Order of battle rg spn in search. Reconnaissance actions on patrol (reconnaissance of the Ministry of Internal Affairs)

5.

INTELLIGENCE ACTIONS IN PATROL (INTELLIGENCE OF THE MVD MVD)

Watch - one of the most important types of reconnaissance actions sent from reconnaissance bodies and subunits of internal troops to conduct reconnaissance of illegal armed formations (enemy), survey the area and direct protection during the performance of service and combat missions and on the march.

The Watch allows you to:

reconnaissance different ways;

conduct a survey of the area, moving in marching order;

be in constant readiness to immediately repel an attack by an illegal armed formation (enemy);

identify fire weapons, ambushes and barriers of illegal armed formations (opponents

deploy in battle formation with the allocation of a fire group

support.

Patrols operate day or night, depending on the situation and the task.

Watch tasks.

The patrol is appointed to solve a wide complex combat missions, each of which involves the conduct of reconnaissance actions to one degree or another, such as:

• obtaining information about the terrain, vegetation, hydrography, illegal armed formations (enemy), local population, etc.;

  search and destruction of illegal armed formations (enemy). These actions include advancing to positions for ambush, clearing settlements, following in the footsteps of an illegal armed formation (enemy), raids on its temporary bases, etc.;

  identification of ways and implementation of penetration or exit from the area of ​​warfare. Regardless of whether the sub-

  separation to the area of ​​operations or to the area of ​​evacuation after the completion of the task, it always sends out reconnaissance patrols - a guarantee of the safety of movement in the area of ​​​​combat operations;

  control of the neutral zone - a piece of terrain between the positions of friendly troops and enemy troops. This gives your troops an advantage in time and space to maneuver, and also makes it easier to get information about the enemy.

  identifying the mood of the local population (refugees, migrants, internally displaced persons);

  search for possible routes of penetration of criminals (enemy), traces of their presence, as well as obtaining information from the local population about the possible penetration of criminals (enemy) or their presence in the area.

Watch Success is achieved by a high level of training, coordination of actions, initiative and decisive actions of each serviceman.

Types of patrols:

Patrolmen on foot – perform reconnaissance tasks and avoid meeting with illegal armed formations (enemy). Stealth action is the most important condition their successful actions.

Having minimum number(2, maximum 3-4 people, one of which is appointed senior), foot patrols perform the following main tasks:

direct inspection of the area and individual local objects




collection of topographic information;

collection of information about the positions of illegal armed formations (enemy) and minefields;

study of routes and features of enemy actions;

conducting reconnaissance by observation and eavesdropping on the paths of movement

zheniya illegal armed formations (enemy) and near its bases;

• reconnaissance of routes for their troops.

  Reconnaissance patrol -conducts reconnaissance in the specified direction or object. He is appointed from the reconnaissance platoon (special purpose platoon), includes up to 10-12 people

  Its main tasks are: a. Collection of topographic information.

  b. Gathering information about enemy positions and minefields. in. Studying the routes and features of enemy actions.

  d. Conducting reconnaissance by observation and eavesdropping on the enemy's movement routes and near his bases.

  e. Reconnaissance of routes for their troops.

  e. Conducting limited raiding activities such as acts of sabotage or actions on the roads.

  Raid (reconnaissance and assault) patrol in most cases, it is assigned as part of a regular RV (VSN) with reinforcement forces. Performs special tasks and has the strength sufficient for combat.

  The main tasks are:

  a. Destruction of separate groups and commanders of the enemy.

  b. Conducting harassing actions by attacking the enemy.

  in. Misleading the enemy about the true intentions of the command.

  d. Conducting raids on enemy positions and targets. e. Capturing prisoners.

  e. Organization of ambushes on the routes of the probable movement of the enemy. and. Influencing the local population.

  h. Organization of bases for long-term operations behind enemy lines. and. Search and destruction of enemy bases.

  The choice of order of battle of the WG SpN depends on:

  • combat mission of the group;

    terrain and conditions for observing it;

    the intended direction of the enemy's attack;

    on the required speed of movement and the required controllability of the group;

    on who (our troops or the enemy) controls the airspace;

  
  

  The main options for battle formation include:

  
  

  "One by one in a column."

  it is used in closed areas, for example, in the jungle, for movement along the edges of the forest, in a minefield, when seeping through enemy battle formations. It is easy for the commander to manage the group, but the execution of the command takes time. RG Special Forces is highly vulnerable from the flanks, frontal fire is difficult

  
  

  

  "In a column of two"

  Effective for driving at night.

  WG SpN is relatively well managed. Frontal fire is somewhat difficult.

  
  

  

  
  

  
  

  Often used when driving on rough open and semi-closed terrain. When driving at night. The group is easy to manage, it is easy to conduct all-round observation and fire in all directions.

  
  

  

  "In line".

  Used in attack. It is convenient for frontal fire. However, the group is difficult to manage. The machine-gun crew must be placed on an open flank or on a flank that provides the most effective fire in a collision with the enemy.

  
  

  - ,_:_ -

  
  

  The basis of any battle formation is a pair (troika) of scouts,which, alternately moving from shelter to shelter (5-7 meters each), cover each other. Moreover, a moving scout, as a rule, looks at his feet, trying to examine the extension of the mine. A reconnaissance officer, prepared for firing from behind cover, observes through the sight of the weapon in readiness to immediately open fire. When observing, he chooses a shelter in 5-7 m for which he will hide during the next transition. It is necessary to practice the manufacture both from the left and from the right hand. The vast majority of soldiers are made for firing from the right hand, therefore, by firing at the left side of the cover, we will hit it faster.

  
  

  Patrol methods.

  There are 4 main ways to patrol:

  Strict adherence to the selected route is not necessary and, when new information is received, the group's route may change. The secret to success lies in using the terrain to your advantage; avoiding excessive fatigue of the personnel, it is necessary to strive to inspect the entire area.

  
  

  The main load during the inspection of the area falls on the sentinels. Paired patrols are usually prescribed, but groups can also be assigned.

  3-4 people. Sentinels move during the day at a distance of 8-10 steps, at night - 3-4 steps, and senior goes a little behind. Movement is carried out from one NP to another. Such TS (stops) are selected with good conditions vision and camouflage towards the enemy. When observing, the sentinels are located lying near a hillock, a tree, behind buildings, in a bush, etc. Observation should be carried out from the side, from the shady side, without raising their heads. When observing, pay special attention to the reconnaissance signs of targets (the enemy), which were given in lecture No. 1. The core begins to move only after receiving a signal from the patrol about the absence of the enemy.

  
  

  All signals are given secretly from the enemy, and it is necessary to make sure that the signal is understood. Hand or automatic signals are visible at 300-1000 m during the day, at 1000-1500 m at night, signal flags at 800-1500 m during the day, rockets up to 5000 m during the day, up to 15000 m at night. /s on signals.

  
  

  Heights are inspected on opposite slopes by two pairs of sentinels. You should not linger on the heights and on the ridges.

  Hollows, ravines, groves and thickets of bushes, individual buildings and ruins are especially carefully inspected, where most often the enemy arranges shelters and ambushes. Sometimes suspicious places are preliminarily shelled, and inspected only in the absence of return fire.

  Gorges and ravines are preliminarily inspected by several pairs of sentinels, and the core does not start moving until the end of the inspection (only after the sentinels occupy convenient positions at the exit, the core moves along the slope). places suitable for defense. The sentinels can also detect the enemy by listening.

  
  

  Reconnaissance of forest areas is carried out by a chain of sentinels (double chain: submachine gunners go in the first line, and machine gunners and snipers go in the second

  ry covering the first line), and pre-examine the edge visually from the greatest possible distances. Trees are examined from the bottom up in order to identify snipers.

  The sentinels operate in full view of each other. When moving in the forest, it is necessary to hide behind trees and shrubs, and clearings, clearings are overcome by throwing or crawling under the cover of the main forces of the taxiway (small bypass). From time to time you need to stop and listen. It is possible to view the area ahead from the trees. When encountering obstacles, mines, buildings, they are inspected with deployment in battle formation or without deployment.

  
  

  The obstacle is examined from the maximum range to the "optics", and then visually from close range; direct inspection is carried out only in the absence of suspicious signs and under the cover of the main forces of the RD.

  
  

  Departure to the place of the base and organization of the base.

  
  

  If the reconnaissance group needs to stop for a period of up to 24 hours, a base is organized. She does not stop in one place for more than a day and does not return to this place again. If the combat mission requires long stay behind enemy lines, then the group commander selects in advance several places for such bases. They are planned to be occupied in cases where it is necessary to stop all daytime activity in order to avoid detection; shelter personnel for the period of reconnaissance; rest after a long march; develop an additional plan of operation and prepare the necessary orders; assemble after penetrating enemy territory in small groups.

  At the same time, passive and active safety measures should be observed. Passive measures provide for the fulfillment of a number of requirements: choose places remote from human habitation, avoid any buildings (forester's house, barn), as well as known and suspected enemy positions; not be located near topographic landmarks, on the banks of rivers, lakes, streams, along roads and paths, in open forests and glades; choose hard-to-reach terrain with ravines, steep cliffs that make it difficult to move on foot, having no tactical value, with developed undergrowth, bushes and trees with a low crown.

  Active security measures require: setting up combat guards or an observation post in the path of a probable enemy approach (the size of the base and the number of guard posts are determined by the size of the group, terrain conditions, the number and quality of available

  shelters); deploy electronic system warnings about the approach of the enemy; develop a plan for the defense and evacuation of the base; to organize the service at the base so that a third of the personnel was ready to open fire at any time of the day, and to reduce movement around the base to a minimum.

  There are several ways to occupy the base, the use of which depends on combat readiness, terrain, and vegetation.

  The first way is "Loop".

The reconnaissance group stops for listening at 100 - 400 m from the proposed base site for 5 - 10 minutes.

Then he passes it forward for 200 - 800 m, makes four turns 90 degrees to the right (left) every 100 - 400 m, writing out a large loop around the proposed base site. Such a maneuver allows the guard to detect in time the enemy pursuing the group in its tracks. After the fourth turn, the place of the future base is directly in front of them at 200 - 300 m.

Here the reconnaissance group takes up all-round defense.

The commander gives an order in case of a sudden meeting with the enemy, in which he informs where, with whom and for how long he leaves, who his deputy is, and also sets out the procedure for contacting the enemy, indicates the places of the main and reserve collection points. This order is given every time someone separates from the group.

The commander with his escorts goes to the place of the proposed base, combs it in a zigzag, sets up guards at positions corresponding to 12 and 6 o'clock, and gives an order in case of meeting with the enemy.

After that, he, along with the "navigator" returns to the reconnaissance group. Here the commander sets up an observation post, gives the appropriate order, and together with the group enters the base, where he organizes all-round defense.

1. The second way is "Knee".

The commander gives the order for action in an emergency.

Then he moves forward, makes one 90-degree turn and exits to the base. And then it works as in the first case.

1. The third way. It is used by small groups that occupy the base at once with the whole composition.

The reconnaissance group stops for listening at 100 - 400 m from the proposed base for 5 - 10 minutes.

Then he passes it forward for 200 - 800 m, makes four turns 90 degrees to the right (left) every 100 - 400 m, writing out a large loop around the proposed base site.

One or two MON mines are laid in the area leading directly to it. The personnel are seated with their backs to each other in two lines. The soldiers sitting on the edges act as guards.




Base organization.




First of all, defense is organized, firing sectors are assigned, the positions of machine guns and group weapons are specified, for which fire cards are compiled.

Then the group proceeds to clean the weapons, and at the same time it is allowed to dismantle no more than a quarter of the existing one. Machine guns are cleaned after individual weapons are cleaned.

The water supply is organized in the following way: the personnel collects flasks in empty backpacks. The commander establishes near and far, located behind the source of water, collection points. The farthest collection point is assigned by the command (for example: "300 m north of such and such a landmark"). The commander places guards on the flanks and in the rear of the reconnaissance group. The patrol approaches the water source, reconnoiters the far side, takes up guard positions and gives a signal that everything is in order: during the day - by hand, at night - by a red light (two flashes). After that, the flask group goes to the water source and fills all the flasks of the reconnaissance group, and the guards of the near side pass it last and "sterilize" the place. The place for collecting water is chosen at bends, in lowlands, in places where the river narrows.

Meals are taken in pairs: the first, with a weapon in his hands, provides security, the second (at 3-5 m) warms up rations on a tablet of dry fuel and takes food (no more than a third of the personnel do this at the same time).

At dawn and dusk, the entire reconnaissance group, half an hour before sunset (sunrise), gathers, takes up firing positions and prepares for battle, then waits at firing positions for an hour. Half an hour after sunset (sunrise), she continues her activities according to the daily routine.

Each scout at the base is informed about the withdrawal plan, the main and reserve collection point. In a sudden attack, it is believed that it is better to engage in battle, destroy the enemy or force a retreat than to allow an unorganized withdrawal and use of the assembly point.

Order of battle, actions of the group commander and personnel.

A raid consists in a sudden attack by a Special Forces group on a pre-selected enemy object with the aim of destroying it (incapacitating it), capturing prisoners, documents, weapons and equipment.

The objects of the raid can be:

• missile subunits in concentration areas and at launch (firing) positions
• command posts, headquarters, communications centers, airfields or their individual elements
• warehouses for various purposes
• radio and radio equipment, small garrisons and other objects

The methods of action and formation of combat order during a raid on an object in each specific case depend on the purpose of the conduct, the composition and security of the group (detachment) and the combat capabilities of the enemy, as well as the nature of the terrain on the object and in the area of ​​​​its location.
Taking into account these conditions, the methods of action during the implementation of a raid can be divided into:

• sudden silent attack
• attack after fire suppression of the enemy

silent attack on an enemy object in all cases is more preferable, as it provides stealth and suddenness of the raid. It is carried out, as a rule, at objects with little security, in closed areas, using only silent small arms and edged weapons.

Attack on the enemy after being subdued by fire usually carried out in cases where the assigned task cannot be performed by silent actions or when the enemy detects the group at the time of the attack.

When carrying out a raid on an enemy superior in strength, the Special Forces unit opens fire from all types of weapons, boldly attacks the object, using surprise and confusion, captures prisoners, documents, weapons, equipment, mines and undermines the object or its elements, with fire from all types weapon destroys personnel, equipment, equipment, after which, using the terrain and mine-explosive devices, it quickly breaks away from the enemy and retreats.

order of battle

The order of battle during a raid, depending on the task, the situation and the composition of the group (detachment), may consist of subgroups (groups):

• attacks
• capture
• ensure
• if necessary, a reserve can be allocated

Subgroup (group) attacks designed to remove sentries, destroy personnel located at the facility as crews, crews, maintenance personnel, guards, etc. Depending on the situation, the task of destroying the guards (removing sentries) may be assigned to a subgroup (group) of support.
Scouts are appointed to the subgroup (group) who are fluent in edged weapons and methods of attack and self-defense without weapons. It is expedient to appoint scouts to this subgroup who are well-versed in mine-blasting and have good skills in blowing up structural elements from various materials. It is also necessary to prepare and correctly position a group of snipers to destroy the guards of the object from special means of covert and silent destruction of enemy manpower.

Capture subgroup (group) designed to capture prisoners, documents, weapons and equipment, destroy (disable) equipment, equipment and structures located at the facility. It is necessary to appoint scouts to this group who are physically strong, dexterous, resolute, who are fluent in hand-to-hand combat techniques.

Support subgroup (group) designed to cover with fire the actions of other subgroups (groups) during the raid and when they withdraw after completing the task

Reserve(if allocated) is directly subordinate to the unit commander and is designed to perform tasks that suddenly arose during the raid:

• providing assistance to any subgroup or the wounded
• covering groups in case the enemy appears from a new direction, etc.

In some cases, when the composition of the Special Forces group is small, some subgroups can perform several tasks in sequence. So, for example, the attack subgroup after the destruction of the guard in the future performs the functions of a capture or support subgroup. And vice versa, if there are enough forces and means, and the elements of the object are located on a large area, not one, but two or more subgroups can be allocated. In all cases, the commander, when creating subgroups, must proceed from the situation that has arisen, the task assigned, and the availability of forces and means. As for snipers, they can be either in an attack or support group, or they can be withdrawn into a separate subgroup, directly carry out the orders of the commander (to monitor, destroy, etc.).

The sequence and content of the work of the commander of the Special Forces unit in organizing the raid

The task for the commander to conduct a raid can be set:

• in its rear even before the withdrawal to the area of ​​​​the task
• in the area of ​​combat operations of groups (by radio)
• in some cases, the commander, being behind enemy lines, can decide on a raid on his own, informing the command before or after the raid

A variant of the sequence and content of the commander’s work when the group is behind enemy lines and receiving the mission for a raid by means of radio communications can be as follows:

• clarification of the received task
• identification of actions that need to be taken immediately
• timing
• issuance of advance directives
• assessment of the situation
• assessment of own forces and means
• decision-making
• issuance of a combat order
• organization of interaction

If the commander knows the exact location of the object, he must organize and carry out the withdrawal of the group to the object and its additional reconnaissance. If the exact location of the object is unknown, then the commander organizes, first of all, its reconnaissance (search).
Understanding the task, the commander must understand its content, i.e., on what object, for what purposes and by what time to raid.

When determining the actions that need to be taken immediately, the commander takes into account the state of the group (detachment) - at the assembly point, during the day, after the implementation or before the implementation of any event, etc .; taking into account the availability and condition of weapons, ammunition, the need and possibility of their replenishment, the presence of the wounded, sick, etc.

When calculating time the commander must set aside time for his direct work (making a decision, issuing a combat order and organizing interaction), practical actions on the organization of the raid (access to the object, its additional reconnaissance) and on the preparation of personnel for the raid.

When issuing advance orders the commander indicates, as a rule, those measures that must be carried out immediately in order to carry out the combat mission as quickly and organized as possible (preparation of weapons, equipment, special equipment, instructions for the removal of stocks material resources cache, etc.).

Assessment of the situation consists in assessing the enemy, his unit, terrain, weather, time of year and day.

Additional reconnaissance of the object is carried out personally by the commander with the involvement of the required number of scouts. This should set:

• the exact location of the object
• forces, composition and weapons of the enemy at the facility
• regime at the facility, its security and defense system
• the presence and location of mine-explosive, wire and other obstacles and obstacles when approaching the object and in its location
• hidden approaches to the object and escape routes after the task is completed
• the nearest places of deployment (garrisons) of enemy troops, probable routes and time of their approach

Based on the results of additional reconnaissance of the object, the commander decides, which defines:

• the goals of the raid, the forces and means necessary for its implementation
• time and moment of attack on the object
• where to focus the main efforts during the raid
• formation of battle order, composition and tasks of subgroups (groups)
• methods and procedure for approaching the object
• the procedure for the destruction of manpower, military equipment and materiel of the enemy, the capture of prisoners, documents, weapons and military equipment
• removal of the dead and evacuation of the wounded
• order and route of withdrawal, collection points after the task is completed and their working hours
• the procedure for organizing and maintaining communication, control signals

The most suitable time to raid an object is at night or in conditions of limited visibility (rain, blizzard, fog).
When determining the moment of attack on an object guarded by sentries, it must be remembered that the vigilance of the sentries is usually high for the first time after taking up the post and before the shift.

After deciding on a raid, the commander issues a combat order to the personnel of the group, which indicates:

• information about the enemy at the facility, the presence, composition of nearby garrisons and the possible nature of their actions
• group task and deadline
• composition and tasks of subgroups (groups), their armament
• the procedure for the destruction of manpower, equipment and the capture of prisoners, documents, weapons and equipment
• order and routes of withdrawal, collection points after the completion of the task and their working hours
• the order of evacuation of the wounded and removal of the dead
• control signals
• his place and the place of the deputy

Having issued a combat order, the commander organizes interaction in order to clarify the options for the actions of subgroups (groups) in various conditions of the situation. At the same time, special attention should be paid to the issues of ensuring the actions of subgroups (groups) of capture, evacuation of the wounded and removal of the dead. If there is time, the interaction can be organized on a layout of the area with the designation of the object and its protection system. In the future, training of scouts can also be carried out in subgroups (groups) to perform certain techniques and actions that they will have to perform during the raid (removal of sentries, installation of mines and explosive charges, escort of prisoners, evacuation of the wounded and removal of the dead).

The considered order and content of the commander's work in organizing a raid are desirable, i.e., all issues are worked out if there is enough time. In reality, the commander will be put in a very difficult position during the performance of the mission (opposition from the enemy, lack of time, fatigue, etc.). In these cases, the sequence and content of the commander's work will be somewhat different, depending on the situation and the personality of the commander.

The action of personnel on the raid

After issuing a combat order, the personnel silently and covertly advance as close as possible to the object of the raid (to combat positions). The scouts assigned to destroy the guards at the facility are advanced in advance and positioned in places convenient for the attack. The support subgroup (group) occupies the position indicated to it and is prepared to fire in the direction of the most probable appearance of the enemy. Depending on the nature of the terrain and other conditions of the situation, it can take up a firing position at a distance of several tens to several hundred meters from the attack subgroup and be in constant readiness for the immediate opening of fire.

The attack sub-group takes up a starting position for a throw as close as possible to the object behind natural shelters.
The capture subgroup takes place behind the attack subgroup.

At the set time, the commander gives a signal to start operations (for a raid). In this case, the actions of subgroups (groups) can be as follows:

• a subgroup (group) of the attack silently destroys the guards, penetrates the facility and blocks the premises (tents, cars) where the security and service personnel are located. If the enemy detects the subgroup (group) of the attack, it acts boldly and decisively, with fire from small arms, with hand grenades, destroys the personnel of the guard, causes panic in the actions of the enemy and ensures the actions of the subgroup (group) of capture
• after the tasks of the capture subgroup (group) are completed, the attack subgroup retreats to the collection point
• the capture subgroup advances after the attack subgroup, captures prisoners, documents, samples of new weapons
• by laying mines and explosive charges, it prepares the elements of the object for detonation. In the event of enemy resistance, the personnel of the group inflicts as much damage as possible on the enemy object by all available means, after which they leave the object and retreat to the assembly point
• the subgroup (group) of support ensures the actions of the attack and capture subgroups, does not allow the enemy to approach the object from the outside (from the outside), and after they complete their tasks, in case of pursuit by the enemy, covers their withdrawal. On the escape route, it can set up minefields and ambush

The departure of the main composition of the troupe (detachment) is carried out at a faster pace, with the traces of withdrawal masked.
The commander must strive to short term move away from the object of the raid to the maximum distance, bearing in mind that the enemy, recovering from a surprise attack and having received reinforcements from the garrisons of the military police and troops, as a rule, organizes a pursuit.

To collect OBP, it is advisable to designate the main collection point at a distance of 5-10 km from the object of the raid, and the spare one - at the same distance from the main one. Several alternate muster points may be assigned.

Russian military special forces [ Polite people from GRU] Sever Alexander

Organization of interaction of units and subunits of the Special Forces with undercover intelligence, army and front-line aviation, local authorities and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan in the interests of identifying and destroying caravans with weapons and ammunition, creating a network of well-wishers in areas of responsibility

Parts special purpose in their areas of responsibility, information about caravans, bandit formations of rebels, warehouses with weapons and ammunition, Islamic committees received from our intelligence agencies, agencies of the Ministry of State Security, Tsarandoy, border units, from local residents and well-wishers.

Information coming from various sources required systematic analysis and careful cross-checking in order to exclude possible cases of misinformation.

With intelligence agencies and agencies of the Ministry of State Security, Tsarandoy, border units, well-wishers, direct contact is made when receiving intelligence data on caravans, Islamic committees, warehouses and bandit formations.

Our intelligence agencies were one of the main sources of intelligence information about the whereabouts of caravans, bandit formations and their objects. Based on their data, the commanders of formations and units of special intelligence made decisions on reconnaissance and fighting.

An analysis of the situation showed that in the specific conditions of Afghanistan, the most reliable and full information formations and special-purpose units received information about the location and nature of the activities of the rebels from undercover intelligence.

Operational intelligence groups (OAGs) were the direct leaders of the active agents on the ground and the organizers of intelligence in the areas of responsibility of the Special Forces detachments.

OAG was equipped with R-353, R-354, "Okolysh", "Lyapis" radio stations, which have high reliability under heavy workloads.

With the OAG, located at a considerable distance from the units of the Special Forces, radio communications were organized and constantly maintained using a special-purpose cipher with on-duty reception at the communication centers of the detachments and headquarters of the Special Forces brigades, which ensured the receipt of processed data in the detachments in 30–40 minutes.

To conduct classes to study the object, to develop the most appropriate methods and methods of combat operations, operational officers of the OAS were involved, according to whose information the WG SpN was planned to be released. Particular attention was paid to working out issues of interaction with attached and supporting units and means - an armored group, aviation, and artillery.

The implementation of incoming urgent information from the OAS was carried out by duty units that were in 10-15-minute readiness at deployment points in helicopters or armored vehicles.

According to the information of the operational-intelligence group, on 04.04.86, WG Special Forces No. 411 was withdrawn in the amount of 20 people to an area 15 km southeast. Barracks. The landing of the group was carried out on the move while the convoy of cars was moving along the Kabul-Gardez road. Using the dark time of the day, the folds of the terrain, the commander led the group to the indicated place, where he organized observation. The approaching caravan was destroyed by fire from a distance of 20-40 m, the battlefield was illuminated by rockets. At the same time, an armored group was called. As a result of the ambush, a caravan consisting of 7 vehicles, 27 rebels, and about 12 tons of ammunition were destroyed. Captured a large number of small arms, explosives, rounds for BO and RPGs, ammunition for small arms, medicines, documents of Islamic committees. The group returned without loss to the point of deployment.

The commander of the intelligence agency received information about the enemy from his sources, evaluated it, double-checked it through other channels, and after clarification brought it to the commanders of formations and special intelligence units via communications, during a personal meeting or through his officer. Developed recommendations on the procedure for implementing intelligence data by organizing an ambush or raid on enemy targets. At the same time, he indicated the most convenient places and times for conducting an ambush (raid), allocated guides (gunners) to lead units to enemy targets. The date and exact time of the ambush or raid were not given to the conductor. So, for example, the military operations of the 100th reconnaissance detachment in March 1085 gave a positive result of working with a gunner. As a result of the implementation of the information received from the intelligence agency with the involvement of a gunner in the village of Araban (ulusvali Surkhrud), the rebels' center for the training of mining specialists was destroyed, and subsequently the caravan with anti-tank mines was destroyed.

In the course of reconnaissance and combat operations, the commander of the reconnaissance body indicated to the commander of the special forces unit the optimal route for reaching the object of the raid (to the ambush area). Upon completion of reconnaissance and combat operations, the group, through its sources, clarified (confirmed) and brought to the commander the results of the ambush (raid).

An example of the successful interaction of units of the Special Forces with the OAS, radio and electronic intelligence, front-line and army aviation are the actions of the 4th detachment of the Special Forces in the period from May 12 to 13, 1987 to destroy a large caravan.

At 1500 hours on May 12, a mobile radio reconnaissance and interception group located the rebels' mobile radio station in the Abchakan region (Logar province). This information was reported to the commander of the detachment, who already had information from the OAS about the possible passage through the area of ​​​​responsibility of the Special Forces detachment of a large rebel caravan on pack animals with ammunition and weapons. The task of inspection group No. 421 was immediately assigned to carry out aerial reconnaissance the specified area. However, the flight carried out did not give results. Having assessed the situation and knowing the tactics of the rebels' actions in escorting caravans, the detachment commander decided to re-send inspection group No. 423 to the same area, changing the route of the helicopters.

At 16.10 in the Abchakan region, the group discovered a caravan of rebels on a day trip. When the group approached the landing site, the rebels opened fire on it. Two fire support helicopters, part of the inspection team, fired at the rebels and a cluster of pack animals.

Under the cover of combat helicopters, group No. 423 landed at 500 m south of the place caravan days. Using the folds of the terrain, with a swift throw, she took advantageous positions at a dominant height. After assessing the situation, the group commander reported to the detachment's CBU and called the reserve DG (inspection group. - Note, auth.) No. 411 and group No. 415 on armored vehicles.

The rebels made an attempt to destroy DGr No. 423. However, skillful combat control, clear and competent aiming of combat helicopters at targets, a properly organized fire system by the commander of the DGr, and the resilience of the scouts did not allow the superior forces of the rebels to destroy the group and take the caravan out of the fire.

DGr No. 411 landed 1 km southeast of Abchakan and, with the help of three subgroups, blocked the exits from locality. With the arrival at 18.50 in the area 1.5 km south of Abchakan, armored group No. 415, a regrouping of forces and means was carried out, and the likely routes of approach of the rebel reserves were blocked.

At 19.50, the organized resistance of the rebels was basically crushed. Two inspection groups (15 people each) under the cover of BrGr (armored group. - Note, auth.) 415 moved out to inspect the caravan, but due to the difficult situation and due to the rapid onset of darkness, the inspection of the caravan was not possible.

The detachment commander reported the situation to the commander of the Special Forces brigade and received an order to gain a foothold on the captured lines and block the caravan with available forces and means before daylight hours.

During the night, the Special Forces detachment monitored the rebels in order to prevent the withdrawal of the caravan, the removal of cargo and their covert approach to our positions, the fire of the onboard weapons of the armored group and, using heavy captured weapons, suppressed the newly identified centers of resistance.

In order to prevent the approach of the rebel reserves to the battlefield in the base areas "Suhrob" and "Dubandai" at 5.00 on May 13, a bombing and assault strike was carried out by front-line aviation, after which a final inspection of the destroyed caravan was carried out.

The search squad's activities were supported by attack helicopters.

By 11:00 on May 13, all the captured weapons and ammunition were loaded onto the approaching BrGr No. 445. Under the cover of helicopters and with the support of artillery, the 4th detachment of the Special Forces returned without loss to the point of permanent deployment.

As a result of the battle, 42 rebels and 193 pack animals, a large amount of ammunition, military equipment, property, and medicines were destroyed.

Captured: MANPADS "Hunyin-5", "Strela-2" - 62, rockets - 600, recoilless rifles - 7, shells for BO - 570, mines for 82-mm mortar - 410, ammunition for DShK and ZGU, small arms - 112400, shots for RPGs - 950, explosives - 340 kg, anti-personnel mines - 600, medicines - 1000 kg.

In the fighting, together with special forces, employees of the MGB and tsarandoy took an active part. Their good knowledge of the area in the zone of responsibility and the operational situation allowed the command of the special forces to make optimal decisions both during the preparation period and during the combat operation in case of a sharp change in the situation. So, in April 1985, the reconnaissance patrol of the 100th reconnaissance detachment, while conducting reconnaissance and search operations, suddenly collided with the head patrol of the rebels. An MGB officer who was part of the reconnaissance patrol began negotiations, calling himself a "mujahedin" of one of the gangs. From the side of the rebels, parliamentarians were sent for negotiations. Using the time of negotiations, the reconnaissance detachment carried out a covert bypass of the rebels and defeated them, capturing prisoners.

Representatives of Tsarandoy provided great assistance in the fight against bands of rebels and in the destruction of caravans with weapons and ammunition. With their personal participation or on their tip, a large amount of information on the destruction of caravans and bandit groups was realized in the course of reconnaissance and combat operations. So, in June 1985, the 412th reconnaissance group, having representatives of Tsarandoy and a gunner, destroyed a large caravan, capturing a large amount of weapons, ammunition, medicines and other property. The soldiers of Tsarandoy provided great assistance when the armored group reached the places of ambush and raid targets, contributing to the safety of passage through mined areas.

Each commander of a Special Forces unit has a certain number of well-wishers, local residents, who, for one reason or another, agreed to cooperate with the Soviet command in the fight against the rebels.

The use of information coming from well-wishers by the unit commander was carried out after its confirmation by the OAG.

The well-wisher is used as a guide (gunner). The results of the implementation of the data received from well-wishers are taken into account in separate documentation and reported to higher headquarters.

The most revealing, according to the well-wisher, was the exit of the reconnaissance detachment of Special Forces No. 700 on January 9, 1987. The commander of the Special Forces detachment learned from information from a well-wisher, confirmed by the OAS, that in the area 6.5 km west of Shinkai there are warehouses with weapons, ammunition and materiel of the gang leader Mullah Ahmad.

The commander of the Special Forces detachment made a decision by forces front-line aviation deliver a bombing assault, landing group number 721 to capture and destroy the warehouses of the rebels.

The composition of ro ​​SpN No. 700:

WG SpN No. 721 - capture group, 24 people, 4PKM, 4RPO-A;

WG SpN No. 731 - cover group, 16 people, 1 AGS-17, 3 P KM;

WG SpN No. 732 - cover group, 18 people, 1 ATS-17, 4GP-25, 3 PKM;

WG SpN No. 735 - armored group, 57 people, 7 BGR-70, 2 URAL-4320, 3 DShK, 3 82 mm mortars, 4 AGS-17;

WG SpN No. 733 - support group, 18 people, 2 AGS-17, 9 GP-25, 3 PKM;

WG SpN No. 713 - reserve, 20 people, 2 AGS-17, 4 GP-25, 3 PKM.

On the night of January 8-9, 1987, the cover groups of the RG Special Forces No. 731 and No. 732 secretly took up positions at the entrance to the gorge with the task of ensuring the landing of the capture group, the exit of the armored group No. 735 and preventing the rebels from approaching Karyayi-Gukhar and Karyayi-Zabit .

By 9.40 on January 9, an armored group advanced into the gorge. As a result of the bombing and assault strike and the fire of the armored group, the resistance of the rebels was suppressed. Boxes with ammunition and weapons were kept in hiding places in caves. By 16.00 on January 9, the mining of warehouses and caves with ammunition was completed. At 16.30, the capture group of RG SpN No. 721, under the cover of an armored group and a cover group, advanced to the evacuation area. The detachment had no losses.

A large number of rebels, weapons, ammunition, including over 500 rockets, were destroyed.

More than 100,000 small arms ammunition, over 60 small arms, radio stations, mines, medicines, documents of the DIRA, IPA and NIFA parties were seized.

Thus, special forces units received valuable and reliable information from operational intelligence groups. Data on caravans with weapons and ammunition, on the timing of their departure and routes, are the most accurate, timely and have sufficient completeness of information necessary for a decision to be made by the commander of a detachment or brigade. Of the information accepted for implementation from the OAS, up to 40% are effective.

The bodies of the MGB and Tsarandoy provided a lot of information to the command of the Special Forces units about caravans, warehouses with weapons and ammunition, about the locations of bandit formations, but elements of disinformation appeared in their information, therefore, the data received from the bodies of the MGB and Tsarandoy were necessarily checked and confirmed through the OAS , other sources with the subsequent issuance of data for decision-making by the commander

for combat operations, so the effectiveness of the implementation of their information was 45-50%.

The most reliable, accurate and timely data on the rebels were obtained as a result of planned reconnaissance, search and ambush actions by reconnaissance groups of the Special Forces, the implementation of the information received from the planned exits of the Special Forces WG was 28–30%, which is slightly lower relative to the number of exits of the groups.

During the capture of prisoners, the data obtained during the initial interrogation directly in the combat area was the most valuable and reliable. The lack of a sufficient number of interpreters with knowledge of the Pashto language made it much more difficult to obtain timely data from the prisoners. Assistance from MGB and Tsarandoy officials often led to information leaks. The high performance of the WG of the Special Forces on the information of the prisoners was in those cases when they agreed to be the guides of the reconnaissance groups to the objects of information.

So, during the raid of the 100th reconnaissance detachment on a caravan located on a day trip in the Tangi-Takchi area on March 19, 1985, a prisoner was captured. During the battle, he was interrogated and testified about the presence of a warehouse with weapons and ammunition. Using the prisoner as a guide, the detachment seized the warehouse, which contained 200 rounds for BO, 132 rounds for RPGs, small arms and ammunition.

On April 14, 1986, during the conduct of hostilities, the 1st detachment of the Special Forces in the Shalatik region captured a prisoner, who did not show anything during the initial interrogation. However, subsequently, well-prepared and thoughtful work with him gave positive results. According to the testimony of the prisoner, three combat exits were made, as a result of which 130 rebels were destroyed, a large number of small arms and ammunition for them, anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines, mines for an 82-mm mortar, and hand grenades were seized. In all three exits, the prisoner was used as a gunner.

Of great interest to the command of detachments and brigades was information from well-wishers from among local residents, employees of the Ministry of State Security, local authorities and representatives of Tsarandoy. However, work on obtaining data of interest through them was poorly organized. This is due to the lack of proper experience among the officers dealing with these issues. Therefore, information from well-wishers was always cross-checked through the OAG and the WG of the Special Forces, as a result of which its timeliness was lost. The greatest effect was brought by the actions of the RG Special Forces, in which the well-wisher acted as a guide (gunner).

The creation of grenadier units in various armies In France, the first grenadiers appeared during the Thirty Years' War. In the guards regiment of King Louis XIV in 1645, there were 4 grenadiers in each company. In 1670, the first detachment was formed in France