only 12 days, however, German sources reduce this period to 6, i.e. They consider the 12th to have already decided the matter, and further bombings to complete the destruction of the forts.
Under the indicated conditions, this bombing was more likely to have the character of range shooting” (Afonasenko I.M., Bakhurin Yu.A. Novogeorgievsk Fortress during the First World War).

Information about total number German heavy artillery is very contradictory and inaccurate (data from Russian and French intelligence on this differ significantly).
General E.I. Barsukov noted:
“According to information from the Russian General Staff received by the beginning of 1914, German heavy artillery consisted of 381 batteries with 1,396 guns, including 400 heavy field guns and 996 heavy siege-type guns.
According to the headquarters of the former Western Russian Front, the German heavy artillery during the mobilization of 1914 consisted, including field, reserve, landwehr, reserve, land assault and supernumerary units, of a total of 815 batteries with 3,260 guns; including 100 field heavy batteries with 400 heavy 15 cm howitzers and 36 batteries with 144 heavy mortars of 21 cm (8.2 in.) caliber.
According to French sources, German heavy artillery was available in the corps - 16 heavy 150-mm howitzers per corps and in the armies - a different number of groups, armed partly with 210-mm mortars and 150-mm howitzers, partly with long 10-cm and 15-cm cannons. In total, according to the French, the German army at the beginning of the war was armed with approximately 1,000 heavy 150-mm howitzers, up to 1,000 heavy 210-mm mortars and long guns suitable for field warfare, 1,500 light 105-mm howitzers with divisions, i.e. about 3,500 heavy guns and light howitzers. This number exceeds the number of guns according to the Russian General Staff: 1,396 heavy guns and 900 light howitzers and comes closer to the number of 3,260 guns determined by the headquarters of the Western Russian Front.
Moreover, the Germans had a significant number of heavy siege-type weapons, for the most part obsolete.
Meanwhile, at the beginning of the war, the Russian army was armed with only 512 light 122-mm howitzers, i.e. three times less than in the German army, and 240 heavy field guns (107-mm 76 guns and 152-mm howitzers 164), t That is, two or even four times less, and heavy siege-type artillery, which could have been used in a field war, was not provided for in the Russian army at all according to the mobilization schedule of 1910.”
After the sensational fall of the powerful Belgian fortresses, a large number of reports appeared about the latest German guns and their combat use.
E.I. Barsukov gives the following example:
“...answer from the GUGSH about 42 cm guns. The GUGSH reports that, according to information received from military agents, the Germans during the siege of Antwerp had three 42-cm guns and, in addition, 21-cm, 28-cm, 30.5-cm Austrian guns, a total of 200 to 400 guns. The firing distance was 9 - 12 km, but a tube of a 28 cm projectile was found, placed at 15 km 200 m. The newest forts could withstand no more than 7 - 8 hours. until complete destruction, but after one successful hit the 42-cm shell was half destroyed.
According to the GUGSH, the German tactics: simultaneous concentration of all fire on one fort; After its destruction, the fire is transferred to another fort. In the first line, 7 forts were destroyed and all the gaps were filled with shells, so that the wire and landmines had no effect. According to all data, the Germans had little infantry, and the fortress was taken by artillery alone...

According to reports, the German and Austrian batteries were out of range of fire from the forts. The forts were destroyed by 28 cm German and 30.5 cm Austrian howitzers from a distance of 10 - 12 versts (about 12 km). The main reason for the rapid fall of the fortifications is considered to be the design of the German heavy grenade with a delay, which breaks only after penetrating the concrete and causes widespread destruction.”

The considerable nervousness of the compiler of this information and its speculative nature are obvious here. Agree that the data that the Germans used “from 200 to 400 guns” during the siege of Antwerp can hardly be considered even approximate in terms of their reliability.
In fact, the fate of Liege - one of the strongest fortresses in Europe - was decided by only two 420-mm mortars of the Krupp group and several 305-mm guns of the Austrian company Skoda; they appeared under the walls of the fortress on August 12, and already on August 16, the last two forts, Ollon and Flemal, surrendered.
A year later, in the summer of 1915, to capture the most powerful Russian fortress of Novogeorgievsk, the Germans created a siege army under the command of General Beseler.
This siege army had only 84 heavy artillery guns - 6 420 mm, 9 305 mm howitzers, 1 long-barreled 150 mm cannon, 2 210 mm mortar batteries, 11 batteries of heavy field howitzers, 2 100 mm batteries and 1,120 and 150 millimeters.
However, even such a powerful shelling did not cause significant harm to the casemated fortifications of Novogeorgievsk. The fortress was surrendered to the Germans due to the betrayal of its commandant (General Bobyr) and the general demoralization of the garrison.
This document also greatly exaggerates the damaging effect of heavy shells on concrete fortifications.
In August 1914, the German army tried to capture the small Russian fortress of Osovets, bombarding it with large-caliber guns.

“The opinion of one of the General Staff officers, sent in September 1914 from the Commander-in-Chief Headquarters to the Osovets fortress to ascertain the actions of the German artillery on the fortifications, is interesting. He came to the following conclusion:
1. 8-in. (203 mm) and smaller calibers cause negligible material damage to fortified buildings.
2. The great moral effect of artillery fire in the first days of the bombardment could be used “only by an energetic” infantry offensive. The assault on the fortress, with a weak quality and unfired garrison, under the cover of 6-dm fire. (152 mm) and 8 inch. (203 mm) howitzers has a high chance of success. In Osovets, where the German infantry remained 5 versts from the fortress, on the last 4th day of the bombardment signs of calming down of the garrison were already revealed, and the shells thrown by the Germans were in vain."
For 4 days, the Germans bombarded Osovets (16 152 mm howitzers, 8 203 mm mortars and 16 107 mm guns, a total of 40 heavy and several field guns) and fired, according to a conservative estimate, about 20,000 shells.
3. Dugouts made of two rows of rails and two rows of logs with sand filling withstood hits from 152 mm bombs. The four-foot concrete barracks withstood heavy shells without damage. When a 203-mm shell directly hit the concrete, only in one place was there a depression of half an arshin (about 36 cm) left...

The small fortress of Osovets withstood German artillery bombardment twice.
During the second bombing of Osovets, the Germans already had 74 heavy guns: 4 42-cm howitzers, up to 20 275-305-mm guns, 16 203-mm guns, 34 152-mm and 107-mm guns. Over the course of 10 days, the Germans fired up to 200,000 shells, but only about 30,000 craters were counted in the fortress. As a result of the bombing, many earthen ramparts, brick buildings, iron gratings, wire nets, etc. were destroyed; concrete buildings of small thickness (no more than 2.5 m for concrete and less than 1.75 m for reinforced concrete) were destroyed quite easily; large concrete masses, armored towers and the domes resisted well. In general, the forts more or less survived. The relative safety of the Osovets forts was explained by: a) the insufficient use by the Germans of the power of their siege artillery - only 30 large 42-cm shells were fired and only at one “Central” fort of the fortress (mainly at one of its mountain barracks); b) firing by the enemy with breaks in the dark and at night, using which the defenders at night (with 1,000 workers) managed to correct almost all the damage caused by enemy fire over the past day.
The war confirmed the conclusion of the Russian artillery commission, which tested large-caliber shells on the island of Berezan in 1912, about the insufficient power of 11-dm. and 12-dm. (280-mm and 305-mm) calibers for the destruction of fortifications of that time made of concrete and reinforced concrete, as a result of which a 16-dm was then ordered from the Schneider plant in France. (400 mm) howitzer (see part I), which was not delivered to Russia. During the war, Russian artillery had to limit itself to 12-dm. (305 mm) caliber. However, she did not have to bombard German fortresses, against which a caliber larger than 305 mm was needed.
The experience of the bombing of Verdun showed, as Schwarte writes, that even the 42-cm caliber does not have the necessary power to destroy modern fortified buildings built from special grades of concrete with thickened reinforced concrete mattresses.”

The Germans used large-caliber guns (up to 300 mm) even in maneuver warfare. For the first time, shells of such calibers appeared on the Russian front in the fall of 1914, and then in the spring of 1915 they were widely used by the Austro-Germans in Galicia during the Mackensen offensive and the Russian withdrawal from the Carpathians. The moral effect of the flight of 30-cm bombs and the strong high-explosive effect (craters up to 3 m deep and up to 10 m in diameter) made a very strong impression; but the damage from a 30-cm bomb due to the steepness of the crater walls, low accuracy and slowness of fire (5 - 10 minutes per shot) was much less than. from 152 mm caliber.

It is about this, the German field artillery of large calibers, that will be discussed further.

Russian light field artillery gun of 76.2 mm caliber.

Actively used in the Russo-Japanese War, World War I, Russian Civil War and others armed conflicts with the participation of countries from the former Russian Empire ( Soviet Union, Poland, Finland, etc.) All versions of this gun were used in the Great Patriotic War.

These guns were in mass production for 36 years and were in service for about 50 years, making a worthy contribution to all the wars that Russia waged from 1900 to 1945.

Tactical and technical characteristics of the gun.

Years of manufacture --1903-1919

Issued, pcs. -- about 17,100

Caliber, mm -- 76.2

Barrel length, club -- 30

Weight in stowed position, kg -- 2380

Firing angles

Elevations (max.), ° -- +17

Decrease (min.), ° -- -3

Horizontal, ° -- 5

Fire capabilities

Max. firing range, km - 8.5

Rate of fire, rds/min -- 10-12

At the end of the 19th century, all types of artillery guns underwent dramatic changes. The advent of piston bolts and unitary ammunition significantly increased the rate of fire. Elements began to be introduced into the design of carriages to ensure the rollback of the barrel along its axis. Sighting devices have appeared that allow firing from closed firing positions. As a result of all these innovations, artillery began to acquire the appearance inherent in modern artillery systems.

In those years, Russia was at the forefront of technical progress in the field of artillery. Thus, already in 1882, Baranovsky’s 2.5-inch rapid-fire gun, which had all the features of a modern artillery piece, was put into service. Russia also looked closely at foreign models. So, in 1892 -1894, on the initiative of the Chief artillery control Comparative tests of high-speed field guns with a unitary shot were carried out: 61 and 75 mm guns of the Nordfeld system, 60 and 80 mm of the Gruson system and 75 mm of Saint-Chamon. However, none of the foreign guns satisfied the GAU, and in December 1896, tactical and technical requirements for a new three-inch rapid-firing field gun were formulated and a competition was announced for the best design of such a gun.

The competition was attended by the Aleksandrovsky, Metallichesky, Obukhovsky and Putilovsky factories, as well as foreign companies Krupp, Chatillon-Camantry, Schneider, Maxim. According to the terms of the competition, each enterprise had to present two copies of a three-inch rapid-fire cannon that met the requirements of the State Autonomous Army and 250 ammunition for each gun.

According to the test results, the development of the Putilov plant, created according to the design of engineers Zabudsky and Engelhardt, was recognized as the best. In 1899, military tests of the new gun began. Tests were carried out in five military districts in different climatic conditions. Six infantry and two horse artillery batteries, equipped with new guns, took part in them.

The tests were considered successful, and by the Highest Order of February 9, 1900, the gun was put into service under the name 3-inch field gun mod. 1900 In the troops she received affectionate

nickname - three-inch.

Serial production of the gun was organized at four factories at once: Putilov, St. Petersburg Ordnance, Perm and Obukhov. In total, during mass production (1900-1903), about 2,400 guns were manufactured and delivered to the troops. Design of a 3-inch gun mod. 1900 represented a sharp qualitative leap compared to the 87-mm field guns of the 1877 model. However, the design of its carriage still had many obsolete elements. The barrel rolled back not along the axis of the channel, but parallel to the frames and rolled back along with the barrel along the carriage slide. The hydraulic recoil brake cylinders were located inside the frame, and the knurling consisted of rubber buffers mounted on a steel rod of the buffer column.

Everything made it difficult for the troops to operate the weapon. Therefore, soon after the adoption of the sample system. In 1900, at the Putilov plant, engineers Bishlyak, Lipnitsky and Sokolovsky began design work to improve the design of the carriage.

The design of the barrel and bolt and the internal ballistics of the new gun were practically no different from the characteristics of the gun mod. 1900. The only difference was the absence of trunnions and the trunnion ring. In the new gun, the barrel was attached to the carriage cradle using a beard and two guide grips. The design of the carriage became completely different. Recoil devices are now placed in a cradle under the barrel. The hydraulic-type recoil brake was placed inside a cylindrical cradle, and its cylinder was attached to the barrel and rolled back with it when fired. The knurling springs were placed on top of the recoil brake cylinder and were compressed when fired, thus accumulating recoil energy, which was subsequently used to return the barrel to its place. The rollback occurred along the axis of the bore. The cradle was attached to the carriage using trunnions. Both guns had screw-type lifting and turning mechanisms.

The design of the gun provided for the maximum use of carbon and low-alloy steel to simplify mass production and reduce costs, but such a replacement did not entail a deterioration in the characteristics of the gun. The new three-inch carriage was equipped with mechanisms that provided horizontal guidance within 1° and vertical guidance from -6.5° to +17°. The gun itself was equipped with a sight with a longitudinal level, a mechanism for taking into account lateral corrections and a protractor with two movable diopters. These devices allowed crews to fire not only direct fire, but also from closed positions when the enemy did not see the battery.

In the same year, in accordance with the order of the Main Artillery Directorate, the gun was presented for comparative tests along with similar guns of the Krupp, Saint-Chamon and Schneider systems. All guns submitted for testing rolled back along the axis of the barrel bore, all of them had a hydraulic recoil brake, and a spring-type knurl. After test firing and transporting guns over a distance of up to 600 versts, the design of the Putilov plant was recognized as the best. In accordance with the Highest Order of January 16, 1901, 12 new guns were manufactured at the Putilov plant, which were transferred to the troops for testing. Based on their results, the plant was asked to make some changes to the carriage design by April 1902.

After repeated military tests, by Order of the GAU dated March 3, 1903, the gun was put into service under the name 3-inch field gun mod. 1902.

In the same year, an order was issued for the production of 4,520 guns. The production of guns was organized at the Putilov, Obukhov and Perm factories. In addition, barrels were manufactured at the St. Petersburg Gun Factory, the carriages for which were assembled at the St. Petersburg, Kiev and Bryansk arsenals.

In 1906, the gun was modernized: a shield cover was installed on the three-inch gun, and therefore two seats for crew numbers were excluded from the design; in addition, a panoramic sight was installed on the gun with an artillery panorama of the Hertz system, which were produced at the Obukhov plant.

The entire guns were manufactured by the Putilov, Obukhov and Perm factories. The St. Petersburg Arms Plant produced only barrels from blanks from the Perm and Obukhov plants; carriages for it came from the St. Petersburg, Kyiv and Bryansk arsenals. Since 1916, the Tsaritsyn group of factories became involved in the production of cannons. Note that all the factories, except for the Tsaritsyn troupe, were state-owned (the Putilov factory was nationalized during the war).

Before the start of the Great War, 4520 guns were produced

in 1915 - 1368,

in 1916 - 6612

in 1917 - 4289 (out of 8500 ordered)
Total 16,789 guns.
The production program of the tsarist government for 1918 was planned production of 10,000 guns

At the beginning of 1917, the GAU announced a competition for a new carriage forlight field artillery piece that could be towed usingtrucks at a speed of at least 45 km/h. This dramatically increased mobilityRussian field artillery and increased its effectiveness.
In addition, the GAU was considering the feasibility of modernizing the 1902 gun in terms oflengthening the barrel by 10-15 calibers, or announcing a competition for the development of a new lightweight three-inchfield gun with a barrel length of 45-50 calibers.

As of June 15, 1917, the active army had 8,605 serviceable 76-mm field guns (of which 984 were model 1900 and 7,621 were model 1902), in addition, there were at least 5,000 in warehouses inside Russia. both new and those in need of repair 76-mm field guns.

By the end of 1917, the production of guns had practically ceased.

Even the beginning Civil War At first, it did not necessitate the resumption of production - there were enough three-inch guns in Russia - both in the Red and White armies. However, the pre-revolutionary supply soon began to dry up, and already in 1919, about 300 field guns were manufactured.

During the First World War, some of the batteries armed with 3-inch field guns were equipped with Ivanov system machines. Such machines made it possible to fire at air targets - airships and airplanes.

The divisional gun of the 1902 model was the basis of the artillery of the Russian Empire. The three-inch gun took part in combat operations during the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in China, in the Russian-Japanese and the First World Wars.

In terms of its characteristics, the Russian three-inch gun was superior to the German and French analogues of 75 and 77 mm caliber and was highly appreciated by both the Russian military, allies and enemies. Among the Germans and Austrians, our three-inch gun received the nickname “death scythe,” since the advancing Austro-German infantry, coming under the deadly fire of shrapnel from our guns, was destroyed almost to the last man.

To field and horse guns -- 5,774,780

To mountain cannons -- 657 825

Total -- .6432605

The consumption of shells already in the first months of the war significantly exceeded the calculations of the command, and in 1915 there were cases of a shortage of 76-mm shells at the front. Which led to limiting the consumption of shells. However, an increase in the production of ammunition at domestic factories and orders abroad led to the fact that by the end of 1915, the supply of shells began to significantly exceed their consumption. This made it possible to remove limits on shell consumption by the beginning of 1916.

Total in 1914-1917. Russian factories produced about 54 million 76-mm rounds. 56 million 76-mm rounds were ordered abroad, about 37 million arrived in Russia.

In 1915, the length of 76-mm guns mod. In 1900 and 1902, chemical, smoke, incendiary, illumination and anti-aircraft shells began to arrive. It should be noted that the use of chemical ammunition was effective not only when operating against infantry units, but was also used to suppress artillery batteries. So, on a clear, quiet day on August 22, 1916, at a position near the village of Lopushany not far from Lvov, the Austrian 15-cm howitzer brigade, with the help of a spotter aircraft, opened fire on a battery of 76-mm field guns mod. 1902 The Austrian howitzers were hidden from the Russian guns by the ridges of the heights and were outside the range of the Russian guns. Then the commander of the Russian battery decided to respond with chemical “choking” fire, firing at the areas behind the ridge, behind which smoke from the enemy battery’s shots was discovered over a length of about 500 m, with rapid fire, 3 shells per gun, jumping through one division of the sight. After 7 minutes, having fired about 160 chemical shells, the battery commander stopped firing, because the Austrian battery was silent and did not resume fire, despite the fact that the Russian battery still transferred fire to the enemy trenches and clearly showed itself by the brilliance of the shots.

By the mid-20s, the three-inch design was somewhat outdated. In Poland, where there were a significant number of guns, the three-inch gun was modernized in 1926. The Polish three-inch gun was recalibrated in order to update worn barrels and unify ammunition with the 75-mm Schneider gun mod. 1897. IN Polish army These guns, designated 75 mm armata polowa wz. 02/26 were in service with horse artillery battalions in cavalry brigades and regimental two-gun batteries of infantry regiments. By 1939, the Polish Army had 466 such guns in service.

In the Soviet Union, work on modernizing the 1902 model gun began in 1927 and continued until 1930. An order for the development of a project for modernizing the gun was issued by the design bureau of plants No. 7 in St. Petersburg, No. 13 (Bryansk) and Motovilikha (Perm). The purpose of the modernization was primarily to increase the maximum firing range and increase the towing speed. The project of the Motovilikha plant, developed under the leadership of designer V.N., was recognized as the best. Sidorenko, despite the higher cost compared to others. The firing range was increased by lengthening the barrel to 40 calibers and increasing the elevation angle. To ensure the movement of the breech of the gun when firing at high elevation angles, the design of the frame was changed - in its middle part there was now a through window. A balancing mechanism was added to the carriage design. New panoramic sights with a normalized scale were installed on the gun.

The design of the modernized carriage made it possible to use both new barrels extended to 40 calibers and barrels 30 calibers long.

The modernized three-inch gun was put into service under the name 76-mm divisional gun model 1902/30. Production of the three-inch gun continued until 1937 and was discontinued due to the adoption of the 76 mm divisional gun of the 1936 F-22 model.

Performance characteristics after modernization

Years of production -- 1931-37

Issued, pcs. -- 4350

Weight and dimensions characteristics

Caliber, mm -- 76.2

Barrel length, club -- 40

Weight in firing position, kg -- 1350