The threat to nuclear security on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's nuclear deterrence is a magic bullet to support

North Korea has enough natural uranium for the development of a nuclear program: the deposit reserves are estimated at 26 million tons of ore, of which more than 4 million are suitable for industrial development. Now the DPRK has 10 nuclear facilities on its territory, including a plant for the production of nuclear fuel, but it is still not known exactly how much weapons-grade plutonium Pyongyang has. The US State Department suggests that this is 6-8 kg., the CIA and military intelligence The US calls the figure 8-9 kg., the US Institute of Science and International Security - 14 kg., South Korean and Japanese sources suggest that stocks can reach 24 kg. According to the IAEA, North Korea launched two industrial plutonium production lines at full capacity and received 25-30 kg of plutonium in 2003-2004. The agency believes that North Korea is capable of producing up to 10 kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually. Regarding the military nuclear capability DPRK has different versions. Some experts believe that North Korea currently has the materials to create 10 or more nuclear weapons, and also believe that the North Koreans already have 12-15 low-yield nuclear weapons at their disposal. However, this data cannot be verified. Real military nuclear potential North Korea remains unknown. However, Pyongyang has the potential to deliver weapons of mass destruction, in particular through small and medium-range missiles. The history of the North Korean missile program has more than 30 years and now the DPRK is one of the few countries in the world that own missile technology. North Korea also has outdated Soviet combat aircraft, which could potentially be upgraded to deliver nuclear weapons. However, the nuclear tests conducted in the DPRK nevertheless showed that the level of development of North Korean technologies is not sufficient to manufacture a missile- or aircraft-based nuclear warhead.

The growth of the nuclear ambitions of the DPRK, the attempts of North Korea to use the nuclear missile factor in its policy, in particular, were facilitated by the geopolitical "withdrawal" of the USSR from a number of regions of the world, including the reduction of its ties with the DPRK, including the military sphere, the reorientation of the USSR, and then Russia, for cooperation with South Korea th; the spontaneous formation of a unipolar world, the policy of the United States as a world policeman, which had its own projection on the Korean Peninsula; a sharp weakening of the already extremely inefficient economy of the DPRK, serious problems with financing the general armed forces of the DPRK and equipping them with modern means, the desire to compensate for this with breakthroughs in the nuclear missile sphere; the desire of the DPRK to draw attention to itself as a political figure in order to increase its status in the region, including during negotiations with the United States, and the use of the nuclear card for trading and exchanges in the economic, political and military spheres.

Nuclear and rocket development North Korea has repeatedly become the cause of international crises, as the DPRK has been successfully blackmailing neighboring countries with its nuclear and missile programs for the past decade. And in February 2005, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially announced that the country had nuclear weapons and that it was temporarily withdrawing from the six-party talks to resolve the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The reaction of the international community to this was sharply negative. The United States once again rejected the possibility of direct bilateral negotiations with North Korea, as well as the proposal put forward by the DPRK back in November 2002 to sign a non-aggression pact. Washington also urged China and South Korea not to make concessions in order to force Pyongyang to resume its interrupted talks on the nuclear program. In July 2006, George W. Bush led another campaign of international protests over North Korea's TAEPHODON-2 ballistic missile test. However, it all ended with the fact that, despite the adoption of the relevant UN resolutions, Pyongyang continued to develop ballistic missiles and work on its nuclear program. On October 14, 2006, the UN Security Council approved another resolution against the DPRK, condemning Pyongyang for testing nuclear weapons on October 9 and imposing a series of sanctions on the country. In addition, the United States, Australia, Japan and South Korea terminated economic relations with the DPRK and suspended supplies of humanitarian aid Pyongyang for an indefinite period. How effective these measures will be remains to be seen. Analysts note that such resolutions of the UN Security Council have not played a special role in international politics for a long time. For its part, North Korea considered the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council as a declaration of war, and threatened to immediately inflict a "ruthless blow" on any state that "attempts to encroach on the sovereignty and right of survival of the DPRK under the pretext of implementing UN Security Council sanctions."

Obviously, the military nuclear program is the only serious trump card with which Pyongyang can keep the country's extremely inefficient economy afloat, and also hopes to increase its political status in the region. It is possible that the North Korean regime decided to use the experience of Pakistan, which detonated its nuclear device in 1998, and withstood three years of sanctions, and is now the main US ally in the Arab world. It is also likely that, with nuclear weapons at its disposal, Pyongyang seeks to protect itself from potential military intervention by the United States. However, as noted by Ted Carpenter, an employee of the Cato Institute research center, author of The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, with the exception of the DPRK, none of the countries that tried to create nuclear weapons , did not do atomic bomb its main political, military, scientific and economic priority. The North Korean nuclear crisis is currently in the center of attention of world politics, but no effective progress in resolving the nuclear problem is yet visible. There is still no clear idea of ​​how to actually ensure nuclear disarmament of the DPRK. However, the question is not so much how to solve the current crisis, but more broadly - "what to do" with the North Korean regime and how to generally create a stable political and legal basis for peace on the Korean Peninsula.


Conclusion

nuclear weapon safety korean

The special interest of the Russian Federation in the development of the situation on the peninsula is connected with ensuring its economic and strategic interests, the security of the Far Eastern borders. It is necessary to emphasize the need for a serious attitude to the solution of the Korean problem and a clear definition of Russia's national interests in the region. Determination of priorities in relation to the DPRK and ROK creates conditions for Russia's participation in solving the Korean problem on the basis of the principle of "limited involvement". Preserving the status quo on the peninsula in the near future is the main priority Russian politics. Ensuring the positive neutrality of the future united Korea is a promising task of the Russian foreign policy.

In the course of my research, I identified the main approaches to solving the problem of nuclear security on the Korean Peninsula: first, North Korea cannot be allowed to safely complete the development of its atomic weapons, secondly, the US-North Korean bilateral contact should be recognized as useful, but the US should not be allowed to monopolize the initiative here, ousting Russia from the negotiation process; thirdly, the North Korean nuclear crisis can and should be resolved only through multilateral negotiations with the help of joint efforts of the international community.

By maintaining and developing its relations with the North Korean regime, Russia counts on 1) relying on the North Korean card to restore its former influence on the peninsula, 2) in this vein, Moscow can support the aspirations of North Korea, 3) taking into account the positive shifts observed in the position With respect to North Korea, the United States and Japan should go further along the path of restoring their previous relations with the North, believing that this is the only reasonable step to maintain a favorable alignment of forces in Northeast Asia for Russia. The settlement of the North Korean nuclear problem should be achieved by political and diplomatic methods, continuing negotiations within the framework of six states: the Russian Federation, the United States, China, Japan, the DPRK, and the Republic of Kazakhstan.

According to the Russian side, the implementation of the measures proposed for consideration at the multilateral forum would make it possible to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime on the peninsula and prevent a slide into confrontation. It must be admitted that the Russian initiative has played a positive role. Along with the efforts of the UN Security Council and the IAEA, our idea of ​​an international conference contributed to a decrease in tension around the nuclear issue in the DPRK and stimulated the resumption of the North Korean-American dialogue, which ended with the Geneva agreements. Russia sees the framework agreement between the US and North Korea as a step towards a nuclear-free status for the Korean Peninsula, full participation of North Korea in the NPT and its implementation of the IAEA safeguards agreement. At the same time, one cannot fail to see that this document is of a compromise nature, and this is its shortcoming. In the current situation, the urgency is growing international forum across Korea. There is practically no reasonable alternative to convening a multilateral conference on the security and nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula. The nuclear aspect is only part of the problem, although it is quite important. Therefore, a broad, comprehensive approach to its settlement is required, which can only be achieved at a representative international forum.

It is also important for Russia - taking into account, of course, the rapidly changing situation - to continue the policy of strengthening an independent constructive role in resolving the nuclear problem of the DPRK, the implementation of which, on the one hand, would help to strengthen Russia's influence on strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime in this region, and on the other hand, the other would encourage all parties involved in this problem to flexibility, compromises, without, of course, damaging the interests of the Russian Federation. It can be unequivocally added that ensuring global nuclear security is one of the highest priority tasks for the world community.

From a conceptual point of view, the most desirable for Russia would be national reconciliation and peaceful coexistence of the two Korean states on the way to the unification of Korea over a long historical period. The emergence in the future of a united Korea, striving to maintain relations of friendship, good neighborliness and cooperation with Russia, in principle, does not contradict Russian interests. At the same time, the unification of Korea is unlikely in the foreseeable future. In general, for Russia, taking into account its current capabilities, the urgent task is not to obtain dominant positions in Korea, but to prevent a situation where the entire peninsula would be under the influence of some one, especially not quite friendly to Russia, state. Since, given the current alignment of forces in Northeast Asia and our economic capabilities, the development of events according to such a scenario cannot be completely ruled out, the existence of the DPRK as a sovereign state is beneficial for us in the short and medium term. The only reasonable way to solve the nuclear problem is to take into account a number of concerns of the DPRK in order to gradually reduce the importance of the nuclear deterrence factor for Pyongyang. In moving towards denuclearization, Russian interests coincide with those of the United States, Japan and the ROK. However, we should probably admit, at least for ourselves, that complete liquidation North Korea's already existing nuclear potential is not an absolute and only priority for us, in relation to which all other goals would be subordinate. If denuclearization happens without building a solid system collective security in the region, military risks may even increase. Today, the agenda should probably include the "freezing" of the existing nuclear missile potential of the DPRK when it accepts a verifiable obligation not to claim recognition as a nuclear power, to comply with the requirements of the NPT, remaining in it, possibly, in a "special" status. Further, we must strive to abandon the military nuclear component in the future, when it will be possible to find non-military mechanisms for ensuring the security of the DPRK - up to the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons.

Sources and literature

1. Vorontsov A.V. Russia and the Korean Peninsula in the system of international relations in the Far East in the 90s // Problems of the Far East. -1997. - No. 3

2. Vorontsov A. V. Korean policy of the Russian Federation in the first half and mid-90s // Political, economic and cultural aspects of the unification of Korea. Part P. - Moscow.-1997.

3. Kobozev N.N. Korean Peninsula: Myths, Expectations and Reality // Problems of the Far East. - 2000. - No. 3.

4. Moiseev V.I. Russia and the Korean Peninsula // International Life. -1996. - No. 2.

5. Moiseev V.I. Russia and the Korean Peninsula // International Affairs. -1996. - №2

6. Moiseev V.I. Russia - the Republic of Korea: a course of constructive partnership // Problems of the Far East. -1994. - No. 4

7. Titarenko M.L. The Korean Peninsula and Security in Northeast Asia // View from Russia Actual Problems of the Korean Peninsula. - Moscow.-1996.

8. Titarenko M.L. Russia: security through cooperation. East Asian vector. - M., - 2003. - 405 p.

9. Tkachenko V.P. The Korean Peninsula and Russia's Interests. - M, -2002. -208s.

10. Tkachenko V.P. Security in Korea and Russian interests: 1961-1995 // Dissertation for the degree of candidate historical sciences. - Moscow.-1997.

11. Tkachenko V.P. Korean policy of Russia // Report at the meeting " round table"Committee on International Affairs State Duma Russia; Bulletin of Scientific Information IMEPI RAS. -1994. - No. 9.

12. Toloraya G.D. New old partner in the Far East // Problems of the Far East. - 2000. -№5.

13. Toloraya G.D. The next cycle of the Korean crisis (2008-2010). Russian interests and prospects for overcoming the Korean impasse//Problems of the Far East. - 2010. -№5

14. Toloraya G.D. The Korean Peninsula in search of a path to stability // ME and MO. - 2008. - No. 1

15. Toloraya G.D. The Korean Peninsula and Russia // International Life. . - 2002. - No. 12.

16. Tolstokulakov I.A., Kim S. Security Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region: A View from Russia and the USA. - Vladivostok. - 2006. - 132 p.

17. Trigubenko M.E. Actual problems of the Korean Peninsula // Problems of the Far East. -1997. -No. 3.

18. Rian news from 16:49 01/04/2010 http://www.rian.ru/politics/20100401/217630437.html

Center for Korean Studies, Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Problems of the Korean Peninsula and the interests of Russia. - Moscow.-1998.

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"We fight in Korea so we don't have to fight in Wichita or Chicago or New Orleans or San Francisco Bay."

G. Truman, 1952

38th parallel. This phrase sounds like a reminder that humanity is on the edge of the nuclear abyss. The situation in those distant 1950-1953 was so difficult and dangerous that more than once brought the world to the red line of a global conflict. Until now, news from Korea disturbs and frightens us with its inconsistency, because sometimes it seems that we are immersed in a virtual world. war game in which there is no winner.

The war between North and South Korea lasted from June 25, 1950 to July 27, 1953 (although there was no official end to the war). In the expert community, it is customary to consider the conflict of times cold war as a proxy war between the United States and its allies and the forces of the PRC and the USSR.

The history of the Korean crisis began in 1910, when Korea was a colony of the Japanese Empire. Having denounced the Non-Aggression Pact (April 5, 1945), on August 8, the USSR declared war on Japan and sent its troops into the northern part of the Korean Peninsula, while the Americans landed on the Korean Peninsula from the south.

In connection with the surrender of Japan, the USSR and the USA agreed on August 10, 1945 to divide Korea along the 38th parallel, which led to the formation of two absolutely opposite states in terms of their parameters. The north became the sphere of influence of the USSR, the south - the USA. In December 1945, an agreement was signed on the temporary administration of the country, after which governments were formed in both parts, headed by Lee Syngman (south) and Kim Il Sung (north). It was assumed that such a division is temporary, however, in the context of the beginning of the Cold War, reunification did not follow, although both regimes sought to unite the peninsula under their rule.

After the mutual withdrawal of Soviet and US troops in 1949, active armed incursions by southerners into North Korean territory began. The growing tension in the region forced China to pay serious attention to the progressing conflict, as it interfered with the plans of Mao Zedong to defeat the forces of the opposition government of the Kuomintang, which settled on about. Taiwan.

After the statement by Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State, that Korea is not within the sphere of America's immediate interests, active preparations for the military operation began. The final decision to invade was made in the spring of 1950, when Kim Il Sung convinced Stalin at a meeting in Moscow.

On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the parallel and launched an offensive. The North Korean government said that the "traitor" Lee Syngman treacherously invaded the territory of the DPRK. The outbreak of the war in Korea came as a surprise to the United States and other Western countries. The President of the United States ordered the Seventh Fleet to provide the defense of Taiwan, thus ending the policy of non-intervention in the struggle of the Chinese Communists and Chiang Kai-shek's forces.

On the same day, the UN Security Council was convened in New York, on the agenda of which was the Korean question. The original resolution proposed by the Americans was adopted by nine votes in favor, with no votes against. Its essence was to create an international coalition (UN troops), which entered the war on the side of the southerners. Soviet Ambassador Yakov Malik boycotted the meeting: the USSR did not participate in the vote, since by that time it had withdrawn its delegation.

By August 20, the entire Korean Peninsula, except for the Pusan ​​Perimeter (southwest of the peninsula), was captured by the North Koreans. UN troops were in a difficult position, but continued to draw huge forces into the region and build up the potential for a counter-offensive that began in mid-September. A full-scale offensive, supported by the American fleet and a brutal strategy of struggle, allowed the southerners to push the North Koreans back to the 38th parallel by October 8th. On October 20, the capital of the DPRK, Pyongyang, fell.

The defeat of the North Koreans forced China and the USSR to intervene in the situation. After consultations, it was decided to send parts of the Chinese army to Korea. On October 25, the Chinese army, supported by Soviet aviation, invaded Korea and completely crushed the defenses of the UN troops. During this period, the US Air Force began to prepare for delivering nuclear strikes against Soviet bases in Siberia. This forced the Chinese army to return to the mountains.

A month later, on November 24, the Chinese launched a second, now full-scale offensive. The "military swing" began, which continued until the summer of 1951. Each side had an army of about a million people. Losses numbered in the hundreds of thousands.

Despite the superiority in technical means, the US and the allies were unable to achieve a decisive advantage. It became clear to all parties to the conflict what to achieve military victory a reasonable price would not be possible, and that negotiations for a truce would be necessary.

The goal of the UN forces was to restore South Korea to pre-war limits. The Chinese command put forward similar conditions. Both sides reinforced their demands with bloody offensive operations.

The scale of the local conflict reached such proportions that it involved the armies and economies of all the leading countries of the world and was, in a way, a miniature of the Third World War. So, directly involved in the conflict:

· The composition of the Northern Coalition included: the USSR, China and North Korea. A total of 1,060,000 people.

· The structure of the Southern Coalition (UN Troops) included: USA, Republic of Korea, Great Britain, France, Australia, Canada, Philippines, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Greece, New Zealand, Thailand, Ethiopia, Colombia, Belgium and the Union of South Africa. A total of 1,100,000 people.

The turning point in the Korean War was the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953, shortly after which the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU voted to end the war. Having lost support from the USSR, China agreed to peace terms. After the UN accepted a proposal for a ceasefire, the agreement was concluded on July 27, 1953. The front was fixed along the 38th parallel. This territory is still guarded by North Korean troops from the north and US-Korean troops from the south.

The Korean War became the prototype for many subsequent conflicts. She created a model of a local war when two superpowers fight in a limited area without the use of nuclear weapons and without directly declaring the presence of their key adversary in the war.

After the war, Soviet-Chinese relations seriously deteriorated due to the tactical and strategic actions of the USSR, which made the policy of the PRC more independent. Chinese army challenged the US troops and was able to inflict serious defeats on them. This testified to the growing power of China and was a harbinger of the fact that soon, in a political sense, China would have to be reckoned with. The United States changed its strategy towards China, relying on Fr. Taiwan and the opposition government.

During the war, the political and economic power of Japan increased, which became the main center for supplying UN forces. Direct contact was established between the Japanese government and the Pentagon, and multi-million dollar contracts were signed to stimulate the Japanese economy. The Korean War accelerated the conclusion of a peace treaty between the United States and Japan, the warming of Germany's relations with other Western countries, and the creation of military-political blocs.

In addition, the Korean War diverted significant attention, resources and forces of the United States, giving the USSR the opportunity and time to deploy its own mass production of nuclear bombs (the first of which was tested on August 29, 1949), and the development of their means of delivery to keep the United States from the temptation launch a preemptive nuclear strike.

In January 1958, the United States deployed nuclear weapons on the territory of South Korea, which was contrary to paragraph 13d of the Armistice Treaty, thereby unilaterally canceling one of its major articles. Nuclear weapons were completely removed from the country only in 1991.

In 1968 an unsuccessful attempt was made to subdivide the Force special operations North Korea for the assassination of South Korean President Park Chung-hee.

On December 13, 1991, the DPRK and the Republic of Korea signed an agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression, cooperation and exchanges through the mediation of the UN. In it, both Korean states actually recognized the sovereignty and independence of each other. The ROK and the DPRK pledged not to interfere in each other's internal political affairs, not to take hostile actions against each other, to respect each other's socio-economic systems. However, the previously reached agreements were disavowed by Lee Myung-bak in 2010 after the aggravation of relations on March 26, when Corvette of South Korea in the Yellow Sea (presumably torpedoed by a submarine of the DPRK Navy).

On February 10, 2005, the DPRK for the first time openly announced the creation of nuclear weapons in the country. On October 9, 2006, the first nuclear explosion took place. In April 2012, the DPRK constitution was amended to nuclear status countries.

The April crisis of 2013 led to the fact that the DPRK ceased to consider itself bound by the terms of not only the 1953 Agreement, but also the 1991 document. On March 8, 2013, the DPRK government annulled the peace treaty with South Korea on non-aggression.

Pyongyang announced on September 3 that it had successfully tested a hydrogen charge that could be used as a warhead for an intercontinental ballistic missile(MBR). Japanese and South Korean seismologists report that, according to their estimates, the power of a man-made earthquake recorded in the DPRK is almost 10 times stronger than a similar earthquake in 2016, when the fifth nuclear test took place. Seoul believes that the power of the detonated charge can reach 100 kilotons and does not rule out the possibility of a military response.

"Time is irretrievably lost"

Frants Klintsevich, First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on Defense and Security, believes that there are no levers of influence on the DPRK's nuclear program, except for negotiations. The senator expressed this opinion on Sunday TASS.

"Today, the United States needs to understand that time has been irretrievably lost, and any pressure on North Korea is counterproductive. There are no levers of influence on it, except for negotiations, except for dialogue. Russia is ready to take an active part in them," Klintsevich said.

He noted that in Pyongyang's report on the test of a hydrogen bomb, attention was drawn to the assertion that the charge could be placed on a ballistic missile.

"In fact, this is an undisguised threat to the United States and its allies in the Far East. In a word, the situation is becoming more dangerous day by day. Moreover, no one really knows whether it is a bluff on the part of the DPRK, or whether it really has such capabilities," - said Klintsevich.

"Such erroneous actions are not good for the DPRK"

The Chinese authorities strongly condemn the actions of the DPRK, which tested the hydrogen bomb and does not take into account the UN's negative position on Pyongyang's nuclear missile program. The Chinese Foreign Ministry announced this on Sunday.

"Despite overwhelming opposition from the international community, the DPRK once again conducted nuclear tests. The Chinese government expresses its categorical protest about this," the ministry said in a statement published on the official website.

"Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and its denuclearization, maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia is Beijing's unchanging position, which coincides with the overwhelming opinion of the world community," the message said. "We persistently appeal to the North Korean side so that it properly responded to the aspirations of the UN on the issue of the denuclearization of the peninsula."

The document emphasizes that Pyongyang must strictly adhere to the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council (SC), stop taking steps, as a result of which the problem of regulating inter-Korean relations has become a vicious circle. "Such erroneous actions are not in favor of the DPRK - it is necessary to return to the dialogue on a peaceful settlement," the statement says. "In turn, China intends to firmly adhere to all UN Security Council resolutions, taking into account the opinion of the world community."

"Daring Challenge"

According to Konstantin Kosachev, head of the Federation Council committee on international affairs, the DPRK's hydrogen bomb test is a challenge to the international community, but a forceful solution to the problem is out of the question.

"North Korea's hydrogen bomb tests are yet another daring challenge to the international community that deserves condemnation," he said. "However, by and large, this test did not change anything in the existing layouts. The forceful option for solving the problem is excluded. Its consequences will be catastrophic and unpredictable, I believe that the task of the DPRK is to convince the world of this," the senator added.

At the same time, he stressed that the North Korean leadership continues to ignore the position of the international community, expressed primarily in UN resolutions.

"However, his actions are addressed exclusively to the United States and its allies in the region. And the race of threats will only increase if one of the parties does not stop it. Ideally, a stronger one," Kosachev is convinced.

He also added that if Pyongyang did not possess weapons mass destruction, an operation following the example of Iraq could be carried out on its territory. “The current story is only more convincing: despite the well-known test tubes, Saddam Hussein became a target precisely because the United States was absolutely sure that he did not have weapons of mass destruction. By attacking Iraq, but being afraid to do it with the DPRK, Washington sends a clear signal to everyone - Arm yourself," he added.

Speaking about ways to resolve the situation, Kosachev recalled that road map deactivation of the situation, proposed by Russia and China, is still relevant. "To be more precise, there is no alternative: the de-escalation of the conflict should be carried out by two sides," he concluded.

"Evidence of the progress of the DPRK nuclear program"

Confirmation of a nuclear test may be evidence of the progress of the DPRK's nuclear program. Pyongyang should refrain from new nuclear testing and accede to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. This was stated on Sunday by the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO PC) Lassina Zerbo.

"Our monitoring stations recorded unusual seismic activity in the DPRK. The analysis showed that the event was more powerful than similar activity in September last year. According to initial data, the activity occurred in the area of ​​the DPRK nuclear test site," Zerbo said in a statement.

According to him, the CTBTO PC experts are currently studying the situation in detail and in as soon as possible prepare a report for the countries participating in the commission in Vienna. "If it is confirmed that a nuclear test has taken place, this will be evidence of the progress of the DPRK's nuclear program. This will be a violation of the provision against nuclear testing, which has been observed by all countries except one since 1996," he said.

As Zerbo emphasized, "The event also highlights the need for the international community to decide on a legally binding nuclear test ban." “I urge the DPRK to refrain from further nuclear testing and to join the 183 signatories of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). I sincerely hope that this will serve as a final call to the international community to outlaw all nuclear testing and serve as the entry of the CTBT into force," he concluded.

The CTBTO PC was established in accordance with a resolution adopted in 1996 in New York at a meeting of signatories to the CTBT. The main task of this commission is to carry out the necessary measures to facilitate the entry into force of the CTBT and the creation of a verification mechanism by the time the Treaty is launched. Because the CTBT has not yet entered into force, the organization is called the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

"Extremely sad event"

The new nuclear test of the DPRK was evidence of ignoring the demands of the international community to abandon the development of the nuclear program and comply with the resolutions of the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This was announced on Sunday by IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano.

"North Korea's new nuclear test is an extremely sad development. This nuclear test, which follows two tests last year and is the sixth since 2006, completely ignores the repeated demands of the international community," Amano said in a statement.

As Amano noted, "The UN Security Council in its resolutions emphasized that the DPRK should renounce further nuclear tests, abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable form." "I once again urge the DPRK to fully comply with all relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and the IAEA. The Agency continues to closely monitor the development of the DPRK nuclear program, which causes serious concern. We remain ready to promote its peaceful settlement," he repeated once again director general of the IAEA.

"We can't rule out the possibility."

The Japanese government admits that North Korea actually tested a hydrogen bomb on Sunday. This was stated by the General Secretary of the Cabinet of Ministers of Japan Yoshihide Suga.

"We cannot rule out the possibility that a hydrogen bomb was tested this time," he stressed. Earlier, the Japanese government officially stated that the DPRK had carried out another, already the sixth nuclear test.

"Destabilizing behavior"

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg condemned North Korea's sixth nuclear test. The corresponding statement was published on Sunday on the official website of the alliance.

The North Atlantic Alliance is "concerned about the destabilizing behavior of the DPRK, which threatens the regional and international security", said Stoltenberg. "The [North Korean] regime must immediately cease all nuclear and missile activities on a comprehensive, verifiable and irreversible basis," the statement said.

NATO Secretary General also called on Pyongyang to re-engage with the international community, respect international obligations and stop threats and actions that lead to escalation of tension.

"The regime makes it clear to us how great the threat to the world is"

The German Foreign Ministry is awaiting a response from the UN Security Council to North Korea's test of a hydrogen bomb. This was stated on Sunday by German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel.

"We will discuss our reaction with our EU partners," he said. "I am sure that the UN Security Council will take the necessary measures with determination."

In his opinion, the DPRK authorities "deliberately stir up the already tense situation on the Korean Peninsula." "The regime makes us clearly understand how great the threat to the world is. We are all facing this challenge, so it is necessary to find a reasonable but unequivocal answer," the German Foreign Minister urged.

"North Korea's nuclear program is gaining momentum every year"

A new nuclear test could become the most powerful in the history of such tests in the DPRK, but it is too early to talk about technical specifications the charge itself. This was announced on Sunday by the Executive Secretary

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO PC) Lassina Zerbo.

“We are not going to speculate about the characteristics of the charge and argue whether it was a hydrogen bomb or not. physical characteristics The events that took place today seem to indicate that it was much more powerful than in 2016 or years earlier," Zerbo said at a special press conference for journalists.

According to him, "the results of the initial analysis of the event that took place today demonstrate that the nuclear program of the DPRK is gaining momentum and growing every year." The CTBTO PC has previously warned that the confirmation of a nuclear test could be evidence of progress in the DPRK's nuclear program, so Pyongyang should refrain from new nuclear tests and accede to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

"Reckless Act"

The DPRK's test of the hydrogen bomb is a reckless act that poses a further threat to the international community. This was stated by British Prime Minister Theresa May.

"North Korea's latest act is reckless and represents an unacceptable further threat to the international community," she said.

"The entire international community has condemned these tests and must unite to continue to increase pressure on the leaders of North Korea to stop their destabilizing actions," the message of the British Prime Minister emphasizes.

Over half a century ago, the war in Korea ended, which lasted three years and claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. On July 27, 1953, a ceasefire agreement was signed between the DPRK and China, on the one hand, and the UN forces led by the United States, on the other, in Phanmunchzhon. Unfortunately, it did not eliminate " hot spot"on the Korean Peninsula, which from time to time makes itself felt, and the political and military passions raging here are forcing the world community to feverishly and intensely seek means to appease them. Moreover, recently the situation has become so tense that there is a danger of returning to the situation of 1953.

Blackmailing Kim Jong Il

In January 2003, the leadership of the DPRK announced the country's withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which could not but cause a negative reaction literally on all continents. However, Pyongyang did not stop there. Its official representatives and means mass media began to put forward arguments in favor of the possession of nuclear weapons. For example, in June 2003 it was reported that North Korea needed it to solve the pressing problems of the national economy, since it would allow "many times to increase the deterrent potential of the Korean People's Army", and this "will make it possible to reduce conventional weapons and direct human and financial resources to the development of production sectors of the country's economy in order to improve the well-being of the people.

There are claims that the DPRK already possesses nuclear weapons. In particular, Pyongyang announced the completion of the processing of 8,000 graphite rods previously used at the nuclear power plant in Yongbyon. It is believed that the resulting weapons-grade plutonium is enough to create five to six nuclear weapons. However, there is no direct evidence that the DPRK has nuclear weapons. After all, in order to check the operability of warheads and determine their combat characteristics, it is necessary to conduct tests, which cannot be hidden under the existing control system (even if these are underground tests and low power).

Pyongyang, apparently, is bluffing, first of all, trying to acquire the status of a nuclear power. The leaders of the DPRK apparently believe that this will not only allow North Korea to emerge from the political and economic isolation in which it has found itself, but will also increase its role in the international arena. There is also an opinion that nuclear weapons are necessary for Pyongyang to solve its problems in the unification of the country. Realizing that the wealthy South can swallow up the North, suffering from a severe economic ailment, having before their eyes the experience of German reunification and especially the unenviable fate of the former rulers of the GDR, the leaders of the DPRK will try to negotiate more favorable conditions for themselves. At the same time, it is possible that, having established the production of weapons-grade plutonium, the North Korean authorities expect to sell it and use the proceeds to boost the economy.

It is likely that official Pyongyang has gone for broke and intends to exchange its nuclear program as expensive as possible for guarantees of maintaining the current situation and broad economic assistance to its country, which is confirmed by the conditions on which the DPRK is supposedly ready to give up its nuclear ambitions. Chief among them is the US renunciation of "hostile policy." For North Korea, this means a complete normalization of relations with the United States, American recognition of the existing system in the DPRK, guarantees against a preventive attack on North Korea, and a promise "not to interfere with its economic development."

Washington categorically rejects such proposals. However, the administration of George W. Bush, in fact, provoked Pyongyang when it ranked the DPRK in the "axis of evil", "rogue states", with which one can only talk from a position of strength. Having dealt with Iraq, the US also clearly demonstrated how it will deal with anyone who does not fit into the Procrustean bed of American politics. Washington pushed Pyongyang to resume its nuclear program and stop deliveries of fuel oil to the DPRK for energy purposes in exchange for shutting down the nuclear reactor in Yongbyon.

Sadly, many facts show that the United States is interested in maintaining tension on the Korean Peninsula, because this is how China is contained, not only the American position is maintained, but also strengthened throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The campaign around the DPRK's nuclear program has contributed to a significant advancement of US plans to create a regional missile defense system, which, according to analysts, is needed not so much against Pyongyang as against Beijing. Japan has already been urged to implement these plans, now Australia and several other countries of the Asia-Pacific region are next in line.

WAYS TO SOLVING AN OLD PROBLEM

The nuclear and other crisis problems can be rationally resolved only in the general system of Korean settlement, taking into account the interests of the Russian Federation, the United States, China, Japan and other countries. The unification of the two Korean states should be gradual, stage-by-stage. Given the exceptional complexity of this task, in the foreseeable future it is only realistic to talk about the peaceful coexistence of North and South Korea. Or, at best, a confederate state with two governments and two distinct social systems.

It seems expedient to develop a comprehensive program for the gradual, phased unification of Korea with the participation of the UN, structural organizations Asia-Pacific, North Korea and ROK, other interested countries. It is advisable to entrust the creation of the initial program (concept) not to state, but to public scientific organizations so that it is not unnecessarily politicized and, if possible, more fully and objectively take into account the real state of affairs that has developed in both parts of Korea, the interests various countries and the common interests of the international community. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the mistakes and lessons arising from the experience of Afghanistan (when the government of the Russian Federation turned its back on the government of Najibullah) and the unification of Germany.

Public and scientific organizations, through repeated and comprehensive discussions, are called upon to prepare a conceptual basis for the development and consideration of the Korean problem at the international, state level.

The program (concept) for solving the Korean problem could cover the following major steps:

Political confidence-building measures. Rejection of extremes and intolerance of ideological confrontation, recognition of the status of the two Korean states, their gradual rapprochement and, above all, broad economic cooperation. Based on the experience of Afghanistan and the unification of Germany, one part of Korea cannot be allowed to be absorbed by another. Both public education have their own advantages: North Korea - in terms of expressing the patriotic feelings of the Korean people, ensuring the independence of the country, education and health care; RK - from the point of view of democratic foundations and the development of a market economy. Therefore, it is necessary to look for ways of mutual enrichment through positive acquisitions and overcoming negative sides. It is necessary to soberly assess the current reality. North and South Koreans are now essentially different peoples in terms of mentality. Therefore, their integration will be very difficult, requiring a lot of effort and time. But it is all the more important to start this process sometime and strive to ensure that all intermediate steps and measures are focused on this final goal. This is, first of all, the comprehensive development of economic and cultural ties between the two parts of Korea. Noteworthy is the proposal of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan to create a forum on regional security and cooperation in Northeast Asia with the inclusion of both Koreas, the United States, China, Japan and Russia;

The reduction of armaments and the gradual demilitarization of the peninsula, the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea. Up to a certain period, deliveries (sales) of weapons to the DPRK and the ROK can be carried out, but in the future, the moment will inevitably come when the USA, China, and Russia will have to coordinate their actions in this direction. This especially applies to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, missile technologies and the creation of missile defense systems. Regarding the nuclear program of the DPRK, Russian positions were explained on the issues of reduction and non-proliferation of nuclear missile weapons, ratification of the CTBT and improvement of the missile technology control regime and other issues of ensuring stability and security in the Asia-Pacific zone.

The Russian participants in the conference emphasized the unswerving desire of the Russian Federation to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in the world, including on the Korean Peninsula. Settlement of the North Korean nuclear problem should be achieved by political and diplomatic methods, continuing negotiations within the framework of six states: the Russian Federation, the United States, China, Japan, North Korea, and the Republic of Kazakhstan. At the same time, Russian military experts drew attention to the groundlessness of the statements of employees of the Korean Institute of Defense Studies regarding the presence in the DPRK of ready-to-use nuclear weapons. It was also noted that South Korea's joining the efforts to create a unified American-Japanese-South Korean missile defense system would destabilize the situation in the Asia-Pacific region and would not benefit the detente process on the Korean Peninsula.

OPINION OF THE SOUTH

During the conference, Korean scientists and experts in the field of defense issues made presentations and reports. For example, Professor Kang Bong Gu ( Research Center problems of the Asia-Pacific region of Hanyang University) emphasized that today Russia manages to effectively combine flexibility and rigidity in its policy towards Korea. At the same time, differences in the approaches of the United States and the Russian Federation are clearly visible, stemming from the divergent national interests of the two states in this region.

According to the professor, Russia, firstly, proceeds from the fact that US-North Korean relations are bilateral relations between two sovereign states and for this reason does not consider it desirable to make any attempts to interfere in them. Moscow and Washington are currently strategic partners. But at the same time, despite the fact that Russia's relations with North Korea were during the 1990s. rather cool, the Russian Federation is now heading towards maintaining long-term good-neighborly and friendly contacts with it.

Secondly, Moscow, as can be seen from its efforts to ensure the unconditional and indefinite operation of the 1965 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, consistently adheres to the position of maintaining the nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula.

Thirdly, the peculiarity of Russia's position lies in the fact that it understands terrorism as a complex supranational phenomenon, a threat to global security as a whole. Therefore, the Russian Federation considers it necessary to actively cooperate with the United States in the fight against this evil.

Such a position of Russia, the speaker believes, cannot but be reflected in the formation of the international community's approaches to the problems of North Korean weapons of mass destruction.

Baek Seung-ju (head of the research laboratory on the problem of North Korea) analyzed the internal situation in the DPRK after the so-called "second nuclear crisis" and came to the conclusion that the prospects for maintaining the North Korean regime have deteriorated significantly. The fact is that before the trilateral talks held in April 2003, China's policy towards the DPRK in connection with the nuclear issue was quite moderate. But after North Korea announced the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons, there were signs that Beijing began to put some pressure on Pyongyang. And this may have a negative impact on the political authority of Kim Jong Il.

Secondly, this is the distrust of the United States towards the DPRK. Moreover, it is at a level where it already seems to be extremely difficult to dissipate. Meanwhile, the position of the international community, in which the United States plays a leading role, is in a certain way capable of weakening the North Korean regime.

Thirdly, the growing wariness of the South Korean public towards North Korea. In the face of the North Korean nuclear threat ROK conservative forces are rallying, which hinders the active implementation of the "solar heat" policy and, in turn, can certainly lead to an aggravation of North Korea's economic difficulties.

Yoo Yong-yeol (Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies) stressed that some of the assumptions about Russia's role as a passive mediator in the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue have not materialized. On the contrary, RF were nominated important suggestions to ensure the non-nuclear status of the DPRK, it is clearly stated that Moscow does not accept the fact that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons.

However, the speaker drew attention to the fact that some Russian media We are convinced that the Russian Federation is outside the main trends of the negotiation process. They believe that in the future the role of Moscow may not be as significant as the Russian leadership expects. In particular, there is skepticism about how effective the mediation capabilities of the Russian government will be in the acute US-North Korean confrontation.

Yu Yong Ehol stressed that there are certain differences between Russia and the Republic of Korea in understanding the North Korean nuclear problem. Undoubtedly, both sides are united in the main thing - in the desire to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem by peaceful means. However, what the ROK sees as excessive Russian protection of North Korea is disappointing.

It was especially noted that during the previous stage in the development of relations between the Republic of Korea and Russia, security issues were not fully taken into account, and emphasis was placed on the development of economic cooperation. However, under the current conditions, mutually agreed efforts are needed to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear problem, and this can turn out to be an economic benefit for both sides.

The results of the conference were summed up by the President of the Korean Institute of Defense Studies, Dr. Hwang Dong Jun and the President of the AVN, General of the Army Makhmut Gareev. In the course of official speeches by representatives of the South Korean side, a common thread was the desire to justify the stable and long-term nature of the US military presence on the Korean Peninsula in connection with the desire of the DPRK to create nuclear missile weapons and the unstable situation in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. This is also evidenced by the great resonance in the press in connection with the statement by the command of the American troops about the plans to withdraw the forward formations of the United States deep into the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan. According to the South Koreans, this could provoke a strike from the DPRK. The wish was expressed that Russia would step up its capabilities and influence on Pyongyang in order to stop the development of nuclear weapons.

Representatives of the Russian side, in particular Colonel-General Varfolomey Korobushin, emphasized that the problem of the nuclear threat on the Korean Peninsula could only be resolved through a common system for overcoming the Korean crisis and uniting the country. In general, the Russian participants in their speeches carried the idea of ​​the need to cultivate in South Korea a consistent, non-confrontational approach to the DPRK and the issue of unification of the country with an emphasis on measures of an economic, humanitarian nature, active involvement in the process of authoritative regional and subregional international economic organizations.

On problematic issues of bilateral military-technical cooperation, the Russian delegation explained to the Korean side the need for a more consistent implementation of previously reached agreements and their further build-up. The President of the Institute of Defense Studies, Dr. Hwang Dong Jun, who is also the Chairman of the Council of Defense Enterprises of the Republic of Kazakhstan, proposed to send a group of entrepreneurs engaged in defense business to Russia in order to expand Korean-Russian military-technical cooperation. AVN is looking forward to specific proposals on this issue.

Representatives of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the leadership of the Korean Institute of Defense Studies expressed their satisfaction with the scientific conference, stressed their readiness to continue military-scientific contacts with the Russian side. An agreement was reached to hold the next scientific symposium in Moscow in October 2004. A wider circle of representatives from the RF Ministry of Defense, the Foreign Ministry and Russian experts on the Korean problem could be attracted to this meeting.