Hungarian tank Turan. Magyar attempt to catch up with Soviet tank building

After the occupation of Czechoslovakia by German troops in 1939, the Germans carried out a thorough accounting of all Czech tanks, both serial and experimental, in order to decide which ones to introduce into the Wehrmacht and produce in the future. Variants of medium tanks developed by the Czechs (including the most "finished" T-21) did not interest them, since they were less perfect than Pz. III or Pz. IV. Nevertheless, the T-21 tank was destined for a long life in Hungarian service. The Hungarians, having received information about Czech tanks in 1939, became very interested in them, as they planned to supplement their armored forces with a more protected and armed vehicle than the Toldi light tanks. With the permission of the Germans, the Hungarians acquired a license for the production of a modified T-21 tank, which received the name 40M Turan. It differed from the prototype in the installation of a Hungarian engine, a radio station, a slightly modified turret and the installation of a semi-automatic 40mm 41M tank gun (instead of a 47mm Czech gun).

Taking into account the fact that the Turan tanks did not correspond to the modern military situation in the spring of 1941, several projects for their modernization appeared. The variant, considered in May 1941, provided for the installation of a 75-mm 41M gun with a barrel length of 25 calibers and a horizontal wedge gate. To do this, it was necessary to increase the height of the tower by 45 mm and change the size of the commander's cupola.

The tank upgraded in this way was visually distinguished by the original armor of the gun's recoil devices. After a long period of design and testing, the tank was put into service in May 1942 under the designation Turan II. Its serial production began in 1943.

The last modification of the 44M Turan III appeared in December 1943 and was associated with an attempt to install a long-barreled 75-mm gun by analogy with the German tank Pz.IV Ausf.F2\Ausf.G. At the same time, it was supposed to strengthen the armor of the frontal part of the hull and turret to 80 mm, as well as modify the turret by installing a superstructure with a beveled front armor plate and a commander's cupola. Accordingly, the mass of the Turan III tank increased to 23 tons, which, with the same power of the Turan-Z engine, reduced the specific power from 13.5 to 11.3 hp / t.

In 1943, another self-propelled gun project based on the Turan tank was being developed - a 105 mm long-barreled howitzer for firing from closed positions - similar in design to the German Grille and Hummel self-propelled guns. However, the project did not leave the design stage.

Since the 40M tank was clearly outdated by 1942, and, on the other hand, it was already well developed by industry, it was decided to create self-propelled guns on its basis in two versions: anti-tank and assault. artillery mount, in accordance with the Hungarian tradition received its own name - Zrinyi.

Initially, the option of creating an open assault self-propelled gun with a 105mm howitzer, similar in type to the German Sturmpanzer, was considered.

But it was not implemented - the military decided that the self-propelled guns, operating in direct contact with the enemy, should have a fully armored fighting compartment.

The first prototype of the 44M Zrinyi I self-propelled guns began to be built in May 1943 and completed by January 1944. A tank chassis was chosen for it without any improvements. Instead of a turret, a low armored cabin was installed (the frontal armor was increased to 100 mm, side and rear armor was similar to the Turan tank), completely closed on all sides, in which a 75-mm long-barreled MAVAG 43.M gun (barrel length 43 caliber) with 80 ammo was installed. shells. In total, 6 units of anti-tank self-propelled guns were built.

The second version of the self-propelled guns - 43M Zrinyi II, entered the test earlier - in December 1942. It was equipped with a 105-mm gun 40\43.M (barrel length 20 calibers), effective not only against fortifications, but also against light and medium tanks . The thickness of the frontal armor was slightly less - 75 mm, but otherwise this modification was not inferior to the 43M Zrinyi I. This version became the most massive type of Hungarian self-propelled guns - more than 100 vehicles were produced. As an infantry support self-propelled gun, the vehicle proved to be quite good, but as an anti-tank weapon (and in this unusual role, the self-propelled guns also had to perform) were generally unsuccessful.


The last tank, created during the Second World War in Hungary, was an experimental heavy tank Tas.
The design of the tank began in 1943, and in August they began to create a prototype without a turret. The hull of the tank and the turret were welded, the forehead of the hull had a thickness of 100 to 120mm, the sides were 50mm. The tank was supposed to be armed with a 75mm long-barreled Hungarian 43M cannon, later it was decided to use a German 75mm gun, similar to that installed on the Pz. V Panther. The Hungarians acquired a license for the production of these guns. An 8mm machine gun was to be paired with the cannon, and the second was supposed to be placed in the hull. A new powerful engine for this tank was only under development, so a pair of 260 hp engines was installed on the prototype, which provided the tank with a mass of 38 tons. Speed ​​up to 45 km / h. A prototype with a turret was being prepared for testing, but was destroyed during one of the bombing raids in 1944.

There was a version of the layout of the Tas tank with a turret similar to the turret on the Pz. VI Tiger, to mount an 88mm gun, but no further details about this project are known.

Together with the Tas tank, an anti-tank self-propelled gun based on it was also designed, which was planned to be armed with an 88 mm KwK 36 or KwK 43 gun (which was on the Pz. VI Ausf. B "Tiger II") according to another project. The frontal armor, set at good angles, was 120 mm according to the plan. However, the failure of the Tas tank creation program also buried this self-propelled gun, which was very interesting in concept.

The Germans, however, refused to sell them a license, but offered to use the developments of Skoda and take as a basis the unfinished Czech sample S-II-c, better known to us as the T-21.

In early June 1940, the tank arrived in Budapest. On sea trials, the Š-II-c showed excellent results: with a mass of 16.5 tons, it reached a maximum speed of up to 50 km / h on a hard road surface. There were also no problems with cross-country ability, but the Hungarians, for some reason not satisfied with these qualities, sent the tanks for revision to the Manfred Weiss company.

The company was recommended to bring the frontal armor to 35 mm, in accordance with the German views on the tactics of using tanks, which served as a model for the Hungarians at that time, to increase the number of crew members in the tower from two to three and install a commander's cupola, as well as make a number of minor changes. Instead of the Czechoslovak 47-mm cannon, the Hungarian 40-mm 41.M. In addition, it was decided to replace the machine guns and the tank engine with Hungarian models.
In total, more than 200 different changes were made to the design of the tank, and on November 28, 1940, the modified tank was adopted by the Hungarian army under the designation 40.M. The tank also received a proper name - "Turan", in honor of the historical ancestral home of the Hungarians, who once lived on the territory of modern Kazakhstan.

The first prototype of a medium Hungarian tank, although made of non-armored steel, was ready in August 1941, and two months later its mass production began. Turan began to enter the troops in May 1942.
Turan had differentiated anti-projectile armor. The armored hull and tower of the Turan were assembled from rolled sheets and plates of homogeneous armor steel, on the frame with bolts and rivets. All Turan vertical armor plates were installed vertically or with slight angles of inclination to the vertical; the thickness of the vertical armor of the hull and turret forehead was, according to various sources, from 50 to 60 mm; sides and stern - 25 mm. The thickness of the bottom armor plates was 14 mm, and the thickness of the roof of the hull and turret varied from 8 to 25 mm in different parts. Since 1944, Turans began to be equipped with a set of 8-mm on-board anti-cumulative screens similar to the German ones, but before the end of hostilities, they did not manage to equip all tanks with them.
Manfred Weiss-Z eight-cylinder carbureted V-engine with 265 hp. at 2200 rpm allowed a tank weighing 18.2 tons to accelerate to top speed 47 km/h. The capacity of the fuel tanks was 265 liters, the cruising range was 165 km.
Turan's transmission consisted of a multi-plate dry friction main clutch, a planetary 6-speed (3 + 3) gearbox, a planetary turning mechanism and final drives. The transmission units were controlled using a pneumatic servo drive. There was also a backup mechanical drive.
The undercarriage was generally similar to the undercarriage of the light Czechoslovak LT-35 tank and consisted of eight rubberized dual road wheels on each side. The rollers were interlocked in pairs in two bogies, each of which was suspended on two semi-elliptical leaf springs. Between the front cart and the steering wheel, which had a gear ring, one double roller was installed, which made it easier for the tank to overcome vertical obstacles. The drive wheel was located at the rear. The upper branch of the caterpillar rested on five double rubberized support rollers. The design of the undercarriage provided the tank with a smooth ride without strong vertical vibrations and swaying.
Turan's main armament was a 40mm cannon. This 40-mm semi-automatic gun 41.M 40/51 was developed by MAVAG on the basis of 37-mm anti-tank guns - the German PaK 35/36 and the Czechoslovak A7 - and had a barrel length of 51 calibers. The initial speed of its armor-piercing projectile was 800 m/s, and the mass of the fragmentation projectile was 0.96 kg. The gun had a rate of fire of 12 rounds per minute.
The gun was placed in the frontal part of the tower on trunnions in an installation that allowed vertical aiming in the range from -10 to + 25 °. Aiming at the target was carried out using a telescopic sight. The gunner had an optical rangefinder. The ammunition load of the gun was 101 unitary shots with armor-piercing and fragmentation shells. The gun could also use ammunition from the Czech Bofors.
Auxiliary weapons Turan

and there were two 8 mm machine guns 34 / 40AM Gebauer.
Rotary periscopic prismatic viewing devices served as a means of observing the terrain in combat conditions for the crew of Turan. The driver, gunner-radio operator, gunner and loader each had one device, and the tank commander had a commander's cupola with two viewing devices. The driver, in addition, had a viewing slot with protective triplex glass in the upper front hull plate.
Already in the summer of 1941, it became obvious that the 40-mm gun was unable to fight medium and heavy Soviet tanks.
and
. Even old
turned out to be too tough for this fluff. And with the defeat of the infantry, things were no better for this gun - a weak high-explosive fragmentation projectile could not cause any harm to the field fortification. Therefore, the Hungarians decided, leaving the reservation unchanged, to re-equip Turan with a more powerful 75-mm caliber gun. The most suitable option turned out to be an Austrian 75-mm mountain gun with a long barrel of 25 calibers. Her projectile allowed to fight with the lungs field fortifications, and the gun itself had a very small recoil, which was important with a very cramped turret, into which the Hungarians did not manage to shove the German KwK 37, which had similar characteristics.
The production of the improved tank began only in 1943, and out of the ordered 322 copies, only 139 were made. 15 tanks from this series were equipped with an additional FuG16 or R-4T radio station, and some copies had armored on-board anti-cumulative screens. Tanks of this modification received full official name 41M Turan 75 rovid, but in modern publications they are most often referred to as Turan II.

Turan II

Until the spring of 1944, neither the first nor the second modification of the Turan tanks appeared at the front. Forward

The last of them were used as part of the 2nd Hungarian Panzer Division, which entered the battle on April 17, 1944, counterattacking the advancing Soviet units near Kolomyia. The tank attack on the difficult wooded and mountainous terrain was unsuccessful, and by April 26 the Hungarian counterattack was successfully repelled. At the same time, the losses of the Hungarians amounted to 30 tanks. In September, the division took part in the battles near Torda, suffered heavy losses and was withdrawn to the rear. Another unit equipped with Turans was the 1st Cavalry Division. In the summer battles in Galicia, she lost all her tanks and returned to her homeland in September. 1st tank division, also equipped with Turans, entered into battle with our troops already in September on the territory of Transylvania, taken by the Hungarians from Romania under the Vienna Arbitration in 1940.
On October 30, the battles for Budapest began, lasting four months. The 2nd Panzer Division found itself surrounded in the city itself, while the 1st Panzer and 1st Cavalry Divisions fought to the north of it. In fierce battles near Lake Balaton in March-April 1945, the Hungarian tank forces have ceased to exist. Then they were destroyed or captured Soviet Army and last
Turans. One of them still stands in Kubinka. It is a rather rare copy of the Turan modification. II , which has side and tower anti-cumulative screens.

Turan II in Kubinka

See also:

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We strongly welcome you! I am with you, Yegor Yakovlev, and Bair Irincheev. Good evening, Yegor. Hello dear viewers. As a result of the last video about Soviet-Finnish relations from 1918 to 1943, Bair and I received a number of questions and today we will try to answer them. Bair is in charge of asking questions, and I will join in as the play progresses. Yes. Dear viewers, thank you very much to everyone who commented and to everyone who sent questions, comments and so on. There are a lot of questions, we will briefly try to comment on them with Egor. The first substantive question: “Good afternoon, Bair and Yegor. Can the campaigns in Soviet Karelia in the 1920s be covered?” Yes, you can. This is a separate video, this is a big topic, because there were many campaigns of Finnish volunteers, nationalists, Karelian separatists and others in Soviet Karelia. He was not alone, and they were all different. There, in addition to military operations, which, due to the small number of both sides, were not very large, i.e. there it was not an assault on the Mannerheim Line or the Battle of Kursk, but there the political component was interesting, how referendums were held in the occupied territories and how the local population there voted to join Finland and not join Finland and so on. Those. this is an absolutely separate topic, plus we have wonderful specialists from academic life at Petrozavodsk State University, these are professors Verigin and Kilin, who, I hope, will be able to describe it all in colors and in all details, i.e. we will also talk about this, but we are planning, in my opinion, to travel to Petrozavodsk to film an intelligence questioning in those places. So yes, it will be covered, but that is a completely separate topic. The next question: “Is it possible to cover in more detail the joint actions of the Soviet and Finnish armies against Nazi Germany, the attitude of the fighters towards each other in such formations. Well, maybe, how did the Third Reich look at it? Although this one is less interesting than the first two questions. Thanks in advance". If you mean that in 44 the Soviet Union and Finland signed a truce and then the Finns, turning their weapons against their former allies, began to fight against the Germans, this is the so-called Lapland War, that is exactly what it has in Finnish historiography. There was no situation when the Red Army and the Finnish army together planned some kind of military operation and carried it out together. Those. we were engaged in the Petsamo-Kirkines operation, it was our operation, while the Finns were conducting their military operations. There were no joint actions of the Soviet and Finnish armies. If you mean about the Finnish fighters in the Red Army, then most of them fought in the ranks of the 71st Rifle Division. Moreover, the division was recruited from the Ingrian Finns, from the Karelians, from the Vepsians, and fought, in fact, in Karelia and went from Karelia to the Volkhov Front and to Poland. Here it is necessary to clarify that these are Soviet citizens. Yes, these are Soviet citizens, of course. Is it the parts of this division that defeated the Germans? Yes, this is a battle, 41 years old, a battle near Tolvajärvi, there the 163rd German division, the Potsdam division, just the 71st Karelian division was very badly beaten, and it was from this division that the only hero of the Soviet Union was the Ingrian Finn Pyotr Abramovich Tikilyainen from the Volosovsky district of the Leningrad region. The next question is: “Dear Yegor and Bair, how much more difficult would Leningrad have had if the border had not been moved back in 1940, in your opinion? And was there a theoretical possibility that the White Finns refused to attack the Soviet Union in 1941, if not winter war? Egor, can you comment on this? Yes. I don't think that possibility existed, because small countries, they don't have the ability to remain neutral in such a huge mess as World War II was. The example of Switzerland, which was the banking capital of Europe and this, in fact, was valuable, thanks to which its neutrality was preserved, does not fit here at all in the same way as the example of Sweden, which in fact, of course, was, although not a belligerent, but according to in fact, it was a raw material appendage of Germany. Nickel was exported from Sweden, which was vital for the actions of the Wehrmacht, therefore, the neutrality of Finland, due to its geographical location, is most likely out of the question. In the most extreme case, Finland would have been overrun by German troops by force, as happened with Norway and Denmark. However, it must be said that the history of relations between Germany and Finland tells us that the Finnish elites were deeply Russophobic, and this brought them closer, a priori, closer to the Nazi elites. Therefore, we know that for a long time the vast majority of the Finnish elites were set up to reject Soviet Karelia in their favor, the Kola Peninsula, and if you're lucky, then other lands. Therefore, alone, naturally, Finland could not do this and could only take advantage of the favorable situation in Europe that would develop as a result of a big war between the big, great powers. Under these conditions, it is inevitable, this is the logic of annexation, the logic of great Finland, it inevitably dictated joining a powerful enemy Soviet Union . Therefore, the USSR had good reason to fear this kind of alliance, and actions to push back, diplomatic activity in order to move the border away from Leningrad, were quite logical and, moreover, repeated the centuries-old policy of the Russian tsars, who, in fact, starting from Peter I, were engaged in to ensure the safety of Petersburg. Therefore, in my opinion, the situation of Leningrad would have been even more difficult if the border had not been pushed back. My comment is that I agree with Yegor. If we return to the previous video and to the memorable film of the Rossiya channel, where it was said that Finnish rangers from the 27th Jaeger battalion of the Kaiser army stormed the Winter Palace, then by the year 39 most of these former rangers, they had already become the middle and highest command staff of the Finnish generals . Those. these are generals, and colonels, and majors, there were 700 of them. As you understand, they were all sharply pro-German and indeed, probably, it is difficult to imagine the situation with Norway when Norway was captured by force. Rather, the Finnish army would really have met them as allies if there had been some kind of landing in Finland. There would be a coup d'etat and, for example, Talvela, General Talvela, who was 100% pro-German, would become such a Finnish dictator. There were many of them, such figures. Talvela - he was such an ardent supporter of the importance of capturing Soviet Karelia. Actually, he led the Olonets campaign, i.e. he led one of the regiments in the Olonets campaign in 1919, i.e. he was so radical. As far as I remember, Talvela was suspected of preparing a pro-Nazi rebellion already in 44. There were several people there. Indeed, there were such suspicions, and now there are conspiracy theories, that indeed part of the generals believed that it was necessary at all costs to stay on the side of Nazi Germany and continue the war. Yes. In any case, Mannerheim's line is so pragmatic towards leaving the war, towards leaving the coalition with Germany, it was not supported by all the generals, on the contrary, there were fierce supporters of the coalition with the Nazis. It's just that they are very big Germanophiles and indeed they worshiped Nazi and non-Nazi Germany with all their might. This is all due to the fact that they already, excuse me, in 1914 joined the German army as volunteers. That is, from my point of view, if the border had not been pushed back, then the situation is quite possible that German troops appear near Streletsk, the Germans get the opportunity to shell Kronstadt from Finnish territory, i.e. it would probably be harder. Again, for example, independent Finland invites German troops to its territory, which, in fact, and so, by the way, were there under the pretext that they were transiting to Norway. Yes. Well, in fact, Sweden granted the right of transit, they calmly rode around Northern Europe. Yes, well, Sweden in this case, we're just talking about Finland, yes, that is. German troops were quite legally on the territory of Finland, the Soviet Union could not do anything about it. Therefore, there would have been a Soviet-Finnish war in 39-40, if it had not happened, Norway would still have been captured and Germany, accordingly, would have received legal grounds to be on Finnish territory. Here the German troops stood on Finnish territory, what can the Soviet Union do? He can either watch indifferently as the Germans settle in there, more openly or covertly. Either the Soviet Union may start a war against Finland, but later, and already under the conditions, perhaps, of a German attack. Politically, this is unfavorable, because the Soviet Union will be exposed as an aggressor. So, the second part of the question - “was there a theoretical possibility that the White Finns refused to attack the Soviet Union in 41, if there were no Winter War?” From a military point of view, as Yegor absolutely correctly said, the Finnish military had developed 2 war plans against the USSR. Option 1 - this is what we actually did during the Soviet-Finnish war, when Finland really was alone, Western assistance was more like moral help and rhetoric in favor of Finland. Indeed, this military plan meant that for some time it would be possible to hold out, but no offensive actions, only limited counterattacks could be launched, which, in fact, they did during the Soviet-Finnish War with varying degrees of success. On the Karelian Isthmus, all their counterattacks failed, to the north of Ladoga - there have already been reconnaissance questions about this and there will be more, there the Finns were much more successful. But option 2 of hostilities against the Soviet Union meant the situation that Yegor described, that there was a big war going on in Europe and the Soviet Union could not be greatly distracted by Finland. And in this situation, the Finns had a plan, it was not defensive, it was rather of such a nature - first we defend ourselves, then we launch counterattacks, we drop the Soviet units somewhere where we can. Those. the second plan, which was implemented in 1941, they really implemented it, it meant just a situation where it is possible not only to successfully defend their territory, but also to grab something from a neighbor. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine that in 1941, in the conditions of the war between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, Finland would have stood aside and calmly watched. Obviously, they would most likely be on the side of the Germans, and this deep distrust between the USSR and Finland was the reason for diplomatic efforts in order to push the border. When diplomatic efforts failed, a military operation, which we are now analyzing with Dmitry Yuryevich. I repeat, once again I would like to focus the attention of the audience on the simple truth that they usually say that the Finns call it the “continuation war”, was a consequence of the Soviet-Finnish war of 39-40. But if it were only so, then indeed, probably, Finland stopped at the old border, taking exclusively its territory. But Finland hatched explicit annexationist plans and, in fact, it was precisely the fact that she did not stop at the old border that became the reason why Great Britain declared war on Finland, because England, Churchill made it very clear that if Finland took what belonged to her , then okay, that will be enough and England will remain on the sidelines. But since Finland made her choice in favor of the annexationist military policy, England declared war on her. Accordingly, such plans were in advance. Moreover, they declared war on December 6, 41. Great Britain en masse declared war on Finland, Bulgaria and Romania, but let me remind you that December 6 is Finnish Independence Day, i.e. it also matched very well. We will talk about this later, namely about the ups and downs of 41 years. I would also like to emphasize for respected viewers that the Finnish term "continuation war" did not appear immediately. It appeared much later than the war itself began. As you and I know, the Finns called the Soviet-Finnish war talvisota, i.e. talvi - land, sota - war, and 41 years, i.e. Finnish offensive, they first called kesäsota, i.e. the summer war, because it was planned that everything would end in the summer, that Germany would defeat and destroy the Soviet Union, Finland would regain its territories, plus what it had long wanted to take for itself, and by Christmas everyone would already be at home. There was such a clear mood in the Finnish army that guys, the war is only for the summer, now everything will be fine. And then, when all this did not work out, after the Battle of Moscow, this propaganda term had to be drastically altered, I had to come up with this logic of the continuation war, and the logic is that the Soviet-Finnish war was only 1 round, and after of this 1st round, Finland takes revenge, i.e. the logic here is Finnish as follows, that if there were no Finnish war, i.e. and there would be no second war In short, the Soviet Union is to blame for everything. This is their official point of view, which they promote in every possible way, but, again, this is what they have the right to, but in the same way we can dispute it. From my point of view, if there had been no Soviet-Finnish war, then all the same, in 41 after the Germans, the Finns would have found a reason to participate in all this. Next question: “The Lapland War. How actively did the Finns fight against their recent German allies? The topic of Finnish aces pilots is interesting, or, in general, to analyze the actions of the Finnish Air Force. Lapland War, by the way, too interesting point that in the conditions of the armistice, which was signed by the USSR and Finland on September 19, 1944, there the Germans were given a certain period in order to get out of Finland. And in the truce, in the treaty, it was stated that Finland undertakes, if after a certain date the Germans did not leave, Finland is obliged to start hostilities. This is their contractual obligation. And the fact that now in the Finnish press very often, by the way, they write, and in popular science books, in the press, that “damned Stalin forced us to fight against the Germans, they would have left anyway, but here, in short, they forced us in October start hostilities against the Germans in Lapland and so on, what is it, damned Stalin. Comrades, you signed it yourself, this is one of the conditions of the agreement. That Finland did not really want to fulfill it is understandable. Of course, I didn’t want to fight again and lay down my soldiers, but this is one of the conditions of the contract, so this modern Finnish rhetoric, it is also more of a propaganda character. This I will explain why. In fact, this rhetoric is translated into Russian as "damned Stalin won the war against us." Because the only alternative to this treaty was the passage of the Red Army through Finland with its subsequent involvement in the Soviet bloc. Thus, Finland, having pledged to expel the Germans from its territory, Finland bought itself independence and good neighborly relations with the Soviet Union. That's all. And, so to speak, those who write like this are grief over the fact that they failed to win the war, failed to capture Karelia, failed to capture the Kola Peninsula and were forced to act as the losing side. Yes. So, about the intensity of hostilities. At first, it is clear that they didn’t really want to, because it seemed like only yesterday the officers were talking, drinking cognac, coffee and talking nicely with each other. Suddenly everything changed dramatically and, sorry, dear Germans, but you have 2 weeks to get out of here. If so, we open fire. That is, of course, the Germans regarded this as a betrayal and, in fact, some local agreements between German and Finnish officers that let's peacefully disperse, the Germans were the first to violate. But then, when the Germans began to retreat north from the areas of Lapland they occupied, they absolutely calmly began to use the scorched earth tactics, i.e. all roads are mined, all communications are destroyed, all bridges are blown up, all houses are burned, all boats, their bottom is broken, we leave nothing to the Finns, since they betrayed us so much. And, of course, after that, the fighting became more intense, but it all ended on April 28, 1945, when the last German soldier left the Finnish territory and is now celebrated in Finland as a memorial day for veterans, i.e. day of the end of the war. But the Lapland War is a separate topic altogether. I will tell you one incident from my life. I was in Rovaniemi and there I talked with one of the locals, who told me over a cup of coffee - "we had very hard battles here, the Germans were just fierce." It sounded unexpected to me. I say - did the Germans rage with you here? Well, they just burned Rovaniemi. Let's insert a couple of pictures, when the Finns enter Rovaniemi, it's just like Stalingrad, everything is destroyed. Such hatred just blew out of him. Yes, i.e. in the north in the 70s, when German tourists came to ski, they were looked at very askance by the locals there, because everything was very lively. There, indeed, the Germans, when leaving, slammed the door loudly and simply destroyed the entire Rovaniemi. So, the topic of Finnish aces pilots and, in general, an analysis of the actions of the Finnish Air Force. Not my subject, yes, there are several Finnish aces pilots, heroes who left memories. Their combat score needs to be seriously checked and there are specially trained specialists for this matter. If we talk about the actions of the Finnish Air Force as a whole during the Soviet-Finnish Great Patriotic War, then it must, of course, be noted that the nature of their actions was dictated by the extremely small number of the Finnish Air Force. Those. they tried to protect their pilots to the maximum, especially bombers. Fighters, of course, worked to the best of their ability, yes, they won victories, especially at the first stage of the Soviet-Finnish war, when our Air Force commanders considered that SB bombers in close formation could repel fighter attacks. It turned out that this is not the case, unfortunately, much to our regret. But it must be said that indeed Finnish fighters and Finnish anti-aircraft gunners, they could not disrupt a single Soviet Air Force raid on any Finnish city, despite all their efforts. But, again, this is a separate issue. Yes, next. “How was the fate of ethnic Finns throughout the USSR? Were there resettlements inland, did they serve in the Red Army? How did the diplomatic relations of Finland develop with other states - Norway, Estonia, Sweden, Denmark and others? Ethnic Finns who lived in the border area were evicted in the 1930s. And, again, this may look like an absolutely unmotivated evil repression of the evil Stalinist regime, but there is a large number of reports from the NKVD that in Karelia, on the Karelian Isthmus, in all border regions, ethnic Finns living in these regions, they, first of all, are connected with smugglers, this is understandable. When there is a border, there will always be smuggling. The second is that they absolutely calmly harbor Finnish intelligence officers who pass illegally across the border line, they are not extradited to the Soviet authorities, and in general they are more likely for Finland than for Soviet power. And there were not only one such reports, there were quite a lot of them. As a result, the Stalinist, Soviet leadership of that period decided that if there is a black sheep in this herd, then we will remove the entire herd from here. They were evicted as disloyal to the Soviet authorities, and, in general, they were scattered throughout the territory of the USSR, most of them were taken to the Vologda region, if I know correctly, and they were taken to the Urals. “Did they serve in the Red Army?” Yes, 71 rifle divisions, they really were numerous there, but rather there were Karelians and Ingrian Finns. In 1942, there was an order for the Red Army - to remove all military personnel of German and Finnish nationalities from the front line as also unreliable, because the war is being waged against Germany and Finland. I met veterans who fell under this and they ended up in the labor army, i.e. the labor army itself is the same labor camps, i.e. cut wood somewhere in the Urals. Someone managed to avoid it. It’s not like everyone who had a Finn written in their passport, that they were loaded in a crowd and sent somewhere to the Urals. But I have seen testimonies of such Finns and others. "Diplomatic relations of Finland with other states - Norway, Estonia, Sweden, Denmark, etc." Well, Norway was occupied by the Germans in 1940, Estonia was part of the Soviet Union, Sweden was allegedly neutral, but in fact, during the Soviet-Finnish war, Sweden was Finland's warring arsenal, i.e. she fought a normal hybrid war. During the Great Patriotic War, yes, Sweden, despite the fact that it declared neutrality, it both traded with the Germans and allowed them to pass in transit, and, in fact, for Finland, Sweden is always an older brother. Those. with formal neutrality, there was quite serious assistance from Sweden in relation to Finland both in the Soviet-Finnish war, and in the second war too. If we talk about the Soviet-Finnish war, then Sweden really immediately officially announced to all Finnish requests “King, bring in the troops”, they, of course, immediately answered that this would not happen, we are neutrals, but at the same time the Swedish volunteer corps was formed, 8000 a man who did not hide at all. Those. everywhere there were recruitment posters for this corps. He fought at the front against the Red Army for 2 weeks in the north. Those. they got to the front quite late. Sweden supplied a large amount of artillery and ammunition to Finland, and this amount of guns that they supplied to the Finns was immediately compensated by a supply from Germany. Those. the Swedes did not just take and give 200 guns to the Finns, because from a military point of view, understand that here you are sitting in Stockholm, in the Swedish General Staff, here the war between Finland and the Soviet Union begins, and, of course, you immediately think that Finland will defeated and next in line you and you need to strengthen the defense of your power, and not distribute weapons even to your neighbor, who is now fighting. Therefore, indirectly, Germany, one might say, helped Finland. The only thing that was bound by a non-aggression pact, she didn’t particularly advertise there in any way, but that’s how it all happened indirectly, through third countries. About iron ore, it must be said about Swedish. Yes, of course, Swedish ore, rare earth metals, all this went to Germany and the landing of the allies, which impressed the Soviet leadership so much, the possibility of landing the allies in northern Sweden and Norway, and the appearance of the Anglo-French corps in northern Finland, on the Finnish side, it was all connected precisely with the desire of the allies, thus, hybridly, also to annoy Nazi Germany. Those. occupy the area of ​​mines and completely cut off the supply of resources for the economy of Nazi Germany, i.e. again, this help that the Western powers promised to Finland, it was not just like that. Nothing just happens in politics, only in human relations it happens, and even then not always. And the allies pursued their goals, absolutely their goals, but the result was that they made peace. In time. Yes, peace was concluded on time. “Will there be a detailed analysis of the hostilities of the war with the White Finns in 40?” Yes, it's already being done. “Dear Bair Klimentievich and Yegor Nikolaevich, could you tell me where you can find the text of the appeal of the Senate (the government and the Parliament of Finland), with which they addressed the Council of People's Commissars, on the recognition of Finland's independence? They turned on December 18 (according to the old style), 1917. I can't find his text either in the literature or on the Internet. Maybe I didn't search well." By topics official data, which are written on the website of the Finnish Parliament, they, the Finnish Parliament have a whole section dedicated to historical materials and in historical materials, there 1 section is precisely the recognition of Finland's independence. They describe it in such a way that at first a delegation went there, talked informally with Lenin, Lenin said that please send some paper, we will consider it and, accordingly, after that we will recognize your independence. This paper was written, so, apparently, it has been preserved somewhere in our archives, but this, again, is a bit out of my period, so I didn’t dig and didn’t see this text anywhere, unfortunately. I do not know either. “Tell me about Toivo Antikainen, in Karelia during the Soviet era there were regular skiing competitions “Antikainen's Ski Track”, I wanted to know the truth about him.” Toivo Antikainen is a radical red Finnish commander who took part in the Finnish civil war . After the defeat of the workers' guard, he fled to the USSR, i.e. even then to Soviet Russia, he actively took part in just repelling the Finnish campaigns in Karelia. Actually, the school of Finnish Red commanders took revenge there, on the Soviet side against their Finns. Antikainen, he was just the hero of these battles. If my memory serves me right, in 42 he crashed in a car accident. There is a monument to him in Arkhangelsk. "Antikainen Ski Track" is dedicated to the young years of the Soviet Republic and all these military operations in Karelia. Antikainen was a very radical red, therefore, of course, he would have taken the events of 44 years with hostility, of course, i.e. He left this world just in time. “In your opinion, is there any point in sorting out the theses that were voiced in the film on the Rossiya channel?” Yes Yes. We will shoot in the Blue Phil genre an analysis of this and other documentaries of the Rossiya TV channel. There are many wonderful discoveries that the script of these paintings is preparing for us. Yes. The next question is: “Why, when talking about the White Terror in Tampere, did they not say a word about the destruction of 200 Russian servicemen of the 106th Infantry Division, led by Lieutenant Colonel Bulatsel G.V.? The white terror against the Russians in Tampere was no less bloody than in Vyborg. Yes, you are absolutely right, but ... It is impossible to tell about everything. Tampere is a separate story and you just see, there is not only that, you see, the difference between Vyborg is that after all in Vyborg there was a mass execution of Russians, and in Tampere, there, unfortunately, they put everyone in a row against the wall, those. this is exactly what Mannerheim is very fond of in Tampere, because Mannerheim, before the assault from a plane with a blue swastika, scattered leaflets, not him personally, but on his behalf a leaflet was scattered that give up, you were deceived by red Russe, Russian pigs or Muscovites however you can translate them. You, honest Finns, give up, I promise - there will be no executions. And then, when the cleansing of Tampere began after 2 days, it started there that ... they killed Russians, non-Russians, everyone they could. The logic was this: Russian means red. Red means against the wall. There was a purpose. Well, the Reds forced him to be their military adviser, the Reds in Tampere - they did not know how to fight, these were workers who, for some, for the first time in their lives, saw a rifle at all. Therefore, there was a goal, they just came and said - Mr. Lieutenant Colonel, citizen Bulazel, everything, you advise us how to fight, and if you refuse, then we will simply shoot you right now. Is that exactly right? There is evidence, right? Well, this, at least, is what is voiced in Finnish sources, that he was shot precisely because he was red. Those. he was shot by the whites when they occupied Tampere, for being a military adviser to the reds. But again, it is emphasized that it was not by his own will. The fact is that the 106th Infantry Division, it was generally left. This is a unique formation, which, on the one hand, was completely in revolutionary positions, and on the other hand, it retained its combat capability. There, part of the 106th Infantry Division leaned towards the Socialist-Revolutionary program, and part was in the Bolshevik positions. And as far as I can judge, according to the logic of 17 years, what is the complexity of the position of the officers at that moment - that they became hostages of the soldier mass. Those. on the one hand, some were really forced, and on the other hand, some officers simply followed their soldiers purely psychologically, because they saw that all the soldiers, the whole mass, were set up in this way. And it's very unclear what you should do. Those. you have the best scenario, if you do not agree with them, it's just to run away from there, because they are clearly hostile to you. And some officers quite followed this mass of soldiers, and many famous Soviet military leaders in the future, for example, Marshal Shaposhnikov, or A.M. Vasilevsky, they were all chosen commanders at that moment after order number 1 in their formations. Although Shaposhnikov was a career officer, he was already a colonel. In March he was a lieutenant colonel, and by October a colonel. And Vasilevsky was a staff captain. And they followed this mass of soldiers. I think quite sincerely. Here is an interesting position in Bulatzel. We need to look more, but the fact remains, because indeed Bulatzel was shot despite the fact that, in my opinion, they were even personally acquainted with Mannerheim in general, before all these events, back in imperial times. So the Finnish civil war is a completely separate topic, which has been little studied in our country, because things are old, things are connected not only with Russia, but also with Finland. But we would suggest that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs discuss the possibility of installing a commemorative sign or plaques dedicated to the victims of the White Terror in Tampere during the Finnish Civil War. Next question: “The following questions remain unclear. Did the Soviet Union even consider the possibility of securing Leningrad in a purely diplomatic way without exchanging territories? A non-aggression pact or some other way to buy Finland's neutrality. If not, why not? If yes, why didn't it work? How profitable was the exchange offered and why did the Finns so rest on the territory? We had a non-aggression pact with Finland. We had it concluded and it did not help, it did not solve the situation in any way, unfortunately. To buy the neutrality of Finland, again, due to the extremely hostile attitude of the Finnish elites of that time, in the 30s, it was simply impossible. I'll explain. Here, firstly, the Soviet Union had a non-aggression pact with Germany. Did it help? Apparently not, this is the first. Second, let's say that some additional act is concluded with Finland, which spells out all the guarantees. The current government of Finland, for example, is determined to adhere to the provisions of this treaty. However, I repeat, this agreement does not insure against the deployment of German troops in Finland, it does not insure. In fact, in the presence of all the agreements, the agreement was concluded after 1940, and the Soviet Union, as we discussed last time, really sought to maintain good neighborly relations with Finland. In any case, set it to neutral. Nevertheless, under these conditions, Finland allowed the Germans to deploy their contingents on its territory. Yes, it was disguised as a transit to the territory of Norway, but, nevertheless, German troops were stationed there. Actually, the Germans launched an attack on Murmansk from the territory of Finland. Therefore, there the Norwegian army was partially located in Finland under the command of Nicholas von Falkenhorst, as far as I remember. Yes, I think so. So, accordingly, no treaty guaranteed that the German troops would not stand up and at one fine moment would not stand on the territory of Finland, at one fine moment would not carry out a coup d'état, would not bring to power a government that would terminate this treaty, and, accordingly, would not attack Finland. A strong, real guarantee that the security of Leningrad would be ensured was only the removal of the territory, which was precisely what they were going to implement through an exchange. And this brings us to the next question: “How profitable was the exchange offered and why were the Finns so stubbornly territorial?” Complex issue. From a modern point of view, if you really rely on afterthought and look at the fact that we ended up with a post-war operation, when the situation was resolved militarily during the Soviet-Finnish war, then the exchange was more profitable than what the Finns received as a result , because the Soviet Union did not demand Vyborg, the Soviet Union did not demand the Saimaa Canal, which is extremely important for Finland, the Soviet Union did not demand the entire northern lagoon. They asked to move the border to the current line. Well, we are even silent about Pechenga with its nickel deposits. Yes. The situation is the following, that if you look at the Soviet requirements, then the question was only about part of the border in the center and in the western part of the Karelian Isthmus. Those. a distance of 80 km, now the Orekhovo district on the Priozerskoye highway, this was quite suitable for the Soviet Union, i.e. they asked in the central and western parts to move the border by 50 kilometers. In exchange, the Finns were offered the very territories that they claimed during their campaigns, just Rebolovo was offered. Part. Some of them, of course, not all. But, nevertheless, Stalin believed that these are normal conditions, this is a normal exchange, let's change and close the whole situation. If here in the previous question we were talking about an agreement, then the Soviet Union proposed an agreement not only on non-aggression, but also on friendship and mutual assistance with Finland. Those. if Finland is attacked by a third power, then the Soviet Union is obliged under this treaty to send troops to the territory of Finland and to help Finland by military means. This is exactly the same proposal. The Finns refused. They said that "we are a neutral country, we have no right to conclude such agreements, if we conclude such an agreement with you, we are no longer neutrals." Formally, they are right. Why are the Finns so rested in the territory? This was the position of the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs of that time, his name was Elias Erkko, he was a newspaper magnate and also an ardent Russophobe. He said that you give these Russians a finger, and they will bite off your arm up to the elbow, so there can be no inch of your native land, no compromise. And, in fact, he really managed to push it through in the then government, and this set such an uncompromising line in the negotiations. Although we note that there were forces that looked at the issue more adequately - both Mannerheim and Paasikivi. Paasikivi, who led the delegation. Once again, a small detail that will also allow you to understand the mood of the Finnish side in the negotiations, October-November 39. Molotov and Stalin, the first 2 persons of the state, were personally present at the first round of negotiations from the Soviet side. The Finns sent Paasikivi to negotiations, who at that moment was the ambassador in Stockholm, this is a man of exactly lower rank, if not 2 ranks lower. Those. sent, the Minister of Foreign Affairs simply did not go, the Prime Minister did not go. In general, they sent a person, yes, Paasikivi, he knew Russian well, he negotiated with Soviet Russia back in Tartu, about the previous peace treaty of 1920. In our time, it would just look like a spit in the face of the Soviet Union in general, that they send a person clearly not of high rank. In principle, yes, the Soviet Union was unlucky with negotiators, the only power that sent a serious person to negotiate with the Soviet Union was Nazi Germany. She sent the Minister of Foreign Affairs, because you know that chronologically at the same time negotiations were taking place with England and France, they were represented there, England was represented by the semi-retired Admiral Drax and the same semi-retired General Doumeng, and Drax also had no authority to conclude an agreement. He just came to hang out in Moscow. I think that in our literature, in our historiography, and even more so in journalism, they very often undertake, pay special attention to this fact, I thought that in England there was some kind of reverse assessment. But quite unexpectedly, I was watching a wonderful series called "Up and Down the Stairs", where the main character is a diplomat, Deputy Foreign Secretary of Great Britain. And that's where the story plays out. There is melodrama, but this plot is also played out. He is an anti-fascist and he sees what Chamberlain's insane policies are leading to. And so he condemns the Munich Agreement, and when he is told that Admiral Drax has been sent to negotiate with the Soviet Union, he says he is talking with a prince of royal blood, and when he hears that Drax has been sent, he says "with the same success they could send a waiter. In general, in modern Britain, apparently, there is also a critical attitude towards these people, and, in fact, it was about the same with Paasikivi. Yes, that means the next question: “How backstage were the pre-war Soviet-Finnish negotiations? Not in the sense of diplomatic secrecy, but in the sense of their coverage in the then media and public discussion on both sides. The Finnish press wrote a lot, and at the same time, in fact, it is not very, ie. Parliament did not know very well, and the public did not really know what they were demanding at all, but it is clear that all this was presented from a very patriotic point of view. This is picture 3, that we do not sell or rent this land, such posters were hung out, in fact, by some Finnish merchants in their stores. I understand that Erkko's newspapers played the first fiddle in coverage. In general, who owns the newspapers, he covers it. Therefore, yes, in fact, the demands from the Soviet side were covered quite hostilely. In our country, on the contrary, as you understand, Soviet demands were portrayed as adequate, generous, and so on. And vice versa, the Finns were reminded of all their antics in the early 20s. And the defeat of the labor movement in the Finnish Civil War, and the expedition to Soviet Karelia, and the sending of intelligence officers, and the support of the separatists in Karelia. And support, by the way, of the white émigré terrorist cells that were in Zelenogorsk, they carried out several terrorist attacks in Petrograd in the 1920s, and then in Leningrad. Those. the Finns were reminded, they rolled out a whole list of the fact that we have a hostile neighbor, it turns out, and probably, if we don’t agree, then it will be necessary to punish him. And this rhetoric only intensified after the failure of the negotiations and after the decision was made to launch a military operation. There was simply a direct processing of public opinion that it was time to teach a neighbor a lesson. Those. Again, dear viewers and listeners, there is no need to think that Soviet people was some kind of herd that did not follow the news, which did not need to be explained. Whatever the Soviet government did, they immediately took it under the hood and went to carry it out. No, absolutely not. The government has gone to great lengths to explain why we do this. Before the Finnish war, it is just clear that for 2 weeks they were directly pumped up, the editorials of Pravda - they are all about the fact that the Finns behaved badly here, and here they are uncompromising. We made them a good offer, they refused. So they are still hostile, and so on and so forth. Those. it was all covered from both sides indeed. “Egor, is it planned to pay attention to the Kronstadt rebellion in future programs?” Yes, definitely, of course. There is a huge question about the losses of the USSR in the war for you, Yegor, but I think that it is better not here. Yes, dear friends. Let's write a separate program on this topic. “Tell me, please, did the participation of Great Britain in the war of 1939 give any obligations to Finland, could she fulfill them? What deadlines for their implementation, if any, did she set for herself, and did they (the deadlines) differ from reality? Well, they didn’t have any union treaty, that is. Finns are neutrals. And it is clear that the rhetoric was proficient. Indeed, the Western world regarded the actions of the Soviet Union as aggression. There were volunteers from the UK who were going to take part. 50 people. One of them was the famous future actor Christopher Lee. Those who visit my page know that I love Star Wars very much. Christopher Lee, who played Count Dooku in the new trilogy and Saruman in The Lord of the Rings, was going to take part in this war on the side of Finland in his youth. He then served in the royal army during World War II. Speaking further, it means that there were actually no obligations, there was a promise to send an Anglo-French expeditionary force, but again, with their own tasks. Frightening bombing of Baku. Yes, the frightening bombing of Baku, but in fact it all remained rhetoric. Although, indeed, these actions of Great Britain were monitored by our intelligence and, indeed, the reports that Great Britain and France might intervene on the side of Finland were the reason why the Soviet Union in March was also ready to conclude a peace treaty with Finland on conditions much more severe for Finland than what was offered in October. As for the supply of weapons, I now offhand do not remember. Immediately after the start of the war, the chief inspector of artillery of the Finnish army, General Vilho Nenonen, the staff captain of the Russian Imperial Army, an artilleryman who studied with us, in St. Petersburg, at the Mikhailovskaya Artillery Academy, immediately went to Europe to buy artillery. And it was in the UK that he ordered a large number of heavy howitzers, six-inch and eight-inch howitzers "Vickers" from the First World War. They did not have time for the Finnish war and started talking only in 1941. In particular, picture 4 - this is such a howitzer firing a shot in Mainil, and if you remember, Mainila - this was the reason for launching a military operation against Finland. The Finns, when they came to Mainil and immediately crossed the border in Mainil, they defiantly set up this howitzer, wrote “Mainila” on the projectile, and fired towards Leningrad, saying that now we fired real Mainil shots. In World War II, again, now we will finish answering questions, in fact, there is only 1 question left and then we will move on to 1941-44, to all sorts of diplomatic conflicts. In the second war, Great Britain declared war on Finland on December 6, 1941, and when we first signed an armistice with the Finns, and then peace, Great Britain also signed with Finland as one of the participants in this conflict. And, in fact, the last question, it was, in my opinion, not for this video, but for the previous one. I don't see him here. There was a question why on June 22, first, Finland declares neutrality, then ... Hitler first allegedly said that Finland was our ally, then somehow it went ... Framed. Framed, and, very strongly framed. All the hostile actions of the then Finland - this was the sending of saboteurs, and the deployment of German aircraft on the territory of Finland, and so on and so forth, which was undertaken by the Finns, this did not lead to the fact that the Soviet Union took and did not immediately declare war on Finland. Those. how is it that the Finns are already trying to somehow militarily attack us, harm us, but the Soviet Union is doing nothing. Those. Stalin leaked or Molotov leaked? Here, dear viewers, we are talking about the military component. Let's remember that our border between Russia and Finland is the longest border in Europe, it is more than 1,000 km long. And when the Great Patriotic War has already begun, when the fight is already beginning not for life, but to the death against Nazi Germany, to get one more front of 1000 km, even against Finland, it must be, in fact, a traitor to your country and a very narrow-minded military man. Indeed, all the efforts of the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1944, so that Finland, without losing face, would possibly withdraw from the war. In this regard, there is a private letter from Churchill to Mannerheim, a secret one, and there is Mannerheim's reply to Churchill, this is just a well-known story. This letter, telegram, is extensively quoted on the Internet, i.e. the fact that the Soviet Union did not respond to Finland's provocations is understandable that at that time it was more beneficial for us, the Soviet Union, that Finland would not enter the war. Because if it enters the war, then we have an even huge front that must be held, and troops must be kept there. It seems to me that the understanding of the situation in the Soviet leadership developed as follows. I think that the Soviet leadership was well aware that Finland was encouraging Germany in one way or another. Maybe she did not fully understand to what extent, but, in any case, the vector of her policy was clear. But in the situation of June 22-23, this seemed the lesser evil compared to participation, with the full-fledged entry of Finland into the war. Moreover, despite this set-up by Hitler, Finland itself declared its neutrality and diplomatic contacts began, because the Soviet embassy worked in Finland, in Helsinki, and Soviet diplomacy immediately began to request the position of Finland, Finland replied that it adhered to neutrality and for some time, short, perhaps, the Soviet leadership retained the illusion that this was the case, or in any case, the Finnish elites are fighting over what position to take in this situation. If I remember correctly, Molotov immediately called the Finnish ambassador to him and asked what position Finland had, you were neutrals, and, if I remember correctly, the ambassador replied that Finland would act as she saw fit and most beneficial for herself. Those. The answer was already quite arrogant. But there was a declaration of neutrality. Yes it was. But on 26, respectively, the Finns declare war against the Soviet peoples. It's literally a few days. Those. 24, it was decided to bomb, because it became clear that an attack was coming from the territory of Finland. It became clear that simply regardless of whether Finland is at war or not at war, its territory is a springboard for an attack on Leningrad. Therefore, the Soviet Union undertook the bombing of airfields ... And other targets. Other military targets in Finland. As a result, the raid was extremely unsuccessful, there were casualties among the civilian population of Finland, which really gave the Finnish government just carte blanche. It was immediately stated that we were attacked, we are again a victim of aggression, so we declare war. Those. On June 26, Finland officially declared war on the Soviet Union. And I would like to emphasize another interesting point: in July, the situation with Petsamo was absolutely the same, because the British, our allies, drove up the aircraft carrier and bombed Petsamo, also carrying out an operation of the same significance. Those. the task was also to bomb the Germans who are sitting in Petsamo. There were also, in my opinion, casualties and destruction, fortunately not as significant as during the Soviet raid (fortunately for the Finns), but Finland, after that, she did not declare war on Great Britain, she only protested and asked for monetary compensation for destroyed property, for damaged property, and so on. A very interesting detail, by the way. Yes. But everyone forgot about it, yes. Absolutely the same situation, i.e. in one situation the Finns “yeah, we were attacked and therefore we declare war”, and in another situation “well, you bombed us, so let's pay compensation”. Finland, of course, maneuvered very strongly. It is necessary to explain to our viewers what Finland has achieved, what goals it has set for itself in the war after it completed its main offensive operations in January 42. And the vision of the Finnish leadership is at the moment when it seems to the Finnish leadership that it is Nazi Germany and the Nazi German-led European Union, version 2.0, that will win. November 29, 41 Prime Minister of Finland Jukka Rangel, close friend and a supporter of the President of Finland, Risto Ryti, also a lawyer, also from the University of Helsinki, ie. a member of the Finnish elite, very pro-German, appears before the Finnish parliament with an extensive government report on the state of affairs and, accordingly, makes a presentation to the parliament, i.e. he is like this, you can say, well, as usual, the prime minister does in parliament, reports for the year on the work done, and so on. This document is on the website of the Finnish Parliament, unfortunately, I translated only part of it, because it is very lengthy. It must be said that in this document, the Prime Minister of Finland, of course, accuses the Soviet Union of all sins, accuses the Soviet Union, starting from the year 20, that all agreements were constantly violated, and then they attacked us, and attacked again , and attacked a third time. From which he concludes that since we have such a terrible eastern neighbor, then for these reasons the only guarantee for ensuring security remains territorial acquisitions. “The foreign regions occupied by us, from which the enemy threatened us, must be left under the military occupation of the Finnish forces. How far our occupation of the security zone will extend is a question that does not need to be answered during the battle, because. it is determined by strategic views. However, it is clear that these military tasks have their limits. We don't claim territories just for the sake of territories. We have a vast country and there are enough places for the labor of our people to get food and raise the standard of living. But the peaceful labor of the people is impossible if our present enemy can again begin to plot his intrigues from those regions from which it will be impossible for us to repulse his next attack. We live in a risk zone. It has not been possible to create an effective international security system. Our only opportunity for effective defense is to shorten and straighten the lines of combat contact. It should also not be forgotten that part of the people of Finland lives in the areas in question. Finland during its period of independence has already tried many times to improve the situation of the Finnish population in these areas. So it was in connection with the conclusion of the Tartu Peace Treaty. After the guarantees under this peace treaty turned out to be insignificant, Finland tried to assist for the benefit of the eastern Karelians, turning to international organizations. All measures, however, turned out to be empty, and the Finnish population of eastern Karelia continued to be ruthlessly oppressed and destroyed. As regards the current situation, the Government of Finland, in its recent response to the United States, pointed out the miserable situation in which the population of occupied eastern Karelia would fall if they were again forced to live under the heel of the Bolshevik rule. Space in quote. “What was said above about guarantees of Finland's security fully applies to the position of the Eastern Karelians. The only satisfactory solution to these issues is that the area of ​​their residence will remain under the occupation of the Finnish forces. It is Finland's duty to do everything possible to ensure the security of their situation." Well, then a report on the international situation. “Relations between Finland and Germany are clear and even. They are based on common military benefits and brotherhood in arms. They are also based on sincere friendship and mutual respect. Finland is grateful that this time she is not fighting alone against the enemy. The great armed forces of Germany, which are fighting on the gigantic Russian front for the sake of destroying Bolshevism, which threatens the security and well-being of all countries of the world, have tied the forces of the Red Army in such a way that Finland is fighting on its fronts in much more equal conditions than in the war 2 years ago . German troops also provided direct military support to our country, closing the northern part of the front between Finland and the Soviet Union. In terms of the economy, relations with Germany have become very valuable for us. After our ocean routes were cut already in mid-June, our international trade, both imports and exports, is directed mainly to Germany, and through Germany to the countries of central and southern Europe. It is especially necessary to emphasize that we constantly receive significant volumes of grain and other vital goods from Germany, and this is of decisive importance for our country. Let's take a break. There is a comment about the grain that Finland received from Germany. The fact is that, just like in the case of Finland, so in the case of Germany, its imports were blocked by the British fleet. And the grain that Germany was transporting to Finland to support its allies, she could transport only for the simple reason that she seized this grain from the occupied territories, from the occupied territories of Ukraine and southern Russia. Thus, Finland, although indirectly, nevertheless, endured the hardships of the war in the same way at the expense of the Soviet Union, as did Germany. I made my remark, but in my opinion, it is very important. Yes. Further here praises to other countries - Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and all other allies of Nazi Germany. And then the Prime Minister of Finland continues. “The struggle against a common enemy thus gave rise to mutual respect and trust between peoples fighting shoulder to shoulder. As I said in the previously mentioned report to the government on June 25 - i.e. the day before the start of the war - then began the struggle for the sake of all mankind against Bolshevism, which is striving for world revolution, general destruction and terror. Well, again, the report must be translated in full, it is replete there, in general, with such strong statements that clearly skew. The Prime Minister made his position very clear. Also the last 3 lines. I would only like to emphasize that, in my opinion, all questions of relations and contradictions between states would be easier to resolve if the pernicious influence of the USSR, based on Bolshevism, were decisively eliminated in international politics. Those. everything will be fine if there is no Soviet Union. This is the report of November 9, 41. Indeed, the Germans near Moscow, in fact, are standing, Leningrad is blocked, there is still about a week left before the Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow. Actually, German and Finnish newspapers are full of headlines that the Kremlin towers with Kremlin stars are already visible, so the report is so very optimistic. But this is about the fact that some of us still say that Finland stopped at the old border. No, she also occupied eastern Karelia, and here the prime minister emphasizes, i.е. he argues from his point of view the necessity, why do we need eastern Karelia. Those. this is also a buffer against Russia, and plus, again, eastern Karelians related to the Finns live there and they must be protected, this is a sacred duty of Finland. Indeed, ideologically, he justifies the emergence of a great Finland. There will be a separate program about the great Finland. On November 6, 1941, the Finnish parliament, a week after these hearings, it approves the 1920 border as a state border. He thereby nullifies the Moscow peace treaty. It’s also good that they still had the sense not to include Petrozavodsk and all these occupied territories, to attach it specifically to their state. But, nevertheless, on December 6, 1941, indeed, Finland officially renounced the Moscow peace treaty of 1940, and on the same day, a declaration of war by Great Britain arrives synchronously. Again, there are already October documents, not only that the battle for Moscow is going on and Stalin begins to panic and demands that the UK urgently do something. No, already in September and October, Soviet diplomacy, in fact, asked, or rather, did not ask - it hinted to Britain that it would be nice for you to declare war on all these comrades who are fighting against us, because we are allies. Again, the difference between a non-aggression pact and an allied pact is clearly visible here. Those. if a non-aggression pact, we declare neutrality to each other, and an allied pact, it already implies a much greater degree of integration and much greater interaction in terms of decision-making. Without the consent of the allies, in fact, the USSR tried to do nothing. All 3 powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, they nevertheless tried to somehow coordinate their actions and at least inform the allies of what was happening in general. Those. it's a much more serious interaction. And on December 6, 1941, Great Britain declares war on Finland, Romania and Bulgaria. But as the British diplomats have already discussed, they said that this, in general, has no practical significance. But it has an ideological significance. Ideologically, it really mattered a lot, which… It scared me seriously, because it’s one thing to fight against the Soviet Union, which, so to speak, is placed outside the framework of civilization, as they think, a pariah state, it seems like everyone agrees on this. It turns out that no, the Soviet Union is a normal European power that has allied relations with Great Britain, and now they are not at war with the Soviet Union, but with the anti-Hitler coalition. Yes. Let me remind you, dear viewers, in fact, the anti-Hitler coalition in 43 was called the United Nations, i.e. United Nations. This was already the foundation of the post-war security system, even then laid. Well, of course, in Finland all this was perceived very, indeed, negatively, a cartoon appeared, picture 1, where Stalin rides Churchill on horseback, saddled him. It was about the same. But this is 41 years, indeed, it seems to all Western pro-Nazi forces that victory is close. I think he and Roosevelt took turns skating. It's true. Regarding Roosevelt, by the way, to be honest, this is a good question, because I don’t know the caricature of Roosevelt. Well, where did the caricatures of Roosevelt come from? They were in Germany. In Germany, this is understandable. Here are the Finns. Why Finns? There was also an interesting conflict, of course, that Great Britain declared war, but the United States did not declare war, they only recalled their ambassador on June 30, 1944 and expelled the Finnish ambassador from Washington, and so they maintained diplomatic relations. Despite the fact that Soviet diplomacy also put a lot of pressure on them, they said - listen, look, Great Britain has already declared war on Finland, they are an ally just like you. Why don't you declare war on Finland? To which the Americans, with their pragmatism, answered - yes, but we are allies, let's declare war on Japan, please, right now, because the Soviet Union had a non-aggression pact with Japan. Declare war on Japan and we will declare war on Finland. Well, we discussed this story with you last time, but it seems to me that this had a practical meaning, because through the United States it was possible to put pressure on Finland. Yes, just like through Sweden. As well as through Sweden, yes, i.e. these were pressure channels. This had its own logic. Yes. But 1943, Stalingrad, then, as Egor rightly said, Kursk, then Sicily, i.e. Indeed, the position of Germany is changing dramatically. I think the breakthrough of the blockade hinted. And the breakthrough of the blockade, the Finnish military became seriously worried in January-February 44, when the blockade was lifted. Those. they saw the military defeat of the Germans and some Finnish generals, at first they did not even believe their eyes that the Germans were doing so badly, because they really believed that the German army was very strong. Highly important point - this is the Tehran Conference, when the leaders of the 3 powers of the anti-Hitler coalition gathered and discussed, in addition to the general military campaign in the summer of 44 years, let me remind you, dear viewers, that June 44 is a coordinated attack, these are coordinated operations on both the eastern and western fronts. On the western front, this is "Overlord" - a landing in Normandy, and with us it is "10 Stalinist strikes." Just the Soviet offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, the Soviet offensive on the Svir and Operation Bagration, they were to a large extent synchronized with Overlord in order to really break the front, i.e. break the German reserves and simultaneously beat Nazi Germany and their allies on all fronts. So, in Tehran, they discussed Finland for a long time, what to do with them as a result. And Roosevelt, in his typical American way, said that there "Mr. Marshal, what can the US government do to get Finland out of the war?" And Stalin immediately outlined the conditions of the USSR, indeed, on what conditions can we reconcile. Because this is the pacification of Finland - this was really the goal of Soviet diplomacy in 41, and in 42, and in 43, i.e. efforts were made, but, unfortunately, there was no result. So, the position of the Soviet Union, dear viewers, is not the occupation of Finland and its inclusion in the Soviet Union, but a return to the 1940 treaty, a public and complete break in relations with Nazi Germany by Finland and compensation. Compensation for what the Finns did in Karelia, they took a piece of Soviet territory that never belonged to them. The auction begins. Churchill says damage is easy to do but hard to repair. Finland is a poor country, they won't be able to pay you. Churchill says that they may be able to cut down a few trees, supply them to you, but nothing more. Stalin replies that they will pay, I know how to make them pay. Churchill rests in the sense that they will never pay you, this is a poor country, this is not Germany and some large European countries. Stalin says - well, we will simply occupy some part of Finland with troops and leave there only when they pay off their debts. Churchill, he does not retreat, he is also a very experienced politician, he says - listen, what about your slogan "a world without annexations and indemnities"? Well, you declared it in 18, if I'm not mistaken. To which Stalin smiled widely, appreciated the humor and said that you know, I am becoming a conservative, so they will still pay. After that, there really is a bargaining over where the border will be, we give or don’t give Petsamo, but the Soviet Union said that our conditions are fundamental - this is a break with Germany, this is the border of 40 years, about some progress, maybe maybe you can still bargain where the border will be, and, thirdly, compensation, i.e. you owe us compensation for the damage that has been caused. Those. let's record that already in 1943 the Soviet Union agreed absolutely to the preservation of an independent Finland, subject to the fulfillment of certain and rather moderate conditions. Yes, Egor, thank you very much for highlighting. Churchill asked this question directly to Stalin, i.e. he said in such a way that we understand that the Soviet Union has its own sphere of influence, there are security issues in Leningrad, the Baltic states, the Baltic Sea, we understand all this. But it would be unpleasant for Great Britain if you included Finland in your state against the wishes of the population of this country. To which Stalin replied that no, let them live as they wish in these very inconvenient areas, but I will teach them a lesson. Those. a return to the year 40, a break with Germany, and most importantly, monetary compensation. Those. not money, but precisely goods, industrial goods that the Soviet Union needs to restore the national economy and the economy, destroyed precisely by what the Finns and Germans arranged, and all the other allies of Nazi Germany staged in the occupied territories. And the main bargaining, the main dispute was precisely because of compensation? About money, yes. All other conditions somehow did not raise questions. It's clear. As Dmitry Yuryevich says - first, of course, about money. Yes, about money. Both Roosevelt and Churchill tried to somehow negotiate with Stalin either the complete abolition of compensation, or its reduction. Protocols from 3 sides, the British vision is very well reflected in Churchill's memoirs, and not in this thick book, where Churchill compressed all his memories of the Second World War, he also wrote a five-volume book, dear viewers, there are 5 volumes. In Volume 4 of Triumph and Tragedy, i.e. "Triumph and Tragedy", there he has it all well painted. And if you take the usual memoirs of Churchill, there is something very casual about this, or, in my opinion, it is completely absent. At least in the English version. The American vision is on the website of some American university, I won't lie, the link is below. You can read the American Protocol. The Soviet protocol, it generally corresponds, the only thing is that some sharp corners are bypassed, they are not included in the transcript. It's all there, and it is confirmed by all 3 parties. And I heard that the Finns are just ignoring these decisions of the Tehran Conference and are trying to present the matter in such a way that the insidious Soviet Union tried to seize Finland and only with their last strength, bleeding, they held out at the last frontier and thus inflicted on the USSR defeat. Yes, i.e. this is the main postulate. So, once again won their independence. Yes. This is the main postulate of modern Finnish official state propaganda that it was already the 3rd war for the independence of Finland and that the great and terrible Soviet Union, led by the no less great and terrible Stalin, wanted to occupy all of Finland in 44, well, since Stalin had the great and terrible this did not work out, which means that he was defeated, and Finland won a defensive victory. Tehran is completely thrown out of any discussion at all, it is simply not considered. In the same way, the Finns are not very fond of remembering that Great Britain declared war on them, i.e. they believe that they fought only against the Soviet Union, and the UK is generally there, as if it were not there. In fact, in fact, the very fact of the blockade, the food blockade, it says a lot. Now it is clear what was discussed, more or less agreed, what practical steps? Roosevelt asks Stalin - are you ready to receive the Finnish delegation in Moscow, if we call them now, say that you fly to Moscow, talk to the Russians, are you ready to receive them? Stalin said that we are ready to accept something, but, in my opinion, this is absolutely not necessary now, because the Finnish government is pro-Nazi and Roosevelt says yes, I know. They will arrive in Moscow, we will talk, we will not agree, and this will immediately be presented by Nazi propaganda, German, as another failure of the allies. And Stalin clearly said that yes, let them come, but my opinion is that they are not ready to make peace on any terms. Then Stalin said such words that let even Ryuti come, let even the devil come, I'm not afraid of devils. And indeed, at the end of March, for 44 years, a Finnish delegation has been arriving in Moscow, on March 27 they have a meeting, and, as always, Paasikivi heads the delegation 10 times from the Finns. All familiar faces, in fact, there are Paasikivi, Enkel. On the Soviet side, Molotov, Dekanozov, Shtemenko and Podtserob. They discuss for a long time. Molotov immediately, of course, he immediately says right off the bat - do you have the authority to conclude a truce or peace? Correctly. Paasikivi immediately says no, we just came to listen to you again. Moscow to see, have not been for a long time. Haven't been for a long time. We came to get an explanation about your conditions, because Kollontai told us something that you are ready to talk. But we didn't understand, you want to make a final peace or truce, so could you please clarify that. For half an hour, at least, Molotov patiently discusses peace, a truce and all these definitions with Paasikivi and the delegation. Actually, Yandex.Disk with all these files is under transfer, this is one, the second - please go to the website of the Russian Foreign Ministry, which posted all these documents for free access to the 70th anniversary of the victory. The link is also under the video. These are amazing documents. Examples of diplomatic skill. Generally. There, of course, Molotov terribly trolled just the Finns, that is. Enkel he just brought to hysterics. Here I will not retell all this, here is the protocol of the meeting for 18 pages. The most important thing here, i.e. there it is clear that everyone remembers each other in 1939, and 41, and so on, but Molotov, in fact, at the end of this long conversation with Finnish diplomats, says that “it is clear to everyone that the USSR did not want war with Finland in June 1941. However, Finland attacked the Soviet Union, thinking that together with Germany they could get something, and that the Soviet Union would not stand on its feet. But the Soviet Union stood on its feet, and Finland must reckon with this. And then Molotov told the delegation that ... compared the Soviet Union with the Russian Empire? He said that the Russian Empire kept Finland in its composition, carried out Russification, and the Bolsheviks gave it independence, pursue a friendly policy, and the Finns are not appeased. Yes. Actually, this is exactly what he tells them, that in fact you don’t love us, us Bolsheviks, our Soviet government, this is your business, but, roughly speaking, the situation is as follows, that if there were not a Soviet government, but an imperial one, royal, you would have no independence at all. And then, in fact, Molotov raises the issue of the blockade of Leningrad, in no way does he hush it up, on the contrary, he says - “The Finns, together with the Germans, carried out the blockade of Leningrad for 2.5 years. Hundreds of thousands of people died of starvation in Leningrad. Now everyone can see that the danger turned out to be exactly as we foresaw it. Our worst fears came true. Finland, although it received its independence from the hands of Russia, was among the allies of Germany, which attacked the Soviet Union. And then Paasikivi's answer, what we just discussed in the answers and questions. Paasikivi replies that if there had not been a war of 39-40, then the Finns might have fought together with the Soviet Union, or the same thing would have happened to them as to Norway and Denmark. Let's hear the answer of Vyacheslav Mikhailovich. Molotov, answering this remark, asks: were there German troops on Finnish territory at the time when Germany attacked the USSR? Answering in the affirmative, Paasikivi says that they will touch on an uncomfortable subject for conversation. Excellent. Molotov says that he did not initiate this conversation. Enkel spoke about feelings, so he, Molotov, decided to speak out about the feelings of his people. The fact is that Enkel, when there was talk about the border of 1940, Enkel said that you, please, understand the feelings of our people, we fought here and we believe that it was you, the Soviet Union, who treated us unfairly. And then Molotov cuts him off very sharply and says - what feelings can we have, sorry if we just had a blockade of Leningrad, 100 thousand people died there, and how will we, the leadership of the USSR, explain to the Soviet people that we are returning to border 39 years. The Finns, by the way, immediately came up with trump cards and said - let's go back to the year 39, i.e. border on Beloostrov. It's, excuse me, March '44, how so? But Molotov immediately said that there could be no talk of this, we had an agreement of 40 years old, which you violated. And indeed here, just read it in full, there those who call Molotov a stone ass and believe that he was a narrow-minded person, this is a brilliant diplomat, in fact. As far as I remember, Churchill wrote that Talleyrand, Metternich and someone else, with pleasure in the afterlife, in paradise, would accept him into their company if the Bolsheviks allowed him to enter paradise. But, as a result, once we talked, we parted, we didn’t agree on anything. Indeed, Enkel was almost hysterical, in general. It's not clear what they were hoping for, really. The bottom line is that in April comes the answer from the Finnish government, very polite, to French , through our embassy in Sweden, stating that I'm sorry, but these conditions are unacceptable. Those. Finns refuse these conditions. As a result, we have the Vyborg offensive operation going on, this is a topic for a separate book that I have written. I am now preparing its second edition, expanded and corrected, because Finnish historians have pointed out several mistakes that I made in it. But the bottom line is that our offensive near Beloostrov really begins on June 9-10, on June 20, after a short battle, our units enter the city of Vyborg and raise a red flag over the tower of St. Olof. And at this moment, the Finns again contact our people in Stockholm, with Alexandra Kollontai. They say, listen, could you voice your conditions again? What was there? What was there? Could you repeat, please, maybe we can somehow agree now. The note in response is a very serious stumbling block in the study of our relations, because I personally have not seen the text of this note, the only place where it is quoted is Mannerheim's memoirs. And it says there, in the interpretation of Mannerheim, that since the Finns have deceived us many times, please write a letter of guarantee signed by the President and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland that Finland is ready to surrender, and send a delegation to Moscow. And this wording, i.e. at least, as it is cited in Mannerheim's memoirs, that Finland was ready to surrender, the Finnish leadership was perceived as a demand for unconditional surrender. But this is precisely their perception, yes, i.e. what if capitulation, then why send a delegation to Moscow at all? We ourselves will then come to you in Helsinki on tanks, if you surrender. Those. obviously, either the wording was unsuccessful, again, I emphasize once again that I have not seen the original. It really needs to be dug up in the archives, because the Finns, in fact, cite Mannerheim's formulation and, of course, immediately declare the Soviet Union guilty of continuing the hostilities that flared up with renewed vigor on June 25 in the battle of Tali-Ihantala. If you had formulated the terms in a milder way now, perhaps we would have come to an agreement. But, again, here we see only the Finnish interpretation of these events. I have not seen the full text of this note; this, by the way, is such an interesting, very exciting study that needs to be done, what did our people really write there, what the Finns interpret like this. It is necessary to look in the archive of foreign policy. Yes. It is the original text itself, and what was the discussion with the allies, for example. Those. what was the position of Great Britain on this whole thing, what were the instructions of Molotov, Alexandra Kollontai, for example. What was the real position of the Soviet Union at that moment. But the intrigue does not end there, because the first thing is that things are not going well at the front for the Finns, to put it mildly, the second thing is that Germany finds out, of course, about all these movements that Finland in general is clearly making behind the back of Nazi Germany . And the arrival of the Paasikivi delegation in March, was it secret? He, in my opinion, was somehow covered in the press, but I will not lie. Of course, I think the Germans knew about this. And as a result of all this, as a result of the cunning gestures of the Finns, as a result of the fact that things were going badly for the Finns at that time, on June 23, 44, without protocols, without anything, without warning, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Minister of Foreign Affairs, arrives in Helsinki affairs of Nazi Germany. Goes straight to President Ryti and says. Well, he said very diplomatically, of course, but the bottom line was that we are supplying you with weapons, we are supplying you with grain. And we are very afraid that it will fall into the wrong hands. To the enemy. It won't fall into those hands. And plus, we also see that you are already somehow starting to take actions related to a separate peace somehow with the Soviet Union, we really don’t like this. Therefore, write a letter of guarantee as the President of the Republic of Finland, that you will not conclude a separate peace, that you will remain an ally of Nazi Germany. And Ryti wrote such a letter. Letter of guarantee as President of the Republic. After that, the Germans resumed the supply of weapons. The key was that they very quickly transferred about 10,000 panzerfausts from Estonia, and this gave the Finnish infantry the opportunity to effectively fight our armored vehicles, unfortunately. And thanks to the very active support of the German Air Force, if anyone does not know, but again, we are moving away from diplomacy a little into military affairs. The Germans, on the other hand, transferred a whole wing of dive bombers and fighter-bombers from the Baltic to Finland, and they were from the very airfields where they were sitting in 41, i.e. Utti and Lappeenranta airfields, they flew and bombed our units at the front 3 times a day, i.e. they provided tremendous support in general from the air to the Finnish ground forces, and they actually doubled the strike potential of the Finnish Air Force. Those. here they are, German pilots helped the Finns very, very much. But time goes by, all our military efforts after Vyborg were not crowned with complete success, but more on that separately, because this is also, from a military point of view, an interesting operation and a forgotten operation with us, we need to remember our heroes who fought there after the capture of Vyborg . And already in mid-July 1944, the hostilities on the Karelian Isthmus gradually subsided and turned into a positional war. And the main, best parts of the Leningrad Front will be relocated to the Narva bridgeheads. On July 26, 1944, after the hardest battles, ours take Narva and begin the assault on the heights of Sinimäe, the hardest battles, of course, were for our guards. But on August 4, the Finnish leadership was finally ripe for the fact that it was time to do something. It's time to put up with the Soviet Union, because clearly now the Germans will be expelled from Estonia in the next few weeks. Germany is defeated. Germany is defeated, yes, i.e. again, let's remember that the Army Group Center in Belarus has already been destroyed, 50,000 prisoners have already been driven around Moscow. The Germans did not throw our allies into the English Channel, i.e. both bridgeheads will obviously already live and the operations of our allies in the west are also developing quite successfully, but the Finns also understand that now, if the Russians are still liberating Estonia and taking Tallinn for themselves, then there will simply be no deliveries of any weapons, nothing will be. Therefore, on August 4, Risto Ryti speaks before parliament and says - you know, I signed a letter to the Germans here, sorry, I didn’t say anything to the people’s deputies about this, I confess, I’m resigning. I'm tired, I'm leaving, I'm sorry, it turned out ugly. Then it turned out ugly with the Germans, because the parliament immediately voted for Mannerheim as the new president of Finland and Mannerheim immediately contacted the Soviet Union through Kollontai, said that everything, we put up - this is the first, second - Hitler wrote such a farewell letter, which he cites in his memoirs, and there he basically justifies the fact that he breaks all promises in general and is really ready to fulfill all the requirements of the Soviet Union. Mannerheim's motivation is formulated very beautifully, no matter what happens to Germany in this war, the German nation will continue to exist, and if Finland loses in this war, i.e. goes with Germany to the end, it is not a fact that it will continue to exist as an independent state. Therefore, as President of the Republic of Finland, writes Mannerheim, I have no right to risk my people, my country, which the parliament has entrusted to me. So sorry, all the best to you. And indeed, on September 4, the ceasefire agreement comes into force, on September 19, after long and painful negotiations with the Finnish delegation, i.e., in fact, even Molotov began to lose patience, because the Finns arrived in Moscow and again in their typical Finnish manner, By the way, dear guests, if you will be dealing with the Finns in negotiations on business, I hope, not on military matters. The Finns have a characteristic feature that they take some small detail, which from their point of view is very important, and they cling to it terribly, and negotiations can go around this small detail for several days without any visible progress and just in some that moment ... From our point of view, it is very tiring and looks like incomprehensible obstinacy and stubbornness. They acted in the same way at the armistice negotiations in September 44, they began to cling to the wording, to some small details, and Molotov told them directly - listen, we agreed with Romania in 1 evening, we have already met 4 times with you and progress no. You have been planning to somehow balk here for a long time, let's finalize the contract and sign it. The treaty was finalized from Great Britain, which also participated in all this, rightly so, because the war was between Finland on the one hand, the USSR and Great Britain on the other. The British ambassador was so tired that he did not come to sign the treaty, he issued a power of attorney to sign the treaty, guess who? Molotov. No. Zhdanov. There is a power of attorney English language and in Russian that Her Majesty's Government, more precisely, His Majesty's then, authorizes Lieutenant General Zhdanov to sign an armistice agreement with Finland for Great Britain, i.e. this, of course, was also such terrible trolling on the part of the British that you are so unimportant that, like, let Zhdanov sign for us. Those. the document is also on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the link is below, Yandex.Disk, there are all these negotiations, there is a power of attorney. Many thanks to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for posting this, because it is really very interesting to read all this there. Listen, but there must have been some resistance among the Finnish elites, ie. surely there were forces that did not want this break with the Germans? Well, Mannerheim still enjoyed such authority that all this somehow didn’t really play a role, because why didn’t Paasikivi, for example, become president. Because Paasikivi, yes, he is a respected person, but he is a civilian, he is very soft, everyone in Finland considered him to be such a compromiser with the Soviet Union, and Mannerheim is also a military, military hero, authority. Well, this is, I would say, Marshal Petain on the contrary. Yes exactly. Marshal Petain was appointed to make peace with the Germans, and Mannerheim was appointed to make peace with the Russians. And for the army to follow him, because again, if Paasikivi had been appointed, then Tavela and his comrades, other officers, could easily arrange a pro-Nazi military coup. There are rumors that there was some kind of preparation for a pro-Nazi military coup, that the Finns write about it? Rather, it was not preparation. I won’t say about the coup, because I didn’t study it, but they were preparing for a guerrilla war, i.e. they already made caches of weapons, just such right-wing Finnish officers. Moreover, they made them, these caches, already in 1944, and only in 1946 it was actually revealed, and they began to imprison them for this deed. Those. some believed that the matter would not really end with a truce on September 19, that the Soviet Union of Finland would arrange something and send troops. The Soviet Union indeed introduced troops, but not to the entire territory of Finland, but only to the Porkala-Ud base. So, dear guests, if you are going to Finland, Porkala-Ud is the current Kirkkonummi, it is 40 km from the parliament and the presidential palace. Those. when the negotiations were about, the Finns said - well, the border is 40 years old, we are losing Pechenga, but, probably, you want Hanko again? Molotov said no, Hanko is not necessary, let's Porkalo. After that, the Finns were shocked, because it was precisely about the Soviet base of Porkalo-Ud that was the expression of Oskar Heikel, in my opinion ... Oskar Enkel, if I remember correctly, the general who said that this is a gun aimed at the heart of Finland, the capital needs transfer to Tampere and in general we are finished. He had a nervous breakdown, the Finnish delegation said that she fell ill and left. Those. Stalin and the Soviet leadership are here, just in case they put up a tank regiment 40 km from the vital centers of the political life of the Republic of Finland in case some encroachments from the Finns begin there again. And the most interesting thing is that they, our troops were not unloaded in Porkala-Ud, but they were unloaded at the central station in Helsinki and marched there. Those. in 44, residents of the Finnish capital, they first saw German troops in June 44, who arrived from Estonia and went to help the Finns near Vyborg, this is the 122nd infantry division. And then, in September, we already saw the Soviet troops, who went to build their military base on the territory of independent Finland. It is important to emphasize that this was a truce, it was not a final peace, because the Soviet Union, seeing these Finnish attempts to outwit everyone, said that there are conditions, and only after all these conditions are met by Finland, we conclude a final peace with you. Therefore, a truce, a control commission headed by Zhdanov arrives in Helsinki and strictly monitors that the Finns fulfill all these conditions. And only in 1947 in Paris did the Republic of Finland, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom conclude a peace treaty, which is still in force between our countries. I remember that Zhdanov invented a story in order to establish business relations with Mannerheim. There is a legend, dear guests, that Zhdanov was here when ... Zhdanov was radically inclined, he generally planned to arrange a trial for Finnish war criminals, there is war criminal No. 1 - this is Risto Ryuti, and there is war criminal No. 1A - this is Marshal Mannerheim. The court is held in Petrozavodsk and after that we hang both of these figures near the monument to Lenin with the confluence of the local population, which had very unkind feelings towards the Finns after the occupation. But, again, Stalin said that Mannerheim, he is a figure that suits everyone, on the one hand. On the other hand, he is ready to do everything that is necessary, so let's not touch Mannerheim, but imprison Ryti, we imprison this Rangel, who read a wonderful speech in front of parliament, and imprison more war criminals. It must be said that it is not necessary to compare the international trial in Nuremberg over Nazi war criminals and the trial of war criminals in Finland, because in Finland it was not an international tribunal, the investigation was conducted by the Finnish Ministry of Internal Affairs under the leadership of Comrade. Zhdanov, and then the Minister of the Interior was just Urho Kekkonen, who later became the President of Finland, and this Paasikivi-Kekkonen line became the basis of good neighborly relations between the USSR and Finland in the Soviet period. You wanted to tell about the story, and what about Zhdanov? Zhdanov is the man who wanted to hang Mannerheim, at the first meeting with Mannerheim he says - Mr. President, and during the First World War I fought under your command, under your command. The conversation is in Russian. Mannerheim, maybe he forgot Russian a little, but he spoke. What Mannerheim says - well, then let's go and drink vodka. This flexibility of politicians on both sides, one, Zhdanov, he clearly heard Stalin's signal that we were not touching Mannerheim, but Mannerheim ... He clearly heard Zhdanov's signal. No, well, just a man, he also hated the Bolsheviks all his life, etc., but when it comes to life and death, let's go and drink vodka. Here. Indeed, this is the beginning of a completely new relationship between Finland and the USSR. If in 18 Mannerheim writes in his order that "I will not sheathe my sword until eastern Karelia is free from the damned Bolsheviks, anyone is there." In '41 he writes that "in '18 I promised and in '41 I did, this is a new beginning for Finland, this is a new flourishing for Karelia, a great Finland, a great future", etc., very pompous rhetoric. In 1944, the same Mannerheim writes that "the bitter experience of the last 5 years has shown us that the key to the secure existence and prosperity of Finland is good, trusting, good neighborly relations with all our neighbors." And, indeed, Finland turns to face the Soviet Union, and a completely different period begins. But this is not the end of the story with our border, because in these protocols you will see that, in fact, Molotov, there was a bargain for Petsamo, as always. This is Pechenga. Petsamo, Pechenga, yes, i.e. there Paasikivi said, “Will you leave Petsamo to us?” Molotov said - no, we won’t leave it, because we gave it to you 2 times and our enemies were there 2 times, so you can live without Petsamo, as it was said. Paasikivi said - maybe we can somehow compensate for this? Molotov says - what do you want as compensation? - Well, maybe some Vyborg, the Saimaa Canal. Molotov said no. By the way, there is an interesting point about Vyborg, it was just at the talks in Tehran, i.e. there, when Roosevelt said that we could leave Vyborg to them, Stalin said that this was out of the question. Those. there is simply nothing about Vyborg at all, Vyborg is ours. And Petsamo, Pechenga becomes a Soviet region, i.e. Russia is taking it back. Finland thereby loses access to the ocean, i.e. it was an ice-free port and also a very important area where there were nickel mines. And Finland mined this nickel in concession with the British, because their own money was sorely lacking. All this is over, the territory is Soviet, already Soviet engineers and industrialists are beginning to develop these mines, and then they realize that the hydroelectric power station that supplied all this remained on the Finnish side of the border. Moreover, there is a tiny piece, literally 5 km to this power plant, so in 47 our people turn to the Finns, they say - listen, you owe us a lot of money. The fact is that Finland, she bought self-propelled guns, planes, tanks, panzerfausts and everything else from the Germans, she did not pay in cash, because the amount is huge, she took it all on credit. Those. Finland had a very large debt for the supply of weapons to Nazi Germany. Nazi Germany lost, and, accordingly, all this debt of Finland to Germany passed to the Soviet Union. Those. we defeated Germany, you owed the Germans, now you owe us. Well, that's in order to compensate. Yes Yes. And, accordingly, the Soviet Union says to the Finns - listen, you have a debt hanging there, let's give us this small piece with a hydroelectric power station, and we will write off part of the debt to you. The Finns agreed. This was the last shift in the border between the USSR and Finland, and if you look at the Russian-language Wikipedia, you will see that it says that the Soviet Union bought this piece. But “bought” and “took for debts” - this is a slightly different wording after all, i.e. here the wording of Wikipedia, they are usually not in our favor. I don't think so. I think this wording may have been chosen by the Finnish government just at that time in order not to stir up revanchist sentiment. By the way, these moods, they were? Or are they more present now? Then, of course, they were very strongly extinguished throughout the Soviet period. The whole Soviet period in general - friendship, trade, good relations. And, rather, Finnish revanchism, that to return Karelia, it appeared rather after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when there was no longer very strong self-censorship on the part of the Finnish government, and any pressure from Russia ceased to appear at all. Well, you live in Finland, tell me, do modern Finns have some kind of complex about the fact that they lost? Some, in my opinion, not all. It seems to me ... Well, that is, is it some kind of noticeable phenomenon or is it some kind of marginal? From my point of view, this is still the lot of the officer corps to some extent, this is their professional war. And it is clear that if there is another war, then it is clear who it will most likely be against. Those. again some... Better against Sweden. Well, not against Sweden. The officer corps is very right-wing, Mannerheim, of course, is their hero, this is their commander in chief, whom they greatly revere. But for the rest, it seems to me that ordinary people are already so tormented by all sorts of other problems that this is not really of any interest to anyone at all. Yes, about 400,000 people were forced to leave the territories that were ceded to the Soviet Union, people lost everything, i.e. real estate, some factories, rural lands, what their ancestors built for centuries. People were cut off from the roots, for them, of course, there was a severe trauma that everything had to be started anew. To rebuild life in another Finland, already without Vyborg, without the Saimaa Canal, without the entire northern lagoon, without Priozersk, without Kannelyarvi and other things. Of course, they transferred this bitterness to their children and grandchildren, but quite a lot of time has already passed and it seems to me that some kind of revanchist moods, yes, they exist, there are some radical groups, and for every municipal election or parliamentary elections, some candidate will pull this card on the table and put it, let's try to return it all. But modern Finland has many other concerns than the return of Karelia, and now Finland is part of the European Union ... the Karelian Isthmus. Yes. They call it Karelia, and the Karelian Isthmus, and the Northern Ladoga. From their point of view, this was their Karelia once. But now Finland's foreign policy is determined, of course, by the European Union, membership in this organization, and Finland will never make any independent drastic movements, this is understandable. At the government level, there is now a cooling of relations, as with all of Europe, in general, but rather, this is something, from my point of view, that is going down in history. Of course, it will be interesting for me to hear how everything will be taught to my son at school, because he studies at a Finnish school and is also very interested in history. Still would. And, accordingly, it will be interesting for me to listen to how it will be taught to them, I will force him to write a presentation or an essay, where both points of view will be presented - both Russian and Finnish. Please tell me which Finnish war criminals were convicted as a result of these post-war trials? Of the well-known - this is Lennart Ash - this is a famous Finnish general. He was charged with the fact that he, commanding the Olonets group, i.e. sat there near Olonets, on the Olonets isthmus, excuse me, on the Onega isthmus, between Ladoga and Lake Onega, in 42 he verbally ordered a demonstration execution of our prisoners. Those. he just went there somewhere with some kind of inspection trip, drove into some kind of prisoner of war camp, there they complained to him that the prisoners of war were almost rebelling ours, i.e. they refuse to go to work, they make some other claims to the Finnish camp administration. And Ash verbally said - yes, shoot 10 people for warning, this will solve the problem. And the most interesting thing is that, like many Finnish officers, Ash tried to sail away to Sweden. Those. the distance by sea is very small, and very many fell down. Martinen, Lauri Turni - these are all Finnish saboteurs who entered Soviet territory. In particular, a member of the Finnish DRG - a sabotage reconnaissance group that destroyed the camp in Petrovsky Pit. It was possible to find out who exactly was sitting on a stump and with single shots from a machine gun shot nurses running out of a burning building. There is a surname of this person, here he is in 44, realizing that they might be looking for him, he left and never returned to Finland, he died in Florida in 2004. And many Finnish saboteurs who had something in their hearts, some kind of sin, which is a war crime, they just left. Those. they fled on boats, on yachts, on some schooners to Sweden, and from Sweden somewhere far away. Many went to America, to South America. Those who did not have any serious crimes began to return in the 60s and 70s, they were not persecuted. And some actually stayed there. Ash also tried to swim away, his boat just started to sink, after which he decided that it was not fate and returned to the shore and himself went to surrender to the police. I think they only gave him 2 years. Those. everything was soft enough. But tell me, it is well known that Mannerheim did not extradite Finnish Jews to the Germans, and Finnish Jews, accordingly, did not become victims of the Holocaust. And what about the Soviet Jews captured in the occupied territories? Soviet prisoners of war ... Well, including civilians. Civilians, there is no evidence that the Finns gave them out, but there is evidence that in the north of Finland, where German troops were stationed and Finnish troops were nearby, there was a lively trade. Sorry, no trade, exchange of prisoners. The Finns themselves asked the Germans for Finno-Ugric Soviet prisoners of war, and the Germans, of course, they asked for Jews, commissars, political workers and commanders. Those. the Finns handed over, the Finnish troops handed over Jews to the Germans. Yes. And this, of course, became a big scandal in Finland, because before that - the study appeared only in the 2000s - before that it was said that we handed over only 6 Jews to the Germans, these were people without passports, they had some serious problems with documents and they were handed over, respectively, the Finnish Ministry of Internal Affairs gave them to Germany and allegedly one of them even survived after all this, i.e. survived the Holocaust. And here, in the 2000s, bang, it turns out that we also gave Jewish prisoners of war to the Germans, it is also clear with what consequences for our prisoners. But for his Jews, yes, there is the same Jukka Rangel, in a conversation with Himmler he said wir haben keine judenfrage, i.e. we don't have a Jewish question in Finland. Those. there are none of their own, all citizens of Finland. And what do you think, in general, in principle, this is the Nazi worldview, implicated in the domination, enslavement of other peoples, how much did it affect Finland, how widespread were such sentiments there? In propaganda, this was completely copied from the Germans, so to speak. Those. if you look at how the war was covered, the course of hostilities, the Finns completely repeated all the statements and postulates of German Nazi propaganda. In Rangel's speech, in my opinion, this is clearly visible, Bolshevism is there ... Bolshevism, yes, but this is not actually a Nazi story, right? No, it was the idea of ​​Russians and Eastern peoples as inferior, that was. They really, just like the Nazis, just like the Germans, they looked for the most downtrodden, the ugliest, the most wounded, flawed, crippled, or pronounced Asians among our prisoners of war, and took pictures with pleasure in the same way. But the only thing, again, that they somehow, they didn't have this policy of extermination, it didn't exist. They just go straight to the concentration camp. However, there were concentration camps along racial lines. That was it. By the way, I am very grateful to you for your vocabulary, you said that there really is Great Britain, the Nazis are building Great Germany, and the Finns are building Great Finland, Suur-Suomi, also the idea of ​​​​building their own great national state, where the Finns will play a dominant role, t .e. they are leaders among Finns, Ingrian Finns, Eastern Karelians, Vepsians. It was not clear what to do with the Estonians, because it seems that the Estonians themselves want their own state, but it seems that our brothers are also. Those. of course, they did not commit such a genocide, but still, my opinion is that, fortunately, military luck quickly turned away. It didn't come to that. Yes, it's just that a lot of things didn't work out. But about the great Finland and how they really began to build it in 41, this will be a separate program altogether. It is very interesting how they tried to integrate the Karelians, how the policy towards the Finno-Ugric population was built, and towards the non-Finno-Ugric, alien element, as they called it. The terminology is quite Nazi. Again, if you read the Finnish newspapers for 41 years, even the headlines, you will not find any drop of compassion for Russia and even to some extent for Great Britain, i.e. there ... About Leningrad, too, here. Yes, an interesting question. The Finns understood perfectly well what was happening in Leningrad. Yes, they knew, they wrote it in the newspapers. Already in November 1941, they wrote that the city was blocked, horror was happening in the city. If the city does not surrender, then it is doomed. We recently talked here with Boris Nikolaevich Kovalev, a well-known historian who has done a lot of work on the Spanish Blue Division. They had their own media, their own newspapers, which published simply mocking cartoons about the events that took place in besieged Leningrad, and about the fate of the Second Shock Army. Those. there they scoffed at the full program. Did the Finns have something like that? To be honest, I have not seen cartoons about Leningrad. I didn't see that for sure. Caricatures of Stalin, Churchill - this is understandable. Well, maybe not cartoons, some snarky, caustic headlines. No, no, it was there, rather, that the city was doomed, well, there were headlines in the spirit of Nazi propaganda there, i.e. I have never seen such trolling, bullying. Precisely, in fact, simply translated reports of the Berlin news agency, one to one. This is clearly visible in the headlines. And rhetoric, and headlines, and the text of articles. And they even created absolutely the same propaganda structure as the Germans. In the Finnish war, they didn’t have much, but in the war of 41-44 they had special propaganda companies, they were called, you will laugh now, PR companies. What are you? Tiedotus. Tiedotus is now PR, public relations. Those. public relations company. That's who came up with the PR in fact. The bottom line is that just like the Germans, writers and artists, graphic artists, designers, photographers, cameramen were recruited there. They could not just take pictures of everything, they could create full content, i.e. and photographed, and an article was written, and a drawing was made, and a chronicle was filmed. They really are more like public relations, creators of propaganda content. This is completely copied from the Germans. The Germans also had these. The Germans called propaganda companies, propagandakompanie, and the Finns called tiedotuskompanie, i.e. "Company of bringing information to the masses." Interesting. The last question, which also interests me a lot. Tell me, did an anti-Nazi, anti-fascist movement exist in Finland during the war years? Yes, it was, but it was very small, simply because the Communist Party, as we know, was thinned out very much, this time. Secondly, the Communist Party was generally illegal, so most of the Communists were in prison at that time. And they couldn't do anything serious. Indeed, there was, in my opinion, one underground group near Tampere, which, just like the anti-fascists in Europe and the anti-fascists in the occupied Soviet territories, blew up German trains. But there were, in my opinion, 20 people. There was only one such group in all of Finland. But, again, their ranks were replenished there when the Finns decided to create their own penal battalion and called in including political ones. Deserted? There, right there, in my opinion, in the echelon to the front, mass escapes began there, in fact, half of the communists immediately jumped out of the car and went underground. Those who reached the front, very many, at the first opportunity, went over to the side of the Red Army. How was their fate then? I honestly don't know about this. I did not specifically deal with those who defected from this 20th separate battalion "Black Arrow", as it was called. Those. this is to the question of when the political were allowed to go to the front. People who don't share... They haven't changed their beliefs? They didn't change their beliefs, and after that... Did any of these people later become famous in post-war Finland? Here is one of those who went to the front as a penalty box, he later became the Minister of the Interior either under Kekkonen or Paasikivi. Because later, after the war, it was, by the way, one of the conditions for a truce that the Communist Party should be allowed, let's return to normal parliamentary democracy. What was his name, do you remember? Now I don't remember. Unfortunately, I do not remember the names of politicians, unlike generals. Those. it was, but it was very small. And the defeat in the civil war, and the 30s, and the ban on the Communist Party, all this, of course, is simply theirs ... So you see how long and difficult the path to peace was, but, fortunately, peace has come. And let's hope that this world will be much longer than the path to it. Yes exactly. Why are we telling all this, well, again, simply because in the modern discussion, especially on the Internet, as a rule, only one side is blamed for all this, i.e. to Russia. For all. Not for all of this, but for everything in general. On Russia, on the Soviet Union, that only we are to blame, and everyone else, as it were, is not, it's just like that. But this, again, is probably the most important postulate in propaganda, and indeed even in foreign policy, whoever is the first to shout “they started it first, but we are not to blame,” turns out to be right. Those. perception of people. All these speeches of the Prime Minister, all the propaganda, this is exactly what ... Yukka Rangel, he says - we are generally waging a defensive war in relation to the war of 41-44, and for some reason they took Petrozavodsk, Olonets, Medvezhyegorsk, went to Vologda the area, so well, was successfully defended. But the most important lesson, probably, is still that the struggle and conflicts between Finland and the Soviet Union, they did not have such a fundamental character of the struggle not for life, but to the death, as with Nazi Germany. With the Finns, we have always had territorial disputes that have been resolved for the moment, and let's hope that peace will not be interrupted anymore, because it will not be good for anyone. And the second important point with which I would like to conclude our today's program is that this is an absolutely ordinary and normal part of European history, i.e. our conflicts, frictions with Finland over the border areas - this is an absolutely normal European situation. Please look at Alsace and Lorraine, the Sudetes and any other border areas in Europe. Everything is the same, i.e. before the Second World War, these borders were cut and redrawn as they wanted. This is such a part of the world in which we live, Europe. Fortunately, after the Second World War, it was still possible to stop for some time. Those. To say that our borders were fixed after the Second World War, they will not change anymore, but ... They continue to change, quite a lot of borders have changed over the past 20 years. Yes. But let's hope for the best and all these things need to be understood when you talk about all the difficult relations with neighbors. The same relations were with other countries - with Poland, with the Baltic states, with anyone. With Turkey, there were a lot of relations with Turkey. By the way, we were asked to talk about relations with all the neighbors. This is a very interesting topic, I think we will get to it somehow. Extensive, extensive topic. And that's all for today. Bair, thanks. Thank you. All the best, do not forget, there, under the video, Bair left a lot of interesting links. Yes. All the best, thank you. See you again. See you again.

In the most popular tank reference book of the 1930s by F. Heigl, twice published in the USSR in the “Commander’s Library” series, four emotional lines were assigned to Hungary: “The Treaty of Trianon prohibits Hungary from possessing armored combat vehicles. However, in the heart of every Hungarian against this treaty there is a protest: “No! Not! Never!"

From this very peculiar information for a reference publication, one could conclude that the Hungarians did not agree with the terms of the agreement.

By the Trianon Peace Treaty, signed on June 4, 1920, the victorious powers in the First World War limited the number of armed forces of Hungary (a state that arose, as you know, after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918) to 35 thousand people, while prohibiting having aviation, tanks and heavy artillery. An exception was made for 1 2 armored vehicles intended for police service.

Attempts to circumvent the restrictions of the treaty were made by Hungary repeatedly and not without success. In 1920, 14 German LK II light tanks were secretly acquired. The Entente Control Commission found out about this, but could not find the tanks. Having disassembled the cars into parts, the Hungarians carefully hid them. In 1928, five tanks were assembled and introduced into the 1st tank company.

It should be noted that England, seeking to oppose Hungary to the countries of the Little Entente - Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, turned a blind eye to the violations of the Trianon Treaty. As a result, in 1931 the Hungarians acquired five Italian FIAT 3000В tanks, a year later - the English Carden-Loyd Mk VI tankette, and in 1937 - german easy tank Pz.lA.

In August 1935, the first large batch of combat vehicles was purchased in Italy: 25 tankettes CV 3/33, which received the Hungarian designation 35M; in 1936 - 125 tankettes CV 3/35 (37M). The Hungarians installed their 8-mm machine guns of the 34 / 37M model, produced under a Czech license by Gebauer, on them. The commander's vehicles were equipped with a square commander's cupola. Subsequently, tankettes fought in Yugoslavia, and in 1941, 65 vehicles participated in hostilities on the Soviet-German front.

In 1938, the Hungarian government adopted a plan for the modernization and development of the armed forces. In particular, great place assigned to the creation of armored forces. The main difficulty along the way was the lack of tanks, although the Hungarian industry was able to produce modern combat vehicles. To speed up the process, we took the path of acquiring licenses.

In March 1938, the Swedish company LandsverkAB in Landskrona ordered one copy of the Landsverk L60B tank. Upon arrival in Hungary, it underwent comparative tests along with the German Pz.lA. The Swedish machine demonstrated incomparably the best combat and technical characteristics. It was decided to take her as a model for light tank Hungarian-made, called 38M To Id i.

As for medium tanks, the situation was somewhat more complicated. Own designs (Straussler V-3 and V-4 tanks) were still far from complete, and attempts to acquire combat vehicles abroad (Landsverk's LAGO tank, Italian M11 / 39 and German Pz.IV) ended in failure.

At the beginning of 1940, Hungarian specialists became interested in an experienced medium tank S-2c (T-21) of the Czechoslovak company Skoda. The latter was a development of the well-known light tank of the same company S-2a (LT-35), which the Hungarians were able to get acquainted with in March 1939, when they occupied Czechoslovakia together with German units. Experts from the Institute of Military Equipment spoke in favor of the T-21, in their opinion, it was the best medium tank of all really available. The Germans were not at all interested in this car, and they did not mind transferring it to the Hungarians. After testing on August 7, 1940, the parties signed a license contract. On September 3, the tank was adopted by the Hungarian army under the name 40M Turan.

Attempts to create a heavy tank of their own design Tas ("Tosh"), armed with a German 75-mm KwK 42 cannon, were unsuccessful.

In 1943, on the basis of the Turan tank, the Zrinyi assault self-propelled guns, modeled after German assault guns, were developed and mass-produced.

The license for the production of another anti-aircraft self-propelled gun Anti based on the L60B tank was purchased from the Swedes. It was produced in Hungary under the name Nimrod and was based on the chassis of the Toldi light tank.

In 1932, the first attempt was made to create a Hungarian armored car. Then and later, until 1937, this work was carried out under the guidance of the talented engineer N. Straussler. By 1940, the 39M Csaba armored car was developed and launched in Hungary in a series.

In 1943, the project of a heavy armored car similar to the German four-axle BA Puma was completed, but they did not have time to start its production.

Hungary declared war on the Soviet Union on June 27, 1941. By this time, almost all Hungarian armored vehicles were part of the so-called "movable corps" (Gyorshadtest). It included the 1st and 2nd motorized brigades with the 9th and 11th tank battalions, respectively, and the 1st cavalry brigade with the 11th armored cavalry battalion. Tank battalions consisted of three tank companies of 18 vehicles each. The armored cavalry battalion had two mixed companies with CV 3/35 tankettes and Toldi light tanks. In total, the "moving hull" consisted of 81 Toldi tanks in the first line. Since the autumn of 1943, one of the companies of the tank battalions was armed with Nimrod self-propelled guns.

In 1943, the 1st and 2nd tank divisions were deployed on the basis of motorized brigades. Each division included a three-battalion tank regiment (39 medium tanks per battalion), a motorized infantry brigade, an artillery regiment, and other support and support units.

The 1st Cavalry Division, formed at the same time, included an armored cavalry battalion with 56 Toldi tanks.

In October 1943, the formation of assault gun battalions began.

The Hungarian army was also armed with foreign armored vehicles coming from Germany in significant quantities. At the same time, the Hungarians received both German-made combat vehicles and captured tanks captured by the Wehrmacht. It should be emphasized that since Hungary turned out to be the most reliable and combat-ready ally of Germany, it received the most modern German armored vehicles, as can be seen from the table below.

tank type 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Pz.IB 8
Pz.Bf.Wg. 6
Pz.IIF 00
Marder II 5
Pz.38(t) 108
Pz.IIIM 10 10-12
Pz.IVFl 22
Pz.IVF2 10
StuG III Pz.IVH 10 42 30
Pz.VI 12
Pz.V 5-10
StuG IIIG 50
Hetzer 2 75 75
LT-35
TKS/TK-3 15 - 20
R-35 3
H-35 15
S-35 2

Light tank (konnyu harckocsi) 38M Toldi

The first large-scale tank of the Hungarian army. It is a partially revised Swedish light tank Landsverk L60B, for which a license was acquired in 1938. Produced by Ganz and MAVAG from 1939 to 1943. Manufactured 199 units.

Serial modifications:

38M Toldi I - basic version. tank hull and chassis significant changes, compared with the Swedish prototype, have not undergone. The tower underwent minor changes: in particular, hatches in the sides, viewing slots, as well as a cannon and machine gun mantlet. Combat weight 8.5 tons, crew 3 people. Armament: 20 mm 36M anti-tank rifle and 8 mm 34/37M machine gun. Manufactured 80 units.

38M Toldi II - additional armor protection of the frontal part of the hull and along the perimeter of the turret. 110 units were made.

38M Toldi Pa - 40-mm 42M cannon with a barrel length of 45 calibers and a coaxial 8-mm machine gun 34 / 40AM. The thickness of the mask armor is 35 mm. The mass of the tank is 9.35 tons, the speed is 47 km/h, the cruising range is 190 km. Ammunition 55 rounds and 3200 rounds. Converted from Toldi II 80 units.

43M Toldi III - the best version of the tank with frontal armor of the hull and turret increased to 20 mm. The gun mask and the driver's cabin were protected by 35 mm armor. The broadened stern of the turret made it possible to increase the ammunition load of the gun to 87 rounds. Manufactured 9 units.

The Toldi tanks entered service with the 1st and 2nd motorized and 1st cavalry brigades. These formations took part in the hostilities against Yugoslavia in April 1941, and two months later, as part of the so-called "mobile corps" - against the USSR. Initially, they included 81 Toldi tanks, then 14 more arrived. With the fighting, the corps traveled about 1000 km to the Donets River, and in November 1941 returned to their homeland. Of the 95 Toldi that participated in the battles, 62 vehicles were repaired and restored, and only 25 of them due to combat damage, and the rest due to breakdowns in the transmission. In general, the operation of the tank showed that its mechanical reliability is low, and the armament is too weak (an anti-tank gun at a distance of 300 m pierced only a 14-mm armor plate located at an angle of 30 ° to the vertical). As a result, the tank could only be used as a reconnaissance and communications vehicle. In 1942, only 19 Toldi hit the Eastern Front. By February 1943, during the defeat of the Hungarian army, almost all of them were destroyed.

Since 1943, "Toldi" of all modifications, for the most part, were part of the 1st and 2nd tank and 1st cavalry divisions and took part in hostilities on the territory of the USSR, Poland and Hungary. On June 6, 1944, the Hungarian army had 66 Toldi I tanks and 63 Toldi II and Toldi NA tanks. During the campaign of 1944-1945, they were lost.

38M Toldi I

38M Toldi On

43M Toldi III

PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TOLDI I TANK

COMBAT WEIGHT, t: 8.5.

CREW, people: 3.

OVERALL DIMENSIONS, mm: length - 4750, width - 2140, height - 1872, ground clearance - 350.

ARMAMENT: 1 anti-tank rifle 36M caliber 20 mm, 1 machine gun 34/37M caliber 8 mm.

AMMUNITION: 208 shotgun rounds, 2400 machine gun rounds.

RESERVATION, mm: forehead, side and stern of the hull - 13, roof and bottom - 6, tower -1 3,

ENGINE: Bussing-NAG L8V/36TR, 8-cylinder, carbureted, V-shaped; power 1 55 hp (114 kW), displacement 7913 cm?.

TRANSMISSION: dry friction main clutch, planetary five-speed gearbox, locking differential, side clutches.

RUNNING GEAR: four double rubber-coated road wheels on board, two support rollers, drive wheel front location; suspension - individual torsion bar.

OVERCOME OBSTACLES: elevation angle, deg. - 40; wall height, m ​​- 0.6; moat width, m - 1.75; fording depth, m - 0.7.

MEANS OF COMMUNICATION: R/5 radio station.

Medium tank (kozepes harckocsi) 40M Turan

A medium tank, which was a slightly modified version of the Czechoslovak experimental tank S-2c (T-21) from Skoda. In preparation for serial production, a Hungarian cannon and engine were installed on it, armor was strengthened, observation devices and communications equipment were replaced. The most massive Hungarian tank. In 1941 - 1944, 424 units were manufactured by Manfred Weiss, Magyar Vagon, MAVAG and Ganz.

Serial modifications:

40M Turan I - the first and most numerous variant. In design and layout, it is most similar to the Czech prototype. Manufactured 285 units.

41M Turan II - 75-mm gun 41M with a barrel length of 25 calibers, 56 rounds of ammunition. Changed the shape of the turret and commander's cupola. Combat weight 19.2 tons, speed 43 km/h, cruising range 150 km. 139 units were made.

Turans began to enter the troops in May 1942, when the first 12 tanks arrived at the tank school in Esztergom. On October 30, 1943, Honvedsheg had 242 tanks of this type. The 3rd Panzer Regiment of the 2nd Panzer Division, which had 120 vehicles, was the most complete of all. The 1st Tank Regiment of the 1st Tank Division had 61 Turan I tanks, 56 tanks of this type were part of the 1st Cavalry Division. In addition, there were two "turans" in the 1st company self-propelled guns and three machines were used as training.

"Turan II" began to enter the army in May 1943, and in March 1944, there were 107 Turan II tanks in the Hungarian army.

In April, the 2nd Panzer Division was sent to the front, with 120 Turan I and 55 Turan II. Baptism of fire Hungarian medium tanks were accepted on April 17, 1944, when the division counterattacked the advancing Soviet units near Kolomyia. The tank attack on the impenetrable wooded and mountainous terrain was not crowned with success. By April 26, the advance of the Hungarian troops was stopped. In this case, the losses amounted to 30 tanks. In September, the division took part in the battles near Torda, suffered heavy losses, and was withdrawn to the rear.

The 1st Cavalry Division took part in heavy fighting in eastern Poland in the summer of 1944. Having lost all her tanks, she was withdrawn to Hungary in September.

Since September 1944, 124 Turans of the 1st Panzer Division fought in Transylvania. On October 30, the battles for Budapest began, which lasted 4 months. The 2nd Panzer Division found itself surrounded in the city itself, while the 1st Panzer and 1st Cavalry Divisions fought to the north of it. In the fierce battles near Lake Balaton in March - April 1945, the Hungarian tank forces ceased to exist. At the same time, the last "turans" were destroyed or captured by the Red Army.

On the basis of this machine, self-propelled artillery mounts and command tanks were produced.

40M Turan I

41M Turan II

PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TANK 40M Turan I

COMBAT WEIGHT, t: 18.2.

CREW, people: 5.

OVERALL DIMENSIONS, mm: length - 5550, width - 2440, height - 2390, ground clearance - 380.

ARMAMENT: 1 cannon 41 M caliber 40 mm, 2 machine guns 34/40AM caliber 8 mm.

AMMUNITION: 101 shots, 3000 rounds.

AIMING DEVICES: telescopic sight.

RESERVATION, mm: forehead of the hull - 50.-.60, side and stern - 25, roof and bottom - 8 ... 25, tower - 50.. .60.

ENGINE: Manfred Weiss-Z, 8-cylinder, carbureted, V-shaped, liquid-cooled; power 265 hp (195 kW) at 2200 rpm, displacement 14,886 cm3.

TRANSMISSION: dry friction multi-plate main clutch, planetary six-speed (3+3) gearbox, planetary slewing mechanism, final drives.

RUNNING GEAR: eight double rubber-coated road wheels on board, interlocked in pairs in two balancing carts, each of which was suspended on two semi-elliptical leaf springs, a thrust roller, five support rollers, a rear drive wheel; each track has 107 tracks 420 mm wide.

SPEED MAX, km/h: 47.

POWER RESERVE, km: 165.

OVERCOME OBSTACLES: elevation angle, deg. -45; moat width, m - 2.2; wall height, m ​​- 0.8; fording depth, m - 0.9.

Self-propelled unit (pancelvadasz) 40M Nimrod

Light anti-tank self-propelled guns developed by the Swedish company Landsverk based on the L60B tank. In the Hungarian version, the SAU was based on the extended chassis of the Toldi light tank. At the end of the war, it was used mainly as a ZSU. In 1941 - 1944, 135 units were manufactured by MAVAG.

Serial modification:

on the chassis of the Toldi tank, extended by one track roller, a rotating turret with weapons, open from above, is installed. The tower accommodated five crew members. The 40-mm automatic gun is mounted on a pedestal in the central part of the hull.

The Nimrods began to enter the troops in February 1942. Since these self-propelled guns were considered anti-tank, they formed the basis of the 51st tank destroyer battalion of the 1st Panzer Division, which was part of the 2nd Hungarian Army, which arrived on the Eastern Front in the summer of 1942. Of the 19 Nimrods (3 companies of 6 self-propelled guns each plus the vehicle of the battalion commander) after the defeat of the Hungarian army in January 1943, only 3 vehicles survived.

Having suffered a complete fiasco in the anti-tank field, the Nimrods began to be used as a means of air defense for the ground forces, and very effectively.

As part of the 2nd Panzer Division during the battles with the Red Army in Galicia in April 1944, there were 37 ZSU of this type, of which 17 vehicles were in the 52nd Tank Destroyer Battalion. In addition, five companies of 4 vehicles each made up the air defense division. On December 7, 1944, the 2nd TD had 26 more ZSUs in service. 10 Nimrods took part in the German counterattack near Lake Balaton. Several of these self-propelled guns fought in the surrounded Budapest.

40M Nimrod

PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS ACS 40M Nimrod COMBAT WEIGHT, t: 10.5.

CREW, people: 6.

OVERALL DIMENSIONS, mm: length - 5320, width - 2300, height - 2800, ground clearance -350.

ARMAMENT: 1 automatic anti-aircraft gun 36M caliber 40 mm.

AMMUNITION: 160 shots.

RESERVATION, mm: hull forehead - 1 3, side and stern - 7, bottom - 6, tower - 13.

ENGINE and TRANSMISSION - like a base tank.

RUNNING GEAR: five double rubber-coated road wheels on board, three support rollers, front drive wheel; suspension - individual torsion bar.

SPEED MAX, km/h: 50.

POWER RESERVE, km: 225.

OVERCOME OBSTACLES: angle of elevation, degrees - 40; moat width, m - 2.2; wall height, m ​​- 0.8; fording depth, m - 0.9.

COMMUNICATIONS: radio station R/5a (only on command vehicles).

Self-propelled gun 43M Zrinvi II

An assault gun based on the Turan medium tank modeled after the German StuG III. The most successful Hungarian armored vehicle during World War II. In 1944, Manfred Weiss and Ganz produced 66 units.

Serial modification:

a converted 105-mm MAVAG infantry howitzer with a barrel length of 20.5 caliber is installed in the front sheet of the low-profile armored cabin in the frame. Riveted construction body. All crew members, including the driver, were located in the wheelhouse.

On October 1, 1943, assault artillery battalions of 30 self-propelled guns each began to form in the Hungarian army, which, along with German-made combat vehicles, began to receive Zrinyi II. By the beginning of 1945, all remaining self-propelled guns of this type were part of the 20th Eger and 24th Kosice battalions. The last units, armed with Zrinyas, capitulated on the territory of Czechoslovakia.

Zrinyi were typical assault guns. They successfully accompanied the attacking infantry with fire and maneuver, but in 1944 they could no longer fight Soviet tanks. An attempt to arm a self-propelled gun with a long-barreled 75-mm cannon (“Zrinyi I”) was reduced to the manufacture of one prototype.

43 M Zrinyi II

43M Zrinyi I

PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS ACS 43M Zrinyi II

COMBAT WEIGHT, t: 21.6.

CREW, people: 4.

OVERALL DIMENSIONS, mm: length - 5550, width - 2900, height -1900, ground clearance - 380.

ARMAMENT: 1 howitzer 40/43M caliber 105 mm.

AMMUNITION: 52 rounds.

RESERVATION, mm: forehead of the hull-75, side and stern - 25, roof and bottom - 8.. .25.

ENGINE, TRANSMISSION and RUNNING GEAR - like the base tank.

SPEED MAX, km/h: 43.

POWER RESERVE, km: 220.

OVERCOME OBSTACLES: elevation angle, deg. - 45; wall height, m ​​- 0.8; moat width, m-2.2; fording depth, m - 0.9.

COMMUNICATIONS: radio station R/5a.

Armored car (felderito oenceikocsi) 39M Csaba

The only serial Hungarian light reconnaissance armored car. It is one of the most successful machines of this type during the Second World War. Produced by Manfred Weiss from 1940 to 1944. 135 units were made.

Serial modifications:

39M - turret and supporting hull are riveted, assembled from straight armor plates located at rational angles of inclination. In the stern, the engine was located on the right, and the rear control post was on the left. 105 units made.

40M - command variant, armed only with an 8 mm machine gun. R/4 and R/5 radios with loop antenna. Combat weight 5.85 tons. 30 units manufactured.

Chabo armored vehicles entered service with the 1st and 2nd motorized and 1st and 2nd cavalry brigades, one company each. The company consisted of 10 combat vehicles, one command and two training. A platoon of three "Chabo" had a mountain brigade. All these formations, with the exception of the 1st KBR, together with the Wehrmacht took part in the aggression against Yugoslavia in April 1941.

In the summer of the same year, the 2nd motorized and 1st cavalry brigade, as well as a company of armored vehicles of the 2nd cavalry brigade - a total of 57 Chabo. By December, 40 armored vehicles were lost. During the hostilities, the weakness of their weapons and armor was revealed.

By the summer of 1944, 48 Chabos remained in the Hungarian army, 14 of which fought in Poland as part of the 1st Cavalry Division.

The last time armored vehicles of this type took part in the battles on the territory of Hungary in the winter of 1945. All of them were destroyed by the Red Army.

39M Csaba

PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ARMORED VEHICLE 39M Csaba

COMBAT WEIGHT, t: 5.95.

CREW, people: 4.

OVERALL DIMENSIONS, mm: length-45 20, width-2100, height - 2270, base - 3000, track - 1700, ground clearance -333.

ARMAMENT: 1 anti-tank rifle 36 M caliber 20 mm, 1 machine gun 34/37AM caliber 8 mm.

AMMUNITION: 200 rounds of 20 mm caliber, 3000 rounds of 8 mm caliber.

RESERVATION, mm: forehead of the hull-13, side-7, tower -10.

ENGINE: Ford G61T, 8-cylinder, carbureted, V-shaped, liquid-cooled; power 90 hp (66.2 kW), displacement 3560 cm3.

TRANSMISSION: six-speed gearbox, transfer case.

RUNNING GEAR: wheel formula 4x2 (when reversing 4x4), tire size 10.50-20, suspension on transverse semi-elliptical springs.

SPEED MAX, km/h: 65.

POWER RESERVE, km: 150.

OVERCOME OBSTACLES: angle of elevation, degrees - 30; wall height, m ​​- 0.5; fording depth, m - 1.

MEANS OF COMMUNICATION: R/4 radio station.

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Medium tank "Turan"

At the beginning of 1940, Hungarian specialists became interested in an experienced medium tank Gb2s (T-21) of the Czechoslovak company Jlkoda. The latter was a development of the well-known light tank of the same company 1b2a (LT-35), which the Hungarians were able to get acquainted with in March 1939. Experts from the Institute of Military Equipment spoke in favor of the T-21, they considered it the best medium tank out of all those actually available. This car did not attract the Germans at all, and they did not mind transferring it to the Hungarians. On June 3, 1940, the T-21 was sent to Budapest, and on June 10 arrived at the Honvedsheg Central Test Site in Khaimashkeri. After the tests, during which the T-21 passed 800 km without breakdowns, on August 7, 1940, the parties signed a license contract. On September 3, the car was adopted by the Hungarian army under the name "Turan" (Turan). Turan is the mythological ancestral home of the Magyars, located in Central Asia, from where they began their migration to Europe in the 6th century. Soon the tank received the army index 40M.

Medium tank T-21

In preparation for mass production, the original Czech design underwent some modernization and changes. A Hungarian cannon and engine were installed, armor was strengthened, observation devices and communications equipment were replaced. This work was carried out under the guidance of the designer of the Manfred Weiss company, engineer Janos Korbul. First order for 230

military vehicles, issued by the Ministry of Defense on September 19, 1940, were divided between four companies: Manfred Weiss (70 units), Magyar Vagon (70), MAVAG (40) and Ganz (50). However, it was still a long way from the issuance of the order to its actual implementation. The start of production was hampered by the lack of a complete set technical documentation, since the last drawings from Jlkoda were received only in March 1941. The implementation of drawings for modernization was also delayed. As a result, the first Turan prototype, made of non-armored steel, left the factory floor only on July 8. New tanks began to enter the troops only in May 1942. A total of 285 40M "Turan 40" tanks were produced, in domestic literature they are sometimes referred to as "Turan I".

The layout and design of the hull and turret, assembled with riveting on a frame of corners, basically corresponded to the Czech prototype. The thickness of the rolled armor plates of the frontal part of the hull and turret was 50 - 60 mm, sides and stern - 25 mm, roof and bottom - 8 - 25 mm.

Medium tank T-21 in the yard of the Skoda factory. Czechoslovak weapons were installed on the vehicle: a 47-mm vz.38 cannon and two 7.92-mm ZB vz.37 machine guns. MTO roof dismantled

The 40-mm 41M 40/51 gun was developed by MAVAG on the basis of the 37-mm 37M gun, intended for the V-4 tank, an anti-tank gun of the same caliber, and the Skoda 37-mm A7 gun. One 8-mm machine gun 34 / 40AM Gebauer was installed in the turret in a ball mount, the other - in the frontal hull sheet on the left, along with an optical sight, protected, like the barrels of both machine guns, by a massive armor casing. Gun ammunition included 101 shots, and machine guns - 3000 rounds.

Turan I

The tank was equipped with six periscopic observation devices and a viewing slot with a triplex in the front hull plate opposite the driver's seat. A radio station R / 5a was installed near the place of the gunner-radio operator.

Manfred Weiss-Z 8-cylinder V-twin carbureted engine with 265 hp. at 2200 rpm, it allowed a tank weighing 18.2 tons to accelerate to a maximum speed of 47 km / h. The capacity of the fuel tanks is 265 l, the cruising range is 165 km.

Medium tank "Turan I" during the crossing. 2nd Panzer Division. Poland, 1944

Transmission "Turan" consisted of a multi-disk main dry friction clutch, a planetary 6-speed gearbox, a planetary turning mechanism and final drives. The transmission units were controlled using a pneumatic servo drive. A backup mechanical drive was also provided.

It should be noted that, having a specific power of 14.5 hp / t, "Turan" had good mobility and maneuverability. They were provided, among other things, with convenient controls that did not require much physical effort.

Turan I with armored screens

Lengthwise cut

cross section

The layout of the tank "Turan I": 1 - installation of a course machine gun and optical sight; 2 - observation devices; 3 - fuel tank; 4 - engine; 5 - gearbox; 6 - turning mechanism; 7 - lever of the mechanical (backup) drive of the turning mechanism; 8 - gear lever; 9 - pneumatic cylinder of the tank control system; 10 - drive lever of the turning mechanism with pneumatic booster; 11 - machine gun embrasure; 12 - inspection hatch of the driver; 13 - accelerator pedal; 14 - brake pedal; 15 - main clutch pedal; 16 - mechanism for turning the tower; 17 - gun embrasure

The undercarriage was generally similar to the undercarriage of the light Czechoslovak LT-35 tank and, in relation to one side, consisted of eight small-diameter rubber-coated dual road wheels, interlocked in pairs and assembled into two carts, each of which was suspended on two semi-elliptical leaf springs. Between the front cart and the steering wheel, which had a gear ring, one double roller was installed, which made it easier for the tank to overcome vertical obstacles. The drive wheel was located at the rear. The upper branch of the caterpillar rested on five double rubberized support rollers. The design of the undercarriage provided the tank with a smooth ride without strong vertical vibrations and swaying.

In addition to the line tank, the Turan RK command variant was simultaneously developed, intended for commanders of companies, battalions and regiments. On this machine, there was not only a standard R / 5a radio station, but also an R / 4T radio station, the antenna of which was mounted on the aft sheet of the tower.

In May 1941, that is, even before the arrival of new tanks to the troops, the Hungarian General Staff raised the issue of modernizing the Turan in order to change its weapons, apparently, under the impression of the German Pz.IV tank. On the machine, which received the designation 41M "Turan 75" ("Turan II"), they installed a 75-mm 41M cannon with a barrel length of 25 calibers and a horizontal wedge gate. The turret had to be redesigned, increasing its height by 45 mm and changing the shape and dimensions of the fixed commander's turret. Ammunition was reduced to 52 artillery rounds. The remaining components and assemblies of the tank have not undergone changes. The mass of the car increased to 19.2 tons, the speed and cruising range slightly decreased. In May 1942, the Turan II was put into service, and in 1943 it was put into mass production; until June 1944, 139 units were produced.

"Turan I" from the 2nd Panzer Division. Eastern Front, April 1944

Commander's "Turan II". characteristic external difference this machine from a linear tank had three radio antennas on the turret. Of the weapons, only the course machine gun was retained; the turret machine gun and cannon are missing (a wooden imitation is installed instead of the gun)

Along with line tanks, command vehicles 43M "Turan II" were also produced. Their armament consisted of only one 8-mm machine gun in the front of the hull. The turret machine gun and cannon were absent, and instead of the latter, a wooden imitation was installed. The tower housed three radio stations - R / 4T, R / 5a and the German FuG 16.

Since the short-barreled gun was not suitable for fighting tanks, the Institute of Military Technology was instructed to study the issue of arming the Turan with a long-barreled 75-mm 43M gun. In parallel, it was planned to increase the thickness of the frontal armor of the hull to 80 mm. The mass at the same time had to grow to 23 tons.

In December 1943, a sample of the 44M "Turan III" tank was made, but the serial production could not be deployed due to the lack of a sufficient number of guns.

In 1944, following the example of the German tanks Pz.NI and Pz.IV, they began to hang screens on the "turans" to protect them from cumulative shells. A set of such screens for "Turan" weighed 635 kg.

As already mentioned, the Turans began to enter the troops in May 1942, when the first 12 vehicles arrived at the tank school in Esztergom. On October 30, 1943, Honvedsheg had 242 tanks of this type. The 3rd tank regiment of the 2nd

tank division - it had 120 vehicles, and in the 1st tank regiment of the 1st tank division - 61 "Turan 40", another 56 units were part of the 1st cavalry division. In addition, two "turans" were in the 1st company of self-propelled guns and three were used as training ones.

Tanks "Turan 75" began to enter the Hungarian troops in May 1943; by the end of August there were already 49, and by March 1944 - 107.

In the photo above - a massive armor-mask of the recoil devices of the 75-mm gun.
In the center is an autonomous installation of a course machine gun, the barrel of which is covered with an armor casing. Bulletproof bolt heads are clearly visible. On the sides of the turret of this tank, in addition to screens, caterpillar tracks are placed.
Below - armored covers of the sight and course machine gun

In April of the same year, the 2nd Panzer Division was sent to the front, having 120 "Turan 40" and 55 "Turan 75" in its composition. The Hungarian medium tanks received their baptism of fire on April 17, when the division counterattacked the advancing Soviet units near Kolomyia. The tank attack on the impenetrable wooded and mountainous terrain was not crowned with success. By April 26, the advance of the Hungarian troops was stopped. In this case, the losses amounted to 30 tanks. In August - September, the division participated in the battles near Stanislav (now Ivano-Frankivsk), suffered heavy losses, and was withdrawn to the rear.

The 1st Cavalry Division took part in heavy fighting in eastern Poland in the summer of 1944, retreating towards Warsaw. Having lost all her tanks, she was withdrawn to Hungary in September.

Since September 1944, 124 Turans of the 1st Panzer Division fought in Transylvania. In December, fighting was already going on in Hungary, near Debrecen and Nyiregyhaza. In addition to the 1st, both other mentioned divisions also participated in them. On October 30, the battles for Budapest began, lasting four months. The 2nd Panzer Division found itself surrounded in the city itself, while the 1st Panzer and 1st Cavalry Divisions fought north of the capital. As a result of fierce battles near Lake Balaton in March - April 1945, the Hungarian tank forces ceased to exist. At the same time, the last "turans" were destroyed or captured by the Red Army.

"Turan II" with mesh screens, modeled on the German "Tom type"

A soldier of the Red Army inspects the captured tank "Turan II", equipped with mesh screens. 1944

As already mentioned, the Hungarian medium tank was created on the basis of the Czechoslovak design of the mid-1930s. If the preparation for its mass production had not been delayed so much and had it been released by 1941, the Turan could have become a formidable opponent for the Soviet BT and T-26. But in April 1944, this angular riveted machine was already a complete anachronism. It should be noted that the Hungarians adopted the German experience with a significant delay: "Turan II" received a short-barreled 75-mm gun by analogy with the Pz.IV. at a time when German tanks were already rearming with long-barreled guns.

In 1942, again taking into account the German experience, the Hungarians decided to create their own assault gun. The only suitable base for it was the Turan, whose hull width was increased by 450 mm. In the 75-mm front sheet of the low-profile riveted armored cabin in the frame, a converted 105-mm MAVAG 40M infantry howitzer with a barrel length of 20.5 calibers was installed. Howitzer horizontal pointing angles ± 11 °, elevation angle - + 25 °. The ACS ammunition consisted of 52 rounds of separate loading. The car did not have a machine gun. The engine, transmission and chassis remained the same as the base tank. The combat weight was 21.6 tons. The crew consisted of four people. This most successful Hungarian armored fighting vehicle of the Second World War period, which received the designation 40 / 43M "Zrinyi 105" ("Zrinyi II"), was named after national hero Hungarian Miklós Zrinyi, was adopted in January 1943 and released in small quantities - only 66 units.

On October 1, 1943, assault artillery battalions of 30 self-propelled guns each began to form in the Hungarian army, which, along with German-made combat vehicles, began to receive Zrinyi assault guns. By 1945, all remaining self-propelled guns of this type were part of the 20th Eger and 24th Kosice battalions. The last units armed with these self-propelled guns capitulated on the territory of Czechoslovakia.

Zrinyi I

Zrinyi II

Armed with a 105-mm howitzer, the Zrinyi self-propelled gun was a powerful assault gun

Battery of self-propelled guns "Zrinyi II" during tactical exercises. 1943

"Zrinyi" were typical assault guns. They successfully accompanied the attacking infantry with fire and maneuver, but in 1944 they could no longer fight Soviet tanks. In a similar situation, the Germans re-armed their StuG III with long-barreled guns, turning them into tank destroyers. The Hungarians, with their more backward economy, such an event was beyond their strength.

Only two combat vehicles from the family of Hungarian medium tanks have survived to this day. "Turan 75" (number 2N423) and "Zrinyi 105" (number ZN022) can be seen in the exposition of the museum of armored weapons and equipment in Kubinka near Moscow.