Where does North Korea get nuclear weapons? Is North Korea ready to use nuclear weapons  Nuclear missile program of the DPRK.

Since the opening in 1965 of the first nuclear reactor on the territory of the DPRK, disputes have not ceased in the world about how dangerous the policy of Korea is. Pyongyang regularly makes statements that weapons are being developed and tested in the republic. mass destruction, which will be used in case of a threat to the ranks. However, experts do not agree on how great the power really is. North Korea. Questions also arise as to whether the country is receiving outside help - and if so, who has become an ally in the development of a weapon capable of causing incalculable casualties.

The military potential of the DPRK

North Korea is one of the twenty poorest countries in the world. There are many reasons for this, and one of them is the Juche political system, aimed at militarizing the country.

The needs of the army are economically in the first place, and this is bearing fruit: the North Korean army is the most numerous in the world.

But the number of soldiers is no guarantee of success.. Insufficient funding leads to the fact that the army uses outdated equipment and weapons.

At the same time, the North Korean government has been claiming since 1974 that the country has been continuously working on the creation of nuclear weapons. Since 2004, Pyongyang has been conducting tests, and this is becoming an additional reason for the discontent of countries trying to resolve the conflict. The DPRK claims that the weapons are created solely for defensive purposes, but confirming the veracity of the claims is difficult.

At a military parade in 2015 in Pyongyang, a thermo nuclear weapon- a hydrogen bomb. The fact that it exists, the government claimed for ten years, but the world community was skeptical about the information. In January 2017, China recorded powerful earthquake near the border with North Korea. The Pyongyang authorities explained this by testing hydrogen bomb, and then its presence was confirmed by foreign intelligence data.

Sources of financing

The question of how the DPRK got nuclear weapons is closely related to the country's economic condition. The test requires money, with the help of which it would be possible to solve most of the humanitarian and energy problems of the peninsula. This raises thoughts of financial assistance from the outside. China is considered the official partner of North Korea, but during the reign of Kim Jong-un, relations between the countries deteriorated. The PRC does not approve of nuclear experiments conducted by Pyongyang.

It is assumed that a new alliance will enter the world political arena - the DPRK and Russia, but there are no solid grounds for this. Kim Jong-un shows respect to President Putin, but there are no more “courtesies” from Moscow in return. This means that funding comes from domestic sources.

Experts suggest that the money for the development of nuclear weapons is received from the following industries:

• social;
• agricultural;
• energy;
• heavy industrial.

There are statements in the media that North Korea is in an energy crisis. Electricity in residential buildings is turned on only for 3-4 hours a day, the rest of the time people are forced to do without electricity. Night pictures of the DPRK from space confirm this information. Next to the electrified territory of China and South Korea, the North looks like a solid dark spot. The beginning of this phenomenon coincided with the start of the nuclear program.

Allegations that the inhabitants of the DPRK are starving are not substantiated. In the last decade, the country's economic growth has been observed, which has also affected the food situation. The government has canceled the cards, which previously issued the norm of products. So the information that the missiles are being created at the expense of hungry Koreans is not confirmed.

Nuclear potential of North Korea

Gone are the days when threats of weapons of mass destruction were considered bluff. Availability powerful weapon the DPRK has a confirmed fact. Moreover, analysts claim that Korea has enough materials to create from 6 to 12 new missiles.

However, their production is associated with a number of difficulties:

• the materials required to complete nuclear warheads are not produced in North Korea, they must be imported into the country;
• even when creating new charges, there remains a problem with the construction of carriers for them;
• Waste produced during the production of nuclear fuel is not exported from the country, and the conditions for their safe storage can be met only with small volumes.

However, all these difficulties do not deter the DPRK from continuing the experiments. To date, at least six explosions have been confirmed in different parts countries, mainly on the border with Russia, China and South Korea. Pyongyang claims there are more. The government's official line is defensive. Threatened by the United States, North Korea can afford only one position: balancing power. To Washington's latest aggressive statement, Kim Jong-un replied that the DPRK would strike if necessary.

And its surroundings have seven nuclear charges. After that, in 1956, the DPRK and the USSR signed an agreement on the training of nuclear specialists. Researchers often refer to 1952 as the beginning of North Korea's nuclear activities, when the decision was made to establish the Atomic Energy Research Institute. The real creation of nuclear infrastructure began in the mid-1960s.

In 1959, the DPRK signed agreements on cooperation in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy with the USSR, the PRC, and began construction of a research center in Nyongbyon, where the Soviet IRT-2000 reactor with a capacity of 2 MW was installed in 1965. The IRT-2000 reactor is a research light water pool type reactor with a water-beryllium neutron reflector. The relatively highly enriched uranium is used as fuel in this reactor. Apparently, such a reactor cannot be used to develop materials for nuclear weapons - for example, for the production of plutonium.

Work on the creation of nuclear weapons began in the 1970s. In 1974, the DPRK joined the IAEA. In the same year, Pyongyang turned to China for help in developing nuclear weapons; North Korean specialists were admitted to Chinese training grounds.

North Korea and the IAEA

In April 1985, under pressure from the USSR and counting on the construction of a nuclear power plant with its help, the DPRK signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As a reward for this, in 1986, the USSR supplied Korea with a 5 MW gas-graphite research reactor (with some probability, all the plutonium available to the DPRK was accumulated on it). An agreement was also signed to build a nuclear power plant in North Korea with four light water reactors of the VVER-440 type.

In 1990, this agreement was refined, and instead of four light water reactors, it was decided to supply three, but more powerful VVER-640 reactors. A contract was also signed for the supply Soviet Union fuel assemblies in the amount of about 185 thousand dollars. Since June of the same year, IAEA inspections began at the country's nuclear facilities, after the United States announced the withdrawal of its tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of South Korea. In the period from 1992-1994. six inspections were carried out, the results of which raised some doubts on the part of the IAEA.

"North Korean Nuclear Crisis"

On February 11, 1993, IAEA Director General H. Blix took the initiative to conduct a "special inspection" in the DPRK. Ten days later, the DPRK Atomic Energy Minister informed the IAEA of his country's refusal to allow this inspection, and on March 12, of the decision to abandon the NPT. In June of the same year, North Korea, in exchange for the US promise not to interfere in its affairs, suspended its withdrawal from the treaty, but a year later, on June 13, 1994, it withdrew from the IAEA.

According to declassified data, in 1994, US President Clinton, together with Secretary of Defense William Perry, considered the possibility of launching a missile attack on a nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, however, after analytical data were requested from the chairman of the Joint Committee of Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces, General John Shalikashvili, it became clear that such a strike could lead to a full-scale war with a large number of American and South Korean casualties, as well as huge losses among the civilian population, as a result of which the Clinton administration was forced to make unfavorable, from its point of view, "Framework Agreements" with North Korea.

USA and North Korea

The processes of preparing the United States for a military action against the DPRK were “launched on the brakes” by the visit of former US President Jimmy Carter to the DPRK leader Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang in 1994, at which an agreement was reached on freezing the North Korean nuclear program. This event was a turning point that brought the crisis to the negotiation plane and ensured its diplomatic resolution. In October 1994, after lengthy consultations, the DPRK signed the Framework Agreement with the United States, under which North Korea assumed certain obligations, for example:

• cessation of the construction and use of reactors and enterprises for the enrichment of uranium;
• refusal to extract plutonium from reactor fuel assemblies;
• withdrawal of spent nuclear fuel outside the country;
• taking measures to dismantle all objects whose purpose in one way or another speaks of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In turn, the US authorities have committed to:

The coming to power of the 43rd US President Bush  (junior) led to an aggravation of relations between the two countries. Light water reactors were never built, which did not prevent the United States from making more and more demands on the DPRK. Bush included North Korea in the "rogue states", and in October 2002, US Deputy Secretary of State James Kelly announced that the DPRK was enriching uranium. After some time, the United States suspended the supply of fuel to North Korean power plants, and on December 12, North Korea officially announced the resumption of its nuclear program and the expulsion of IAEA inspectors. By the end of 2002, the DPRK, according to the CIA, had accumulated from 7 to 24 kg of weapons-grade plutonium. On January 10, 2003, North Korea officially withdrew from the NPT.

Six-Party Talks

In 2003, negotiations began on the nuclear program of the DPRK with the participation of China, the United States, Russia, South Korea and Japan. The first three rounds (August 2003, February and June 2004) did not bring much results. And Pyongyang declined to participate in the fourth, scheduled for September, due to another aggravation of US-Korean and Japanese-Korean relations.

At the first round of negotiations (August 2003), the United States began to seek not only the curtailment of the North Korean nuclear program, but also the elimination of the nuclear infrastructure already created in the DPRK. In exchange, the United States agreed to guarantee the security of the DPRK and provide economic assistance to Pyongyang, in particular by supplying it with two light water reactors. However, the United States and Japan demanded the curtailment of the DPRK nuclear program under the control of the IAEA or the five-power commission. The DPRK did not agree to such conditions .

In the second round (February 2004), the DPRK agreed to freeze its nuclear program under the supervision of the IAEA and in exchange for deliveries of fuel oil. However, now the United States, with the support of Japan, demanded not a freeze, but complete elimination nuclear facilities of the DPRK under the control of the IAEA. The DPRK rejected such proposals.

Hopes for a successful resolution of the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula first appeared in the third round of six-party talks that took place between June 23 and 26, 2004, when the US agreed to a "freeze reward." In response, North Korea said it was prepared to refrain from producing, testing and transferring nuclear weapons and to freeze all WMD-related facilities. The United States has put forward a project to transfer the DPRK's nuclear facilities under the interim international administration of the five-power commission or the IAEA. Subsequently, the elimination of North Korean nuclear facilities under international control was proposed. But North Korea did not agree with this option either. The DPRK Foreign Ministry expressed dissatisfaction with the results of the talks.

Explosion

On September 9, 2004, a strong explosion was recorded by a South Korean reconnaissance satellite in a remote area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe DPRK (Yangando Province) near the border with China. A crater visible from space remained at the site of the explosion, and a huge mushroom cloud with a diameter of about four kilometers grew over the scene.

On September 13, the DPRK authorities explained the appearance of a cloud similar to a nuclear mushroom by explosive work during the construction of the Samsu hydroelectric power station (the two largest rivers of this region, Amnokkan and Tumangan, originate in Yangando).

South Korean experts doubt that it was a nuclear explosion. In their opinion, there might not have been an explosion at all, and the emission of smoke into the atmosphere was a consequence of a major fire. According to some reports, there may be a plant for the production of missile components in the area, and the cause of the explosion could be the ignition of rocket fuel or the detonation of warheads.
According to other information, military-strategic facilities are concentrated in this area, in particular, the recently built missile base Yonjori, which is an underground missile range where ballistic missiles capable of reaching Japan are stored and tested in deep tunnels.

Official American sources believe that there was no nuclear explosion. At the same time, American intelligence services noted strange activity in the area of ​​the country's nuclear facilities.

Refusal to negotiate

On September 16, 2004, the DPRK announced that it would not participate in the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue until the situation with secret uranium and plutonium developments in South Korea was clarified. In early September, South Korea admitted that it received a small amount of enriched uranium in 2000. According to officials, all experiments were purely scientific in nature and were soon completely curtailed.

On September 28, 2004, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK stated at a session of the UN General Assembly that North Korea had already turned enriched uranium obtained from 8,000 reprocessed fuel rods from its nuclear reactor into a nuclear weapon. He stressed that the DPRK had no other choice in creating a nuclear deterrence force in the conditions when the United States declared its goal the destruction of the DPRK and threatened with preventive nuclear strikes.

At the same time, the diplomat dismissed reports of North Korea's preparations for the resumption of missile tests as "unverified rumors." North Korea's unilateral moratorium on ballistic missile testing was introduced in 1999 and extended in 2001 until 2003. In 1998, North Korea tested a ballistic missile that flew over Japan and landed in the Pacific Ocean.

On October 21, 2004, then-US Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that "intelligence cannot tell whether the DPRK has nuclear weapons."

On February 10, 2005, the DPRK Foreign Ministry for the first time openly announced the creation of nuclear weapons in the country: “We are for the six-party talks, but we are forced to interrupt our participation in them for an indefinite period - until we are convinced that sufficient conditions and atmosphere have been created to allow hope for the results of the dialogue. The negotiation process stalled due to the anti-Korean hostile policy of the United States. As long as America brandishes the nuclear baton, intent on destroying our order at any cost, we will expand our stockpiles of nuclear weapons to protect our people's historic choice, freedom and socialism."

International reaction

At that time, there was no real evidence that the DPRK was indeed implementing a military nuclear program and, moreover, had already created a nuclear bomb. Therefore, it was suggested that the leadership of the DPRK by such a statement simply intended to demonstrate that it was not afraid of anyone and was ready to counter the potential threat from the United States, including nuclear weapons. But since the North Koreans did not provide evidence of its existence, then Russian experts considered this statement as another manifestation of the policy of "blackmail with elements of bluff" . As for the Russian Foreign Ministry, its representatives called the DPRK's refusal to participate in the six-party talks and the intention to build up its nuclear arsenal "not in line with Pyongyang's desire for a nuclear-free status for the Korean Peninsula."

In South Korea, in connection with the statement of the DPRK, an urgent meeting of the country's Security Council was convened. The South Korean Foreign Ministry called on the DPRK to "renew its participation in the talks without any conditions."

In March 2005, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice proposed that China exert economic pressure on Pyongyang by cutting off oil and coal supplies, which would be tantamount to a trade and economic blockade. According to experts, the share of China in providing economic assistance to North Korea is, according to various sources, from 30 to 70%.

South Korea was against resorting to sanctions and refusing to provide assistance to the DPRK humanitarian aid or from joint economic projects. The official representative of the ruling Uridan party even demanded that the United States provide evidence of its accusations that the DPRK was exporting nuclear materials, or stop "engaging in propaganda", since such a policy could cause serious problems between South Korea and the United States.

Subsequently, it turned out that the United States distorted the data that they had previously provided to other countries regarding the North Korean nuclear program. In particular, in early 2005, the United States informed Japan South Korea and China that the DPRK supplied Libya with uranium hexafluoride, a starting material in the process of uranium enrichment, which can also be used to create a combat nuclear charge. However, according to The Washington Post newspaper, the DPRK actually supplied uranium hexafluoride to Pakistan - not knowing about its further transfer to Libya.

The main thing that Japan was able to do was to block the flow of foreign exchange earnings to the DPRK from the Koreans living in Japan by creating a number of bureaucratic barriers. On March 22, 2005, Pyongyang demanded that Japan be excluded from participation in the Six-Party Talks, since Japan "fully follows American policy and does not make any contribution to the negotiations."

At the same time, the DPRK hastened to express its solidarity with Seoul, whose relations with Japan deteriorated sharply due to Japan's territorial claims to the South Korean island of Dokdo, even emphasizing the possibility of military support for Seoul.

Resumption of negotiations

In July 2005, after lengthy informal consultations, the DPRK agreed to return to the six-party nuclear talks in Beijing. As a condition, the DPRK put forward one demand - that the United States "recognize North Korea as a partner and treat it with respect."

The fourth round of negotiations took place in July-August 2005, when the participants for the first time managed to agree on the adoption of a joint document. On September 19, 2005, a Joint Statement of Principles for Denuclearization was adopted. North Korea was recognized the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and all participants in the negotiations agreed to discuss the issue of supplying the DPRK with a light-water nuclear reactor. In addition to confirming the DPRK's commitment to curtail its nuclear program, return to the NPT and under IAEA inspections, the document contained statements of intent to normalize relations between the DPRK and the United States, and between North Korea and Japan.

During the fifth round of negotiations (November 9-11, 2005), North Korea announced its readiness to suspend nuclear weapons testing. Pyongyang has vowed to delay nuclear weapons testing as the first step in a program to gradually make the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free.

However, after US Ambassador to Seoul Alexander Vershbow said on December 10, 2005 that the communist system in North Korea could be called a "criminal regime", North Korea said it was considering the words american ambassador as a "declaration of war" and called on South Korea to expel Vershbow from the country. Pyongyang also said that the ambassador's statement could nullify all previously reached agreements on the DPRK's nuclear program.

As early as December 20, 2005, the Korean Central News Agency reported that North Korea intended to intensify nuclear development based on graphite reactors, which can be used to produce weapons-grade plutonium. The authorities of Pyongyang explained their actions by the termination in 2003 of the program for the construction of a nuclear power plant at two light water reactors in Sinpo (east coast of the DPRK) by the international consortium Korean Peninsula Nuclear Power Development Organization (KEDO) under the auspices of the United States: “In the conditions when the Bush administration stopped supplying light water reactors, we will actively develop an independent nuclear power industry based on graphite reactors with a capacity of 50 and 200 megawatts.”
At the same time, North Korea planned to build its own light water nuclear reactor and reconstruct two plants that would be able to produce large amounts of nuclear fuel.

With this statement, the DPRK actually denounced its previous promises to abandon all nuclear programs in exchange for security guarantees and economic assistance.

The statement was a reaction to the US imposition of sanctions against North Korean companies that were accused of supplying missiles and making counterfeit dollars, as well as to the adoption of a UN resolution on human rights in the DPRK.

At the beginning of 2006, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan confirmed the position of the Chinese side: it is impossible to abandon the further advancement of the negotiation process, the fundamental goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the principles of achieving this goal through peaceful negotiations.

On March 19-22, 2007, the first stage of the sixth round of negotiations was held in Beijing, and from September 27 to 30, 2007, meetings of the second stage of the sixth round were held in Beijing.

Nuclear tests

At the end of September 2006, a bill approved by both houses of the American Congress was sent for signature by US President George W. Bush. The bill imposed sanctions against North Korea and companies cooperating with it, which, according to the United States, are assisting the DPRK in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), missiles and other WMD delivery technologies. The sanctions also included a ban on financial transactions and a denial of export licenses.

On October 3, 2006, the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued a statement stating North Korea's intention to "carry out a nuclear test, provided that its safety will be reliably guaranteed". As a justification for this decision, it was stated that there was a threat nuclear war from the United States and economic sanctions aimed at strangling the DPRK - in these conditions, Pyongyang sees no other way out but to carry out nuclear test. At the same time, as noted in the statement, "the DPRK is not going to be the first to use nuclear weapons," on the contrary, "it will continue to make efforts to ensure the nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula and make comprehensive efforts towards nuclear disarmament and a total ban on nuclear weapons."

At the point with coordinates 41°18′ N. sh. 129°08′ E d. HGIOL an earthquake with a magnitude of 4.2 was registered. The earthquake was recorded in South Korea, Japan, USA, Australia and Russia.

As the Russian newspaper Kommersant reported the next day, "Pyongyang informed Moscow of the planned time for the tests through diplomatic channels two hours before the explosion." The PRC, which was warned by Pyongyang about the test only 20 minutes before the explosion, almost immediately informed its partners in the six-party talks - the United States, Japan and South Korea.

According to the statement of the DPRK authorities and the monitoring of the relevant services of the surrounding countries, no radiation leakage was recorded.

All the leading world powers, including Russia and (for the first time) China, as well as the leadership of NATO and the European Union condemned the conduct of a nuclear test in the DPRK. Russian President Vladimir Putin, at a meeting with members of the government, said: "Russia, of course, condemns the tests conducted by the DPRK, and it's not just about Korea itself - it's about the enormous damage that has been done to the process of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the world."

South Korea canceled the dispatch of another batch of humanitarian aid to the DPRK and brought its armed forces to a state of high alert.

According to American experts, the DPRK has enough plutonium to produce 12 nuclear weapons. At the same time, experts believe that the DPRK does not have the technology to create ammunition that could be placed in the head of the rocket.

Second test

On May 25, 2009, North Korea again conducted nuclear tests. The power of the underground nuclear explosion, according to the Russian military, was from 10 to 20 kilotons. On May 27, the North Korean radio station for abroad “Voice of Korea” in all 9 languages ​​​​of its foreign broadcast (including Russian) reported on the “mass public rally” that had taken place the day before in Pyongyang, at which the secretary of the Central Committee of the WPK Che Te Bok gave an official justification for conducting a nuclear test : "The conducted nuclear tests are a decisive measure to protect the highest interests of the Republic to protect the sovereignty of the country and the nation in an environment where the threat from the United States of America of a nuclear preventive strike, their intrigues to apply sanctions" is growing. The broadcast then cited a statement from the "Korean People's Army Mission in Panmunjeong," which stated that "despite the Korean Armistice Agreement, which prohibits any blocking of the belligerents, South Korea has joined the initiative to limit nuclear weapons, and the United States has introduced sanctions against North Korea. The statement stated that if there were attempts to forcibly spread the initiative to limit nuclear weapons to the DPRK, such as attempts to inspect the country's maritime transport, then the DPRK would consider this a declaration of war.

Third test

The beginning of research in the field of nuclear energy in North Korea was laid in 1956, when an agreement was signed between the DPRK and the USSR on cooperation in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In 1964, also with the assistance of the USSR, a research center was founded in Yongben, and a little later a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor was put into operation. Around the same time, according to a number of experts, the DPRK began work on the use of nuclear energy for military purposes.

Over the next few decades, an extensive nuclear infrastructure was formed in the DPRK, including, in particular, the College of Nuclear Physics at the University. Kim Il Sung and the College of Nuclear Physics at the Technological University. Kim Cheek in Pyongyang Research Center nuclear power plant, Pakchon uranium mine and enrichment facility, Atomic Energy Research Center and Science University in Pyongson. Also, a number of uranium mines were discovered and put into operation on the territory of the DPRK.

At the same time, in 1985, the DPRK signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in 1991 - with the Republic of Korea - an agreement on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula, and in 1992 - with the IAEA - an agreement on access to nuclear facilities of agency employees. According to the results of the ensuing verification, the DPRK was indeed working on the production of weapons-grade plutonium necessary for the production of warheads. In the same year, 1992, the country's leadership refused to conduct inspections by the IAEA at spent nuclear fuel storage sites, and the following year, it even made a statement about its intention to withdraw from the NPT.

On June 11, 1993, a joint statement was issued by the DPRK and the United States. The document, in particular, indicated that the DPRK was suspending withdrawal from the NPT, and the United States was creating the International Consortium for the Development of Energy on the Korean Peninsula (KEDO) to replace North Korean gas-graphite reactors with light water ones (which significantly reduce the possibility of using the plutonium produced in them for military purposes).

On September 1-3, 1993, negotiations were held in the DPRK with an IAEA delegation on the "partiality" of the latter's inspections.

On March 1, 1994, a group of IAEA experts arrived in the DPRK to check the agency's monitoring equipment installed at nuclear facilities.

On May 15, 1994, the DPRK issued a statement about the beginning of the replacement of graphite rods in the Yongbyon reactor.

On October 21, 1994, a framework agreement between the DPRK and the United States was published to resolve the nuclear problem and normalize bilateral relations. The document, in particular, obligated the United States to take measures to build a nuclear power plant in the DPRK on two light-water nuclear reactors with a total capacity of 2 million kW, and also - even before the completion of the construction of the first reactor by 2003 - to ensure the supply of liquid fuel to the DPRK in the amount of 500 thousand tons. t per year. An obligation was received from the DPRK to freeze and dismantle the existing gas-graphite reactor. In addition, according to the document, he guaranteed the preservation of the DPRK as a party to the NPT.

On November 1, 1994, the DPRK announced the suspension of the construction of graphite-moderated reactors with a capacity of 50,000 kW and 200,000 kW.

In March 1995, the International Consortium for the Development of Energy on the Korean Peninsula (KEDO) was officially approved.

On August 31, 1998, the DPRK carried out a test launch of a three-stage ballistic missile that flew over the territory of Japan and then fell into the Pacific Ocean.

In 1999, the DPRK agreed to establish a moratorium on such launches until 2003.

In 2001, the US administration put North Korea on the list of countries suspected of violating the ban on research into biological weapons.

On January 29, 2002, US President George W. Bush, Jr., in his message to Congress characterized the countries of the DPRK as an integral part of the "axis of evil" along with Iraq and Iran. In response, the North Korean leadership stated that such a statement was equivalent to a declaration of war.

In March 2002, in New York, the Permanent Representative of the DPRK to the UN held two meetings with the US Special Representative for the Korean Peace Talks, Jack Pritchard. The latter, in particular, was informed that the issue of resuming negotiations between the two countries was "considered in a benevolent light."

On August 7, 2002, in the DPRK, KEDO began building the foundation for one of the light water reactors. At the same time, construction work financed by the Republic of Korea and Japan was limited to the construction of a reinforced concrete frame of the reactor (which was facilitated to a certain extent by the change in US policy towards the DPRK after the change of presidents).

In October 2002, the DPRK notified the United States that it no longer intended to adhere to the agreement to resolve the nuclear issue. In addition, the long-term covert implementation of the program was recognized by North Korea in violation of the said agreement.

On October 3-5, 2002, US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly paid a visit to the DPRK, during which evidence was presented of North Korea's continuation of its own nuclear program. The DPRK was recognized as the resumption of development due to the failure of the United States to build light water reactors.

On October 17, 2002, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il made a statement about allowing IAEA inspectors to inspect the country's nuclear facilities.

On October 21, 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell made a statement that the agreement on the re-equipment of the DPRK's nuclear program had become invalid due to violations of the terms of the document by this country.

On October 21-25, 2002, the DPRK announced its own right to develop nuclear weapons, but at the same time announced its readiness to curtail its nuclear programs in exchange for assistance and a "non-aggression" pact with the United States.

On December 13, 2002, the DPRK announced the resumption of its nuclear program and its intention to return to the construction of a nuclear reactor. The North Korean leadership emphasized the forced nature of such a step due to the cessation of fuel oil supplies from the United States.

On December 25, 2002, the DPRK proceeded to remove the seals from one of the fuel rod factories.

On January 6, 2003, the IAEA issued an ultimatum to the DPRK to curtail its nuclear program.

On January 7, 2003, the United States announced its consent to negotiate with the DPRK, but only on the condition that North Korea fulfills its international obligations.

On March 12, 2003, the IAEA submitted to the UN Security Council for consideration materials on the violation by the DPRK of its obligations to halt work on the creation of nuclear weapons.

March 13, 2003 official representative North Korean Foreign Minister Lee Kwang Hook made a statement that Pyongyang "is capable of inflicting a crushing blow on American interests around the world," and also has ballistic missiles "capable of hitting enemy targets at any distance."

On April 5, 2003, US President George W. Bush promised to seek a solution to the complex of problems associated with the DPRK's nuclear program through peaceful and diplomatic means. At the same time, North Korea issued a warning that it did not intend to recognize the legality of any UN Security Council resolutions adopted in connection with Pyongyang's nuclear program.

On April 12, 2003, the DPRK announced its consent to negotiations with the United States in a multilateral format if Washington abandons its hostile approach.

On April 18, 2003, the DPRK announced that in the country "at the final stage, work on the nuclear program is being successfully carried out, up to the processing of 8,000 used reactor rods."

On May 12, 2003, the DPRK unilaterally withdrew from the agreement on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean Peninsula (concluded in 1992 with the Republic of Korea).

In June 2003, the United States seeks a complete cessation of work within the framework of KEDO on the construction of a light water reactor, referring to the DPRK's refusal to sign a protocol on compensation in case of incidents at a future nuclear power plant.

On July 9, 2003, the state intelligence agency of the Republic of Korea presented to the country's parliament data on the conduct by the DPRK of about 70 tests of "devices for nuclear explosions" at a test site located 40 km northwest of Yongbyon. In addition, according to the agency, the DPRK has completed the processing of 8,000 used rods from the Yongbyon nuclear reactor (and, thus, Pyongyang received weapons-grade plutonium for the production of warheads).

On July 14, 2003, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade of the Republic of Korea, Yoon Yong Gwan, stated that South Korea had no reliable evidence that North Korea had completed the processing of used nuclear reactor rods in Yongbyon.

On September 3, 2003, the DPRK parliament adopted a resolution stating that the country had no choice but to "actively build up nuclear deterrence forces to protect against possible nuclear strikes In addition, the resolution noted that, given the "extremely hostile attitude of Washington," North Korea "sees no point in continuing the six-party talks until the US reconsiders its position."

On September 23, 2003, the DPRK rejected the resolution of the 47th IAEA General Conference on curtailing its nuclear programs and refused to return to fulfilling its obligations under the NPT.

On October 2, 2003, the DPRK announced the successful completion of the processing of 8,000 used rods from a nuclear reactor and the direction of the weapons-grade plutonium extracted from them to strengthen its own "nuclear deterrence forces." According to some experts, the resulting plutonium is enough to make 4-6 warheads.

On October 20, 2003, during the APEC forum summit in Bangkok, US President George W. Bush put forward a proposal to the DPRK to abandon the nuclear program in exchange for the provision of security guarantees by the United States and other states, but the possibility of signing an agreement with North Korea "on non-aggression".

On February 13, 2004, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, based on Pakistani scientist Abdul Khan's admission of the latter's transfer of nuclear technology to the DPRK, stated that "North Korea's nuclear program has existed longer and is more developed than the United States believed."

On May 22, 2004, the American newspaper The New York Times published an article according to which, in 2001, the DPRK sold uranium used in weapons to Libya (and the IAEA, in turn, has evidence that this uranium was supplied from DPRK).

On June 7, 2004, the DPRK announced its intention to build up its own "nuclear deterrence force", the reason for which was an underground experiment using a subcritical mass of plutonium, conducted by the United States on May 25, 2004 at a test site in Nevada.

On June 30, 2004, the General Secretary of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, Shinzo Abe, at a meeting with US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, stated that Japan was ready to compensate the DPRK for the missing part of its energy resources in exchange for specific steps to freeze its nuclear program as part of a general plan to provide North Korea humanitarian aid.

On July 24, 2004, the DPRK media published materials characterizing the US proposal to curtail the country's nuclear program in exchange for economic assistance to "fictitious" ones. "The US proposals are not worthy of further consideration," the North Korean leadership says.

On February 10, 2005, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the six-party talks (with the participation of Russia, the United States, the Republic of Korea, China and Japan) on overcoming the crisis that has developed around its nuclear program, and for the first time recognized the existence of its own nuclear weapons. According to the DPRK Foreign Ministry, the country's nuclear weapons are "entirely defensive" and will remain a "nuclear deterrent."

Seismologists from a number of countries on September 3 recorded unusual tremors in North Korea. According to Yonhap, according to the Korea Meteorological Agency, located in South Korea, the magnitude of the earthquake was 5.6 points. Geophysicists drew attention to the fact that seismic activity was recorded near the city of Kilju in the province of Hamgyongbukto, where the North Korean nuclear test site is located. The data of South Korean scientists were confirmed by their colleagues from the USA, Japan and China. According to the Chinese side, the power of the push was 6.3 points.

The earthquake happened around 6:30 Moscow time. Chinese and South Korean scientists also recorded a second tremor of less power - about 4.6 points. According to experts from the China Seismological Center (CENC), the second earthquake occurred at 6:38 Moscow time - presumably, it was a collapse and subsidence rock collapsed as a result of the first shock.

According to the Primorsky Department for Hydrometeorology and Monitoring environment, weak echoes of the earthquake in North Korea were felt in Vladivostok. However, the radiation background in the Russian Primorye is within the normal range.

“After the alleged nuclear test in the DPRK, no excess background radiation was recorded in the Primorsky Territory,” the agency said in a statement.

According to the United States Geological Survey, tremors in North Korea are nothing more than a "possible explosion."

“If what happened is not an explosion, the National Earthquake Center of the United States Geological Survey cannot determine it (earthquakes. — RT) type,” seismologists said.

Chinese specialists also reported about the "explosion" of high power as a probable cause of two tremors.

The Japanese military noted that the yield of the North Korean bomb was 70 kilotons. The South Korean side estimated the yield of the charge at 100 kilotons, and the Norwegian seismologists talk about an indicator of 120 kilotons - this is six times more powerful than the US bomb dropped on Nagasaki in 1945 (21 kilotons).

In Seoul, an urgent council on internal and external security was convened in connection with the testing of nuclear weapons by Pyongyang.

South Korea's Yonhap news agency reported that North Korea has confirmed the first test of a hydrogen bomb and called it "absolutely successful." The Daily Telegraph reports that North Korean television also reported on the successful test of a thermonuclear charge.

"Power (explosion. - RT) is 10 or 20 times greater than in previous tests,” a Seoul professor told Reuters. national university Kong She. “Such a scale speaks of testing a hydrogen bomb,” the expert confirms the information to the media.

Juche motifs

“The test of the hydrogen bomb was carried out in order to test and confirm the accuracy and operability of the power control technology and the internal design of the hydrogen bomb intended to be placed on intercontinental ballistic missiles, whose production has recently begun, ”Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the official news agency of the DPRK, quotes Yonhap.

Shortly before the tremors were recorded, the KCNA posted information that the country had developed a new compact hydrogen warhead that could be placed on intercontinental ballistic missiles. Two tests of missiles with a range of up to 10,000 km, capable of hitting not only American bases on the island of Guam in the Pacific Ocean, but also the west coast of the United States, North Korea conducted in July.

• North Korean ballistic missile launch
• KCNA/Reuters

The new thermonuclear warhead was personally examined by the leader of the country Kim Jong-un, visiting the Institute for Nuclear Research. “The Supreme Leader watched as a hydrogen bomb was planted on an ICBM,” the KCNA statement emphasized.

“All components of the hydrogen bomb were made by domestic manufacturers, based on the Juche idea. Thus, the country can produce powerful nuclear weapons in as many quantities as it pleases, ”KCNA quotes the North Korean leader.

Immediately after reports of the development of a new nuclear bomb in the DPRK, the leaders of Japan and the United States held telephone conversations on the North Korean issue. Donald Trump and Shinzo Abe "discussed the growing threat from the DPRK" and ways to put pressure on Pyongyang, the White House press service said.

In turn, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono called the actions of the DPRK absolutely inexcusable and called on Russia to put more pressure on North Korea, in particular, consider imposing an oil embargo on Pyongyang.

However, this gesture, taking into account the history of the region, can be perceived in Pyongyang as a provocation, against the backdrop of ongoing exercises by the United States and South Korea.

“The fuel embargo is directly a preparation for war,” Konstantin Asmolov, a leading researcher at the Center for Korean Studies at the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, told RT. "Because if you've studied history, you know what role the American fuel embargo played in Japan's entry into the war with the United States in 1941."

“Here, both technical and political reasons are intertwined,” explained political scientist Irina Lantsova, who is conducting a nuclear test by the DPRK right now. “The main reason is the pressure and threats from the United States, forcing Pyongyang to strengthen its defenses.”

First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense Alexander Sherin, in an interview with RT, said that the United States provoked the DPRK.

“Here I must say a big thank you to the United States, because they put the squeeze on the country. It was they who created such conditions when the state begins to shrink into a ball and spend money on defense. Let them go american soldiers and bases to the borders of the United States, and there will be no such arms race in the world, ”the deputy emphasized.

“Now North Korea has found itself in such a situation that it needs to protect itself with a guarantee, and in order to guarantee this protection, it is necessary to conduct tests,” Lantsova notes. “Politics plays a role here indirectly. In this case, it’s not even a demonstration, but a reaction to what is happening.”

“Kim’s goals are clear: to try now in a very short time to bring its nuclear missile program to such a level that it is clear to everyone that there is no third option - either a war begins, or it is necessary to negotiate with North Korea, ”said Konstantin Asmolov.

“You have to understand that Kim is not going to communize the south or portray the main reptile of Indian cinema in a fit of psychopathy, his goals are more pragmatic,” the expert says.

• KCNA/Reuters

According to Asmolov, Pyongyang believes that, having received nuclear weapons capable of reaching the United States, it will reach a level of nuclear deterrence similar to that of the US-China. And then, despite the contradictions, the option of war between the two countries will be excluded.

We understand but do not accept

“It cannot but cause regret that the leadership of the DPRK, by its actions aimed at undermining the global non-proliferation regime, poses a serious threat to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in the region as a whole. The continuation of such a line is fraught with serious consequences for the DPRK itself, ”the Russian Foreign Ministry commented on the nuclear test in the DPRK.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) called Pyongyang's actions "an extremely sad act" and "a complete disregard for the repeated demands of the international community."

According to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Tokyo has already sent a protest to Pyongyang through diplomatic channels in connection with the test of a thermonuclear charge. Shinzo Abe ordered to keep in touch with representatives of the United States, Russia and China in order to quickly respond to the developing crisis.

• Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
• Reuters

“The actions of the DPRK are understandable, but unacceptable, because such a policy, firstly, greatly exacerbates tensions, and secondly, undermines the world order, which is built on the authority of the UN, whose resolutions are ignored, and on the fact that nuclear weapons should be who is supposed to, - notes Konstantin Asmolov. “That is why Moscow and Beijing may question the substance of the sanctions, but believe that every such action should be formally condemned.”

According to the expert, the DPRK chose the date of the test unsuccessfully. “The congress of the Communist Party of China is on the nose, today is the BRICS summit - I think that this will cause a certain emotional irritation of Moscow and Beijing and, of course, we should expect a new round of tightening sanctions, although there is nowhere to tighten further,” Asmolov said.

Frants Klintsevich, deputy chairman of the Federation Council Committee on Security and Defense, in an interview with RT, called the DPRK nuclear test a provocation.

“If earlier it was a sparring, which, in my opinion, could hardly lead to any serious conflicts, then the tests that have passed today are already a provocation on the part of North Korea. This is really serious. I think this can no longer be allowed. There is no alternative to the negotiation process and peaceful conversation. Today we need to sit down at the negotiating table and solve this problem, because North Korea’s upholding of its sovereignty in this way can lead to a very serious conflict, ”Klintsevich emphasized.

Trump will answer

What is Trump going to do now? - Increase pressure on Russia and China to achieve some serious joint action. The bet is that the irritation of Moscow and Beijing with such a step by North Korea will make them more accommodating in terms of American proposals, ”Konstantin Asmolov believes.

In turn, South Korea has already announced that it will seek tougher sanctions against the DPRK, according to Yonhap, citing the head of the National Security Department of the Presidential Administration of South Korea, Chung Ui Yong.

The agency notes that the Korean official has already held relevant consultations with his American counterpart, National Security Adviser to President Trump, General Herbert McMaster. Yonhap also reports that South Korea will seek to host "the most powerful tactical weapon" of the United States.

“We are in for a very serious escalation, one of the most difficult in the last six months,” Irina Lantsova predicts the consequences of new nuclear tests by the DPRK.

• US President Donald Trump
• Reuters

According to the expert, the main problem now is that after a number of high-profile statements from the United States, the leaders of this country have seriously limited their room for maneuver and will most likely be forced to escalate. “The problem is that Trump has threatened so much, promised so much that he now has to do something,” the political scientist says.

“This is not the first nuclear test - this is the sixth nuclear test, and it has always been possible to do something diplomatically,” the expert notes. “But over the past six months, so many formidable promises have been made to do something that you will now have to answer for your words,” Lantsova believes.

“We should expect more emotional involvement,” Asmolov notes. According to the expert, despite the expected tightening of rhetoric from the United States, the likelihood of a new war in Korea now is “only” 35%. “I used to say that the probability of a conflict on the peninsula is approximately 30%, now it has increased by five percent,” the expert believes.

PEACE AND SECURITY

NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF THE DPRK

Park Sang Hoon

Institute of Foreign Policy and National Security (Republic of Korea) Republic of Korea, Seoul, Seocho-gu Seocho-dong, 13-76-2, 137-863

The article analyzes the modern aspects of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on the example of international approaches to the nuclear program of the DPRK, as well as the efforts of the world community to resolve it, especially through the Six-Party Talks.

Key words: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), IAEA, North Korea, nuclear program, nuclear issue, Six-Party Talks.

After Caribbean Crisis 1962, which almost led to a world nuclear missile war, the USSR and the USA, as the leading nuclear powers, came to the conclusion that, firstly, the arms race should be limited to some extent, and secondly, that the access of new members in the "nuclear club" should be closed. As a result, in 1968, the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, as well as about fifty other countries that had already determined for themselves that they did not need their own nuclear weapons, signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which entered into force in 1970 After France and the People's Republic of China joined it in 1992, all five nuclear powers - permanent members of the UN Security Council - became its members. However, unfortunately, this did not stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Back in the 1970s. Israel created its first nuclear devices, and cooperated in this area with the apartheid regime in Republic of South Africa. A few years would have been enough for Shah Iran to acquire the potential to create nuclear weapons, but this was prevented by the 1979 revolution. At the same time, all these countries categorically denied even the existence of such intentions.

The situation changed in 1998, when India and Pakistan, which are not members of the NPT, joined the "nuclear club" on a whim. The situation was further exacerbated when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) first withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and then officially announced that it had conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, followed by another in 2009.

but there were also suspicions about the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

From a formal legal point of view, India and Pakistan cannot be condemned for violating the provisions of the NPT, since they are not members of it. Both countries argue that they need nuclear weapons solely in self-defense against each other, but could join the NPT - provided the other side joins. But this is unlikely, because India has another potential adversary that "legitimately" possesses nuclear weapons - China. Iran, in fact, is suspected only of striving to become a "threshold state", which the NPT does not prohibit being.

The situation with North Korea is completely different. It openly declares that it has carried out nuclear tests and that it has nuclear weapons. At the same time, in addition to the border with the Republic of Korea, it also has common borders with two nuclear, but not hostile powers - the PRC and Russia, and also deals with the nuclear-armed forces of the United States of America based in the region, which it considers as its own. most dangerous enemy. Therefore, it is clear that the possibility of North Korea giving up nuclear weapons on a reciprocal basis with any or all three regional nuclear powers is completely absent - it is possible only unilaterally. This makes the North Korean nuclear issue particularly complex and complex, and it has many dimensions or levels. It seems appropriate to comprehend it at three levels - global, regional and national.

At the global level, this problem is a serious threat to the nonproliferation regime as negative example for other countries. This fact obvious to any unprejudiced investigator.

At the regional level, conflict over this issue is at the heart of a broader security problem in Northeast Asia. It seems reasonable to fear that if, with the appearance of a nuclear potential in North Korea, there are doubts about the readiness of the United States to fulfill its obligations to protect allies, then the latter, most likely, will also rush to possess nuclear weapons.

At the national level, North Korea's military nuclear program is the main obstacle to the economic development of the North and South of Korea, to inter-Korean reconciliation and, ultimately, to the reunification of the country. This level includes factors and processes at the level of individual states involved in the conflict and their governments. At this level, the steps taken by the Republic of Korea (RK), the United States, China, Russia and Japan are most influential in the development of the situation.

It should be recalled that in response to the US withdrawal of its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea in September 1991, the ROK and the DPRK signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation in December of the same year, and in January of the following year, the Joint Declaration of North and South on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, already in 1993, the first nuclear crisis broke out, when the DPRK suspended its participation in the NPT for a very short time. And then the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kim Yong Sam, closely linked the nuclear issue with progress in the

ronnih relations. In 1994, the mediation of former US President John Carter helped the parties to agree to a summit, but the sudden death of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung eliminated the prospects for negotiations.

Nevertheless, the DPRK remained in the NPT, and in 1998 the new South Korean President Kim Dae-jung began to actively pursue a fundamentally new policy of comprehensive and active interaction with the North, which continued throughout the presidency of his successor Roh Moo-hyun. However, this policy solar heat”, the symbols of which were the Kim-Kim summits, i.e. Kim Dae-chung and the new leader of the DPRK, Kim Jong Il (2000) and the No-Kim summit, i.e. No Moo Hyun with Kim Jong Il (2007), has spread mainly to economic and humanitarian exchanges. It was never able to launch the peace process because the North refused to discuss security issues, including the nuclear issue.

Thanks to the signing of the Framework Agreement, reached through a series of bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea in 1994, the first nuclear crisis ended, but the prerequisites for it remained. With the outbreak of the second nuclear crisis in 2003, the Six-Party Talks with the participation of both Korean states, the United States, China, Russia and Japan became a new platform for discussing the problem. However, such important breakthroughs as the Joint Declaration of September 19, 2003 and the Agreement of February 13, took place only thanks to bilateral US-North Korean negotiations.

Part of the reason why the North Korean nuclear issue has not been seriously discussed at the inter-Korean level is the lack of will on the part of the former South Korean governments. They tended to deal only with simpler issues, retreating without serious objection to Pyongyang's refusal to discuss the nuclear issue. Secondly, characteristics the North Korean nuclear crisis over the years have become different and have gone beyond the North-South relationship. The framework of the Six-Party Talks provided for the participation of the ROK in the discussion of the nuclear problem, but in this way they themselves limited the possibility of resolving it on an inter-Korean basis. Therefore, the dropping of the nuclear issue from the agenda of inter-Korean meetings was partly due to the lack of will on the part of Seoul, but the main reason is the characteristics of the problem that have changed over the past twenty years.

After the inauguration of President Lee Myung-bak in South Korea in February 2008, inter-Korean relations remain tense, especially in terms of opposing views on the implementation of the agreements reached as a result of two inter-Korean summits in 2000 and 2007. From point of view new administration, the ten-year policy of "solar heat", inter-Korean dialogues and exchanges, cooperation and assistance from the South to the North failed to push North Korea to abandon its nuclear program.

The new South Korean administration began to pay more attention to the problem of denuclearization. At the same time, she made it clear that if the North demonstrates its determination to give up nuclear weapons, then the South is ready to implement a comprehensive program for the development of inter-Korean economic cooperation. Pyongyang was extremely dissatisfied with such changes and began

express this by building up hostile propaganda and real physical measures against the Republic of Kazakhstan. This was also reflected in the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in 2009, for which the ROK, the United States, and Japan laid the blame on Pyongyang, although the DPRK did not admit its involvement, and Russia and China took the position of supporters of the presumption of innocence and in shelling the North Korean artillery of the South Korean island for the next year, and in other actions.

Regarding the United States, it can be noted that, in contrast to the Clinton administration, which supported the policy of "solar heat", the initial approach of the George W. Bush administration to the problem was vague. Secretary of State C. Powell announced continuity, that the Republican administration "will pick up what President Clinton left behind." In June 2001, the Bush administration announced its strategy for North Korea, which it defined as stepping up implementation of the Framework Agreement while taking a more comprehensive approach to negotiations. However, the Bush administration's "sunshine" policy soon became an irritant in US-South Korea relations. Under Bush, the US has taken a more reserved stance on bringing the DPRK into cooperation. With North Korea pushing hard for bilateral talks with the US, the US has opted for multilateral talks involving the ROK, China, Japan, and Russia to share responsibility for nuclear nonproliferation. This is especially true in the post-September 11, 2001 period, when the United States unveiled a new strategy to prevent international terrorism and the use of WMD, justifying this by saying that political and military deterrence strategies based on reacting to what has already happened are no longer adequate.

The Bush administration quickly lost confidence in the Six-Party Talks. Differences between core interests, negotiating styles and domestic priorities of each participating country complicated this process. The remaining five participants in the talks managed to bring the DPRK back to the negotiating table and work out agreements on the implementation of the Joint Statement. But the talks came up against Pyongyang's unwillingness to agree to mandatory clear verification.

Critics of George W. Bush's policy in the United States accused it of inadequacy, that it caused an increase in confrontation with North Korea, led to the inaction of the Framework Agreement and forced the formation of the mechanism of the Six-Party Talks without a clear understanding of how these steps were supposed to ensure the curtailment of the North Korean nuclear program . It was further noted that the administration was overly preoccupied with the invasion of Iraq, where no nuclear weapons had been found, when indeed a real and urgent nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula was allowed to get out of hand. When the outcome of the Iraq war turned out to be problematic, the Bush administration failed to secure an end to internal debate, and this severely limited its ability to shift to a policy of engaging North Korea in constructive cooperation with some major, attractive proposal.

By the time the Obama administration came to power, North Korea reportedly possessed enough plutonium to produce six to eight nuclear weapons and showed little interest in taking steps to build on its earlier commitments. The Obama administration has declared its commitment to diplomatic methods. However, North Korea rejected these approaches and, in 2009, denounced the 1992 Joint Inter-Korean Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors from its newly commissioned nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, left - perhaps temporarily - The Six-Party Talks, saying it "would no longer participate in such negotiations" and conducted a second nuclear test. In response, the US stated that its vital interest was the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea's military nuclear program.

Chinese People's Republic since the early 1990s. avoided an active role during the first North Korean nuclear crisis. At that time, China emphasized its principle of non-intervention and emphasized that the problem should be solved by the parties directly involved. However, when the second crisis erupted, he abandoned the role of cautious observer and took a more active position. Following North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003, China organized the Tripartite Talks in April between the United States and North Korea as a prologue to the Six-Party, and in August 2003 all six parties met for the first time. , and, remarkably, in Beijing.

China's approach is driven by its need to maintain domestic stability and promote economic development. driving force China's resistance to the harsh international response to the actions of the DPRK are fears that the collapse of the North Korean regime or the economic crisis caused by strict sanctions could generate a huge flow of North Korean refugees across the common border. At the same time, Beijing sometimes makes a constructive contribution to the development and application of tough UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea. He wants to improve his image in the world and build a more positive relationship with the United States, and his role as chairman of the Six-Party Talks and, in fact, the lead mediator between the parties, was designed to help achieve these goals.

Considering China's close relationship with the DPRK and its incomparable influence on it, China, in the event of a deeper involvement in the solution of the North Korean nuclear problem, would play a key role in any resolution of it. North Korea's dependence on China for economic ties and political patronage makes it a powerful and authoritative force. The PRC's approach to the DPRK apparently reflects at the same time a genuine desire to prevent international sanctions that could destabilize that country, and an equally genuine desire to keep Pyongyang from taking any rash steps.

Since North Korea's second nuclear test in May 2009, China has become more receptive to the idea of ​​new UN sanctions.

But it did not find a real embodiment. The reason is that while the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is desirable for China, a more immediate priority for Beijing is to keep North Korea on the peninsula as a viable ally. In theory, China could use its position as a major source of energy, food and other vital goods to force Pyongyang to abandon its military nuclear program. However, in reality, Beijing is very afraid possible consequences use of such a powerful "lever". Beijing is most concerned about the possibility of military action on the peninsula, the collapse of the state in the North, the flow of North Korean refugees to China, and, even more so, such a reunification of Korea that would lead to a US military presence north of the 38th parallel. Therefore, while China is in favor of resuming the negotiation process, its value to Beijing should not be exaggerated. Compared to keeping the DPRK, it ranks much lower on the priority scale of Chinese diplomacy.

The participation of the Russian Federation in the Six-Party Talks all this time remained cautious, but principled and based on two principles, namely, a "nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula" and a "peaceful resolution of the conflict." Russia's position is fully consistent with its consistent commitment to the NPT. It was the USSR that persuaded the DPRK to sign the NPT and ensure the work of IAEA inspectors as a condition for its long-term cooperation with Pyongyang. Only after that did Moscow agree to supply the DPRK with four light-water nuclear reactors.

Russia is concerned not only that North Korean nuclear weapons will jeopardize the overall balance of power in Northeast Asia, pushing Japan and South Korea to create such weapons and, accordingly, accelerating the Chinese nuclear buildup, but also that North Korea has them will harm global non-proliferation efforts. The costs associated with an arms race in the region would be very high, and chain reaction nuclear proliferation in the world is very serious. Russia is also directly concerned to avoid armed conflict or any unexpected changes on the Korean Peninsula. Due to the geographical proximity to North Korea, an unexpected collapse of the regime or the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula would be detrimental to the Russian Far East, since, as you know, both radiation and refugees do not recognize state borders.

These considerations have led Russia to resist any proposal for the use of force or any other scheme aimed at abrupt regime change in the DPRK. Russia takes the view that a negotiated solution to the current nuclear crisis can be found and believes that threats, sanctions and accusations against North Korea could be counterproductive. At the same time, for a long time now, information reports on contacts between Russian diplomats and North Korean colleagues contain the same statement that Russia hopes for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

As for Japan, as a country that survived Hiroshima and is experiencing Fukushima, it is also extremely concerned about the North Korean nuclear issue. Stability in Northeast Asia is critical to the economic well-being of this country, and the DPRK's military nuclear program (as well as its missile program) is perceived by Japan as a direct threat to national security. The main goal of Japan's policy towards the DPRK is to normalize, in cooperation with the US and the ROK, relations with it by resolving the North Korean nuclear problem.

At the same time, the Japanese side regularly raises the issue of abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents in the past. Tokyo's stance on these abductions has been delicately criticized by the rest of the Six-Party Talks, who believe that progress on denuclearization should not be held hostage to this important but much more specific issue. However, without his decision, Tokyo refuses to provide any energy assistance or other positive incentives to North Korea. In September 2002, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il apologized to Prime Minister D. Koizumi for the kidnappings, apparently believing that this would remove or at least soften the issue. However, on the contrary, the very recognition of the fact of abductions sharply worsened the attitude of Japanese public opinion towards the DPRK. Of course, this issue definitely needs a final resolution, but it is more likely only in an atmosphere of improved bilateral relations. In principle, it can be stated that of all five of Pyongyang's counterparties in the negotiations, Tokyo apparently took the toughest position, thereby exposing cracks in the regional multilateral system and provoking sharp disagreements about procedural issues and principles regarding the development of the negotiation process.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons provided a fundamental, though not 100% effective, legal framework for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. In April 2010, the US and Russia signed a new START treaty, ratified eight months later, and then at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, 47 world leaders unanimously agreed to work to reduce the vulnerability of nuclear materials to terrorists.

In the context of the global problem of non-proliferation, the solution of the North Korean nuclear problem is not only an issue concerning inter-Korean relations, even if it causes the greatest concern for the ROK, but also an important regional and global task. However, tougher regulations and better institutions alone are unlikely to solve the North Korean nuclear problem, as it has grown out of a lack of internal and international security this country, as well as its unique history and the worldview of its leaders.

The experience of studying the foreign policy of the DPRK shows that it is very consistent in its own way. If any changes occur in it, then they are due to changes in the internal situation and external influences. As for the former, for all the apparent immutability of the inner life

nor, it differs in some respects from what it was thirty years ago. The influence of external factors - for example, sanctions - is limited by the balance of power and by far not fully coinciding interests of the states present in the region, all of which would like changes to one degree or another, but none would like catastrophic upheavals. Because of this, the significance of the change of leaders in North Korea should not be exaggerated. Of course, Kim Jong Il's foreign policy differed in some details from the line of his father Kim Il Sung, but no one will undertake to determine under which of them it was tougher or, on the contrary, prone to compromise.

Likewise, it is difficult to speculate whether the DPRK will return to negotiations and, if so, in what format. After the death of Kim Jong Il, there was a reasonable impression that in the context of humanitarian assistance and compensation for the freezing of the nuclear program, including through the promotion of a peaceful nuclear program, as well as thanks to the "sunshine" policy pursued by the Kim Dae-jung administration, this country would gradually open up to the outside world and move to a more peaceful position. However, in the new century these hopes were almost not justified.

By taking into account this experience in relation to the new leader Kim Jong-un, one can only assume that Pyongyang's positions on foreign policy issues, including the problem of denuclearization, are likely and most likely to be formed as the resultant positions of various informal groups in the ruling elite, which, in turn, will be determined to an increasing extent not so much by ideological attitudes as by real material interests. It can be assumed that the DPRK, in essence, although without declaring it, will also seek to solve its problems primarily through contacts with the United States and China as the main geopolitical actors in the region, and only secondarily with their regional allies and partners.

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NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF THE DPRK

Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (Republic of Korea) Republic of Korea, Seoul, Seocho-dong, Seocho-gu, 137-8631, 3-76-2

The article analyzes the contemporary aspects of the nuclear weapon nonproliferation issue as exemplified by the international approaches to the DPRK nuclear weapons program, as well as the international community efforts to resolve it, in particular via the Six-Party Talks.

Key words: Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), IAEA, North Korea, nuclear program, nuclear problem, Six-Party Talks.