Katukov in the regiment of the rifle division. In the post-war period

17.9.1900 - 8.6.1976

Katukov Mikhail Efimovich - Commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army, Colonel General tank troops.

Born on September 5 (17), 1900 in the village of Bolshoye Uvarovo today, Ozersky District, Moscow Region. Russian. Participant of the October armed uprising in Petrograd in 1917.

In the army since 1919. Member civil war on the southern front. In 1922 he graduated from the Mogilev infantry courses, in 1927 - courses "Shot", in 1935 - KUKS at the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army. Served in tank troops. Since 1940 - commander of the 20th Panzer Division.

Member of the Great Patriotic War since June 1941 as commander of the 20th Panzer Division. From September 1941 - commander of the 4th (1st Guards) tank brigade, which became famous during the defense of Moscow on the Volokolamsk highway. In 1942 - commander of the 1st tank corps, who distinguished himself near Voronezh, from September 1942 - commander of the 3rd mechanized corps. From January 1943 he commanded the 1st Tank Army (from April 1944 - the 1st Guards), which participated in Battle of Kursk, the liberation of Ukraine, the Lvov-Sandomierz operation.

for successful leadership military formations and the personal courage and heroism shown at the same time, Colonel-General of the Tank Forces Mikhail Efimovich Katukov was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union on September 23, 1944 with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

Later, units of the army distinguished themselves in the Vistula-Oder, East Pomeranian and Berlin operations.

For the successful leadership of military formations and the personal courage and heroism shown at the same time, Colonel-General of the Tank Forces Mikhail Efimovich Katukov was awarded the second Gold Star medal on April 6, 1945.

After the war, he commanded the army, armored and mechanized troops of the Group Soviet troops in Germany. In 1951 he graduated from the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff. Since 1955 - Inspector General of the Main Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, since 1957 - Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of Combat Training of the Ground Forces. Since 1963 - in the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Marshal of the armored forces (1959). Awarded 4 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st Class, Orders of Kutuzov 1st and 2nd Class, Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st Class, Red Star, "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" 3rd degrees, medals, foreign awards.

A bronze bust was installed in the city of Ozyory. A memorial plaque was installed on the house where he lived (Moscow, Leningradsky Prospect, 75), a museum-apartment was opened. Streets in Moscow, the cities of Mtsensk and Snezhnoye are named after him, where memorial plaques are also installed.

Soviet military leader, marshal of armored forces (1959), twice Hero of the Soviet Union (1944,1945).

Rzhevsko Sychevskaya offensive, Kursk Bulge, Lvov-Sandomierz offensive operation, unheard of in military history in terms of depth and pace, the raid during the Vistula-Oder operation, the assault on Berlin ... They said about the commander of the 1st Panzer Army: if it was necessary to stop the enemy, to make a breakthrough in some sector of the front, Stalin sent Katukov there.

Mikhail Efimovich Katukov was born in the "village" - so he affectionately called the village of Bolshoe Uvarovo, Kolomna province, Moscow region. Now it is Ozersky district. Mother - Maria Semyonovna, father - Efim Epifanovich. The most legendary person in the family is grandfather Epifan Yegorovich, who served as a soldier at Skobelev, on Shipka, who participated in the battles for Plevna and on the Green Mountains. The old warrior told his grandchildren how he was "in secret", showed how to capture the Turks, wield a bayonet, often repeated: "A soldier is a statesman. A servant to everyone does not serve himself”, “The main thing is a brick in the eaves, and not in the foundation”, “What you bring up in childhood, you will rely on in old age”. All this left an indelible mark on the boy's soul and formed the basis of his fate. In addition to the grandfather, the grandmother also had a great influence on the future marshal, wise woman, a skillful storyteller who filled her grandson's life with legends, epics, and various instructive stories.

Until the age of 12, Mikhail Efimovich lived in the village and studied at a local school. He graduated with a commendable diploma, was the first student, loved to read, had an extraordinary, amazing memory. Never forgot anything, remembered and knew a lot. As a child, he was fond of Jules Verne, Stevenson, Mine Reid, Fenimore Cooper. In his youth he loved Lermontov's Borodino, Nikitin's and Koltsov's songs and poems, he knew Pushkin's Poltava by heart, and then often read it all from memory to the soldiers at the front.

After the 1917 revolution, Mikhail Katukov connected his fate with the army. Prior to this, there was a difficult period of "teaching" in St. Petersburg in the service of a "boy" in the Sumakov dairy company. Five years of hard labor tempered character and opened my eyes to many things. Mikhail Efimovich volunteered to join the Red Army, participated as a private in the Civil War as part of the 54th rifle division, in 1919 he fell ill with typhus. After being cured, he was sent to the 57th Infantry Division on the Polish Front and fought with the White Poles until peace was concluded. At the end of 1920, at his own request, he entered the courses of the paint committees and on March 1, 1922 he graduated from the 23rd Mogilev infantry courses. He received the rank of commander and was sent to the 235th Nevelsky Rifle Regiment of the 27th Omsk Red Banner Division (in the first company) as a platoon commander. Mikhail Efimovich served in this division until April 1932, holding the positions of assistant company commander, assistant chief, and, finally, head of the school. During this time, he became an excellent sniper, smart, prudent, focused.

In 1927 he graduated from the advanced training courses "Shot". And in April 1932, when the rifle regiment was deployed into the tank 5th separate brigade in the city of Borisov on the Berezina, M. E. Katukov was temporarily appointed chief of staff of the brigade. Then - head of the intelligence department, head of artillery, commander of a separate training battalion, where he trained 1,500 tankers for parts of the tank forces of the Red Army, mainly for the Far East. But first, he himself had to learn tank business and technology through self-training. And already in 1933, Mikhail Katukov took first place in the district shooting competitions in tank shooting, but he received a professional tank education only in 1935, having successfully completed advanced training courses at the VAMI. Stalin in Moscow.

In 1940, M.E. Katukov was ordered to form the 20th Panzer Division, which was part of the 9th Mechanized Corps, commanded by General K.K. Rokossovsky. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the division was in the process of formation: it had one third of its personnel, and instead of 375 tanks, laid down by the state, there was not a single one. The T 34 tanks had not yet been sent, they were supposed to arrive in July-August 1941. Thus, Katukov began the war as the commander of the 20th Panzer Division ... without tanks. They fought with the enemy on foot, deceived the enemy, setting up tanks made of plywood with camouflage in ambushes.

The front-line wrote down what Katukov recalled about these days: “ The main forces of my division were already fighting the Germans. Remember the laconic reports of the Soviet Information Bureau: “A tank battle unfolded in the Lutsk direction during the day, in which up to 4000 tanks participate from both sides. Tank battle continues».

Well, my 20th division with thirty training tanks also participated in this battle. But our people fought desperately: each of our tanks, albeit a training one, defeated from three to nine German ones. And then ... Then they fought like infantrymen: they fired from rifles, whoever had them, fought with shovels, wrenches, crowbars».

Katukov quickly realized that the small number of tanks that is available is used incorrectly, for maintaining tank battle a powerful armored “fist” is needed, but so far there are few tanks (only “BTs”) this is impossible. And already at that time, Katukov had the idea of ​​​​using tank ambushes. This tactic helped to inflict sensitive blows on the enemy with small forces.

In November 1941, the 1st Guards Tank Brigade was created, commanded by M.E. Katukov. This brigade defended Moscow in the Mozhaisk and then in the Volokolamsk directions, then launched a counteroffensive, liberating the cities and towns near Moscow. She became the ancestor of the tank guard, and the commander himself, who led her into battle, was called the first tank guard.

“The 4th tank brigade, through courageous and skillful combat operations from 04.10 to 11.10, despite the significant numerical superiority of the enemy, inflicted heavy losses on him and completed the tasks assigned to the brigade to cover the concentration of our troops.

Two fascist tank divisions and one motorized division were stopped and suffered huge losses from the glorious fighters and commanders of the 4th tank brigade.

As a result of fierce fighting, the brigade with the 3rd and 4th tank divisions and the enemy motorized division lost: 133 tanks, 49 guns, 8 aircraft, 15 ammunition tractors, up to an infantry regiment, 6 mortars and other weapons. The losses of the 4th tank brigade were calculated in units.

I order:
For courageous and skillful fighting, the 4th tank brigade is called: "I am the 1st Guards Tank Brigade."
To the commander of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, Major General Katukov, present the most distinguished fighters and commanders for the government award.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I. Stalin

“You need to hold on steadfastly, courageously and by all means destroy the uninvited enemy.”
M. E. Katukov

“It is important to be able to act not only as a team as a whole. Each unit, each individual tank must be prepared for autonomous operations in isolation from the main forces.
M. E. Katukov

In April 1942, General Katukov M.E. was appointed commander of the 1st tank corps. In mid-August 1942, an order came: the 1st Tank Corps would enter the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and concentrate south of Tula. Here, Major General M. E. Katukov received an order to appoint him commander of the 3rd mechanized corps, which, according to the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, was intended for military operations in the Kalinin region. Very little time was allotted for the formation of the corps. The Katukov corps was to participate in the Rzhev-Sychevsk offensive operation of the troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts, and the personnel of the newly formed corps successfully coped with the task.

From the memoirs of Katukov about being called to the Kremlin in September 1942: “ Stalin, pacing around the office, asks me another question:
– Do you think our tanks are good or not? Speak directly, without prejudice.
I answer that the T 34 tanks fully justified themselves in battles and that we have high hopes for them. But heavy KV tanks and combat vehicles T 60 and T 70 are not liked by the troops.
Stalin paused for a moment, arching an eyebrow questioningly:
- For what reason?
- KV, Comrade Stalin, are very heavy, clumsy, and therefore not maneuverable. They overcome obstacles with difficulty. But the thirty-four does not care. In addition, HF break bridges and generally bring a lot of unnecessary trouble. And the KV is armed with the same seventy-six-millimeter cannon as on the thirty-four. So, the question is, what combat advantages does heavy tank? Now, if the KV had a stronger gun, a larger caliber, then it would be another matter. It would be possible, perhaps, to put up with its severity, and with other design flaws.
I criticized and light tank T 60. He is armed with an automatic, but only a 20 mm cannon. This machine cannot lead a serious fight against the armored forces of the enemy. In addition, it has low ground clearance, and making marches on it, attacking through snow and mud is a dead thing. In the battles near Moscow, we had to carry these tanks in tow.
The T 70 light tank has more solid armor protection, is armed with a 45 mm cannon, and has two car engines. But he has just begun to enter service and has not yet shown himself to be anything special.
“One rigmarole with them, Comrade Stalin,” I concluded.
The Supreme listened attentively, did not interrupt. But when I stated my point of view about all the tanks that were in service with us, after a long pause, he suddenly began to prove to me that I had no reason to attack the KV, T 60 and T 70 so sharply that they were good vehicles and, perhaps, , we tankers simply underestimate them.
Listening to Stalin, of course, I was worried ... Already by the fact that Stalin, with particular predilection, tortured me, what are good and what are bad in terms of their tactical and technical properties of our tanks, I realized that the Supreme Commander wants thoroughly, to the very, as they say, depth deal with the strong and weaknesses our armored vehicles forty-second year».

In January 1943, a tank formation of the 1st Tank Army was formed, under the command of which Mikhail Efimovich Katukov was appointed, who was awarded the rank of Lieutenant General of Tank Forces. Like Suvorov, he understood: in battle there is no more important soldier. And therefore, before the battles in all regiments, brigades, he himself conducted conversations with personnel. He taught how to fight, how to use equipment, weapons, how to interact in battle with other branches of the military, within units and crew. Explained the task. The soldiers knew and understood what the commander wanted. Katukov delved into all the needs of soldiers and officers, took care of awards and never forgot his promise to help or figure something out. He was especially concerned about the wounded. Everyone knew their commander by sight and paid him devotion for his warmth and cordiality, appreciated his composure, calmness, restraint, were proud of him, rejoiced that they were fighting well under his command, and called themselves "Katukovites", and Mikhail Efimovich knew many by names and faces...

During the battle on the Kursk Bulge in the summer of 1943, 1st Panzer was in the direction of the main German attack and fought with eleven panzer divisions and numerous infantry. Katukov recalled the beginning of the Battle of Kursk: “ Burda crossed the threshold of the hut, barely on his feet. His unshaven face was black with soot and fatigue. The tunic is stained with sweat. Boots in the dust. We have never seen him like this. He raised his hand to his helmet. But I stepped towards him, hugged him and sat him on the bench:
- Well, tell me in order.
- Comrade commander, losses ...
- Without losses in the war ...
No, there were none...
It was strange to hear all this from such a commander as Burda.
- Tell me, Alexander Fedorovich.
And Burda began to talk. In their sector, the enemy attacked continuously. Fifty to a hundred tanks marched. Ahead of the "Tigers", "Panthers".
“But it’s difficult with them, Comrade Commander. You hit them, and the shells ricochet off.
- Well, what are the results of the battle?
- Losses ... Terrible losses, Comrade Commander ... Sixty percent of the brigade.
One could understand the state of Burda. Shortly before the start of the fighting, he took over the brigade. This was his first battle as a brigade commander. And suddenly such an unusual outcome: after all, he usually knew how to fight with little bloodshed, as they said then. He took the enemy with cunning ...
I asked Shalin (Chief of Staff) to give a report, which included the combat score of the 49th Tank Brigade. German losses greatly exceeded the losses of the Burda brigade.
I got up and shook hands with the brigade commander.
- Consider that you have completed the task. The main thing is that you survived, did not retreat. Now go to the repairmen, hurry them up. Let them restore the cars as soon as possible. I am sure that you will still fight on them in the guards».

It was on the defense sector of the 1st Panzer that 200 Panthers, the first new German tanks thrown into battle, failed. The significance of this battle in the history of the Great Patriotic War is enormous. First of all, it was precisely as a result of it that the Wehrmacht finally lost its strategic initiative: the German army could no longer launch offensives with strategic goals. But the Red Army received the freedom of choice: where, when and with what forces to strike and gradually move further west.

Commander Katukov's talent as a commander was also clearly manifested in the Lvov-Sandomierz offensive operation carried out by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in July - August 1944. The tankers of the 1st, already guards, tank army quickly reached the Vistula, forced it and, together with the infantrymen and artillerymen with the support aviation captured the Sandomierz bridgehead, which was later used as a starting area for the subsequent offensive operations of the Soviet troops to the borders of Nazi Germany.

From the memoirs of Katukov: “N I must say, the 1st Guards Army suffered serious losses and hardly repulsed the attacks of the Nazis on outer ring encirclement ... Probably, the enemy guessed our condition. In any case, the Nazis even tried to be funny. The German radio gave us the answer to the ultimatum: "We are in the ring and you are in the ring - let's see what happens in the end»…

On August 18, 1944, the enemy's resistance in the city was broken, the last Nazi submachine gunners were knocked out of their nests. When I drove into Sandomierz, I was surprised that most of its buildings were intact: probably, being occupied with stubborn defense, the Nazis did not have time to blow them up.

The ancient city has retained many features of the Middle Ages: narrow streets, lancet arches and pointed spiers of churches. Gray walls and tiled roofs of castles, cobbled pavements - from all this breathed deep antiquity. To this day, the ruins, torn rows of barbed wire, smoking tanks and wrecked cars were returned.

And soon the Soviet Information Bureau transmitted the latest report on the battles in the area:
« August 20 north of the city Sandomierz, our troops completed the liquidation of the encircled grouping ... due to the refusal to surrender, most of the encircled enemy troops were destroyed ...».

For 35 days of fighting, the 1st Guards Tank Army, in cooperation with other armies, destroyed and captured over 34 thousand Nazis, knocked out and captured 461 tanks and assault guns, 187 armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles, 887 guns and mortars, 683 vehicles, 864 machine guns, 88 aircraft " .

For this operation, in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of September 23, 1944, Guards Colonel General of Tank Forces Katukov Mikhail Efimovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

On January 14, 1945, from the western bank of the Vistula, south of Warsaw, Katukov's tank army begins a raid, unprecedented in military history in terms of depth and pace, during the Vistula-Oder operation (offensive depth of 600 kilometers). On some days, the pace of movement reached 100 kilometers or more, and all this - through enemy territory. Actions unfold rapidly. After the liberation of the cities of Lodz and Gniezen, the 1st Guards Tank Army blocks the city of Poznan with part of its forces, and with its main forces enters the Oder and immediately captures a bridgehead on the western bank. In addition, Katukov's army crosses the rivers: Pilica, which bends several times along the route of the army, Varta, Obra. The western bank of the Obra was fortified with powerful steel armor of multi-storey pillboxes. Here are the teeth of the dragon, and gouges, and traps, and minefields - and all this is overcome by Soviet tankers, punching a gap in the defense before the infantry approaches. Then Katukov's tanks rushed to the Oder, leading the infantry. On March 1, 1945, the 1st Guards Tank Guards in a swift raid, cutting Pomerania into two parts, reached the Baltic coast, cutting off and surrounding the enemy troops. Then, like a tornado, the Katukovites swept through Eastern Pomerania, occupied the Baltic coast and began preparing for the assault on Berlin.

The fighting friend of the commander E. S. Katukova recalled those days: “ We are on German soil! Out of habit, this country makes a depressing impression. All in a gray stone of some prison color, with a greenish tint. Houses - with gabled roofs, are crowded, similar to each other.

Many villages passed before Berlin, and they are all like one. The houses have standard furniture, everything is the same, there is no individuality. Everything here is somehow not ours, and nothing pleases the eye. There is no our Russian space. Even the forest, and that one is different. Pines, like matches, are poked in rows, the entire undergrowth is cut down. The ground is bad - one sand.

We entered towns and villages, from which the Germans, not having time to close the doors of apartments and shops, fled. Coffee pots were still boiling on the stoves... There were unwatered cattle in all the yards. Cows that had not been milked for several days mooed as if they had been burned with fire. The economy of the Germans is not poor, in every house there are electric milkers, cabinets are filled to the brim with good. And the roads are all strewn with fluff from feather beds, pillows, like snow ... ".

The enemy was waiting for the offensive of the Soviet troops in the Berlin direction, although he did not know its exact date. With the beginning of the battle for the German capital, the army of Katukov gnawed through the defense in depth of the Germans on the Seelow Heights. Here the area was wooded with countless rivers, swamps, canals. Maneuver in the process of conducting a battle with tank troops was extremely difficult. After fierce fighting, a narrow gap formed on the heights - the railway to the city of Seelow. At that moment, Katukov came up with the idea to launch tanks with headlights on at night along the railway track. The enemy decided that it was his troops leaving the encirclement, and for some time did not open fire. Katukov, taking advantage of surprise, threw all his forces into the breach, leaving only cover in other areas. “In 1941, Katukov had only 45 tanks, and now this mass: tank to tank, cannon to cannon, occupied a space of 150 kilometers. And the whole army of Katukov entered this narrow neck, ”wrote E. S. Katukova.

So, in fierce battles, destroying the enemy and repelling his desperate counterattacks on the left flank of Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front, Katukov's tank army broke into the eastern and southeastern part of Berlin. She was the first to cross the Spree River and, interacting with the troops of the 8th army of V.I. Chuikov, captured the Zoo and part of the Tiergarten park near the Reichstag. Here, the "Katukovites" came into contact with the troops of the tank army of General S.I. Bogdanov, advancing from the north and northeast. On May 2, 1945, Berlin fell.

From the end of the war until 1948, Mikhail Efimovich Katukov held the post of head of the Soviet military administration of the Land of Saxony and at the same time commanded a tank army. From 1948 to 1950 he was the commander of the armored and mechanized troops in Germany, from 1951 to 1955 he served in Bobruisk in Belarus. In 1953, he was a member of the Bobruisk Regional Council of Working People's Deputies; in February 1955, he was a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus. In June 1955 he was appointed to the Ministry of Defense in the Main Inspectorate - General Inspector of Tank Forces. In April 1957, M. E. Katukov became deputy head of the Main Directorate for Combat Training of the Ground Forces of the USSR Ministry of Defense. In 1959 he was awarded the rank of Marshal of the Armored Forces.

During his service in the Soviet army, Mikhail Efimovich Katukov was twice awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union, received four Orders of Lenin, three Orders of the Red Banner, two Orders of Suvorov, I degree, the Order of Kutuzov, I and II degrees, the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky, and other awards. However, the biggest reward for him, like for every real commander, was the love of those whom he commanded, for the sake of whom he endlessly improved himself, sparing no effort. After his death, returning from the funeral of the marshal, a simple Soviet soldier A. Erofeev took up a pen and wrote poems in memory of his commander:

He was a legend, an example of courage,
He was worse than death for enemies.
With your mind and victorious action
Won love among the people of Katukov.
No, do not make up for the bitterness of loss,
His deeds will survive the years.
Bow your heads, soldiers,
Such people live forever.

These words say almost more than all the awards ... The memory of Mikhail Efimovich Katukov is alive. A military unit, streets in Moscow and other cities, schools are named after him. He is an honorary citizen of the cities of Mtsensk, Ozera, Berlin. The monument to twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal M. E. Katukov in the city of Ozyory, Moscow Region, is also a recognition of his services to the Fatherland.

Surzhik D.V., Institute world history RAN.

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Updated: January 8, 2017 By: admin

Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, marshal of the armored forces.

Born on September 17, 1900 in the village of Bolshoye Uvarovo, now Ozersky District, Moscow Region, in a peasant family. March 27, 1919 was drafted into the Red Army. He was sent to the 484th Infantry Regiment of the 54th Infantry Division, in which he participated in the battles on the Southern Front. In December 1920 he was sent to infantry commander courses in Mogilev. After completing the course on March 1, 1922, he was appointed platoon commander of the 1st company of the 235th Nevelsk rifle regiment of the 27th Omsk division, which was part of the Western Military District. From October 1926 to 1927 he studied at the Higher Officer Courses "Shot" in Moscow. Then he was appointed chief of staff in the 80th rifle regiment, which was soon reorganized into the 5th separate light tank brigade.
In the fall of 1934, Mikhail Efimovich became head of the operations department of the 134th tank brigade. In 1937 he was appointed chief of staff of the 45th tank corps.
In 1940, M.E. Katukov was appointed commander of the 20th Panzer Division, which from the first days of World War II took an active part in the battles against the Nazi invaders as part of the 9th mechanized corps of General K.K. Rokossovsky.
In October 1941, in fierce battles in the Orel-Mtsensk direction, the 4th tank brigade under the command of M. E. Katukov destroyed 133 tanks in 8 days of continuous fighting, delayed the advance of the 2nd tank group of General Guderian and, together with other units, thwarted the enemy plan bypass Moscow from the southeast. In November 1941, the Katukov brigade was renamed the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, it became the ancestor of the tank guard.
In 1942, the 1st Tank Corps entered the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and concentrated south of Tula.
In the Battle of Kursk, General M.E. Katukov, at the head of the 1st Panzer Army, covered a particularly important direction - to Kursk, took part in the Belgrade-Kharkov offensive operation, and then in the development of the offensive to the Dnieper.
In 1944, the tank army smashed the enemy in Right-Bank Ukraine, participated in the Proskurov-Chernivtsi operation.
In 1945, tankers under the command of M. E. Katukov liberated Poland and Germany.
M. E. Katukov was awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3rd degree, the Order of the Red Star, the Order of Kutuzov 2nd degree, the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st degree, the Order of Kutuzov 1st degree, 2 orders Suvorov 1st degree, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 4 Orders of Lenin. Also, he is twice Hero of the Soviet Union (Gold Star medal of the Hero of the Soviet Union No. 4585 09/23/1944, medal "Gold Star" Hero of the Soviet Union No. 5239 04/06/1945).
The name of M. E. Katukov is one of the streets of Lipetsk, on which there is a memorial

Mikhail Katukov, perhaps, deserves the title of the main Soviet tank general. Escaped from the border battle in Western Ukraine, he fought near Moscow, raised a whole galaxy of tank aces, and already took Berlin as commander of a tank army.

Mikhail Efimovich Katukov, one of the largest commanders of the Soviet tank forces, was born on September 17, 1900 near Kolomna, in a huge peasant family (seven children), which was usual for that time.

In 1912 he was sent "to the people" in St. Petersburg. He worked as a messenger, then as a worker. After the revolution, he returned home, but in 1919 he joined the Red Army, to which he remained faithful to the end. Fought on the Polish front. Since 1932, Mikhail Katukov contacted the tank troops, and this became his fate.

At the end of 1940, he received a tank division of a new formation, deployed in Western Ukraine.

Then the war began. In August 1941, Colonel Katukov pulled the remnants of the 20th Panzer Division entrusted to him from the encirclement.

"Tank" is more in name: one of the two tank divisions of the 9th mechanized corps of General Konstantin Rokossovsky went into battle on 36 BT and T-26 tanks instead of 375 vehicles that were supposed to be in the state.

I went to the largest tank battle of the Second World War, which raged in the Lutsk-Brody-Dubno triangle.

Coming out of the encirclement, Katukov received the 4th tank brigade, which joined the personnel of the 20th and 15th tank divisions that had left with him. Among the officers of the 15th division, the brigade included lieutenant and senior lieutenants Alexander Burda and Konstantin Samokhin - in the future, the largest Soviet aces-tankers of the war.

The 4th brigade advanced near Mtsensk, and there showed everything that a well-managed tank formation is capable of. But the main glory in the battle for Moscow, of course, the brigade won in the battles in the Volokolamsk direction.

Katukov was, if not the author of the idea of ​​tank ambushes, then at least consistently put it into practice. His tank brigade was not drawn into a hard "not a step back" - the Germans easily bypassed such positions from the flanks and moved on, leaving the resting in the rear.

Major General Katukov with officers at the map, winter 1941-1942

Instead, Katukov organized covert ambushes along the routes of advance of the German columns, combining them with counterattacks by trained mobile groups. The defense was carried out mobile, on the move, the enemy did not have a picture of finding the forces opposing him. In 1942, Katukov, snatching time from command, even wrote a short training manual for the command staff "Tanks on the Defense", summarizing his experience in practicing tank ambushes.

On November 11, the 4th brigade was renamed the 1st Guards and became the first of the tank units of the Red Army to receive the guard rank. But the need for larger mobile connections was growing. In the spring of 1942, the 1st Tank Corps was deployed on the basis of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, Katukov was appointed its commander. The corps fought near Voronezh, from the autumn of 1942 Katukov commanded the 3rd mechanized corps on the Kalinin front.

In January 1943, Lieutenant General Katukov received the 1st Tank Army, with which he reached the end of the war.

On his account - the defense of Oboyan in the Battle of Kursk, the liberation of Ukraine, the capture and retention of the strategically important Sandomierz bridgehead.

Take Berlin. The legend about the conflict between the commander and Marshal Zhukov, at that time the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, is connected with this episode. Zhukov allegedly demanded that Katukov be the first to enter Berlin, but in all cases it turned out that the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front of Marshal Konev were the first to reach the cities. Katukov refused to break through the strong defenses of the Germans with his forehead, missed a little time for additional reconnaissance and searching for weaknesses in the enemy’s position, and nevertheless entered Berlin, but later.

An analysis of the course of the Berlin operation rather refutes this myth.

However, it is difficult to understand one thing: why, immediately after the war, all of the largest Soviet tank generals became marshals, except for the “junior” ones ... and the luminary of the tank forces, the hero of the battle for Moscow, Katukov, who, with his entire track record, asked for the role of the first of them?

Katukov received this title, we note, only in 1959, a year and a half after Georgy Zhukov was reliably “rolled up” in retirement from all senior military posts.

But Mikhail Efimovich never made a career. He received a marshal as deputy head of the Main Directorate for Combat Training of the Ground Forces. Prior to that, he commanded tank and mechanized armies. Since 1963 - in the "paradise group" (a group of general inspectors of the Ministry of Defense, an honorary, but nothing decisive place for honored senior officers). He died in 1976, shortly before his death he left his memoirs (“On the Edge of the Main Strike”). A well-written image of Commander Katukov can be found in the memoirs of N.K. Popel, a member of the military council of his army (another hero of the battle for Lutsk-Brody-Rivne).

Hero of the Soviet Union, marshal of the armored forces is less known than Zhukov, Rokossovsky and Konev. However, to defeat the enemy, he. Katukov's tankers played a huge role in the battle near Moscow. It was they who were the first to use the tactics of tank ambushes and were able to stop German tanks on the outskirts of the Russian capital. An intelligent tank commander was noticed by Stalin, and it was Katukov, along with our other famous tank commanders, who created military formations with a large number of armored vehicles. He created and led first a mechanized corps, and then a tank army. Left an interesting memoir "On the edge of the main blow" .

I bring to your attention an extensive article on the military work of M.E. Katukov. Source: Military literature @ Bystrov V. // Generals and commanders of the Great Patriotic War. Issue 3 - M .: Young Guard, 1985.

Marshal of Armored Troops Mikhail Katukov

October 1941. The tank and mechanized armadas of Hitler's General Guderian were rapidly advancing towards Moscow. On October 3, one of his most combat-ready corps - the 24th motorized - broke into Oryol on the move. The troops of the Bryansk Front, which were covering here the distant approaches to the Soviet capital, were dismembered by superior enemy forces. Hitler's command rejoiced. And there was a reason: the way to Moscow in the first days of October, in fact, was free.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command took vigorous measures to close the gap that had formed. Troops were transferred to the area of ​​the enemy breakthrough. On the spot, they were supposed to be united into the 1st Guards Rifle Corps under the command of Major General D. D. Lelyushenko.

The 4th tank brigade stationed near Moscow near the Kubinka station was included in the corps. Raised on October 2 before dawn on combat alert, she immediately began to load into echelons. And its commander, Colonel Katukov, was called to the phone by the head of the main armored department of the People's Commissariat of Defense, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Ya. P. Fedorenko.

Hurry up, comrade Katukov, - Fedorenko quickly spoke in response to the greeting. - The task is super-responsible and it was decided there. - Fedorenko singled out the word "there", making it clear that the decision to send the 4th tank brigade to Orel was made at the highest levels of the military leadership. - The main thing: to close the road to Tula for Guderian.

I obey, Yakov Nikolaevich! I will do everything possible.

Few! The impossible is required there ... Guderian's tanks are a colossus, and you have a cat crying. There are no tank formations in Lelyushenko's corps, except for your brigade. Yes, you will be the first to arrive.

Katukov was familiar with Fedorenko and was even friendly through joint pre-war service. Having taken up a responsible post in the army, Fedorenko treated his former colleagues and comrades as always affably and caringly. But his concern was special. He entrusted the most difficult cases to his comrades, helped them, but also demanded from them more strictly than from others.

It began to dawn a little when the brigade was already loaded into trains. We drove fast, without stopping. Katukov decided to rest. But it was not possible to take a nap. Thoughts and memories, running into each other, dispersed the dream. Well, maybe this is how a person works, maybe he needs to take stock of some stage in his life before entering another. In the military fate of Katukov, such a line was just outlined, and the need to comprehend the recent past firmly seized him.

Katukov entered the war as the commander of the 20th Panzer Division, which was part of the 9th Mechanized Corps, Major General K.K. Rokossovsky. The division was in the process of reorganization and was far from being staffed with people and equipment. The KV and T-34 tanks had not yet arrived: there were only 33 obsolete BT-2 and BT-3 tanks. The artillery regiment received only howitzers, the motorized rifle regiment ended up without artillery at all, the pontoon battalion - without pontoons. The communications battalion had only training equipment.

On the first day of the war, Katukov himself was in the Kiev district military hospital, where he underwent a difficult operation: the seam had not yet completely healed, the temperature reached 38 °. With difficulty persuading the doctors to be discharged, on June 23, on passing cars, he reached the division that had come out to meet the enemy troops, rushing to Novograd-Volynsky. The next day, June 24, near the town of Klevan, the division attacked the motorized units of the enemy's 13th Panzer Division.

The first fight is remembered forever, in all details. But now the details got in the way of Katukov. He thought over and over again about the tricks that helped him then inflict quite tangible damage to the enemy. First of all, tank ambushes. By means of them, the BT-2 and BT-3, vulnerable in all respects, disabled many German tanks. True, in this battle the division lost all its tanks. But for each of them the enemy paid with several of his own. In subsequent battles, another trick showed itself well - "wandering" guns. Artillery batteries changed positions day and night - the enemy got the impression that he was dealing with large artillery forces.

I also remembered another trick. Katukov has already forgotten who exactly proposed it. The fact is that from the first days of the war, enemy infantry began to be afraid of T-34 tanks. But in the division, as in many other tank formations, they were not. Once Katukov approached a group of commanders who were arguing about something animatedly.

And what? Make layouts. And put real guns somewhere nearby, - one of the commanders said.

Fritz will see - immediately drapa! yelled another commander.

And what? - did not give up the first. - The infantry will be scared for sure.

M-yes. The need for inventions is cunning, - someone from the audience noticed.

Seeing Katukov, the commanders drew themselves up.

At ease! - ordered Katukov. - "Necessity is cunning for inventions," he repeated. - But this is about smart people proverb. The thought of layouts is worthwhile. Let's brainstorm.

And they brainwashed. They sheathed with plywood “under the T-34” several failed transport vehicles, attached wooden trunks to them and painted it all in a protective color. Disguised in the bushes and on the edges of the forest, but so that the enemy could detect them, these scarecrows looked like genuine thirty-fours hiding in ambush. Nearby they fired at the enemy and real guns "roamed". Indeed, such false ambushes made a strong impression on the enemy infantry. In the areas of these ambushes, she did not climb ahead. Later, when the enemy captured such "tanks", the fascist newspapers made fun of the "Russian plywood equipment" a lot. But the one who laughs last laughs: the soldiers of the Katukov division more than once witnessed how the enemy infantry stopped dumbfounded, noticing the "ambushes" of the "thirty-fours", or how the fascist aviation bombed these "ambushes" furiously. False fortifications also proved themselves well.

In the midst of the fighting, Katukov unexpectedly received an order: to hand over the division to the deputy and depart for Moscow at the disposal of Ya. N. Fedorenko.

Yakov Nikolayevich greeted him cordially, but immediately announced in an orderly tone:

That's what, comrade Katukov, you have been appointed commander of the 4th tank brigade.

Brigades? - Katukov asked in bewilderment.

Calm down, you fought well. Represented to the Order of the Red Banner. Therefore, we give a brigade. - Fedorenko got up, silently walked around the office, sighed and finally explained: - The mechanized corps and tank divisions are being disbanded. Technique is not enough. Industry: half on wheels, half rebuilt. It was decided to create tank formations of a smaller scale - brigades. We will select all the best that is in them: people and mostly new equipment ... Your brigade is being formed near Stalingrad. Prepare it in such a way that it is in no way inferior to a German tank division.

The command staff of the brigade was selected before the arrival of Katukov. Regimental commissar M.F. Boyko was appointed commissar, lieutenant colonel P.V. Kulvinsky was appointed chief of staff, senior battalion commissar I.G. Derevyankin was appointed head of the political department, captain M.T. Nikitin was appointed head of the operational department, captain P. G. Dyner. They say the first impression is always the last. Like it or not, but even at the first meeting, and especially afterwards, Katukov was very pleased with his assistants.

Shortly before Katukov's arrival, a commission from Moscow arrived at the tank camp near Stalingrad to select the most experienced driver-mechanics, tower shooters, commanders and political workers for the brigade. Katukov and Boyko joined the work of the commission, trying to select the best of the best. And you really had to choose from the best. The brigade was manned from the personnel of the 15th Panzer Division withdrawn from the front. The commission and the command of the brigade received a huge number of statements in which the tankers swore to fight for the Motherland to the last breath. Everyone who entered the office where the commission worked asked, demanded, tried to prove as convincingly as possible that he must be enlisted in the brigade. And how difficult it was to refuse any of them! All these people were eager for a holy cause and, most importantly, they knew what awaited them: everyone had already been in battles with the Nazis. And I had to refuse. There were more applicants than was required to complete the brigade.

Ah, what a people! Katukov rejoiced when the formation of the brigade was completed. - And they know their business, and with combat experience! And how many communists and Komsomol members!

Soon the brigade began to receive equipment. The first battalion was armed with T-34 tanks. They were made right there, at the Stalingrad Tractor Plant. The plan was overfulfilled, the workers worked in a front-line manner. But Katukov was in a hurry to have more time for combat training. Dyner found a way out. Once he came to Katukov with a proposal:

I believe that the deputy commanders of technical units, the drivers and the entire technical support company should work directly at the plant.

But the idea! Katukov rejoiced. - And things will go faster, and assembly is a wonderful school for studying the material part of new tanks.

The very next day, the tankers allocated by Dyner, together with the workers, assembled parts and assemblies at the plant new car. Soon they, as Dyner put it, "knew her insides to the last screw."

At the same time, combat training was launched. From the very beginning, it was so close to the conditions of the war that it differed from it only in the absence of losses. Classes lasted fourteen hours a day. Katukov was inexhaustible in developing combinations that put fighters and commanders in the most difficult conditions, as close as possible to a combat situation. Already after the battles near Klevan, he carefully considered the methods of actions of tank units that justified themselves then in the conditions of superiority of the enemy in tanks and aircraft. He selected the most typical of them, combined them into a single circuit diagram. Its main provisions were discussed at a meeting of the brigade command. And he was glad to receive sensible suggestions from his assistants.

The essence of the scheme developed by Katukov is better stated in his words:

“Motorized riflemen are located on the defensive, first detachment of real trenches and false ones. In false ones, mock-ups of cannons and machine guns are placed. Some of these trenches are occupied by small groups of fighters with real machine guns. The role of "actors" who inspire the cutting edge falls to their lot. Behind, at a short distance, there are real trenches, and further, in tank-dangerous directions, tanks are placed - sometimes a platoon, sometimes just one car. For camouflage, tanks use local shelters: bushes, trees, stacks of bread, haystacks, reverse slopes of heights. Each crew prepares for itself not one position, but two or three, which can be changed without the enemy noticing. Crews predetermine landmarks and distances to them. Interaction is organized in advance with infantry, artillery, and sappers and communication is established either by radio, or by special signals, or by messengers. All tank crews must be in each other's field of vision, ready to help their neighbor. The enemy begins ground and air reconnaissance. Ambushes do not reveal themselves. The enemy is probing the front line in battle. "Actors" in false positions enter into action. The tanks are silent.

Enemy aircraft begin to bomb the false trenches. The "actors" imperceptibly retreat in the course of the message. And finally, the enemy launches tanks, accompanied by infantry. The most critical moments of the battle are coming.

Arrows, gunners, mortars shoot enemy infantry. The ambush is silent. And only when the enemy vehicles come up to 200-300 meters, ambushes go to the firing position and open fire on the attackers at close range, for sure. At the same time, ambush crews do not let their neighbors out of sight and hit enemy tanks that have broken through on the sides. It turns out oblique, cross, destructive fire.

The ambush commander enters the firing position only in case of emergency. From somewhere in the trench or from behind the bushes, he watches the battlefield, outlines targets, determines the sight, and only after that he gets into the tank, and the car jumps out to open fire. The sight is set, the gun is approximately aimed at the target. After firing three or four shots, the tank crawls back into cover. It is impossible to stand in position for a long time: the crew will become a victim of aimed fire.

From the shelter, the commanders again conduct observation and again jump out to the position, but now to another. This is repeated several times."
After discussing this scheme with the command of the brigade, Katukov held a meeting with the unit commanders. Each of them has already had to deal with an enemy vastly superior in tanks and aircraft. Therefore, Katukov's scheme turned out to be close and understandable to everyone. It was the basis of the combat training of the brigade.

And now Katukov recalled with satisfaction how proactively the unit commanders conducted exercises according to this scheme and, like himself, excelled in choosing such situations that required the crews to be smart, quick to react, and excellently trained.

Katukov steadily complicated the tasks of combat training.

It is important to be able to act not only as a team as a whole. Each unit, each individual tank must be prepared for autonomous operations in isolation from the main forces, - Katukov instructed the commanders and immediately offered techniques, one more difficult than the other, for training such autonomous operations.

Various communication and intelligence options were carefully worked out - Katukov gave them exclusively great importance.

I also remembered something else: “the collapse of instructions,” as Boyko joked. Once, at a meeting of the command staff, it was discussed (for the umpteenth time!) About the lack of tractors for pulling damaged tanks from the battlefield.

Dyner stood up and briefly reported:

They do not give and do not promise in the near future.

You are not talking about something. - Katukov caught an intriguing note in Dyner's voice: that's what he always said when he found some interesting solution.

Thirty-fours and KVs can, if necessary, replace tractors ... They checked it, checked it several times. They pull well.

This is against the instructions,” Kulvinsky spoke doubtfully.

Ah... - Katukov waved his hand. “Tomorrow we will conduct comprehensive tests.

Tests once again showed that thirty-four and KV perfectly coped with the task of tractors.

The same instruction forbade landing infantry on thirty-fours and other tanks. Meanwhile, the war showed the high efficiency of direct and simultaneous interaction between tanks and infantry.

And what if we try to parachute infantry like this, - suggested Katukov to Boyko, who was watching with him a tank returning from classes, plastered on top by infantrymen.

Once again we will crush the instruction, - he laughed. - I also think that landings on tanks are possible.

And again, the classes became more complicated, supplemented by working out the actions of tank landings. And there was no case that the thirty-four and KV, even on very rough terrain, could not withstand the additional load.

On September 23, an order came: urgently load the brigade into trains and arrive in the Kubinka area. And now she's on her way again.

Katukov got up and went to the window, examining the monotonous landscape passing by. Memories as if at once receded, they were replaced by another: now Katukov mentally reviewed his forces. What does he have? A tank regiment - 49 combat vehicles, a motorized rifle battalion, an anti-aircraft artillery battalion - 16 guns, a transport and repair company, and other auxiliary units. “The fist is too small,” he sighed, and immediately noted mischievously: “Small, but daring!” Indeed, the equipment in the brigade was mostly new - T-34 tanks. The brigade was a close-knit combat team, consisting of well-trained fighters and commanders who had combat experience. In the crews, each, if necessary, could replace the other. Units were trained various types interactions. And the morale of the staff! The fist really turned out to be remote.

Busy to the limit with preparing the brigade for the upcoming battles, Katukov internally prepared himself for them. All this is good: both new equipment, and qualified personnel, and everything that combat training gives the brigade. This, of course, will bear fruit. But what should he, Katukov, do to multiply these fruits? Fedorenko's words were constantly drilled into my memory: "Prepare the brigade so that it is in no way inferior to the German tank division." Well, perhaps it has been achieved. The 4th Tank Brigade, Katukov was sure of it, was capable of competing with a German tank division. But is that the point? Technology has brought a lot of new things to the art of war. And not all, far from all the possibilities of using technology are understood - after all, the war, in fact, has just begun.

Now these thoughts again took possession of his mind. I recalled a recent conversation with Boyko and Kulvinsky. Dissatisfied with the slowness of the actions of some units in the past classes, Katukov meticulously analyzed the mistakes made at a meeting of unit commanders.

Didn't you intercept, Mikhail Efimovich? Boyko turned to Katukov when he dismissed the commanders. - In general, the units acted well. If they fight the Germans like this...

The Germans are not an example for us, - answered Katukov. - So far, I have not seen what we can learn from them, at least on our tactical scale. Well, fuck. With such superiority, this is a simple matter. Where is the art?

Well, it's you ... Your own words: "You can't underestimate the enemy," objected Boyko.

And I do not underestimate, I believe that neither we nor the Germans have yet fully understood the possibility new technology tanks in particular. So far, I see one thing: the German command understood the significance of the massive use of tanks in modern warfare.

With our help, - Kulvinsky joined the conversation. - The theory of the massive use of tanks long before the war was put forward and substantiated by Soviet military theorists.

They learned it on their own head, - Katukov muttered angrily. - They just didn't get it. We’ll have a lot of cars, then we’ll see what it is - the massive use of tanks!

Come back to earth! Boyko laughed.

And I'm on the ground. That's why I'm looking to the future. Now ... Now we can already successfully use tanks on the defensive, even though we have much fewer of them than the Germans. Tanks! Yes, they can! What is tank war? This is primarily a skillful use of maneuver, speed, lightning decisions and sophisticated cunning. This is the main thing both in the offensive and in defense, with superiority in tanks, and when there are few of them, this is even more important here. It's all about who practically masters it better - us or the enemy. Therefore, today, as you said, I intercepted.

Sat up after midnight. Katukov then, as they say, dispersed - he spoke about tortured, carefully weighed by long reflections, tested more than once in exercises - about continuous reconnaissance, the interaction of tanks with infantry and artillery, various methods of tank ambushes - about everything that his interlocutors had long known from him and what the brigade was taught with him. They understood that Katukov, as happens with people who are focused on an idea for a long time, spoke more to himself. But they also got carried away - the ideas of Katukov in the process of combat training of the brigade became their own.

It is bad, very bad that we did not succeed on the scale of the entire war, but I consider the formula correct. It is necessary to fight with little blood, - Katukov said with conviction. - And now from this formula it is not necessary to refuse. In any case, our brigade must fight in this way,

Remembering this conversation now, Katukov felt uncomfortable. “I got carried away then,” he annoyed. “Maybe tomorrow you will have to answer to your conscience for all these words, to prove in practice that you are right.” But Katukov was sure of his rightness and was annoyed because, as it seemed to him, he then spoke somewhat pompously, and he could not stand this, “He boasted, going to the army,” he mentally grumbled at himself.

Boyko entered the compartment:

Did you sleep off, Mikhail Efimovich? We are approaching Mtsensk.

I see, - answered Katukov, nodding at the window, beyond which floated ashes with charred pipes, funnels on the streets of a small town. - All. From here on your own.

Having gathered in the headquarters bus, Katukov, Kulvinsky and Nikitin began to discuss the intelligence plan. At that moment, a squat man in a Red Army raincoat and helmet entered the bus. It was Major General Lelyushenko. There we had a short meeting.

A battalion of cadets of the Tula Arms and Technical School entered the city before you. Today, your brigade and this battalion are all our available forces, - Lelyushenko informed. - Other parts and connections of the hull are on the way. Do you have any ideas, comrade Katukov?

Intelligence, of course, is primarily intelligence.

On the morning of October 4, Katukov sent two groups of tanks in the direction of Orel with landing troops in a company of motorized infantry. One of them was commanded by Captain Gusev, the other by Senior Lieutenant Burda. Katukov himself, together with Nikitin, left after the reconnaissance to study the area. Trying on different lines, they finally chose the most convenient for defense - five kilometers from Orel along the northern bank of the Optukha River, not far from the village of Ivanovskoye.

By evening, all parts of the brigade pulled up to the line and immediately began to equip positions. In the darkness of the night they dug trenches with a deep profile, false trenches, in the early morning they set up tank ambushes and artillery. The brigade had no neighbors on the right and left. Therefore, Katukov organized a thorough reconnaissance, ordered tank ambushes to be put forward on the flanks. He kept up everywhere and every time he was convinced that everything was done quickly, dexterously and as it should: ambushes had two or three well-camouflaged positions, artillery had well-thought-out ways for maneuvering. In a word, study in the camp near Stalingrad was bearing fruit.

Soon information began to come in from Captain Gusev. He ambushed the tanks along the highway at the exit from Orel. At night, the clang of caterpillars and the noise of engines were heard. The moon emerging from behind the clouds illuminated the highway: ten tanks were moving quickly along it. "Intelligence service!" - Gusev decided and ordered to open fire. Constantly changing positions, Gusev's crews destroyed four enemy tanks. The rest hurried back.

Katukov was dissatisfied with the actions of the scouts. Captain Gusev did not obtain specific data; there was no connection at all with Burda's group. But something did become clear. First, it was confirmed that large enemy forces were concentrated in Orel. Secondly, the enemy sent reconnaissance. So, he does not intend to linger in Orel.

Indeed, throughout the night of October 5, enemy reconnaissance groups tried to probe the brigade's defenses. By ten o'clock in the morning, when the rain stopped and the sky cleared up, the enemy artillery rumbled, his bombers appeared in the sky. A lot of air bombs and shells fell on false positions. In general, the correct arrangement of shelters and careful camouflage had an effect: the brigade did not suffer any significant damage from the artillery and aviation preparation of the enemy.

Soon, enemy tanks appeared in front of the positions of the motorized rifle battalion, behind them the motorized infantry moved in a dense scattering. Katukov and Kulvinsky were at that time at the forefront of motorized rifles. Kulvinsky counted about 40 tanks alone and perhaps as many, if not more, armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers.

Bending down, they ran to the command post, but, obviously, the German artillerymen noticed them: the shells began to burst closer and closer. Two signalmen were pulling the cable nearby. - Lie down! - shouted Katukov and rushed to the side of the road. He saw how both signalers fell, beveled by shells that exploded nearby.

Kulvinsky!

Here I am. Alive.

Quick bushes on the CP!

From the command post, the battlefield was clearly visible: enemy tanks broke into the positions of a motorized rifle battalion. How motorized rifles fought was evident from several burning German tanks. Having given the order over the radio to bring tank ambushes into battle, Katukov clung to his binoculars and saw how almost simultaneously several thirty-fours jumped out from behind a hillock. Almost every shot they fired hit an enemy tank. Nimble, swift, they jumped out from behind barns, bushes, haystacks, made several shots and disappeared. Immediately they reappeared, but from a different position. The formation of enemy tanks was mixed up, some of them burning in thick black fires. The chains of fascist submachine gunners lay down, rose and lay down again, pressed by machine-gun fire.

This first attack of the enemy lasted three hours. More attacks followed. The enemy made desperate efforts to crush the brigade's defenses. In the evening, when the last attack was repulsed, the brigade headquarters summed up the results: the motorized rifle battalion suffered significant losses. The enemy's damage was much greater - he lost 18 tanks, 8 guns and several hundred soldiers and officers. The main thing was that the enemy failed to break through the brigade's defenses. Nevertheless, Katukov made a decision: to change the line of defense, and quickly and covertly.

Tomorrow the enemy will look for a new place to break through. You need to deceive him, ”he explained at a meeting of the brigade command.

On the night of October 6, the brigade withdrew to the Naryshkino - First Warrior area, riding the Orel - Mtsensk highway. Katukov instructed the unit commanders and ordered that the positions be ready by early morning.

Releasing the commanders, he turned to Boyko:

People are exhausted. But the devil only knows when Guderian will start. Let's prepare the defense - then, maybe, an hour or two will turn out for rest. Send the workers of the political department to the subdivisions... Let them explain the task. Outside the window, a growing noise of moving tanks was suddenly heard and almost immediately fell silent. Senior Lieutenant Burda quickly entered the hut,

At ease, at ease, - Katukov stopped him. - Report immediately. However, no. Why didn't they respond to our requests?

The radio is out of order.

It's clear. Now everything is in order"

For 36 hours, the Burda group was behind enemy lines, destroyed 10 medium and light tanks, 2 tractors with anti-tank guns, 5 vehicles with infantry and about a hundred enemy soldiers and officers.

Here is the material for conversations in the units, - said Katukov, turning to Boyko. - Make arrangements, please.

The trophy documents and prisoners delivered by the Burda group were of particular value. It turned out that along the Orel-Mtsensk highway the enemy intended to move a huge armada of tanks, artillery and motorized infantry: the 24th motorized corps, consisting of two tank and one motorized divisions. In addition, another tank division was moving to the rear of the emerging 1st Guards Corps. All these troops, according to the plans of the German command, were to break through Mtsensk to Tula and go to Moscow from the south.

Before they had time to sum up the results of Burda's reconnaissance, a messenger from Lelyushenko appeared and reported that an anti-tank artillery battalion was at the disposal of Katukov. This turned out to be very helpful.

The plan for the defense of the new frontier had been developed by Katukov and his staff in advance, and now the units were being placed in their places. The new positions were very convenient for defense: skyscrapers, from where the terrain was clearly visible, small groves, bushes, haystacks made it possible to disguise tank ambushes and guns. Now Katukov has made adjustments to the balance of power: he increased the reconnaissance of the flanks, sent Burda's tanks to help the motorized rifle battalion straddling the highway - they became six ambushes at the positions of motorized rifles, and determined positions for the arriving units of the anti-tank artillery battalion.

In the early morning, the brigade command gathered at the command post of the brigade commander. And almost immediately, reports began to arrive about the movement of large enemy forces from Orel. Having climbed a large tree, the commander of the 2nd Tank Battalion, Captain Raftopulo, reported on what he had seen through binoculars:

About a hundred tanks, anti-tank artillery, a lot of motorized infantry, submachine gunners on motorcycles ...

Approaching, the enemy tanks opened heavy fire on the positions of the motorized rifle battalion and the anti-tank division. Some of the enemy vehicles were set on fire by return fire, but the rest stubbornly moved forward. Soon they broke into the location of motorized riflemen and began to iron their trenches.

The mortar company was in a difficult position. To help her, a thirty-four jumped out of the ambush under the command of Lieutenant Kukarin. She flew almost close to the enemy tanks when the shell pierced her caterpillar. But the crew was not taken aback. The tank commander and the radio operator began to fire shells, and the turret gunner Lyubushkin showed his skill in full: three shots - and three enemy tanks went up in flames. Another shot - and another direct hit. Lyubushkin, who jumped out of the fourth tank, shot the enemy crew with a fragmentation projectile. But then an enemy shell hit the right side of the thirty-four and exploded inside it. Acrid smoke filled the car, "Shell!" - demanded Lyubushkin and knocked out another tank. In total, Lyubushkin destroyed nine enemy tanks in this battle.

Meanwhile, the position of the motorized rifle battalion was becoming more and more difficult. Katukov sent four tanks under the command of Senior Lieutenant Lavrinenko to help him. And again began what was so carefully practiced in the exercises. Thirty-four jumped out of ambushes and opened fire on enemy tanks. From his command post, Katukov saw several enemy vehicles burst into flames. Others began to back away in confusion. Thirty-four suddenly disappeared and a minute later emerged from another shelter. A number of aimed shots - and several enemy vehicles caught fire again. With such swift, sudden attacks, Lavrinenko's tanks destroyed 15 enemy tanks. In the end, the breakthrough was eliminated.

With smaller, but still impressive forces, the enemy tried to break through in other places of the brigade's defense. And every time tank ambushes, skillful actions of motorized riflemen and artillerymen thwarted these attempts.

The brigade did not suffer heavy losses. But people are extremely tired. And suddenly a report: to the right of the highway Orel - Mtsensk concentrated up to 200 tanks and a large number of enemy motorized infantry.

Twice as much as in the morning! Boyko exclaimed.

Yes, well ... - thought Katukov. - Well, we will conjure, and you and the employees of the political department are urgently in the units. And I ask: explain to political workers that they tell people everything as it is. Nothing has such a detrimental effect on fighters as a sweet little half-truth ... And people? Our people will understand.

“Conjure! - mentally mimicked himself Katukov. - And what can you conjure? Nevertheless, the headquarters earned with might and main: some tank and artillery ambushes were rearranged, communications were checked, reconnaissance of the flanks was intensified.

The day was drawing to a close, and the enemy artillery increased their fire.

Will they start at night? This is something new for the Germans,” Kulvinsky frowned, worried that not all positions were ready for battle yet.

At this time, a tall artilleryman entered the command post.

Captain Chumak, commander of the division of guards mortars, he introduced himself. - Ordered to plant a spark in your area.

Of course, Katukov heard about the Katyushas, ​​but he did not have to see them. And now he looked at the installations with disappointment: ordinary trucks with rows of steel rails raised up - this did not fit with the stories about the huge destructive power of the new weapon. And then Chumak completely spoiled the impression.

I have been ordered to fire one volley,” he said. But, obviously, having understood the condition of the brigade commander, grinning, he assured: - Do not worry. And that's enough. You will see how Katyusha “plays”, then you will understand what it is.

Chumak plotted the enemy's concentration area on his map and turned to Katukov:

We need to warn the people on the front lines. The noise will be terrible. As if it did not cause panic.

Kulvinsky sent messengers to the trenches. Chumak brought the installations into position and gave the command. Dazzling flashes of flame brightly lit up the evening sky, a piercing whistle was heard, then a terrible roar broke out, from which the earth trembled.

The hollow was engulfed in flames, which expanded and soon turned into a huge sea of ​​fire. Explosions were heard from below - cars with ammunition were torn. Katukov saw through binoculars that many vehicles that were not directly hit by the volley were leaving in disorder. “One volley is not enough,” he decided. “Apparently, the supply of ammunition for new weapons is still tight.”

In an hour you can see everything in place, - Chumak said answering the handshakes. - And I, Comrade Colonel, need to immediately withdraw installations. So according to the instructions.

When the flames over the hollow began to die out, intelligence was sent there. The volley of Katyushas turned out to be accurate: dozens of smoking tanks, tractors, cars, motorcycles, many corpses - it was difficult to calculate everything exactly in the dark.

Late at night, the headquarters summed up the day. The battle went on almost continuously for twelve hours. All enemy attacks were repulsed. He lost 43 tanks, 16 anti-tank guns, up to 500 soldiers and officers. Six tanks were damaged in the brigade, four of which were soon repaired. The motorized rifle battalion was seriously damaged. He was assigned to the second echelon of the brigade.

Guderian's tank ram was clearly crushed, weakened, but still far outnumbered the 4th tank brigade. And again, Katukov decided that the brigade could not remain in its previous positions: the enemy now already knew the area, and it was impossible to repeat the previous methods of tank ambushes on it - their effect would have sharply decreased. On the night of October 7, the brigade withdrew to a new line: Ilkovo - Golovlevo - Sheino.

In the morning, Lelyushenko arrived at the Katukov command post. He said that he spoke on the HF with Stalin and he highly appreciated the actions of the brigade. Needless to say: the praise of the Supreme Commander delighted Katukov. But she made a lot of commitments. And there was a moment when, with a chill running down his back, he thought: “Maybe it’s just been lucky so far?”

Lelyushenko brought another good news: the brigade was given a regiment of border guards under the command of Colonel Piyashev. There was also a replenishment for the motorized rifle battalion of the brigade on the way. Katukov once again thought over the plan for the location of his forces, strengthened many areas at the expense of the border guards, expanded intelligence, especially on the flanks.

Apparently, the preceding three days of fighting, and especially the strike of the Katyushas, ​​made a strong impression on the enemy: on October 7 and 8, he did not show much activity, only trying to probe the brigade's defenses with small reconnaissance groups. Katukov ordered these groups to resist decisively, but in such a way as not to reveal the location of the units. As before, he aimed to mislead the enemy about the Soviet troops opposing him, to make him nervous. Languages ​​were also needed. In this case, the border guards showed themselves perfectly. At night, in small groups, they made their way to the enemy location, launched grenades or daggers, and captured prisoners.

Katukov's plan succeeded. The prisoners showed that the enemy command believed that it was dealing with a large tank grouping of Soviet troops.

On October 9, the enemy began a decisive offensive. Fifty dive-bombers, turning on the sirens, fell on the trenches with a heart-rending howl, literally bombarding them with bombs. This happened more than once or twice: enemy air preparation lasted a quarter of an hour. But the fascist vultures worked on false trenches and trenches.

Then tanks moved - about a hundred vehicles and motorized infantry. Katukov quickly figured out the enemy's maneuver: to outflank the positions of the brigade and deliver the main blow from the left through Sheino to Mtsensk. Tank and artillery ambushes held back the advance of the enemy. Fierce fighting broke out everywhere. The enemy suffered huge losses. And yet his tanks broke through to Shein. Here they came across a company of Lieutenant Samokhin's BT-7 tanks. The lieutenant buried part of the tanks in the ground - their task was to accurately fire artillery at enemy vehicles. The tank duel lasted an hour and a half, one after another the enemy tanks flared up. However, regardless of the losses, the enemy continued to attack Sheino. Katukov sent three tanks to help Samokhin. Their attack turned out to be so unexpected for the enemy and swift that the enemy tanks did not even have time to deploy their guns. Direct aimed shots immediately set fire to 11 German tanks, the rest left the battlefield and hid in the forest.

Enemy attacks were repulsed everywhere, with heavy losses for him. However, at 22 o'clock Katukov received an order from Lelyushenko to withdraw to a new line, since the enemy managed to break through in another sector of the corps' defense and he was threatened with encirclement.

The new frontier, in fact, is the outskirts of Mtsensk. On the morning of October 10, the enemy began attacks on the front line of the brigade's defense, but this time somehow unusual: sluggishly, without serious pressure. And this is with multiple superiority! Katukov immediately realized that these attacks were distracting, and the main blow was being prepared somewhere else, not in the area defended by the brigade.

And indeed, pinning down the brigade along the front, the enemy broke into Mtsensk with east direction. Reports kept coming to Katukov, one more disturbing than the other. For each of them specific answers were given. Their general meaning boiled down to one thing: to act in such a way that the enemy did not dare and assume that the Soviet troops were about to withdraw.

By active actions, you need to confuse the enemy so that, with the onset of darkness, break away from him and move away in an organized manner, - Katukov explained his plan to Boyko and Kulvinsky. - We are lucky so far, Guderian, apparently, continues to believe that he is dealing with large tank forces.

The city did not have any clear line of defense. And here the tactics of tank ambushes, combat and psychological preparation fighters and commanders to conduct independent combat operations in small units.

The pressure of the enemy steadily increased. By the middle of the day, the enemy brought up large artillery forces, which began a massive shelling of the bridge across the Zusha River. It was no longer possible to escape through it. The brigade and units attached to it were surrounded.

There was a narrow railway bridge. But will cars pass through it? Twilight was already gathering when deputy political officer Zavalishin, sent for reconnaissance, reported that he had crossed the bridge in his thirty-four. But the joy was immediately replaced by anxiety. Zavalishin saw the movement of troops on the opposite bank. Whose - he did not make out. A caterpillar jumped off his tank, and he ran back to report what he managed to reconnoiter.

In those specific conditions, it was impossible to exclude the possibility of the enemy crossing to the other side of Zushi. Finally, it turned out that Soviet troops were occupying the defense on the other side.

Soon began what was then called in the brigade the crossing of the "devil's bridge". After making sure that the units and subunits were being drawn to the bridge in the prescribed manner, Katukov gathered staff workers and ordered:

Regardless of ranks and positions in a column of two - become! Prepare the grenades!

There was a relatively long distance to the bridge. And the headquarters column had to be ready to take the fight. Katukov explained that the employees of the headquarters were responsible for maintaining order at the crossing.

Trouble began immediately. The floorboards withstood guns and vehicles, but were falling apart. Artillery batyugs fell through cracks, broke their legs, fell; congestion occurred. The horses had to be shot and thrown into the river. The wheels of guns and vehicles got stuck in the cracks, the fighters and employees of the headquarters dragged them on their hands. And yet the crossing went on.

Suddenly, the rain suddenly stopped. The clouds quickly parted, and the full moon brightly illuminated the area. The enemy immediately discovered the crossing and opened artillery fire on the bridge. The shells came closer and closer. Soon, automatic fire was added to the artillery fire: enemy submachine gunners sat down in the station premises.

The decision came almost instantly. Katukov ordered the commander of a nearby tank, Sergeant Kapotov, to secretly break through to the station, knock out machine gunners from there and set fire to several wooden buildings.

Soon the automatic bursts stopped, and then a fire broke out at the station. The situation immediately changed. Blinded by the flames, the enemy gunners could no longer conduct aimed fire. The crossing was in full swing. The tanks approached the bridge, continuing to shoot back from the advancing enemy. Many were dragging wrecked combat vehicles or trucks on a trailer: Katukov ordered nothing good to be left to the enemy.

With the first cars, Katukov and Boyko crossed to the other side. Soaking wet and chilled, they just now felt what nervous tension cost them the crossing of the brigade. After the war, Katukov noted in his memoirs: “For those who managed to stay alive, crossing the railway bridge will probably be remembered forever. No wonder the tankers called this bridge "damn".

The 13th Army took up defense on the right bank of the Zushi. There were other connections as well. The front that blocked the enemy's path to Moscow began to stabilize. The 4th Tank Brigade was assigned to the second echelon of the 50th Army.

Oh, thanks! - He happily spoke, answering the greeting. - Do you even really know what enemy forces you fought with?

Apparently not all. Guderian threw his best formations against your brigade. Here, one of our big bosses said that your commander's tooth erupted ... Even if several tank divisions had beaten Guderian's group like that, then this would have been a great success. And here is the brigade!

Fedorenko spoke longer than usual, apparently, he wanted to say something specific, but did not say it.

In the evening, the meaning of Fedorenko's omissions became clear. The radio broadcast the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On awarding orders and medals to the commanders and rank and file of the tank troops of the Red Army." The announcer listed the names of 32 soldiers of the 4th tank brigade. Katukov and Boyko were awarded the Orders of Lenin. Then a separate Decree was announced on awarding the title of Hero of the Soviet Union to Sergeant Ivan Timofeevich Lyubushkin. The awardees were congratulated, rocked. The embarrassed Lyubushkin blushed and repeated in confusion:

Why am I alone, everyone fought ...

Yes, the soldiers of the 4th tank brigade had every reason to rejoice. They arrived at the Oryol direction when the enemy managed to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops. Guderian's tank formations then moved 80-90 kilometers a day. The brigade reduced this pace to 7 kilometers. But the enemy all the time had a multiple superiority, on some days ten or more times. Each kilometer of advance was given to the enemy at the cost of huge losses. Subsequently, Guderian admitted in his memoirs that, because of the heavy losses, "the prospects for quick and continuous success disappeared." And this is a considerable merit of the soldiers of the 4th tank brigade.

The battles near Orel and Mtsensk with particular force revealed Katukov's outstanding commanding abilities. Yes, that big boss, whom Fedorenko spoke about, was right, noting that Katukov's "commander's tooth erupted." Whether this expression is successful or not, its meaning is certainly correct.

On October 16, Katukov was summoned to the headquarters of the 50th Army. “The Supreme Commander-in-Chief will speak to you via HF,” they announced to him. After saying hello, Stalin asked about the combat capability of the brigade. Katukov was, of course, ready for this question and, somehow immediately calming down, briefly reported on the main thing: the brigade was ready for new battles. The Supreme Commander, apparently pleased with the answer, ordered the brigade to arrive in the Kubinka area as soon as possible.

Volokolamsk direction! How often it was mentioned in the reports of the Soviet Information Bureau during the Battle of Moscow! It was in the Volokolamsk direction that the enemy managed to drive the sharpest wedge into the defense of the Soviet troops and reach the near approaches to Moscow. The 16th Army under the command of Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky, who soon gained legendary glory, stood here to death. The 4th tank brigade was also included in its composition.

On November 6, a passenger car, accompanied by an armored car, drove up to the Katukov checkpoint. Rokossovsky got out of the car.

At ease! - he stopped Katukov, who rushed towards him, and hugged him. - Hello, Katukov! We haven’t seen each other for a long time, well, let’s go to you, tell me what you did there with Guderian.

At an impromptu dinner, Katukov spoke about the brigade, about how it prepares for battles and how it fought. Rokossovsky described the situation in the area of ​​the 16th Army.

The superiority of the enemy, especially in tanks, is multiple. This is where your experience of the battles near Orel will be very useful ... Try to generalize, - suggested Rokossovsky, - in the form of a memo or instruction, or something.

I have something. I started back in Stalingrad. - Katukov took out a folder from a traveling safe and handed it to Rokossovsky. - “Instructions for tankers to fight tanks, artillery and infantry of the enemy,” Rokossovsky read and began to skim through the brochure. - Interesting... Exactly... There are tank ambushes, attacks at maximum speed... Interesting, very interesting... Very right about reconnaissance: in mobile forms of combat, it should stretch for tens of kilometers...

The conversation with Rokossovsky pleasantly excited Katukov. Leafing through the instructions that Rokossovsky had just approved, Katukov felt relieved. “What kind of theorist am I!” - He used to doubt, working on the instructions. At the same time, he felt the need to generalize combat experience, to extract from it the most effective and promising. Rokossovsky's assessment reinforced this need.

We were also pleased with the interest with which Rokossovsky asked about the battles of the brigade near Orel, and the high appreciation of his, Katukov, decisions and actions in these battles. This feeling had nothing to do with the feeling of satisfied vanity. Katukov was always far from both vanity and complacent satisfaction with what had been achieved. Everything was simpler: the opinion of such a talented commander confirmed that he, Katukov, was on the right path in his quest. This was pleasing.

Leaving, Rokossovsky said:

Your next task is to strike at Skirmanovo. The main thing we have now discussed. You will receive an order later.

The next task was not easy. The bridgehead with the settlements of Skirmanovo, Kozlove, Maryino ran like a wedge into the defense line of the 16th Army. The 2nd German Panzer Division was concentrated here, other forces were being brought up. Intelligence established that the enemy intended to strike from this bridgehead in order to encircle and destroy the 16th Army. To cut off the resulting wedge and thereby thwart the enemy's plan - such a task was set by Rokossovsky before the 4th tank brigade and other formations located here.

Soon an order came, according to which units of the 16th Army on the morning of November 12 were to begin fighting for mastering a more convenient line of defense, including the indicated bridgehead.

On the afternoon of November 11, Katukov and Kulvinsky came to the Chief of Staff of the Army, Major General S. M. Malinin, to agree on issues of interaction in the upcoming battles.

Things later, - Malinin said with a mysterious smile, - You, I see, do not know anything? .. Well then, read on. - Malinin handed Katukov Pravda.

So, you have been walking in the generals for a day already. Congratulations!

At this time, Rokossovsky appeared at the door.

Congratulations? - he asked. - But that's not all. Roth, read.

It was the document that needs to be reproduced here in full.

"To all fronts, armies, tank divisions and brigades. Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 337. Moscow

On the renaming of the 4th Tank Brigade into the 1st Guards Tank Brigade

Despite the significant numerical superiority of the enemy, the 4th Tank Brigade inflicted heavy losses on the enemy with courageous and skillful combat operations from 04.10 to 11.10 and completed the tasks assigned to the brigade to cover the concentration of our troops.

Two fascist tank divisions and one motorized division were stopped and suffered huge losses from the glorious fighters and commanders of the 4th tank brigade.

As a result of the fierce battles of the brigade with the 3rd and 4th tank divisions and the enemy motorized division, the Nazis lost 133 tanks, 49 guns, 8 aircraft, 15 ammunition tractors, up to an infantry regiment, 6 mortars and other weapons. The losses of the 4th tank brigade were calculated in units.

The excellent performance of the brigade and its success are due to the fact that:

1. The brigade conducted continuous combat reconnaissance. 2. Full interaction of tanks with motorized infantry and artillery was carried out.

3. Tanks were used and used correctly, combining ambushes with strike group actions.

4. The personnel acted bravely and harmoniously.

The fighting of the 4th tank brigade should serve as an example for the Red Army units in the liberation war against the fascist invaders.

I order:

1. For courageous and skillful fighting, the 4th tank brigade is called: "1st Guards Tank Brigade."

2. The commander of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, Major General Katukov, present the most distinguished fighters and commanders for the government award.

3. To the head of the GABTU and the Head of the GAU, to replenish the 1st Guards Tank Brigade with the material part of combat vehicles and weapons to the full state.

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR

I. Stalin

Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Marshal of the Soviet Union

B. Shaposhnikov.
And again congratulations, hugs, handshakes. But in war, little time is allotted for joy.

In the tank forces, your brigade was the first to be awarded such an honor,” said Rokossovsky. - On this occasion, she should be given two days to rest ... But alas! Tomorrow your brigade must show in practice what tank guardsmen are.

And yet there was a holiday in the brigade. Short rallies were held in the subdivisions. “Justify the high honor!”, “Beat the enemy like a guard!” - said the fighters and commanders who spoke at the rallies.

On the morning of the next day, the brigade entered the battle. For twelve hours she stormed Skirmanovo. From the morning of November 13, she fought a continuous 38-hour battle for Kozlov. The enemy fiercely resisted, but was forced to retreat. The brigade fought like a guard during the November "general", "decisive" offensive of the enemy on Moscow. I had to retreat. With pain in their hearts, the fighters and commanders left behind kilometer posts with the numbers 60, 55, 53 ... ”Moscow was nearby, completely behind.

Noting the participation of tank guardsmen in these battles, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov wrote after the war: “The 1st Guards Tank Brigade, transferred to the 16th Army, acted with unparalleled courage. In October, this brigade (then the 4th Tank Brigade) fought heroically near Orlam and Mtsensk ... Now, in November, defending the approaches to Moscow, the tank guards raised their glorious reputation even higher with new exploits, ”

During the November battles, Katukov's commanding talent manifested itself even more deeply. In a rapidly changing situation, in conditions of constant superiority of the enemy in manpower and military equipment, he invariably found the most effective tactics, new versions of his favorite tank ambushes. And here, as a month earlier near Orel, Katukov invariably built his decisions based on the principle: inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy and preserve the forces of the brigade as much as possible. And he got it every time.

During the two weeks of the enemy offensive, the brigade destroyed 106 tanks, 16 heavy and 37 anti-tank guns, 16 mortars, 3 mortar batteries, 8 tractors, 55 cars, 51 motorcycles, up to three enemy infantry regiments, smashed 13 bunkers and 27 machine gun nests. All this was several times greater than the number and armament of the brigade. During this time, 33 tanks failed in the brigade - three times less than the enemy lost. In fact, the brigade lost only 7 tanks, and thanks to the efforts of Dyner, 26 damaged vehicles were repaired and returned to service.

Finally, the long-awaited came: the Red Army drove the fascist invaders from the walls of the Soviet capital. The 1st Guards Tank Brigade operated in infantry combat formations, cleared the way for it with swift attacks, bypassed the enemy from the flanks and from the rear, from ambushes made stunning raids on the retreating enemy.

The high spirits in which Katukov was constantly present these days also had purely personal reasons. He had been alone for several years: his wife died before the war, there were no children. And somehow, the foreman of the medical service, Katya, immediately bewitched him - that was her name in the unit where she served. No matter how difficult the situation was, Katukov found "reasons" for visiting this unit. Soon Katukov and Ekaterina Sergeevna got married. But Ekaterina Sergeevna flatly refused to leave the service or be only a wife under Katukov. So, until the end of the war, she fought, albeit next to her husband, but as a foreman of the medical service. Katukov was proud of her decision, although he was worried. For distinction in battles, Ekaterina Sergeevna was awarded the Order of the Red Star and combat medals.

In mid-April 1942, Katukov received an order to transfer the brigade to Moscow for reorganization. He and Boyko were recalled to the disposal of the Main Armored Directorate.

Fedorenko greeted Katukov and Boyko cordially, treated them to tea and sandwiches.

I have for you good news, - he said. - You, Katukov, have been appointed commander of the 1st tank corps, you, Boyko, have been appointed commissar. Do you feel, friends, what this means?.. Now we can handle the formation of large tank formations! Our factories are gaining capacity.

Fedorenko said that the corps would include three tank brigades - about 250 tanks in total, a motorized rifle brigade, a rocket-propelled mortar battalion, a reconnaissance battalion and various rear units. Katukov and Boyko felt stunned. At that time, one could only dream of such a scale.

Well, how? Powers? - Satisfied with the effect, asked Fedorenko. - So that's it ... And the first building - you! Well, they deserve it. I will also please others: the 1st Guards Brigade will become part of the corps ... Now let's think about personnel. We recommend Colonel Kravchenko as the chief of staff of the corps.

Katukov and Boyko proposed to appoint Derevyanko as the head of the political department of the corps, Dyner as the deputy commander for the technical part, and Nikitin as the head of the operational department.

The conversation got long. Katukov, both earlier and later, as an army commander, carefully studied his subordinates, did not forget to mark those who distinguished themselves, and boldly promoted worthy ones. In the arrangement of personnel, he paid great attention to what is now called psychological compatibility. And now Katukov passionately explained why he was nominating this or that commander and why the one whom he recommended, and not another, no less worthy, should be appointed as deputy to this commander.

A few days later, Katukov was summoned to V. A. Malyshev, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for the Tank Industry. He was interested in the shortcomings of the tanks. “Speak everything, about every little thing,” Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich asked.

"Little things" were. In practice, they sometimes turned out to be far from trifles. For example, what was it like for paratroopers to balance on a racing tank? Or else. Someone came up with the idea of ​​putting outwardly different antennas on command vehicles, and enemy artillery concentrated fire on these vehicles. Katukov subsequently noted with satisfaction how quickly his proposals were implemented: the tanks arriving at the front had the same antennas, handrails to hold on to the paratroopers, and other improvements.

In Moscow, the headquarters and some services of the corps were completed. The main work on its formation was carried out in Lipetsk, where Katukov and Boyko soon arrived.

All parts of the corps were fully equipped, and the roads had not yet had time to dry out from the spring thaw, when an order was received to send it to the Bryansk Front.

The corps spent more than three months in battles - offensive, and more often defensive. Katukov was dissatisfied with neither one nor the other. What actually changed? There were more tanks, large tank formations appeared, and they were used in the old way - by separate units, without proper support by aviation and artillery.

No, not like that, not at all like how Katukov imagined the combat use of large tank forces. Apparently, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were also dissatisfied with the way tank troops were used on the Bryansk Front. After the war, Katukov came across a document addressed to the front command, signed by the Chief of the General Staff A. M. Vasilevsky. It said:

“Some of the tank corps have ceased to be tank corps and switched to infantry fighting methods. Examples: Katukov (1st Corps), instead of quickly destroying enemy infantry, was engaged in the encirclement of two regiments during the day, and you, apparently, encourage this ... ”Later in his memoirs, Katukov wrote:

“This document explains much of the situation of those days. Of course, the 1st Panzer Corps surrounded the two infantry regiments not on its own initiative, but on orders from above. But it's not only that. A more important conclusion follows from this document: tank corps were introduced into battle separately, each of them was assigned narrow, limited tasks. But it was possible to concentrate them into a powerful fist and, having strengthened the means of air and ground support, inflict a really devastating blow to the Nazis on the flank.
In mid-August, the corps was withdrawn to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, and soon Katukov was summoned to Moscow for an appointment with Stalin.

Stalin began the conversation with specific, but not directly related to the activities of Katukov questions. Answering them, Katukov felt uncomfortable, seeing that Stalin did not like his critical remarks about the KV and T-70 tanks. And yet, overcoming his confusion, he stubbornly objected:

No, Iosif Vissarionovich, in battle they did not show themselves well. Ask any tanker - everyone will prefer a thirty-four.

Katukov saw the dissatisfied expression in Stalin's eyes, but stated his views to the end, showed what exactly were the shortcomings of the KV and T-70 tanks. Perhaps the persistence of the young general attracted Stalin. He turned the conversation to other topics. Katukov could not understand why Stalin called him, but he felt that he was gradually probing him, weighing what he was worth, And suddenly Stalin, interrupting his questions, said that mechanized corps were being created, stronger than tank ones, and he , Katukov, is appointed commander of the 3rd mechanized corps.

Katukov, as they say, was relieved from the heart: it means that his service was assessed well. But it was a pity - Katukov immediately felt it - to part with his fighting friends, with the formations, with whom he went through a difficult military path. And Katukov, as he put it in his memoirs, "begged":

“- Comrade Stalin, it is not so easy to prepare and teach troops. It’s a big deal for a fight when people know you well and you know them. As part of the 1st Tank Corps there is the 1st Guards Brigade, with the fighters of which I am bound by the bonds of the strongest friendship. Is it easy to part with her!
At the request of Katukov, Stalin ordered that formations from the 1st Tank Corps be included in the 3rd Mechanized Corps: the 1st Guards and 49th Tank Brigades, the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade, to be transferred to the corps as an assistant commander for the technical part of Dyner and the head of the operational department Nikitin.

From the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Katukov immediately went to Fedorenko. He told him in detail about the conversation with Stalin, answered questions and, encouraged by Fedorenko's approving remarks, as they say, poured out his soul, expressed everything that he had changed his mind while commanding a tank corps.

There are a lot more tanks. It seems that quantity should turn into quality, - Katukov got excited. - Tank corps appeared, and now mechanized corps. Those are heavy fists! What do we have? Not fists, but outstretched fingers! There has never been a massive strike against the enemy by large tank forces! What about interaction?

Correctly! - Fedorenko cooled Katukov. - Correctly think. And you are not alone.

So what's the deal?

In experience. It's kind of like growing pains. Not everyone from the combined arms command was able to correctly understand how to use large tank forces, organize their interaction with other branches of the military. Now on this occasion we are preparing a draft order of the people's commissar. You will receive soon.

Indeed, on October 16, 1942, a special order was issued by the People's Commissar of Defense, in which shortcomings in the combat use of tank forces were revealed.

The order set out in detail all the main issues of tactics and organization of the actions of tank units and formations, determined the principles and procedure for their interaction with infantry, artillery and aviation. Much attention was paid to tank and mechanized corps. They were declared to be the means of the army and front command for operations in the main direction as echelons for the development of success. The dispersion of their forces, the allocation of independent sectors of defense to them was prohibited. Katukov later wrote: “This order played big role in the future fate of the tank troops. In fact, he became the most important theoretical basis their combat use.

Nothing so quickly and firmly determines the relationship of people as war. But she is also an inexorable lover. Boyko remained in the 1st Tank Corps. And, no matter how hard it was, Katukov understood: there Boyko, as an “old-timer”, was more needed. An experienced political worker, brigade commissar N.K. Popel was appointed commissar of the 3rd mechanized corps. He began the war as a commissar of the same 15th Panzer Division, from the fighters and commanders of which the 4th Panzer Brigade was formed. Apparently, because he again met with many of his combat comrades-in-arms, and even more so because he was, as they say, now a sociable person, Nikolai Kirillovich quickly found his rightful place in the combat team, imbued with his needs and concerns.

Katukov, encouraged by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of October 16, 1942 and strengthened in the correctness of his views, revised a lot in those days. Hard work was in full swing in his, so to speak, "creative laboratory", and he more and more clearly imagined the true possibilities of large-scale actions of tank forces.

Your thoughts are something like a concentration of forces, - Popel once said, with whom Katukov often shared his thoughts. - The massive use of tank troops is a new thing for us. And here you can’t do without the work of your own brain convolutions. The time will come - you will realize a lot.

But there were thoughts of a different kind - personal. I was worried about my father's health. They wrote that Yefim Epifanovich was sad, worried: would it be possible to see his son?

How many times already was there, but to his father did not escape! - somehow Katukov Popel was annoyed, having received another letter from his father.

Yes, he replied thoughtfully. We don't see our parents very often. After all, life is ours...

Remembering, apparently, his personal sorrows, Popel unexpectedly told his biography.

My life seems to be unremarkable too. And time is always short, I always postpone everything personal for later, - Katukov sighed.

The "unremarkable" life of Mikhail Efimovich was in fact quite remarkable for the people of his generation and destiny. Mikhail Efimovich was born in the village of Bolshoe Uvarov near Kolomna on September 17, 1900 in the family of a poor peasant. A piece of bad land - sand and loam - could not feed his family. My father, like many fellow villagers, often went to work in St. Petersburg, where he worked various jobs. He returned tired, brought little - he could hardly somehow make ends meet. But he never forgot the lollipops for his son, he caressed him like a man. And it was not easy for him, probably, to write to his wife from St. Petersburg that it was time to put 12-year-old Mikhail to work, that he had found something worthwhile for him.

Shedding tears, the mother put some linen and simple village food into a basket of willow twigs. With her, Mikhail went to his father in St. Petersburg to work. The “worthwhile” job was working as a “boy” in a dairy store. For five years I washed bottles, scrubbed door handles, wiped tiled floors, delivered milk to customers.

Life in the capital city taught me a lot. The difference between rich and poor here was even more striking than in their village. And the poor in the city were completely different - they did not want to put up with their deprivation.

The February Revolution made a huge impression on Mikhail. Rallies, demonstrations - he heard a lot then, and even began to understand something. I saw how huge crowds of people hurried to the Finland Station to meet Lenin. And when a little later he heard that Lenin was a German spy, he came to his father in dismay. “He is for the people, for the factory workers, and for us, the Lapot workers,” explained Yefim Epifanovich. - You do not listen to the owners, they bend their line. Take a closer look at the factory ones. They are stronger than us, the village squalor, and stand up for themselves with the whole world.

During the days of the October Revolution, 17-year-old Mikhail, together with the Red Guards, participated in the defeat of the junkers who settled in the Sevastopol Hotel. Then he returned to his native village - from the "boys" he grew up both in age and in consciousness. I firmly decided to stand with a mountain for the new government, for the Soviets. How? He didn't know this yet. But life itself determined the path of his generation. There was a civil war. In 1919, Mikhail volunteered to join the Red Army, fought against the White Poles, the gangs of Bulak-Bulakhovich, Savinkov and other enemies. Soviet power.

It was hard, but still Katukov fell in love with military service. To become a red commander - this dream took possession of him more and more. Apparently, the platoon commander, with whom Mikhail shared his thoughts more than once, reported on his desire to the authorities. Once he announced to Katukov:

You will go to Mogilev for command courses. It seems that you fit in all respects: both in the service you are competent and brainy.

They studied without letting go of the rifles. Often, alerted, the cadets were sent to remote areas of the Mogilev region, where bandit gangs still roamed and terrorized the population.

On March 1, 1922, the graduation of young painters took place at the Mogilev courses. Katukov was sent as a platoon commander to the 27th Omsk Rifle Division, which was part of the Western Military District.

He commanded the troops of the district M. N. Tukhachevsky. And it affected everyone. AT combat training troops Tukhachevsky persistently introduced everything new, advanced. In the House of the Red Army in Smolensk in the winter of 1923/24, he gave weekly lectures to the command staff on the history of military art. Katukov was lucky: that winter the 27th Omsk division was stationed in Smolensk, and he did not miss a single lecture by Tukhachevsky.

The lectures delighted me, made me think a lot - both the content and the advice. Katukov learned for himself from these councils, as he rightly decided, the main thing: the military knowledge of the commander should be higher than his official position and constantly replenished, however, not only military, but also general education. Knowledge is only a tool for thinking. You need to learn to think for yourself, based on knowledge. Naturally endowed with an inquisitive, analytical mind, he turned self-education into a constant norm of his life.

A visit to the camp of the division of M.V. Frunze, his speech at a meeting of Red Army soldiers and a conversation with command and political staff left a deep imprint in the minds of the young painter. I will always remember the meetings with S. S. Vostretsov and M. I. Fabricius. Communication with extraordinary people, even for a short time, always enriches. And Katukov, what to say, was always lucky for such communication. Later, his command formation was greatly influenced by service in the formations led by K.K. Rokossovsky and other, later outstanding military leaders. No, he did not seek to imitate them, but his remarkable abilities, his entire spiritual world, received from such communications a kind of powerful impulses for further development.

In the fall of 1926, Katukov was sent to study at the Shot courses. Many commanders who became major military leaders during the Great Patriotic War studied in this illustrious military educational institution in the twenties and thirties.

Created in November 1918 at the direction of V. I. Lenin on the basis of the Oranienbaum officer rifle school of the old Russian army, the Shot courses played an outstanding role in the training of the command staff of the Soviet troops. Most of the teachers of the Oranienbaum school voluntarily went over to the side of the Soviet government and managed to pass on to the courses the rich experience and positive traditions of the military educational institution, which in the old army was considered the best in the shooting training of officers.

Extensive theoretical and design work was carried out at the courses. Under them, a statutory subcommittee and a rifle committee were created, which developed issues of the theory of shooting and the tactics of combat operations of combined arms units. Under the guidance of the first head of courses N. M. Filatov, outstanding designers V. A. Degtyarev, V. F. Tokarev, V. G. Fedorov and others worked on the creation of new systems for automatic small arms. The students of the "Shot" were the first who, in the process of studying, practically got acquainted with the samples of these weapons, mastered the recommendations of the statutory subcommittee and the rifle committee.

In the first decade, the courses were attended by students who were unique in their kind. Not every one of them had any thorough general education, at best it was limited to a four-year parochial school. They had a different “educational qualification”: they were still very young, they had already gone through a harsh labor school, had a conscious active life position, and most importantly, combat experience. No allowances were made for lack of knowledge. Strictly taught that it was necessary to know and be able. However, the word "strictly" in this case should be understood in the sense of the depth, strength of knowledge. The students themselves did not need strictness: they studied with the same passionate, indomitable will with which they fought on the fronts of the civil war. At the time when Katukov arrived at the courses, they were already engaged in the retraining of command personnel and were called "Shooting and tactical courses for the improvement of the command staff of the Red Army." The training program was much more difficult than before. And although the courses were located near the capital, in the city of Solnechnogorsk, Katukov managed to visit Moscow a few times: all the time and energy went to study.

Natural abilities and incredible work did their job: Katukov returned to the division significantly enriched with knowledge. Immediately he was appointed commander of the regimental school of junior commanders and remained in this position for almost six years. For Katukov himself, these years were also a kind of school. They allowed him to understand even more deeply the role of junior commanders in the troops. Later, occupying high command positions, he constantly paid attention to the work of subordinate commanders in the selection and education of sergeants, always emphasizing: "What are the foremen and sergeants - such are the soldiers."

There were many capable, talented commanders in the 27th division. The division in the artillery regiment was commanded by N. N. Voronov, the future Chief Marshal of Artillery. He was replaced by V. A. Penkovsky - later an army general. Katukov became closer to Valentin Antonovich, since he acted with him more than once in maneuvers and exercises. Penkovsky went into the field with his division, and Katukov - with the regimental school, which played in such cases for the rifle battalion. Together they worked out issues of interaction, searched for and found methods and methods that ensured the most effective combination of fire and maneuver, close communication between infantry and artillery at all stages of the battle.

In early 1931, Katukov was appointed chief of staff of the 80th Infantry Regiment of the same division. And soon there was a decisive turn that determined the entire future fate of Mikhail Efimovich. In April 1932, the regiment was redeployed from Vitebsk to Borisov. And suddenly, out of the blue, an order came: to reorganize the regiment into the 5th separate light tank brigade. The entire command staff of the regiment was sent to a six-month armored course. But Katukov had to stay: he replaced the regiment commander. Together with business executives, junior commanders and Red Army soldiers, he was engaged in equipping the town for the future tank formation. Soon technicians began to arrive, and then combat vehicles. With the help of specialists, Katukov mastered tanks as much as time allowed. Sometimes it was sad: the comrades were learning a new business, and now he became a business executive. What's next?

In the fall, the commanding staff returned from courses. Katukov, as they say, felt out of place. He did not undergo special retraining, but he was irresistibly drawn to a new business. He was given a choice: to accept a rifle regiment or remain at the brigade headquarters as the head of the intelligence department. Agreed with the latter - still closer to the new case.

The brigade was formed for almost six months. During this time, Katukov studied the BT and T-26 tanks, with the help of specialists he went through the initial practical school of a tanker and soon he confidently drove combat vehicles, fired from a tank gun.

In 1932, Katukov was accepted as a member Communist Party. Excited by this event, he spent the whole night pondering his future life. And the next day he came to the brigade commander, asked him to send him to study at the Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army.

Go to the academy. Just not now. - The brigade commander looked approvingly at Katukov. - Try yourself first on the real thing, command a training tank battalion. I believe you can do it.

Commanding a training tank battalion, Katukov trained gunners, drivers, and other specialists. And he prepared himself - he mastered every specialty of a tanker well. Then the brigade commander made him temporarily head of the artillery of the brigade - he helped him come to the academy, as he put it, not empty-handed, but with some experience.

In the autumn of 1934, an order was received by which Katukov was appointed head of the operational department of the 134th tank brigade stationed in Kyiv. By the same order, he was ordered to temporarily transfer the position to a deputy, and to arrive in Moscow himself for the Academic Courses of Tactical and Technical Improvement at the Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army.

Katukov spent a year on courses. He studied the material part of tanks, radio communications, tactics of armored and mechanized troops. Listeners sometimes spent days and nights at the training ground and tankodrome. In the brigade, I had to learn again on the go to master the duties of the head of the operational department. The 134th brigade was commanded by the energetic, widely erudite tank commander S.I. Bogdanov - later Marshal of the Armored Forces, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. He built combat training in such a way that every day of study, every command and staff lesson was necessarily different from the previous ones, were more difficult than them. Katukov himself subsequently built combat training in the formations he commanded in exactly this way.

In 1937, Katukov was appointed chief of staff of the 45th Tank Corps. Behind him was already almost seven years of experience in staff service. So I mastered new duties quickly, but I was drawn to the ranks. I wanted to work on my own - Katukov felt that he was ripe for this. The corps commander N. D. Vedeneev, an experienced, strong-willed and at the same time sincere man, heeded Katukov’s repeated requests for transfer to a combat position. Mikhail Efimovich was appointed commander of the 34th tank brigade - the same one where he served as head of the operations department after completing academic courses. During the Great Patriotic War, Katukov heard more than once about N. D. Vedeneev, who became the commander of the tank corps of the 2nd Guards Army, Hero of the Soviet Union.

In September 1939, together with the Katukov brigade, he participated in the liberation campaign of the Soviet troops, who took under the protection of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. I had to meet with parts of the Wehrmacht. True, the incident did not happen. The Nazis quickly retreated beyond the established demarcation line. "How long?" thought Katukov. It was a troubled time, and he was apparently not the only one asking himself such questions. In 1940, Katukov was unexpectedly summoned to Moscow. He visited the People's Commissariat of Defense, then the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - there he was offered to accept the 20th Panzer Division. With her, he entered the Great Patriotic War ...

At the beginning of 1943, Katukov received an order: to report urgently to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Katukov could not find any understandable reasons for such an unexpected call and its urgency, and this set him in an alarming mood. Stories about the coolness of the Supreme also came to mind.

I flew on the U-2, looking with interest at the landscapes passing below. "Messer!" - suddenly the voice of the pilot was heard in the headphones. The plane immediately dived down, then the pilot began to throw the car from side to side. "Messer" flashed several times from above, apparently firing. The skill of the pilot came to the rescue. Maneuvering at low altitude, hiding in the folds of the terrain, he broke away from the "Messer" and landed the plane on the outskirts of Torzhok.

The further flight to Moscow passed without incident. But there was no time to put himself in order, and Katukov appeared in the Kremlin as he was - in a soldier's tunic, in cotton trousers and felt boots. Poskrebyshev apparently explained to Stalin the reason for Katukov's marching attire. And when he entered the office of the Supreme Commander, he only slightly smiled. A. S. Shcherbakov, N. Ya. Fedorenko, S. K. Timoshenko and several other generals were in the office.

“Having greeted, the Supreme Commander unexpectedly asked: - How, Comrade Katukov, will you cope if we put you in command of a tank army?

I was taken aback, but it was not supposed to be silent in his office for a long time. He thanked for the trust and replied that I hope to cope.

Here, read it, - said Stalin and, taking two documents from the table, handed them to me.

The first document is the resolution of the State Defense Committee of January 4, 1943. It talked about the formation of the 1st Panzer Army and that I was appointed to command its troops. From the second, I learned that I had been awarded the rank of lieutenant general of tank troops.
It was immediately decided to appoint N.K. Popel as a member of the Military Council of the Army. When Stalin released Katukov, Fedorenko took him to his place in the People's Commissariat of Defense.

For that time, the creation of tank armies was a new, outstanding thing. One composition of the future army was striking in its grandiosity: the 3rd mechanized corps, the 6th tank corps, four separate tank regiments and a separate tank division, six ski rifle brigades, two airborne divisions, two howitzer regiments, two regiments rocket artillery, two mortar regiments, an aviation regiment, an artillery anti-tank fighter brigade, an engineer brigade, an army reconnaissance regiment, an anti-aircraft artillery division, two motor-engineer battalions, a communications regiment, many different rear units and institutions. In a word, as Katukov put it, "a considerable colossus."

That's it, Commander! Can you handle it? - Fedorenko asked, having finished listing the composition of the future 1st Panzer Army.

Of course ... That's how things went after the Battle of Stalingrad! We now have a strategic initiative... The enemy, of course, will try to take it away, but we are not the same now. Get your army ready. The time has come for the large-scale use of tank forces.

Fedorenko said that the headquarters of the 1st Tank Army would be created on the basis of the 29th Combined Arms Army. Noticing the displeasure flickering on Katukov's face, he explained that, of course, the specifics of tank troops must also be taken into account; but other tank armies are also being created, so there may simply not be enough tank commanders of the corresponding ranks - they should not be taken from the newly formed or formed tank corps. Perhaps there was a reason for this, and Katukov did not argue. However, taking advantage of the ongoing conversation about personnel, he asked to appoint P. G. Dyner as his technical assistant.

Katukov spent the night almost without sleep. Thoughts, caused by the new appointment, disturbed the mind. Of course, the trust placed was pleasing. But Katukov clearly saw the complexity and responsibility of his new duties. After all, in fact, his commanding activity acquired a qualitatively new content. And this is not only the most difficult job of leading many units of a huge association of tank forces. This is a new, higher stage in the art of the combat use of tank forces. Now he had to solve, first of all, tasks of an operational scale, to clearly understand the role and place of the tank army in operations of operational-strategic and strategic importance. In such operations, tank armies constituted the main strike force of the ground forces and were used primarily in the main axes to inflict powerful and deep blows on the enemy. All this, of course, Katukov knew, but, having lost hope of overcoming insomnia, he still thought about this and that he himself needed to form himself as a commander.

The next day, by plane, Katukov returned "home" - to the headquarters of the 3rd mechanized corps. There was no time for "spreading". The formation of the army was ordered to be completed by February 17 in the immediate rear of the North-Western Front.

This case turned out to be incredibly painful - it is difficult to find other words. A blizzard was raging, the roads were covered with huge snowdrifts and turned out to be absolutely impassable for wheeled vehicles. I had to use tanks as tractors and snow plows. The representative of the armored command who arrived at the scene categorically forbade this as contrary to the instructions. It took an order from G.K. Zhukov to lift the ban. And yet, units and formations moved extremely slowly along the snowy impassability.

To all this, another misfortune came to light: there was no fuel, no ammunition, no food in the formation area. The nearest supply base was 250 kilometers away. Only country roads led to it, also covered with snowdrifts. Here, too, tanks had to be used to clear the roads.

I don’t know how we will fight, but I will remember the formation of the army all my life, - Katukov was annoyed in a conversation with Popel. - The blizzard here only also helps out.

Blizzard? - Popel was amazed. She is our main tormentor.

And a savior. Imagine how the terrain would look from above if the traces of the passage of troops were not immediately swept up and enemy aircraft could operate.

Yes. A live map for bombing, - Popel was alarmed.

Everything possible is being done to speed up the movement of troops to the places of concentration and camouflage these places, - continued Katukov. - But it is necessary ... impossible, or something ... Concentrate, Nikolai Kirillovich, all party political work on this. A lot of sweat will be required, but there will be no blood, Snowstorm is an insidious thing. Suddenly it will stop, and there, you see, the sky will clear up. Then wait for the bombing.

Katukov got along with Popel quickly and highly appreciated his ability to work with people, the ability to find effective ways to mobilize troops to solve complex specific tasks. As always, Dyner provided Katukov with great help these days. Before the war, an engineer of one of the Kyiv enterprises, Pavel Georgievich turned out to be a very outstanding military engineer-organizer. Together with Katukov, being his constant technical assistant, he always quickly mastered a new scope of activity.

Both of them - Popel and Dyner, each in his place - did a great job during the formation of the army, took upon themselves the solution of many organizational and economic issues, giving Katukov the opportunity to more thoroughly get acquainted with the command personnel and the arriving troops.

The formations included in the army and their command made a gratifying impression. For the 3rd mechanized corps, Katukov was calm. Moreover, he knew Major General of the Tank Forces S. M. Krivoshein, who was appointed instead of him as the commander of this corps, before, and often met with him on official business. Before the war, Krivoshey commanded a mechanized corps, and at the beginning of it he took part in the first battles with the Nazi invaders. Since August 1941, he was the head of the combat training department of the armored and mechanized troops of the Red Army.

The 6th Panzer Corps was a powerful formation. He already had some combat experience: he participated in the summer-autumn battles as part of the troops of the Western Front. The corps was commanded by Major General of Tank Troops A. L. Getman. After graduating from the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army in 1937, A. L. Getman served in the tank troops, as commander of a tank division he participated in the battle for Moscow.

The 3rd Mechanized Corps and the 6th Tank Corps constituted the main striking force of the 1st Tank Army, and both of them were led by literate, with combat experience, determined, strong-willed tank generals. With satisfaction, Katukov got acquainted with the command and political composition of the individual units that arrived in the army.

True, initially not everything went well in the administrative apparatus of the army. Some of its workers did not manage to rebuild, to understand the specifics of the tank troops. And this worried Katukov more and more.

Soon an order was received according to which the 1st Panzer Army was to become the main striking force in the front-line offensive operation, which had the goal of defeating the 16th German Army and completely eliminating the blockade of Leningrad. And immediately, work of incredible intensity began: the formation of the army was being completed, combat training among the troops was intensified, and the headquarters and all services concentrated on drawing up calculations and other documents necessary to develop a plan for a future operation. It was here that the incompetence of some employees of the army headquarters in tank affairs affected. Katukov urgently recalled his old comrade-in-arms Nikitin from the 3rd mechanized corps to the post of chief of the operational department of the army. There were fewer discrepancies. But drastic measures were needed. And Katukov turned to G.K. Zhukov, who had come to get acquainted with the preparations for the operation, with a request to replace the chief of staff of the army. He recommended Major General M.A. Shalin, Chief of Staff of the 22nd Army, for this position, whom he knew well and was sure that he would quickly master the specifics of tank troops.

G.K. Zhukov immediately instructed to make a replacement: a few hours later, Shalin, who arrived by plane, reported to Katukov about his readiness to start work. A man of action, energetic and resolute, Shalin quickly delved into the plan of the forthcoming operation. All plans, orders, calculations were made quickly and as needed.

Somewhat earlier, Major General E.V. Baranovich arrived at the post of deputy commander of the army. Behind him was the richest combat experience of three wars - the Russo-Japanese, the First World War and the Civil War. A middle-aged man, Efim Vikentievich, with enviable energy, was carried away by the development of an operation plan, provided Katukov with very tangible assistance in preparing the army troops.

Katukov was now calm about the administrative apparatus of the army: he quickly turned into a well-coordinated, clearly, proactively working team. The team of the political department of the army, headed by the head, Major General A. G. Zhuravlev, turned out to be the same. In general, the cadres of leading political workers in the army, in the words of Popel, were "what you need."

Having completed the formation, the army went off-road up to 90 kilometers and settled in the starting area for the offensive. And suddenly, the early spring that suddenly came here confused all the plans of the Soviet command. The snow was rapidly melting: water spilled over the fields and ravines - several tanks launched for testing plunged into it up to the very towers.

Soon a directive arrived, announcing that the planned operation was cancelled. Together with the directive, an order was received: the troops of the 1st Panzer Army without airborne, ski-rifle and some other formations and units urgently dive into echelons for transfer to another place. Where - the order did not say.

Preparations for this failed operation were of great importance for the formation of the 1st Panzer Army. In the process of it, shortcomings were identified and eliminated, the coherence in the work of all links of its management was checked, the abilities of the political command staff, the combat readiness of formations were revealed. This process also gave Katukov a lot. Now he knew the army to some extent and had gained some practical experience as an army commander himself.

Kursk Bulge. Here - in the composition of the troops of the Voronezh Front - long before the start of the grandiose battle, the 1st Panzer Army was transferred. Located in the second echelon in the Oboyan direction, it was supposed to firmly cover the Belgorod-Kursk road and be ready to launch counterattacks in order to defeat the enemy groupings that were breaking through. The first echelon was occupied by the 6th Guards Army.

To the locations of the troops of the army arrived secretly from the enemy. Careful camouflage was also observed at the line of army deployment. Tanks, guns, vehicles were placed right next to the local buildings. Enemy reconnaissance aircraft could not detect them. Engineering work began immediately. Trenches, communication passages, caponiers, bunkers, dugouts, and various artificial obstacles were built along the entire 60-kilometer front. On the most probable directions of the enemy offensive, not only real, but also false trenches were dug. Later, a trophy card came to Katukov. False positions of the 1st Panzer Army were marked on it.

The enemy did not show activity - he was preparing for a "sudden" strike, which had long been known to the Soviet command. And Katukov strove to use the pause comprehensively, with maximum benefit. Questions of interaction of tank formations with infantry, artillery and aviation were carefully worked out. Possible options for the actions of the troops when delivering counterattacks were played out with the commanders and headquarters of corps and brigades through command-staff exercises and games.

Together with Shalin and Nikitin, Katukov repeatedly discussed various options for possible enemy actions. And they managed to foresee a lot, a lot, including the main thing: if the enemy breaks through the defenses of the combined arms armies, then instead of a counterattack of the 1st Panzer Army, they had to play the role of an armored shield in the direction of the main attack of the enemy troops. Intense combat and political training was carried out in the troops. Many generals and officers of the army administration were sent to formations and units.

It is necessary that both interaction and everything else be worked out at all levels - up to subdivisions, - Katukov admonished them. - In the units, in Suvorov's way: "Each soldier must know his maneuver." And this is combat training and specific political work.

Katukov himself, together with Popel, also spent a lot of time in the army. They visited brigades, regiments and battalions, checked their main and reserve areas of defense.

Katukov always found time for conversations with the personnel and did it skillfully: he spoke about stamina, military skill and immediately inserted an instructive parable or a sharp joke under the general laughter. He himself got into the tank and showed the soldiers how to perform this or that maneuver, how to fire from various positions and distances.

Much attention in combat training was paid to explaining how to deal with Tiger tanks. All units were provided with a memo issued by the Directorate of the Commander of the Armored and Mechanized Forces of the Red Army, in which there were pictures of this new German tank, its tactical and technical data and vulnerabilities were indicated, and methods for destroying it on the battlefield were described. The memo was carefully studied, its recommendations were used in practical exercises.

Special classes were held with young soldiers, including a run-in: tanks were passed through the trenches with soldiers. The newly called up soldiers were convinced that the tank is not so terrible if the trenches are well equipped, and their defenders know how to use weapons.

By the end of May, the main tasks of the combat training of the troops were completed. Katukov set the task of deepening skills and knowledge, mastering related specialties in order to develop complete interchangeability in tank crews, gun, mortar and machine gun crews.

Meanwhile, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command took measures to strengthen the 1st Tank Army with troops. In mid-May, an anti-aircraft artillery division, two communications air regiments, a motor transport regiment, nine hospitals and some other units and special units were included in it and soon arrived at the scene.

In the "dugout debate", as Katukov put it, the idea arose to strengthen the army at the expense of its own capabilities: to create another tank corps on the basis of a separate tank brigade and four separate tank regiments. This brigade and regiments were intended for operations in combat formations of airborne and ski-rifle formations included in the army when it was preparing to liquidate the blockade of Leningrad. Now there were no such formations in the army. The tank units intended for them turned out to be directly subordinate to the command of the army. In combat conditions, this would only make it difficult to direct their actions.

We discussed everything in detail and turned with a proposal to the headquarters of the Voronezh Front, then to G.K. Zhukov. In the end, it came to Stalin - the creation of such large formations as a tank corps was the prerogative of the Supreme Commander. Stalin approved the proposal. The next day, a directive came to create the 31st Tank Corps. Unfortunately, by the beginning of hostilities, the corps had not been fully formed: the motorized rifle brigade and artillery had not arrived. And yet, as subsequent events showed, the new corps solved tasks that were beyond the power of a separate tank brigade and separate tank regiments.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the 1st Tank Army was a cohesive, trained, well-armed military formation. It relied on a powerful system of engineering structures and was capable of active defensive and offensive operations.

The Soviet command knew about the start date for the enemy offensive: July 3–6. On the night of July 5, Katukov decided to sleep. He advised Shalin and Nikitin to do the same. But it was not possible to fall asleep in anticipation of such an event. Thinking half asleep is useless. Katukov got dressed and at about three o'clock came to the headquarters. Shalin and Nikitin were there.

Midnight?

Just like you,” Nikitin laughed.

Shalin reported various pieces of information confirming that the enemy should launch an offensive any hour now.

Basically, the direction of the enemy's main attack was known - in the defense zone of the 6th Guards Army. The headquarters of the front warned about this in a timely manner. And this meant that, as Katukov had assumed, the 1st Panzer Army was to be an armored shield in the direction of the main attack of the enemy troops.

“... Army Group South strikes with concentrated forces from the Belgorod-Tomarovka line, breaks through the front at the Prilepa-Oboyan line, connects at Kursk and east of it with the advancing Army Group Center.

Thus, the enemy's plan was basically unraveled by the Soviet command. By decision of the commander of the Voronezh Front, N.F. Vatutin, early in the morning, a powerful air and artillery strike fell upon the enemy troops prepared for the offensive. He weakened the offensive capabilities of the enemy. But already at seven in the morning from the headquarters of the front they reported that the enemy troops had gone on the offensive. The main blow of the enemy hit the positions of the 67th and 52nd Guards Rifle Divisions, which were attached to artillery units and the 1st Guards Tank Brigade of the 1st Tank Army.

It is quite obvious that the enemy intends to break out onto the Oboyan highway, - Shalin stated, bending over the map. - And a powerful tank strike.

So, the decisive moment has come. Katukov sat in silence for a minute, experiencing natural inner excitement in connection with the start of a major operation. Then he went to the corps, already raised on combat alert. Everywhere there were final preparations for battles, rallies, party and Komsomol meetings were held.

On July 5, at 16:00, the commander of the front forces ordered: by 24:00, the 6th Tank and 3rd Mechanized Corps should be advanced to the second defensive line of the 6th Guards Army, and the 31st Tank Corps should be placed behind them. The task of the army is under no circumstances to prevent the enemy from breaking through to Oboyan. By 23-24 hours the corps reached the indicated lines. By this time, the enemy's 4th Panzer Army had significantly pressed the 6th Guards Army in many places, captured its first and second positions, and in some places reached the second line of defense.

July nights are short. But the line of defense was prepared in advance in engineering terms, and by the morning of July 6, the 1st Panzer Army was already ready to repel an enemy strike. At dawn, after an hour and a half of aviation and artillery preparation, the enemy's 4th Tank Army managed to break through the main line of defense of the 6th Guards Army. The enemy, apparently, believed that now he would not meet serious resistance in the offensive against Kursk: his divisions moved in pre-battle formations - in company columns, tanks were ahead, followed by infantry in armored personnel carriers and vehicles. And suddenly, his reconnaissance and security units ran into tank ambushes and were defeated.

The enemy found himself forced to deploy his main forces into battle formations again. They included selected formations of the Wehrmacht. Their names alone spoke volumes: SS Panzer Divisions "Adolf Hitler", "Reich", "Dead Head", motorized division "Grossdeutschland". "Tigers" and "Ferdinands" went ahead, followed by "Panthers" and other tanks and assault guns. A fierce battle ensued, lasting several hours. Everything was put into action on both sides: tanks, artillery, aircraft, infantry. In some places, the enemy managed to achieve superiority in strength, but even in these cases he was not successful: the stamina and skill of the Soviet soldiers seemed to be limitless.

When Katukov arrived at the command post of the commander of the 6th Panzer Corps Hetman, he reported:

Repulse the fourth attack.

“It was half past three,” Katukov recalled. But it seemed to come solar eclipse. The sun was hidden behind clouds of dust. And ahead, in the twilight, bursts of shots could be seen, the earth took off and crumbled, engines roared, caterpillars clanged.

More than half of the personnel and equipment lost in the first battle of the 49th tank brigade. Shortly before this, the hero of the battles near Orel, A.F. Burda, appointed by her commander, was inconsolable. Katukov loved him for his prudent courage, the ability to achieve success in battles with little bloodshed. It turned out that the losses of the enemy far exceeded the losses of the brigade. Besides, she never took a step back. And so it was everywhere - not a single unit participating in the battles retreated under the onslaught of a superior enemy.

The battle died down only with the onset of darkness. The results of the first day of fighting satisfied and at the same time worried Katukov. The enemy failed to break through our defenses. But this was achieved at the cost of heavy losses. The fact that the enemy's losses were significantly greater was no consolation. It was evident from everything that he had great superiority. And not only numerical. Enemy "tigers" from their 88-mm cannons could fire at Soviet tanks at a distance of up to 2 kilometers, being out of reach of the 76.2-mm thirty-four guns. Given these advantages of the enemy, Katukov did not tire of repeating his demands for the widespread use of tank ambushes. It was necessary that enemy vehicles approached ambushes at 300-400 meters. This made it possible for the more mobile thirty-fours to suddenly unleash aimed fire on the Tigers. Measures were taken to improve interaction with aviation and the widespread use of anti-tank weapons.

At night, the army was reinforced with a number of anti-tank artillery regiments and anti-tank rifle battalions from the reserve of the front commander. Obviously, the enemy also received significant reinforcements and carefully prepared for the offensive. With dawn it became clear that this time he decided to ram the defenses of the 1st Panzer Army with a powerful concentrated blow.

Something incredible, comrade commander, the enemy has thrown up to seven hundred tanks and self-propelled guns in our sector! - Krivoshey reported to Katukov.

This was the first time that the fascist command concentrated such a huge amount of military equipment on a narrow 10-kilometer front. The breakthrough site he had previously planned was subjected to intensive aviation and artillery processing. And no sooner had the dust from the explosions of aerial bombs and artillery shells settled than the enemy tanks in front rushed to the attack. Every quarter of an hour Katukov contacted Krivoshein. He reported that tankers, artillerymen, and motorized riflemen were fighting selflessly, but the enemy was stepping up their strikes. From everything it was clear that he was striving at all costs to break through to Kursk in order to unite with the troops advancing from the north.

The first attack was followed by a second, then a third. And every time the enemy started all over again - he carried out powerful aviation and artillery preparation, then he threw tanks and motorized infantry into the attack. At 13 o'clock the fourth attack followed. This time, the enemy had even greater superiority in strength. The 3rd mechanized corps began to slowly withdraw. Katukov advanced a number of tank and artillery units into his defense zone. At his call, powerful blows to the enemy troops were inflicted front-line aviation. As a result, the plan of the fascist command was frustrated: the enemy only managed to push the 3rd mechanized corps.

At night, Katukov traveled around several connections.

Rod and rod! Eight attacks were repulsed today, - reported the commander of the 3rd mechanized brigade, Lieutenant Colonel A.Kh. Babajanyan. - People fall asleep on the go.

For several days now, Katukov himself either did not sleep at all, or snatched 2-3 hours to sleep, then “finishing up” in a car or in an armored personnel carrier during trips to the formations. His brain was strained to the limit. It was he, the army commander, who presented a complete picture of the many inflamed and inflamed battles waged by the army, saw the general trend of their development, and had to direct it in the right direction. Therefore, only he had to decide who to give reinforcements in the first place, how and where to use the reserves, when and how to change the tactics of hostilities. Behind all this are countless specific issues that also needed to be addressed immediately and simultaneously.

In the most general terms, Katukov's line was to conduct a tough defense of advantageous heights, crossroads, and settlements. This should have changed the situation dramatically. Fights would be fought in many places at once: the enemy would be forced to split his forces, to unclench his fist. The defense of tactically important points was also supposed to deprive the enemy of superiority in technology and manpower. It consisted, as it were, of two interconnected parts - rigid and maneuverable defense. On the way to these points, the enemy invariably ran into "surprises": aimed fire from skillfully disguised tank and artillery ambushes, and powerful tank barriers that suddenly appeared. Such an organization of defense made it possible to inflict huge losses on the enemy and prevented him from maneuvering his reserves and aircraft.

Events, in fact, and developed. But the enemy stepped up their attacks. On July 8, the intensity of the fighting and their scale reached its climax. On this day, the enemy launched 12 large-scale attacks, supported by hundreds of aircraft. There were critical situations: individual enemy tanks broke through the second line of defense. In the center and on the left flank, the 1st Panzer Army was forced to retreat 4-5 kilometers. The front of her defense bent, but did not break. And every kilometer of advance was given to the enemy at the cost of huge losses.

At night, pondering the reports and other data that came from the field, Katukov smiled and, getting up from the table, stretched himself so that his bones crunched.

Today the enemy went for broke. This is the climax!

Yes, it seems, - after thinking, Shalin agreed.

And you, Efim Vikentievich, what do you think? - Katukov asked Baranovich.

All signs for that. I think that we need to strengthen the counterattacks.

Correctly! While we are counterattacking in companies, battalions, today we counterattacked with two brigades ... Mikhail Alekseevich, - Katukov turned to Shalin, - tell them to the formations: tomorrow to launch counterattacks with larger forces, taking into account, of course, specific conditions. If the enemy really went for broke, then his reserves were exhausted. Counterattacks will test this...

As subsequent events showed, Katukov correctly assessed the situation: on July 8, the enemy command threw all its reserves, all aviation into attacks.

The next day, outwardly, everything happened as before: large forces of enemy tanks and infantry were attacking. And the skirmishes continued in the sky. But...

You know, the enemy is nervous, ”Popel noted, looking through the reports from the formations together with Katukov.

It seems to be ... He rushes about, in response to our counterattacks he did not introduce fresh forces. - It turns out that today's attacks are a gesture of desperation?

It turns out, it seems ... But what will this gesture turn into for us tomorrow? We are also at the limit, - Katukov answered with a sigh. - I reported to the commander of the front. I'm waiting for help.

And help came. General Vatutin reinforced the 1st Tank Army with the 204th Rifle Division and the 10th Tank Corps. The 5th Guards Tank Corps of General A. G. Kravchenko was also subordinated to the tank army. By the morning of July 10, these formations occupied the defense sectors assigned to them.

On July 10, the "gesture" of the enemy turned into major attacks. They fought back everywhere. There was something in them that allowed Katukov to say to Shalin in the evening:

It is necessary to hold out for a day or two, and the enemy's forces will dry up. And now we are much stronger. Vatutin strongly supported us.

Yes, the same troops are operating for the second day. Apparently, the enemy no longer has fresh forces.

After listening to the reports of the deputies, Katukov suddenly felt so tired that he swayed. Having somehow reached the hut where he lived, he, without undressing, collapsed on the bed. Early in the morning he was pushed aside with difficulty by his adjutant.

At Katukov's headquarters, he met Nikitin.

Today is an unusual day, Mikhail Efimovich! He said cheerfully after saying hello. - The enemy behaves quietly, only indicates his presence.

Later it turned out that the enemy command, convinced of the invincibility of the defense of the Soviet troops in the Oboyan direction, regrouped its forces in order to bypass the 1st Panzer Army from the east and break through to Kursk through Prokhorovka.

At the height of the famous tank battle near Prokhorovka, on the right flank of the army, the 8th and 10th tank corps attached to it, by order of Katukov, launched a counterattack. As a result, the enemy not only did not remove additional forces from the Oboyan direction, but also brought in part of the artillery and other fire weapons that were already heading for Prokhorovka.

On the evening of July 14, enemy attacks on the front of the 1st Panzer Army ceased altogether. Katukov reported this to Vatutin.

It's the same everywhere," he replied.

That means... "Yes," interrupted Vatutin. It means we survived...

Taking advantage of the respite, Katukov pondered the past battles. For the first time, the Soviet command used powerful tank formations and formations to hold lanes in the depths of the defense. This case was not only new, but also exceptional. After all, tank formations and formations in defensive battles are intended for delivering counterattacks, and not directly for defense. But what does not happen in the war! Memory pointed not only to successes, but also to failures, including his own. And in shortcomings, he usually dug more than in successes. In general, Katukov was pleased. He managed to carry out much of what he had thought about more than once: maneuvering large tank forces, tank barriers, ambushes, various options for interaction with other branches of the military, especially with artillery and aviation.

At the end of July, N.F. Vatutin analyzed the Battle of Kursk. He noted that the 1st Panzer Army had fully fulfilled its tasks in the defense in the direction of the enemy's main attack. Later, in a report from the command of the troops of the Voronezh Front to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Katukov read: "The enemy crashed in the Oboyan direction and did not break through our front."

Katukov thought with gratitude about his closest assistants, about the commanders of formations, admired the skill and heroism of the personnel and was very happy for the troops entrusted to him when all the army corps were renamed guards.

On July 22, a meeting of commanders and members of the military councils of the armies was held at the headquarters of the Voronezh Front. Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov outlined in detail the plan of a major offensive operation of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which went down in history under the name Belgorod-Kharkov. It was an integral part of the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk and was intended to defeat the Belgorod-Kharkov enemy grouping and create conditions for the liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine.

The 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies were instructed to develop the success of breaking through the enemy defenses in the direction of the main attack of the troops of the Voronezh Front.

Here it is "finally, the long-awaited thing that Katukov considered the main purpose of the tank troops - the offensive! Having received specific instructions, he enthusiastically set about preparing for the upcoming operation. First of all, it was necessary to increase the combat capability of the army itself. Here Katukov could now limit himself to fundamental instructions. Everything practical Baranovich was in charge of this matter. The army received 200 new tanks and other equipment. Under the leadership of Dyner, repair work was widely launched. Of the 562 tanks available in the army, only 20 could not be restored - there were not enough spare parts. In a short time, army soldiers repaired 1215 vehicles.

For the period of the operation, the command of the front troops reinforced the 1st Panzer Army with a number of fighter-artillery, mortar, engineer-assault and other formations and units. The combat operations of the army were to be supported by assault and fighter divisions.

Preparations for the offensive were carried out at all levels, starting with subdivisions. And at all levels, under the leadership of Popel and Zhuravlev, active party political work was carried out. In a word, the army was gaining strength.

Katukov himself, together with Shalin and Nikitin, focused on developing a plan for the upcoming operation, working out interaction with future neighbors, with the command of aviation and artillery allocated to support the army. Then they moved to a lower level - they worked out all these issues within the army itself, ensuring that the corps and individual units clearly represented their tasks and were able to closely interact with each other. The same work was carried out in formations and units. And again, as always, Katukov brought the development of interaction up to the crews, artillery and mortar crews.

Everyone should be able to act autonomously: formations, units, subunits, and individual crews, he insistently repeated. - This is especially important on the offensive. We will have to break away from the main forces, act behind enemy lines, and make decisions independently.

Soon the moment came when Katukov could consider the preparations for the operation completed. Everything that depended on the command of the army and its formations was done. Still, Katukov was worried. And there was a reason. The staffing of the army was far from necessary: ​​in terms of personnel - 82, tanks - 81, self-propelled artillery installations - 67, guns and mortars - 85, vehicles - about 55 percent, more than 3 thousand vehicles were missing.

Katukov, Shalin and Nikitin considered this and that, but in the end they ensured that the formations, which were assigned the most important tasks, had the necessary firepower, mobility and maneuverability.

On the night of August 2, army troops began to move to their original areas. Happy combat mission was communicated to all personnel. Rallies were held in all units, Katukov visited some of them and, together with everyone else, experienced that feeling of upliftment, special concentration, which usually caused such rallies. He carefully peered into the tanned, seemingly scorched faces of soldiers and officers who had just passed battles, who sternly, with concentration said:

“We swear to you, our great people, that we will fight to the last breath, while the heart beats in the chest, and the eyes see the earth ...”

On August 3, at 6 o'clock, the morning silence was shaken by the roar of artillery cannonade. Thousands of guns and mortars hit the enemy fortifications. At 07:40, the roar intensified - Katyushas opened fire on the enemy. At the same time, hundreds of aircraft continuously bombed enemy defenses from the air.

Immediately after the artillery and aviation preparation, the combined arms formations went on the offensive. The enemy launched a series of violent attacks. To complete the breakthrough, forward detachments of the 1st and 5th tank armies were introduced into the battle. They helped the infantry to break through the enemy's main line of defense. Then, through a narrow corridor, both tank armies, the 1st and 5th Guards, entered the operational space.

For nine days - from 3 to 11 August - the troops of the 1st Panzer Army were in continuous battles. There was everything - both swift, stunning blows to the enemy, and the reflection of his furious counterattacks. And Katukov was right: often units and subunits had to act autonomously. The army covered 120 kilometers in nine days. Its formations cut the Kharkiv-Poltava railroad. The enemy managed to recapture this highway. At the direction of the Headquarters, the 5th Guards Tank Army was transferred to this direction. Interacting, both armies cut the enemy troops into two parts, went to the flank of his Kharkov grouping and cut off her retreat to the west. The successful advance of the tankers helped the troops of the Steppe Front in the liberation of Kharkov.

For Katukov, this operation was the first experience of directing the military operations of the army on the offensive, a new, extremely important step in the development of his art of a military leader. Even the fact that some shortcomings in the organization and actions of the troops were immediately eliminated testified to his ability to quickly navigate the situation and make the right decisions.

High skill was shown by his closest assistants and unit commanders. On the whole, during the Battle of Kursk, the 1st Tank Army acquired vast and comprehensive experience in large-scale military operations - defensive and offensive.

In September, the army was withdrawn to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. A few days later, Katukov and Popel were summoned to a meeting with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

It turned out to be very representative: all the commanders and members of the Military Councils of the tank armies were present.

In his opening speech, Stalin said that major offensive operations were coming up in the near future, and therefore it was necessary to sort out the organizational and staffing affairs of the tank armies.

Opinions were divided. Some army commanders believed that tank armies should be "lightened", freed from "appendages" - hospitals, sanitary-epidemic detachments, road-bridge battalions. They proposed that medical and road-bridge services for tankers be entrusted to the corresponding services of the combined arms armies, in the zone of which the formations of tank troops would have to operate. Katukov was in favor of keeping these special units in tank armies. He gave convincing examples showing that these units, adapted to the characteristics and tasks of tank troops, on the contrary, contribute to the mobility and maneuverability of tank armies, especially after they have been introduced into a gap, when they leave the combined arms armies for three to four days. Katukov also proposed to reinforce tank armies with howitzer artillery.

Katukov's proposals were accepted. We also discussed many other issues.

I saw how: major offensive operations are coming, - Popel admired, returning with Katukov from the Kremlin. - Remember, you called our army near Kursk an armored shield? Now it will be a cleaving sword.

You're speaking nice. After the war, you will probably write... Okay, Fedorenko said that Kalinin was calling us. Went.

Smiling softly, Kalinin said that he had heard about both of them. It turned out that a friend of Kalinin, an old Bolshevik who wrote to him a lot, served as a political worker in the 1st Tank Army, and Mikhail Ivanovich decided to personally get acquainted with Katukov and Popel. And he delayed the orders for the Battle of Kursk in order to hand them over himself. Kalinin gave them boxes with orders.

Yours, comrade Katukov, is a special order - military leader, - said Mikhail Ivanovich. - The status of the Order of Kutuzov of the first degree just corresponds to the actions of your army in the Battle of Kursk - the transition from active defense to a decisive counteroffensive.

Returning to the front, Katukov made a small detour - he drove to his father. I found him very decrepit, sick. But Yefim Epifanovich asked about the war with great interest and was proud of his son, even storing for him the words of Suvorov read somewhere: “Russian Prussians have always been beaten.” This was Katukov's last meeting with his father. Soon Efim Epifanovich died.

At the end of November, the 1st Tank Army was transferred to the 1st Ukrainian Front and took an active part in operations to liberate Right-Bank Ukraine. In the Zhytomyr-Berdichev operation, its formations and units, acting in the direction of the main attack, fought up to 300 kilometers in 17 days, liberated more than 100 settlements and, together with the 38th Army, went into the deep rear of the German 8th Army defending on the Dnieper . In this operation, Katukov made extensive use of a method carefully thought out by him: the troops acted not only during the day, but also at night, and most of the large settlements were taken, as a rule, on the move at night. For that time, this was a bold and innovative thing - after all, tanks did not yet have night vision devices.

An exceptionally important role in the liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine was played by the Proskurov-Chernivtsi offensive operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front, carried out from March 4 to April 17, 1944, in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. Three tank armies took part in this operation in the direction of the main attack.

The 1st Panzer Army was given a difficult task - in cooperation with other troops, to cut the enemy's front and create conditions for the main forces of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts to liberate a vast part of the territory of the Right-Bank Ukraine. The operation plan set a high rate of advance for the 1st Panzer Army. Only in the first three days of the offensive, she had to advance 120 kilometers.

Front commander G.K. Zhukov discussed in detail with Katukov the situation and conditions in which the army was to operate, calling them the most difficult. And although he rarely spoke about the general, this time he emphasized the special significance of the operation and, smiling, concluded:

You have a chance to excel, Katukov. Do you understand everything? .. Good. So, in a week, be with the army here. - Zhukov pointed with a pencil on the map to the Ternopil region. - And there - "cheers", and be healthy ...

The most difficult conditions affected almost immediately. The splintering began. Tanks could go, and they went, crushing the enemy's strongholds, smashing his manpower and equipment. But tanks are not people. They couldn't starve. A huge amount of ammunition was also needed. Wheeled vehicles were hopelessly skidding. Katukov ordered all tanks, except for those that operated in the forward detachments, to attach drags and carry fuel, ammunition and food to them. To make hundreds of drags from improvised means to transport thousands of tons of cargo, and immediately, in conditions of continuous fighting, is a matter that can rightfully be equated with military exploits.

Katukov had to simultaneously solve many complex tasks, and in such a way as to fulfill the main one: to maintain the established pace of the offensive. And he was patient. In 15 days, the army advanced 250 kilometers. But little can be expressed by the word "advancing" - these are fierce battles, and daring but in design and execution, the coverage of enemy groupings, sudden attacks on his flanks. This includes forcing on the move using improvised means of the Dniester, night attacks and the capture of large settlements. In cooperation with the 4th Panzer Army, the 1st Panzer Army cut through the enemy Army Group South and cut off its main forces from the escape route to the territory of Western Ukraine.

On the way, Katukov caught up with good news - on April 4 he was awarded the rank of Colonel General of the Tank Forces.

Damn, and there is no time to note! - answered Katukov, who congratulated him Popel.

The day will come, he replied.

And the day has come. Yes, what! The operation ended, the army took up positions in the second echelon. On April 25, Katukov was called to the HF apparatus. The General Staff reported that an order had just been signed by the People's Commissar of Defense to rename the army into the 1st Guards Tank Army.

Then Fedorenko picked up the phone.

Congratulations, Mikhail Efimovich! I wish to continue to act like a guard ...

Thank you, Yakov Nikolaevich!

And you personally also in Suvorov style! Fedorenko added. - You were awarded the Order of Suvorov of the first degree. And you know what? Read the status, of course. Orders of Kutuzov are awarded for counter-offensives, and Suvorov - for military leadership in offensives ... Do you understand the hint?

I understand, - Katukov laughed.

Congratulations! So match.

It was necessary to "correspond" quickly. From July 13 to August 29, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front carried out the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, during which the western regions of Ukraine and the southeastern regions of Poland were liberated. In exclusively fast pace the 1st Guards Tank Army advanced in this operation: in 35 days - 400 kilometers! Katukov made extensive use of his previous experience and boldly enriched it with new techniques.

Ever since the time of the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, Katukov thought a lot about the inexpediency of tank armies getting involved in protracted battles for large strongholds in the depths of enemy defenses. Katukov later wrote about this:

“... We have accumulated sufficient experience to learn the truth - the liberation of settlements is by no means the task of tank troops. To cut off the enemy's communications, bring chaos to his defenses, cause panic in the rear, block the escape routes of his advanced units or the routes of the transfer of his reserves - this is the task that we set in the first place.
During the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, Katukov directed the actions of the army formations in this way: they bypassed the large strongholds of the enemy, and this ensured a high rate of advance.

Katukov himself was, as always, cheerful, fit, and energetic. On his all-terrain vehicle, he raced over potholes and potholes, managing to visit the headquarters of many formations. And few people knew that it was far from easy for him. On the eve of the onset of an acute attack of appendicitis forced him to turn to surgeons. G.K. Zhukov advised to go by plane to Moscow, but Katukov reasoned: appendicitis is not such a serious matter to fly thousands of kilometers, and went to his army hospital. The professor called for this operated on him, but unsuccessfully: the skin grew together, and the abdominal muscles did not grow together. There was no time for reoperation. It ended up that they made a corset, which Katukov wore until the end of the war.

There were serious water obstacles in the way of the army advance. Without waiting for the approach of the pontoon units, its formations on improvised means crossed the Bug, San and Vistula, in cooperation with other troops, the army captured and held the so-called Sandomierz bridgehead, which later became a springboard for throwing troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front across Poland to the Neisse River.

For the skillful leadership of the troops, courage and heroism in the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, Katukov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

For three months the 1st Guards Tank Army was in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. As always in such cases, this time was filled with combat and political training of troops, the acceptance of new equipment and the repair of existing equipment, and the training of replacements. There were changes in the command structure, including in the highest army level. For health reasons, E. V. Baranovich was forced to leave the army. Lieutenant-General of Tank Troops Andrey Lavrentievich Getman, who had shown outstanding abilities as a commander, became the deputy commander of the army. In his place, Colonel A.Kh. was appointed commander of the 11th Guards Tank Corps. Babajanyan.

Respite between operations Katukov always used to bypass troops. Now there was a big pause. Together with Popel, Katukov visited all the hospitals and medical battalions, which both of them generally considered the rule for themselves. Even earlier, they decided to send only seriously wounded soldiers to the deep rear. The rest of the wounded were treated in hospitals belonging to the army itself, and the veterans returned to their units and divisions. Katukov used to check himself: were the wounded, as well as orderlies, nurses and doctors, not circumvented by awards? He often went to the troops, as he said, just like that: not for checks and meetings, but for communication with soldiers, sergeants and officers. It always happened to him simply, naturally. His authority among the troops was exceptionally high. The warriors proudly called themselves Katukians. The soldiers sang a song composed by someone in the army:

But time will fly by, we will defeat the Nazis,
The homeland will flourish again victoriously.
A brave tanker, a guy from Katuk.
He will meet, caress the one that is waiting somewhere.
At the end of November, the 1st Guards Tank Army was transferred to the 1st Belorussian Front and soon concentrated in the forests near Lublin.

I know the army from previous battles, - the commander of the front, G.K. Zhukov, met Katukov and Popel. - That's why I begged you from the Supreme. Get ready - big things are coming.

Things were really big. A major strategic operation was planned, which went down in history under the name of the Vistula-Oder. The troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, part of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian and 4th Ukrainian fronts were involved in its implementation. Four tank armies were to operate in the directions of the main attacks, including the 1st Guards Tank Army. During the operation, Soviet troops were to liberate Poland and enter German territory.

Soon the front command arranged a war game on cards, to which commanders, chiefs of staff and members of the military councils of the armies were invited. The scope of operations and its security amazed. Soviet troops now outnumbered the enemy in everything - numerically and in terms of weapons. But the enemy had powerful fortifications, reinforced by natural obstacles - large rivers. The depth of the enemy defense, which consisted of seven defensive lines, extended up to 500 kilometers. The tank armies were given the task of capturing the enemy defense lines with swift throws before the enemy troops were introduced there, cutting off his communications, the approach routes of the reserves.

With the same care, Katukov organized military games on cards and in the army: with the commanders and chiefs of staff of the corps, then in the corps with the command of the brigades. Separately, a game was held with the command and political staff of the rear services of the army, corps and brigades. These games largely contributed to the development of a unity of views on the nature and methods of action in the upcoming operation of all levels of leadership of the army troops.

On January 2, Katukov received a directive defining the specific tasks of the 1st Guards Tank Army in Vistula-Oder operation.

The pace is unprecedented! exclaimed the usually imperturbable Shalin. - Is it conceivable! Near Lvov and Sandomierz, we advanced 25 kilometers a day, and this seemed to be a record. And here...

Thinkable, of course, thinkable, dear Mikhail Alekseevich! - Katukov felt in Shalin's excitement that high spirits experienced then by everyone who knew the goals and scope of the grandiose operation. - And you will have to think about this first of all, as the chief of staff of the army.

I'll have to, of course, - Shalin laughed.

The 1st Guards Tank Army was introduced into the gap the day after the start of the Vistula-Oder operation. For 18 days, she fought over 600 kilometers, overcame seven defensive lines, crossed the Pilica, Warta, Oder (Odra) rivers on the move. The average daily rate of advance of army formations was 33, and the maximum - 75 kilometers! The situation was changing rapidly, unforeseen situations arose, difficulties with communications and supplies. But the careful preparation of the army for the operation, the skill of the commanders of the formation, and the unstoppable offensive impulse of the tank soldiers also had an effect. The formations of the army withstood the high pace of the offensive. Sometimes they broke away from the main forces at a distance of up to 100 kilometers, broke through the intermediate lines of the enemy defense on the move, performed skillful maneuvers, swiftly pursued the enemy troops, cut them through, and did not give them the opportunity to gain a foothold in previously prepared positions.

Tank radios of that time had a range of no more than 30–35 kilometers. Therefore, in order to directly supervise the actions of the troops, Katukov formed an operational group of the army headquarters. It included: himself, a member of the Military Council, the commander of artillery and the head of the operations department. The group moved after the troops, often at their own pace - it was necessary to have time to be where, first of all, immediate decisions of the army command were required. In the rear, the headquarters of the front, headed by Shalin, remained. He moved to a new place only after he summarized all the data on the actions of the army and reported them to the front headquarters.

Rapidly advancing, the troops of the army left behind unfinished parts of the enemy, his strongholds. In this regard, in a number of cases, critical situations arose. In one of them was the task force. Once she settled down on the outskirts of Nowe Miasto, on the eastern bank of the Pilica. The troops moved to Lodz, only the sapper unit remained at the crossing. It suddenly became clear that on both banks of the Pilica, battered enemy units from the defeated Warsaw group were withdrawing. One such wandering "cauldron" - up to a thousand infantrymen with artillery and tanks - made its way directly to Nowe Miasto. Attempts to contact the brigades by radio gave nothing. There were such breaks - the connections went beyond the reach of the walkie-talkies.

The enemy is attacking Nowe Miasto! panting Nikitin ran up to Katukov. - He is held back by a company of a motorcycle battalion of senior lieutenant Baikov. He has six tanks, the enemy has seventeen!

Ordering to send guard tanks to help Baikov, Katukov ordered:

All over me! Into the chain!

A platoon of guards, signalmen, drivers rushed after Katukov. A fight broke out. Having seized the moment, Katukov ordered the radio operator to contact the brigade of I. N. Boyko, who was somewhere nearby. Finally, it succeeded, and Katukov quickly explained the situation to the brigade commander.

There is! I will be soon!

The Nazis continued to press, the shells were bursting very close by. The chain of defenders of the command post was thinning. But Boyko managed in time, the wandering "cauldron" was eliminated.

The army conducted active offensive operations until the very end of the operation and fully completed the tasks assigned to it. For the skillful leadership of the army, personal courage and heroism shown in the Vistula-Oder operation, Katukov was awarded the second Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

The Vistula-Oder operation crushed the entire strategic front of the enemy defense from the Vistula to the Oder. Soviet troops stopped 60 kilometers from Berlin. At this time, the enemy concentrated Army Group "Vistula" in Eastern Pomerania to strike at the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front that had pulled ahead. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided: to defeat the East Pomeranian enemy grouping with the forces of the 2nd and part of the forces of the 1st Belorussian Fronts and then resume the offensive against Berlin. The 1st Guards Tank Army was also involved in the East Pomeranian operation.

After reviewing the tasks and conditions of the army’s actions, Shalin gasped:

Full of rivers, streams, swamps!

However, this time the matter was extremely difficult. G.K. Zhukov was also worried. On February 28, he summoned Katukov. In his memoirs, Katukov reproduced this conversation with G.K. Zhukov in this way:

“From his conversation, I understood that he was worried about whether the tank troops would be able to fulfill the order of the Headquarters in time. - Slush, there are almost no roads to the north. The only one with a hard surface ... How will such a mass of troops pass through it? Meanwhile, four days are allotted for the entire operation. Before Baltic Sea one hundred kilometers. This means that you have to walk twenty-five kilometers a day. Can you handle it?

Don't worry, comrade marshal, the army will complete its task on time.

Zhukov frowned at me.

Won't you let me down? - Not at all. During the Vistula-Oder, not such distances were overcome.

Well look. Keep me updated. If you need help, call.

It seemed to me that the commander of the front cheered up a little.”
Katukov and Shalin carefully thought out all possible options for the army's actions in the upcoming operation, discussed them in detail with the formation commanders. And when the operation began, nothing could help the enemy - neither fortifications, nor difficult terrain conditions for tank operations, nor fierce resistance. Katukov ordered the offensive around the clock. Night blows especially stunned the enemy. But they were also difficult for Soviet tankers. The nature of the fighting changed rapidly. The formations of the army crushed the enemy troops, bypassed the nodes of resistance. Often, due to the conditions of the terrain, this could not be done, and then the tankers acted in infantry combat formations, storming cities and other settlements. The established pace of advance was maintained.

From Colonel Smirnov, - he reported and gave the commander a bottle with a cloudy liquid.

What's this?

Water, Comrade Commander. Baltic. Like a battle report. The Colonel himself scooped it up and ordered it to be delivered to you.

Katukov did not need a better report that the 40th tank brigade had reached the Baltic Sea. By March 5, other formations of the army reached the coast of the Baltic Sea. The task set by G.K. Zhukov was completed.

The completion of the East Pomeranian operation was entrusted to the 2nd Belorussian Front. The 1st Guards Tank Army was also temporarily transferred to its composition. In cooperation with other troops, she occupied Gdynia on March 28, and Danzig (Gdansk) on March 30. This completed the East Pomeranian operation.

And finally, the battle for Berlin! The 1st Guards Tank Army was again included in the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front and again acted in the direction of the main attack.

A fierce battle unfolded on the Seelow Heights. The troops of the 8th Guards Army of V.I. Chuikov stubbornly made their way through the enemy defenses, but many of its attempts to break through were unsuccessful: both the terrain itself and the huge mass of fortifications all favored the enemy. And then the order of G.K. Zhukov followed: without waiting for a complete breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses, to bring the 1st Guards Tank Army into battle. In practice, this meant throwing tanks at unsuppressed enemy firing points. But the commander of the front, apparently, had no other choice.

It was hard, very hard for the soldiers-infantrymen and tankers, who now together uprooted the enemy from the Seelow Heights. Chuikov's guards managed to break through the enemy's first line of defense. But the second one was even more powerful. It was literally crammed with "Tigers", "Panthers", "Ferdinands", anti-tank artillery, deployed here from the Berlin air defense zone with anti-aircraft artillery regiments, motorized infantry formations. The heights were surrounded by trenches, bunkers, bunkers, minefields. The steepness of the eastern slopes of the heights was such that, when lifting, the tanks were forced to bypass the steepness and cliffs, which means that they expose their sides to the shelling of enemy artillery.

The command of the troops of the front, subjecting the Seelow Heights to powerful massive artillery and air strikes, helped the guardsmen of Chuikov and Katukov to speed up the advance. And now they finally mastered these, as Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov later put it, "devilish heights."

The tank guards and infantrymen, still acting shoulder to shoulder, broke out to the Spree River, crossed it with the main forces and came close to Berlin. Zhukov especially noted the actions of Katukov's tankers in those battles unprecedented in tension and fierceness.

“It should be emphasized,” he wrote in his memoirs, “the significant role of the 1st Guards Tank Army of the 1st Belorussian Front, which, having reached the southeastern outskirts of Berlin, cut off the retreat of the 9th Army to Berlin. This facilitated the further struggle in the city itself.
One of the first to start katukovtsy and fighting in Berlin itself. Every building here has been turned into a fortress. Tanks, accompanying the infantry, together with artillery uprooted the enemy from these fortresses. They spread out over many streets and slowly but irresistibly moved forward. The actions of the army sometimes broke up into a mass of local battles. However, the commander Katukov did not let go of the thread of their leadership for a second. He maneuvered reserves, organized the interaction of troops, concentrated artillery forces to clear passages for tanks. The army made its way to the very center of Berlin, when the long-awaited came - the enemy capitulated.

Open hatches!

It was already a symbolic command. Victory has come.

Katukov toured the formations and units of the army. On their banners shone military orders, almost all of them had names: Berdichevsky, Chernivtsi, Peremyshlsky, Vistula, Sandomierz, Lodz, Brandenburg, Berlin and others. He stayed for a long time in his native 1st Guards Tank Brigade. Now her battle banner decorated with six orders: two orders of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky. At the head of it, Katukov participated in the battle near Moscow, among the best formations of the 1st Guards Tank Army, the brigade went through a glorious battle path right up to the final battles in the capital of the Nazi Reich.

* * *
After the end of the Great Patriotic War, Katukov commanded the army, armored and mechanized troops of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. In 1951 he graduated from the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff.

Learn! - Katukov called on fellow soldiers hung with order strips. - All your experience needs to be filtered through military theory. Only then will it be useful for the future.

The future of the Soviet Armed Forces was also devoted to all the further activities of Mikhail Efimovich. Since 1955, he was the inspector general of the Main Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, then the deputy head of the Main Directorate of the Ground Forces. In 1959 he was awarded the rank of Marshal of the Armored Forces.

For the last ten years of his life, Mikhail Efimovich was a military inspector-adviser of the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense. During these years, he worked hard to generalize and theoretically comprehend the experience of combat operations of tank troops during the Great Patriotic War. His articles in military journals, and indeed his memoirs, contain valuable provisions for the art of war, many of which are still of great theoretical and practical importance for the Soviet Armed Forces.

On June 8, 1976, Mikhail Efimovich Katukov passed away. In the room where he died, a moire pillow is attached to the wall. She wears orders and medals. A lot of them. Among them are two Stars of the Hero of the Soviet Union, four Orders of Lenin, three Orders of the Red Banner, two Orders of Suvorov 1st class, Order of Kutuzov 1st class, Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st class. And behind each of these awards are remarkable military accomplishments in the name of the triumph of the ideas of October, in defense of socialism. In Moscow and other cities there are streets and schools named after M. E. Katukov. And on the battle path of the 1st Guards Tank Army, in many places there are monuments to tank soldiers on pedestals - the famous thirty-fours.

The name of Mikhail Efimovich Katukov is among those whom the people will always honor, surround with grateful memory