Soviet tanks in the service of the Wehrmacht! (a photo). Combat use of the Pz.Kpfw.747 in the Wehrmacht and SS troops Under the German wing

After capturing the first T-34/76s, the Germans gave it the designation Panzerkampfwagen T-34747(r). A large number of these vehicles were captured by the German army and handed over to their troops for combat use, while the Wehrmacht managed to get only a few T-34/85 tanks. T-34 / 76 were captured in the period from 1941 to mid-1943, when Germany was still firmly on the Eastern Front, while the T-34/85 appeared on the battlefields only in the winter of 1943, when success in the east began to change Germany, and Wehrmacht divisions were bled dry after stubborn resistance and successful military operations of the Red Army. The first captured T-34/76s were sent to the 1st, 8th and 11th Panzer Divisions in the summer of 1941.

But they did not dare to use them in a combat situation, due to the fact that gunners are primarily guided by the silhouette of the tank, and not by identification marks. And this could lead to the shelling of captured T-34s by their own artillery or other tanks. In the future, in order to prevent such cases, on the hull and tower captured tanks identification marks or a swastika of a large size and in large quantities were applied. Also, it was common to put identification marks on the roof and hatches of the tower, so that the Luftwaffe pilots could identify the tank's ownership. Another way to help avoid the destruction of captured T-34s by your troops was to use them in conjunction with infantry units. In this case, the problem of identification was practically non-existent. The T-34/76D tank had two round hatches on the turret and was nicknamed Mickey Mouse by the Germans. With open tower hatches, he evoked such an association. From about the end of 1941, captured T-34s were sent to a factory in Riga for repair and modernization, until in 1943 Merzedes-Benz (factory in Mrienfelde) and Wumag (factory in Goerlitz) also began to repair and modernize the T-34. There, the T-34/76 was equipped according to the German standard: in particular, a commander's cupola with hinged doors, radio equipment and many more non-standard alterations in accordance with the requests of their new owners. More than 300 T-34/76 were put "under the gun" of the Wehrmacht. Other tanks were used as tractors for artillery, or carriers of ammunition and ammunition.

A number of heavily damaged T-34s were installed on armored train platforms as artillery mounts(for example, on the famous armored train "Michael"). Of the units of the Wehrmacht that had captured T-34s in their arsenal, one can name the 1st tank regiment of the 1st tank division (as of October 15, 1941, there were 6 T-34/76 tanks of 1940 and 1941), the 2nd Panzer Division, 9th Panzer Division (33rd Panzer Regiment), 10th Panzer Division (7th Panzer Regiment), 11th Panzer Division, 20th Panzer Division (21st Panzer Regiment) and 23rd th Panzer Division. And it's still far from full list. A number of captured T-34s remained in use by the Wehrmacht until 1945, for example, in the 23rd Panzer Division in Slovakia and in East Prussia. In the summer of 1943, several T-34/76s even had Italian crews. According to the statistics of the German command, as of July 1943, the South Army Group included 28 captured T-34s, and the CENTER Army Group - 22 T-34s. In September 1943, RONA (Russian Liberation Army), under the command of Mechislav Kaminsky, used 24 captured T-34s in the fight against Belarusian partisans. Even the most elite tank units of the Wehrmacht used T-34s, for example, the Panzergrenadier Division "Grossdeutschland" (the tank regiment of the same name) used some examples of captured T-34s until 1945. SS units also did not do without the T-34. They were used by the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" (25) and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf". One of the interesting German modifications, based on the captured T-34 chassis, was a tank air defense 2cm. Flakvierling auf Fahrgestell T-34(r). Also known as the Flakpanzer T-34(r), it was equipped with a 20mm Flakvierling 38 cannon or four (in a bunch) 20mm L/115 AA guns. The guns were mounted in turrets made in field workshops from the armor plates of damaged tanks. They were used by the Heeres Panzerjaeger Abteilung 653 on the Eastern Front in early and mid-1944. The Flakpanzer T-34(r) can be compared to the post-war Chinese Type 63 anti-aircraft gun, also using the T-34 chassis, which remained in service with the Chinese People's Army until the late 1980s.

This unique vehicle based on the T-34 was used in the 653rd heavy tank destroyer battalion (Schw. pz. jag. Abt. 653). Also in this unit were used and other experimental tanks: Tiger (P) and Panther with Panzer IV turret. T-34 was modified for installation anti-aircraft guns 2cm Flakvierling in a partially open turret (somewhat reminiscent of the turret of the Ostwind anti-aircraft tank). The vehicle was assigned to the command platoon of this unit.
In 1943, the Red Army received an improved modification - the T-34/85. This tank already had a crew of 5 people, was armed with an 85mm gun. Until the end of the war, 29430 tanks of this type were produced. The German army managed to capture a very small number of T-34/85s, and even less to use. In the middle of 1944, the 5th SS Panzer Division, during fierce battles near Warsaw, managed to capture one T-34/85 and use it later against the Red Army. Also, one T-34/85 was captured by the 252nd Infantry Division in the battles in East Prussia, and it was also taken into service.

Performance data T-34/76 (Ausf B)
Weight: 27000 kg
Crew: 4 people
Engine: V2 Diesel / 12 cylinders / 500 hp
Fuel capacity: 614 liters
Speed: Road: 51 km/h
Off-road: 40 km/h
Power reserve: Road: 450 km
Length: 6.40 m
Width: 2.74 m
Height: 2.43 m
Armament: 76.2 mm gun L/41.2
2 x 7.62 mm "DT" machine guns
Ammunition: 76.2 mm - 77 rounds
7.62 mm - 2000-3000 shots
Armor: 15-65 mm

Gun type: Srvetskoe 76.2mm
F-34German 75mm
KwK 40 L/48 American 75mm M3 L/37.5
Weight (kg): 1155 750 405.4
Projectile: OF-350BR-350ABR-354P SprGr 39 PzGr 39 PzGr 40 M 48 M72
Weight (kg): 6.23 6.50 3.05 5.72 6.80 4.10 6.67 6.32
projectile speed
(m/s): 680 662 950 590 790 1060 464 619
Penetration ability when the armor plate is tilted 90 degrees (mm):
500m - 71 100 - 114 143 - 66
1000m - 51 51 - 85 97 - 60
2000m - 40 - - 64 - - 50

"Tank Club" Stalin Melekhov Andrey Mikhailovich

T-34 through the eyes of the Germans: "With respect, but without hysteria ..."

I think that the opinion of the Germans, who had to deal with the T-34 in battle almost from the first days of the war, is important in this regard. To begin with, anyone who has ever read the memoirs of Guderian, Manstein, Halder, Luke, Mackensen and other German military leaders will agree that all these memoirists had a generally low opinion of the professional qualities of the soldiers, officers and generals of the Red Army. Almost all of these "lost victories" and "memoirs of a soldier" are characterized by frequent derogatory remarks about the "Russian masses", their "stupid indifference", "complete lack of imagination" and bestial "fatalism". Almost every former Nazi military man curses the ultimate failure of the “blitzkrieg” in the autumn and winter of 1941, not the courage of the Soviet soldier and his technical equipment, but "barbaric" cold, "monstrous" dirt, "disgusting" roads and "intervention of the Fuhrer." I will not now dwell on the correctness of such points of view, I will only emphasize: all these memoirists served in the army, which suffered a complete and crushing defeat during the Second World War. Germany was not helped by the unconditionally outstanding fighting qualities of the German soldier. Despite the fact that the “Mongoloid barbarians” suffered from the Russian cold and dirt, as well as the “valuable” instructions of their own leader, no less than the carriers of the advanced Nordic civilization, the former completely defeated the latter. And, I note, they defeated it so that the Germans forever lost the desire to fight in the future. For which they, despite all the horrors of the Soviet invasion that certainly took place, should thank their former opponents more often. But in the same way, in contrast, the respect - expressed or implied - of the former generals and officers of the Wehrmacht in relation to the Soviet military equipment, weapons and equipment.

Interestingly, before the start of the war in the German army in relation to Soviet armored vehicles(and technology in general) on the whole, the “hat-captive” attitude prevailed. To illustrate this, here are some excerpts from the diaries F. Halder:

“Scarce data on Russian tanks. They are inferior to our tanks in terms of armor thickness and speed. Maximum booking - 30 mm. The 45-mm cannon (Erhard) pierces our tanks from a distance of 300 m. The maximum range of a direct shot is 500 m. At a distance of 800 m it is safe. Optical instruments are very poor; cloudy glass, small angle of view. The control mechanism is unimportant” (vol. 2, p. 316).

"The number of tanks in general ( infantry divisions+ mobile units) is very large (up to 10 thousand tanks against 3.5 thousand German tanks). However, given their quality, this superiority is negligible. Nevertheless, surprises are not ruled out" ( and what - T-34 and KV! - Approx. ed.) (ibid., p. 347).

"Sayings about Russian tanks ( deserve respect). 47 mm gun, not bad heavy tanks (apparently, they mean the "obsolete" three-turret T-28 and five-turret T-35 - the Germans did not even suspect the existence of the KV at that time. - Approx. auth.), but for the most part - obsolete types. In terms of the number of tanks, the Russians are the strongest in the world, but they have only a small number of new giant tanks with a long-barreled 105-mm (?) cannon (tanks-colossus weighing 42-45 tons) ”(ibid., p. 429).

From the above statements of the chief of the Nazi General Staff, we can first of all conclude that the Germans did not work well enough intelligence, unable to provide in time at least some accurate information about long-produced Soviet tanks. Otherwise, I can’t explain the mention of “maximum armor of 30 mm”, a 47-mm cannon that came from nowhere (this was not used in the USSR), “ giant tanks with a long-barreled 105-mm cannon" (a cannon with such a caliber was also not used on Soviet tanks) and "safety" for the "Panzers" of the Soviet 45-mm tank gun. The latter, by the way, as Halder himself confirmed, was of German origin. What then could be said about the local 37-mm "mallets"? .. It is also interesting that, without any respect for the T-26 and BT, Halder spoke very respectfully about the medium and heavy Soviet tanks T-28 and T-35 . But it was precisely these machines that Soviet (and after them all the rest) historians laughed with might and main! It is also curious that the German intelligence agencies incorrectly informed the top military and political leadership of the Reich in relation to total Soviet tanks: there were much more than ten thousand of them even in the border districts that directly opposed the invading army.

The same F. Halder on July 25 - a month after the start of the war - admitted: "The number of tank troops in the enemy turned out to be greater than expected" (volume 3, book 1, p. 184). A diary entry dated September 21 describes the experience of fighting heavy tanks acquired by the 17th division of General Tom (who, let me remind you, once studied at the secret Kama school near Kazan): “First, it is necessary to deprive the tank of mobility, and then subversive sappers means to destroy him and the crew” (ibid., p. 366). In other words, German tankers and the gunners first had to kill the caterpillar of the KV tank, and then, sneaking up to it at night, undermine it with dynamite - like the walls of an old fortress. Okay, at least they managed without digging ... It is curious that Halder in this case did not comment on the fighting qualities of the now German 37-mm "door knockers" ...

Now I will go directly to the statements about the T-34 and quote the memoirs Hans von Luke, who in 1941 served as adjutant to the commander of the 7th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht, advancing in the Baltic states: “... then we had to face the T-34 tanks for the first time, which later became famous and served as the backbone of the Russian armored forces. Structurally, the T-34 was not particularly intricate. Booking sheets were held together by rough welding, the transmission device was simple, as, indeed, everything else, for whatever you take. Breakdowns were easily repaired” (c.l 11). Von Luke does not say anything about the advantages of the new Soviet tank, but even so one can understand that they made a strong impression on the tankers of his division, who fought mainly on the light Pz.II and Pz.38 (t). In any case, the only other Soviet tanks he mentions separately are the newest (and rather rare) light T-50s, "possessed the best weapons and booking” (ibid., p. 122). Even if these light 13.8-ton Soviet vehicles (in the Red Army they were called "little Klim" - because of their external resemblance to the heavy KV) could be hit in the forehead, protected by a modest 37-mm armor, only "pulling up the 88-mm guns, "then the T-34 and KV of the 7th division of the Panzerwaffe should have been very difficult ...

Erhard Raus, who I have already mentioned, who commanded the 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht near Stalingrad at the beginning of 1942, speaks of, apparently, the T-34 as follows: “... the Soviets had at their disposal twice as many tanks, and all of them represented a model that was a complete equal to our panzers ... "( by that time, the 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht received the latest Pz.III and Pz.IV models. - Approx. auth.). And here is how he describes the first meeting of the newest "tigers" of the "Grossdeutschland" regiment with the "thirty-fours" in March 1943: "This was the first collision of Pz.VI with Russian T-34s, and the results were more than encouraging for us. For example, two "tigers", acting at the head of the attacking formations, destroyed an entire group of T-34s. Usually ( the word "usually" is used to describe the fighting at Tamarovka near Kharkov in the spring of 1943. - Note, auth.) These Russian tanks preferred to lie in ambush at a deliberately safe distance of 1200 meters and wait for the approach of German tanks ... They began to fire at our Pz.IVs at a time when they could not yet cause damage to the Russians with their guns. Until the moment of meeting with the “tigers”, this tactic was flawless ... ”(“ Panzer Operations ”, p. 191). It turns out that even the new modifications (in the yard in the spring of 1943) "structurally better than the used" German "fours" had a hard time in a direct collision with their "poor-quality" Soviet equivalent - the T-34-76. Note that, judging by the time of the episode mentioned by Routh, the battle should have involved the most that neither is "shameful" cars- "Sormovo freaks" produced in Gorky. The last expression, according to M. Baryatinsky, was used by I.V. Stalin in a letter to the tank commissar Malyshev in June 1942 (“T-34 in battle”, p. 263). The letter, in particular, dealt with the sad fact that "our tankers are afraid to fight in Gorky's vehicles." However, I would not take the leader's words literally: Stalin often and deliberately exaggerated, trying in this way to "aggravate" the problem. I am sure that the facts of the refusals of Soviet tankers to go into battle (if they really took place: after all, only two scenarios for the development of events could follow such a step - execution or a penal battalion) concerned not so much the quality of equipment as the circumstances under which tyrant commanders forced their subordinates to go in another suicidal frontal attack on the well-prepared anti-tank defense of the Germans - that is, on stupid and inevitable death. " Combat success the newest "tigers," Routh concludes the description of the battle, "led to an increase in morale" ("Panzer Operations", p. 191). It must be understood that before that - while the Pz.HI and Pz.IV dealt with the T-34 on their own - there were certain problems with the "spirit" ... ambush (or even openly on a hillock) and shoot defenseless opponents from afar - then the German "tigers" were also successfully used. This tactic was used until the appearance of effective means of dealing with them at long distances - the SU-100, IS-2, ISU-152 and "Sherman fireflies" with a powerful 17-pounder gun.

And here is how the same Erhard Raus, who, by the way, did not write for the general public, but for the American military, who was not noticed in particular sympathy for the enemy, spoke about the patency of the Soviet tank: “... a sudden increase in temperature caused a terrible mudslide. All vehicles, except for those that were moving along the Kharkov-Kursk paved highway, turned out to be helpless in front of the mud ... Even the T-34s of the Russian rearguard got stuck in it so that we could only pull them out with the onset warm weather"("Panzer Operations", p. 192). Note that the T-34 serves as a combat general of the Wehrmacht as a kind of cross-country standard. So what these tanks are not thrown into the mud, but pulled out. What for? More on that later... And here's another comment by Routh on this topic: "... the T-34 had the best cross-country ability among all the tanks on the continent and could sometimes do amazing tricks..." (ibid., p. 231).

Former high-ranking General Staff officer Eike Midzeldorf, engaged during the war, among other things, in generalizing the combat experience of the Wehrmacht, in his book “Russian Campaign: Tactics and Weapons” wrote the following: “The T-34 tank was inferior to the German Pz.IV tank, which was in service in the first years of the Russian campaign, in terms of quality weapons and optical instruments. However, in terms of the quality of armor and patency, the T-34 tank was so superior to the German Pz.IV tank that it became a very dangerous opponent of German tanks, and for the infantry and anti-tank defense of the German army it was a real nightmare "(p. 288). But what about the quality of the armor, which was either too fragile (according to M. Baryatinsky), or, on the contrary, too soft (according to M. Zefirov and D. Degtev), Steven Zaloga and James Grandsen wrote: “Models T-34 1942 and 1943s clearly had a rougher look than the well-made "thirty-four" of 1940. But the apparent roughness of welding and joints did not in the least affect the quality of the armor. So, tests of the T-34 of the 1942 release, carried out at the British School of Tank Technology in 1943, showed that the quality of the tank's armor was the same or better than British armor plates"(p. 133). Apparently, it was this T-34 tank, seen in the Bovington Museum, that Viktor Suvorov described in one of his books. We note in passing that the "viscosity" of the armor English tanks praised by almost all the Soviet tankers who fought on them, that is, the praise of British experts regarding the quality of the T-34 armor is worth a lot ...

The German historian (and former translator of Hitler) already cited by me in other works Paul Karel wrote the following about the T-34: “But the most formidable enemy was the Soviet T-34- an armored giant with a length of 5.92 m, a width of 3 m and a height of 2.44 m, which had high speed and maneuverability. It weighed 26 tons, (was) armed with a 76-mm cannon, had a large turret, wide tracks and sloping armor ”(“ Eastern Front ”, book 1, p. 29). Then on p. 66 Karel described the first meeting of the 17th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht with the T-34 on July 8, 1941 in the Senno area (Western Front). I will not dwell on the details - they are typical of all such descriptions: the initial shock of the German gunners from the invulnerability of the Soviet "giant", 37-mm shells bouncing off the armor, heavy losses of anti-tank artillery, "through" passing through the German battle formations. The end of most of these very unpleasant episodes for the Wehrmacht soldiers is also quite typical: deprived of infantry (and any other) support, the T-34 ends its journey fifteen (!) Kilometers from the front line, stuck in a swamp, where it was “finished off” by a long-barreled gun of the German divisional artillery . Mentions Karel and a bad gearbox of the tank (drivers used a sledgehammer to switch gears - "an example of the Soviet approach"), and a cramped turret for two people, which significantly reduced the combat rate of fire (one Russian shell against three in Pz.IV), and the absence radio stations in most cars. “Nevertheless,” the German historian writes in conclusion, “the T-34 remained a formidable and respected weapon throughout the war. It is even difficult to imagine what consequences the massive use of the T-34 in the first weeks of the war could have entailed ”(ibid., p. 67).

To my bewilderment, M. Baryatinsky, unlike me, almost completely quoted the same pages of Karel's book, the last - and in many ways the key! - I decided to omit the phrase, commenting on everything else as follows: “As you can see, the reviews are quite restrained, respectful, but calm. Without hysteria about the "invulnerable Russian miracle tanks" that sow terror and panic" ("T-34 in battle", p. 187). I'll be honest: I was alarmed by such selectivity. I was also surprised by the comments of M. Baryatinsky regarding positive feedback about the Soviet tanks "Kleist, Schneider, Guderian and others" and "the duty list of those pulled from different sources and quotes taken out of context” (ibid., p. 188). It turns out that Kleist wrote laudatory words about the T-34 while sitting in the Vladimir prison (respectively, he was under pressure), von Millentin did not write at all, and Schneider and Guderian “never participated in a battle with the T-34” ... Well, personally, I I didn’t “pull” quotes, but honestly used what I found in my own library: unfortunately, the memoirs of Schneider, Kleist and Millentin are absent in it. But there are enough memoirs of others German officers and generals. So, regardless of which of them was sitting with whom (say, von Luke spent several years in Soviet camps), they basically wrote the same thing. Most of these memories in Soviet time characterized as "tendentious" and "revanchist". So, in order to refute the words of his former opponent, Marshal Eremenko, after the release of Guderian's Memoirs of a Soldier, was not too lazy and composed a whole separate book. And what M. Baryatinsky wrote about Guderian's reviews, I think is simply incorrect.

In order not to be unfounded, I will quote p. 378 "Memories of a Soldier": "... in November 1941, prominent designers, industrialists and weapons control officers came to my tank army to get acquainted with the Russian T-34 tank, which is superior to ours combat vehicles... The proposals of front-line officers to produce exactly the same (!) Tanks as the T-34, in order to straighten out the extremely (!) Unfavorable situation of the German armored forces as soon as possible, did not meet with any support from the designers. The designers were embarrassed, by the way, not by aversion to imitation, but by the impossibility of producing the most important parts of the T-34, especially the aluminum diesel engine, with the required speed. In addition, our alloy steel, the quality of which was reduced by the lack of the necessary raw materials, was also inferior to Russian alloy steel.” Note: here we are talking about a lag not anyhow, but a technological one. And although Guderian himself, being the commander of a tank group (army), did not go into battle against the T-34 (we agree: “this is not a royal matter”), he does not voice his opinion, but front-line officers.

Now I will give fragments of the German “Instructions for all parts of the Eastern Front on combating the Russian T-34”, issued on May 26, 1942 by the command of the Wehrmacht’s mobile troops (Schnellen Tguppen): “... the T-34 is faster, more maneuverable, has better off-road capability, than our Pz.III and Pz.IV. His armor is stronger. The penetrating power of its 7.62 cm gun is superior to our 5 cm and 7 cm guns. The successful location of the inclined armor plates increases the likelihood of ricochet ... Fighting the T-34 with our 5 cm KwK 38 cannon is possible only at short distances by firing at the side or stern of the tank ... it is necessary to shoot so that the projectile is perpendicular to the surface of the armor "(" June 22. Anatomy of a disaster " , p. 202). Note that the mentioned advice to German soldiers saw the light in the spring of 1942 - just when, according to M. Zefirov and D. Degtev, the T-34s allegedly completely lost their advantage in booking, and according to M. Baryatinsky, “largely degrees have lost combat capability.

Comparing what was written about the T-34 by G. Guderian - perhaps the main German expert in this field - with what was written by M. Baryatinsky, M. Zefirov and D. Degtev, I confess, I ask myself the question: is it about one and Are we talking about the same tank? No, everything seems to be correct: T-34-76 ...

But then another question arises: why modern Russian historians Pz.III and Pz.IV are praised when the most seemingly interested in the same German commander, who always praised anything Russian very sparingly, directly speaks of the T-34: “superior to our combat vehicles”? Moreover, he cites, frankly, the insulting request of his subordinates to the German designers - to copy such a seemingly imperfect tank. And they did copy it! But more on that later…