North Korean nuclear bomb. Does North Korea have nuclear weapons? Countries with nuclear weapons
Since the opening in 1965 of the first nuclear reactor on the territory of the DPRK, disputes have not ceased in the world about how dangerous the policy of Korea is. Pyongyang regularly makes statements that weapons of mass destruction are being developed and tested in the republic, which will be used in the event of a threat to the ranks. However, experts do not agree on how great the power of North Korea really is. Questions also arise as to whether the country is receiving outside help - and if so, who has become an ally in the development of a weapon capable of causing incalculable casualties.
The military potential of the DPRK
North Korea is in the top 20 poorest countries the globe. There are many reasons for this, and one of them is political system Juche, aimed at the militarization of the country.
The needs of the army are economically in the first place, and this is bearing fruit: the North Korean army is the most numerous in the world.
But the number of soldiers is no guarantee of success.. Insufficient funding leads to the fact that the army uses outdated equipment and weapons.
At the same time, the North Korean government has been claiming since 1974 that the country has been continuously working on the creation of nuclear weapons. Since 2004, Pyongyang has been conducting tests, and this is becoming an additional reason for the discontent of countries trying to resolve the conflict. The DPRK claims that the weapons are created solely for defensive purposes, but confirming the veracity of the claims is difficult.
At a military parade in 2015 in Pyongyang, a thermo nuclear weapon- a hydrogen bomb. The fact that it exists, the government claimed for ten years, but the world community was skeptical about the information. In January 2017, a powerful earthquake was recorded in China near the border with North Korea. The Pyongyang authorities explained this by testing a hydrogen bomb, and then its presence was confirmed by foreign intelligence data.
Sources of financing
The question of how the DPRK got nuclear weapons is closely related to the country's economic condition. The test requires money, with the help of which it would be possible to solve most of the humanitarian and energy problems of the peninsula. This raises thoughts of financial assistance from the outside. China is considered the official partner of North Korea, but during the reign of Kim Jong-un, relations between the countries deteriorated. The PRC does not approve of nuclear experiments conducted by Pyongyang.
It is assumed that a new alliance will enter the world political arena - the DPRK and Russia, but there are no solid grounds for this. Kim Jong-un shows respect to President Putin, but there are no more “courtesies” from Moscow in return. This means that funding comes from domestic sources.
Experts suggest that the money for the development of nuclear weapons is received from the following industries:
- social;
- agricultural;
- energy;
- heavy industrial.
There are statements in the media that North Korea is in an energy crisis. Electricity in residential buildings is turned on only for 3-4 hours a day, the rest of the time people are forced to do without electricity. Night pictures of the DPRK from space confirm this information. Next to the electrified territory of China and South Korea, the North looks like a solid dark spot. The beginning of this phenomenon coincided with the start of the nuclear program.
Allegations that the inhabitants of the DPRK are starving are not substantiated. In the last decade, the country's economic growth has been observed, which has also affected the food situation. The government has canceled the cards, which previously issued the norm of products. So the information that the missiles are being created at the expense of hungry Koreans is not confirmed.
Nuclear potential of North Korea
Gone are the days when threats of weapons of mass destruction were considered bluff. The presence of powerful weapons in the DPRK is a confirmed fact. Moreover, analysts claim that Korea has enough materials to create from 6 to 12 new missiles.
However, their production is associated with a number of difficulties:
- the materials required to complete nuclear warheads are not produced in North Korea, they must be imported into the country;
- even when creating new charges, there remains a problem with the construction of carriers for them;
- Waste produced during the production of nuclear fuel is not exported from the country, and the conditions for their safe storage can be met only with small volumes.
However, all these difficulties do not deter the DPRK from continuing the experiments. To date, at least six explosions have been confirmed in different parts countries, mainly on the border with Russia, China and South Korea. Pyongyang claims there are more. The government's official line is defensive. Threatened by the United States, North Korea can afford only one position: balancing power. To Washington's latest aggressive statement, Kim Jong-un replied that the DPRK would strike if necessary.
PEACE AND SECURITY
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF THE DPRK
Park Sang Hoon
Institute of Foreign Policy and National Security (Republic of Korea) Republic of Korea, Seoul, Seocho-gu Seocho-dong, 13-76-2, 137-863
The article analyzes modern aspects of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on the example of international approaches to the nuclear program of the DPRK, as well as the efforts of the world community to resolve it, especially through the Six-Party Talks.
Key words: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), IAEA, North Korea, nuclear program, nuclear issue, Six-Party Talks.
After the Caribbean crisis of 1962, which almost led to a world nuclear missile war, the USSR and the USA, as the leading nuclear powers, came to the conclusion that, firstly, the arms race should be limited to some extent, and secondly, that the access of new members to the "nuclear club" should be closed. As a result, in 1968, the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, as well as about fifty other countries that had already determined for themselves that they did not need their own nuclear weapons, signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which entered into force in 1970 After France and the People's Republic of China joined it in 1992, all five nuclear powers - permanent members of the UN Security Council - became its members. However, unfortunately, this did not stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Back in the 1970s. Israel created its first nuclear devices, and cooperated in this area with the apartheid regime in Republic of South Africa. A few years would have been enough for Shah Iran to acquire the potential to create nuclear weapons, but this was prevented by the 1979 revolution. At the same time, all these countries categorically denied even the existence of such intentions.
The situation changed in 1998, when India and Pakistan, which are not members of the NPT, joined the "nuclear club" on a whim. The situation was further exacerbated when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) first withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and then officially announced that it had conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, followed by another in 2009.
but there were also suspicions about the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
From a formal legal point of view, India and Pakistan cannot be condemned for violating the provisions of the NPT, since they are not members of it. Both countries argue that they need nuclear weapons solely in self-defense against each other, but could join the NPT - provided the other side joins. But this is unlikely, because India has another potential adversary that "legitimately" possesses nuclear weapons - China. Iran, in fact, is suspected only of striving to become a "threshold state", which the NPT does not prohibit being.
The situation with North Korea is completely different. It openly declares that it has carried out nuclear tests and that it has nuclear weapons. At the same time, in addition to the border with the Republic of Korea, it also has common borders with two nuclear, but not hostile powers - the PRC and Russia, and also deals with the nuclear-armed forces of the United States of America based in the region, which it considers as its own. most dangerous enemy. Therefore, it is clear that the possibility of North Korea giving up nuclear weapons on a reciprocal basis with any or all three regional nuclear powers is completely absent - it is possible only unilaterally. This makes the North Korean nuclear issue particularly complex and complex, and it has many dimensions or levels. It seems appropriate to comprehend it at three levels - global, regional and national.
At the global level, this problem is a serious threat to the nonproliferation regime as negative example for other countries. This fact obvious to any unprejudiced investigator.
At the regional level, conflict over this issue is at the heart of a broader security problem in Northeast Asia. It seems reasonable to fear that if, with the appearance of a nuclear potential in North Korea, there are doubts about the readiness of the United States to fulfill its obligations to protect allies, then the latter, most likely, will also rush to possess nuclear weapons.
At the national level, North Korea's military nuclear program is the main obstacle to the economic development of the North and South of Korea, to inter-Korean reconciliation and, ultimately, to the reunification of the country. This level includes factors and processes at the level of individual states involved in the conflict and their governments. At this level, the steps taken by the Republic of Korea (RK), the United States, China, Russia and Japan are most influential in the development of the situation.
It should be recalled that in response to the US withdrawal of its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea in September 1991, the ROK and the DPRK signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation in December of the same year, and in January of the following year, the Joint Declaration of North and South on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, already in 1993, the first nuclear crisis broke out, when the DPRK suspended its participation in the NPT for a very short time. And then the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kim Yong Sam, closely linked the nuclear issue with progress in the
ronnih relations. In 1994, the mediation of former US President John Carter helped the parties to agree to a summit, but the sudden death of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung eliminated the prospects for negotiations.
Nevertheless, the DPRK remained in the NPT, and in 1998 the new South Korean President Kim Dae-jung began to actively pursue a fundamentally new policy of comprehensive and active interaction with the North, which continued throughout the presidency of his successor Roh Moo-hyun. However, this policy of "sunshine heat" symbolized by the "Kim-Kim" summits, i.e. Kim Dae-chung and the new leader of the DPRK, Kim Jong Il (2000) and the No-Kim summit, i.e. No Moo Hyun with Kim Jong Il (2007), has spread mainly to economic and humanitarian exchanges. It was never able to launch the peace process because the North refused to discuss security issues, including the nuclear issue.
Thanks to the signing of the Framework Agreement, reached through a series of bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea in 1994, the first nuclear crisis ended, but the prerequisites for it remained. With the outbreak of the second nuclear crisis in 2003, the Six-Party Talks with the participation of both Korean states, the United States, China, Russia and Japan became a new platform for discussing the problem. However, such important breakthroughs as the Joint Declaration of September 19, 2003 and the Agreement of February 13, took place only thanks to bilateral US-North Korean negotiations.
Part of the reason why the North Korean nuclear issue has not been seriously discussed at the inter-Korean level is the lack of will on the part of the former South Korean governments. They tended to deal only with simpler issues, retreating without serious objection to Pyongyang's refusal to discuss the nuclear issue. Second, the characteristics of the North Korean nuclear crisis have changed over the years and have gone beyond the North-South relationship. The framework of the Six-Party Talks provided for the participation of the ROK in the discussion of the nuclear problem, but in this way they themselves limited the possibility of resolving it on an inter-Korean basis. Therefore, the dropping of the nuclear issue from the agenda of inter-Korean meetings was partly due to the lack of will on the part of Seoul, but the main reason is the characteristics of the problem that have changed over the past twenty years.
After the inauguration of President Lee Myung-bak in South Korea in February 2008, inter-Korean relations remain tense, especially in terms of opposing views on the implementation of agreements reached as a result of two inter-Korean summits in 2000 and 2007. From the new administration's point of view, a decade of "sunshine" policy, inter-Korean dialogues and exchanges, South-to-North cooperation and aid have failed to push North Korea to abandon its nuclear program.
The new South Korean administration began to pay more attention to the problem of denuclearization. At the same time, she made it clear that if the North demonstrates its determination to abandon nuclear weapons, then the South is ready to implement a comprehensive program for the development of inter-Korean economic cooperation. Pyongyang was extremely dissatisfied with such changes and began
express this by building up hostile propaganda and real physical measures against the Republic of Kazakhstan. This was also reflected in the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in 2009, for which the ROK, the United States, and Japan laid the blame on Pyongyang, although the DPRK did not admit its involvement, and Russia and China took the position of supporters of the presumption of innocence and in shelling the North Korean artillery of the South Korean island for the next year, and in other actions.
Regarding the United States, it can be noted that, in contrast to the Clinton administration, which supported the policy of "solar heat", the initial approach of the George W. Bush administration to the problem was vague. Secretary of State C. Powell announced continuity, that the Republican administration "will pick up what President Clinton left behind." In June 2001, the Bush administration announced its strategy for North Korea, which it defined as stepping up implementation of the Framework Agreement while taking a more comprehensive approach to negotiations. However, the Bush administration's "sunshine" policy soon became an irritant in US-South Korea relations. Under Bush, the US has taken a more reserved stance on bringing the DPRK into cooperation. With North Korea pushing hard for bilateral talks with the US, the US has opted for multilateral talks involving the ROK, China, Japan, and Russia to share responsibility for nuclear nonproliferation. This is especially true in the post-September 11, 2001 period, when the US unveiled a new pre-emption strategy international terrorism and the use of WMD, justifying this by saying that political and military deterrence strategies based on reacting to what has already happened are no longer adequate.
The Bush administration quickly lost confidence in the Six-Party Talks. Differences between core interests, negotiating styles and domestic priorities of each participating country complicated this process. The remaining five participants in the talks managed to bring the DPRK back to the negotiating table and work out agreements on the implementation of the Joint Statement. But the talks came up against Pyongyang's unwillingness to agree to mandatory clear verification.
Critics of George W. Bush's policy in the United States accused it of inadequacy, that it caused an increase in confrontation with North Korea, led to the inaction of the Framework Agreement and forced the formation of the mechanism of the Six-Party Talks without a clear understanding of how these steps were supposed to ensure the curtailment of the North Korean nuclear program . It was further noted that the administration was overly preoccupied with the invasion of Iraq, where no nuclear weapons had been found, when there was indeed a real and urgent nuclear threat to Korean peninsula allowed to get out of control. When the outcome of the Iraq war turned out to be problematic, the Bush administration failed to secure an end to internal debate, and this severely limited its ability to shift to a policy of engaging North Korea in constructive cooperation with some major, attractive proposal.
By the time the Obama administration came to power, North Korea reportedly possessed enough plutonium to produce six to eight nuclear weapons and showed little interest in taking steps to build on its earlier commitments. The Obama administration has declared its commitment to diplomatic methods. However, North Korea rejected these approaches and, in 2009, denounced the 1992 Joint Inter-Korean Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors from its newly commissioned nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, left - perhaps temporarily - The Six-Party Talks, saying it "would no longer participate in such negotiations" and conducted a second nuclear test. In response, the US stated that its vital interest was the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea's military nuclear program.
Chinese People's Republic since the early 1990s. avoided an active role during the first North Korean nuclear crisis. At that time, China emphasized its principle of non-intervention and emphasized that the problem should be solved by the parties directly involved. However, when the second crisis erupted, he abandoned the role of cautious observer and took a more active position. After North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003, China organized the Tripartite Talks in April 2003 between the United States and North Korea as a prologue to the Six-Party, and in August 2003 all six parties met for the first time. , and, remarkably, in Beijing.
China's approach is driven by its need to maintain domestic stability and promote economic development. driving force China's resistance to the tough international reaction to the actions of the DPRK are fears that the collapse of the North Korean regime or caused by strict sanctions economic crisis could generate a huge flow of North Korean refugees across the common border. At the same time, Beijing sometimes makes a constructive contribution to the development and application of tough UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea. He wants to improve his image in the world and build a more positive relationship with the United States, and his role as chairman of the Six-Party Talks and, in fact, the lead mediator between the parties, was designed to help achieve these goals.
Considering China's close relationship with the DPRK and its incomparable influence on it, China, in the event of a deeper involvement in the solution of the North Korean nuclear problem, would play a key role in any resolution of it. North Korea's dependence on China for economic ties and political patronage makes it a powerful and authoritative force. The PRC's approach to the DPRK apparently reflects at the same time a genuine desire to prevent international sanctions that could destabilize that country, and an equally genuine desire to keep Pyongyang from taking any rash steps.
Since North Korea's second nuclear test in May 2009, China has become more receptive to the idea of new UN sanctions.
But it did not find a real embodiment. The reason is that while the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is desirable for China, a more immediate priority for Beijing is to keep North Korea on the peninsula as a viable ally. In theory, China could use its position as a major source of energy, food and other vital goods to force Pyongyang to abandon its military nuclear program. However, in reality, Beijing is very afraid of the possible consequences of using such a powerful "lever". Most of all, Beijing is concerned about the possibility of hostilities on the peninsula, the collapse of the state in the North, the flow of North Korean refugees to China, and, even more so, such a reunification of Korea that would lead to a US military presence north of the 38th parallel. Therefore, although China is in favor of resuming the negotiation process, its value to Beijing should not be exaggerated. Compared to keeping the DPRK, it ranks much lower on the priority scale of Chinese diplomacy.
The participation of the Russian Federation in the Six-Party Talks all this time remained cautious, but principled and based on two principles, namely, “a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons” and “ peace resolution conflict." Russia's position is fully consistent with its consistent commitment to the NPT. It was the USSR that persuaded the DPRK to sign the NPT and ensure the possibility of the work of IAEA inspectors as a condition for its long-term cooperation with Pyongyang. Only after that did Moscow agree to supply the DPRK with four light-water nuclear reactors.
Russia is concerned not only that North Korean nuclear weapons will jeopardize the overall balance of power in Northeast Asia, pushing Japan and South Korea to create such weapons and, accordingly, accelerating the Chinese nuclear buildup, but also that North Korea has them will harm global non-proliferation efforts. The costs associated with an arms race in the region would be very high, and the chain reaction of nuclear proliferation in the world would be very serious. Russia is also directly concerned to avoid armed conflict or any unexpected changes on the Korean Peninsula. Due to the geographical proximity to North Korea, the sudden collapse of the regime or the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula would be detrimental to the Russian Far East, since, as you know, both radiation and refugees do not recognize state borders.
These considerations have led Russia to resist any proposal for the use of force or any other scheme aimed at abrupt regime change in the DPRK. Russia takes the view that a negotiated solution to the current nuclear crisis can be found and believes that threats, sanctions and accusations against North Korea could be counterproductive. At the same time, for a long time now, information reports on contacts between Russian diplomats and North Korean colleagues contain the same statement that Russia hopes for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.
As for Japan, as a country that survived Hiroshima and is experiencing Fukushima, it is also extremely concerned about the North Korean nuclear issue. Stability in Northeast Asia is critical to the economic well-being of this country, and the military nuclear program of the DPRK (like the missile program) is perceived by Japan as a direct threat to national security. The main goal of Japan's policy towards the DPRK is to normalize, in cooperation with the US and the ROK, relations with it by resolving the North Korean nuclear problem.
At the same time, the Japanese side regularly raises the issue of abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents in the past. Tokyo's position on the issue of these abductions is delicately criticized by the rest of the Six-Party Talks, who believe that progress on denuclearization should not be held hostage to this important, but much more specific issue. However, without his decision, Tokyo refuses to provide any energy assistance or other positive incentives to North Korea. In September 2002, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il apologized to Prime Minister D. Koizumi for the kidnappings, apparently believing that this would remove or at least soften the issue. However, on the contrary, the very recognition of the fact of abductions sharply worsened the attitude of Japanese public opinion towards the DPRK. Of course, this issue definitely needs a final resolution, but it is more likely only in an atmosphere of improved bilateral relations. In principle, it can be stated that of all five of Pyongyang's counterparties in the negotiations, Tokyo apparently took the toughest position, thereby exposing cracks in the regional multilateral system and provoking sharp disagreements about procedural issues and principles regarding the development of the negotiation process.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons provided a fundamental, though not 100% effective, legal framework for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. In April 2010, the US and Russia signed a new START treaty, ratified eight months later, and then at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, 47 world leaders unanimously agreed to work to reduce the vulnerability of nuclear materials to terrorists.
In the context global problem non-proliferation solution of the North Korean nuclear problem is not only an issue concerning inter-Korean relations, even if it causes the greatest concern among the ROK, but also an important regional and global task. However, tougher regulations and better institutions alone are unlikely to solve the North Korean nuclear problem, as it has grown out of a lack of internal and international security this country, as well as its unique history and the worldview of its leaders.
The experience of studying the foreign policy of the DPRK shows that it is very consistent in its own way. If any changes occur in it, then they are due to changes in the internal situation and external influences. As for the former, for all the apparent immutability of the inner life
nor, it differs in some respects from what it was thirty years ago. The influence of external factors - for example, sanctions - is limited by the balance of power and by far from the coinciding interests of the states present in the region, all of which would like changes to one degree or another, but none - catastrophic upheavals. Because of this, the significance of the change of leaders in North Korea should not be exaggerated. Of course foreign policy Kim Jong Il differed in some details from the line of his father Kim Il Sung, but no one will undertake to determine under which of them she was more rigid or, on the contrary, prone to compromise.
Likewise, it is difficult to speculate whether the DPRK will return to negotiations and, if so, in what format. After the death of Kim Jong Il, there was a reasonable impression that in the conditions of providing humanitarian aid and compensation for the freezing of the nuclear program, including through the promotion of a peaceful nuclear program, as well as through the "sunshine" policy pursued by the Kim Dae-jung administration, this country will gradually open up to the outside world and move towards a more peaceful position. However, in the new century these hopes were almost not justified.
By taking into account this experience in relation to the new leader Kim Jong-un, one can only assume that Pyongyang's positions on foreign policy issues, including the problem of denuclearization, are likely and most likely to be formed as the resultant positions of various informal groups in the ruling elite, which, in turn, will be determined to an increasing extent not so much by ideological attitudes as by real material interests. It can be assumed that the DPRK, in essence, although without declaring it, will also seek to solve its problems primarily through contacts with the United States and China as the main geopolitical actors in the region, and only secondarily with their regional allies and partners.
LITERATURE
Naji Khalifa. Security in the Middle East and the Iranian nuclear program // Bulletin of the People's Friendship University of Russia. Series " International relationships". - 2010. - No. 4.
Byung-joon Ahn. South-North Korean Relations and the North Korean Nuclear Challenge // Coping with Korea's Security Challenge. - Vol. 2. - Future of ROK-US Alliance, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 2003.
David C. Kang. Kim "s Nuclear Obsession // The National Interest online, 13 April 2010. URL: http://nationalinterest.org
Hillary Clinton, Press Conference at ASEAN Summit, 22 July 2009. URL: http://www.state.gov/ secretary/rm/2009a/july/126320.htm
Natalya Bazhanova. North Korea's Decision to Develop an Independent Nuclear Program // North Korean Nuclear Program. Security, Strategy and New Perspectives from Russia. - N.Y., L.: Routledge, 2000.
Sun Bae Kim. How Can an Inter-Korean Summit Contribute to the Denuclearization of North Korea? // Policy Forum Online 10-035, 1 July 2010, Nautilus Institute.
Patrick M. Morgan. The Role of the United States in the North Korean Nuclear Crisis // Korean Security in a Changing East Asia. - N.Y.: Praeger Security International, 2006.
Press availability conducted between Colin Powell and Swiss Foreign Minister on March 6, 2001. URL: http://2001-2009. state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/1116. htm.
Shades of Red: China's Debate over North Korea // Crisis Group Asia Report No. 179, 2 November 2009.
Ted Galen Carpenter. False Hopes // The National Interest online, 11 March 2010. URL: http://nationalinterest.org
The Korean Peninsula: Challenges and Opportunities for Russia // CSCAP Russian National Committee Report, September 2010.
Yevgeniy P. Bazhanov, James C. Moltz. China and the Korean Peninsula: Managing an Unstable Triangle // North Korean Nuclear Program. Security, Strategy and New Perspectives form Russia. - N.Y., L.: Routledge, 2000.
Yoichi Funabashi. The Peninsula Question. - Washington, DC.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007.
NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF THE DPRK
Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (Republic of Korea) Republic of Korea, Seoul, Seocho-dong, Seocho-gu, 137-8631, 3-76-2
The article analyzes the contemporary aspects of the nuclear weapon nonproliferation issue as exemplified by the international approaches to the DPRK nuclear weapons program, as well as the international community efforts to resolve it, in particular via the Six-Party Talks.
Key words: Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), IAEA, North Korea, nuclear program, nuclear problem, Six-Party Talks.
On February 10, 2005, North Korea officially announced the creation of nuclear weapons. This caused concern in the United States and Japan and became the reason for the introduction of tough sanctions against the republic. Restrictive measures did not stop the leadership of the DPRK, and in 2017 the country got a ballistic missile, according to experts, capable of delivering a deadly charge to the territory of the United States. However, according to experts, the likelihood that North Korea will strike first is minimal. How the DPRK created a nuclear missile shield - in the material RT. 13 years ago, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea officially announced the creation of its own nuclear weapons.
“The negotiation process has stalled due to the anti-Korean hostile policy of the United States. As long as America brandishes a nuclear baton, intending to destroy our system at any cost, we will expand our stocks of nuclear weapons in order to protect the historical choice of our people, freedom and socialism," the DPRK Foreign Ministry said on February 10, 2005.
The grin of the "paper tiger"
Potential nuclear threat in different years was assessed by the leaders of the DPRK in different ways. At one time, the country's leadership did not attach much importance to this. North Korean leader Kim Il Sung believed that a nuclear bomb was a "paper tiger".
The beginning of work on the creation of the nuclear infrastructure of North Korea began shortly after Kim Il Sung learned that the United States during the Korean War of 1950-1953 was going to drop seven nuclear bombs on the capital of the republic. Already in 1956, cooperation began between the USSR and the DPRK in this area, at first consisting in the training of specialists.
“Nuclear weapons in North Korea appeared almost immediately after the end of the Korean War. Even then, it became obvious that North Korea needed to maximize its defense capabilities, ”said Irina Lantsova, an expert on North and South Korea, an associate professor at the Department of American Studies at St. Petersburg State University, in an interview with RT.
According to professor Russian University friendship between the peoples of Yuri Tavrovsky, the main reason for the start of nuclear development in the DPRK was "a deep sense of threat from traditional opponents of Korea, such as Japan and the United States, as well as the desire to rely on own forces, Juche politics".
The Koreans decided not to rely on the nuclear umbrella of the Soviet Union and China, Tavrovsky believes. In addition, in his opinion, at that time the memory of a destructive and bloody war was still fresh.
“They (the North Korean authorities - RT ) came to the conclusion that only nuclear weapons can be a guarantee of non-repetition of war by conventional methods, which are extremely destructive, and they obviously believed that nuclear weapons would not be used, but would be a good defense,” the expert believes .
Gradually, North Korea acquired the necessary infrastructure and already in 1974 joined the IAEA. At the same time, work began on the creation of Pyongyang's own nuclear weapons. Significant assistance in this was provided, in particular, by China, which allowed North Korean scientists to their facilities.
According to Tavrovsky, two main factors contributed to the success of the DPRK: "the overstrain of the economic, technical, scientific forces of North Korea itself", as well as "conscious and unconscious transfers of technology by other countries, such as the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and, possibly, Pakistan" . At the last stage, already in our time, the Koreans bought out technologies or specialists from Ukraine, from Dnepropetrovsk, where the Yuzhmash plant is located, which produced the heaviest liquid rockets for the Soviet Union, which are known in the West as Satan.
In 1985, counting on the assistance of the USSR in the construction of nuclear power plants, Pyongyang, under pressure from Moscow, signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the early 1990s, IAEA inspectors frequented the country, and the results of their checks were ambiguous.
In the spring of 1993, the DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty, and in the summer of 1994 the country left the IAEA. Subsequently, it became known that it was in 1994 that the United States almost attacked the Yongbyon reactor, North Korea's largest nuclear facility. However, after analyzing the inevitable victims, Clinton abandoned this venture.
After a visit to the DPRK by former US President Jimmy Carter, the countries managed to sign the so-called Framework Agreement at the end of 1994. According to this document, North Korea, in particular, took upon itself the obligation to stop building, as well as use the infrastructure for uranium enrichment and extract plutonium from reactors, remove enriched nuclear fuel from the DPRK and dismantle all facilities, one way or another related to nuclear weapons.
The US was to supply fuel oil to North Korea under the agreement and build two much larger light water reactors to replace the Yongbyon reactor, which was shut down. They could not be used to produce nuclear fuel.
Dashing zero
In 2001, George W. Bush came to power in the United States, who included the DPRK in the list of "rogue states". Under him, the promised reactors were not built, but the requirements for North Korea became more and more. As early as 2002, the US announced Pyongyang's failure to comply with the Framework Agreement and accused the DPRK of continuing to enrich uranium. At the end of the year, North Korea expelled IAEA employees from its territory and announced the continuation of work on the nuclear program.
The result of a new round of confrontation between the United States and the DPRK in January 2003 was Pyongyang's withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
The six-party talks between North Korea, China, the United States, Russia, South Korea, and Japan that began in the summer of 2003 also came to nothing. In 2004, North Korea refused to participate, demanding clarification about South Korea's nuclear program, which, as it turned out, had been going on for four years.
On February 10, 2005, the DPRK announced the creation of nuclear weapons, but the first test was carried out only in October 2006. Several tests of new weapons by North Korea are known from 2006 to 2017.
In 2017, Pyongyang announced the test of a thermonuclear charge, the so-called hydrogen bomb.
Experts note that the development of the North Korean nuclear program was a forced measure.
“Already after Iraq, and then after Libya and Syria, it became clear that there are no other ways to defend sovereignty. If North Korea did not have a nuclear program, it is likely that it would have already been bombed, ”said Konstantin Asmolov, an employee of the Center for Korean Studies at the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in an interview with RT.
According to the expert, North Korea exists in an unfriendly environment, for example, from the point of view of South Korea, the DPRK does not exist as a state. Formally, the South Korean Constitution also applies to the northern territories.
Delivered to the White House
North Korea began developing a nuclear delivery vehicle in 1988. To create a ballistic missile medium range Taepodong-1 took ten years - the first launch was made in 1998.
From 1999 to 2005, the DPRK observed a unilateral moratorium on missile testing, introduced following negotiations with the Clinton administration in exchange for food aid.
"Dialogue with the United States ended in 2001 with the coming to power of the Bush administration, which means that we have the right to resume missile testing," read the text of a statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry, which was published on March 3, 2005.
In subsequent years, Pyongyang continued to launch rockets, and at the end of 2012, North Korea became a space power, successfully launching the Gwangmyeongsong-3 satellite into orbit.
In 2017, the launch of the Hwaseong-14 rocket, which fell into the Sea of Japan, became the reason for the convening of the UN Security Council. Soon, another North Korean Hwaseong-12 missile was fired, which fell into the Pacific Ocean, flying over the Japanese island of Hokkaido.
The United States is of particular concern latest version"Hwaseong" - "Hwaseong-15", which, according to experts, can hit any target in the United States.
Today, North Korea is also an exporter of missiles. Among its largest buyers are the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Pakistan and Yemen. In addition, the Iranian carriers were presumably made on the basis of the North Korean Taekhodong-2.
Sanction pressure
The DPRK developed its nuclear program under severe sanctions imposed by both the United States, Japan and South Korea, as well as the European Union, and even Australia. The UN Security Council committee on sanctions against the DPRK was created. Each nuclear test was followed by packages of sanctions that affected almost all areas of life - from cultural exchanges and money transfers to a ban on the supply of various raw materials and goods.
According to Lantsova, North Korea has achieved a very good result under tough sanctions: significant progress has been made in the work on the nuclear missile program - this applies to both delivery vehicles and the nuclear weapons themselves.
From the US side, pressure on North Korea intensified with the coming to power of Donald Trump, who had already managed to threaten the DPRK with complete destruction.
“The United States has a lot of strength and patience, but if we have to defend ourselves, then we will have no choice but to completely destroy the DPRK. Rocket Man (Kim Jong-un - RT ) has embarked on a suicide mission," the head of the White House said, speaking at the UN.
However real danger emanating from the DPRK raises serious doubts among specialists. According to Tavrovsky, the likelihood that North Korea will be the first to launch a nuclear strike is minimal.
“The North Koreans have achieved all their goals. They have achieved what they have been malnourished for many years, overworked. They practically created a nuclear missile shield, this is already recognized by all the opponents of the DPRK,” the expert is sure.
Meanwhile, Asmolov admits the possibility that North Korea could act first if provoked.
“If the North Korean leadership is confident that there are no peaceful alternatives and that they are already going to be killed, they will naturally act on the principle of “hit first,” the expert emphasized.
The North Korean leadership demonstrated a resolute attitude and independence of its policy on the eve of the start of the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang. On February 8, 2018, a military parade was held in the capital of the DPRK, Pyongyang, in honor of the 70th anniversary of the People's Democratic Republic. Traditionally, the celebrations take place in April. However, the country's authorities decided to hold the event in February, timed to coincide with the anniversary of the founding of the regular army of North Korea. A new type of intercontinental ballistic missile Hwaseong-15 was demonstrated at the parade.
"As long as the hostile policy of the United States persists, the mission of the people's army, acting as a powerful sword to protect the country, will continue," North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said, speaking at a parade in front of the military.
Funds mass media USA and several other countries Western Europe, apparently at the suggestion of the US intelligence services, began to draw the attention of the world community to the state and potential consequences of the development of the nuclear program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea).
During the scientific and technical cooperation of the USSR with the DPRK in the field of nuclear production, the Soviet side trained a significant number of North Korean specialists. True, it should be noted that they were prepared exclusively for work in the field of the nuclear industry. In addition, in 1965, the Soviet Union delivered to North Korea a small pool-type IRT-2000 uranium research reactor with a capacity of 2 MW. After being put into operation in 1966, at the insistence of the USSR, it was placed under the guarantees of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Again, at the insistence of the USSR, the DPRK had to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), signed on December 12, 1985. In response to this "concession", the Soviet Union supplied North Korea with a 5 MW gas-graphite uranium research reactor (installed in Nengbyon and put into operation in 1986 after becoming under IAEA safeguards), and also signed an agreement on the construction of a nuclear power plant in North Korea with four light water reactors of the VVER-440 type. By the way, in 1992 this agreement was clarified - instead of four VVER-440 reactors, it was decided to put three, but more powerful VVER-640 reactors, which were considered the safest.
In addition, in 1991, a contract was signed for the supply of fuel assemblies (TVELs) by the Soviet Union to the DPRK for a total of $185,000. Such assistance from the Soviet Union contributed to a significant advancement of the North Korean nuclear program.
However, unexpectedly, Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign policy course underwent cardinal changes. And the subsequent rapprochement between the USSR and the United States since 1987, and in particular the establishment of diplomatic relations by the Soviet Union with South Korea in 1990, dealt a serious blow to Pyongyang's nuclear plans. In addition, the USSR began to transfer relations with the DPRK into an economic channel. As a result, Pyongyang's plan to receive nuclear reactors from the USSR free of charge failed. At the same time, the strategic alliance between Pyongyang and Beijing cracked.
In the late 1980s, Kim Il Sung's regime, deprived of traditional allies and seemingly no room for further maneuver, was driven into a corner. But, according to an ancient Chinese proverb, a "frightened cat" can "turn into a tiger."
Does North Korea have nuclear weapons?
Back in the early 1970s, Kim Il Sung made a political decision to start work on the creation of nuclear weapons - largely based on information that South Korea had a military nuclear program obtained by North Korean intelligence. And also on the basis of Pyongyang's confidence that the economic war against Seoul is lost, and the diplomatic war is also fraught with defeat.
Indeed, as it has now become known, in the 1970s, South Korea carried out independent and fairly successful developments to create nuclear weapons, by the way, being a member of the NPT (it signed this treaty on June 1, 1968, and ratified it on April 23, 1975) . South Korea was supposed to have nuclear weapons in 1981. The project was close to completion, but was thwarted by the assassination of South Korean President Park Jong-hee (October 1979) and strong pressure from the United States.
The CIA received the first confirmation of Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions in 1982. It was then that the United States put before the USSR the question of the need to develop joint approaches to the nuclear plans of the DPRK. But the Soviet leadership did not share American concerns and stepped up joint activities with the DPRK in the field of nuclear energy. Gorbachev's fatal mistake was the agreement to supply the DPRK with a 5 MW graphite reactor capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium.
In 1989, the Americans expressed their suspicion that the North Koreans had refueled the Nengbyon nuclear reactor, then reprocessed the nuclear fuel and most likely obtained up to 12 kg of weapons-grade plutonium, enough to make two nuclear explosive devices. On March 12, 1993, the North Korean side sent a letter to the depository countries of the NPT about the decision to withdraw from this treaty - this is how the first crisis around the North Korean nuclear program began.
After a round of negotiations with the United States, the DPRK suspended its withdrawal from the NPT in June 1993 (one day before the expiration of the 90-day period established by paragraph I of Article X of this treaty). But at the same time, the DPRK stated that it does not consider itself a full member of the IAEA and does not recognize its right to carry out inspections of its nuclear facilities. On October 21, 1994, a framework agreement was concluded in Geneva between the United States and the DPRK, according to which Pyongyang first "frozen" and then dismantled its graphite uranium reactors. The United States, in turn, undertook to provide KEDR with modern power light water reactors with a total capacity of 2000 MW, and until they were put into operation (in 2003) - to supply oil for heating and power generation in the amount of 500 thousand tons annually.
According to experts, the total amount of weapons-grade plutonium in the DPRK at the end of 2002 could be 15-20 kg, which is enough to manufacture 3-4 nuclear warheads. Some experts do not exclude the possibility that high-tech methods of uranium enrichment are being developed in the DPRK. In particular, US experts show increased attention to the activities of the Laser Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the DPRK in Pyongyang, believing that the appropriate technology for uranium enrichment is being developed here.
However, based on the available information, it is not possible to draw an unambiguous conclusion not only about the possible scale of the North Korean uranium enrichment program, but also about the location of enterprises involved in uranium enrichment. If we assume that these enterprises are designed to meet the fuel needs of the two light-water nuclear reactors under construction at Sinpo, then their capacity will be enough to produce weapons-grade uranium in an amount sufficient to produce six nuclear warheads annually.
North Korean missile program on the brink of crisis
The military nuclear program of the DPRK turned out to be not the only headache for the world community. The development of the DPRK's missile program in conjunction with its nuclear program has created a threat to the national security of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region and a number of other states. North Korea was one of the first among the countries of this region to launch work on mastering missile technologies. In the 1960s, the DPRK purchased from the USSR unguided tactical solid-fuel rockets with conventional warheads "Luna" and "Luna-M" (North Korean designation "Frog-5" and "Frog-7"). Their range did not exceed 50-70 km, and the weight of the warhead was 400-420 kg.
Not possessing the necessary scientific and technical potential, the DPRK tried to use the opportunities for fairly close cooperation with China. In the second half of the 1990s, North Korean specialists took an active part in the Chinese program to create a ballistic missile with a range of up to 600 km and a payload of about 600 kg.
In 1980, three operational-tactical missile systems with the 8K14 (Scud-B) missile were purchased from Egypt. In doing so, a twofold problem was solved. In 1984, the first flight tests of North Korean-made Scud-B missiles were carried out, and a year later they began to enter service with the army. This single-stage liquid-propellant rocket with a non-detachable warhead has a launch weight of 5.9 tons, a length of 11.25 m, a maximum diameter of 0.88 m and delivers a payload of 1000 kg to a range of up to 300 km with an accuracy of about 450 m .
A new impetus to expand missile production was given shortly after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, when Iran offered to finance the development of an upgraded Scud-B missile to North Korea on the condition of supplying it with 100 missiles of this type. Financial injections helped to quickly solve the problem of modifying the Scud-B rocket. Its range was increased to 340 km, and the payload increased by 15%. However, it was not possible to overcome the traditional disadvantage of North Korean missiles - low accuracy.
Another attempt to modernize the Scud-B missile was made after Iran handed over the wreckage of the Iraqi al-Hussein ballistic missile to North Korea. Using Iraqi technology, the DPRK defense industry, with the help of China, created in 1989 an improved model of an operational-tactical missile, called the Scud-C. Her tests were carried out in 1990, and after that she was put into service. This single-stage liquid-propellant rocket has a launch weight of 6.4 tons, a length of 12 m, a maximum diameter of 0.88 m, a payload of 750 kg and a range of 600-650 km. The hitting accuracy in this case is 700-1000 m. To the development of the rocket own production North Korea started in 1988-1989. The goal of the new program was the creation of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) with a detachable warhead. Iran and Libya participated in the implementation of this missile project, called Nodon-I. These countries, through intermediaries, purchased various necessary materials and technical means from Western countries.
The first successful test launch of the Nodon-I IRBM was carried out in May 1993 at the Taipoteng test site on the east coast of the DPRK. This missile was put into service in 1997. "BRSD Nodon-I" is a single-stage liquid-propellant rocket with a detachable warhead and an inertial control system. Its launch weight is ~ 16 tons, length - 16 m, maximum diameter - 1.34 m. Maximum range - 1300-1500 km with a payload of 700-1000 kg. The firing accuracy is 2000-3000 m. When creating the Nodon-I MRBM, Scud missile technology was used. Its propulsion system is a combination of 4 Scud-B liquid propellant rocket engines. The energy capabilities of the Nodon-I IRBM make it possible to hit targets in Japan, Eastern China (including Beijing) and the Russian Far East (including Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Chita).
Three separate missile brigades have been formed in the North Korean army, armed with missile systems with Scud-B, Scud-C and Nodong-I missiles. A total of 54 launchers. Assessing the capabilities of the North Korean missile industry, it can be argued that the North Korean army does not experience a shortage of missiles. As for missile systems with tactical missiles, their number can be 60-90 units.
North Korea is currently developing new extended-range missiles (over 2,000 km). In the design of the two-stage Nodon-2 IRBM, the Nodon-I rocket sustainer stage is used as the first stage, and the Scud-C rocket sustainer stage is used as the second stage. It is assumed that this rocket will have a launch weight of 21-22 tons, a length of 27 m, a maximum diameter of 1.34 m. Its range should be 2200-2300 km with a payload of 1000 kg or 3000 km with a payload of 500 kg. Firing accuracy - 3700 m. This "BRSD" will be able to hit targets in Japan (including the islands of Okinawa), China, Mongolia, Russia (including the territory to Krasnoyarsk).
A three-stage version of this rocket, called the Taepodong-I, uses a solid rocket engine as the third stage. This missile can have a launch weight of 24 tons, a length of 30 m, and a maximum diameter of 1.34 m. Its range will be 3,200 km with a payload of 1,000 kg or 5,700 km with a payload of 500 kg. The firing accuracy is 3700-3800 m. The Tephodon-I missile is capable of hitting targets in Japan, China, Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Russia (up to the Urals), as well as on the islands of Guam and Hawaii, and reaching Alaska.
Adoption of the Nodong-2 IRBM and its three-stage modification, Taekhodong-I, was expected in 2003-2004. However, only one test has been carried out to date. The Taekhodon-2 ICBM will be capable of hitting targets in Japan, China, Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Russia (up to Moscow), as well as on the islands of Guam and Hawaii and reach not only Alaska, but also California.
At the present stage, the pause taken by Pyongyang in the development of long-range ballistic missiles indicates a certain crisis in the North Korean missile program. Industry has come up against a number of objective difficulties, primarily related to the lack of qualified scientists and engineers. Therefore, the moratorium on missile tests announced by North Korea should be regarded as a forced measure, and not good will Pyongyang.
Security interests
The second crisis around North Korea's nuclear program erupted in October 2002. During a visit to Pyongyang, US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, at a meeting on October 4, 2002, with the head of the DPRK Parliament, Kim Yong Nam, presented to the North Koreans intelligence information that he had, which indicated that North Korea was pursuing a secret program to obtain highly enriched uranium to create nuclear weapons. . According to James Kelly, the North Korean side did not even try to refute his information, but, on the contrary, calmly admitted that it was enriching uranium.
Further events developed on the rise. At the end of October 2002, the DPRK officially announced its right to have "nuclear and more powerful weapon"for self-defense. In response, the United States and its partners in November 2002 stopped deliveries of heating oil to North Korea. On December 12, 2002, Pyongyang published a statement about the resumption of its nuclear program, and at the end of the same month removed IAEA inspectors from all "frozen" nuclear facilities and to de-mothball the gas-graphite uranium reactor in Nengben.These actions had no effect, and on January 10, 2003, the DPRK leadership made an official statement about North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT and termination of cooperation with the IAEA.
On April 18, 2003, Pyongyang announced that the processing of 8,000 rods containing irradiated nuclear fuel from the Nengbyon reactor was in the final stages. This meant the official recognition of the fact that the DPRK had a significant amount of weapons-grade plutonium, which was not placed under IAEA safeguards. The consultations held on April 23-25, 2003 in Beijing (China) in the China-DPRK-USA trilateral format did not lead to any agreements. According to the American delegation, at this meeting the North Koreans acknowledged their intention to develop nuclear weapons. On May 12, 2003, Pyongyang announced its unilateral withdrawal from the agreement on declaring the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-free zone, concluded in January 1992 with South Korea.
In the summer of 2003, thanks primarily to the active work of China and Russia with North Korea and the United States, Pyongyang was able to agree to start negotiations in a six-party format (China, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, the United States, and Japan). The talks, which began in August 2003, were held in Beijing. The first two rounds of negotiations ended without any significant results.
The United States demanded that North Korea agree to a "complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination of all nuclear programs." North Korea rejected this approach and agreed only to "freeze" its military nuclear programs. Pyongyang also demanded an immediate "reward" for freezing military nuclear projects in the form of large-scale economic assistance, primarily energy supplies (up to 2.7 million tons of heating oil annually), as well as security guarantees from the US. The latter presuppose the establishment of US diplomatic relations with North Korea, the conclusion of a bilateral non-aggression pact between them, and the exclusion of the DPRK from the US list of states that support terrorism.
The situation changed slightly for the better after the third round of negotiations, held in June 2004. Great hopes for further progress were pinned on the fourth round of negotiations (end of 2004). However, the planned plan was thwarted.
Three scenarios
On the this moment There are three possible scenarios for the development of the Korean crisis. Scenario one- "Reconciliation". The implementation of this scenario is the real goal of the leadership of the DPRK in the current crisis. The North Koreans "opened their cards" and indicated both their product and the expected price for it. Nothing less than the national security of the DPRK is now up for sale, and it is proposed to pay for it with something no less adequate - guarantees of non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs and recognition of the DPRK by the United States. At the same time, the unconditional elimination of all components of the military nuclear program of the DPRK remains a condition. The question of a peaceful nuclear program under the control of the IAEA is still open.
So that the US would not have illusions that Pyongyang would "surrender without a fight," the North Koreans played their main trump card - they declared Pyongyang's possession of nuclear weapons.
The main outcome of the three rounds of the six-party talks underway in Beijing should be considered that they have shown the possibility of resolving the crisis through negotiations, and that this is now more likely than before. But for the implementation of the "Tease" scenario, a political decision by the US administration is required that the DPRK, in the event of a complete and verifiable renunciation of nuclear weapons (or all types of weapons of mass destruction), will not be considered as a state whose existence is contrary to American interests.
If the George W. Bush team has the political will to make such a decision, then the Conciliation scenario has a hope of being realized. True, for this it will be necessary for the "five" (USA, China, Russia, South Korea, Japan) to offer the DPRK a price that it could not refuse. At the same time, it is not at all necessary that the United States bear the main costs. Rather the opposite.
Scenario two- increased tension with continued limited political dialogue. This scenario means that the United States refuses to carry out an armed action against the DPRK, but firmly insists on the set conditions for resolving the crisis and does not make concessions to the North Korean leadership. At the same time, it is possible to strengthen the American military presence on the territory of South Korea, and under certain conditions for the development of the situation, the return of US tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea.
North Korea, for its part, will carry out actions demonstrating the seriousness of its intentions to resist American diktat. For example, it will resume testing of ballistic missiles. It is also impossible to rule out a nuclear test with the detonation of a nuclear explosive device.
That is, the situation is "frozen" until the moment when the foreign policy situation changes, as well as the situation in the United States itself. It is quite probable that the "unfreezing" of the situation will take place only after the departure of the George W. Bush team from the scene.
This scenario seems to be quite dangerous. On the one hand, it enables the DPRK to conduct military nuclear research, completely withdrawing its nuclear program from international monitoring. On the other hand, the United States, within the framework of achieving its goals, will increase pressure on the DPRK, seeking complete political and economic isolation of the republic. Taken together, such actions on the part of the DPRK and the United States may become a transitional phase to the start of real hostilities.
Scenario three- US military action. This option is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Although it is likely that the political legitimization of such an operation may be less difficult than in the case of Iraq.
The main problem of implementing this scenario is that, unlike S. Hussein, the North Korean leadership, both from a military point of view and from the point of view of having political will, is quite ready for a preventive invasion of the territory of South Korea in order to prevent the formation of an "army" on its territory. invasion by the United States and its allies. Although it seems obvious that Pyongyang is not unambiguously aimed at the use of force. With all the obvious preference for the first scenario, unfortunately, the likelihood of events developing under it today is lower than under the second scenario. And the main reason for this lies in the stubbornly demonstrated by the team of George W. Bush Jr. intolerance towards the regime of Kim Jong Il.
How to prevent global consequences?
The question of the possible consequences of gaining the status of a state that actually possesses nuclear weapons deserves special consideration.
On February 10, 2005, the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement saying: "We have already taken decisive action to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and have manufactured our own self-defense nuclear weapons in response to the policies of the US President George W. isolate and strangle the DPRK." It also states that "North Korean nuclear weapons will remain a deterrent under any circumstances."
It should be noted that earlier some representatives of the DPRK stated that their country possesses "nuclear deterrence forces." Quite recently, on January 24, 2005, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the DPRK, Kim Ge Gwan, at a meeting with US Congressman Curt Weldon, said that Pyongyang possesses nuclear weapons, but will use them "exclusively for defense purposes." However, this time the recognition of the DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons sounded like an official position.
Can this statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry be trusted? The North Koreans did not provide evidence of the possession of nuclear weapons. Visited at the beginning of 2004 the nuclear facilities of the DPRK former leader US Los Alamos Laboratory Siegfried Hacker doubts Pyongyang's ability to create nuclear weapons in the near future. In his opinion, the North Koreans failed to solve a number of technical problems, primarily related to the creation of effective detonators to actuate the main warhead.
But, on the other hand, one cannot ignore the already mentioned confession of the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb A.K. Khan that the North Korean uranium program is much more advanced than it suggests global community. In addition, this program, unlike plutonium, was in no way controlled by the IAEA. Therefore, it can be assumed that under the guise of a plutonium weapons project, which, although dosed, was still monitored by IAEA inspectors until December 2002, Pyongyang was able to implement a uranium weapons project.
In view of the foregoing, it would be reckless to agree with the assessments of a number of Russian and foreign experts that the DPRK Foreign Ministry's statement of February 10, 2005 is yet another manifestation of a policy of blackmail with elements of bluff. A more balanced assessment seems to be the following: it is unlikely that the North Koreans have made nuclear weapons, but such a scenario cannot be ruled out.
At the same time, it is clear that work is underway to create nuclear weapons in the DPRK, and if the world community does not take coordinated measures that take into account the security interests of the DPRK, sooner or later this country may nevertheless appear (if it has not already appeared). And this event, in the event of strong evidence of its accomplishment, will have far-reaching consequences for security not only in Northeast Asia, but also on a global scale.
Firstly, the likelihood of attempts to resolve the Korean "nuclear crisis" by force is increasing, including due to the growing threat of uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons - Pyongyang is trading in ballistic missiles, why shouldn't it also trade in nuclear munitions and technologies for their manufacture? Secondly, crisis stability on the Korean Peninsula will decrease significantly. The United States cannot ignore the possibility of North Korea using nuclear weapons, albeit against the territories of South Korea and Japan, and therefore, in the event of an aggravation of the crisis, they can launch a preventive strike against North Korean nuclear facilities. In Pyongyang, in turn, in this situation, they can act on the principle of "to use or to lose."
Thirdly, the process of "nuclear domino" will begin in the North-Eastern region. Within a short time, literally in 4-6 months, Japan will create its own nuclear weapons. This country has all the necessary technologies for this, and its plutonium reserves in the amount of 5.6 tons are suitable for creating 1000-1200 nuclear weapons. Along with this, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan will certainly intensify their efforts to develop missile defense in cooperation with the United States. The United States itself will increase its efforts to protect both its territory and the territory of its allies from nuclear missiles, including by deploying ships with anti-missile weapons in the waters adjacent to North Korea. Under these conditions, both China and Russia will be forced, in turn, to step up their own efforts in the nuclear missile field. A new race is brewing in the field of nuclear missile weapons.
Fourth, the acquisition by the DPRK of nuclear weapons and the process of "nuclear domino" that has begun in the Northeast region will lead to the actual collapse of the NPT, moreover, the nuclear nonproliferation regime as a whole. Those states parties to the NPT that, for one reason or another, would like to acquire nuclear weapons, will be convinced that a demonstrative withdrawal from this treaty remains virtually unpunished, and the leading states of the world cannot or do not want to reason with a country that challenges the world community.
What conclusions should be drawn from the analysis of the policy of the DPRK in the nuclear and missile areas? There are four of them. First, despite all the rhetoric about the possibility of North Korea inflicting an "all-destroying" blow on the territories of countries unfriendly to it, Kim Jong Il clearly understands that as a result of retaliatory actions, he will lose everything at once. The presence of nuclear missile weapons for him is extremely important factor maintaining its regime in the face of the predicted actions of the international coalition led by the United States in terms of forceful pressure on totalitarian states. This refers to the announcement by Washington crusade against countries enlisted by the United States in the "axis of evil".
Secondly, it is impossible to reliably state that the DPRK possesses nuclear weapons. Yes, it probably has everything necessary to create a nuclear weapon, primarily based on highly enriched uranium (the design of this type of nuclear charge is much simpler than that based on weapons-grade plutonium). Only one thing can be stated with certainty - the DPRK has not yet carried out nuclear explosions, although it has not assumed obligations not to carry them out (it has not signed the CTBT).
Thirdly, North Korea is ready to curtail its military nuclear program if the US, in turn, abandons its hostile policy towards it. Whether Pyongyang will have a peaceful nuclear program, which, in fact, does not exist now, is a matter of future agreements. There is a wide choice possible solutions, up to the construction of nuclear power plants on the territory of other states with a share of North Korean ownership and the participation of North Korean specialists in the operation of such nuclear power plants.
Fourth, the development (or curtailment) of the DPRK's nuclear and missile programs will be determined by the outcome of the six-party talks, including whether they will be continued after the pause in mid-2004.
Loading...
