The SDI program As it quickly became clear, the budgeted allocations for SDI could not ensure the successful accomplishment of the grandiose tasks set for the program. It is no coincidence that many experts estimated the real costs of the program during the entire

The Fon program In the early 1970s, research and development work was carried out in the USSR under the Fon program in order to create a promising missile defense system. The essence of the program was to create a system that would make it possible to keep "on sight" all

Chapter 3. Program Its full name is "Working program for testing the turbine generator No. 8 of the Chernobyl NPP in the modes of joint run-down with auxiliary load." There is nothing outstanding in the Program, the usual program, normally written. She gained fame

Program The block diagram of the program is shown in fig. 8.17. After the power is turned on, the travel motor is turned off and the microcontroller begins to search for the brightest light source by turning the servomotor. If the light source is too bright, then the mode turns on.

Program 1 'Microcontroller 1start:High 4: low 4 'LED blinkingb7 = 0button 5,0,255,0,b7,1,avoid 'Check obstaclepot 7, 255, b0 'Read CdS sensor 1pot 6, 255, b1 'Read CdS sensor 2if b0<= 250 then skip ‘Достаточно темно?If b1 >= 250 then slp ‘Yes skip: ‘No if bo > 25 then skip 2 ‘Too much light if b1< 25

Program 2 'Microcontroller 2b4 = 150 'Set servo mid position start:peek 6, b1 'Read microcontroller data 1let b0 = b1 & 7 'Mask except first three bits if b0 = 0 then slp 'Sleep time if b0 = 1 then rt 'Turn right if b0 = 2 then lt 'Turn left if b0 = 3 then fw 'Move

Program for the microcontroller The microcontroller 16F84 controls the operation of three servomotors. The presence of a large number of idle I / O buses and space for the program provides an opportunity to improve and modify the basic model

PICBASIC program 'Six-legged walking robot'Connections'Left servo Pin RB1'Right servo Pin RB2'Tilt servo Pin RB0'Move forward onlystart:for B0 = 1 to 60pulsout 0, 155 'Tilt clockwise, right side uppulsout 1, 145 ' Left feet in placepulsout 2, 145' right

BASIC program The BASIC program is very simple. After finding the printer port address, the program controls the operation of the air valve via pin 2.5 REM Air Valve Solenoid Controller10 REM John Iovine15 REM Find Printer Port Address20 DEF SEG = 025 a = (PEEK(1032) + 256 * PEEK(1033))30 REM

The Mercury Program Almost during the same period of time, beginning in 1958, work was also launched on a broad front in the United States to implement the country's first manned space program, the Mercury. In the late 50s, the United States did not have a sufficiently powerful launch vehicle,

The Apollo program Under this name, in the 60s, a huge complex of works was carried out in the USA, the main task of which was to land a man on the moon. The implementation of the program, whose prestigious significance was far from the last place, required the expenditure of about

The ASTP program For about a decade and a half, space technology in the USSR and the USA developed relatively independently. One of the motives for joining forces was the desire to be able to provide mutual assistance in outer space. For this, it was necessary first of all

According to some military experts, the name more accurately conveying the essence of the program would be "strategic initiative defense", that is, defense that involves the implementation of independent active actions, up to an attack.

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✪ COSMIC REVELATION About the secret space program with Corey Goode and David Wilcock

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THE VIEWS AND OPINIONS OF INDIVIDUALS ON THE FOLLOWING SHOW DO NOT NEED TO COIN WITH THE OPINIONS OR VIEWS OF GAIAM TV AND THE PARENT AND SUBSIDIARIES SPACE REVELATION About the secret space program with Corey Goode and David Wilcock A MESSAGE TO HUMANITY We are interviewing a remarkable man. DAVID WILCOCK Corey Goode, 45, native of Texas. You still live in Texas. What did he do? He shared insider information about what is really going on behind the scenes of secret government and military programs , their development and the industrialization of our solar system. The story is great, I've done dozens of interviews over the years with employees up to level 35, which is above the President of the United States. I did not disclose 90% of this information to the public, because they could have been killed for this, and I also did not want to disclose anything that would prevent me from identifying real insiders. With the advent of Corey, it turned out that he not only knew the 90%. He also had other pieces of the puzzle that I was looking for. I knew that something was not being told to me. But the mosaic has developed. So, Corey, hello. - Thank you for coming. - Thank you. As I understand it, you will now tell us something so unusual that it will be difficult for people to accept it, especially if they do not understand the subject of the conversation. Let's not try to console everyone in advance, let's take the bull by the horns. Could you quickly tell us about your connection to what the space program was for you. For me, it started when I was 6. CORE GOOD I was then taken to the so-called MILAB. MILAB Also called the MILAB Program. I have been identified as an intuitive empath. What does it mean? Intuitive means you intuitively feel what might happen. - Psychic ability? - Yes, prophetic. And empaths have a strong emotional connection with those around them. You feel what they feel, you connect on an emotional level. Just the right set of skills. I have been trained, my skills have grown. To such an extent ... I was 12-13 years old. I was trained with other people involved in the program ... We were the so-called IE support for the delegation of earthlings to the super federation. It was a federation of a large number of ET federations that met to discuss the great experiment. What kind of experiment? What were the aliens doing? A group of 40 humanoids was almost always present, sometimes up to 60. There were 22 genetic programs. What does it mean? What is the genetic program? A program with mixing their genes and manipulating ours. Was this happening? Yes, and it's happening now. That's what it's about. The Earth delegation tried to get... Tried to participate in this for a long time. Finally, they managed to get a seat. As intuitive empaths, sitting there, we didn't know what was going on. Because most of it took place in an ancient monotonous alien language that we did not understand. Much was communicated by telepathy. We just sat there, they gave us a device - a glass smart tablet, similar to an iPad, with access to the database of aliens. We were told to occupy our minds by reviewing the materials. This helped us with the ability of intuitive empaths to detect danger and betrayal. And what were you able to view on these tablets? There... Basically, they wanted to show us information about 22 genetic experiments that were in development. But we had access to other information as well. Depending on the person... We had different interests. We looked at different information. I've looked at a lot. Reminds, as if to remember the days of study. All the books you've read, all the information you've looked at, how much can you keep in your memory? You know, there was so much information. Were there unanswered questions where it was just "I don't know"? No. In general, you were simply given available information. You were looking at things that our group, the human delegation, were not aware of. But we were open to almost all the information. What did the screen look like? Looks like an iPad? No, it looks more like a piece of plexiglass. Nothing remarkable. If it had been dropped from a window and you had found it on the field and picked it up, you would not have realized that it was something special. It must be taken in hand and activated mentally. Then it turns on in your language. You also enter the database with the help of your mind, the device shows what you want. Text, images and videos. Pictures and videos were as if holographic, they rose slightly from the screen. Well, not completely, but the holography is such that you might think so. Just 3D depth, like holography. And the hand at this moment is also visible - under the glass? - Not. Does it get dark first? - Exactly. Yes, it goes completely opaque or black or something before showing pictures and text. Were there buffers or firewalls? To not have access to some answers? Well, I have already said that it is extremely rare for the screen to turn blue. Well, no information. Basically everything was available. The same devices were on the research vessel with access to our own databases. Is this advanced technology being used in the space program? Yes. Big screens used for conferences and demonstrations. Obviously, you came across a lot of different information. Was there anything that seemed really significant, shocking, even with what you already knew? I wonder what's in there... The information was provided almost like... Let's go back to the college analogy. There were 22 competing term papers. Each of the genetic programs was presented in this form. They competed with each other. They didn't move at all. Was it about humanoid aliens? - Yes. - Linking their DNA to ours? - Like that? - Yes. And manipulation of our DNA. There is also a spiritual component. They are participating in the experiment. They are not just experimenting on us. They themselves participate in an extensive experiment. Did they have a purpose? Why do they need it? What do they care? I do not know this. Maybe just because they can. In an attempt to create... Some kind of super-being. But why try..? Mixing the best genes and then manipulating us and our civilization to keep us from rising? How long do you think the program has been running? 22 different programs run at different times. But genetic manipulation has been happening to us for at least 250,000 years. These programs vary in duration. From 5 thousand to ... They are all different. It does not seem that our secret or elected government would like these programs. Can we stop it? Hardly. More recently, we managed to get ourselves a place at the table to participate in the discussion. It turns out that these are hostile aliens? Neutral or friendly? It's like looking. It all comes down to... Point of view. It's hard to say that this kind group and this one is evil. After all, they consider their experiments positive. On your site you mention a certain LOK. What's this? Lunar Operations Corps. This institution on the far side of the moon is something like a neutral diplomatic corps, which is used by all participants in space programs. There... There are employees there, but this is a transit station. People are constantly arriving there and leaving for further ... To the solar system and beyond, to other stations and bases, to home ships. Tell us about how you got from home to a research ship in the solar system. Kind of like a sightseeing tour. I was taken from home in the middle of the night in the usual way to Carswell Air Force Base. Carswell Air Force Base is now a Naval Air Station Under the base is a secret room. An elevator leads there. Many people know about the underground tram system under the USA. It is called the shuttle subway. Yes, it's a shuttle system. Single-rail cars go along the pipe. Something like a magnetic plane in a vacuum tube. I was transferred from there to another place. From where I was transported to the LOC using Stargate technology - or "portal". - So. I ended up in LOK. And then they put me on a manta-shaped vessel. - In the shape of a stingray? - Yes. Yes, it looked like a manta ray. And not only me. We were then ferried from the moon further into the solar system. Was there a hangar in LOK? Yes, there are several of them. This one was big. - So. - And... How big was the manta boat? Man 600. - Large. - Yes. It took us to the right place. How long were you in the LOC before landing on the manta? Not at all. I signed the papers there, although I was too young to sign the papers. They explained to me that I was signing up for 20 years. Called 20-and-back. Doesn't it look like the scenery from The Next Generation of Star Trek? - What's the interior like? - Mostly narrow corridors and ordinary doors. Not at all... No Star Trek doors that close like an elevator. Nothing advanced. If you shoot a video inside there, can you easily tell that this building is on the ground? - Yes. Exactly. - So. What was the hangar? Was there anything out of the ordinary? It's something naval. - So. - It's like an aircraft hangar connected to a submarine hangar. How long have you been flying the manta? 30-40 minutes. So. And what happened next? I happened to see the research vessel to which I was assigned. And how long were you there? I was assigned to this ship for 6 years. You said that the service life is 20 years? Yes. And why were you kept on a research ship for 6 years? The Intuitive Empath skill set was needed in other programs, and for the remainder of my 20 years, I was transferred through programs. Can you provide an example program? For example, a program to intercept and interrogate violators. What are the violators? These are those who have entered the solar system or the earth's atmosphere without invitation or permission. And you could detain them and interrogate them? This was done by the team participating in the program. I attended interrogations as an intuitive empath. And tried to define betrayal? Somewhat. Sometimes... When communicating with these beings, it's called docking. Sometimes I had to dock, sometimes I just had to read them, read emotions, see if they were telling the truth, like a lie detector. Consciousness works in much the same way, what can be considered aliens? More or less like people? Definitely. You left the program after 20 years of service. My tenure had ended, leaving only work to complete. On your website, you mention 5 factions of the Secret Space Program. Could you name these factions for us? Tell me a little about each, how do they differ? Of course. I'll start with the oldest one - the Solar Watcher. SUN ROVER It all started in the seventies, eighties, during the Strategic Defense Initiative, the DOD's STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE for short, SDI, before and after the Reagan administration. DEFENSE PROTECTION Budget battles and star wars And then there is the ICC ICC (INTERPLANETARY CORPORATE CONGLOMERATE) An interplanetary corporate conglomerate. Corporations from all over the world have representatives on the corporate supreme council that manages the infrastructure of the Secret Space Program deployed in space. Extensive. There is also the Dark Fleet. DARK FLEET This is a top-secret fleet operating primarily outside the solar system. There are also black ops BLACK OPERATIONS (MILITARY) covert military space operations, they are all in the same group. And then there is the Global Galactic League of Nations group. GLOBAL GALACTIC LEAGUE OF NATIONS This is something like a carrot offered to the rest of the nations to keep secret what is happening in space. They were given the space program, they were given information about the security threat in the form of invasion. What you need to get together and work together. And I also visited one institution, similar to the television series "Stargate Atlantis." There was a relaxed atmosphere. People walk around in overalls decals different countries of the world. This group also operates primarily outside the solar system. You often mentioned a certain "alliance", explain, in order to avoid confusion. There is an Earth alliance. It has its own agenda. They are working to create a new financial system, to free themselves from the political cabal and much more. And then there is the Space Alliance. It is made up of what started out as a faction of the Solar Watcher and defectors from other covert space programs. These defectors left their programs with the skills, with the information, and joined the Secret Space Programs alliance. What sequence of events made you a whistleblower? What prompted you to expose? I've been contacted by a group of aliens known as the blue birds. - Feathers? You mean birds? - Feathers. And what do they look like? 2.5 meters tall. Very similar to birds. Feathers of all colors from blue to indigo. Are you saying that these are birds with wings? Without wings. Sketch of Android Jones according to Corey They have a human torso, arms, hands, feet. - Humanoids? A bird's head on a human body? Yes, but without the long beak, as in many images on the Internet. They have a soft, flexible beak. And they... When they talk, they use sign language with one hand. They also move their mouths and communicate by telepathy. Who are these blue birds? Where did they come from? - What's on their minds? “The blue birds told me that they and the other beings they work with came from densities six through nine. - And this... - What kind of density? Everything around us is made of substances, energy. Thoughts are made up of vibrations. They are from a different vibration or frequency. Like a different plane? - Yes. - Is it somewhere out there, in the galaxy, in the universe or around us? It's not on a planet far, far away, closer to the center of the universe, nothing like that. It's all around us. Very close and at the same time far away. So what's on their mind? Why are they here? They've been here for a long time. They are watching. But... We are moving towards a high-energy part of the galaxy that will change the density of the solar system and the local star cluster. Is that what they told you? Or was there evidence of this in the program? There is tangible evidence for this. They have been studied for a long time. But they told me the same. If we find ourselves in another density, what will happen to humanity according to the blue birds? What we... There will be a transformation. We will change mainly at the level of consciousness. What is it like? Psychic and telepathic abilities? Well, there are many theories. I was not told that we could do this or that. I have heard many different theories. I don't know if this will happen to everyone at the same time, or if more spiritually developed people will notice the signs sooner. I don't have all the answers. I am not a guru. I can't answer all questions. Are blue birds oriented towards goodness? Do they have ulterior motives? Can we trust them? They are definitely positive. To the best of my knowledge, beings above sixth density do not have the ulterior motives we attribute to them. Third and fourth density beings are different, we always have motives. Get money. Manipulate people to do or think as we want. You can't project that onto beings of high densities, you can't say that they will behave and think the same way. Their huge spheres help to discharge the gigantic waves of energy that enter the solar system. They discharge energy so that we don't get too much at once, they give us time to prepare. If it weren't for the spheres, what would happen? Many would go mad, chaos would reign. Are you talking about spheres, what are they? People don't see spheres through a telescope. No. They are also different density. Many believe that these are spaceships. I'm pretty sure from my travels in these realms that they're on a macro level. And spherical beings are also gigantic spheres. What are spherical creatures? One of the five creatures of the Sphere Alliance. They are from high densities. Of... Of the five kinds of beings. Have you personally met the blue birds? Yes. I was nominated as a delegate to this group's communications with the secret space program alliance council. And to start speaking on their behalf to the old superfederation council where I sat as an intuitive empath as a teenager. I tried to dissuade the nomination. I can't speak in public. The voice is weak. He put forward many excuses not to be a delegate. I excused myself when I was brought to one of the huge spheres that is in outer space. I met a blue feather named Ro-T-Air. While I was trying to dissuade my nomination, he came up to me, put his hand on my forearm and telepathically told me that I needed to discard everything negative, stop thinking about the bad. I felt the softness of his hand on my skin. He touched me physically only once. And then he told me that only the message to humanity is important. What's the message? A message to humanity... All religious groups. We need to love more. We need to forgive ourselves, forgive others, thereby stopping the wheel of karma. We need to focus on serving others. Daily. We need to focus on the growth of vibrations and consciousness. Many aggressively comment on the articles, they say that the elite wants to mix us into one world religion. How can we understand that this is not another mental operation to force us to walk in formation to someone else's new tune? They said, and I posted on my website, that there is no need to change your faith. You can use... These provisions exist in major religions. There is nothing new here. Here... There isn't much time. And it must be done. It's time to focus. Christians, Muslims, Buddhists can remain themselves. Let faith remain. Are they not trying to present themselves as new gods? Not at all. They managed to get it into my head that this should not become either a cult or a religion. I don't know the exact story, but they've already tried three times. And each time the message was distorted, people used it to control. Turned into a cult and religion. It is clear that we have just begun. The information is bewitching. I want to add on my own that this confirms what I have been studying for many years. I did my best to find a scientific basis. There's a lot to talk about. We've only just begun. I'm glad you agreed to participate. Courage does you credit. You have two children. You turned down a high paying job. So, revelations are not a trifle for you at all. I appreciate it very much. Thank you. - Thank you. - So. Freemasonry Judaism Brahmanism Islam Confucianism Buddhism Christianity Taoism Maya Baha'i Faith COSMIC REVELATION About the Secret Space Program with Corey Goode and David Wilcock

Description

The main elements of such a system were to be based in space. In order to hit a large number of targets (several thousand) within a few minutes, the missile defense system under the SDI program provided for the use of active weapons based on new physical principles, including radiation, electromagnetic, kinetic, microwave, as well as a new generation of traditional missile weapons "land -space", "air-space".

The problems of launching missile defense elements into reference orbits, recognizing targets under conditions of interference, divergence of beam energy at large distances, aiming at high-speed maneuvering targets, and many others are very complex. Such global macrosystems as missile defense, which have a complex autonomous architecture and a variety of functional connections, are characterized by instability and the ability to self-excite from internal faults and external disturbing factors. Possible in this case, unauthorized operation of individual elements of the space echelon of the missile defense system (for example, putting it on high alert) can be regarded by the other side as preparation for a strike and can provoke it into preemptive actions.

The work on the SDI program is fundamentally different from the outstanding developments of the past - such as, for example, the creation of an atomic bomb (the "Manhattan" project) or the landing of a man on the moon (the "Apollo" project). When solving them, the authors of the projects overcame fairly predictable problems caused only by the laws of nature. When solving problems on a promising missile defense system, the authors will also have to fight against a reasonable adversary capable of developing unpredictable and effective countermeasures.

The creation of a space-based missile defense system, in addition to solving a number of complex and extremely expensive scientific and technical problems, is connected with overcoming a new socio-psychological factor - the presence of powerful, all-seeing weapons in space. It was the combination of these reasons (mainly the practical impossibility of creating the SDI) that led to the refusal to continue work on the creation of the SDI in accordance with its original plan. At the same time, with the coming to power in the US of the Republican administration of George Bush (junior), these works were resumed as part of the creation of a missile defense system.

SOI components

Detection and target designation

Defeat and destruction

Missiles

Anti-missiles were the most "classic" solution within the framework of SDI and seemed to be the main component of the last echelon of interception. Due to the insufficient reaction time of anti-missiles, it is difficult to use them to intercept warheads in the main section of the trajectory (since it takes a considerable time for an anti-missile to overcome the distance separating it from the target), but the deployment and maintenance of anti-missiles was relatively cheap. It was believed that anti-missiles would play the role of the last echelon of SDI, finishing off those individual warheads that could overcome space-based missile defense systems.

At the very beginning of the development of the SDI program, it was decided to abandon the "traditional" nuclear warheads for anti-missiles. High-altitude nuclear explosions made it difficult for radars to work, and thus, knocking down one warhead made it difficult to hit the others - at the same time, the development of guidance systems made it possible to achieve a direct hit by an anti-missile in a warhead and destroy the warhead with the energy of a counter kinetic collision.

In the late 1970s, Lockheed developed the HOE project (eng. Homing overlay experiment) - the first project of a kinetic interception system. Since a perfectly accurate kinetic hit at that level of electronics development was still a bit of a problem, the creators of the HOE tried to expand the area of ​​effect. The HOE striking element was a folding structure resembling an umbrella frame, which, when leaving the atmosphere, unfolded and moved apart due to the rotation and centrifugal action of the weights fixed at the ends of the "spokes". Thus, the area of ​​damage increased to several meters: it was assumed that the collision energy of the warhead with the cargo at a total approach speed of about 12-15 km/s would completely destroy the warhead.

Four tests of the system were undertaken in 1983-1984. The first three were unsuccessful due to failures in the guidance system, and only the fourth, undertaken on June 10, 1984, was crowned with success when the system intercepted a Minuteman ICBM training warhead at an altitude of about 160 km. Although the HOE concept itself was not further developed, it laid the foundation for future kinetic interception systems.

In 1985, the development of the ERIS anti-missiles was initiated. Exoatmospheric Reentry Interceptor Subsystem - Subsystem for exoatmospheric interception of incoming (into the atmosphere) warheads) and HEDI (eng. High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor - High Altitude Atmospheric Defense Interceptor).

The ERIS missile was developed by Lockheed and was designed to intercept warheads in outer space at rendezvous speeds up to 13.4 km/s. The rocket samples were made on the basis of the steps of the Minuteman solid-propellant ICBMs, the target was aimed using an infrared sensor, and the damaging element was an inflatable octagonal structure, at the corners of which loads were placed: such a system provided the same area of ​​destruction as the HOE "umbrella" with much less weight. In 1991, the system carried out two successful interceptions of a training target (an ICBM warhead) surrounded by inflatable simulators. Although the program was officially closed in 1995, ERIS developments were used in subsequent American systems like THAAD and Ground-Based Midcourse Defense.

The HEDI developed by McDonnel Douglas was a small short-range interception missile developed from the Sprint anti-missile. Its flight tests began in 1991. A total of three flights were made, two of which were successful before the program was closed.

Nuclear-pumped lasers

A promising basis for the SDI system in initial period seen X-ray laser systems, pumped from nuclear explosions. Such installations were based on the use of special rods located on the surface of a nuclear charge, which, after detonation, would turn into ionized plasma but retain (for the first milliseconds) the previous configuration, and, cooling down in the first fraction of a second after the explosion, would radiate a narrow beam of hard energy along its axis. x-ray radiation.

To circumvent the treaty on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in space, missiles with atomic lasers had to be based on converted old submarines (in the 1980s, in connection with the decommissioning of the Polaris SLBM, 41 SSBNs were withdrawn from the fleet, which were supposed to be used to deploy missile defense ) and launch out of the atmosphere in the first seconds of the attack. Initially it was assumed that the charge - codenamed "Excalibur" - would have many independent rods, autonomously aiming at different targets, and thus be able to hit several warheads with one blow. More recent solutions involved concentrating multiple rods on a single target to produce a powerful, focused beam of radiation.

Mine testing of prototypes in the 1980s gave generally positive results, but raised a number of unforeseen problems that could not be quickly resolved. As a result, the deployment of atomic lasers as the main component of SDI had to be abandoned, transferring the program to the category of research.

Chemical lasers

According to one of the proposals, the space component of the SDI was to consist of a system of orbital stations armed with chemically pumped lasers. Various design solutions have been proposed, with laser systems ranging from 5 to 20 megawatts. Deployed in orbit, such "battle stars" (eng. battlestar) were supposed to hit missiles and breeding units in the early stages of flight, immediately after leaving the atmosphere.

Unlike the warheads themselves, the thin bodies of ballistic missiles are highly vulnerable to laser radiation. The high-precision inertial navigation equipment of autonomous dispersal units is also extremely vulnerable to laser attacks. It was assumed that each laser combat station would be able to produce up to 1000 laser series, and the stations located closer to the enemy’s territory at the time of the attack were supposed to attack taking off ballistic missiles and disengagement units, and those located further away - separated warheads.

Experiments with the MIRACL laser Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser - advanced infrared chemical laser) have demonstrated the feasibility of building a deuterium fluoride laser capable of developing a megawatt output power within 70 seconds. In 1985, on bench tests, an improved version of the laser with an output power of 2.2 megawatts destroyed a liquid-propellant ballistic missile fixed 1 kilometer from the laser. As a result of the 12-second irradiation, the walls of the rocket body lost strength and were destroyed by internal pressure. In a vacuum, similar results could be achieved at a much greater distance and with a shorter exposure time (due to the absence of beam scattering by the atmosphere and the absence of pressure external environment on the rocket tanks).

The laser combat station development program continued until the closure of the SDI program.

Orbital mirrors and ground lasers

In the 1980s, SDI considered the idea of ​​a partial-space laser system, which would include a powerful laser complex located on Earth and a redirecting orbital mirror (or rather, a system of mirrors) that directs the reflected beam at warheads. The location of the main laser complex on the ground made it possible to solve a number of problems with the provision of energy, heat removal and protection of the system (although at the same time it led to inevitable losses in beam power during the passage of the atmosphere).

It was assumed that a complex of laser installations located on the tops of the highest mountains in the United States, at the critical moment of the attack, would be activated and send beams into space. Concentrating mirrors located in geostationary orbits were supposed to collect and focus the beams scattered by the atmosphere, and redirect them to more compact, low-orbit redirecting mirrors - which would aim the doubly reflected beams at the warheads.

The advantages of the system were simplicity (basically) of construction and deployment, as well as low vulnerability to enemy strikes - concentrating mirrors made of thin film were relatively easy to replace. In addition, the system could potentially be used against take-off ICBMs and breeding units - much more vulnerable than the warheads themselves - at the initial stage of the trajectory. The big drawback was the huge - due to energy losses during the passage of the atmosphere and the reflection of the beam - the necessary power of ground-based lasers. According to calculations, almost 1000 gigawatts of electricity were required to power a laser system capable of reliably defeating several thousand ICBMs or their warheads, the redistribution of which in just a few seconds in the event of war would require a gigantic overload of the US energy system.

Neutral particle emitters

Considerable attention within the SDI was given to the possibility of creating a so-called. "beam" weapons that hit the target with a stream of particles accelerated to sublight speeds. Due to the significant mass of particles, the striking effect of such a weapon would be much higher than that of lasers similar in energy consumption; however, the downside was problems with focusing the particle beam.

As part of the SDI program, it was planned to create heavy orbital automatic stations armed with neutral particle emitters. The main stake was placed on the radiation effect of high-energy particles during their deceleration in the material of enemy warheads; such irradiation was supposed to disable the electronics inside the warheads. Destruction of the warheads themselves was considered possible, but required long exposure and high power. Such a weapon would be effective at distances up to tens of thousands of kilometers. Several experiments have been carried out with the launch of prototype emitters on suborbital rockets.

It was assumed that the emitters of neutral particles can be used within the SDI as follows:

• Discrimination of decoys - even small beams of neutral particles hitting a target would cause emissions of electromagnetic radiation, depending on the material and structure of the target. Thus, even at minimum power, neutral particle emitters could be used to identify real warheads against the background of decoys.
• Damage to electronics - slowing down in the target material, neutral particles would provoke a powerful ionizing radiation capable of destroying electronic circuits or living matter. Thus, irradiation with streams of neutral particles could destroy the target's microchips and hit crews without physically destroying the target.
• Physical destruction - with sufficient power and density of the beam of neutral particles, its deceleration in the target material would lead to a powerful release of heat and physical destruction of the target structure. At the same time - since heat would be released as the particles travel through the target material - thin screens would be completely ineffective against such weapons. Given the high accuracy inherent in similar weapons, it was possible to quickly disable an enemy spacecraft by destroying its key components (propulsion systems, fuel tanks, sensor and weapon systems, control cabin).

The development of neutral particle emitters was considered a promising direction, however, due to the significant complexity of such installations and the huge energy consumption, their deployment within the framework of SDI was expected no earlier than 2025.

Atomic buckshot

As a side branch of the program of nuclear-pumped lasers, within the framework of the SDI program, the possibility of using the energy of a nuclear explosion to accelerate material projectiles (buckshot) to ultra-high speeds was considered. The Prometheus program involved using the energy of the plasma front, which is formed during the detonation of the kiloton power of nuclear charges, to give acceleration to tungsten buckshot. It was assumed that during the detonation of the charge, a special-shaped tungsten plate placed on its surface would collapse into millions of tiny pellets moving in the right direction at speeds up to 100 km / s. Since it was believed that the impact energy was not enough to effectively destroy the warhead, the system was supposed to be used for effective selection of decoys (since the “shot” of the atomic shotgun covered a significant volume of space), the dynamics of which should have changed significantly from collision with buckshot.

railguns

As an effective means of destroying warheads, electromagnetic rail accelerators were also considered, capable of accelerating (due to the Lorentz force) a conductive projectile to a speed of several kilometers per second. On opposite trajectories, a collision with even a relatively light projectile could lead to the complete destruction of the warhead. In terms of space-based, railguns were much more profitable than the powder or light gas guns considered in parallel with them, since they did not need a propellant.

During the experiments under the CHECMATE (Compact High Energy Capacitor Module Advanced Technology Experiment) program, significant progress was made in the field of railguns, but at the same time it became clear that these weapons were not very suitable for space deployment. A significant problem was the large consumption of energy and the release of heat, the removal of which in space caused the need for large radiators. As a result, the SDI railgun program was canceled, but gave impetus to the development of railguns as weapons for use on Earth.

Space activity as one of the directions of scientific and technological progress is objectively becoming the most important means of solving the common problems of mankind - energy, food, environmental and others. Due to its international character and the global scope of possible consequences, it directly affects the interests of almost all states of the globe. This requires the organization of their close cooperation in matters of peaceful use and prevention of the militarization of outer space, which is the "common heritage of mankind."

To date, thanks to the persistent efforts of the Soviet Union, some international legal restrictions have been introduced on the military activities of countries in space, but the constant obstructionist policy of the United States prevents the conclusion of comprehensive agreements in this area. Since the late 1950s, the United States has been striving to put the unique capabilities of space technology at the service of its military department. As a result of these efforts, they have up to 100 functioning satellites of various space systems in orbit and annually launch 15-20 new military satellites. These systems used to solve the problems of communications and command and control, navigation, cartography, meteorological support and reconnaissance are not considered in literally space weapons and do not pose a threat of direct attack.

However, the situation in this area may change significantly in connection with the intention of the United States to start creating and deploying strike weapons designed to destroy objects in space or on the ground from space. Practical activities The Pentagon on the militarization of outer space became especially active after the announcement of the presidential directive on national space policy (1982). The main goals of this policy are proclaimed to ensure "national security" and the protection of "vital interests" of the United States in space. In order to achieve the goals set, the American leadership, in accordance with the directive, solely reserves the right to take military actions in space. The further steps taken by the US militarist circles demonstrated their desire not only to achieve superiority over the Soviet Union in space, but also to break the existing strategic parity by deploying space strike weapons and open another channel for the arms race. A vivid example of this is the so-called "strategic defense initiative" (SDI), which even in the Western press has received a more accurate name - "star wars".

It was officially announced in March 1983 as a long-term program to create a multi-layer space-based missile defense system (ABM) against the Soviet Union. According to the US administration, this program pursues the alleged goals complete elimination threats from ballistic missiles, strengthening stability and international security, but in fact is aimed at depriving the USSR of the opportunity for a retaliatory strike. At the same time, the facts are carefully hushed up that the US militarists are conducting research in this area against the backdrop of a further buildup of American strategic offensive weapons and intend to use their results to create strike space weapons that would be capable of almost suddenly appearing over the territory of any state and creating a real threat to space , air and ground facilities. In fact, as M. S. Gorbachev clearly described this program in an interview with the editor of the Pravda newspaper, “they talk about defense - they are preparing for an attack, they are advertising a space shield, but they are forging a space sword, they promise to eliminate nuclear weapons - in practice they are building up, improving it . They promise stability to the world, but they are leading to a break in the military balance. The USSR proposed a complete ban on strike space weapons. No matter how they are called - the "strategic defense initiative", the space "shield", etc., they represent a danger to the peoples. Therefore, the core issue of our time is the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its curtailment on Earth. On the way to its solution, the main obstacle remains - the American program of "star wars".

Rice. 1. The concept of the American multi-layer missile defense system with space-based elements: 1 - the active segment of the ICBM flight trajectory; 2 - combat space station; 3 - early warning satellite; 4 - missile with X-ray laser launched from a submarine; 5 - separation of the warhead of the ICBM (breeding of warheads and separation of decoys); 6 - powerful ground-based laser installation; 7 - re-reflecting orbital mirror; 8 - middle section of the warhead flight path; 9 - satellite tracking, recognition and targeting; 10 - space platform with accelerating weapons; 11 - the final section of the trajectory of the warheads; 12 - aviation missile interception system; 13 - long-range and short-range anti-missiles

The new "initiative" in the United States meant a complete reorientation of efforts directed towards the militarization of space. Beginning in 1983, all R&D plans in the field of missile defense were revised at an urgent pace, a program for further research was developed, specific areas and amounts of funding were identified, and a preliminary assessment was made of the possibilities of practical implementation of the concept of a multi-layer system with space-based elements. At this stage, the plans include the study of all technical means that could potentially be used in a promising missile defense system, including means of intercepting operational-tactical and tactical missiles. As a result, SDI has become the largest R&D program in the US Department of Defense, with more than $5 billion allocated in a short period of time (Fiscal Years 1984-1986).

According to the press, the structure and possible combat composition of the missile defense system created within the framework of "Star Wars" has not yet been finally determined. However, it is assumed that it will include at least three echelons designed to destroy ballistic missiles in all the main characteristic sections of their flight trajectory (Fig. 1).

The main role in such a system is assigned to the first echelon, whose assets must destroy ICBMs immediately after launch during the first 3-5 minutes of flight, that is, before the warheads are separated. American experts believe that missile trajectories in this section are large and rather vulnerable targets that are easier to detect and destroy. At the same time, as a result of their defeat, all warheads mounted on ICBMs with multiple warheads will be immediately disabled, and thus maximum combat effectiveness will be achieved. The second echelon is designed to destroy missile warheads throughout their flight outside the dense layers of the atmosphere. The means of the third echelon should intercept the surviving warheads after they enter the dense layers of the atmosphere, where their recognition is facilitated due to natural braking and lagging behind lighter decoys.

According to the authors, the main components of a multi-layer missile defense system will be the means of detecting, tracking and recognizing ballistic targets, directed energy weapons and kinetic (conventional) weapons, combat control and communications equipment.

To detect, track and recognize targets, the SDI program develops radar and optical (infrared) means, designed mainly for installation on space platforms and aircraft, as well as special launch vehicles launched towards approaching warheads on a signal from early warning systems.

Rice. 2. Sketch of a combat space station

In the field of directed energy weapons, research covers high-power lasers (including nuclear-pumped X-rays), particle accelerators, and electromagnetic (microwave) radiation generators. Combat space stations(Fig. 2) with laser and accelerator weapons, with the exception of X-ray lasers, are intended for permanent placement in orbits. X-ray lasers, in which a nuclear explosion serves as an energy source, are supposed to be launched in the direction of targets by special launch vehicles from submarines on a signal from early warning systems. In the case of placing powerful lasers on the ground, their beams are aimed at ICBM warheads using large mirrors installed on space platforms.

Ground-based long-range and short-range anti-missiles, as well as electromagnetic guns (Fig. 3) and space-based rockets, are being developed as kinetic weapons.

For centralized control of these components, ultra-high-speed computing tools are being created, research is being conducted in the field of artificial intelligence, and new machine languages ​​and algorithms are being developed. At the same time, in order to assess the practical possibilities of creating a combat missile defense system, the general needs for energy sources, the survivability of individual components, and methods for organizing the operation of space vehicles in orbits are determined.

Rice. 3. Sketch of the space electromagnetic gun

At present, work on the SDI program is aimed at solving fundamental problems, studying possible options for building a missile defense system, and experimentally testing individual technical solutions.

As reported in the foreign press, according to plans to create a new strike weapon, testing of X-ray lasers continues at the test site in Nevada. In 1984-1985, at the American missile defense range Kwajelein (Pacific Ocean), a Minuteman ICBM warhead (target) was intercepted at high altitude using a homing experimental long-range anti-missile (Fig. 4), and at the White Sands range (New -Mexico made several launches of short-range anti-missiles.At the same range, the Americans conducted an experiment on the destruction of the test laser installation of the hull of the ICBM "Titan", installed motionless on the ground at a distance of about 1 km. fast-moving objects, a series of experiments was conducted using a low-power ground-based laser facility in the summer of 1985. The laser beam of this facility was directed at small mirror reflectors located on the Discovery orbital stage (the 18th flight of the manned Space Shuttle spacecraft) and special rockets launched high altitude for this purpose. An experimental electromagnetic gun is being tested in the laboratories of the University of Texas, and at the same time, a more advanced model of it with a barrel (guides) about 40 m long is being developed.

Particular attention in the SDI program is given to projects for the creation of weapons of directed energy. This weapon is considered by American experts not only as the main component of a promising missile defense system, but also as a potential means of destroying space targets, strategic bombers and cruise missiles in flight. The achieved level of laser radiation power allowed the US Department of Defense in the early 1980s to conduct field tests for the destruction in flight using ground and aircraft laser systems of such moving targets as radio-controlled air targets, air-to-air missiles and anti-tank missiles. rockets. The immediate goal of the research is to complete the Space Laser Triad program, which provides for testing a model of a combat laser installation, first on the ground, and then on board the Shuttle spacecraft.

Work on fundamentally new types of weapons is being carried out in such major US research centers as the Livermore Laboratory. E. Lawrence (staff about 8 thousand people), Los Alamos National Laboratory (7.5 thousand highly qualified specialists) and the laboratory of the Sandia company (6.9 thousand employees). The Livermore Laboratory's annual budget, for example, is about $800 million, of which half is spent on SDI and other military programs. Within the walls of these organizations for military research, powerful elementary particle accelerators are used, laser devices of various types are being developed, and the mechanism of the impact of directed energy flows on structural materials and electronic equipment is being studied.

Lawyers for the US military-industrial complex in every possible way emphasize the supposedly purely research nature of the SDI program, however, judging by foreign press reports, along with R&D, it also provides for the production and deployment of a combat missile defense system. The entire program is expected to be implemented in four stages. At the first stage (until the 1990s), it is planned to carry out all the main studies, at the second - to test models, prototypes and individual components, at the third and fourth - to begin and complete the construction of a multi-layer missile defense system with space-based elements. Already at the first stage of such "research" it is planned to allocate more than 30 billion dollars, and in ten years, according to American experts, up to 70 billion dollars can be spent. The total cost of the program for 20-25 years, including the deployment of a multi-layer system in full force, is believed to reach a fantastic amount - 1-1.5 trillion. dollars.

In this regard, in order to reassure the American taxpayer, US officials say that the deployment of a combat missile defense system will begin only if its high efficiency and survivability are proven, and the expected costs turn out to be less than the costs of the Soviet Union for the creation of reliable means of overcoming such a system. Pentagon strategists also do not exclude the possibility of deploying some "interim" system using such traditional means as anti-missiles and ground-based radars, supplemented by aircraft detection and target designation. It is believed that the main task of such a limited missile defense system will be to cover the most important objects of strategic offensive forces on the territory of the country.

The American leadership intends to constantly increase the pace and volume of work on the SDI program until concrete results are obtained. According to repeated statements by Washington officials, the possibility of abandoning this program is ruled out both at the stage of research work and in the event of the deployment of a multi-layer missile defense system, if its creation turns out to be possible. Figures of the US military-industrial complex associate with the program not only the creation of such a system, but also the rapid development of other types of offensive weapons and military equipment. In the opinion of a number of American experts, the technical means conceived within the framework of SDI can in themselves turn out to be an effective offensive strike weapon and find application in various areas of military affairs. This clearly shows the imperial orientation of the program to achieve overall military and technological superiority over the USSR and other countries of the socialist community.

In accordance with the far-reaching goals of the program, it was given the highest priority among other programs for the development of the armed forces, and a special department was created at the Pentagon to coordinate all work. A number of central departments and main commands, including the joint space command, commands of the branches of the armed forces, as well as the Ministry of Energy, other departments and individual organizations, are involved in work in this area. On the basis of the main aerospace firms and research organizations, consortiums have been formed in certain areas of work. For the practical testing of individual missile defense components in space, it is planned to widely use manned spacecraft "Shuttle", officially owned by NASA, but in fact already being used by the Pentagon without restrictions.

Along with its scientific and technical potential, the United States seeks to involve NATO allies and Japan in the Star Wars program, exert all-round pressure on these countries and achieve political approval of its course at the government level. However, sensible politicians expressed concern that with the deployment of such a system, the role of the United States in NATO would increase even more, and if a similar system appeared in the Soviet Union, in the event of an armed conflict, the American command would try to limit it to the geographic boundaries of the European theaters of war. In addition, Western countries saw in the US proposals an attempt to unilaterally use their scientific and technical potential for their own purposes, which would result in a "brain drain" and the diversion of their own resources. They were also unhappy with the US intention to limit the transfer of research results and the latest technology to them.

To overcome the disagreements that arose, Washington hastened to assure the allies that the security of Western Europe is inseparable from the security of the United States, and in order to increase the interest of Western European countries, he offered to place orders not only for research, but also for the production of individual components of the system. At the same time, the United States agreed to allow them to participate in some secret research and offered its assistance in creating a European system for the destruction of enemy operational-tactical missiles, including relevant developments in the SDI program. As a result of pressure from the United States, the "Star Wars" program at this stage was supported by Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Portugal. The Government of Canada refused to officially participate in the program, but decided not to interfere with the involvement of national industrial companies in it. A similar position was taken by the Japanese government, which expressed its "understanding" of American goals. The program was opposed by France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Greece and Australia. The prospects for the creation and practical deployment of a multi-layer missile defense system with space-based elements are assessed in the United States in different ways. Administration officials say there has been "real progress" in the SDI program, allowing the overall time frame to be significantly reduced from what was originally planned. It is believed that these terms will be determined mainly by the results of research into directed energy weapons, without which the creation of an effective system of defense against a massive nuclear missile strike is considered impossible. Some American experts involved in the program express the opinion that the final decision on the creation of combat models of such weapons can be made in five or six years. In general, supporters of the system in the US government and the military-industrial complex argue that its deployment will be realistic as early as the next decade.

At the same time, there is a fairly widespread opinion that such a system will eventually turn out to be the "Maginot Line of the 21st century." As noted by the foreign press, the most objective study of all aspects of the SDI program was carried out by the American public organization Union of Concerned Scientists, which published a special report in March 1984. As a result of a thorough analysis of the available data, the authors of the report, including prominent US physicists, came to the common opinion that the creation of an effective missile defense system on the territory of the country at this stage is practically impossible. The main conclusions of the report, as well as the assessments of other American experts cited in the foreign press, boil down to the fact that in the foreseeable future it will not be possible to create laser and accelerating weapons of the required power, deploy the necessary energy sources, and establish mass production of the most important technical means. These scientists believe that the most difficult technical task is the organization of combat control of missile defense systems, the development of appropriate programs and algorithms. Practical development and testing of the combat control system in real conditions can never be carried out, as a result of which any mistake will cause catastrophic consequences. Due to the need to immediately put the system into action immediately after the detection of missile launches, the control of all means must be fully automated. This will extremely limit the role of a person in decision-making at the most critical stage and further increase the likelihood of the system getting out of control and spontaneously triggering.

In addition, the development, deployment and subsequent operation of such a system, especially its space elements, are associated not only with enormous financial costs, but also with the expenditure of huge human and material resources. According to American experts, the SDI program, only at the research stage, can be equated with eight "Manhattan projects" for creating an atomic bomb, and its implementation will require the involvement of more than 40,000 highly qualified scientists and engineering and technical workers. To ensure the deployment of the necessary system assets in orbits, the United States will have to develop new powerful launch vehicles, carry out hundreds of launches of manned space shuttles "Shuttle" a year.

As you know, at present, the maximum carrying capacity of the Shuttle does not exceed 30 tons, one launch costs 150-250 million dollars, and the United States plans to ensure 20-24 launches annually only in the mid-90s. The catastrophe that occurred on January 28, 1986 during the launch of the Challenger orbital stage (the 25th Shuttle flight) significantly complicated these plans and once again showed the danger of transferring weapons into space, the illusory nature of calculations for an absolutely error-free functioning of space technology.

Judging by reports in the foreign press, the SDI program met with widespread resistance not only from the American but also from the world community. In the United States itself, the bleak prospect of "Star Wars" has caused a sharp division in scientific circles and has become the subject of heated discussions concerning the problems of ensuring international security. Thus, 54 Nobel Prize winners and more than 700 members of the US National Academy of Sciences signed an appeal to the administration demanding to cancel the SDI program, and more than 1,000 scientists from 39 American universities refused to participate in the deployment of a new round of the arms race. The progressive public is primarily concerned about the possible negative consequences of the deployment of combat missile defense systems. These consequences include the squandering of vast resources, the feverish intensification of the arms race, the growth of tension and the significant decline in international security.

According to American military experts, since the creation of a missile defense system in itself does not solve the problem of complete protection of the United States from all means of aerospace attack, it will inevitably entail the implementation of other costly projects. In particular, in connection with the implementation of the SDI program, the Pentagon is already hatching plans for a complete modernization of the air defense system of the North American continent, the cost of which, as experts believe, could amount to about another 50 billion dollars. These plans, which provide for the broad involvement of Canada as a partner in the joint organization of the aerospace defense of the North American continent (NORAD), were discussed at a meeting between the President of the United States and Canadian Prime Minister M. Mulroney, held in March 1985.

Continuation of work on the SDI program will lead, as is believed, to a complete loss of prospects for achieving mutual trust, to a disruption of the existing strategic balance, and a rejection of restraint in the development of strategic offensive weapons. The main task of both sides will be to build up these weapons to a level that would ensure reliable overcoming of defensive systems. An opinion is also expressed that even the beginning of the deployment of such a system can provoke a conflict, since neither side wants to passively observe the deployment of strike weapons with great destructive power over its territory. The first most likely victim of Washington's space ambitions is expected to be the arms limitation process, including one of the most important elements of this process, the May 26, 1972 Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

As you know, this Treaty contains provisions prohibiting both sides from creating the foundations for territorial missile defense systems, deploying missile defense components outside the permitted limited geographical areas, transferring technology and deploying such systems on the territories of other countries. It also prohibits the creation, testing and deployment of sea, air, space or mobile-land-based systems, as well as restrictions on the development of anti-missile weapons based on new physical principles.

On the whole, the spirit and letter of the Treaty testify that it was drawn up with the expectation that the parties would renounce the deployment of any large-scale missile defense systems as one of the essential factors in curbing the strategic offensive arms race.

Research and the ultimate goals of the SDI program run counter to the specified provisions of the Treaty, which has been repeatedly written in the foreign press. The incompatibility of "star wars" with treaty obligations is obvious, but the White House is trying to distort the essence of the matter, trying to use the "game of wording" or unauthorized amendments to the meaning of the Treaty to prove the legitimacy of research and testing carried out in the United States.

The Soviet Union firmly adheres to the agreements that have been concluded and consistently advocates the prevention of the militarization of outer space and is against the deployment of new strike weapons in outer space under the guise of defensive systems. The White House's assertions about the desire to strengthen international security by moving to the possession of such weapons can not mislead anyone. The Star Wars program cannot be viewed otherwise than as an attempt by the United States to increase its offensive potential, undermine the strategic balance, create conditions for constant armed blackmail of the Soviet Union and other countries, as well as nuclear attack with impunity. However, Washington underestimates the capabilities of the Soviet Union, which will not allow an American monopoly in space. At a press conference in Geneva, MS Gorbachev made it clear that the response to US actions "will be effective, less costly, and can be carried out in a shorter time frame."

The arms race and the level of development of military equipment have now generally reached a critical point beyond which the situation may become uncontrollable. The Soviet Union is strongly criticizing the American plans to saturate space with strike weapons not out of fear, as some in the West imagine. His position on this issue is based on the firm conviction that a complete ban on such weapons will have a profound positive impact on the entire process of nuclear arms limitation and will be a solid foundation for strategic stability and international security. Realizing its high responsibility for the destinies of the world, the Soviet government called on the US administration, instead of creating weapons supposedly designed to counteract nuclear weapons, to begin to eliminate these weapons themselves.

The main obstacles to the peaceful exploration of outer space by the forces of all mankind are the plans for conducting "star wars", programs for the further buildup of strategic nuclear and conventional weapons in the United States. Under these conditions, the Soviet Armed Forces bear a special responsibility for the defense capability of the motherland, the defense of the gains of socialism and the protection of the peaceful labor of our people. As was emphasized at the 27th CPSU Congress, they must exercise high vigilance, be in constant readiness to suppress the hostile intrigues of imperialism against the USSR and its allies, and repulse any aggression, no matter where it comes from.

Colonel I. Ignatiev

"Foreign military review" No. 4 1986

Oznobishchev Sergey Konstantinovich

Potapov Vladimir Yakovlevich

Skokov Vasily Vasilievich

This short work highlights a number of pages in the history of the formation of the concept and specific programs of the USSR's "asymmetric response" to President R. Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative" in the 1980s. Many provisions of these programs retain their significance in modern conditions, which is also discussed in this work.

The publication is intended for specialists in management in the political-military and military-technical sphere, for use in the educational process in civil and military universities, for all those interested in political-military and military-technical problems.

One of the most interesting examples of a comprehensive strategy of a political and military plan (which included diplomatic, political and propaganda activities and specific programs for the development of weapons systems and the scientific and technical base for them) is the strategy of an "asymmetric response" to American program Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) launched by US President Ronald Reagan in 1983.

Reagan proposed on March 23, 1983, a system that could "intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reach our territory or the territory of our allies." Reagan urged American scientists and engineers to quickly "create means that would deprive nuclear weapons of their power, make them obsolete and unnecessary."

Declaring that the task of R & D under the SDI program is to make nuclear weapons "obsolete and unnecessary", the top US government set a super-task for the future missile defense system, the implementation of which would undermine all the foundations of the strategic stability that has developed in the world.

Two days later, the White House issued National Security Presidential Directive 85, which provided for the administrative and financial support of the SDI program. In particular, this directive established the Executive Committee on Defense (anti-missile) technologies.

President Reagan's launch of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" was perceived by a significant part of the top Soviet leadership not only negatively (as they fully deserved), but rather nervously, almost hysterically. As Academician G. A. Arbatov wrote in his memoirs, US President R. Reagan, assessing such a reaction of the Soviet leaders, believed that "... the weapon against which the Russians so fiercely protest cannot be so bad." According to G.A. Arbatov's reasonable assessment, such a surge of hysteria from the Soviet side only convinced Washington that "we are afraid of SDI". It destroyed the picture of the world that had just taken shape, in which with such difficulty it was possible to ensure a certain bipolar balance and stability. The far from young leadership of the country at first simply did not understand what Reagan wanted and sought.

For his part, Ronald Reagan was a far-fetched figure. Many experts and politicians remember him as the president who called the USSR an "evil empire." To others, he is remembered as a president who made notable efforts to build rapport with Moscow and advance the path of arms control. As it turned out later, Reagan wrote handwritten appeals to all the leaders of the USSR, who quickly replaced each other at that time, with a proposal for a personal meeting. The format for communication between the leaders of states was more than unusual for the Soviet leaders and apparatus. By different reasons, including those of an ideological nature, Soviet leaders before M. S. Gorbachev did not respond to Reagan's calls. In the apparatus of Mikhail Sergeyevich, this unusual message, already received, was found only after a notification that came from the American side.

One of the authors of this work was invited and attended the tenth anniversary of the meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik. Aides to President Reagan who participated in the meeting confirmed that in the course of a face-to-face conversation, Gorbachev "persuaded" the head of the White House to the need to move to a nuclear-free world. True, the stubbornness of the neophyte, with which the US President clung to the preservation and development of large-scale missile defense (ABM) programs with space-based elements, did not even allow to begin to implement this ambitious task.

Much here is explained precisely by the incompetence of Reagan himself, in the past a good film actor, in such complex military-technical issues, as they would now say, of an "innovative nature." The president came under the influence of such prominent authorities as the "father of the American hydrogen bomb" Edward Teller, his close associate physicist Lowell Wood, and other "proponents" of SDI. It seemed to Reagan (as, in many ways, to George W. Bush today) that purely technical solutions to security problems were possible. And yet, under the pressure of changing geopolitical realities, arguments and active proposals from our side (largely supported by the coordinated actions of the community of prominent Russian and American scientists), the American president has come a long way in his political evolution.

The transformation of Reagan's approaches to solving cardinal security problems is a clear example of what can happen with a concerted and complex impact, largely initiated by the other side. Looking ahead, one should also pay attention to the final result achieved - the SDI program remained unrealized in its "full-fledged form". Influenced by criticism from outside and inside the country from the recognized authorities of the scientific world and prominent politicians, the US Congress resorted to its favorite practice for such cases and began to regularly reduce the allocation of requested funds for the most odious and destabilizing projects.

One of the most important components of our response to the idea of ​​creating a large-scale space-based missile defense system, which played a key role in the "destruction of SDI", was undoubtedly the so-called "asymmetric response". The idea of ​​asymmetric actions on the part of Russia in relation to certain actions of the United States that could disrupt strategic stability, the military-strategic balance, in last years became almost central in the official statements of Russian state leaders, military leaders.

The prehistory of the formula of asymmetric actions, an asymmetric response to certain actions of the "opponent" is connected primarily with what was done in the USSR in the 80s. of the last century in the face of the Reagan program "Strategic Defense Initiative", nicknamed by journalists the "Star Wars" program. It was an epic little known to the wide circles of our public, which lasted for a number of years.

On March 27, 1983, US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger established, based on the recommendations of a special committee, the SDI Implementation Organization (SDIO), headed by Lieutenant General James Abrahamson. Directions were identified in which research should go. The speech, in particular, was:

• on the development of instruments for detecting, tracking, selecting and assessing the degree of destruction of strategic missiles in any phase of their flight against the background of decoys and interference;
• on the development of interceptor missiles for strategic ICBMs and SLBMs of the other side;
• about research in the field of creating various types of weapons, including directed energy transfer (beam weapons);
• on the creation of ICBM and SLBM interceptor satellites deployed in space;
• on the development of qualitatively new control and communication systems;
• on the creation of electromagnetic guns;
• on the development of a more powerful space transport system compared to the Shuttle spacecraft.

Soon, the research program adopted by the US leadership began to be intensively implemented, especially in terms of all kinds of demonstration tests.

The components of the "asymmetric strategy" of the Soviet side were developed in a number of research centers of the country - both in the USSR Academy of Sciences and in departmental research institutes (among the latter, the developments of the TsNIIMash of the USSR Ministry of General Mechanical Engineering, headed by Yu. A. Mozzhorin and V. M. Surikov; TsNIIMash at the same time closely cooperated with the 4th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, a number of other research institutes of the USSR Ministry of Defense, as well as with institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences).

The concept of an "asymmetric response", and even more so the specific programs of this plan, were implemented, overcoming great obstacles, because in our country there was a tradition of predominantly symmetrical actions, actions "point against point". And this tradition manifested itself in its entirety when the question of how to respond to Reagan's "star wars" was being debated in the USSR.

The essence of the "asymmetric response" was, first of all, to ensure that in the most difficult conditions, when the United States deploys a multi-layered missile defense system using a variety of, including the aforementioned "exotic" missile defense systems (including different kinds directed energy transfer weapons - neutral particle accelerators, free electron lasers, excimer lasers, X-ray lasers, etc., electrodynamic mass accelerators (EDUM) - "electromagnetic guns", etc.). to ensure the possibility for Soviet nuclear missiles in a retaliatory strike to inflict "unacceptable damage" on the aggressor, thereby persuading him to abandon a preemptive (preventive) strike. (The question of a preventive strike is a “damned” question of the balance of power, Academician Yu. A. Trutnev wrote (in 1990) in one of his notes.) nuclear missile weapons the first with an attempt at the most effective disarming and "decapitation" strikes, primarily disabling US strategic nuclear weapons and their control system. Computer simulation played an important role in this.

A prominent, if not the main, role in the final decision in favor of the “asymmetric response” formula was played by a group of Soviet scientists headed by a prominent nuclear physicist, vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences Evgeny Pavlovich Velikhov, who at that time was in charge of the academic among other issues, fundamental and applied research in the interests of defense. The open part of this group was created by Velikhov (with the approval of the top leadership of the USSR) the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat - abbreviated KSU.

For a long time Velikhov worked at the Institute of Atomic Energy (IAE) named after. Kurchatov - at the leading institute of the entire Soviet nuclear industry. It was a large, powerful research organization with scientists and engineers of various specialties. A feature of the IAE (in 1992 it was transformed into the Russian Research Center "Kurchatov Institute") was and remains that its specialists not only develop, but also embodied, as they say, super-complex technical systems, including, in particular, reactors for nuclear submarines. Already at the age of 36, Velikhov became the deputy director of the IAE for scientific work. At the age of 33, he became a corresponding member of the USSR AI, and at the age of 39, a full member (academician) of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1975, he became the head of the Soviet thermonuclear program.

The wide range of Velikhov's knowledge, his deep understanding of the problems of fundamental and applied science, the most complex weapons systems contributed to the fact that he turned out to be one of the leaders of the domestic academic community, who raised the issue of the development of informatics in our country with an edge. He is known as a deeply educated person in the humanitarian sphere - in the field of history, economics, Russian and foreign literature.

E. P. Velikhov is a brilliant versatile scientist who has achieved major scientific and practical results in several areas. It should be noted among his other achievements the major results obtained under his leadership in the development of high-power lasers. A deep understanding of what laser technology and other types of potential directed energy weapons can and cannot do has proven to be very valuable for the development of the anti-SDI program.

Although Velikhov did not deal with issues related to nuclear weapons as a scientist, he was well versed in strategic nuclear weapons, air defense and missile defense systems. Velikhov played an important role in the development of informatics in our country. Already in the late 1970s. here the USSR developed a significant lag behind the United States, Japan and other Western countries in the information and communication sphere. There were a number of strategic mistakes in the development of electronic computing technology made by the Soviet leadership back in the 1960s, when, in particular, it was decided to copy the American computer technology of the IBM company, instead of continuing their own research and development, which embodied earlier in such well-known computers as "Strela" and "BESM-6".

In making proposals on specific elements of the Soviet "anti-SDI" program, Velikhov, first of all, took care to develop the information and analytical component of the Soviet "asymmetric response". Largely due to these decisions, the foundations were laid for the revival of domestic developments in the field of general-purpose supercomputers, which resulted, in particular, in the creation of machines of the SKIF series, including the 60-teraflop supercomputer SKIF-MGU. The main developer of machines of the SKIF series is the Institute of Program Systems of the Russian Academy of Sciences, created by Velikhov in the first half of the 1980s. under the asymmetric response program.

Velikhov was able to appreciate the dignity of Yury Vladimirovich Andropov, who, after the death of L.I. Brezhnev in 1982, took the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, to whom Evgeny Pavlovich received direct access. Velikhov developed good relations with the Minister of General Engineering O.D.Baklanov and with the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defense Forces of the country A.I. Koldunov (who was also in charge of missile defense issues).

The “right hand” in the “Velikhov group” was A. A. Kokoshin, who at that time held the post of deputy director of the Institute for the USA and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences (ISKAN). Prior to his appointment to this post, A. A. Kokoshin was the head of the military-political research department of this institute, becoming the successor to the legendary Lieutenant General M. A. Milyshtein. Mikhail Abramovich at one time managed to visit the role of acting. head of intelligence on the Western Front (under the command of G. K. Zhukov in 1942), head of the intelligence department of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. Milyptein was the author of a number of interesting works on military-strategic and military-historical issues, which have retained their significance to this day.

One of the "gurus" of the mentioned department was Colonel General N. A. Lomov, who at one time held the post of Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces - Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. During the Great Patriotic War, N.A. Lomov, working as Deputy Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, more than once personally reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (JV Stalin) the situation on the fronts, and was directly involved in the development of plans for major strategic operations. He happened to work under the command of such outstanding military leaders as A. I. Antonov, A. M. Vasilevsky, S. M. Shtemenko. Later, N. A. Lomov, a real Russian military intellectual, for a long time headed the Department of Strategy of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. Milshtein and Lomov were personally well acquainted with many top military leaders of the Soviet Union and had an idea of ​​the real experience of the Red Army, the Soviet Armed Forces both during the Great Patriotic War and in the post-war decades - about such an experience that at that time it was impossible to read about. in open or closed literature.

Many prominent military and civilian specialists worked in the department, including those seconded from various units of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. Among them were Major General V.V. Tumkovsky, captain of the first rank V.I. Bocharov and others. The "techies" who came to the humanitarian field - M.I. Gerasev and A.A. Konovalov (immigrants from MEPhI and MVTU, respectively) also brightly showed themselves.

A special place in this department belonged to the graduate of the Moscow State Technical University. N. E. Bauman, Ph.D. A. A. Vasiliev, a brilliant specialist in rocket and space technology, who moved to ISKAN from a high position in the “royal firm” in Podlipki (now the city of Korolev, Moscow Region, NPO Energia). A.A. Kokoshin, like A. A. Vasiliev, graduated from the Faculty of Instrumentation of the Bauman Higher Technical School in the Department of Radio Electronics, famous not only for strong engineering training, but also for general scientific training - in physics, mathematics, theory of large systems, etc. Kokoshin's Bauman education included special courses taught at Moscow Higher Technical School on cybernetics, on the theory of building complex technical systems by Academician A. I. Berg and his colleague Admiral V. P. Bogolepov, as well as Kokoshin’s participation in a number of large-scale projects of the Bauman Student Scientific and Technical Society named after Zhukovsky.

Thanks to the involvement of specialists in military-strategic issues, armaments and military equipment, officers who were well versed in the land, sea and aviation components of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces, physicists, political historians, economists, specialists in international legal issues, the department was able to solve major applied and theoretical issues at the intersection of various disciplines. In general, the department of military-political studies of ISKAN by the beginning of the 1980s. took shape in a unique interdisciplinary team, of which, unfortunately, there were very few in our country, in our research institutes with a high degree of segmentation and specialization.

Having become deputy director of ISKAN, Kokoshin continued to deal a lot with military-political problems, supervising directly the department of military-political studies. Kokoshin was also subordinate to a special laboratory for computer modeling, headed by a well-known specialist in artificial intelligence, Ph.D. n. V. M. Sergeev, who later became a doctor of political sciences. E. P. Velikhov, vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, singled out the rates for the employees of this laboratory and the most modern computers for that time.

G. A. Arbatov, being a "pure humanist" (he graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs), supported Kokoshin's initiative, as a result of which a division that was completely atypical for a predominantly political science academic institute arose. The models developed by Sergeev's laboratory for ensuring strategic stability for various compositions of the groups of forces and means of the parties, with missile defense systems of various "density" and effectiveness, were transferred for use to the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces and other "interested" organizations. The work of V. M. Sergeev “Subsystems of the combat control of the space anti-missile system USA ”, published in an open version in 1986. Later, many of its provisions appeared in the works of other domestic specialists (including without reference to V. M. Sergeev).

Among the divisions of ISKAN, supervised by Kokoshin, was the department of control systems, which not only studied the American experience of corporate and public administration, but also led a number of projects for the development of control systems in the USSR.

By the end of the 1980s. Several works by A.G. Arbatov (who worked at IMEMO RAS), A.A. Kokoshin, A.A. Vasiliev on theoretical and applied issues of strategic stability in the nuclear sphere appeared, which have not lost their significance in our time.

Bauman education with the addition of a special course of the Mechanics and Mathematics Department of Moscow State University, which was read at the Department of Radio Electronics, allowed Kokoshin to formulate such tasks for computer modeling of strategic stability, which were always subject to algorithmization. A number of verbal formulas for various components of the general "macro-formula" of strategic stability were perfected by him together with Ph.D. A. A. Vasiliev.

The role of this bright, untimely deceased scientist should be especially noted. Vasiliev combined knowledge and rich experience gained in areas of activity that were absolutely “closed” in Soviet times, and a special talent that allows him not only to instantly grasp the most important elements from the new sphere of international military-political relations for him, but also to check them on the “village practical realities known to him. These qualities quickly put Vasiliev in the first row of experts of the time. He was consulted, his opinion was listened to.

Extremely important was his contribution to the report on strategic stability, revolutionary for its time, to other publications of the Committee.

These works were not just innovative - their release was accompanied by overcoming the atmosphere of "pseudo-secrecy", which was guarded by the censorship authorities. Each new word, even substantive and demonstrative criticism of SDI, was given with difficulty. Until then, domestic politicians, experts and society had not seen anything like the reports of the Committee.

It is no coincidence that the original formulas and calculations cited in the papers, which proved the inconsistency of providing effective protection with the help of a large-scale missile defense system with space-based elements, were considered by foreign experts literally through a magnifying glass. During one of the annual seminars on security issues that the Italian physicist Antonio Zichichi has collected and continues to collect in Erice, Lowell Wood said that the calculations are incorrect, the system will still be effective, and that he is gathering the press tomorrow to to disavow the "politicized" calculations of Soviet scientists.

A. Vasiliev, who represented our country at the seminar, was able overnight to develop new formulas that once again proved the ineffectiveness of such space weapons in the face of possible Soviet countermeasures, much cheaper than the American missile defense system itself. Lowell Wood could no longer oppose this. So the high level of competence, deep knowledge and abilities of this bright scientist once again confirmed the competence of domestic science.

Lomov, Larionov and Milshtein drew Kokoshin's attention to the works of the outstanding Russian and secular military theorist A. A. Svechin, forgotten at that time, repressed in 1938, and then, after the XX Congress of the CPSU, completely rehabilitated). Svechin's works contained ideas and specific formulas for asymmetric strategies for different periods of history. As Kokoshin himself believes, in the formation of the "ideology of asymmetry" an important role for him was played by the treatise of the outstanding ancient Chinese theorist and strategist Sun Tzu - both in the military-technical and psychological dimensions in politics. This treatise, according to Kokoshin, "is imbued with the spirit of asymmetry." The ideas of asymmetry formed the basis of a series of scientific and technical reports prepared by the "Velikhov group". Later Kokoshin's original works appeared on the problems of strategic stability at the level of forces and means of general purpose.

ISKAN occupied a special place in the system of analytical support of the Soviet leadership. This institute was established in 1968 by the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. It must be said that the inclusion of research institutes in the decision-making process, the special creation of institutions "in the directions" of foreign policy was a characteristic feature of that time. Such a scheme ensured a high level of analytical study of foreign policy actions. In addition, such institutions and their representatives sometimes carried out delicate "unofficial" foreign policy missions (for example, "pumping" any foreign policy positions - determining the possible reaction of the other side), which officials could not undertake.

Director of the institute G. A. Arbatov had a particularly close relationship with Yu. V. Andropov for many years. - since Andropov became secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU responsible for working with socialist countries, and Aratov was a member of the group of consultants for the department of the Central Committee of the CPSU for working with socialist countries (a full-time position in the Central Committee apparatus) under Andropov. The son of Yu. V. Andropov, Igor Yuryevich, who worked in the Foreign Policy Planning Department (UPVM) Ml of the USSR, concurrently worked in the department of military-political studies "at Kokoshin" as a senior researcher. In 1983, Yu.V. Andropov, already the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, planned to introduce the post of assistant for national security; I. Yu. Andropov recommended A. A. Kokoshin to him for this position. At the end of 1983, Kokoshin was supposed to be presented to the Secretary General, but it did not stand. Yuri Vladimirovich's state of health deteriorated sharply. In February 1984 he died.

G. A. Arbatov himself is a front-line officer who ended his service as the head of intelligence of the artillery regiment of guards mortars (“Katyushas”) with the rank of captain, a highly educated native of a Moscow intellectual family. One of the features of Arbatov was that he, being a man of predominantly liberal (by the standards of that time) views, a politician and a social scientist, was quite tolerant of the employees of his institute, who stood on relatively conservative positions (which included, of course, ) Colonel General N. A. Lomov, who was considered a "hawk" and a number of other military and civilian researchers of ISKAN). ISKAN scientists dealing with military-political issues had a good creative contact with a group of their colleagues from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the USSR Academy of Sciences, headed by A. G. Arbatov, G. A. Arbatov's son. Arbatov Jr. did not have an engineering or natural science education, but in many works he demonstrated serious knowledge of American weapons programs and the mechanisms for making military-political decisions in the United States.

His knowledge of military strategy and military-technical aspects was very deep, which helped him greatly later, when for a number of years he was deputy chairman of the Defense Committee of the State Duma of the Russian Federation. By the mid 1980s. he, despite his young age, was already the author of several fundamental monographs. Among the colleagues of Arbatov Jr. at IMEMO, who dealt with the problems of strategic stability, one can single out, first of all, A. G. Savelyev.

The Department of Military-Political Research and the ISKAN Laboratory of Computer Modeling established good cooperation with a number of prominent domestic natural scientists involved in defense issues. Many modeling issues were considered in creative contact with the Computing Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences headed by Academician N. N. Moiseev, who was a member of Velikhov's group. A number of scientists from the Space Research Institute (IKI) of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, headed by Academician R. Z. Sagdeev, actively participated in the work on analyzing the problems of strategic stability associated with SDI in the open, unclassified part of this work.

This well-known world-famous scientist led the work of the KSU for a number of years - in the second half of the 1980s. The potential of fundamental knowledge about space and space activities, developed at the institute, gave an additional dimension to the work of the Committee, and the IKI building became the venue for serious expert meetings, both between Russian scientists and with their foreign colleagues. Sagdeev made a significant contribution to the justified criticism of the "Reagan approach" to missile defense, to the study, development and promotion of the arguments of representatives of domestic science.

Among other scientists of the IKI, one can note S. N. Rodionov and O. V. Prilutsky, well-known and authoritative physicists in their environment, who were well versed in lasers and elementary particle accelerators. (Once during one of the Soviet-American meetings of scientists on the problems of strategic stability, one of the largest American physicists, Wolfgang Panofsky, said about S. N. Rodionov, whom he met at seminars at the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences: physicist.") So, from this side, there were good prerequisites for the formation and effective functioning within the framework of the "Velikhov group" of an interdisciplinary team that could, in all the necessary completeness and complexity, consider issues related to the policy of the USSR in relation to the problem of Ronald Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative".

Especially close relations with Kokoshin were established with the first deputy chairman of the Commission on military-industrial issues of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (VPK) V.L. USSR; "perestroika" transferred it to a building on Mayakovsky Square).

In the 1990s Kokoshin advocated the re-establishment of the military-industrial complex in the Russian Federation, which, after all, was done in the current decade. However, the military-industrial complex from the Government of the Russian Federation did not receive those administrative functions and that expert power that the military-industrial complex of the Council of Ministers of the USSR possessed.

Solving the problem of forming the “anti-SDI” program, ensuring its effective political and psychological impact on the American side, required the “Velikhov group” to make public appearances both in front of a domestic audience and in front of a foreign one. So, Velikhov, together with Kokoshin, organized the first appearance on television of the outstanding Soviet weapons physicist, three times Hero of Socialist Labor Academician Yuli Borisovich Khariton, who for a long time headed the Sarov nuclear center (“Arzamas-16”), who had previously been an almost completely secret scientist, known to a relatively narrow circle of people. The speech of the “troika” Velikhov-Khariton-Kokoshin was intended both to explain to its own citizens the meaning of the USSR’s actions to ensure strategic stability, and to give the appropriate signals to the West. Khariton was, of course, as they say now, an “iconic figure”. The creator of the Soviet thermonuclear weapon Yu.B. Khariton here, as it were, opposed the mentioned Edward Teller - one of the main initiators of the Reagan "Strategic Defense Initiative". So the involvement of Khariton in this process in the public version was a very important step for Velikhov.

In 1987, at the international forum “For a nuclear-free world, for international security” in Moscow, a public discussion on the problems of strategic stability was held between A. A. Kokoshin and academician A. D. Sakharov, about which Andrei Dmitrievich writes in some detail in his “ Memories." It should be noted that the appearance of Sakharov at this forum, and even speaking on such a topic, was then of great importance in the interaction between Soviet and American scientists.

The greatest differences in the speeches of Sakharov and Kokoshin concerned the question of the role of land-based and stationary intercontinental ballistic missiles. Sakharov at that time actively advanced the thesis that ICBMs of this kind are "first strike" weapons, since they are the most vulnerable part of the strategic nuclear triad for each side. Sakharov said that one ICBM with MIRV "destroys several missiles" of the other side. He stated that a party "relying mainly on silo missiles could be forced in a critical situation to deliver the “first strike”. Based on these arguments, Academician Sakharov considered it necessary to adopt the principle of "primary reduction" of silo-based ICBMs when reducing the strategic nuclear arsenals of the parties.

Historically, in the USSR, it was the silo-based ICBMs that made up the lion's share of the strategic nuclear forces arsenal. In addition (which Sakharov most likely did not know about or simply did not think about) silo ICBMs in the USSR were the most technically advanced means, and the ground component of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces had the most sophisticated combat control system, which made it possible, under certain conditions, to carry out a response, response-oncoming and even a counter strike against the enemy who dared to attack first, but a preemptive (preventive) strike. Kokoshin, in a number of his works, noted that the threat of a retaliatory or counter strike is an additional factor in nuclear deterrence, while saying that readiness for such actions is expensive and increases the likelihood of accidental or unauthorized launches of ICBMs. Calling first of all for the reduction of Soviet silo-based ICBMs, Sakharov said that “it is possible to simultaneously replace part of the Soviet silo-based missiles with less vulnerable missiles of equivalent strike force (frames with a mobile camouflaged launch, cruise missiles of various basing, missiles on underwater boats, etc.)

Arguing with Sakharov, Kokoshin spoke out against his thesis that silo ICBMs are a "first strike" weapon. This position of Kokoshin was based on subject knowledge of the characteristics of the various components of the strategic nuclear forces of both sides. Including Kokoshin was well aware of a number of technical problems with the development and naval component of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces. In fact, the logic of Sakharov's reflections in many respects coincided with the arguments of a number of American politicians and experts, who demanded, in the process of limiting and reducing strategic offensive weapons, primarily the reduction of Soviet silo ICBMs, "reshaping the strategic nuclear "triad" of the USSR, which was noted in their speeches by a number of authoritative Soviet physicists.

A significant part of Sakharov's speech at this forum was devoted to the problem of SDI. Sakharov stated that "SDI is not effective for the purpose for which, according to its supporters, it is intended," since missile defense components deployed in space can be disabled "as early as the non-nuclear stage of the war, and especially at the moment of transition to nuclear stages with the help of anti-satellite weapons, space mines and other means. Similarly, "many key ground-based missile defense facilities will be destroyed" . Sakharov's speech contained other arguments that called into question the ability of a large-scale missile defense system to provide effective protection against a "first strike." They largely coincided with what was presented in the open reports of the "Velikhov group" and in a number of publications by American and Western European scientists - opponents of the SDI program.

Sakharov went on to state that he “seems wrong” the assertion of SDI opponents that such a missile defense system, being ineffective as a defensive weapon, serves as a shield under the cover of which the “first strike” is delivered, since it is effective for repelling weakened retaliation strike. He substantiated this in terms not characteristic of a physicist: “Firstly, the blow of retaliation will certainly be greatly weakened. Secondly, almost all of the above considerations of the ineffectiveness of SDI apply to a retaliatory strike.

The “Velikhov group” had active contacts, sanctioned by the decisions of the corresponding “instance”, with American scientists who dealt with the same problems. Among them were the largest figures - Nobel laureate Charlie Townes, Victor Weiskopf, Wolfgang Panofsky, Paul Doty, Ashton Carter, Richard (Dick) Garvin - one of the leading developers in the past of American thermonuclear munitions, subsequently for many years the main scientific adviser to such a giant American high technology industry as "IBM". The meetings between scientists of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the National Academy of Sciences (HAH) of the USA were joined by former minister US Defense Robert McNamara, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Jones, and others. The then President of the Federation of American Scientists, Jeremy Stone, played a significant organizing role. The well-known specialist John Pike acted as an almost constant expert on space. In their overwhelming majority, these representatives of the upper layer of the American technocracy were opponents of Reagan's large-scale missile defense, people who in their time did much to conclude in 1972 the Soviet-American Anti-ABM Treaty.

One of the components that ultimately determined the optimal nature of our response to the “Star Wars program”, which at the same time saved the spiral of the “space arms race” from unwinding, was the opportunity for the first persons of the domestic group of scientists to come out to the leadership of the country. It was this inherent concept of what the Americans call "double track" (something like the concept of "double circuit" in our understanding) that helped save Moscow from hasty and ruinous decisions in the anti-missile field - the path that some domestic leaders were pushing.

As part of the “asymmetric response” strategy to the American SDI, a wide range of measures was envisaged both to increase the combat stability of Soviet strategic nuclear forces (invulnerability of intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic missile submarines, the ability to withdraw from a potential strike strategic aviation, the reliability of the strategic nuclear forces combat control system, the survivability of the state administration system as a whole, etc.), and by their ability to overcome multi-layer missile defense.

Means and procedures of a military-strategic, operational and tactical order were assembled into a single complex, making it possible to provide a sufficiently powerful retaliatory strike (including a deep strike) of retaliation even under the most unfavorable conditions resulting from massive preemptive strikes against the Soviet Union (up to the use of the “dead hand” system, which provides for the automatic launch of silo ICBMs that survived after a preemptive strike by the enemy in conditions of violation of the centralized combat control system). At the same time, it was always meant that all these means would be much cheaper than the American missile defense system with a space echelon (echelons).

As Kokoshin noted later, it was important not only to develop all this and have it “for a rainy day” which could become the “last day” for both sides), but also to demonstrate to the opponent to a certain (dosed) extent at that other moment using the art of a “strategic gesture ". Moreover, it was necessary to do this in such a way that it looked convincing both for the "political class" of the other side, and for specialists, including experts of the highest qualification on the problem of strategic stability in general and on its individual technical and operational-strategic components, which immediately the races would have known any stretches, elements of misinformation, etc. (It should be noted that this kind of American scientific and expert community in terms of its number of resources was many times greater than the Soviet side; we had to compensate for this with increased work intensity.

In closed studies on problems of nuclear deterrence (institutes of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces, TsNIIMash, the Applied Problems Section of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, in Arzamas-16, in the city of Nezhi Iske, etc.), political and psychological issues were touched upon very rarely.

A number of particularly vulnerable components of the potential US missile defense (primarily in space echelons) were identified, which could be disabled not only through direct physical damage, but also by means of electronic warfare (EW). Active measures of this type included various ground, sea, air and space-based means that use kinetic energy (rockets, projectiles), laser and other types of high-energy radiation as a damaging effect. It was noted that active countermeasures are especially effective against elements of space missile defense echelons that are in orbits with known parameters for a long time, which greatly simplifies the task of their neutralization, suppression, and even complete physical elimination.

High-power ground-based lasers were also considered as active countermeasures. The creation of such lasers is much simpler than those intended for space combat stations with the aim of using them to destroy ballistic missiles in flight. In the confrontation between "laser vs. rocket" and "laser vs. space platform," the advantage may be on the side of the latter option. This is due to a number of factors. Firstly, space battle stations are larger targets for laser destruction than ICBMs (SLBMs), which makes it easier to aim a laser beam at them and destroy them. Secondly, the number of such stations would be significantly less than the number of ICBMs (SLBMs) ​​or their warheads to be destroyed during a massive nuclear missile strike. This virtually eliminates the problem of over-fast re-targeting of the laser beam. Thirdly, space combat stations are in the field of view of a ground-based laser installation for a long time, which makes it possible to significantly increase the exposure time (up to 10 s), and therefore reduce the requirements for its power. In addition, for ground installations, the limitations inherent in space systems in terms of mass, dimensions, energy intensity, efficiency, etc., are much less significant.

The corresponding report of Soviet scientists concluded: “A brief overview of possible measures to neutralize the suppression of a large-scale missile defense system with echelons of strike weapons deployed in space shows that it is far from necessary to set the yoke for its complete destruction. It is enough to weaken such a missile defense system by influencing the most vulnerable elements, to punch a “gap” in this so-called defense in order to maintain the power of a retaliatory strike unacceptable for the aggressor.”

In parallel with the development of an “asymmetric response” to SDI, within the framework of the activities of the “Velikhov group”, research was carried out on the problems of climatic and medical and biological consequences nuclear war, as well as measures to adequately control the absence of underground nuclear weapons testing. These studies were carried out practically in parallel with what was being done at that time by American and Western European scientists, who were very seriously alarmed by the belligerent rhetoric of President Reagan, the general deterioration of Soviet-American relations after a period of detente - a period when the cooperative efforts of the Soviet and American sides managed to achieve a serious strengthening strategic stability.

A serious scientific work on mathematical modeling of the climatic consequences of a nuclear war was prepared by a group of scientists from the Computing Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences, headed by V.A. Aleksandrov (the director of the Computing Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician N.N. Moiseev, was the curator of this work). After the mysterious disappearance of V. A. Aleksandrov in Italy, this work was continued by his colleague G. L. Stenchikov.

Important research work on the climatic consequences of a nuclear war with full-scale experiments was carried out by scientists from the Institute of Physics of the Earth of the USSR Academy of Sciences G. S. Golitsyn, A. S. Ginzburg and others. As for the medical and biological consequences of a nuclear war, they were analyzed in the work, published by a group of Soviet scientists headed by academician E. I. Chazov.

By the way, the conclusions drawn then and the evidence presented for the onset of the "nuclear winter" are relevant in our time. Undoubtedly, this should be seriously considered by those who are inclined today to consider nuclear weapons as a possible "battlefield" weapon.

The authors of the “asymmetric response” concept initially proceeded from the fact that the confrontation between the two strategies in this most important sphere of national security of the USSR and the USA is political and psychological (in the terminology of recent years - virtual) character.

One of critical tasks consisted of persuading SDI supporters in the United States that any option for creating a large-scale, multi-layer missile defense system would not give the United States any significant military or political advantages. Accordingly, as Kokoshin notes, the task was to influence the US “political class”, the American “national security establishment” in such a way as to prevent the US from withdrawing from the 1972 Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, which by this time and in the political-psychological and military-strategic terms, it has already firmly established itself as one of the cornerstones for ensuring strategic stability. He also played an important role in preventing an arms race in space, imposing important restrictions on the creation of those systems that could be used as anti-satellite weapons.

Having become the first deputy minister of defense of Russia in 1992, Kokoshin directly dealt with the R&D that was included in the programs associated with the strategy of "asymmetric response" to SDI. Among the most famous of them is the development of the latest intercontinental ballistic missile, with the "light hand" of Kokoshin received the name "Topol-M" in 1992 (with a shortened booster section and various means of overcoming missile defense). This is how Kokoshin suggested calling this system, faced with the obvious reluctance of a number of major government figures to finance the latest ICBM. Having received the name "Topol-M", in the eyes of many, this system looked like a modernization of the already known and in service for a number of years PGRK "Topol".

It is impossible not to remember what a difficult time it was for us after the collapse of the USSR. At that time, the new Russian authorities destroyed the control system of the military-industrial complex that had existed for decades. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, not adapted for this, actually had to deal directly with thousands of defense industry enterprises, and besides, the defense industry, which lost hundreds of valuable research institutes and design bureaus, factories located in Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and other new sovereign states - the former republics of the USSR. The general atmosphere in the government circles that dominated at that time in Russia was by no means conducive to the development of the latest weapons systems. So in many ways Kokoshin had to "row against the current."

At the beginning of 1992, A. A. Kokoshin was considered as a real candidate for the post of Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. A number of prominent figures of the domestic defense industry actively advocated for his appointment, in particular, the League for Assistance to Defense Enterprises of Russia, headed by a prominent figure in the domestic defense industry, electronic warfare specialist A.N. Shulunov (it included the heads of such enterprises as the Mil helicopter design bureau, aviation company MiG, developers of various missile systems, avionics and other equipment). Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Viktor Dmitrievich Protasov, who headed the Board of Directors of Defense Enterprises of the Moscow Region, one of the largest associations of this kind in our country at that time. Among the supporters of the Appointment of Kokoshin to the post of Minister of Defense was such an outstanding designer of anti-aircraft missile systems as Academician twice Hero of the Socialist. Truda Boris Vasilievich Bunkin. Defense scientists, advocating the appointment of Kokoshin as Minister of Defense, proceeded at least from the fact that a relatively depoliticized technocrat in the person of a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences (RAS) is much more understandable and acceptable to them than paratrooper general P.S. Grachev, known primarily for his personal devotion to B. N. Yeltsin, or than any of the politicians close to the first president of Russia, many of whom at that time appeared at the top of power literally from nowhere.

In 1992, having announced the creation of the Armed Forces of Russia, B.N. Yeltsin himself headed the military department; P. S. Grachev and A. A. Kokoshin were appointed his first deputies. This state of affairs did not last long. Soon, P. S. Grachev, who demonstrated special devotion to Yeltsin in every possible way, became Minister of Defense.

Among the advisers of A. A. Kokoshin (when he was in the position of First Deputy Minister of Defense), with whom he repeatedly discussed various issues of the development of strategic nuclear forces, missile defense, combat control systems for strategic nuclear forces, missile attack warning systems, systems control of outer space, etc., it should first of all be noted Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov (who was once one of the most authoritative chiefs of the Soviet General Staff), Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov, Army General V. M. Shabanov (formerly Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR for armaments), Academicians V. II. Avrorin, B. V. Bunkin, E. P. Velikhov, A. V. Gaponov-Grekhov, A. I. Savin, I. D. Spassky, Yu. company "G. A. Efremov, General Designer of OKB-2 (NPO Mashinostroenie) M. F. Reshetnev (Krasnoyarsk), General Designer of the Central Research Institute of Radio Engineering. Academician A. I. Berg Yu. M. Pirunov.

At that time, the idea of ​​developing our nuclear missile shield, which was generally supported at the proper level of Russia's defense potential, as mentioned above, was alien to a significant part of those who then held dominant positions in the political life of our country.

Rampant inflation, regular progressive cuts in defense spending, including R&D, dictated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which provided Russian Federation"stabilizing loans" under very tough conditions, which had the most negative impact on the country's defense capability - all this had to be more than experienced in those years by both the military department and the military-industrial complex. One sometimes has to simply wonder how at that time such great results, now known, were achieved in the development of domestic armaments and military equipment. Those who were engaged in this, all this was given by an incredible exertion of strength, which often cost the loss of health, and sometimes the life of workers.

So, Kokoshin's associates, such as Colonel-General Vyacheslav Petrovich Mironov (who served under him as Chief of Armaments of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and earlier - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR for Armaments), Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for Armaments, Admiral Valery Vasilyevich Grishanov, died untimely. . They literally died on the battlefield.

Kokoshin and his subordinates (among them, first of all, it is worth noting General V. I. Bolysov in the main Missile troops of strategic appointment, the same Colonel-General V.P. Mironov, Assistant to the First Deputy Minister of Defense V.V. Yarmak, an employee of the Committee on Military-Technical Policy of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Lieutenant Colonel K.V. Masyuk, etc.) did everything possible together with the Research Institute of Thermal Engineering in order to “pull out” the new intercontinental ballistic missile “Topol-M” (“Universal”) that was already “lying on its side”. This design bureau at that time was headed by General Designer B. N. Lagutin, who replaced the legendary A. D. Nadiradze. Later, the Research Institute of Heat Engineering was headed by Yu.S. Solomonov, who effectively brought the matter with the creation of "Topol-M" to the end. Kokoshin has repeatedly noted the great role in determining the fate of this ICBM of the Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, General V.P. Dubynin, who supported Kokoshin. For this and a number of other weapons programs, at a critical moment in 1992, he received at that moment full support from another most authoritative military leader - Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Colonel General Valery Ivanovich Mironov, a highly educated military professional. Kokoshin supervised this program in close cooperation with General of the Army M.P. Kolesnikov, who replaced Dubynin as Chief of the General Staff.

Today, the unique properties of the Topol-M ICBM entering the troops are noted in increasing quantities precisely from the point of view of the possibilities of overcoming the missile defense system of the other side; moreover, with regard to promising missile defense systems, which can only appear in the foreseeable future of 15-20 years. Initially, this complex was conceived as an ICBM and in a mine (stationary) version, and in a mobile version, both in a monoblock version and with MIRVs. (December 18, 2007, First Deputy Prime Minister of the Government of the Russian Federation S. B. Ivanov said that the Topol-M missile system with multiple warheads (both in stationary and mobile versions) would appear in service in the near future However, the ability of this missile to have several warheads for the time being, to put it mildly, was not advertised.) Soon, the creation of the Yars missile system with MIRV as a development of Topol-M as part of the Universal project was announced.

A major role in the development of this direction, as well as in a number of other areas of defense science and technology, was played by the Committee on Military-Technical Policy (KVTP) created by Kokoshin in the Russian Ministry of Defense.

This is a relatively small division of the military department, consisting mainly of young highly educated officers and civilian scientists and engineers from the military-industrial complex, from academic institutions. Significant emphasis in the activities of the KV "GP" was placed by Kokoshin on the development of the entire range of information tools that provide management at all levels - from tactical to strategic and political-military, the effectiveness of weapons and military equipment, reconnaissance, target designation, control over execution orders, directives, decisions, etc.

Within the framework of the KVTP, among other things, the program "Integration-SVT" was born to develop a complex of computer equipment for the needs of the Armed Forces and dual-use equipment. Under this program, in particular, the high-performance microprocessor Elbrus-ZM was created, the state tests of which were successfully completed in 2007. A major role in its implementation was played by Lieutenant-General V.P. years of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (created in the General Staff by V.P. Volodin after the abolition of the Committee on Military-Technical Policy by one of the Ministers of Defense of the Russian Federation).

An in-line system of military and dual-use electronic computing equipment was also developed - the Baguette program, the initiators and main ideologists of which were Velikhov and his students (and, above all, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V. B. Betelin) from the Department of Informatics of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Much was done by Kokoshin and his team to preserve and develop the naval and aviation components of the domestic strategic nuclear forces Kokoshin was categorically against the transformation of the Russian strategic "triad" into a "monad" with only one ground component in the strategic nuclear forces, which some of our military leaders called for and influential experts. This position of Kokoshin was based on a deep understanding of the problems of ensuring Russia's strategic stability.

Having become Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation in 1998, Kokoshin managed to consolidate this course towards maintaining the strategic "triad", and, consequently, towards ensuring a high degree of combat stability of our strategic nuclear forces. Appropriate decisions of the Security Council of the Russian Federation on the nuclear policy of our country were adopted, which were later specified in several decrees of the President of Russia. These were strategic decisions that remain significant to this day. In preparing these decisions, Kokoshin relied on the extensive expert work of the special commission of the Security Council of the Russian Federation he created, headed by the Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academician N.P. relevant components of domestic science of the military-industrial complex.

An important role in the preparation and then in ensuring the implementation of these decisions was played by Colonel-General A. M. Moskovsky, whom A. A. Kokoshin attracted from the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation to work in the Defense Council, and then in the Security Council of the Russian Federation as his deputy for military-technical policy. A. M. Moskovsky served as Deputy Secretary of the Security Council for a whole for a number of years, having worked with such secretaries of the Security Council of the Russian Federation as N. N. Bordyuzha, V. V. Putin, S. B. Ivanov. Then A. M. Moskovsky, when S. B. Ivanov became the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, was appointed Chief of Armaments - Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, he was awarded the military rank of Army General.

In all these positions, Moskovsky showed high professional qualities and perseverance, perseverance in the implementation of Russia's long-term military-technical policy, including in the nuclear missile sphere.

The approaches laid down by Kokoshin to the development of decisions on Russia's nuclear policy were implemented at the end. 1998, already after he left the post of Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, in the form of the Permanent Conference on Nuclear Deterrence created by the order of the President of Russia. This working body of the Security Council of the Russian Federation was headed by the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, and its decisions, after their approval by the President of the Russian Federation, became binding on all federal executive bodies. working group for the preparation of decisions of the Permanent Conference on Nuclear Deterrence was headed by the Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation V.F. Potapov, and all the draft work in the structure military security, which was led by Colonel-General V.I. Yesin (in 1994-1996 he was Chief of the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces - First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces).

In 1999-2001, the Permanent Conference on Nuclear Deterrence, relying on the in-depth studies of the scientific and expert community of Russia dealing with the problems of strategic offensive and defensive weapons, managed to to develop the foundations of Russia's nuclear policy, which became the foundation of those plans for the construction of Russia's nuclear forces, which are now being implemented in practice.

A lot was done by A. A. Kokoshin in the 1990s. and for the development of technologies for the domestic missile defense system. The fact that this system continues to live and develop is largely due to his merit.

Knowledgeable people consider it especially important that with the direct participation of Kokoshin, it was possible to maintain in the country (and in some places even improve) cooperative chains for the development and production of strategic nuclear weapons (including a nuclear weapons complex), high-precision weapons in conventional equipment, radar equipment for the needs of the missile attack warning system and missile defense, spacecraft for various purposes (including the first echelon of the missile attack warning system (SPRN)) and others.

Kokoshin himself notes the great role in his deep knowledge of the problems of the domestic military-industrial complex of the First Deputy Minister of Defense Industry of the USSR Yevgeny Vitkovsky, who closely introduced him to the Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR for armaments, Colonel General Vyacheslav Petrovich Mironov, who replaced General of the Army V. M. Shabanova. Mironov, a well-educated specialist in the field of engineering in general, who studied at the Moscow State Technical University. Bauman and at the Military Engineering Artillery Academy. Dzerzhinsky (who served in the Strategic Missile Forces), was one of the main developers of the domestic system of medium-term and long-term planning of the scientific and technical equipment of the Armed Forces, the formation of the state armaments program; the planning methods developed under the leadership of Mironov are still largely valid to this day.

Recognition of the above-mentioned merits of Kokoshin was reflected in the active support of his candidacy by weapon scientists when Kokoshin was elected by the General Meeting of the Russian Academy of Sciences to full members of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Yury Alekseevich Trutnev, who spoke at this meeting on behalf of all gunsmiths in support of Kokoshin, noted that Kokoshin was one of the key figures among those who saved in the most difficult 1990s. the most important components of the domestic military-industrial complex. The former Prime Minister of Russia, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences E. M. Primakov spoke in a similar spirit at this General Meeting, pointing to the merits of Kokoshin precisely as a scientist who made a great contribution to the development of Russian science. Thus, he responded to the allegations that appeared in the media on the eve of the academic elections that “Colonel-General” Kokoshin was running for the Academy on the basis of rank, and not on scientific achievements.

With regard to the "asymmetric response" to the American SDI, Kokoshin classified three groups of means:

(a) means of increasing the combat stability of the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR (now the Russian Federation) in relation to a preemptive strike by the enemy in order to convincingly demonstrate the ability to carry out a massive retaliatory strike that “penetrates” the US missile defense system;

(b) technologies and operational-tactical solutions to improve the ability of the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR (RF) to overcome the missile defense system of the other side;

(c) special means of destroying and neutralizing missile defense, especially its space components.

Among the first - increasing the stealth and invulnerability of mobile missile systems and strategic submarine missile carriers (SSBNs); the latter - including by providing them with appropriate means of cover from the means of anti-submarine warfare of the other side. Among the second - the creation and equipping of ballistic missiles with various means of overcoming missile defense, including false warheads that overload the radar and other "sensors" of missile defense, its "brain", confusing the picture, creating problems with target selection and, accordingly, with target designation and hitting targets. Third, various types electronic warfare, blinding of the CBS, their direct defeat.

In the mid 1990s. Kokoshin developed the concept of the "Northern Strategic Bastion", which provided for special measures to ensure the combat stability of the submarine strategic missile carriers of the Russian Navy. His principled position prevented the transfer to the American side of a complex of data on hydrology and hydrography of the Arctic, which was going to be carried out by the Government of the Russian Federation within the framework of the Chernomyrdin-Gor Commission. Thus, damage to the country's defense capability was prevented.

The strategy of "asymmetric response" was eventually officially adopted by the Soviet leadership, declared publicly. At a press conference in Reykjavik on October 12, 1986, MS Gorbachev said: “There will be an answer to SDI. Asymmetric, but will. And we don't have to sacrifice a lot." By that time, it was no longer just a declaration, but a verified and prepared position.

Publicly, at a high professional level, the role played by domestic scientists in preparing such a “response” was also recognized. In his interview at the end of the same year, Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, General of the Army Yu. An effective countermeasure, in the opinion of Soviet scientists, for example, could be an ICBM launch tactic designed to "deplete" the space missile defense system by activating it early with a specifically chosen retaliatory strike order. These can be combined launches of ICBMs and "dummy" missiles, launches of ICBMs with a wide variation in trajectories ... All this leads to a greater consumption of energy resources of missile defense space echelons, to the depletion of X-ray lasers and electromagnetic guns, to other premature losses in firepower missile defense systems". All these and some other options had by that time been analyzed in detail in the works of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat.

But this did not happen suddenly; As noted above, significant efforts were required to convince the country's leadership of the correctness of the "asymmetric response" scheme. In practice, it was far from being implemented unambiguously - much, as it turned out later, was done in a symmetrical order.

The issue of an “asymmetric response” has again become relevant in the light of the attempts by the George W. China, which has a significantly (an order of magnitude) smaller nuclear potential)”.

Many on those proposed in the 1980s. measures remain relevant today - naturally, with correction both in relation to the new level of missile defense technologies of our "opponent" and the technologies available to the Russian Federation. The ideology of the "asymmetric response" today is no less, and perhaps even more relevant from an economic point of view.

Some of the lessons of that time are important and instructive for improving the process of making military-political decisions today. It seems that the practice of "embedding" scientific institutions in the process of developing such decisions is extremely important, which allows for a serious analytical study - the "background" of state policy in the most important areas. True, for this it is important today to take measures to support scientific teams, groups of scientists capable of carrying out such work in a qualified and permanent manner.

In addition, the experience of more than twenty years ago testifies not only to the importance of creating domestic interdisciplinary teams for breakthrough research on topical problems. This experience unequivocally suggests the importance of constant and supported in the interests of the country through various mechanisms of international expert dialogue for an objective consideration of the most pressing challenges and threats to national and international security. It is this dialogue and the in-depth expertise that is born on its basis that can not only lay the foundations for optimal decisions, but also carry out a scenario (multi-variant) initial study of the possible consequences of such decisions.

Sergey Konstantinovich Oznobishchev , professor at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (U) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, one of the participants in the development of the Soviet "asymmetric response";

Vladimir Yakovlevich Potapov , Colonel General in the reserve, in the recent past, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation;

Vasily Vasilievich Skokov , Colonel-General in reserve, former commander of formations of the Armed Forces of the USSR, adviser to the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation - active participants in the development and implementation of the political and military course of the Russian Federation in modern conditions.

Moscow: Institute for Strategic Assessments, ed. LENAND, 2008

Arbatov G. BUT. System man. M.: Vagrius, 2002, p. 265.

Kokoshin A. A. “Asymmetric response” to the “Strategic Defense Initiative” as an example of strategic planning in the field of national security // International Life. 2007. No. 7 (July-August).

Kokoshin A. A. - "Asymmetric response" ... .

For the good of Russia. On the occasion of the 75th anniversary of Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Yu.A. Trutnev / Ed. R. I. Ilkaeva. Sarov; Saransk: Type. "Red October", 2002. S. 328.

Space weapon. Security Dilemma / Ed. E.P.Velikhova, A.A.Kokoshina, R. 3. Sagdeepa. M.: Mir, 1986. S. 92-116.

See, for example: Shmygin A.I. "SDI through the eyes of a Russian colonel

Strategic stability in the face of radical reductions in nuclear weapons. Moscow: Nauka, 1987.

Lowell Wood at a public diplomatic seminar in Salzburg (Austria). Although Wood's knowledge of physics was undoubtedly high (which inspired serious misgivings), but the supporters of the "star wars" were often so confident in themselves that they were substituted in the argument. Thus, in Wood's report it was written that space platforms with weapons on board would have a multi-purpose character and could be useful to mankind, since using their capabilities, it would be possible to "predict the weather more accurately." This made it possible to turn the discussion in such a way that the diplomats stopped even delving into the essence of the intricate formulas of the American physicist, laughter began to be heard among them, and the "battlefield" once again remained with the representative of domestic science.

See: Sakharov A.D. Memoirs: In t. T. M .: Human Rights, 1996. S.289-290.

Sakharov A.D. Memories. C, 290.

Sakharov A.D. Memories. S. 291.

Sakharov L.D. Memoirs. S. 292.

See: Kokoshin A. A. - "Asymmetric response" to the "Strategic Defense Initiative" as an example of strategic planning in the field of national security // International Affairs. 2007 (July-August). pp. 29-42

Kokoshin L. A. Looking for a way out. Military-political aspects of international security. M.: Politizdat, 1989. S. 182-262.

Cm.: Chazov E. I., Ilyin L. A., Guskova A. K. Nuclear war: medical and biological consequences. The point of view of Soviet medical scientists. M.: Ed. APN, 1984; Climatic and biological consequences of nuclear war / Under. ed. K. P. Velikhova. M.: Mir, 1986.

Under the terms of the Treaty, the parties assumed obligations not to develop (create), not to test and not to deploy missile defense systems and components throughout the national territory. According to Article III of this Treaty, each of the parties received the opportunity to deploy a missile defense system "with a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers with a center located in the capital of this Party." The second area for the deployment of the missile defense system with a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers, in which mine launchers ICBM.

In 1974, in accordance with the Protocol to the ABM Treaty, it was decided to leave only one strategic missile defense area. The Soviet Union chose Moscow for defense. United States - Grand Forks ICBM base in North Dakota. In the late 1970s the high cost of maintaining the system and its limited capabilities forced the American leadership to decide to close the missile defense system. The main missile defense radar at Grand Forks was incorporated into the North American Air Defense (NORAD) system.

In addition, the Treaty provided that the ABM system could only be ground-based and stationary. At the same time, the Treaty allowed the creation of missile defense systems and components “on other physical principles” (“promising developments”), but they also had to be ground-based and stationary, and their deployment parameters should be the subject of additional approvals. In any case, they could only be deployed in one area.

Reliable Shield (Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR Army General Yuri Pavlovich Maksimov answers questions about some aspects of the Soviet military doctrine) // Novoye Vremya. 1986. No. 51 (December 19). pp. 12-14.

Cm.: Dvorkin V.Z. Soviet response to the Star Wars program. M: FMP MGU-IPMB RAS, 2008.

It is impossible not to note the appearance on the American side of "trial balloons" regarding the state of the nuclear strategic balance, which, according to the estimates of the relevant authors, is changing very radically in favor of the United States. In particular, the articles by K. Lieber and D. Press attract attention (especially their article in International Security). Cm.: Lieber K. A., Press D.FROM. The End of Mad? The Nuclear Dimension of US Primacy // International Security. Spring 2006. Vol.4. P. 7-14. This kind of "trial balloons" should not be underestimated.

Glossary

SLBM - ballistic missile on a submarine.

KSU - Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace,

against the nuclear threat.

ICBM - intercontinental ballistic missile.

R & D - research and development work.

Air defense - air defense.

PGRK - mobile ground missile system.

SSBN - a nuclear submarine with a ballistic missile.

ABM - anti-missile defense.

PSYaS - Permanent Conference on Nuclear Deterrence.

MIRV - separable warhead of individual guidance.

SSBN - strategic missile submarine cruiser.

EW - electronic warfare.

SDI - "Strategic Defense Initiative".

SPRN - missile attack warning system.

SNF - strategic nuclear forces

The Cold War was not only the largest geopolitical event of the 20th century, but also became the strongest catalyst for a scientific breakthrough in the field of military technology. The rivalry between the two superpowers gave rise to an arms race, which resulted in a mass of breakthrough technologies and concepts.

A striking military concept was the program put forward by the then US President Ronald Reagan "Strategic Defense Initiatives". Also, such a program received a bright name in the press - "Star Wars Program" SDI.

Strategic Defense Initiative

The US Strategic Defense Initiative program provided for the active use of weapons in outer space. Earth orbit has not been actively used for military purposes (other than the use of spy satellites).

The United States was the first to think about launching a weapons system into orbit.

To practice an attack or defend against an attack from the USSR. In addition, not only the military, but also private companies associated with space had high hopes for the Star Wars program, as it promised multibillion-dollar contracts.

The essence of the program was to destroy enemy nuclear warheads in near-Earth orbit, thereby creating a reliable missile defense system along the perimeter of the entire territory.

The US nuclear doctrine is calculated and assumes that a nuclear strike of both limited and full power will be the first to be launched, in the event of a threat to national interests, even outside its own territory.

Soviet doctrine assumed a massive retaliatory strike.

The desire to completely secure the territory of the entire country also had many political benefits for the presidential administration. First of all, the Star Wars program is connected with the fact that the presence of such a defense system would allow the United States to confidently dictate its will not only to the Soviet Union, but to the whole world, which would mean world hegemony.

After detente between the USSR and the USA in the 1970s, another round of hostile confrontation began and more more weapons both countries. The Americans, developing plans to strike at the territory of the USSR, were only afraid of retaliatory actions, since a retaliatory strike with nuclear weapons from the USSR with 100% probability would completely destroy the United States as a state. That is why the United States began to take steps to create a guaranteed means of protection.

The project assumed the presence of a number of means of destruction of warheads.

The beginning of the development of the SDI program in the USA was carried out as early as the end of the 70s, naturally, in a regime of strict secrecy. Reagan, in his famous speech about the empire of evil and the Star Wars program, was only making a publicity stunt - the concept could not then, nor now, be realized at the current level of technological development.

The development also took place in high secrecy throughout the 80s and required funding of several tens of billions of dollars.

The political leadership in the person of Reagan hurried scientists and work on the Star Wars program went in several alternative directions at once. Electromagnetic, laser and weapons were tested on other physical principles.

All defense enterprises worked on the American SDI.

The ultimate goal of the project was to completely cover the territory of North America and minimize damage as much as possible.

It was planned to complete the manufacture and implementation of the complex by the end of the 90s, at which time the missile defense system covers most territory of the country. However, the developers of the SDI program in 1983 faced a lot of problems that did not eventually allow the project to be implemented.

These problems were both financial in nature and purely applied - the impossibility of implementing some stages of SDI in the United States at the level of technological development. The result was a complete fiasco of the Star Wars program.

The development of the program ended in the late 80s. According to some reports, about $100 billion was spent on it. However, despite the failure of the introduction of this system, the developments were successfully applied in other defense areas. The current missile defense system deployed in Europe is only a small part of the unrealized plans of the Americans.

SOI components

Reagan's Star Wars SDI program was a combination of several constituent parts, which included:

• The ground part - made up the frame of the system.

From the ground, automated processes for targeting and destroying warheads are controlled. These processes are controlled by the systems of the US missile defense complex - NORAD. This control center coordinates the actions of space objects, monitors the threat in the form of single or massive launches of enemy missiles, and makes the final decision on the retaliatory strike and use of the missile defense system.

After receiving a signal from space or ground radars At the beginning of a mass launch, the missile defense system activates ground-based launch silos with nuclear warheads using a signal and prepare the missiles for launch.

The threat signal was sent to all organs and military units.

In addition, the satellites in orbit also received the signal, which were supposed to relay the signal to the orbital elements of the missile defense system about the destruction of incoming ballistic missiles. Orbital elements must be in a certain way (electromagnetic, laser, wave or interceptor missiles located on orbital combat platforms).

• The ground-based interception system was supposed to be the second and last echelon of destruction of enemy missiles., after their passage of space missile defense.

The system, under an agreement between the US and the USSR, covers the operational areas - Washington and the Cheyenne Mount Base (NORAD). In reality, only the second missile defense system is functioning.

Some are launchers with specialized missiles that are capable of intercepting carriers at low altitude. Such munitions are themselves equipped with a nuclear charge (since the accuracy of interception at a high speed of the warhead is low, and coverage over areas is required for confident interception).

• The main component was to be a grouping of spacecraft of various operating principles.

The devices were supposed to be divided into two main types: satellites, which signal the beginning of a nuclear attack, and devices that should disable incoming warheads in near-Earth orbit using a certain type of radiation.

The type of destruction of nuclear weapons remained open on the agenda - various experiments were carried out with laser weapons, radiation of electromagnetic waves and others. As a result, none of the types guaranteed 100% destruction of the warhead, which served main reason cancel all programs.

None of the types guaranteed 100% destruction of the warhead.

Satellites must shoot down missiles on approach, without causing significant damage to US territory.

After the destruction of the warheads, it was supposed to destroy strategic objects on the territory of the USSR with a guiding strike, or in the case of a first strike and repulse the residual strike of the Soviet army. Also, these devices were supposed to disable the Soviet space orbital group, thereby blinding the enemy.

After Reagan's announcement in 1983 about the start of work on the Star Wars project, the Soviet leadership became very worried about the threat of neutralizing a retaliatory nuclear strike and decided to develop response measures. Well-known defense design bureaus of the country participated in the creation of this system.

The changes concerned the development of a new type intercontinental missiles capable of overcoming most missile defense components. Improvements also affected the command and control system in the event of the withdrawal of the main control units out of action.

this year, a new missile was adopted under the designation r-36M "Voevoda"

Such work was crowned with complete success. By 1985, a new missile was adopted under the designation r-36M "Voevoda", which received the name "Satan" in the west, modernized since its introduction in 1970. Nuclear weapons are endowed with high speed characteristics.

The rocket is based in the mine and during the launch it has a mortar type of ejection, which allows it to develop a launch speed of 230 km / h (due to the design of the engines, the rocket starts even in a nuclear cloud).

After acceleration, the rocket goes into near-Earth orbit and fires off heat traps (the Americans failed to solve the problem of combating false targets). Descending in orbit, the warhead is divided into 10 warheads, each of which carries a charge of 1 megaton (the equivalent of TNT is enough to destroy a city of a million people).

A strategic weapons control system has also been developed, called the "Perimeter", and in the west the "Dead Hand". The principle of its operation was as follows: in orbit in the constant monitoring mode, two missiles with hardware are loitering, which signal the launch of missiles from enemy territory.

The missiles are equipped with sensors that constantly monitor the situation for changes. atmospheric pressure, weather conditions, changes in the magnetic field and other parameters that indicate the beginning of a massive nuclear attack. The information is sent to the control center.

Also, in the absence of a response from the center (when enemy command posts are destroyed), the elements of the complex themselves send codes for launching warheads to mines, strategic bombers and nuclear submarines, where the launch is carried out either with the help of crews or automatically.

The principle of operation lies in the inevitability of a retaliatory strike even without human intervention, therefore, after the end of the Cold War, the American side insisted on the abolition of the Perimeter complex.

As history shows, the adoption of the SDI program actually turned out to be an operation to misinform the enemy in order to involve the USSR in an arms race. The Cold War inflicted a crushing defeat on the mighty power, destroying the economy and the country.