Battle of Kursk. Kursk Bulge

Battle of Kursk(July 5, 1943 - August 23, 1943, also known as Battle of Kursk) in terms of its scale, involved forces and means, tension, results and military-political consequences, is one of the key battles of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into 3 parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-12); Orel (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive. The German side called the offensive part of the battle "Operation Citadel".

After the end of the battle, the strategic initiative in the war went over to the side of the Red Army, which until the end of the war carried out mainly offensive operations, while the Wehrmacht was on the defensive.

Preparing for battle

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, facing the west (the so-called "Kursk Bulge"). During April-June 1943, there was an operational pause at the front, during which the parties were preparing for the summer campaign.

Plans and forces of the parties

The German command decided to conduct a major strategic operation on the Kursk ledge in the summer of 1943. It was planned to launch converging strikes from the areas of the cities of Orel (from the north) and Belgorod (from the south). The shock groups were to link up in the Kursk region, surrounding the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts of the Red Army. The operation received the code name "Citadel". According to the German general Friedrich Fangor (German. Friedrich Fangohr), at a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the plan was adjusted at the suggestion of General Hoth: the 2nd SS Panzer Corps turns from the Oboyansky direction towards Prokhorovka, where terrain conditions allow for a global battle with armored reserves Soviet troops.

To carry out the operation, the Germans concentrated a grouping of up to 50 divisions (18 of them tank and motorized), 2 tank brigades, 3 separate tank battalions and 8 assault gun divisions, with a total strength, according to Soviet sources, about 900 thousand people. The command of the troops was carried out by Field Marshal Günther Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Army Group South). Organizationally, the strike forces were part of the 2nd Panzer, 2nd and 9th Armies (commander - Field Marshal Walter Model, Army Group Center, Orel region) and the 4th Panzer Army, the 24th Panzer Corps and Operational Group "Kempf" (commander - General German Goth, Army Group "South", Belgorod region). Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.

To carry out the operation in the Kursk region, several elite SS Panzer divisions were advanced:

• 1st Division Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler"
• 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich"
• 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" (Dead Head)

Troops received some new technology:

• 134 Pz.Kpfw.VI Tiger tanks (another 14 command tanks)
• 190 Pz.Kpfw.V "Panther" (11 more - evacuation (without guns) and command)
• 90 assault guns Sd.Kfz. 184 Ferdinand (45 each in sPzJgAbt 653 and sPzJgAbt 654)
• only 348 relatively new tanks and self-propelled guns ("Tiger" was used several times in 1942 and early 1943).

At the same time, however, a significant number of frankly outdated tanks and self-propelled guns remained in the German units: 384 units (Pz.III, Pz.II, even Pz.I). Also during the Battle of Kursk, the German Sd.Kfz.302 telewagons were used for the first time.

The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, wear down the enemy troops and inflict defeat on them, inflicting counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. To this end, a defense in depth was created on both faces of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average density of mining in the direction of the expected enemy strikes was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines per kilometer of the front.

The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The fronts were coordinated by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

In the assessment of the forces of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with the different definitions of the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as the difference in the methods of accounting and classification of military equipment. When assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is associated with the inclusion or exclusion from the calculations of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1500 tanks). The following table contains some estimates:

The role of intelligence

From the beginning of 1943, the intercepts of secret communications from the Nazi High Command and Hitler's secret directives increasingly referred to Operation Citadel. According to the memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, on March 27 he was informed in general details by Stalin about the German plans. On April 12, 1943, the exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the Plan of Operation Citadel” translated from German by the German High Command, which was endorsed by all services of the Wehrmacht, but not yet signed by Hitler, translated from German, fell on Stalin’s desk, who signed it only three days later. This data was obtained by a scout who worked under the name "Werther". The real name of this man is still unknown, but it is assumed that he was an employee of the Wehrmacht High Command, and the information he received came to Moscow through the Luci agent operating in Switzerland, Rudolf Rössler. There is an alternative suggestion that Werther is the personal photographer of Adolf Hitler.

However, it should be noted that back on April 8, 1943, G.K. Zhukov, relying on data from the intelligence agencies of the fronts of the Kursk direction, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk salient:

Although the exact text of the "Citadel" lay on Stalin's desk three days before Hitler signed it, four days before that the German plan became obvious to the highest Soviet military command, and they knew the general details about the existence of such a plan at least for eight days before.

Kursk defensive operation

The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation - 3 a.m. (the German army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow 5 a.m.), at 22:30 and 2:20 Moscow time, counter-barrage preparation was carried out by the forces of two fronts with the amount of ammunition 0.25 ammo. German reports noted significant damage to communication lines and minor losses in manpower. An unsuccessful air raid was also carried out by the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies (more than 400 attack aircraft and fighters) on the Kharkov and Belgorod enemy air hubs.

Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 o'clock in the morning our time, the Germans also inflicted bombing and artillery strikes on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern face was inflicted in the direction of Olkhovatka. Having not achieved success, the Germans suffered a blow in the direction of Ponyri, but even here they could not break through the Soviet defenses. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which, from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of the tanks, the German 9th Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main blows of the Germans were directed to the areas of Korocha and Oboyan.

July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky.

Operation "Citadel" - the general offensive of the German army on the Eastern Front in 1943 - was aimed at encircling the troops of the Central (K. K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (N. F. Vatutin) fronts in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe city of Kursk by counter attacks from the north and south under the base of the Kursk ledge, as well as the defeat of Soviet operational and strategic reserves east of the main direction of the main attack (including in the area of ​​Prokhorovka station). Main blow from southern directions were applied by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army (commander - Herman Goth, 48th TC and 2nd SS TC) with the support of the army group "Kempf" (W. Kempf).

At the initial stage of the offensive, the 48th Panzer Corps (commander: O. von Knobelsdorf, chief of staff: F. von Mellenthin, 527 tanks, 147 self-propelled guns), which was the strongest formation of the 4th Panzer Army, consisting of: 3 and 11 Panzer divisions , mechanized (tank-grenadier) division "Grossdeutschland", 10 tank brigade and 911 det. division of assault guns, with the support of 332 and 167 infantry divisions, had the task of breaking through the first, second and third lines of defense of units of the Voronezh Front from the Gertsovka-Butovo area in the direction of Cherkasskoe-Yakovlevo-Oboyan. At the same time, it was assumed that in the Yakovlevo area, 48 TC would connect with units of the 2nd SS TD (thus surrounding units of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division and 67 Guards Rifle Division), change units of the 2nd SS TD, after which it was supposed to use units of the SS division against the operational reserves of the Red Army in the area of ​​Art. Prokhorovka, and 48 shopping mall was supposed to continue operations in the main direction Oboyan - Kursk.

To accomplish the task, the units of the 48th TC on the first day of the offensive (Day "X") needed to break into the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I. M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I. P. Sivakov) and the 67 Guards Rifle Division (Colonel A. I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoye and carry out a breakthrough with armored units in towards the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th shopping mall determined that the village of Cherkasskoye was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5. And already on July 6, part 48 of shopping mall. should have reached the city of Oboyan.

However, as a result of the actions of the Soviet units and formations, the courage and stamina they showed, as well as the preparation of defensive lines they carried out in advance, the Wehrmacht's plans in this direction were "significantly adjusted" - 48 shopping mall did not reach Oboyan.

The factors that determined the unacceptably slow rate of advance of the 48th mk on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the terrain by the Soviet units (starting from anti-tank ditches almost throughout the defense and ending with radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of assault aircraft on the accumulated front engineering obstacles to enemy tanks, competent location of anti-tank strongholds (No. 6 south of Korovin in the lane of the 71st Guards Rifle Division, No. 7 southwest of Cherkassky and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassky in the lane of the 67th Guards Rifle Division), rapid reorganization of the combat formations of battalions of the 196th Guards Rifle Division .sp (Colonel V. I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassky, timely maneuver by divisional (245 otp, 1440 sap) and army (493 iptap, as well as 27 oiptabr colonel N. D. Chevola) anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units 3 TD and 11 TD with the involvement of forces 245 otp ( lieutenant colonel M.K. Akopov, 39 tanks M3) and 1440 glanders (lieutenant colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), as well as the not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of the outposts in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 battalions. 199th guards regiment, captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of ​​workers' barracks southwest of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of 48 TC (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of 11 TD and 332 RD before the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day "X-1", however, the resistance of the combat guard was not completely suppressed by dawn on July 5). All of the above factors affected both the speed of concentration of units in their original positions before the main attack, and their advancement during the offensive itself.

Also, the shortcomings of the German command in planning the operation and the poorly practiced interaction between tank and infantry units affected the pace of the corps' offensive. In particular, the Great Germany division (W. Heierlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and 10 brigade attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 command tanks Pz.V) in the current conditions of the battle turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, throughout the first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow “corridors” in front of engineering barriers (especially great difficulties were caused by overcoming the swampy anti-tank ditch west of Cherkassky), came under a combined attack by Soviet aviation (2nd VA) and artillery from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Ap (Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments 33 from Pabr (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially in officers), and was unable to turn around in accordance with the offensive schedule on the tank-accessible terrain at the Korovino-Cherkasskoye line for a further strike in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkasskoye. At the same time, infantry units that overcame anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own firepower. So, for example, which was at the forefront of the strike of the division "VG" battle group The 3rd Battalion of the Fusiliers Regiment at the time of the first attack found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the VG division could not actually bring them into battle for a long time.

The result of the resulting congestion on the advance routes was also the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th tank corps in firing positions, which affected the results of the artillery preparation before the start of the attack.

It should be noted that the commander of the 48th TC became a hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of the higher authorities. Knobelsdorff's lack of an operational reserve had a particularly negative effect - all divisions of the corps were put into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, 1943, after which they were drawn into active hostilities for a long time.

The development of the offensive of 48 mk on the afternoon of July 5 was most facilitated by: active operations of sapper-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 sorties) and an overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the initiative actions of units 11 TD (I. Mikl) and 911 TD. division of assault guns (overcoming the strip of engineering obstacles and access to the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy by a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).

An important factor in the success of the German tank units there was a qualitative leap in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles that occurred by the summer of 1943. Already during the first day defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of the anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units manifested itself in the fight against both the new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, and modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet Iptaps were armed with 45-mm guns, the power of 76-mm Soviet field and American tank guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances two to three times less than the effective range of fire of the latter, heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in the combined arms 6 Guards A, but also in the second line of defense of the 1st tank army of M.E. Katukov, which occupied behind it).

Only after overcoming in the afternoon the bulk of the tanks anti-tank barriers south of Cherkassky, having repulsed a number of counterattacks of the Soviet units, units of the VG division and 11 TD were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting turned into a street phase. At about 21:00 division commander A. I. Baksov ordered the withdrawal of units of the 196th Guards Rifle Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassky, as well as to the center of the village. During the withdrawal of units of 196 Guards Rifles, minefields were set up. At about 21:20, a battle group of grenadiers of the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th brigade, broke into the Yarki farm (north of Cherkassky). A little later, the 3rd TD of the Wehrmacht managed to capture the Krasny Pochinok farm (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th TC of the Wehrmacht was the wedging into the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the background of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating east in parallel with 48 TC), less saturated armored vehicles, who managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. BUT.

Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoe was crushed around midnight on July 5th. However, the German units were able to establish full control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.

Thus, the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division, not possessing large tank formations (they had only 39 American M3 tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245 otp and 1440 sap) were held for about a day in the area of ​​​​the villages of Korovino and Cherkasskoe five enemy divisions (of which three are armored). In the battle on July 5, 1943, in the area of ​​​​Cherkassky, the fighters and commanders of the 196th and 199th guards especially distinguished themselves. rifle regiments 67 guards. divisions. The competent and truly heroic actions of the fighters and commanders of the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division allowed the command of the 6th Guards. And in a timely manner to pull up the army reserves to the place where the units of the 48th TC were wedged in at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division and prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this sector in the following days of the defensive operation.

As a result of the hostilities described above, the village of Cherkasskoye actually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts, it was a “lunar landscape”).

The heroic defense of the village of Cherkasskoye on July 5, 1943, one of the most successful moments of the Battle of Kursk for the Soviet troops, is unfortunately one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.

July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks.

By the end of the first day of the offensive, 4 TA wedged into the defense of 6 Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the area of ​​​​offensive 48 TC (near the village of Cherkasskoe) and 12-13 km in the area of ​​​​2 TC SS (in the Bykovka-Kozmo-Demyanovka area). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the first line of defense of the Soviet troops to the full depth, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I.M. Nekrasov), and approached the 5-6 km front directly to the second the line of defense occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), engaging in battle with its advanced units.

However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - did not complete the task of the day on July 5, encountering stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the advancing 4th tank army. As a result, Hausser was forced from July 6 to 8 to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely the Dead Head TD, to cover his right flank against the 375th Rifle Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units brilliantly proved themselves in the battles of July 5 .

On July 6, the tasks of the day for units of the 2nd SS TC (334 tanks) were determined: for the Dead Head TD (brigadeführer G. Priss, 114 tanks) - the defeat of the 375th rifle division and the expansion of the breakthrough corridor in the direction of the river. Lipovy Donets, for TD "Leibstandarte" (brigadeführer T. Vish, 99 tanks, 23 self-propelled guns) and "Das Reich" (brigadeführer V. Kruger, 121 tanks, 21 self-propelled guns) - the fastest breakthrough of the second line of defense near the village. Yakovlevo and exit to the line of the bend of the river Psel - with. Teterevino.

At about 9:00 on July 6, 1943, after a powerful artillery preparation (carried out by artillery regiments of the Leibstandarte, Das Reich divisions and 55 MP six-barreled mortars) with the direct support of the 8th Air Corps (about 150 aircraft in the offensive zone), the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps moved into offensive, delivering the main blow in the area occupied by 154 and 156 guards sp. At the same time, the Germans managed to identify the command and control posts of the regiments of the 51st Guards Rifle Division and launch a fire raid on them, which led to the disorganization of communications and command and control of its troops. In fact, the battalions of the 51st Guards Rifle Division repelled enemy attacks without communication with the higher command, since the work of communication officers was not effective due to the high dynamics of the battle.

The initial success of the attack of the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions was ensured due to the numerical advantage in the breakthrough area (two German divisions against two guards rifle regiments), as well as due to good interaction between the regiments of the divisions, artillery and aviation - the advanced units of the divisions, the main ramming force of which was the 13th and 8th heavy companies of the "Tigers" (7 and 11 Pz.VI, respectively), with the support of assault gun divisions (23 and 21 StuG) advanced to Soviet positions even before the end of the artillery and air strike, finding themselves at the moment of its end a few hundred meters from the trenches.

By 13:00, the battalions at the junction of the 154th and 156th Guards Rifle Regiments were knocked out of their positions and began a disorderly retreat in the direction of the villages of Yakovlevo and Luchki; the left-flank 158th Guards Rifle Regiment, having bent its right flank, generally continued to hold the line of defense. The withdrawal of units of the 154th and 156th Guards Rifle Regiments was carried out mixed with tanks and motorized infantry of the enemy and was associated with heavy losses (in particular, in 156 Guards Rifle Regiment out of 1685 people on July 7, about 200 people remained in the ranks, that is, the regiment was actually destroyed) . The general leadership of the retreating battalions was practically absent, the actions of these units were determined only by the initiative of junior commanders, not all of whom were ready for this. Some units of the 154th and 156th Guards Rifle Regiments went to the positions of neighboring divisions. The situation was partly saved by the actions of the artillery of the 51st Guards Rifle Division and the suitable 5th Guards Rifle Division from the reserve. Stalingrad tank corps - howitzer batteries of the 122nd Guards Ap (Major M.N. Uglovsky) and artillery units of the 6th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel A.M. Shchekal) fought hard battles in the depths of the defense of the 51st Guards. divisions, slowing down the pace of the advance of the Leibstandarte and Das Reich combat groups in order to enable the retreating infantry to gain a foothold on new lines. At the same time, the gunners managed to save most of their heavy weapons. A fleeting but fierce battle flared up for the village of Luchki, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bwhich the 464th guards artillery division and 460th guards managed to deploy. mortar battalion 6 guards msbr 5 guards. Stk (at the same time, due to insufficient provision of vehicles, the motorized infantry of this brigade was still on the march 15 km from the battlefield).

At 14:20, the armored group of the Das Reich division as a whole captured the village of Luchki, and the artillery units of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade began to retreat north to the Kalinin farm. After that, up to the third (rear) defensive line of the Voronezh Front, in front of the Das Reich combat group, there were actually no units of the 6th Guards. armies capable of holding back its offensive: the main forces of the anti-tank artillery of the army (namely, 14, 27 and 28 oiptabr) were located to the west - on Oboyanskoye Highway and in the offensive zone of 48 TC, which, according to the results of the battles on July 5, was assessed by the army command as the direction of the main German strikes (which was not entirely true - the strikes of both German tank corps 4 TA were considered by the German command as equivalent). To repel the strike of the TD "Das Reich" artillery from the 6th Guards. And by this point, it just wasn't.

The offensive of the Leibstandarte TD in the Oboyan direction in the first half of the day on July 6 developed less successfully than that of the Das Reich, which was due to the greater saturation of Soviet artillery in its offensive area (the regiments of Major Kosachev's 28th Oiptabr were active), timely strikes of the 1st Guards. brigade (colonel V. M. Gorelov) and 49 brigade (lieutenant colonel A. F. Burda) from the 3 mechanized corps 1 TA M. E. Katukov, as well as the presence in its offensive zone of the well-fortified village of Yakovlevo, in street fighting in which the main forces of the division, including its tank regiment, got stuck for some time.

Thus, by 14:00 on July 6, the troops of the 2nd SS TC had basically completed the first part of the general offensive plan - the left flank of the 6th Guards. A was crushed, and a little later with the capture of s. Yakovlevo, on the part of the 2nd shopping mall of the SS, conditions were prepared for their replacement with units of the 48th shopping mall. The advanced units of the 2nd SS TC were ready to begin to fulfill one of the general goals of the Citadel operation - the destruction of the Red Army reserves in the area of ​​​​st. Prokhorovka. However, Hermann Goth (commander of 4 TA) failed to fully fulfill the offensive plan on July 6, due to the slow advance of the troops of 48 TC (O. von Knobelsdorf), who faced the skillful defense of the Katukov army that entered the battle in the afternoon. Although Knobelsdorff's corps managed to surround some regiments of the 67th and 52nd guards divisions of the 6th guards in the afternoon. And in the interfluve of the Vorskla and Vorsklitsa (with a total strength of about a rifle division), however, having stumbled upon the rigid defense of the brigades of 3 microns (Major General S. M. Krivoshein) on the second line of defense, the corps divisions could not capture bridgeheads on the northern bank of the Pena River, discard the Soviet mechanized corps and go to the village. Yakovlevo for the subsequent change of parts 2 shopping mall SS. Moreover, on the left flank of the corps, the battle group of the tank regiment of the 3rd tank regiment (F. Westkhoven), which gaped at the entrance to the village of Zavidovka, was shot by tankmen and artillerymen of the 22nd tank brigade (Colonel N. G. Vennichev), which was part of the 6th tank regiment (Major General A D. Hetman) 1 TA.

Nevertheless, the success achieved by the divisions "Leibstandarte", and in particular "Das Reich", forced the command of the Voronezh Front, in conditions of incomplete clarity of the situation, to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough that had formed in the second line of defense of the front. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakov on the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin, by his order, transfers the 5th Guards. Stalingrad shopping mall (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34 and 21 are Mk.IV Churchill) and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A. S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 are T-34s and 17 are Mk.IV Churchills) under the command of the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves his proposal to launch counterattacks on the German tanks that broke through the positions of the 51st Guards Rifle Division with the forces of the 5th Guards Rifle Division. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 TC SS with the forces of 2 Guards. Ttk (straight through battle formations 375 sd). In particular, on the afternoon of July 6, I. M. Chistyakov puts the commander of the 5th Guards. Stk Major General A. G. Kravchenko tasked with withdrawing from the defensive area he occupied (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy, using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strongholds) of the main part of the corps (two of the three brigades and a heavy breakthrough tank regiment), and the application by these forces of a counterattack on the flank of the Leibstandarte TD. Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture with. Luchki tanks of the division "Das Reich", and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the implementation of this order. However, under the threat of arrests and execution, they were forced to proceed with its implementation. The attack of the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.

Sufficient own artillery means of the 5th Guards. Stk did not have, and the order did not leave time to link the actions of the corps with neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without air support, on level ground and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of the Das Reich TD, which regrouped, setting up tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, having called in aviation, inflicted significant fire damage on the brigades Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop attacking and go on the defensive. After that, pulling up the anti-tank artillery and organizing flank maneuvers, units of the Das Reich TD between 17 and 19 hours managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of ​​the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 zenap (Major Savchenko) and 464 guards artillery that had withdrawn from the village of Luchki .division and 460 guards. mortar battalion of the 6th guards msbr. By 19:00, units of the Das Reich TD actually managed to surround most of the 5th Guards. Stk between s. Luchki and the Kalinin farm, after which, building on success, the command of the German division of part of the forces, acting in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka, tried to seize the Belenikhino junction. However, thanks to the initiative actions of the commander and battalion commanders of the 20 brigade (lieutenant colonel P.F. Okhrimenko) of the 5th guards, which remained outside the encirclement ring. Stk, who managed to quickly create a tough defense around Belenikhino from various parts of the corps that were at hand, managed to stop the offensive of Das Reich, and even force the German units to return back to x. Kalinin. Being without communication with the headquarters of the corps, on the night of July 7, the encircled units of the 5th Guards. Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the encirclement and connected with parts of the 20 brigade. During July 6, 1943, units of the 5th Guards. Stk for combat reasons, 119 tanks were irretrievably lost, another 9 tanks were lost for technical or unexplained reasons, and 19 were sent for repair. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (losses of the 5th Guards Stk on July 6 exceeded even the losses of the 29th Tank Corps during the attack on July 12 near the Oktyabrsky temporary storage warehouse).

After the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, continuing to develop success in the northern direction, another detachment of the Das Reich tank regiment, using the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of army defense occupied by units 69A (Lieutenant General V. D. Kryuchenkon) , near the Teterevino farm, and for a short time wedged into the defense of the 285th joint venture of the 183rd rifle division, however, due to a clear lack of strength, having lost several tanks, he was forced to retreat. The exit of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front already on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.

The offensive of the “Dead Head” TD did not receive significant development during July 6 due to the stubborn resistance of units of the 375th rifle division, as well as the counterattack of the 2nd guards carried out in the afternoon on its sector. Tatsinsky tank corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 tanks), which took place simultaneously with the counterattack of the 2nd Guards. Stk, and demanded the involvement of all the reserves of this SS division and even some parts of the Das Reich TD. However, to inflict losses on the Tatsinsky Corps even approximately commensurate with the losses of the 5th Guards. The Germans did not succeed in the Stk, even despite the fact that during the counterattack the corps had to cross the Lipovy Donets River twice, and some of its units were surrounded for a short time. Losses of the 2nd Guards. TTK for July 6 amounted to: 17 tanks burned out and 11 lined, that is, the corps remained fully combat-ready.

Thus, during July 6, formations of 4 TA managed to break through the second line of defense of the Voronezh Front on their right flank, inflicted significant losses on the troops of 6 Guards. A (of the six rifle divisions by the morning of July 7, only three remained combat-ready, of the two tank corps transferred to it - one). As a result of the loss of control of units of the 51st Guards Rifle Division and the 5th Guards Division. Stk, at the junction of 1 TA and 5 Guards. Stk formed a section not occupied by Soviet troops, which in the following days, at the cost of incredible efforts, Katukov had to plug up 1 TA brigades, using his experience in defensive battles near Orel in 1941.

However, all the successes of the 2nd SS TC, which led to the breakthrough of the second defensive line, again could not be translated into a powerful breakthrough deep into the Soviet defense to destroy the strategic reserves of the Red Army, since the troops of the Kempf AG, having achieved some successes on July 6, nevertheless again failed complete the task of the day. AG "Kempf" still could not provide the right flank of the 4th TA, which was threatened by the 2nd Guards. TTK supported by the still combat-ready 375 sd. Also significant to the further course of events was the loss of the Germans in armored vehicles. So, for example, in the tank regiment of the TD "Great Germany" 48 mk, after the first two days of the offensive, 53% of the tanks were considered incapacitated (Soviet troops disabled 59 out of 112 vehicles, including 12 "Tigers" out of 14 available), and in 10 tank brigade to on the evening of July 6, only 40 combat Panthers (out of 192) were considered combat-ready. Therefore, on July 7, less ambitious tasks were set for the 4th TA corps than on July 6 - expanding the breakthrough corridor and securing the flanks of the army.

The commander of the 48th Panzer Corps, O. von Knobelsdorf, on the evening of July 6 summed up the results of the day's battle:

Starting from July 6, 1943, not only the German command had to retreat from previously developed plans (which did this on July 5), but also the Soviet one, which clearly underestimated the strength of the German armored attack. Due to the loss of combat capability and the failure of the material part of most divisions of the 6th Guards. And, from the evening of July 6, the overall operational control of the troops holding the second and third lines of the Soviet defense in the area of ​​​​the breakthrough of the German 4th TA was actually transferred from the commander of the 6th Guards. And I. M. Chistyakov to the commander of 1 TA M. E. Katukov. The main frame of the Soviet defense in the following days was created around the brigades and corps of the 1st Panzer Army.

Battle of Prokhorovka

On July 12, the largest (or one of the largest) in the history of the oncoming tank battle took place in the Prokhorovka area.

According to data from Soviet sources, from the German side, about 700 tanks and assault guns participated in the battle, according to V. Zamulin - the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 294 tanks (including 15 "Tigers") and self-propelled guns.

On the Soviet side, the 5th Panzer Army of P. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 tanks, participated in the battle. After a massive air strike was launched, the battle on both sides entered its active phase and continued until the end of the day.

Here is one of the episodes that clearly shows what happened on July 12: the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm and high. 252.2 resembled a sea surf - four tank brigades of the Red Army, three SAP batteries, two infantry regiment and one battalion of a motorized rifle brigade rolled in waves against the defense of the SS Grenadier Regiment, but, having met fierce resistance, retreated. This went on for almost five hours, until the guards drove the grenadiers out of the area, suffering enormous losses in the process.

From the memoirs of a participant in the battle, Untersturmführer Gurs, commander of a motorized rifle platoon of the 2nd grp:

During the battle, a lot of tank commanders (platoon and company) were out of action. High level command personnel losses in the 32nd brigade: 41 tank commanders (36% of total number), commander of a tank platoon (61%), company (100%) and battalion (50%). Very high losses were suffered by the command link and in motorized rifle regiment brigades, many company and platoon commanders were killed and seriously injured. His commander, Captain I. I. Rudenko, failed (evacuated from the battlefield to the hospital).

Grigory Penezhko, a participant in the battle, deputy chief of staff of the 31st brigade, later Hero of the Soviet Union, recalled the condition of a person in those terrible conditions:

By the end of July 12, the battle ended with unclear results, only to resume on the afternoon of July 13 and 14. After the battle, the German troops could not move forward in any significant way, despite the fact that the losses of the Soviet tank army, caused by the tactical mistakes of its command, were much greater. Having advanced 35 kilometers on July 5-12, Manstein's troops were forced, having trampled on the achieved lines for three days in vain attempts to break into the Soviet defenses, to begin the withdrawal of troops from the captured "bridgehead". During the battle there was a turning point. The Soviet troops, which went on the offensive on July 23, threw back the German armies in the south of the Kursk Bulge to their original positions.

Losses

According to Soviet data, about 400 German tanks, 300 vehicles, over 3,500 soldiers and officers remained on the battlefield in the battle of Prokhorovka. However, these numbers are being questioned. For example, according to the calculations of G. A. Oleinikov, more than 300 German tanks could not take part in the battle. According to the research of A. Tomzov, referring to the data of the German Federal Military Archive, during the battles of July 12-13, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division irrevocably lost 2 Pz.IV tanks, 2 Pz.IV and 2 Pz.III tanks were sent for long-term repairs , in the short term - 15 tanks Pz.IV and 1 Pz.III. The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS TC on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the Totenkopf Division.

At the same time, the Soviet 18th and 29th tank corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army lost up to 70% of their tanks.

According to the memoirs of Major General of the Wehrmacht F. W. von Mellenthin, in the attack on Prokhorovka and, accordingly, in the morning battle with the Soviet TA, only the Reich and Leibstandarte divisions, reinforced by a battalion of self-propelled guns, took part - up to 240 vehicles in total, including including four "tigers". It was not supposed to meet a serious enemy, according to the German command, TA Rotmistrova was drawn into the battle against the “Dead Head” division (in fact, one corps) and a counter attack of more than 800 (according to their estimates) tanks was a complete surprise.

However, there is reason to believe that the Soviet command “overslept” the enemy and the TA attack with attached corps was not at all an attempt to stop the Germans, but pursued the goal of going into the rear of the SS tank corps, for which its “Dead Head” division was taken.

The Germans were the first to notice the enemy and managed to reorganize for battle, the Soviet tankers had to do this already under fire.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The central front involved in the battle in the north of the arc, for July 5-11, 1943, suffered losses of 33,897 people, of which 15,336 were irretrievable, its enemy, the 9th Army of the Model, lost 20,720 people over the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which participated in the battle on the southern face of the arc, lost on July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including only the Voronezh Front - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed the losses of their front to be 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irretrievable. If, contrary to Soviet documents of the war period, the official numbers of the German command are considered correct, then taking into account German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses of the Soviet and German sides is 4.95: 1 here.

According to Soviet data, only in the Kursk defensive operation from July 5 to July 23, 1943, the Germans lost 70,000 killed, 3,095 tanks and self-propelled guns, 844 field guns, 1,392 aircraft and over 5,000 vehicles.

During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front used up 1079 wagons of ammunition, and Voronezh - 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front was the smaller massing of forces and means in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern face of the Kursk salient. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.

According to Ivan Bagramyan, the Sicilian operation did not affect the Battle of Kursk in any way, since the Germans were transferring forces from west to east, so "the defeat of the enemy in the Battle of Kursk facilitated the actions of the Anglo-American troops in Italy."

Oryol offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov)

On July 12, the Western (commanded by Colonel General Vasily Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commanded by Colonel General Markian Popov) fronts launched an offensive against the 2nd Panzer and 9th German armies in the area of ​​the city of Orel. By the end of the day on July 13, Soviet troops broke through the enemy defenses. On July 26, the Germans left the Orlovsky bridgehead and began to withdraw to the Hagen defensive line (east of Bryansk). On August 5, at 05-45, Soviet troops completely liberated Oryol. According to Soviet data, 90,000 Nazis were destroyed in the Oryol operation.

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev)

On the southern front, the counteroffensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5, at about 18-00, Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, the Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railroad on August 11, and captured Kharkov on August 23. The German counterattacks were not successful.

On August 5, the first salute in the entire war was given in Moscow - in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

The victory near Kursk marked the transition of the strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front was stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for an offensive on the Dnieper.

After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as Watch on the Rhine (1944) or the Balaton operation (1945), were also unsuccessful.

Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, later wrote:

According to Guderian,

Differences in loss estimates

The losses of the parties in the battle remain unclear. Thus, Soviet historians, including Academician of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR A. M. Samsonov, speak of more than 500 thousand killed, wounded and captured, 1500 tanks and over 3700 aircraft.

However, German archival data show that in July-August 1943, the Wehrmacht lost 537,533 people on the entire Eastern Front. These figures include those killed, wounded, sick, missing (the number of German prisoners in this operation was insignificant). In particular, based on 10-day reports of their own losses, the Germans lost:

Total total losses of enemy troops that took part in the attack on the Kursk salient for the entire period 01-31.7.43.: 83545 . Therefore, the Soviet figures for German losses of 500 thousand look somewhat exaggerated.

According to the German historian Rüdiger Overmans, in July and August 1943 the Germans lost 130,429 people killed. However, according to Soviet data, from July 5 to September 5, 1943, 420 thousand Nazis were exterminated (which is 3.2 times more than Overmans), and 38,600 were taken prisoner.

In addition, according to German documents, the Luftwaffe lost 1696 aircraft on the entire Eastern Front in July-August 1943.

On the other hand, true Soviet military reports about German losses even the Soviet commanders did not consider during the war years. So, the chief of staff of the Central Front, Lieutenant General M.S. Malinin wrote to the lower headquarters:

In works of art

• Liberation (movie epic)

• "Battle for Kursk" BattleofKursk, German Die Deutsche Wochenshau) - video chronicle (1943)
• "Tanks! Battle of Kursk" Tanks!The Battle of Kursk) — documentary, filmed by Cromwell Productions, 1999
• "War of the Generals. Kursk" (eng. GeneralsatWar) is a documentary by Keith Barker, 2009
• "Kursk Bulge" is a documentary film shot by V. Artemenko.
• Panzerkampf composition by Sabaton

A nation that forgets its past has no future. So once said the ancient Greek philosopher Plato. In the middle of the last century, "fifteen sister republics", united by "Great Russia", inflicted a crushing defeat on the plague of mankind - fascism. The fierce battle was marked by a number of victories of the Red Army, which can be called key. The topic of this article is one of the decisive battles of the Second World War - the Kursk Bulge, one of the fateful battles that marked the final mastery of the strategic initiative by our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. From that time on, the German occupiers began to be smashed at all frontiers. A purposeful movement of fronts to the West began. Since that time, the Nazis have forgotten what it means "forward to the East."

Historical parallels

The Kursk confrontation took place on 07/05/1943 - 08/23/1943 on the primordially Russian Land, over which the great noble prince Alexander Nevsky once held his shield. His prophetic warning to Western conquerors (who came to us with a sword) about imminent death from the onslaught of the Russian sword that met them once again gained strength. It is characteristic that the Kursk Bulge was somewhat similar to the battle given by Prince Alexander by the Teutonic Knights on 04/05/1242. Of course, the weapons of the armies, the scale and time of these two battles are incommensurable. But the scenario of both battles is somewhat similar: the Germans with their main forces tried to break through the Russian battle formation in the center, but were crushed by the offensive actions of the flanks.

If we pragmatically try to say what is unique about the Kursk Bulge, the summary will be as follows: unprecedented in history (before and after) operational-tactical density per 1 km of the front.

Battle disposition

The offensive of the Red Army after the Battle of Stalingrad from November 1942 to March 1943 was marked by the defeat of about 100 enemy divisions, driven back from North Caucasus, Don, Volga. But due to the losses suffered by our side, by the beginning of the spring of 1943, the front had stabilized. On the map of hostilities in the center of the front line with the Germans, in the direction of the Nazi army, a ledge stood out, to which the military gave the name Kursk Bulge. The spring of 1943 brought a lull to the front: no one attacked, both sides forcedly accumulated forces in order to again seize the strategic initiative.

Preparation of Nazi Germany

After the Stalingrad defeat, Hitler announced mobilization, as a result of which the Wehrmacht grew, more than covering the losses incurred. "Under arms" were 9.5 million people (including 2.3 million reservists). 75% of the most combat-ready active troops (5.3 million people) were on the Soviet-German front.

The Führer was eager to seize the strategic initiative in the war. The turning point, in his opinion, was to occur precisely on that sector of the front, where the Kursk Bulge was located. To implement the plan, the Wehrmacht headquarters developed the strategic operation "Citadel". The plan envisaged the application of attacks converging to Kursk (from the north - from the region of the city of Orel; from the south - from the region of the city of Belgorod). In this way, the troops of the Voronezh and Central fronts fell into the "cauldron".

Under this operation, 50 divisions were concentrated in this sector of the front, incl. 16 armored and motorized, totaling 0.9 million selected, fully equipped troops; 2.7 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft; 10 thousand mortars and guns.

In this grouping, the transition to new weapons was mainly carried out: the Panther and Tiger tanks, assault guns"Ferdinand".

In preparing the Soviet troops for battle, one should pay tribute to the military talent of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov. Together with the Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky, he reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin the assumption that the Kursk Bulge would become the main future battlefield, and also predicted the approximate strength of the advancing enemy grouping.

Along the front line, the Nazis were opposed by the Voronezh (commander - General Vatutin N.F.) and the Central Fronts (commander - General Rokossovsky K.K.) with a total number of 1.34 million people. They were armed with 19 thousand mortars and guns; 3.4 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft. (As you can see, the advantage was on their side). Secretly from the enemy, behind the listed fronts, the reserve Steppe Front (commander I.S. Konev) was located. It consisted of a tank, aviation and five combined arms armies, supplemented by separate corps.

The control and coordination of the actions of this group was carried out personally by G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

tactical battle plan

The idea of ​​Marshal Zhukov assumed that the battle on the Kursk Bulge would have two phases. The first is defensive, the second is offensive.

A bridgehead in depth (300 km deep) was equipped. The total length of its trenches was approximately equal to the distance "Moscow - Vladivostok". It had 8 powerful lines of defense. The purpose of such a defense was to weaken the enemy as much as possible, to deprive him of the initiative, making the task of the attackers as easy as possible. In the second, offensive phase of the battle, two offensive operations were planned. First: the operation "Kutuzov" with the aim of eliminating the fascist group and liberating the city of "Eagle". Second: "Commander Rumyantsev" for the destruction of the Belgorod-Kharkov group of invaders.

Thus, with the actual advantage of the Red Army, the battle on the Kursk Bulge took place from the Soviet side "on defense". For offensive operations, as tactics teach, two or three times the number of troops was required.

Shelling

It so happened that the time of the offensive of the fascist troops became known in advance. On the eve of the German sappers began to make passages in the minefields. Soviet front-line intelligence started a fight with them and took prisoners. From the "tongues" it became known the time of the offensive: 03-00 07/05/1943

The reaction was prompt and adequate: On July 5, 1943, Marshal Rokossovsky K.K. (Commander of the Central Front), with the approval of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. It was an innovation in combat tactics. Hundreds of Katyushas, ​​600 guns, 460 mortars were fired at the invaders. For the Nazis, this was a complete surprise, they suffered losses.

Only at 4-30, having regrouped, they were able to carry out their artillery preparation, and at 5-30 go on the offensive. The Battle of Kursk has begun.

The beginning of the battle

Of course, our generals could not predict everything. In particular, both the General Staff and the Headquarters expected the main blow from the Nazis in the southern direction, to the city of Orel (which was defended by the Central Front, the commander was General Vatutin N.F.). In reality, the battle on the Kursk Bulge from the side German troops focused on the Voronezh front, from the north. Two battalions of heavy tanks, eight tank divisions, a division of assault guns, and one motorized division moved against the troops of Nikolai Fedorovich. In the first phase of the battle of the first hot spot became the village of Cherkasskoe (actually wiped off the face of the earth), where two Soviet rifle divisions held back the advance of five enemy divisions for a day.

German offensive tactics

This Great War is famous for martial art. The Kursk Bulge fully demonstrated the confrontation between the two strategies. What did the German offensive look like? Heavy equipment was moving ahead along the attack front: 15-20 Tiger tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns. They were followed by from fifty to a hundred Panther medium tanks, accompanied by infantry. Driven back, they regrouped and repeated the attack. The attacks were like the ebb and flow of the sea, following each other.

Let's follow the advice of the famous military historian, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Professor Zakharov Matvey Vasilievich, we will not idealize our defense of the 1943 model, we will present it objectively.

We have to talk about the German tactics of tank combat. The Kursk Bulge (this should be admitted) demonstrated the art of Colonel-General Herman Goth, he "jewellery", so to speak about tanks, brought his 4th Army into battle. At the same time, our 40th Army with 237 tanks, the most equipped with artillery (35.4 units per 1 km), under the command of General Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, turned out to be much to the left, i.e. out of business. The opposing 6th Guards Army (commander I. M. Chistyakov) had a density of guns per 1 km - 24.4 with 135 tanks. Mainly on the 6th Army, far from the most powerful, came the blow of Army Group South, commanded by the most gifted strategist of the Wehrmacht, Erich von Manstein. (By the way, this man was one of the few who constantly argued on issues of strategy and tactics with Adolf Hitler, for which in 1944, in fact, he was dismissed).

Tank battle near Prokhorovka

In the current difficult situation, in order to eliminate the breakthrough, the Red Army brought into battle strategic reserves: the 5th Guards Tank Army (Commander Rotmistrov P.A.) and the 5th Guards Army (Commander Zhadov A.S.)

The possibility of a flank attack by the Soviet tank army in the area of ​​​​the village of Prokhorovka was previously considered by the German General Staff. Therefore, the divisions "Dead Head" and "Leibstandarte" the direction of the strike was changed to 90 0 - for a head-on collision with the army of General Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov.

Tanks on the Kursk Bulge: 700 combat vehicles went into battle from the German side, 850 from ours. An impressive and terrible picture. As eyewitnesses recall, the roar was such that blood flowed from the ears. They had to shoot point-blank, from which the towers turned off. Coming to the enemy from the rear, they tried to fire on the tanks, from which the tanks flared with torches. The tankers were, as it were, in prostration - while he was alive, he had to fight. It was impossible to retreat, to hide.

Of course, it was unreasonable to attack the enemy in the first phase of the operation (if during the defense we suffered losses one to five, what would they be like during the offensive?!). At the same time, real heroism was shown by Soviet soldiers on this battlefield. 100,000 people were awarded orders and medals, and 180 of them were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In our time, the day of its end - August 23 - is annually met by residents of the country as Russia.

We continue the theme of the Kursk Bulge ...

Attack of German tanks and self-propelled guns in the area of ​​the state farm "Komsomolets"

“Already on the second day of the offensive, the enemy intensified counterattacks against the front and flanks of the army’s shock wedge. The enemy began to bring operational reserves into battle, which he had in the northwestern part of the Kursk salient and in front of the southeastern sector of the Oryol salient. This was a sign that the enemy intended to hold the Kursk Bulge under all circumstances, and at the same time that, if Operation Citadel was successful, it would be possible to surround really large enemy forces. Despite these counterattacks, the shock wedge of the 9th Army was advancing, although in a strip only 10 km wide.

tank duel

However, on July 9, the offensive stopped on the enemy's line of defense on a hilly area in the Olkhovatka area, 18 km from the starting positions of the 9th Army. The army command assumed that after repelling enemy counterattacks, moving the main direction of its attack and bringing reserves into battle, it would resume the offensive again on July 12 in order to complete the breakthrough. But that did not happen. On July 11, the enemy went on the offensive with large forces from the east and northeast against the 2nd Panzer Army, which held the Oryol Bulge. The development of events in this sector forced the command of the "Center" group to suspend the offensive of the 9th Army in order to throw its large mobile forces into battle in the sector of the 2nd Panzer Army.

And on the front of the "South" group, the first breakthrough of the enemy defense also turned out to be difficult. The absence of infantry divisions to deliver the first strike, as well as the relative weakness of artillery in support of the offensive, made itself felt especially.

German tank Pz.Kpfw.IV in the field in the Oryol direction. 07.1943

The Kempf army group was unable to advance in the sector of its right-flank corps (11 ac of General Rauss) to the planned new line on the Korocha River, but only reached the heights west of the line of the Koren River. If the intended goal on this extreme right flank of the offensive operation was not achieved, then one could still be satisfied with the subsequent success of the corps. Thanks to his very energetic offensive, he pulled over troops from the enemy’s operational reserves, located east of Volchansk. In the following days, he achieved great success in the defense, inflicting significant losses on the enemy, including losses in tanks. Finally, the group could also be satisfied with the defense on the Koren River, since as a result of this the width of its own offensive front did not decrease.

SS Panzergrenadiers during Operation Citadel. July 1943

3rd TC was also supposed to fight heavy battles. The first attack through the Donets on both sides of Belgorod was a success, but it was carried out in very difficult conditions. Then the corps, apparently, stopped in front of the second defensive line of the enemy - about 18 km ahead of the Donets. In view of the losses suffered by the troops, the commander of the army group asked if the offensive should not be suspended here as well. Based on a conversation with the commander of the 3rd TC, General Breit and his division commanders, I nevertheless decided to continue the offensive. The command of the army group gave the corps another 198 infantry divisions, which stood as a reserve in the rear of the 1st tank army on the Donetsk front, despite the fact that a dangerous situation was created there too. On July 11, the corps finally managed to break through the last enemy line of defense. The way was clear, and we could take the fight on unprotected terrain with suitable mobile formations of enemy reserves located east of Kharkov.

The command of the group ordered that the right flank of the 3rd TC moved further towards Korocha, while the left flank interacted with the 4th Panzer Army and defeated the 69th enemy army, wedged between our two advancing armies.

An SS grenadier looks at a freshly knocked out Soviet T-34

The 4th Panzer Army broke through the enemy's first and second lines of defense in heavy fighting during the first two days. On July 7, the tank corps (48 TC of General von Knobelsdorf) operating on the left flank of the army in open areas managed to break through to the area about 11 km in front of Oboyan. In the following days, he had to repel strong enemy counterattacks launched from the northeast, north and west, and in these battles he defeated significant forces of the advancing enemy troops. In this sector and in the sector in front of the 2nd SS TC, formations from the operational reserve acted from the enemy, namely, three tank and one mechanized corps, thrown into battle as part of the 69th and 1st tank armies. Other mechanized corps were thrown up by the enemy from the area east of Kharkov.

near Kursk. Summer 1943

The right tank corps of the army (2nd SS TC Ober-Gruppenführer Gauser) also managed to enter the operational space. On July 11, he attacked Prokhorovka and then crossed Psel further west.

On July 12, the enemy threw into battle in the center {*3} and on the flanks of the offensive front of the group new units from their operational reserves.

On July 12 and 13, both armies repulsed all these attacks. On July 14, the SS corps, building on success, reached Prokhorovka, 48 TC approached the Psela valley west of Oboyan. In these battles, other significant forces from the operational reserves of the enemy were partially defeated, partially badly battered.

In general, the enemy threw into battle against a group of 10 new tank and mechanized corps. Basically, these were short-range reserves prepared by the enemy in front of our front, with the exception of groups located in front of the fronts on the Donets and Mius, where the enemy only seemed to be preparing an offensive.

By July 13, the enemy had already lost 24,000 prisoners, 1,800 tanks, 267 guns and 1,080 anti-tank guns on the Citadel front. .

Near Prokhorovka

The battle has reached its climax! It was soon to be decided whether it was victory or defeat. On July 12, the command of the group, however, became aware that the 9th Army was forced to suspend the offensive and that the enemy went on the offensive against the 2nd Panzer Army. But the command of our group firmly decided not to stop the battle prematurely, perhaps before the final victory. We still had 24 tk with 17 td and the SS Viking division, which we could throw into battle as our trump card.

Near Prokhorovka

Because of this corps, the command of the group fought Hitler from the very beginning of the offensive, or rather, from the beginning of its preparation. Let me remind you that we have always adhered to the point of view that if Operation Citadel is carried out at all, then everything must be done to achieve the success of this enterprise, even at great risk in the Donbas region. For these reasons, the command of the group left, as I already mentioned, on the Miussky and Donetsk fronts only two divisions (23 TD and 16 TD) as reserves, providing for the use of 24 TK - first as a group reserve - in the operation "Citadel". But for this we had to report to the OKH several times, until Hitler, who was afraid of any risk in the Donbass, agreed to place a corps behind the Citadel front line. The corps, however, was constantly on alert west of Kharkov, albeit as a reserve of the OKH, for which it was withdrawn from the direct subordination of the group.

Such was the situation when Field Marshal von Kluge and I were summoned to the Fuhrer's Headquarters on 13 July. It would have been more correct, of course, if Hitler himself had arrived in both groups, or - if he believed that the general situation did not allow him to leave Headquarters - he would have sent the Chief of the General Staff to us. But during the entire eastern campaign, it was rarely possible to persuade Hitler to go to the front. He did not allow his Chief of the General Staff to do this.

Near Prokhorovka

The July 13 meeting began with Hitler's announcement that the situation in Sicily, where the Western powers had landed on July 10, had become serious. The Italians did not fight at all. We will probably lose the island.

The next step of the enemy could be a landing in the Balkans or in southern Italy. New armies must be formed in Italy and the western Balkans. The Eastern Front must give up part of its forces, and therefore Operation Citadel cannot continue any longer. Consequently, exactly the situation was created, about the possible occurrence of which I warned in Munich on May 4, having in mind the postponement of Operation Citadel.

Prokhorovka

Field Marshal von Kluge reported that Model's army could not advance further and had already lost 20,000 people. . In addition, the group was forced to take away all mobile units from the 9th Army in order to eliminate the deep breakthroughs made by the enemy already in three places of the front of the 2nd Panzer Army. For this reason alone, the offensive of the 9th Army cannot continue and cannot be resumed later.

On the contrary, I stated that, speaking of Group South, the battle had entered a decisive stage. After successfully repulsing the attacks of the enemy, who threw last days almost all of their operational reserves into battle, victory is close at hand. Stopping the battle now would probably mean losing the victory! If the 9th Army will at least only pin down the enemy forces opposing it and, perhaps, then resume the offensive, then we will try to finally defeat the forces of our armies that are acting against us and are already badly battered parts of the enemy. Then the group—as we already reported to the OKH on July 12—would again advance northward, cross the Psel east of Oboyan with two tank corps, and then, turning westward, force the enemy forces in the western part of the Kursk Salient to accept battle with an inverted front. In order to ensure this operation effectively from the north and east, Kempf's group must now immediately receive 24 TC. Naturally, the forces of the group will only be enough to continue the offensive to the area south of Kursk. If, however, even after overcoming the crisis on the Orlov Bulge, the 9th Army cannot resume the offensive, we will at least try to break up the enemy forces now acting against us so that we can breathe easily. Otherwise, if the enemy is only half-smashed, a crisis will immediately arise not only in the Donbass, but also on the Citadel front.

SS soldiers are firing from 150-mm guns. Prokhorovka

Since Field Marshal von Kluge considered it impossible to resume the offensive of the 9th Army and, moreover, considered it necessary to return it to its original positions, Hitler decided, at the same time taking into account the need to withdraw forces to transfer them to the area mediterranean sea, stop the implementation of the operation "Citadel".

24th shopping mall, due to the threat of an enemy offensive on the Donetsk front, was subordinated to the group, but not for its free use.

Hitler nevertheless agreed that the South group should try to break the enemy units operating on its front and thereby create the possibility of withdrawing forces from the Citadel front.

"Dead Head"

After my return to the headquarters of the group and a conference with both army commanders on July 16, orders were issued according to which we were to strike the enemy even before the end of the battle in the Kursk Bulge region.

The 4th Panzer Army had the task of completely defeating the enemy units located south of Psel with two short blows to the north and west.

Army Group Kempf was supposed to cover these attacks, operating in an easterly direction, and at the same time, interacting with the 4th Army, destroy the enemy grouping surrounded at the junction between both armies.

Then the command of the group intended to withdraw both armies to their original positions, somewhat improved due to the nature of the terrain, in order to free up the necessary forces. Whether it would still be possible to defeat the enemy forces standing in front of the front with a tank strike in the western direction depended on the situation.

We asked 4 air fleet, which could not operate in the Citadel area these days due to bad weather conditions, to transfer its operations to the front area on the Mius and Donets so that it could disrupt the enemy’s offensive preparations noticed there.

Unfortunately, none of these plans came to fruition.

SS artillerymen support infantry with fire

On July 17, the OKH ordered the immediate removal of the entire 2nd SS TC and put it at its disposal, and on July 18 it demanded that 2 other tank divisions be transferred to the disposal of the Center group.

In connection with such a decrease in forces, the command of the group was forced to abandon the planned strikes, stop operations and return the armies to their original positions.

Calculation of the German 150-mm howitzer in battle

On July 17, the enemy, as expected, launched an offensive on the Donetsk and Miussky fronts. In sector 6 and 1 of the tank armies, the enemy carried out significant, albeit local, breakthroughs. In connection with this situation, the command of the group managed to keep, at least for use in the Donbass region, along with the 24th Tank Corps, which had already turned to the Donbass, also the SS Panzer Corps intended by Hitler for Italy.

If, therefore, the command of the group was forced to stop the battle even before it ended, perhaps before the very victory, at least on our front, then we still managed to inflict serious blows on the enemy. We succeeded, at least partially, in defeating, along with the enemy rifle divisions and tank brigades, which were on this front from the very beginning, also a large number of mobile formations of its operational reserves located in the area of ​​the Kursk Bulge and in front of the Kharkov Front. In general, 11 tank and mechanized corps and 30 rifle divisions stood against the armies of our group.

They lost about 34,000 prisoners. The number of those killed reached approximately 17,000. If we count in a light favorable to the enemy, then we must also add a double number of wounded, so that the total losses of the enemy amounted to about 85,000 people.

The losses of both German armies amounted to 20,720 people, including 3,330 killed. All divisions, with the exception of one panzer division, remained combat-ready, although some of them, namely, some infantry divisions suffered significant losses.

Rocket mortar

An officer of the division "Grossdeutschland" in a trench on the Kursk Bulge. Late July - early 08.1943.

SS soldiers at the wounded owl. pilot from U-2, shot down on the Kursk Bulge. Summer 1943

SS soldiers remove their wounded comrade from the armor of the PzKpfw III. Somewhere near Belgorod

SS Hauptsturmführer Vinzenz Kaiser. Kursk Bulge, next to the captured Churchill tank

The tankers have a smoke break. July 1943

Soldiers of the SS troops rest near the tank "Tiger" on the Kursk Bulge. 1943

At Ponyri

The crew of the Pz.Kpfw.IV from the 2nd SS Panzer Regiment on the Kursk Bulge. 07.08.43

New "position"

ADDITION:

Conclusion

The failure of Operation Citadel can be explained by many reasons, the main of which was the lack of a moment of surprise. Despite false regroupings and camouflage measures, the offensive did not catch the enemy unprepared.

But we would do wrong if we saw the reasons for the failure mainly in the tactical sphere.

Operation "Citadel" was terminated by the German High Command even before the outcome of the battle for the following reasons: firstly, due to the strategic influence of other theaters of military operations (Mediterranean Sea) or other fronts (2nd Panzer Army on the Oryol Bulge), and only in- the second - in connection with a tactical failure, namely, the stoppage of the offensive of the 9th army, which called into question at least the rapid achievement of the outcome of the battle.

Both factors could have been foreseen or avoided if the German High Command in the spring of 1943 had drawn a clear conclusion from the general situation that it was necessary to abandon all forces in order to achieve a draw in the east of the war, or at least to exhaust the strike force of the Soviets. . At the same time, it had to act in accordance with this decision, determining the required number of forces and timing.

A tanker examines a hole in the armor of a Tiger tank. Kursk Bulge, 08.1943.

In terms of the number of troops, we would need a small effort, mainly from infantry divisions, to ensure the success of the offensive of the 9th Army, as well as to facilitate the first blow of Army Group South and thereby hasten the success of the battle. It would also be sufficient to strengthen the front of the 2nd Panzer Army to such an extent that the enemy could not, at least, quickly achieve success here, threatening the rear of the 9th Army. The forces for this reinforcement could obviously be found in the so-called theaters of war of the OKW. This could be done, of course, only at the expense of a significant risk in Norway, France and the Balkans, as well as due to timely evacuation from North Africa, where it was already impossible to supply the army operating there. Hitler did not dare to take this risk and leave the territory of Africa. He might have done just that, had he been able to foresee the mistakes that the Western powers would make.

These errors consisted in their continuing to wage war on German civilians by terrorist air raids for another year before launching decisive invasion operations, and in advancing their "second front" after landing in southern Italy along the entire "Italian boot", instead of using the more advantageous operational possibilities that gave them complete supremacy at sea and in the air.

The trace of a shell hit on the frontal armor of the "Tiger"

If we talk about the timing, then the conduct of Operation Citadel as early as the end of May or at the latest in early June would exclude, in any case, its coincidence with the landing of the enemy on the continent. In addition, the enemy would not have fully restored combat capability. If the German command, moreover, had taken into account the conclusions I indicated regarding the use of troops, then even with the then inevitable refusal to increase the number of tanks, we would have achieved superiority in forces for Operation Citadel, quite sufficient to achieve victory.

On the armor of the "Tiger". Kursk Bulge

Thus, the failure of Operation Citadel is explained by the fact that the German command was trying to avoid the risk in terms of the number of troops and the time it had to take if they wanted to ensure the success of this last major German offensive in the east.

The troops, as well as their command, are not to blame for this failure. They again showed their best side. A comparison of the data on the losses of both sides shows how much our troops were superior to the enemy in terms of their qualities.

Needless to say, whether the retaliatory strike, originally proposed by the command of Army Group South, would have led to a better result. Since the Soviets did indeed delay their offensive until mid-July, the idea of ​​a preemptive strike was, in any case, not false. It can also be assumed that the Soviets would have launched their offensive anyway later than summer 1943, as their allies insisted on it » .

In the summer of 1943, one of the most grandiose and important battles of the Great Patriotic War took place - the Battle of Kursk. The Nazis' dream of revenge for Stalingrad, for the defeat near Moscow, resulted in one of the most key battles, on which the outcome of the war depended.

Total mobilization - selected generals, the best soldiers and officers, the latest weapons, guns, tanks, planes - such was the order of Adolf Hitler - to prepare for the most important battle and not just win, but do it spectacularly, indicatively, avenging all the previous lost battles . A matter of prestige.

(In addition, it was precisely as a result of the successful operation "Citadel" that Hitler assumed the opportunity to negotiate a truce from the Soviet side. German generals repeatedly stated this.)

It was for the Battle of Kursk that the Germans prepared a military gift for Soviet military designers - a powerful and invulnerable tank"Tiger", which was simply nothing to resist. Its impenetrable armor was too tough for Soviet-designed anti-tank guns, and new anti-tank guns had not yet been developed. During the meetings with Stalin, Marshal of Artillery Voronov said literally the following: "We do not have guns capable of successfully fighting these tanks"

The Battle of Kursk began on July 5, and ended on August 23, 1943. Every year on August 23, Russia celebrates the "Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the Victory of the Soviet Troops in the Battle of Kursk."

Moiarussia has collected the most interesting facts about this great confrontation:

Operation Citadel

In April 1943, Hitler approved military operation codenamed Zitadelle ("Citadel"). For its implementation, a total of 50 divisions were involved, including 16 tank and motorized; more than 900 thousand German soldiers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand 245 tanks and assault guns, 1 thousand 781 aircraft. The location of the operation is the Kursk salient.

German sources wrote: “The Kursk ledge seemed to be a particularly suitable place for delivering such a blow. As a result of the simultaneous offensive of German troops from the north and south, a powerful grouping of Russian troops will be cut off. They also hoped to defeat those operational reserves that the enemy would bring into battle. In addition, the elimination of this ledge would significantly shorten the front line ... True, even then someone claimed that the enemy was expecting the German offensive in this area and ... that therefore there was a danger of losing more of their forces than inflicting losses on the Russians ... However, it was impossible to convince Hitler , and he believed that the operation "Citadel" would succeed if it was undertaken soon"

The Germans were preparing for the Battle of Kursk for a long time. The start of it was postponed twice: either the guns were not ready, or new tanks were not delivered, or new aircraft did not have time to pass the tests. On top of that, Hitler's fears that Italy was about to withdraw from the war. Convinced that Mussolini was not going to give up, Hitler decided to stick to the original plan. Fanatic Hitler believed that if you strike at the place where the Red Army was strongest and crush the enemy in this particular battle, then

"The victory at Kursk," he declared, would strike the imagination of the whole world.

Hitler knew that it was here, on the Kursk ledge, that the Soviet troops numbered more than 1.9 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, about 2.9 thousand aircraft. He knew that he would lose this battle by the number of soldiers and equipment involved in the operation, but thanks to an ambitious strategically correct plan developed and the latest weapons, which, according to the assurances of the military specialists of the Soviet army, would be difficult to resist, this numerical superiority would be absolutely vulnerable and useless.

Meanwhile, the Soviet command did not waste time in vain. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command considered two options: attack first or wait? The first option was promoted by the commander of the Voronezh Front Nikolai Vatutin. The commander of the Central Front insisted on the second . Despite Stalin's initial support for Vatutin's plan, Rokossovsky's safer plan was approved - "wait, wear down and go on the counteroffensive." Rokossovsky was supported by the majority of the military command and, first of all, by Zhukov.

However, later Stalin doubted the correctness of the decision - the Germans were too passive, who, as mentioned above, had already postponed their offensive twice.

Having waited for the latest technology - the tanks "Tigers" and "Panthers", the Germans on the night of July 5, 1943 began their offensive.

That very night took place telephone conversation Rokossovsky with Stalin:

- Comrade Stalin! The Germans are on the offensive!

- What are you happy about? - asked the surprised leader.

“Now victory will be ours, Comrade Stalin!” - answered the commander.

Rokossovsky was not mistaken.

Agent Werther

On April 12, 1943, three days before Hitler approved Operation Citadel, an exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the plan for Operation Citadel” translated from German by the German High Command appeared on Stalin’s desk, signed by all services of the Wehrmacht. The only thing that was not on the document was the visas of Hitler himself. He put it in three days after the Soviet leader got acquainted with it. The Fuhrer, of course, did not know about this.

Nothing is known about the person who obtained this document for the Soviet command, except for his code name - "Werther". Various researchers put forward different versions of who "Werther" really was - some believe that Hitler's personal photographer was a Soviet agent.

Agent "Werther" (German: Werther) - the code name of the alleged Soviet agent in the leadership of the Wehrmacht or even in the top of the Third Reich during the Second World War, one of the prototypes of Stirlitz. For all the time he worked for Soviet intelligence, he did not allow a single misfire. It was considered the most reliable source in wartime.

Hitler's personal translator, Paul Karel, wrote about him in his book: “The heads of Soviet intelligence addressed the Swiss residency as if they were asking for information in some kind of information bureau. And they got everything they were interested in. Even a superficial analysis of radio interception data shows that in all phases of the war in Russia, the agents of the Soviet General Staff worked first-class. Part of the transmitted information could only be obtained from the highest German military circles.

- it seems that the Soviet agents in Geneva and Lausanne were dictated to the key directly from the Fuhrer's Headquarters.

Biggest tank battle

key point The Battle of Kursk is considered the largest in the history of the war tank battle near the village of Prokhorovka, which began on July 12.

Surprisingly, this large-scale clash of armored vehicles of the warring parties to this day causes fierce disputes among historians.

Classical Soviet historiography reported 800 tanks for the Red Army and 700 for the Wehrmacht. Modern historians tend to increase the number of Soviet tanks and reduce the number of German ones.

None of the parties managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of the Soviet troops and enter the operational space, and the Soviet troops failed to surround the enemy grouping.

Based on the memoirs of German generals (E. von Manstein, G. Guderian, F. von Mellenthin and others), about 700 Soviet tanks took part in the battle (some of them probably fell behind on the march - “on paper” the army had more than a thousand vehicles ), of which about 270 were shot down (meaning only the morning battle on July 12).

Also preserved is the version of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, the son of Joachim von Ribbentrop, the commander of a tank company, a direct participant in the battle:

According to the published memoirs of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, Operation Citadel pursued not strategic, but purely operational goals: to cut off the Kursk salient, destroy the Russian troops involved in it, and straighten the front. Hitler hoped to achieve military success during the front-line operation in order to try to enter into negotiations with the Russians on a truce.

In his memoirs, Ribbentrop gives a detailed description of the disposition of the battle, its course and result:

“In the early morning of July 12, the Germans had to take Prokhorovka, an important point on the way to Kursk. However, suddenly, units of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army intervened in the course of the battle.

The unexpected attack on the deep-seated spearhead of the German offensive - by units of the 5th Guards Tank Army, deployed overnight - was undertaken by the Russian command in a completely incomprehensible way. The Russians inevitably had to go into their own anti-tank ditch, which was clearly shown even on the maps we captured.

The Russians drove, if they ever got that far, into their own anti-tank ditch, where they naturally became easy prey for our defenses. Burning diesel fuel spread a thick black fumes - Russian tanks were burning everywhere, partly colliding with each other, Russian infantrymen jumping between them, desperately trying to orient themselves and easily turning into a victim of our grenadiers and artillerymen, who also stood on this battlefield.

The attacking Russian tanks - there should have been more than a hundred of them - were completely destroyed.

As a result of the counterattack, by noon on July 12, the Germans "with surprisingly small losses" occupied "almost completely" their previous positions.

The Germans were stunned by the extravagance of the Russian command, which threw hundreds of tanks with armored infantrymen to certain death. This circumstance forced the German command to think deeply about the power of the Russian offensive.

“Stalin allegedly wanted to court-martial the commander of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army, General Rotmistrov, who attacked us. In our opinion, he had good reasons for this. Russian descriptions of the battle - "the grave of German tank weapons" - have nothing to do with reality. We, however, felt unmistakably that the offensive had run out of steam. We saw no chance for ourselves to continue the offensive against the superior forces of the enemy, unless significant reinforcements were given. However, there were none."

It is no coincidence that after the victory at Kursk, Army Commander Rotmistrov was not even awarded, as he did not justify the high hopes placed on him by the Headquarters.

One way or another, the Nazi tanks were stopped on the field near Prokhorovka, which actually meant the disruption of the plans for the German summer offensive.

It is believed that Hitler himself ordered the termination of the Citadel plan on July 13, when he learned that the Western allies of the USSR had landed in Sicily on July 10, and the Italians had failed to defend Sicily during the fighting and it became necessary to send German reinforcements to Italy.

"Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev"

When they talk about the Battle of Kursk, they often mention Operation Citadel - the German offensive plan. Meanwhile, after the onslaught of the Wehrmacht was repulsed, the Soviet troops carried out their two offensive operations, which ended in brilliant successes. The names of these operations are much less known than Citadel.

On July 12, 1943, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. Three days later, the Central Front began its offensive. This operation was codenamed "Kutuzov". During it, a major defeat was inflicted on the German Army Group Center, whose retreat was stopped only on August 18 at the Hagen defensive line east of Bryansk. Thanks to Kutuzov, the cities of Karachev, Zhizdra, Mtsensk, Bolkhov were liberated, and on the morning of August 5, 1943, Soviet troops entered Oryol.

On August 3, 1943, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began an offensive operation. "Rumyantsev", named after another Russian commander. On August 5, Soviet troops captured Belgorod and then proceeded to liberate the territory of the Left-Bank Ukraine. During the 20-day operation, they defeated the opposing forces of the Nazis and went to Kharkov. On August 23, 1943, at 2 am, the troops of the Steppe Front launched a night assault on the city, which ended in success by dawn.

"Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev" became the reason for the first victorious salute during the war years - on August 5, 1943, it was held in Moscow to commemorate the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Maresyev's feat

The book of the writer Boris Polevoy "The Tale of a Real Man", which was based on the life of a real military pilot Alexei Maresyev, was known to almost everyone in the Soviet Union.

But not everyone knows that the glory of Maresyev, who returned to combat aviation after the amputation of both legs, was born precisely during the Battle of Kursk.

Senior Lieutenant Maresyev, who arrived at the 63rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, faced distrust. The pilots did not want to fly with him in pairs, fearing that the pilot with prostheses would not be able to cope in difficult times. The regiment commander did not let him into battle either.

Squadron commander Alexander Chislov took him to his pair. Maresyev coped with the task, and in the midst of the fighting on the Kursk Bulge he made sorties on an equal basis with everyone else.

On July 20, 1943, during a battle with superior enemy forces, Alexei Maresyev saved the lives of two of his comrades and personally destroyed two enemy Focke-Wulf 190 fighters.

This story immediately became known all over the front, after which the writer Boris Polevoy appeared in the regiment, immortalizing the name of the hero in his book. On August 24, 1943, Maresyev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Interestingly, during his participation in the battles, fighter pilot Alexei Maresyev personally shot down 11 enemy aircraft: four before being wounded and seven after returning to service after amputation of both legs.

Battle of Kursk - losses of the parties

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including seven tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops surpassed the German ones - they amounted to 863 thousand people, including 254 thousand irretrievable. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about six thousand tanks.

After the Battle of Kursk, the balance of forces on the front changed dramatically in favor of the Red Army, which provided it with favorable conditions for launching a general strategic offensive.

In memory of the heroic victory of Soviet soldiers in this battle and in memory of the dead, the Day of Military Glory was established in Russia, and in Kursk there is the Kursk Bulge Memorial Complex, dedicated to one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War.

Hitler's revenge did not take place. The last attempt to sit down at the negotiating table was destroyed.

August 23, 1943 - is rightfully considered one of the most significant days in the Great Patriotic War. After the defeat in this battle, the German army began one of the longest and longest retreat routes on all fronts. The outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion.

As a result of the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the greatness and stamina of the Soviet soldier was demonstrated to the whole world. Our allies have no doubts and hesitations about the right choice of side in this war. And the thought that let the Russians and the Germans destroy each other, and we look at it from the side faded into the background. The foresight and foresight of our allies prompted them to intensify their support for the Soviet Union. Otherwise, the winner will be only one state, which at the end of the war will get vast territories. However, that's another story...

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70 years ago the Great Battle of Kursk began. The Battle of Kursk is one of the most important battles of the Second World War in terms of its scope, forces and means involved, tension, results and military-strategic consequences. The Great Battle of Kursk lasted 50 incredibly difficult days and nights (July 5 - August 23, 1943). In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide this battle into two stages and three operations: the defensive stage - the Kursk defensive operation (July 5 - 12); offensive - Orel (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3 - 23) offensive operations. The Germans called the offensive part of their operation "Citadel". In this great battle from the USSR and Germany, about 2.2 million people participated, about 7.7 thousand tanks, self-propelled guns and assault guns, over 29 thousand guns and mortars (with a reserve of more than 35 thousand), more than 4 thousand combat aircraft .

During the winter 1942-1943. offensive of the Red Army and the forced withdrawal of Soviet troops during the Kharkov defensive operation of 1943, the so-called. Kursk ledge. The "Kursk Bulge", a ledge facing west, was up to 200 km wide and up to 150 km deep. During April - June 1943, there was an operational pause on the Eastern Front, during which the Soviet and German armed forces were intensely preparing for the summer campaign, which was to be decisive in this war.

The forces of the Central and Voronezh fronts were located on the Kursk ledge, threatening the flanks and rear of the German army groups Center and South. In turn, the German command, having created powerful strike groups on the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads, could deliver strong flank attacks on the Soviet troops defending in the Kursk region, surround them and destroy them.

Plans and forces of the parties

Germany. In the spring of 1943, when the enemy forces were exhausted and the mudslide set in, negating the possibility of a quick offensive, it was time to prepare plans for the summer campaign. Despite the defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of the Caucasus, the Wehrmacht retained its offensive power and was a very dangerous adversary who craved revenge. Moreover, the German command carried out a number of mobilization measures and by the beginning of the summer campaign of 1943, compared with the number of troops at the beginning of the summer campaign of 1942, the number of Wehrmacht had increased. On the Eastern Front, excluding the SS troops and Air force, there were 3.1 million people, almost the same as there were in the Wehrmacht at the beginning of the campaign to the East on June 22, 1941 - 3.2 million people. In terms of the number of formations, the Wehrmacht of the 1943 model surpassed the German armed forces of the 1941 period.

For the German command, unlike the Soviet, a wait-and-see strategy, pure defense, was unacceptable. Moscow could afford to wait with serious offensive operations, time played on it - the power of the armed forces grew, enterprises evacuated to the east began to work at full capacity (they even increased production compared to the pre-war level), partisan struggle in the German rear expanded. The probability of the landing of the Allied armies in Western Europe, the opening of a second front, grew. In addition, it was not possible to create a solid defense on the Eastern Front, which stretched from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. In particular, the Army Group "South" was forced to defend the front with 32 divisions up to 760 km long - from Taganrog on the Black Sea to the Sumy region. The balance of forces allowed the Soviet troops, if the enemy was limited only to defense, to carry out offensive operations in various sectors of the Eastern Front, concentrating the maximum number of forces and means, pulling up reserves. The German army could not stick only to defense, it was the path to defeat. Only a maneuver war, with breakthroughs in the front line, with access to the flanks and rear Soviet armies, allowed us to hope for a strategic turning point in the war. A major success on the Eastern Front made it possible to hope, if not for victory in the war, then for a satisfactory political decision.

On March 13, 1943, Adolf Hitler signed Operational Order No. 5, where he set the task of preempting the offensive of the Soviet army and "imposing his will on at least one of the sectors of the front." In other sectors of the front, the task of the troops is reduced to bleeding the advancing enemy forces on defensive lines created in advance. Thus, the strategy of the Wehrmacht was chosen as early as March 1943. It remained to determine where to strike. The Kursk ledge arose at the same time, in March 1943, during the German counteroffensive. Therefore, Hitler, in Order No. 5, demanded converging strikes on the Kursk salient, wanting to destroy the Soviet troops stationed on it. However, in March 1943, the German troops in this direction were significantly weakened by previous battles, and the plan to attack the Kursk salient had to be postponed indefinitely.

On 15 April, Hitler signed Operational Order No. 6. Operation Citadel was scheduled to begin as soon as weather conditions allowed. The Army Group "South" was supposed to strike from the Tomarovka-Belgorod line, break through the Soviet front at the Prilepa-Oboyan line, connect at Kursk and east of it with the formations of the Amii "Center". Army Group "Center" struck from the line of Trosna - an area south of Maloarkhangelsk. Its troops were to break through the front in the Fatezh-Veretenovo section, concentrating the main efforts on the eastern flank. And connect with the Army Group "South" in the Kursk region and east of it. The troops between the shock groups, on the western front of the Kursk ledge - the forces of the 2nd Army, were to organize local attacks and, when the Soviet troops retreated, immediately go on the offensive with all their might. The plan was pretty simple and obvious. They wanted to cut off the Kursk ledge with converging blows from the north and south - on the 4th day it was supposed to surround and then destroy the Soviet troops located on it (Voronezh and Central Fronts). This made it possible to create a vast gap in the Soviet front and seize the strategic initiative. In the Orel region, the 9th Army represented the main strike force, in the Belgorod region - the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force. Operation Citadel was to be followed by Operation Panther - a strike to the rear of the Southwestern Front, an offensive in a northeast direction in order to reach the deep rear of the central group of the Red Army and create a threat to Moscow.

The start of the operation was scheduled for mid-May 1943. The commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, believed that it was necessary to strike as early as possible, preempting the Soviet offensive in the Donbass. He was supported by the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Gunther Hans von Kluge. But not all German commanders shared his point of view. Walter Model, commander of the 9th Army, had great authority in the eyes of the Fuhrer and on May 3 prepared a report in which he expressed doubts about the possibility of the successful implementation of Operation Citadel if it began in mid-May. The basis of his skepticism was intelligence data on the defensive potential of the opposing 9th Army of the Central Front. The Soviet command prepared a deeply echeloned and well-organized line of defense, strengthened the artillery and anti-tank potential. And the mechanized units were taken away from the forward positions, removing the enemy from a possible strike.

On May 3-4, a discussion of this report was held in Munich. According to the Model, the Central Front under the command of Konstantin Rokossovsky had an almost double superiority in the number of combat units and equipment over the 9th German Army. 15 infantry divisions of the Model had the number of infantry half as much as regular, in some divisions 3 out of 9 regular infantry battalions were disbanded. Artillery batteries instead of four they had three guns, and in some batteries 1-2 guns. By May 16, the divisions of the 9th Army had an average "combat strength" (the number of soldiers directly involved in the battle) of 3.3 thousand people. For comparison, 8 infantry divisions of the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf group had a “combat strength” of 6.3 thousand people. And the infantry was needed to break into the defensive lines of the Soviet troops. In addition, the 9th Army experienced serious problems with transport. Army Group "South", after the Stalingrad disaster, received formations, which in 1942 were reorganized in the rear. Model, on the other hand, had mainly infantry divisions that had been at the front since 1941 and were in urgent need of replenishment.

Model's report made a strong impression on A. Hitler. Other commanders were unable to put forward serious arguments against the calculations of the commander of the 9th Army. As a result, we decided to postpone the start of the operation for a month. This decision of Hitler would then become one of the most criticized by the German generals, who pushed their mistakes onto the Supreme Commander.

I must say that although this delay led to an increase in the striking power of the German troops, the Soviet armies were also seriously strengthened. The balance of power between Model's army and Rokossovsky's front from May to early July did not improve, and even worsened for the Germans. In April 1943 the Central Front had 538,400 men, 920 tanks, 7,800 guns, and 660 aircraft; in early July - 711.5 thousand people, 1785 tanks and self-propelled guns, 12.4 thousand guns and 1050 aircraft. The 9th Model Army in mid-May had 324,900 men, about 800 tanks and assault guns, and 3,000 guns. In early July, the 9th Army reached 335 thousand people, 1014 tanks, 3368 guns. In addition, it was in May that the Voronezh Front began to receive anti-tank mines, which would become a real scourge of German armored vehicles in the Battle of Kursk. The Soviet economy worked more efficiently, replenishing troops with equipment faster than German industry.

The plan for the advance of the troops of the 9th Army from the Oryol direction was somewhat different from the typical reception for the German school - Model was going to break into the enemy defenses with infantry, and then bring tank units into battle. The infantry was to attack with the support of heavy tanks, assault guns, aircraft and artillery. Of the 8 mobile formations that the 9th Army had, only one was immediately introduced into battle - the 20th Panzer Division. In the zone of the main attack of the 9th Army, the 47th Panzer Corps under the command of Joachim Lemelsen was to advance. The zone of his offensive lay between the villages of Gnilets and Butyrki. Here, according to German intelligence, there was a junction of two Soviet armies - the 13th and 70th. In the first echelon of the 47th Corps, the 6th Infantry and 20th Panzer Divisions advanced, they struck on the first day. The second echelon housed the more powerful 2nd and 9th Panzer Divisions. They should have been introduced already into the breakthrough, after breaking the Soviet defense line. In the direction of Ponyri, on the left flank of the 47th Corps, the 41st Tank Corps advanced under the command of General Josef Harpe. The 86th and 292nd Infantry Divisions were in the first echelon, and the 18th Panzer Division was in reserve. To the left of the 41st Tank Corps was the 23rd Army Corps under General Frisner. He was supposed to inflict a diversionary strike with the forces of the 78th assault and 216th infantry divisions on Maloarkhangelsk. On the right flank of the 47th Corps, the 46th Panzer Corps of General Hans Zorn advanced. In his first strike echelon there were only infantry formations - the 7th, 31st, 102nd and 258th infantry divisions. Three more mobile formations - the 10th motorized (tank-grenadier), 4th and 12th tank divisions were in the reserve of the army group. Their von Kluge was supposed to hand over to Model after the breakthrough of the shock forces into the operational space behind the defensive lines of the Central Front. There is an opinion that Model initially did not want to attack, but was waiting for the Red Army to attack, even prepared additional defensive lines in the rear. And he tried to keep the most valuable mobile formations in the second echelon, so that, if necessary, they could be transferred to a sector that would collapse under the blows of Soviet troops.

The command of the Army Group "South" was not limited to the attack on Kursk by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army, Colonel-General Hermann Hoth (52nd Army Corps, 48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps). In the northeast direction, the Kempf task force under the command of Werner Kempf was to advance. The group was facing east along the Seversky Donets River. Manstein believed that as soon as the battle began, the Soviet command would throw into battle strong reserves located east and northeast of Kharkov. Therefore, the strike of the 4th Panzer Army on Kursk had to be secured from the east from suitable Soviet tank and mechanized formations. Army Group "Kempf" was supposed to be one of the 42nd Army Corps (39th, 161st and 282nd Infantry Divisions) of General Franz Mattenclot to hold the line of defense on the Donets. Its 3rd Panzer Corps under the command of General of Panzer Troops Herman Bright (6th, 7th, 19th Panzer and 168th Infantry Divisions) and the 11th Army Corps of General of Panzer Troops Erhard Raus, before the start of the operation and Until July 20, it was called the Reserve of the Raus High Command for Special Purposes (106th, 198th and 320th Infantry Divisions), they were supposed to actively ensure the offensive of the 4th Panzer Army. Kempf's group was planned to subordinate another tank corps, which was in the reserve of the army group, after it had captured a sufficient area and secured freedom of action in the northeast direction.

The command of Army Group South was not limited to this innovation. According to the memoirs of the chief of staff of the 4th Panzer Army, General Friedrich Fangor, at a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the offensive plan was adjusted at the suggestion of General Hoth. According to intelligence data, a change in the location of Soviet tank and mechanized troops was observed. The Soviet tank reserve could quickly join the battle, passing into the corridor between the Donets and Psyol rivers in the Prokhorovka area. There was a danger of a strong blow to the right flank of the 4th Panzer Army. This situation could lead to disaster. Goth believed that it was necessary to bring into the oncoming battle with the Russian tank forces the most powerful formation that he had. Therefore, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of Paul Hausser as part of the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division "Leibstantart Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division "Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division "Totenkopf" (" Dead Head") should not now move directly north along the Psyol River, he should have turned northeast to the Prokhorovka area to destroy Soviet tank reserves.

The experience of the war with the Red Army convinced the German command that there would definitely be strong counterattacks. Therefore, the command of the Army Group "South" tried to minimize their consequences. Both decisions - the strike of the Kempf group and the turn of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps to Prokhorovka had a significant impact on the development of the Battle of Kursk and the actions of the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army. At the same time, the division of the forces of Army Group South into the main and auxiliary attacks in the northeast direction deprived Manstein of serious reserves. Theoretically, Manstein had a reserve - the 24th tank corps of Walter Nering. But he was a reserve of the army group in case of an offensive by Soviet troops in the Donbass and was located quite far from the impact site on the southern face of the Kursk salient. As a result, it was used for the defense of Donbass. He did not have serious reserves that Manstein could immediately bring into battle.

The best generals and the most combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht were involved in the offensive operation, a total of 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized) and a significant number of individual formations. In particular, shortly before the operation, the 39th Tank Regiment (200 Panthers) and the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion (45 Tigers) arrived in Army Group South. From the air, the strike groups supported the 4th Air Fleet of Field Marshal Wolfram von Richthofen and the 6th Air Fleet under the command of Colonel General Robert Ritter von Greim. In total, over 900 thousand soldiers and officers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, more than 2700 tanks and assault guns (including 148 new heavy tanks T-VI "Tiger", 200 T-V tanks"Panther" and 90 assault guns "Ferdinand"), about 2050 aircraft.

The German command pinned great hopes on the use of new models of military equipment. Waiting for the arrival of new equipment was one of the reasons why the offensive was postponed to a later time. It was assumed that heavily armored tanks (Soviet researchers "Panther", which the Germans considered a medium tank, were classified as heavy) and self-propelled guns would become a ram for Soviet defense. Entered service with the Wehrmacht medium and heavy tanks T-IV, T-V, T-VI, Ferdinand assault guns combined good armor protection and strong artillery armament. Their 75-mm and 88-mm guns with a direct range of 1.5-2.5 km were about 2.5 times the range of the 76.2-mm gun of the main Soviet medium tank T-34. At the same time, due to the high initial speed of the shells, German designers achieved high armor penetration. To fight Soviet tanks armored self-propelled howitzers, which were part of the artillery regiments of tank divisions, were also used - 105-mm Vespe (German Wespe - “wasp”) and 150-mm Hummel (German “bumblebee”). German combat vehicles had excellent Zeiss optics. The German Air Force received new Focke-Wulf-190 fighters and Henkel-129 attack aircraft. They were supposed to gain air supremacy and carry out assault support for the advancing troops.

The German command tried to keep the operation secret, to achieve the surprise of the strike. To do this, they tried to misinform the Soviet leadership. They carried out intensive preparations for Operation Panther in the zone of Army Group South. They carried out demonstrative reconnaissance, deployed tanks, concentrated crossing facilities, conducted active radio communications, activated their agents, spread rumors, etc. In the offensive zone of Army Group Center, on the contrary, they tried to disguise all actions as much as possible, hide from the enemy. The measures were carried out with German thoroughness and methodicalness, but they did not give the desired results. The Soviet command was well informed about the upcoming enemy offensive.

In order to protect their rear from the strike of partisan formations, in May-June 1943, the German command organized and carried out several major punitive operations against Soviet partisans. In particular, 10 divisions were used against approximately 20 thousand Bryansk partisans, and 40 thousand were sent against the partisans in the Zhytomyr region. grouping. However, it was not possible to fully realize the plan, the partisans retained the ability to inflict strong blows on the invaders.

To be continued…