1319th Infantry Regiment of the 185th Division. Book of Memory and Glory - Kalinin defensive operation

In Turginov, by order of the commander of the Western Front, the brigade was again reassigned to the 30th Army, whose commander clarified its mission. It consisted of, moving along the Volokolamsk highway, destroying enemy reserves in the area of ​​​​the villages of Krivtsovo, Nikulino, Mamulino and, together with units of the 5th Infantry Division, capturing Kalinin.

On the morning of October 17, the brigade's tank regiment, consisting of 27 T-34 tanks and eight T-60 tanks, headed for Kalinin. The tankers met stubborn enemy resistance in Efremov and Pushkin. Along the entire route from Pushkin to Kalinin, the tanks were subjected to continuous bombardment from the air, and when approaching Troyanov and Kalinin they were met by powerful fire from anti-tank guns. Only eight tanks managed to reach the southern outskirts of Kalinin, and only one T-34 tank (commander senior sergeant S. Kh. Gorobets) broke into the city and made a heroic raid on it. The remaining surviving tanks reached the Pokrovskoye area on the Turginovskoe highway.

The brigade caused some damage to the enemy and caused panic. But the task assigned to the brigade turned out to be impossible. In the Kalinin area, the Germans had two tank, one motorized divisions and one motorized brigade. Our tank regiment was thrown into battle without infantry support or air cover. The territory captured by the tankers was not secured by infantry. In addition, the brigade's offensive was not supported by the active actions of other formations of the 30th Army. The operational report of the army headquarters at 17.00 on October 17 indicated that the 5th Infantry Division was still regrouping its forces during the day. In this battle, the brigade lost 11 T-34 tanks and 35 people killed and wounded. Regimental commander Hero died Soviet Union Major M.A. Lukin and tank battalion commander Hero of the Soviet Union Captain M.P. Agibalov.

Giving exclusively important Kalinin operational direction, the Supreme Command Headquarters on October 17 decides to create the Kalinin Front.

HQ DIRECTIVE ON THE CREATION OF THE KALININ FRONT
Commander of the North-Western, Western Fronts
Deputy Commander of the Western Front, Comrade KONEV
October 17, 41 6 p.m. 30 min.
For the convenience of command and control of troops in the Kalinin direction, Headquarters Supreme High Command orders:
1. The troops operating in the Ostashkov, Rzhev directions and in the Kalinin region are to be separated into an independent Kalinin Front with direct subordination to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
2. Include 22, 29 and 30 A Western troops in the Kalinin Front troops. fr., 183, 185 and 246 SD, 46 and 54 CD, 46 Motorcycle Regiment and 8 Tank Brigade North-West. front.
3. Appoint Colonel General Konev as commander of the Kalinin Front. To strengthen the front headquarters, turn the headquarters of the 10th Army. The front headquarters will be deployed in the Bezhetsk area.
4. Boundary lines: from the North-West. fr. - Poshekhonye - Volodarsk, st. Ostolopovo, st. Akademicheskaya, lake Istochino, everything for the Kalinin Front inclusive; from Western front - st. Berendeevo, st. Verbilki, st. Reshetnikov, st. Princely Mountains, Sychevka, everything for the West. fr. inclusive.
5. The next task of the front is to clear the Kalinin area from enemy troops and eliminate it in cooperation with the Western and North-West. fronts of the enemy's attempts to bypass Moscow from the north.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
Stalin
Vasilevsky

In total, the front consisted of 16 rifle and two cavalry divisions, one motorized rifle and two tank brigades. Front troops operated in a zone of 220 km. By October 17, superiority in forces was on the enemy's side: in infantry - 1.9 times, in tanks - 2.8 times, in guns - 3.3 times, in machine guns - 3.2 times.

The creation of the Kalinin Front was timely and responded to the current situation. This made it possible to reliably strengthen the central section of our strategic front, firmly connecting it with the northwestern direction.

The Kalinin Front did not receive aviation. Requests for air support were to be fulfilled by aviation from the North-Western Front. Significant difficulties arose due to the fact that at first the front did not have its own rear. In this extremely difficult situation, local Soviet and party bodies, and above all the regional party committee, headed by First Secretary I. P. Boytsov, provided enormous assistance to the front troops.

Simultaneously with the creation of the Kalinin Front, it was decided to restore the field control of the 31st Army in order to unify the command and control of the troops operating in the Torzhok and Kalinin directions. Major General V. A. Yushkevich was appointed commander of the army. It included units of General Vatutin’s operational group, as well as the 119th and 133rd rifle divisions. However, in the following days, part of the task force’s formations was transferred to the 29th and 30th armies and transferred to the front reserve.

In this regard, it should be noted that the command of the Kalinin Front made a mistake by undertaking the disbandment of General Vatutin’s operational group at a crucial moment in the defensive operation. It was a real strike force of five formations. The transfer of these formations to the armies disrupted smooth management. The opportunity for immediate action to liberate the city of Kalinin was missed.

Here is how General Vatutin indicated this in the report on the combat operations of the task force:

“On October 17, 1941, the Kalinin Front was created. The troops of the operational group are included in the troops of the Kalinin Front. 18.10 Colonel General Konev issues combat order No. 00122, setting the troops the task of encircling and destroying the enemy’s Kalinin group.
The main blow was to be delivered by the troops of the operational group of the North-Western Front, with the crossing of the Volga River and actions in general directions: Mednoye - Kalinin; Stanishino, Danilovskoye, Kalinin. However, this order arrived to the group late and without taking into account the element of time to eliminate the Mednov enemy group and concentrate troops. Despite this, the situation in the Kalinin area was still favorable for the implementation of this order. The enemy has not yet brought up fresh reserves to the area of ​​​​the proposed crossings of the operational group of the North-Western Front.
On the most critical days, the troops of the task force were transferred to the 31st Army, which could not quickly establish contact with the troops. In the following days, new orders follow from the Kalinin Front for the army, according to which the entire group of troops of the operational group is distributed among the armies and some divisions are withdrawn to the front reserve...
Thus, the troops of the operational group of the North-Western Front, as a single organism, disappeared. The only striking force in the Kalinin area was dispersed among the armies.
This was a mistake by the command of the Kalinin Front, since while the divisions were being regrouped among armies, the enemy, anticipating a possible crossing of our troops at Nesterov and Akishev, threw in the fresh 6th Infantry Division, preempted us and thwarted the planned active actions of the 46th, 54th 1st cavalry and 183rd rifle divisions."

The 20th of October The front commander issues a directive to the troops, in which the armies are given the task of encircling the enemy group in the Kalinin area. 22nd Army - firmly defend the line of the lake. Seliger - r. Volga to Staritsa, preventing the enemy from breaking through to Torzhok from the south and southwest. The 29th Army, defending on the right flank in the area of ​​​​Staritsa, Akisheva, on the night of October 20-21, with its main forces, crossed the Volga in the Izbrizhye, Danilovskoye sector. By the end of the day, capture Nekrasov, Danilovsky, cut off the enemy’s escape route to the southwest, establish cooperation with the 21st Tank Brigade (30th Army) in the Negotino area. The 31st Army to attack from the northwest and north to Kalinin and, in cooperation with the 30th Army, by the end of October 21, capture the northwestern and southern part city ​​of Kalinin. The 30th Army should attack Kalinin from the northeast and southeast and, by the end of October 21, capture the southern and northeastern part of the city, preventing the enemy from retreating to the south and southeast.

Due to the fact that part of the formations of the 29th Army (commanded by Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov) fought fierce battles with the enemy group retreating from the Maryino-Mednoye area, the task set in the directive of the front commander of October 20 was not it at the specified time completed. Only 22 of October The 246th Infantry Division of this army crossed the Volga in the Khvastovo-Chapayevka sector and captured a bridgehead on the right bank in the Putilov area. Within two days, units of the 246th and 119th rifle divisions were transported here. By October 25 They managed to significantly expand the bridgehead and cut off the enemy's main transport route Staritsa - Kalinin in the Talutin, Danilovsky area. There was a real threat of encirclement of the Kalinin enemy group.

To liquidate the bridgehead, the fascist command was forced to transfer two new divisions to this area (14th motorized and 161st infantry). At the same time, fascist German troops began a new operation to capture Torzhok from further development attack on Vyshny Volochek. To carry it out, the 23rd and 6th Army Corps of the 9th Army, reinforced by two motorized divisions of the 3rd Tank Group, were involved.

October 24 The enemy managed to cross to the left bank of the Volga in the Staritsa - Brody section and launch an attack on Struzhnya - Torzhok.

Through the efforts of the troops of the 22nd and 29th armies, the enemy offensive by the end of October was stopped. But at the same time, the 29th Army had to leave the bridgehead in the area of ​​​​Putilov, Talutin, Danilovsky and retreat to the line of the river. Darkness.

In the offensive zone of the 31st Army, the fighting became stubborn and intense. Units of the 133rd Rifle Division liberated the village of Kiselevo (0.5 km north of Kalinin) and captured several blocks on the northern outskirts of the city.

Units of the 30th Army were the first to enter the battle for Kalinin. In five days (from October 14 to 19), they lost over 1,600 people and 25 tanks. In the 256th Rifle Division, 400 people were killed and wounded, in the 5th Rifle Division - 525 people, the 21st Tank Brigade lost 450 people, 21 T-34 tanks, three BT tanks and one T-60 tank. But, despite this, the army fought fierce battles on the eastern and southeastern outskirts of the city. Bolshaya and Malye Peremerki, Elevator, Koltsovo, Vlasyevo changed hands several times.

The fighting at the end of October did not bring victory to our troops, but in the end the enemy abandoned attempts to attack and was forced to go on the defensive. In the Kalinin area the front has stabilized.

An interesting statement by the former commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, General G. Hoth:

“Due to a lack of fuel, the 3rd Tank Group was stretched between Vyazma and Kalinin and got stuck in this area, getting involved in heavy fighting near Kalinin, and was already short of ammunition. Large in number, combat-ready enemy forces, concentrated along the left bank of the Volga and north-west of Rzhev, hung over its flank. Thus, the chances of bypassing Moscow from the north and south at the same time were very low.”

Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin was particularly concerned about the bridges across the Volga in Kalinin that were not destroyed during the retreat. He demanded from Konev:

“Destroy the railway and highway bridges in the city of Kalinin by means of aviation.”

The Kalinin Front did not yet have its own aviation at that time, and this task was assigned to long-range aviation.

Here is what the former commander of the 12th Guards Bomber Aviation Regiment writes about this long-range aviation Nikolai Bogdanov in the book “In the Sky Guards Gatchinsky”:

“The most difficult task for us was the destruction of the Kalinin railway and highway bridges. And not only for us. They turned out to be a tough nut to crack, which the crews of other units were unable to crack.”

The Nazis reliably covered the approaches to the bridges and concentrated on both banks of the river a large number of anti-aircraft artillery of various calibers and anti-aircraft machine guns. In addition, fighter aircraft were also brought in to protect the bridges.

Starting from October 16, 1941, our pilots regularly bombed bridges. A variety of bombing methods were used. However, the bridges remained intact.

It should be noted that at the beginning of the war, bridges were usually bombed with 100-kilogram high-explosive bombs. Some of them flew through the openwork trusses of the railway bridge and exploded in the water without causing any harm to it. In one of the raids on a railway bridge, the crew of Lieutenant Koryakin’s aircraft repeated the feat of Captain Gastello. In the book “In the Sky Guards Gatchinsky” Nikolai Bogdanov writes:

“On the day of departure for the mission, November 12, the weather was cloudy... The flight promised to be difficult. At the target, enemy anti-aircraft artillery and machine guns met us with hurricane fire. I focus all my attention on accurately maintaining the course set by the navigator. Due to the dense anti-aircraft fire, this was very difficult to do. Finally, out of the darkness, behind the bright splashes of exploding anti-aircraft shells, a bridge appeared large, at an acute angle, as if floating towards us, a few more seconds, and from a height of six hundred meters bombs flew at it from the hatches of our vehicles.
At this time, Koryakin’s plane caught fire to my right. The shells apparently hit the cockpit and gas tanks. In a split second, the entire plane was engulfed in flames. I only managed to see the pilot’s head, bowed to the instrument panel; I couldn’t see the radio operator gunner because of the thick black smoke that enveloped the fuselage.
The plane went into a dive. But this was not an arbitrary fall; it was clear that the pilot’s hand was still controlling the machine. Obeying her, the plane turned sharply towards the group of guns, which were still throwing out tongues of flame with their long muzzles, and, as if covering us with a flattened steel body from their destructive shells, fell onto the battery and at the same moment exploded, blazing with a huge fire. This is how our young comrades died the death of heroes - crew commander Koryakin, navigator Belov, gunner-radio operator Shilenko and gunner Vishnevsky.”

It was decided to destroy the Kalinin railway bridge using the radio guidance system of an aircraft filled with explosives. For this purpose, a design bureau was brought in to develop a radio control system for unmanned aircraft.

Two bombers were allocated for the experiment: TB-3, intended to be a torpedo aircraft, and DB-ZF, from which it was supposed to be controlled by radio. While the test flights were underway, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive near Moscow, liberated Kalinin and the need to destroy the bridges disappeared.

Having occupied Kalinin, fascist German troops turned it into a major stronghold. They concentrated a large amount of equipment and manpower here. All measures were taken to hold the city. From here the Nazis supported their hordes advancing on Moscow, guarding their left flank. Here, in warm apartments, they hoped to restore the strength of their battle-weary divisions.

By the end of October the front had stabilized and passed along the line: Selizharovo, the Bolshaya Kosha and Darkness rivers, the northern and eastern outskirts of Kalinin, Malye Peremerki, Vishenki, Turginovo, Dorino, Sintsovo. The total length of the front line reached 270 km.

In October, the Kalinin Front managed to solve the problem: repel the enemy’s attack on Torzhok, Vyshny Volochek and prevent his advance around Moscow from the north-west.

At the end of October, the front commander issues a directive on the transition to defense and the construction of front-line rear and intermediate army defense lines.

The weakest line of defense was the 30th Army, which covered the Klin-Solnechnogorsk direction. By mid-November, its combat strength included rifle and motorized rifle divisions, a tank brigade, motorized and reserve regiments. With these forces the army defended on a front of about 70 km. There were no second echelons or reserves. The defense was focal in nature, the gaps between strong points reaching four kilometers.

Back at the end of October, the commander of the 30th Army reported to the front commander that “the army does not have sufficient strength combat personnel and equipment, few mining equipment... The left flank of the army is a particularly weak point.” However, according to information received from local residents and from a survey of prisoners, it was already known that the fascist command was concentrating troops and preparing a new attack on Moscow in the defense zone of the 30th Army.

Reliable defense and preventing enemy troops from breaking through to Moscow from the north-west, according to the Supreme Command Headquarters, was one of the main tasks of the troops of the Kalinin Front. However, the commander and his staff did not take the necessary measures to strengthen the combat strength of the 30th Army and strengthen its defense. It was against this that the fascist German troops struck the main blow in November 1941.

By mid-November against the left flank of the 30th Army, the fascist command concentrated a strike force consisting of the 27th army corps 9th Army and parts of the forces of the 41st and 56th motorized corps of the 3rd tank group.

“I was killed near Rzhev.” The tragedy of the Monchalovsky “cauldron” Gerasimova Svetlana Aleksandrovna

January 21–23, 1942

By this time, the capabilities of the armies of the Kalinin Front, including the 29th, were very limited: the number of divisions was small, the available material did not allow them to fully carry out the assigned tasks. The formations and units of the army were exhausted and bled dry by constant attacks on villages occupied by the enemy, and “night attacks were not successful due to the low training of the troops.”

Reinforcements of personnel were minimal. So, on January 21, 1942, the head of the army staffing department received a report that reinforcements had been accepted from the 115th reserve rifle regiment: junior command staff 110 people, ordinary personnel 923 people. “The reinforcements arrived without weapons. Uniform according to the winter plan. There are no Red Army books.” For an army conducting active offensive operations, this was extremely little.

The situation with the equipment in the army on January 21, 1942 looked like this: 45 mm guns - 37; 76 mm PA – 18; 76 mm YES – 66; 122 mm howitzers – 33; 152 mm – 41; 85 mm – 29; installations M-13–6; installations M-8–7. One KV tank and three T-60 tanks, as well as the 24th and 39th separate guards mortar divisions, whose installations were already mentioned above, who arrived to reinforce the army, could not change the situation. The tanks turned out to be technically faulty and remained in the area of ​​the Monchalovo station, and the mortar divisions “had one salvo each.” The army had no oats left for the horses. To solve the problem, an order was required from a member of the front's Military Council to put the entire political apparatus on the roads to more quickly push through transport with oats.

The situation in the formations allows us to present excerpts from the resolution of the Military Council of the 29th Army dated January 22, 1942 on the situation in the 381st Infantry Division: “Of the 200 machine guns available in the division on 20.1.42. barely 60 remained. Of the existing 200–240 light machine guns in the arsenal of each joint venture, no more than 7–10 units remained...” The division’s neglect of camouflage “led to large losses in manpower, especially in cavalry. About 300 horses were lost, which put artillery and transport in an extremely difficult situation...” The resolution noted “unacceptable carelessness when moving units from one place to another” and cited the fact that “a group of German machine gunners, dressed in Red Army uniforms, managed to attack a battery, kill and wound 15 people. and disable the entire horse train.” The resolution also spoke about shortcomings in reconnaissance and inept organization of battle, when infantry actions were not always supported by artillery. The “unacceptably high attrition” of ordinary, junior, middle and senior command personnel was especially emphasized. During the 20-day participation in the battles, the division lost 90 percent of its junior commanders and 75–80 percent of the rest of its command personnel. The new division commander, who replaced Colonel A. Tolstov in this post, against whom the case was opened, Lieutenant Colonel V. Shulga, was reprimanded.

No less indicative are the figures from the documents of the 185th Infantry Division: on January 20–21, reinforcements arrived in the division - 240 people “without weapons”; The division's losses during these days amounted to 184 killed and 670 wounded. By the middle of the day on January 23, the division had 76-mm shells - 802 pieces, 122-mm - 143 pieces, 37-mm - 147 pieces, 120-mm mines - 16 pieces.

It is unlikely that the front commander did not know about the real state of the army. Rather, he did not want to notice it, since he would change something in better side didn't have the opportunity. The front continued to carry out the task set by the Supreme Command Headquarters to destroy the Mozhaisk-Gzhatsk-Vyazma group of the enemy. The 29th Army, consisting of eight divisions, was again tasked with “capturing Rzhev with the previous reinforcement units of 22.1 and reaching the Osuga, Ignatovo, Shchekoldino area with 24.1.”

At the same time, as noted above, the enemy was gathering new additional forces to the breakthrough site, which was confirmed by intelligence data. Thus, the reconnaissance department of the 29th Army in a generalized report for January 11–20 stated: “The enemy, with the remnants of units 256, 26 infantry, 84 pp 8 infantry, 135 pp 45 infantry, 145 pp, 3/396 pp, special airborne battalion, battalion air schools and, presumably, 216 PP 86 Infantry, offering strong resistance with fire and counterattacks, stubbornly defends the approaches to Rzhev, pinning down army troops in order to secure the flank of the retreating units of the Moscow group of its troops; at the same time, it continues to pull up reserves from the depths of hastily recruited reserve battalions to Rzhev to replenish the bloodless formations...” The front intelligence department confirmed the pull-up of reserves at the expense of other sectors of the front, noting the enemy’s withdrawal in the Oleninsky and Pogorelo-Gorodishchensky directions.

Intelligence data also recorded the state of the enemy’s defensive line: “The line to the north. – zap., sev. and sowing – east The approaches to Rzhev were prepared in advance, where the improvement of defensive structures is still ongoing. Bunkers, dugouts and shelters for housing are mainly built at road junctions and sectors beyond the reach of machine gun crossfire from populated areas. In some areas there was a wire fence of 2 stakes and snow debris up to 1 meter high.”

On the morning of January 21, the divisions of the army's right flank again went on the offensive to complete the assigned task. A rather indicative entry was preserved in the combat report of headquarters 183 at 10 o’clock that day: “The tanks did not go into battle due to a malfunction. An investigation is underway."

At the same time, on the morning of January 21, the German offensive began. According to the report of the chief of staff of the 29th Army V.M. Sharapov, the enemy, with the strength of a full-blooded regiment with 13 tanks, began an offensive in the morning at the junction between the 246th and 174th rifle divisions both along the road to Selizharovo and on the right flank of the 915th th rifle regiment - along the Volga with the strength of a battalion. Old Korostelevo and other villages were captured.

On January 21, I. S. Konev had a conversation by telegraph with a member of the Military Council of the Kalinin Front, Corps Commissar D. S. Leonov [recording of the conversation is undated; date determined by content. . – S.G.]: “... Returning Smokachev [divisional commissar P. E. Smokachev - member of the Military Council of the front. . – S.G.] from Shvetsov also confirms the small number of active bayonets... The use of 365 Infantry Division by Shvetsov must be delayed... It is planned to be transferred to Lelyushenko... Shvetsov has enough strength to take Rzhev, the trouble is that there is no determination. This is the main thing. Polenov, without removing the 243rd division, was temporarily sent to carry out the operation to capture Rzhev at the 369th Infantry Division, leaving the current commander of the 369th Infantry Division as Polenov’s deputy. Make Polenov Shvetsov’s deputy with the right to give orders to the two right-flank divisions... Warn Shvetsov that he will be tried for failure to complete the task of capturing Rzhev... It seems to me that things are going badly for Shvetsov because Shvetsov personally talks a lot himself, is not confident in his actions and does not demand this from his subordinates... His hand is not strong enough, everything slips out of his hands...” D.S. Leonov replied that he would send Polenov today to speed up the capture of Rzhev and support the army command. Konev ordered him to find out more precisely, “when Shvetsov still plans to take Rzhev... If he manages to take Rzhev before January 24, then we can risk giving him 365 rifle divisions... The argument you brought about the small number of Shvetsov’s troops is very easy to defeat, you just have to carefully calculate, and he will receive triple superiority over the enemy with these so-called small divisions... About 365... For now it cannot be advanced anywhere. I mean the previous plan to advance to the Osuiskoye region.”

Let us pay attention to the mention in the conversation of the 365th Infantry Division, which in February 1942 will be destined tragic fate, as well as in the name of Major General Polenov, who will also have to play an important role in subsequent events.

The exact time when this conversation took place is not indicated, but it most likely took place even before the commander was informed about the start of the German offensive and the capture of the village of Star west of Rzhev. Korostelevo. From that moment on, events in the Rzhev direction began to develop extremely negatively for the 29th and 39th armies and the 11th cavalry corps.

The maps show that Old Korostelevo was almost in the center of the breakthrough, but “behind” the divisions advancing on Rzhev. It was impossible to urgently turn these divisions around. The front command initially hoped to restore the situation in this area through partial regroupings, bringing into battle the 243rd Infantry Division from the reserve. The front command tried to convince the chief of staff of the 29th Army that “the enemy’s attack on St. Korostelevo is simply a diversion in order to divert our forces from the south [from Sychevka. . – S.G.] and west [from Rzhev. . – S.G.] ... Any major offensive is ruled out. The enemy undertook sabotage in order to disrupt our rear...”

It is not clear whether this was an attempt to calm the army command or whether there was still no full understanding of the danger of the enemy’s actions. But probably, having analyzed the situation in detail, the front commander recognized the need to urgently transfer larger additional forces to this sector, regrouping the 30th Army into the 29th Army's zone of operations. At the very beginning of the day on January 22, the commander of the 30th Army was ordered to surrender the front to the 31st Army, whose commander was to receive him by 18.00 on January 22.

Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General D. D. Lelyushenko, commander of the 30th Army, did not agree with this decision. He sent a report of disagreement with the order of his commander to a superior commander, who in this situation was the Chief of the General Staff. D. D. Lelyushenko, but turned to the People’s Commissar of Defense himself, who was Supreme Commander-in-Chief J. V. Stalin during the war, which is very reminiscent of the action of V. Model in a similar situation, who turned to Hitler over the head of his immediate superior.

The report said: “At 00.45 22.1 an order was received from Comrade. Konev on the transfer of the 30th Army with all its rear from the left flank of the Kalinin Front to its right flank, to the Olenino region (50 km west of the city Rzhev), while crossing the front of three armies (31st, 29th and 39th). The concentration period for the army headquarters is by the end of the day on January 23 and the last division on January 26. Distance 140–160 km. Movement is given on one road. I consider it my duty to report to you:

1. The timing of the concentration of the army was not thought out seriously - it is unrealistic.

2. With its movement, the army, crossing the communications of the three armies, will inevitably cause confusion and interruptions in the supply of the front armies.

3. In addition, the 30th Army does not represent any striking force at the moment. From the army front behind Lately six best divisions and one tank brigade were taken. In the remaining four divisions in most regiments, due to continuous fierce fighting during the crescent, there are 80-120 active bayonets. The army fought 180–220 km (from the Volga-Moscow canal to Pogoreloye Gorodishche).

In connection with the above, I report:

1. I consider it inappropriate to transfer 30 A in this state to the right flank of the Kalinin Front, since it was expected by Comrade. Konevym cannot give any effect under the specified circumstances.

2. In our opinion, this task of the front had to be solved not by transferring an army from one flank to another, but by consolidating the armies on the right flank by [perhaps a typo or typo; “for” is more logical. . – S.G.] by increasing the front of the left-flank armies. It will be much faster and more accurate.

3. I ask you to complete our army and assign it any combat mission.

4. I'm waiting for an answer."

D. S. Leonov - member of the Military Council of the Kalinin Front 1941

Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General (from January 2, 1942) D. D. Lelyushenko - commander of the 30th Army. 1941

The report was written on behalf of one person, but signed by members of the Military Council of the 30th Army: “Lelyushenko, Abramov, Khetagurov” and dated 9 o’clock on January 22, 1942.

The reasons for D. D. Lelyushenko’s reluctance to redeploy the army to another section of the front can probably be attributed to the successful pursuit by army divisions of enemy troops, who were withdrawing their troops on Hitler’s orders. The “Journal of Combat Operations” of the 30th Army for January 22 records that it handed over its combat sector during the period of “the most successful development of the offensive in the direction of Pogorely Gorodishche.” In our opinion, the successes in the advancement of the formations of the 30th Army would hardly have been long-lasting: having reached a certain prepared line, the Wehrmacht units consolidated and strengthened their defenses, which would have been problematic to break through with the army forces named in the report.

The response to the report of Lieutenant General D. D. Lelyushenko was a directive from the Supreme Command Headquarters, signed by J. V. Stalin about a day later - on January 23 at 3:15 a.m.: “In the current situation, the Rzhev-Vyazma direction is of primary importance, from quick success in the success of the operation as a whole depends on it, and vice versa, the real direction of the 30th Army has become secondary. Hence I consider the decision of comrade. Konev is correct, every effort must be made to implement it as quickly as possible.” It probably took the Supreme Commander-in-Chief a day to discuss the issue with the high command of the Red Army.

Looking ahead, let's say that D. D. Lelyushenko turned out to be right: it was no longer possible to change the situation on the front of the 29th Army. When units and formations of the 30th Army began to arrive at the breakthrough site, it was already closed by Wehrmacht units. The army got involved in fierce battles with German troops, first west of Rzhev, then directly beyond Rzhev. At the end of September 1942, its divisions managed to enter the city and recapture several northeastern quarters from the enemy, but Rzhev became completely free only after the Wehrmacht troops left the city. D. D. Lelyushenko in November 1942 was appointed commander of the 1st guards army and distinguished himself in the battles of Stalingrad. After him, Major General V. Ya. Kolpakchi was appointed commander of the 30th Army. In April 1943, the army was awarded the rank of Guards, and it became known as the 10th Guards Army.

On the morning of January 22, in a telegram for the “comfront” message, Major General Shvetsov suggested that “a breakthrough of the enemy’s Rzhev group to the north-west and west is possible,” and he was right. From the morning of January 22 German troops forces up to an infantry regiment, as recorded in the “Journal of Combat Operations” of the front [in military historical literature there is information about two regiments of the 6th Army Corps. . – S.G.], went on the offensive with tanks in the north westward along the road Rzhev - Yeltsy [in other documents - along Selizharovskoe highway, which is the same thing . – S.G.]. The offensive was supported by bombing and fighter aircraft from Rzhev airfield.

While the divisions of the right flank group of the 29th Army - 185, 381, 369, 183rd continued the offensive in the Rzhev direction, which the Germans reinforced with tanks, cavalrymen, skiers, divisions of the center and left flank of the army - 246, 375, 174, 220th - fought defensive battles, holding back the advance of enemy infantry, supported by tanks. All units of the divisions participated in repelling enemy attacks.

Thus, in the operational report of the 246th Infantry Division it is written: “...The defensive detachment and the communications battalion defended Malakhovo-Volzhskoye, Litvinovo. A joint group of 35 people. from 6.00 they advanced on the lime factory. Before reaching the plant 200 m, the group was subjected to heavy machine-gun and mortar fire and counterattacked. Withdrew with heavy losses...” The 87th Ski Battalion also fought together with units of the 246th Infantry Division. To stop the enemy’s advance at the breakthrough site, the army command began to gather “all the rear: one and a half hundred from the engineering battalion, hundreds of all sorts of stragglers in the villages, they used all the special divisions [probably all the divisional special units .. – S.G.] ... 70 signalmen,” a replenishment company for the 39th Army. In a conversation with the front commander, Major General Sharapov said: “With the available forces, I think we can contain the enemy’s spread further, but we will not be able to restore the situation with these forces.” In response, Colonel General Konev ordered “to stop the panic, stop the enemy’s advance and destroy the units that broke through, not a step back, shoot those retreating on the spot.” Major General Sharapov was given personal responsibility as the commander of the “northern group of forces of the 29th Army” for restoring the situation; he was ordered to take command of the 375th, 174th, 220th, 243rd rifle divisions and army reinforcement units located north of the Volga.

By 18 o'clock the enemy occupied Nozhkino, Petelino, Nov. Korostelevo, Bukhavino, Filkino, i.e. settlements on the northern side of the Volga, cutting off communications of the 29th and 39th armies. In a telegram in code to I.S. Konev on January 22, Major General Shvetsov reported: “From 12.00 on January 22, the supply of all types of supplies stopped.”

It should be clarified that from the beginning of the army's offensive, its control was divided. The army commander, Major General V.I. Shvetsov, a member of the Army Military Council, brigade commissar N.N. Savkov, and some heads of army headquarters units were in the advancing troops of the right-flank group. The chief of staff of the army, Major General V.M. Sharapov, with part of his command, was on the northern bank of the Volga. In the “Certificate” summarizing intelligence data for the end of January - beginning of February 1942, this part of the headquarters was called “northern. [faithful] KP.” The connection between the front headquarters and Major General Shvetsov was carried out not directly, but through the headquarters of the 29th Army, i.e. through Major General Sharapov. All reports, telegrams, and encrypted messages received by the army headquarters from the half-encircled and then encircled group of troops of the 29th Army were immediately transferred to the front headquarters. At the same time, in some cases, the reaction of the front command, a number of orders from the front commander, Colonel General Konev, suggest that he was not personally familiar with all the incoming documents.

Chief of Staff V.M. Sharapov had radio contact with the army commander almost all the time, but sometimes the information was late. The first entry in the Army’s “Combat Operations Log” about the lack of information “about the actions of the right-flank group (381, 185, 369 and 183 infantry divisions, tank group, 24 and 39 MGD)” was made on January 23. Major General Shvetsov also did not always have information “about the position of the units north of the river. Volga". Telegrams from the troops located south of the Volga were almost always signed by the commander of the 29th Army, Major General Shvetsov, and a member of the Military Council, Brigadier Commissar Savkov, telegrams, encrypted messages and messages from the headquarters of the 29th Army - by the chief of staff, Major General Sharapov, and the military commissar of the headquarters, senior battalion commissar Chepurnykh. Sometimes communication between the army headquarters and the army command in the encirclement was carried out by communications aircraft and messengers. But “in early February, mail exchange stopped. We reported the aerial reconnaissance data on the regroupings of the project in code,” stated the “Help” mentioned above. Later, when leaving the encirclement, radio communication will be interrupted for several days.

Below, in order to avoid complex sentences overloaded with information, we will only mention the last name of the commander or political officer without indicating ranks and positions, as in the documents.

Early in the morning - at 5.50-23 January, an encrypted message signed by Konev and Zakharov was sent from the front headquarters to General Shvetsov: “The enemy is apparently trying to break out of Rzhev to the west. I order: take all measures to prevent the enemy from breaking through to the west in the direction of Bakhmatovo and Solomino. 365 SD, 375 SD were transferred to you. Using the forces of your army and the transferred two divisions, organize a strike to destroy the enemy group that has broken through. 646 ap RGK have been transferred to you...” At the same time, the task of capturing Rzhev’s army by the front command was not removed. The encryption ended with the following words: “Master [I. Stalin . – S.G.] is extremely dissatisfied and does not allow the thought of how it could have happened that the enemy regiment pushed back two of our divisions.”

The owner's dissatisfaction is understandable. A group of troops numbering, according to the most conservative estimates, from 50 to 60 thousand people was cut off from the main front. The reasons for the current situation are obvious: the extreme small number of the 174th and 246th rifle divisions, which bore the brunt of the enemy’s attack, fatigue of people, and lack of ammunition.

The situation with the “transferred divisions” is not very clear. According to entries in the “Journal of Combat Operations” of the 29th Army for January 22, the 375th Infantry Division was already part of the army and resisted enemy attacks in the direction of Nozhkino, Petelino, Nov. Filkino, and interacting with the 174th Rifle Division - at the line of Ilyino, Kolesnikovo, Bukhanino. On January 23, units of the division also fought at the Timontsevo line.

The 365th Rifle Division was the same one that front commander I. S. Konev discussed in a conversation with D. S. Leonov on January 21, not wanting to give it to Shvetsov. The front headquarters in the evening of the same day - at 22.40 - decided that it, together with the 375th Infantry Division, was to become part of the 30th Army from January 23. But the events of this and the next days forced the front command to change their decision, and the divisions were transferred to the 29th Army on January 22. But if the 375th Infantry Division was already engaged in defensive battles that day, as mentioned above, then the situation with the 365th Infantry Division was much more complicated.

Probably, between the two named orders of January 21 and 22, there was another order in which the division was most likely transferred to the 39th Army. At the time of writing, this order could not be found. Confirmation of this fact can be the message of Major General Sharapov to the chief of staff of the front M.V. Zakharov, probably on the evening of January 22: “About 365 Rifle Division. Shvetsov tried to detain her, but by the end of the day, when the division commander posed the question: “What to do?”, Shvetsov, not having the right to hold the division any longer, answered the commander: “Act at your own discretion,” but warned that he could return back.” . Probably, at the very end of the day on January 22, the front headquarters signed an order to transfer the 365th Infantry Division to the 29th Army. Sharapov reported to Zakharov [recording of negotiations without fixing date and time. – S.G.], most likely, either at the end of the day on January 22, or at the very beginning of January 23: “The order regarding the commissioning of the 365th Infantry Division was immediately transmitted by radio to Shvetsov upon receipt from you. The order was accepted... No response received. The sent delegates – liaison officers – do not return.”

Thus, despite the words about the “transferred” divisions, by the morning of January 23, the 29th Army did not have additional forces. As the day began, the divisions of the army's right-flank group continued their attack on Rzhev. The divisions of the center and left flank “went on the offensive with the task of encircling and destroying the enemy who had broken through to Timontsevo and Bukhavino.” But the enemy, advancing “with a force of up to 5 battalions with 6 tanks,” occupied Usovo and Vorobyovo by 2 p.m. By 20.00, the enemy managed to “unite the eastern and western groups and finally cut off communications 29 and 39A.” Let us remember that, according to German data, the connection of the advancing eastern and western German groups occurred at 12.45.

From that moment on, the troops of the two armies and the 11th Cavalry Corps of the Kalinin Front were cut off from the main front, and their fight with the enemy began in semi-encirclement.

Meanwhile, at 6 a.m. on January 23, the 365th Rifle Division had already “reached the Osuiskoye area,” which is 14 km south of Okorokovo, where the commander of the 29th Army met with its commander. The division was ordered to concentrate in the Karpovo area. Deputy The battalion commander of the 433rd separate engineer battalion of the 365th rifle division, G.I. Kravchenko, recalled after the war: “... North-west of Rzhev, the division entered a breakthrough through a corridor made by the troops of the 39th Army. We walked quickly, covering about 200 km in three days. The rear units (medical battalion, utility unit, etc.) fell far behind, did not enter the breakthrough, and then were completely detained. Near the villages of Solomino - Kokoshkino, our units crossed the Volga (known places of subsequent battles) and then rushed to the southwest, following the formations of the 39th Army, which had already started fighting for Sychevka...

The days of mid-January were clear, frosty, there was boundless snow all around, sparkling in the sun, and above us german planes. They bombed, shelled, and burned villages. There were fierce battles to the right and left of the breakthrough corridor. We have reached almost the source of the Dnieper.”

All day on January 23, Sharapov received requests from Zakharov demanding information about the division: “365 Infantry Division... turn north immediately,” “... Get from Shvetsov: is 365 Infantry Division turned north…”, “... Is 365 Infantry Division turned north and where is it?” is he now?..” Let us note that on this day negotiations with the 29th Army were conducted only by the chief of staff of the front, M.V. Zakharov. Perhaps the front commander I.S. Konev went to the troops.

By 22:00 on January 23, Shvetsov, in the document “The situation on the right flank of 29 A” addressed to I. S. Konev, reported: “365 Rifle Division in the Karpovo area. An order was given by radio and communications officers to return to the Okorokovo area to attack general direction Kokoshkino". The Front's "Combat Log" for January 24 records that the 365th Rifle Division left the Karpov area at 2.00 to the north with the task of advancing from the Brekhovo area in the direction of Kokoshkino and Star at 16.00. Korostelevo. According to updated data, the division set out from the Karpovo area only on January 25 at 3.30 and, according to information at 16:00, was already advancing in the direction of Kokoshkino, Spas-Mitkovo.

Thus, from the available information about the 365th Infantry Division it follows that on January 22, at a time of urgent need for additional forces to contain the German offensive in the breakthrough area, the 365th Infantry Division went south, then in extreme haste returned to the breakthrough site, but it was already closed by the Wehrmacht. And after this three-day, almost thirty-kilometer “walk” off-road in conditions of severe frosts and high snow, the division entered the battle by the end of the day on January 25. Later, in the “Report on the combat activities of the Southern Group of the 29th Army,” Major General V.I. Shvetsov wrote: “365 Infantry Division, which was located in the Okorokovo area on January 22, 1942 and whose subordination was denied to me, went south and to did not take part in the battle during the most decisive period. The march to the south and return to the 29th Army to the north took 3 days. The division returned exhausted and almost incapable of combat, without rear support.” Let's remember the last phrase, it will be needed later.

It is necessary to add that during the German offensive on January 22–23, part of the 178th Infantry Division of the 22nd Army was also cut off from the main front (Diagram 7). The division carried out the task of liberating the village of Olenino to the west of the breakthrough site Soviet troops. In the “Historical Form of the Division” the events of these days are described as follows: “On January 22–23, the enemy, with a massive simultaneous attack from the east (Rzhev) and from the west (Urdom, Molodoy Tud), using aviation and tanks, liquidated the 39A breakthrough and occupied a continuous defense of Rzhev - Young Thud.

Scheme 7. Fragment of the report card of the 29th Army. February 1942

To restore the situation, Army Commander 22 ordered the withdrawal of 386 rifle regiments from the approaches to Olenino and an attack from the Chertolino area in order to eliminate the enemy breakthrough. 386 joint venture, instead of participating in the attack on Olenino, moved in the direction of Mal. Nikulino – Zaitsevo, however com. front ordered the return of the regiment, occupy the previous area and, in cooperation with the 298th rifle regiment and the cavalry detachment, drive the enemy out of Olenino.

The enemy took advantage of the retreat of the 386th regiment, the weakening of the southern group [division . – S.G.] and led the offensive with units of the 235th infantry regiment and cavalry. SS brigades from Gorenka and line... [written illegible . – S.G.] on the right flank of the southern group, displacing cavalry units. squad. At the same time, with a force of up to one point, the enemy launched an offensive from the area of ​​Pogorelki, Glyadovo in the direction of Zaitsevo - Chertolino, creating a threat to the rear of 39 A and intending to cut off our southern group from parts of the 29th and 39th armies. The question of mastering Olenino disappeared.

The southern group faced an exceptionally difficult situation. The supply routes for ammunition and food were also cut off. There was no contact with the 39th and 29th armies. Ammunition and food are running out. There is nowhere to evacuate the wounded. We had to create management and supply bodies and switch to local food procurement.”

So, by the evening of January 23, 1942, the troops of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps were cut off from the main front. The 29th Army was cut in two. The 174th, 220th, 243rd and 375th rifle divisions remained on the northern bank of the Volga. 183, 185, 246, 365, 369, 381st Rifle Divisions, tank group, part of the 510th artillery regiment The RGK, the 24th and 39th separate guards mortar divisions and some other units remained south of the Volga, semi-encircled. During the period from January 16 to 24, the army's losses amounted to 1,500 people killed and up to 3,000 wounded.

No. 95 Certificate on the composition of prisoners held in the NKVD camps on January 1, 1942. To the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Commissar of State Security 3rd Rank, Comrade Kruglov, I present statistical information on the composition of prisoners held in