Vorobyov Vasily Vasilievich. Where to go next? round table of the Communist Party faction on the state of the armed forces of the Russian Federation

The US is beginning to modernize its tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), including those based in the European theater of operations. Referring to the expert of the Federation of American Scientists Hans Christensen, the British newspaper Guardian writes that in the first place we are talking about about 200 tactical nuclear bombs ah B-61 stationed in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey.

The new US military budget allocates $11 billion for these purposes. 10 billion will be spent on "life extension" of these bombs, and another billion will be spent on adapting them to the new F-35 fighter-bombers, which are designed to replace the fleet of the current F-16s. American tactical nuclear weapons will be completely updated in Europe by 2019 or 2020. “What will return to Europe (after modernization) will be a guided nuclear bomb. And if it is also combined with the F-35 fighter, which has the characteristics of "stealth", then this will expand the number of targets that can be threatened from Europe, since with a more accurate hit, you can use a charge of less power. This is very important as there is less radioactive fallout. Many people are very worried about this, as it does nuclear weapon more convenient to use,” explains Christensen. At the same time, the expert notes: “This will be a significant upgrade of the American nuclear potential in Europe. This is in direct conflict with Obama's promises made in 2010 that he would not deploy new weapons."

What prompted Obama to renege on his promise? It turns out that the stubbornness of Russia, which refuses to negotiate the reduction of its tactical nuclear weapons, in which it, they say, has an overwhelming superiority. And such an argumentation, admittedly, outwardly looks quite convincing, but only if we ignore the overall balance of military forces between the United States and NATO (and China, if you look from Moscow to the east) on the one hand and Russia on the other. It is no coincidence that the position of the United States, calling on Russia to further nuclear disarmament, looks very much like the position of various kinds of nuclear pacifists (or those who "mow down" under pacifism), who call the whole world to nuclear "zero". With the now overwhelming advantage of the Americans (not even counting the army of their NATO allies) in modern high-precision weapons, and indeed the whole complex ground forces, aviation and navy, it would be extremely beneficial for the Americans today to "zero out" the world's nuclear arsenals, which would guarantee them unconditional military superiority. After that, they could simply remind the intractable opponent about the results of the "contactless" wars they won in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan ... If we take, for example, the current balance of general forces between the United States and NATO on the one hand and Russia on the other, then experts evaluate it in the range from 12:1 to 60:1. After such an analysis, the desire of the United States to induce Russia to complete nuclear disarmament, you will agree, does not look so peaceful.

In this light, the very presence of a rather impressive arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons in Russia is an obvious deterrent for both military group the West, and (although our military strategists prefer to keep quiet about this) China. Along with the Russian strategic nuclear forces (SNF), it is our TNW that does not allow Western military strategists to harbor illusions about the possibility of a fleeting "non-contact" victory in a still speculative military conflict with Russia. And therefore, all calls for a radical reduction in the Russian arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, coming, by the way, from some of our experts, who for this alone can be ranked as a home-grown fifth column, are aimed at undermining the security of our country. Moreover, our military strategists and scientists, who are just concerned about strengthening the country's security, are calling for the modernization of the TNW arsenal, making it a reliable deterrent against the threat of a "contactless" attack by a potential adversary.

It is believed that by the beginning of 1991 we had approximately 22,000 tactical nuclear weapons. These are nuclear charges of air bombs, warheads of tactical missiles "Luna", "Tochka", "Oka", nuclear warheads of anti-submarine and anti-ship weapons fleet, special warheads for air defense and missile defense missiles, nuclear mines and nuclear shells of the artillery of the ground forces.

Since the early 1990s, Russia has unilaterally assumed a commitment to reduce its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons by 75% and withdraw them to its territory. Since then, it has been exclusively located there - unlike, by the way, the American TNW, which, in violation of the same Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), is located not only in the United States itself, but also on the territory of five non-nuclear states - Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey. Yes, the Americans, as they announced, had destroyed all their tactical nuclear weapons, including warheads for Tomahawk cruise missiles. The only thing they say they have left is 500 of the aforementioned B-61 bombs, 300 of which they keep at home, and 200 in Europe. But this reduction did not make it particularly easier for Russia: the same Tomahawks and without nuclear filling capable of a lot. And if we take 200 B-61 bombs placed on the European theater of operations (which will also become precision weapons by 2019 and will be suspended under the wing of the F-35 stealth), then for Russia this is in fact the same strategic weapon as the American intercontinental ballistic missiles. If not more dangerous: tactical nuclear weapons have less flight time, and no missile defense system will take it. For the Americans, our tactical nuclear weapons, located exclusively on the territory of the Russian Federation, pose no threat at all. Let the Europeans worry, thereby playing along with the American calls for a nuclear "zero". And the Europeans are already seriously demanding that Russia unilaterally create two nuclear-free zones on the territory of our country - in the Kaliningrad enclave and on the Kola Peninsula.

However, the presence of American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe (let us repeat: in violation of the NPT) gives Russia a bargaining chip in possible negotiations on this issue. Moscow has the right to demand a preliminary withdrawal of American tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and only then consider the very possibility of negotiations on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons, demanding, by the way, at the same time reducing the same French nuclear arsenal. In addition, at the moment, Moscow will most likely condition the start of negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons by issuing legally binding guarantees to the United States that the American missile defense system will not be directed against Russian strategic nuclear forces.

The Americans, of course, will not make such concessions now. In fact, they don't even want to hear about the withdrawal of their tactical nuclear weapons from the European theater of operations. So they put pressure on the "stubborn" Moscow with an 11 billion program to modernize their bombs.

In turn, Russia, according to some of our military experts, would also do well to modernize its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. The new domestic tactical nuclear weapons of small and ultra-low yield may well become Russia's asymmetric response to the threats facing it. Experts write about this on the pages of the Military Industrial Courier Russian Academy Missile and Artillery Sciences (RARAN) Igor Artamonov and Roman Ryabtsev.

Modern technologies, according to experts, make it possible to create new tactical nuclear weapons in the calibers of the main artillery weapons, promising high-precision multi-purpose missile systems and MLRS rockets; at the same time, the possibility of its use by terrorists is almost completely excluded, even if such ammunition falls into their hands. Of course, RARAN experts note, such a decision will cause sharp criticism from Russia's neighbors, the countries of the "nuclear club", accusations of lowering the threshold for nuclear war, etc.

But on the part of Russia, this measure is forced. After all, even the full implementation of the State Armament Program - 2020 and the permanent reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will not provide it with the possibility of waging a sixth-generation war with any serious adversary, experts are convinced. According to them, the capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces - 2020 will be enough, figuratively speaking, for the simultaneous conduct of only a few counter-terrorist operations - probably for "peace enforcement" of a border state with an army of 20,000 people. But they will be clearly not enough to fight a technologically equal, but numerically significantly superior enemy (the army of the PRC - more than 2.3 million people, with a mobilization reserve - more than 30 million) or with the opposing side, approximately equal in number, but significantly superior technologically ( the US army - just under 1.5 million people, the army of European NATO countries - just over 1.5 million troops).

Amirks 20-01-2016 07:01

Guys, as it is very little information on this issue online.

What tactical nuclear weapons are in service with the Russian army?

What is the tactics of its use (what are the prerequisites for using TNW instead of conventional ammunition?)

mpopenker 20-01-2016 12:56

just in case, I remind you that the topic of nuclear weapons has all sorts of different unpleasant vultures and categories that are better not to be violated or disclosed.

NDI 20-01-2016 15:06

Just curious material showing that tactical nuclear weapons are a weighty argument in the deterrence system: http://sputnikipogrom.com/war/...a/#.Vp936pqLS9J

STEPAN1983 20-01-2016 16:33

NDI 20-01-2016 20:34

Well, since you are not a moderator, you can only dream about it. And if you were not too lazy to follow the link, you would see that this is a translated article - and a very competent author. It is a reality that scenarios for the possible use of nuclear weapons are closely related to politics.

Amirks 21-01-2016 10:26

Guys, I'm not interested in the political issues of the use of nuclear weapons.
If there is enough information about strategic nuclear weapons, then there is very little structured information about tactical nuclear weapons.

To be specific, for example, recently the media wrote about another modernization by the Americans of their free-falling bomb B-61. I have never heard of domestic bombs that could be used from aircraft front-line aviation(Su-24 / Su-34). They are?

mpopenker 21-01-2016 12:14

They are?

Lviv 21-01-2016 17:03

http://sputnikipogrom.com/war/...a/#.Vp9*****S9J
author zhzh0t, him scripts for computer games write ... We have such "doctors" near each entrance, three of them gather ...

Novgorodian 22-01-2016 12:41

quote: for front-line aviation were, for IL-28 for sure

Amirks 22-01-2016 12:46

quote: there were also special warheads in air defense

Air defense interests me to a lesser extent.

What is the point of nuclear munitions for 152mm howitzers? As far as I understood, even in the best years, the number of such shells was estimated at 2-3 thousand pieces. Their power is like 2,5 Kt., The firing range is 17 km. Taking into account the fact that the divisional / army artillery does not fire from the forward trenches, then the range to the target from the forward units will probably be 10-12 kilometers. What kind of target in tactical depth could it be, on which such a motherfucker should be dropped?

mpopenker 22-01-2016 10:09

quote: Originally posted by Amirks:

What kind of target in tactical depth could it be, on which such a motherfucker should be dropped?

NDI 22-01-2016 11:58

quote: Originally posted by Amirks:

I heard that the S-300 also had them (maybe they have)

The S-300 is very vague. Wikipedia reports on the special warhead 5V55s, but there is no detailed information. People who served on the S-300 note that there are a number of OLTC commands on the console that are never used. Perhaps they are just for special warheads. But the troops did not see such missiles. Maybe, of course, somewhere they are on duty, but they keep quiet about it.

quote: Originally posted by Amirks:

What is the point of nuclear munitions for 152mm howitzers?

ded2008 22-01-2016 18:56

Amirks 22-01-2016 22:14

quote: for everyone Soviet tanks there was anti-nuclear protection.

Starting with the T-55, what are you talking about?

ded2008 23-01-2016 12:23

well, like breaking through the nuclear explosions of adversaries. By the way, Soviet nuclear weapons for art installations seemed to be in the GDR. possibly in Wünsdorf.

Novgorodian 23-01-2016 12:33

quote: well, like breaking through the nuclear explosions of adversaries.

JRL 23-01-2016 08:24

The T-64 was carrying two special ammunition. Fine. By rail the knot can be screwed up, the division can be covered. Wearable was 38kg, a land mine to install. Normal weapon.

goga312 23-01-2016 09:26

Currently, the following types of special ammunition are in service. Their specific nomenclature and characteristics are classified.
1 Free Falling Bombs
2. Artellirian shells with special warheads
3. Guided missiles of medium and short range with special warheads
4. Air defense missiles with special warheads
5. Torpedoes with special warheads
6. Wearable nuclear devices for sabotage purposes
7. Engineering nuclear munitions for mining terrain

Judging by data from open sources, Russia has the largest arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons in the world.

Tactical nuclear weapons, like strategic nuclear weapons, are used by decision of the military commander to whom they are assigned. In the event of an attack on the Russian Federation, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief authorizes the launch of strategic launch vehicles, and the command on the ground is responsible for disposing of tactical charges.

Amirks 23-01-2016 09:50

quote: Carried T-64 two special ammunition

I have never heard of tank ammunition with a nuclear warhead. In the open press I met the opinion that:
it was not possible to shove a nuclear weapon into less than 152mm (otherwise, why were there no special ammunition for 122mm artillery systems);
Allegedly, the USSR and the USA agreed in the 70s not to "lower" nuclear weapons to the battalion level (in fact, we did not have nuclear weapons below the divisional level)

Amirks 23-01-2016 09:52

Is it insidious that the enemy is forced to consider each artillery system of the appropriate caliber as a potential means of delivering nuclear weapons?

goga312 23-01-2016 10:45

quote: Originally posted by Amirks:
Is it insidious that the enemy is forced to consider each artillery system of the appropriate caliber as a potential means of delivering nuclear weapons?

Well, anyway. If with 2S7 "Peony" and 2S4 "Tulip" everything is more or less clear, i.e. they were reduced to separate self-propelled artillery battalions of high-capacity artillery brigades of the reserve artillery of the Supreme High Command of the Ground Forces of the USSR and, accordingly, were used to perform specific tasks for which they could receive special ammunition 3VB2 and 3VB4.

But with 152 mm, everything is not so clear. Until recently, 152 mm howitzers were a divisional weapon. I do not think that nuclear weapons were stored in the warehouses of the divisions. All the same, the division commander could hardly have made the decision to use tactical nuclear weapons, there were relatively few of them (shells), and storage conditions must be ensured. And here there are questions of logistics, delivery time, secrecy of delivery.

Special ammunition is issued under direct subordination to the commanders of armies or operational formations of troops, they reinforce brigades or divisions as tactically necessary. The principle is the same as for artillery of special power. The guys come, bring special ammunition, transfer it to the unit, and there, either by order of the superiors or at the discretion of the division commander, it is used.

All tactical weapons are issued piece by piece to the higher authorities, and the condition for its use is stipulated. The level of the military commander who will decide to use it can be completely different, ranging from an ordinary soldier from some thread of the GRU group to a lieutenant general in command of the front.

The insidiousness of 152 mm shells with special warheads is that they can be quickly and efficiently used by absolutely any ancient shooter like shit mammoth. At least from a 152 mm howitzer of the 1938 model, at least from what else. At the same time, its destructive power allows for full-fledged artillery preparation before an offensive with just 1 gun, there is no need to concentrate artillery to waste wagons of shells. 1 gun 1 projectile, and you can attack. Moreover, from the side it is not possible to guess whether this gun has a special warhead or not.

JRL 23-01-2016 16:29

quote: I have never heard of tank ammunition with a nuclear warhead.

Novgorodian 24-01-2016 12:13

ded2008, great pictures! I wonder why the projectile in the first photo. From "Condenser"?

280-mm projectile from the M65 "Atomic Annie" cannon.

JRL 24-01-2016 09:12

As for the minimum diameter of a tactical A-bomb. If you shoot from a rifled howitzer or a 152mm cannon. then you need a projectile with a thick wall so that it does not collapse in the barrel when fired. And if you shoot from a smooth, and even dynamo-reactive, then the diameter is smaller due to the smaller wall thickness. So it climbs into 125mm. smooth.
In the USSR, tactical equipment for the Western Group of Forces was stored in the city of Kirovograd. There was also a large therapeutic hospital next to the vault. Charges were stored for: receiver, for attack aircraft bombs, for the fleet for depth charges and torpedoes. By the way, large anti-submarine helicopters had anti-submarine reconnaissance helicopters and the helicopter carried a depth bomb with a tactical one.

ded2008 24-01-2016 09:53

Sakstorp 24-01-2016 13:35

P.M. C
ded2008
written on 24-1-2016 09:53

ded2008 24-01-2016 14:14

oh. well it's all right...

desert eagle 24-02-2016 02:47

I wonder what is the minimum possible projectile to create?

DBoronin 28-02-2016 01:10

and what for, by the way, in modern realities, free-falling nuclear bombs that the Americans modernized?

does the whole plane need to break through all the air defense?

the device itself is not cheap, from which, for example, it cannot be installed in x-31, x-35, etc., the probability of delivery to the address using an aircraft current carrier will increase.

and if you really use tactical nuclear weapons, then just a platform like Eskander to the greatest depth, then for this.
you can get closer to a tornado rocket, for example ... this is a word about a 152mm projectile, which in modern realities is also not clear why.

ded2008 28-02-2016 04:57

I read that one country bought two hundred of these trucks and, having equipped them with nuclear devices, sent them to the country of a potential enemy where they travel around the cities and hour "H" will be blown up. delivery time 0h.0min.0sec. cannot be intercepted.

Fat 28-02-2016 08:23

I read that one country bought two hundred of these trucks and, having equipped them with nuclear devices, sent them to the country of a potential enemy where they travel around the cities and hour "H" will be blown up. delivery time 0h.0min.0sec. cannot be intercepted.

Read less. Send 200 nuclear devices to travel around a foreign country ... well, maybe in Zimbabwe what will happen.

DBoronin 28-02-2016 12:46

quote: Originally posted by ded2008:

I read that one country bought two hundred of these trucks and, having equipped them with nuclear devices, sent them to the country of a potential enemy where they travel around the cities and hour "H" will be blown up. delivery time 0h.0min.0sec. not amenable to interception

200 cars, and even on the go, this is a striving. You never know what, an accident, force majeure or some kind of cataclysm. and the entire program is at stake. and scandal of an incredible level.

NDI 02-03-2016 22:17

DBoronin 02-03-2016 23:18

I don't believe in a house with a safe either. A nuclear charge is not a can of stew. It requires monitoring and maintenance, not to mention storage conditions.

Fat 02-03-2016 23:24

modern plutonium charges up to megaton capacities do not require anything like that. they have a long shelf life and the storage conditions in their containers are nothing special.

but the fact that this is an ambush is a risk, yes ... God forbid someone's nerves will give up and someone will pierce somewhere or some other forcemaker. scandal will be grandiose.

NDI 03-03-2016 12:28

I will assume that none of us is a competent specialist in the field of maintenance of nuclear charges)
In general, I really like these legends. As a rule, they have a logical flaw, which is curious to look for.

I think the main miscalculation here is that a massive missile strike is essentially irresistible anyway. And it will be irresistible for a long time, at least in the coming decades. And during this time, the mining trick will most likely be revealed. At the very least, the risk of this is too great.

Fat 03-03-2016 01:29

Yes, it's all a joke of humor.
Of course, dragging a nuclear charge across the border imperceptibly, oh, how difficult, there is little sense from it alone, and oh, what a scandal will rise upon detection, so no one will suffer from such garbage.
But a shahidmobile for some kind of Palestinian militants, and to an Israeli checkpoint - that would be a yes.

ded2008 03-03-2016 11:04

quote: Yes, it's all a joke of humor.

Llandaff 03-03-2016 18:47

quote: Originally written by Fath:

Then they’ll mine their embassies: no one will go there, and it’s beautiful to gasp when leaving, so to speak - to slam the door.

It was at Afanasyev's. The Armenians kept their only atomic bomb in the embassy in Baku and gasped at the start of the conflict.

DBoronin 03-03-2016 19:01

quote: Originally posted by NDI:

In addition, the destruction major cities, in general, a meaningless thing. This does not deprive the enemy of the opportunity to strike a retaliation strike. It is no coincidence that various scenarios of nuclear war involve a disarming strike first.

ded2008 03-03-2016 20:03

We have 20 million-plus cities. Let roughly 40 million live there. another 100 million scattered throughout the villages of all sorts. yes full of people. enough kalash for everyone.

DBoronin 03-03-2016 21:16

I actually spoke about those who are preparing an attack and their calculated losses, which they will go to for the sake of victory.

those who are attacked do not actually leave a choice, everything is at the mercy of the winner. in the last world war, there wasn’t much mercy for us ... I’m sure you shouldn’t count on future ones either. they will call them narrow-eyed or whatever, and how the most humane will spit poisons and other nuclear weapons.

NDI 03-03-2016 23:23

and here and there, before the wars start, all the military calculate the probable losses

DBoronin 03-03-2016 23:47

quote: Originally posted by NDI:

I do not understand what exactly you object to me. I meant that the undermining of large cities, although it is enormous damage, does not give the attacker a tactical advantage in a nuclear war. If you think about it, there is no difference at all whether the cities are mined or not. In the event of a missile strike, they will turn to ashes anyway.

NDI 04-03-2016 12:10

quote: Originally posted by DBoronin:

will he attack?

I'm not well versed in missile defense, but it seems that these systems are still not "relevant" enough to rely on them in a global conflict. That is, the conditional defender does not yet have the need to resort to such dangerous blackmail.

DBoronin 04-03-2016 08:12

Cuba is pure politics.
Imagine, for example, sowing Korea and a courier from them.

Fat 04-03-2016 08:41

quote: Originally posted by DBoronin:

you did not understand, because you are considering mining enemy cities from the point of view of an attack.
Now look from a defense point of view.
for example, what thoughts will the attacker have if a courier comes to him before the attack and, for example, brings him a nuclear weapon the size of the same 152mm.
will he attack? how many more and what size? it is hard to launch a "global strike" in such an environment when missile defense is no longer relevant.

In fact, such ammunition will not cause great destruction - it will, in fact, be like one powerful air bomb, no more, but it will probably not be easy to hide such an operation from counterintelligence.

DBoronin 04-03-2016 17:28

I beg you, drug lords carry tons of nonsense. Submarines go and planes fly, and underground tunnels.
And if this state project, then the more it is quite feasible.

DBoronin 04-03-2016 17:32

And what does insignificant damage to tens of thousands of people and infection mean? Who in their right mind would deliberately cause such damage if it could be prevented simply by giving up their political ambitions?

DBoronin 04-03-2016 17:36

This scenario is not about us and the Americans, it is rather a Chinese or Indian scenario, well, probably somewhere in North Korea.
With our capabilities, somewhere deep at the bottom of the Atlantic, there is probably a land mine in neutral waters. Megaton at 10-30.

ded2008 04-03-2016 17:39

He also noted that in case of any threat from the outside, the country can use nuclear weapons "at any moment".

Fat 04-03-2016 20:11

quote: Originally written by ded2008:
Chapter North Korea Kim Jong-un announced his readiness to use nuclear weapons at any time. This is reported by the South Korean news agency Yonhap.

This statement was made by the leader of the country in connection with the "growing threat of external enemies."

According to Kim Jong-un, in the near future the country will review its military doctrine under the new terms, the agency said.

He also noted that in case of any threat from the outside, the country can use nuclear weapons "at any moment".

DBoronin 04-03-2016 20:17

quote: Originally posted by Fath:

Decorative villains are always needed to spin up the military budget.

GregoryM 16-03-2016 17:38

quote: Originally posted by DBoronin:

Originally posted by Fath:

Decorative villains are always needed to spin up the military budget.

God forbid, what if he's a psychopath?

ded2008 17-03-2016 15:44

the fact that he shoots them from anti-aircraft guns is an American fake.

abc55 18-03-2016 12:16

Eun minami throws ministers
mde
What they don't say on TV
on TV 25 years ago other songs were sung
that Kimirsen is a young wrestler
that capitalism is evil, and kammuniaks are our true
now the songs are different
now socialism is evil
well, kaneshn Eun is the axis of this evil
such uncles are big, and they watch all the TVs
why the head?

ded2008 18-03-2016 13:18

mpopenker 18-03-2016 15:50

quote: Originally posted by ded2008:

in the head they eat GMO products and Crimeanash.

ded2008 21-03-2016 12:43

Small kilotonnage portable warheads. Designed to destroy medium and large concentrations of enemy forces. One person with such a knapsack is able to destroy an entire brigade stationed in a residential area, along with the area itself. In total, there are two such companies in the Korean army, it is assumed that in the event of a massive intervention, one company will go on a land kamikaze trip through the territory occupied by the enemy, the other will be parachuted from an aircraft into the territory of South Korea.

Fat 21-03-2016 16:40

Correct shahids.

abc55 21-03-2016 21:43

more like dirty bombs
or layouts

Novgorodian 22-03-2016 12:32

quote: Originally posted by abc55:

more like dirty bombs

lisovTo 25-03-2016 14:30

quote: Originally written by ded2008:

Small kilotonnage portable warheads. Designed to destroy medium and large concentrations of enemy forces. One person with such a knapsack is able to destroy an entire brigade stationed in a residential area, along with the area itself. In total, there are two such companies in the Korean army, it is assumed that in the event of a massive intervention, one company will go on a land kamikaze trip through the territory occupied by the enemy, the other will be parachuted from an aircraft into the territory of South Korea.

Llandaff 25-03-2016 15:36

Actually, these are combat dosimetrists or some other RHBZshniks. In knapsacks, not bombs, but dosimeters.

Defense Minister Geletey's recent statement regarding the possible use of Russian troops of nuclear weapons against the forces of the ATO, as he later noted, was due to the information available at that time that Russia had brought to the territory of the Lugansk region and was using self-propelled mortars 2S4 "Tyulpan" against Ukrainian military personnel

He noted that a feature of this powerful weapon is that in addition to high-explosive and active-reactive mines, this self-propelled mortar can fire ultra-small nuclear weapons. What are ultra-small nuclear charges.?

Ultra-small nuclear charges: from cartridge to projectile

The problem of creating ultra-small caliber atomic weapons is not new. They have been actively engaged in both the USA and the USSR since the late 60s. However, all work on this topic was strictly classified, and only after the transfer of the Semipalatinsk test site to the jurisdiction of Kazakhstan and the declassification of some of the archives, some interesting details became known.

In the test reports, references were found to experiments in which the energy release is indicated as "less than 0.002 kt", that is, two tons of explosives! Several documents were truly sensational. They talked about nuclear ammunition for small arms - special cartridges of 14.3 mm and 12.7 mm calibers for heavy machine guns, but the most amazing thing was that there were also 7.62 mm caliber cartridges!

True, nuclear cartridges were not intended for the Kalashnikov AKM assault rifle, but for another brainchild of the legendary designer - the Kalashnikov machine gun, PKS. The cartridge for this machine gun became the smallest nuclear weapon in the world.

A radical reduction in size, weight and design complexity was achieved through the use of uranium or plutonium, which is unusual for nuclear bombs, and the exotic transuranic element californium - more precisely, its isotope with an atomic weight of 252.

After the discovery of this isotope, physicists were stunned that its main decay channel was spontaneous fission, in which 5-8 neutrons were emitted (for comparison: uranium and plutonium have 2 or 3). The first estimates of the critical mass of this metal gave a fantastically small value - 1.8 grams! True, further experiments showed that its real value turned out to be noticeably larger.

However, scientists had only micrograms of this material at their disposal.

The program for obtaining and accumulating California is a separate chapter in the history of the USSR nuclear project. The secrecy of the project is evidenced at least by the fact that practically no one knows the name of Kurchatov's closest associate, Academician Mikhail Yuryevich Dubik, who was entrusted with as soon as possible solve the problem of producing a valuable isotope.

The technology developed by the academician is still secret, although something has become known. Soviet nuclear scientists made special targets-traps for neutrons, in which, during the explosions of powerful thermonuclear bombs, californium was obtained from plutonium extracted from spent nuclear fuel.

The traditional production of isotopes in a reactor would be much more expensive, since in thermonuclear explosions the neutron flux density is billions of times greater. The stuffing of unique bullets was made from the isolated californium - a detail resembling a rivet or a dumbbell. A tiny charge of special explosives, located at the bottom of the bullet, crushed this thing into a neat ball, due to which a supercritical state was achieved.

In the case of 7.62 mm bullets, the diameter of this ball was almost 8 mm. The explosives were triggered by a contact fuse specially designed for this program. As a result, the bullet turned out to be overweight, and in order to maintain the ballistics familiar to the machine gunner, a special gunpowder had to be made, which gave the bullet the correct acceleration in the machine gun barrel.

But this is not all the difficulties that the creators of the unique ammunition had to overcome. The main problem that ultimately decided his fate was heat dissipation. All radioactive materials heat up, and the shorter the half-life, the greater the heat release. The California core bullet produced about 5 watts of heat. Due to the heating, the characteristics of the explosive and fuse changed, and with strong heating, the bullet could get stuck in the chamber or in the barrel, or, even worse, spontaneously detonate.

Therefore, the cartridges were stored in a special refrigerator, which was a massive (about 15 cm thick) copper plate with slots for 30 cartridges. The space between the nests was filled with channels through which liquid ammonia circulated under pressure, providing the bullets with a temperature of about minus 15 degrees.

This refrigeration unit consumed about 200 watts of power and weighed about 110 kg, so it could only be transported on a specially equipped UAZ. In classical atomic bombs, the heat removal system is an integral part of the design, but here it was of necessity external.

However, even a bullet frozen to minus 15 had to be used within 30 minutes after being removed from the thermostat, that is, loaded into the magazine, taken a position, selected the desired target and fired. If this did not happen in time, the cartridge had to be returned to the refrigerator and thermostated again. If the bullet stayed out of the refrigerator for more than an hour, then it was subject to disposal.

Another insurmountable drawback was the irreproducibility of the results.

The energy release during the explosion of each particular instance ranged from 100 to 700 kilograms of TNT equivalent, depending on the batch, time and storage conditions, and most importantly, the material of the target that the bullet hit.

The fact is that ultra-small nuclear charges interact with the environment in a fundamentally different way than classical nuclear charges. The result is not similar to conventional chemical explosives. After all, when a ton of chemical explosive explodes, tons of hot gases are formed, evenly heated to a temperature of two to three thousand degrees. And here is a tiny ball that cannot convey in any way environment nuclear decay energy.

Therefore, the shock wave turned out to be rather weak compared to chemical explosives of the same power, but radiation, on the contrary, received a much larger share of energy. Because of this, it was necessary to shoot at maximum effective range machine gun, but even in this case, the shooter could receive a noticeable dose of radiation. So the maximum burst that was allowed to be fired was limited to three shots.

However, one shot was usually enough. Despite the fact that the active armor of modern tanks did not allow such a warhead to penetrate the protection through, the powerful energy release heated the impact site until the armor components evaporated and the metal melted, so that the tracks and the turret were tightly welded to the hull. Having hit a brick wall, such a bullet evaporated about a cubic meter of masonry, and the building collapsed.

The strangest was the effect of a bullet hitting a tank of water. There was no nuclear explosion at the same time - the water slowed down and reflected neutrons. Slow neutrons fission nuclei more efficiently and the reaction begins before the bullet hits the tank wall, causing the bullet to fail due to the intense heat. They tried to use the resulting effect to protect tanks from subminiature nuclear weapons, hanging on them the so-called "water armor", or, more simply, containers with heavy water.

The implementation of this program has yielded many interesting scientific results. But the supply of californium, "produced" during super-powerful nuclear explosions, was steadily melting away. After the introduction of a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, the problem became even more acute: californium from a reactor was much more expensive, and its production volumes were small. Of course, the military would not be deterred by spending if they felt an urgent need for such weapons. The generals, however, were in doubt, which was the reason for the termination of this program shortly before Brezhnev's death.

The shelf life of unique Californian bullets did not exceed six years, so none of them survived to this day. Californium was removed from them and used for purely scientific purposes, such as, for example, obtaining superheavy elements.

Undoubtedly, it was those bullets that did not survive to our time, but no one will undertake to assert that developments were really stopped and since then the results have not been conducted and improved. This prompts reflections on the possible appearance of such weapons by terrorists - the only question is the price.

Nuclear munitions for tanks

In the 1950s, opposing military blocs were in full swing preparing for an all-out nuclear war. At the same time, the United States managed to overtake the USSR in matters of miniaturization of nuclear weapons. At the very beginning of the 1960s, the Americans adopted the 120-mm and 155-mm Davy Crocket recoilless rifles. These were relatively small and light guns (weight about 50 kg for the first and 180 kg for the second). "Davy Crocket" could launch a 35-kg projectile at a distance of 2 to 4 km, respectively. According to various estimates, the power of one charge reached up to 1 kiloton.

These recoilless guns were transported using conventional jeeps and were in service with paratroopers and ground forces. Having created such a weapon, the Americans decided to go even further. In the late 1950s, work began in the United States on the creation of the 152-mm Shilleleila guided munition, which was supposed to be included in the ammunition load of the M551 Sheridan light tank and the M-60A2 MBT. AT serial version such a missile weighed 4.1 kg, and in addition to a nuclear warhead, it could be equipped with a conventional cumulative warhead. The missile was guided to the target by an infrared beam. The maximum range of fire reached 4-5 km.

The first new 152-mm gun-launcher received light tank"Sheridan" with armor of only 13 mm and a total weight of 16 tons. Up to 12 guided projectiles could be loaded into this tank. In total, approximately 1,700 of these combat vehicles were produced, some of which even managed to fight in Vietnam, where the tanks demonstrated their poor survivability.

The program for the creation of the M-60A2 weighing 44 tons also developed not quite well. Despite the fact that this tank was equipped with the most advanced automated control system at that time, which had an analog-to-digital ballistic computer and a laser rangefinder, the tank quickly disappointed the military, primarily with its 152-mm gun and rocket to it.

The tank reached the army by the time when the nuclear versions of such ammunition had already been withdrawn from service. In the usual version, it was extremely unreliable and not so effective. As a result, the M-60A2 did not remain in service for long, and rather quickly they were all converted into engineering vehicles.

Etc.

Tactical nuclear weapons are in service with all nuclear powers, except for Great Britain, which left only strategic class nuclear weapons (although in the past it also had tactical nuclear weapons).

Encyclopedic YouTube

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✪ Testing tactical nuclear weapons

✪ Testing tactical nuclear weapons (51-54)

✪ On the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons by the Russian Federation. K. Sivkov

✪ Tactical nuclear weapons. Forced issuance of passports and airlift

✪ Tactical nuclear weapons (2011)

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Initially, nuclear weapons were seen as a purely strategic weapon, due both to their exceptional power and to the technical limitations of early atomic weapons. However, as early as 1945, the US military began to consider the possibility of using the destructive power of nuclear weapons to solve tactical problems - for example, breaking through the enemy's fortified defenses. The suppression of such a defense with conventional ammunition required a long artillery preparation (sometimes lasting whole days), which gave the enemy the place of the impending attack and allowed him to concentrate reserves in advance for counteraction. The use of nuclear weapons made it possible to destroy an entire sector of the enemy’s defenses with one sudden blow, and immediately go on the offensive, completely taking the enemy by surprise.

During the planning of the proposed landing in Japan, the US military proposed the use of nuclear bombs for tactical purposes, to quickly destroy Japanese defenses in the proposed bridgeheads. Second World War completed before these plans could be implemented. In 1946, the Americans conducted a series of nuclear tests "Crossroads" aimed at studying the use of nuclear weapons against warships; Based on the results of this operation, valuable conclusions were drawn about the need to provide anti-nuclear protection and deactivate combat units to counter possible nuclear strikes. Subsequently, a series of exercises were conducted with the use of nuclear weapons, including training forced marches through the area that was subjected to a nuclear strike with the detonation of a real nuclear charge. The purpose of these tests was to work out the tactics of actions in the conditions of the use of nuclear weapons and to familiarize the soldiers with its damaging effect.

In the USSR, the first nuclear test was carried out in 1949 ; during which the questions of the effect of nuclear weapons on military equipment and defensive structures. The first large-scale exercises with the detonation of a real nuclear charge were held at the Totsk test site in 1954.

US tactical nuclear weapons

The US military paid considerable attention to tactical nuclear weapons, considering them to be an effective way to neutralize the significant numerical superiority of the military forces in the potential European theater. Since the main part of the mobilization potential of the US Army was located across the Atlantic, the US military proceeded from the fact that in the event of any conflict involving the USSR, it would have a significant initial advantage in continental Europe, which it would try to realize in order to achieve strategic success in the European theater before how the European armies will be fully mobilized and the American one will be transferred across the ocean.

An effective way to neutralize the initial Soviet superiority in the 1950s was seen as tactical nuclear weapons, which could be used both to disrupt enemy offensives and to quickly break through the front and tactical counteroffensives. In the 1950s, the US had a significant quantitative and qualitative superiority in the nuclear arsenal. The mass deployment of tactical nuclear-armed units - requiring relatively few personnel - was seen as a substantially cheaper solution than defending Europe with conventional forces alone.

For use in the immediate vicinity of the battlefield, the US Army, Air Force and Navy in the early 1950s created the first samples of tactical atomic bombs (capable of being delivered to the target by battlefield aircraft), tactical missiles with nuclear warheads and atomic artillery shells. Particular attention was paid to small dimensions, ease of maintenance and high accuracy of use - which made it possible to use such weapons near the front line without risk to their troops. A number of large-scale military exercises - with the detonation of real nuclear weapons - were held in order to study the influence of the damaging factors of nuclear weapons, their effect on troops, and the problems of overcoming contaminated space. Based on these data, tactical schemes and techniques were developed that made it possible to achieve the most effective interaction between tactical nuclear weapons and conventional forces.

In the mid-1950s, the miniaturization of nuclear warheads made it possible to use them as warheads for surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles. The use of nuclear charges on missiles of this type made it possible to effectively compensate for the imperfection of the guidance systems of that time and achieve significant effectiveness of such ammunition. At the same time, samples of nuclear depth charges were created for the US Navy and nuclear torpedoes, to effectively destroy submarines.

By the turn of the 1960s, the US military had the largest arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons in the world, giving it effective parity with any potential adversary. Further development of the theory of nuclear weapons has made it possible to achieve a number of topical improvements in the field of battlefield nuclear weapons:

• The general miniaturization and increasing efficiency of nuclear devices has led to the possibility of creating artillery shells for conventional caliber guns - rather than specialized large-caliber "atomic guns" - as well as to the creation of especially compact nuclear devices, hand-carried or fired from infantry grenade launchers.
• It became possible to carefully calibrate the power of a nuclear charge directly on the battlefield, without the need to create different models of the same ammunition with different powers.
• The main damaging factor for tactical nuclear weapons was considered to be neutron radiation, and not a shock wave. This was due in many respects to the widespread use of military equipment equipped with anti-nuclear protection and the optimization of troop tactics on the battlefield.

In the 1970s, with the increase in the range and accuracy of missile weapons, the boundaries between strategic and tactical missiles were largely blurred, which led to an increase in international tension and, as a result, the signing of agreements between the USSR and the United States on the mutual decommissioning of small ballistic missiles. and medium range, regardless of their intended purpose. During the 1970s and 1980s, the US military developed a number of types of tactical nuclear weapons to replace obsolete, previous models. In general, in the 1980s, there was a decrease in interest in tactical nuclear weapons in the US military due to the emergence of other ways to solve the corresponding tactical tasks - in particular, ammunition volume explosion and cluster munitions.

After the collapse of the USSR in the 1990s, the US tactical nuclear weapons arsenal was significantly reduced, including the withdrawal of half of the US tactical arsenals in Europe. Significant progress in the field of communication systems and the development of precision weapons have made possible solution tasks on the battlefield without the use of nuclear weapons. All artillery nuclear shells and tactical missile warheads were completely decommissioned and dismantled. Currently, the US arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons is maintained primarily in the form of free-falling aircraft bombs delivered by tactical aircraft. Tactical nuclear weapons are no longer an integral part of American combat doctrine. However, the US military maintains a significant reserve of nuclear warheads removed from delivery vehicles, which can be used in the future to equip new types of tactical weapons.

Tactical nuclear weapons in the USSR

Having initially smaller resources, the USSR experienced certain difficulties in creating tactical nuclear weapons, despite the understanding by the Soviet leadership of its capabilities. Until the end of the 1950s, the only type of tactical nuclear weapon in the arsenal of the USSR was aerial bombs (the first of which was RDS-4 in 1954-1956). In view of the refusal of the USSR industry to create “cannon” type bombs - expensive and inefficient, but at that time more compact than implosion ones - the first samples of Soviet nuclear artillery shells had monstrous dimensions of about 400-410 millimeters, and did not enter service. Similar problems occurred in the development of warheads for anti-aircraft and tactical missiles.

On October 10, 1957, the first tests of a Soviet torpedo with a nuclear combat charging compartment (BZO) took place. Torpedo 53-58, fired from the S-144 submarine (captain of the 1st rank G.V. Lazarev) of project 613, having traveled 10 kilometers, exploded at a depth of 35 meters. The result of her action was the sinking of all ships intended for testing (two destroyers, two submarines and two minesweepers). It became clear that a new weapon could determine the result not of a single naval battle, but of an entire operation. Already in 1958 Navy The USSR adopts the 53-58 torpedo with the RDS-9 nuclear warhead.

In the 1960s, the USSR, having successfully solved technological problems, adopted a wide range of different tactical ammunition, including artillery shells conventional caliber guns, warheads for tactical and anti-aircraft missiles, and warheads for anti-ship cruise missiles. By the end of the 1960s, the USSR's tactical nuclear arsenal ranked second in the world after only the US. The lack of information on specific types of tactical nuclear weapons makes it impossible to establish the exact characteristics and development trends of such. In the doctrine of the USSR, tactical weapons occupied an important place as a means of rapid development of success. offensive operations and obstruction by the enemy.

Tactical nuclear weapons in other countries

Some estimates suggest that Pakistan may be developing tactical nuclear weapons.

Types of tactical nuclear weapons

Aviation atomic bombs

Tactical usually includes aviation nuclear bombs intended for use by battlefield aviation - fighter-bombers and front-line bombers - capable, unlike strategic aviation, of dropping tactical nuclear weapons with the high accuracy necessary for use near the front line. The equivalent of tactical atomic bombs typically ranges from kilotons to hundreds of kilotons; however, tactical nuclear bombs of both subkiloton and megaton equivalents are known.

In 2014, the U.S. Air Force tested the B61-12 guided version of the B61 nuclear bomb, designed to be dropped with extreme precision against heavily defended targets. This option is expected to be integrated on US and NATO aircraft, incl. F-16 A/B/C/D, PA-200 Tornado, F-15E, F-35B, LRS-B, B2-A . Modifications B61 may refer to strategic or tactical weapons.

Artillery atomic shells

Atomic artillery shells appeared in the early 1950s as a means of using atomic weapon with high precision directly on the front line. Aviation at that time could not yet ensure the release of atomic bombs with sufficient accuracy to use them near friendly troops; rocket weapons were not yet sufficiently reliable and also had unsatisfactory accuracy. The problem was solved by creating atomic munitions compact enough to fit in an artillery shell.

Initially, atomic weapons were specialized large-caliber systems. By the early 1960s, however, it was possible to create nuclear projectiles used by conventional caliber artillery. Atomic shells were considered as a valuable addition to conventional artillery, capable of qualitatively increasing its capabilities and effectiveness in operations against the enemy's defensive formations, his troops and rear facilities, as well as in counter-battery combat. Typically, atomic artillery was deployed at the divisional and regimental level; In 1961-1971, the US Army created a battalion-level tactical nuclear weapon in the form of the Davey Crocket recoilless rifle capable of firing the over-caliber W54 subkiloton nuclear projectile.

Tactical missile warheads

Nuclear warheads were widely used to equip surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, including tactical ones. The first samples of tactical ballistic and tactical cruise missiles were created in the 1950s; later, it was ballistic operational-tactical missiles that formed the basis of the arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. Their advantages include high accuracy, mobility and a significant range, which allows them to be used both to destroy objects on the front line and in the near rear of the enemy.

The problem of tactical missile weapons is the difficulty of differentiating them from strategic ones. The increase in the accuracy of ammunition in the 1970s made it possible to use for tactical purposes both the OTRK and the BRMD and even the MRBM.

In the USSR, from the 1950s to the 1980s, some anti-ship cruise missiles were equipped with nuclear warheads. In other countries, the development of nuclear anti-ship missiles was undertaken repeatedly, but for reasons mainly of an economic nature, they were not brought to a practical result.

Nuclear-powered anti-aircraft missiles and air-to-air missiles

Tactical nuclear weapons are also an effective way to deal with enemy aircraft and cruise missiles. The significant radius of destruction of a nuclear warhead compensates for any conceivable miss, nullifies the effectiveness of electronic warfare and allows you to destroy several aircraft in close formation with one blow. The world's first anti-aircraft nuclear complex became the American MIM-14 Nike-Hercules; in the future, similar types of ammunition were created in the USSR. Nuclear warheads were also used by naval anti-aircraft missiles, mainly as a means of guaranteed destruction of supersonic anti-ship missiles.

In the 1950s, the United States also created samples of atomic air-to-air missiles. The compact guidance systems needed to build the URVV were not yet sufficiently reliable at the time, and engineers hoped to compensate for guidance errors by using a nuclear warhead. Two samples of such weapons - the AIR-2 Genie unguided missile and the AIM-26 Falcon guided missile - were put into service. The second was in service for a short time, but the first remained in the arsenal until 1984.

Nuclear missiles

Nuclear warheads on anti-missiles were initially considered as an effective means of intercepting the warheads of enemy ballistic missiles. Since the accuracy of the electronic equipment of the 1950s and 1970s did not guarantee a direct hit on the ballistic missile warhead, a nuclear warhead, with its extensive radius of destruction, was the only reliable way to intercept a ballistic target.

Since the interception of ballistic missiles was supposed to be outside the atmosphere, the neutron flux should have become the main damaging factor. Neutron radiation from the detonation of the anti-missile warhead penetrated the enemy's missile warhead, disabling electronic equipment and heating the nuclear fuel inside to destruction. Later, thermonuclear warheads were created with an increased output of X-rays, which evaporated and destroyed the very structure of the enemy warhead.

Currently, nuclear warheads on anti-missiles are not considered promising. The development of electronics made it possible to ensure a direct hit by an anti-missile into an enemy warhead. In addition, high-altitude nuclear explosions of anti-missiles interfered with their own radars, making subsequent interceptions more difficult.

Engineering atomic bombs

In the 1960s, both in the US and in the USSR, a number of types of engineered nuclear charges were developed - intended for laying and subsequent detonation in position. Such charges were supposed to be used both for engineering purposes (as a particularly powerful equivalent of conventional engineering charges), and in combat, as a kind of atomic mines. A number of charges of this type were made portable, and could be used by special units for covert sabotage behind enemy lines.

Underwater atomic charges

Both the US and the USSR developed a significant number of atomic warheads adapted for underwater use - in the form of torpedo warheads, depth charges and atomic bombs. bottom mines designed to destroy enemy ships and submarines.

Classification problem

At present, there is no unambiguous and exhaustive definition of which nuclear weapons should be considered tactical. The line between tactical and strategic weapons is very arbitrary and may vary depending on the conditions of use. Attempts have been made to classify tactical nuclear weapons according to:

• Capacities - in general, tactical nuclear weapons are usually less powerful than strategic ones (due to the possibility of being used near the front line, that is, near friendly objects). However, this classification is not exhaustive, as most modern nuclear weapons have varying yields. Thus, for example, the B61 American nuclear bomb considered tactical has an equivalent of 0.3 to 340 kilotons - more than the W87 strategic warhead considered.
• For carriers - it is assumed that tactical nuclear weapons should be deployed on carriers that are not intended for operations at long distances of the order of thousands of kilometers. However, due to the significant uniformity modern species weapons, there are no fundamental obstacles to the installation of tactical nuclear weapons on strategic carriers - for example, the suspension of tactical nuclear bombs under strategic bombers. In addition, the increase in the range of tactical aviation, the possibility of aerial refueling and the emergence of long-range cruise missiles launched from tactical aircraft have largely blurred the line between strategic and tactical launchers.
• Purpose - it is assumed that tactical nuclear weapons are intended for use near the front line and in the near rear of the enemy, and strategic - to destroy the enemy's deep rear. However, the formal appointment does not preclude the use tactical weapons for strategic purposes (for example, arming a strategic bomber with tactical bombs), as well as the use of strategic weapons for tactical purposes (for example, striking an important front-line airfield with an SLBM)
• Accuracy - for tactical nuclear weapons, accuracy is a key parameter, since such weapons are created based on the possibility of using them in close proximity to friendly troops. For strategic weapons, these requirements are usually less relevant, since strategic weapons are used far from friendly objects. However, general increase accuracy of nuclear weapons in the 1980s led to the fact that the line between tactical and strategic was practically erased.

In this regard, there are difficulties in the formation of international agreements on tactical nuclear weapons, since it is not entirely clear how to precisely define one. Only nuclear anti-missiles that do not have thermal protective fairings (that is, they are not capable of re-entry into the atmosphere) and nuclear depth charges designed to combat submarines can be considered unambiguously tactical nuclear weapons.

Therefore, NATO has to rely on nuclear forces to counterbalance NATO's overwhelming military superiority. We bring to your attention five nuclear systems weapons that pose a threat.

Russia is investing heavily in modernizing its nuclear forces, both strategic and tactical. We bring to your attention five Russian nuclear weapons systems. Among them are not only the usual nuclear weapons, but also systems with a nuclear component. If we talk about the military power of Moscow, then it is they who pose a real threat to the West.

Modern Russia is not the Soviet Union. If the USSR adhered to the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, then in November 1993 Russia abandoned it. In fact, Moscow has secured for itself the right to use its nuclear arsenal in any conflict under a doctrine paradoxically called "de-escalation."

This is due to the fact that if the Soviet military were confident in their ability to defeat any enemy in a war using conventional means, now in Russian army complete confusion. Some of its units and units are well equipped and trained, but most of Russia's non-nuclear armed forces are made up of poorly trained conscripts who use obsolete Soviet-era weapons.

So Russia has to rely on its nuclear forces to counterbalance NATO's overwhelming military superiority. It is investing heavily in modernizing its nuclear forces, both strategic and tactical.

We bring to your attention five Russian nuclear weapons systems. Moreover, we are talking not only about the usual nuclear weapons, but also systems with a nuclear component. All of them pose a threat to the United States of America.

Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are the most survivable component of the nuclear deterrence force. At Soviet Union there was a whole fleet of SSBNs, represented by Delta class submarines (a collective designation for four types of Soviet strategic nuclear submarines: Murena, Murena-M, Kalmar and Dolphin - approx. Per.) and Project 941 Akula. The new Project 955 Borey strategic missile submarine has replaced these boats.

The new boat is significantly smaller than the huge Project 941 Shark (NATO Typhoon) submarine, but still larger than the American Ohio-class SSBNs. The project that formed the basis of Borea was conceived in the last years of the existence of the Soviet Union. SSBN "Borey" has good characteristics and can carry on board 16 ballistic missiles of submarines "Bulava". This quiet boat has excellent hydrodynamics.

To date, three such boats have been built, and three more are under construction. Some of them have been upgraded and, according to some reports, are capable of carrying 20 missiles on board. Russia hopes to build 10 Borey-class submarines. However, there are doubts that such construction will be within its means.

SLBM Bulava

Submarines of the Borey project would be useless without their nuclear weapons. These submarines are equipped with new RSM-56 Bulava solid-fuel ballistic missiles. The Russians worked hard to build this missile. A considerable number of such missiles exploded during testing, and there were other problems associated with the quality of the control system. It seems that most of these problems have been solved, but only time can confirm this.

On paper, the Mace seems like a very powerful weapon. The 37-ton missile has a range of 11,000 kilometers and can carry 10 warheads with a yield of 150 kilotons each. But usually missiles are equipped with only six warheads.

Submarines of the Yasen project are a new generation of Russian submarine missile carriers. The first boat was laid down in 1993, but due to lack of funds, construction was completed only in September 2011. The first boat of the Yasen project, called Severodvinsk (pictured), makes a deep impression. So deep that the head of the American submarine development program ordered a mock-up for his office.

“We will face a strong potential enemy. Just look at Severodvinsk, the Russian version of a nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine. This ship made such an impression on me that I asked the people from Carderock (the center for the development of surface weapons - approx. Lane) to build its model based on data from open sources, - said the program manager at the end of 2014 at the Falls Church submarine symposium submarines from the office for the development of marine systems Rear Admiral Dave Johnson (Dave Johnson). “The submarine fleet of the rest of the world never stands still, but is constantly evolving.”

Russia is building improved versions of the Project 855 boats, which take into account the mistakes and shortcomings made since 1993. However, the Yasen submarines do not carry strategic nuclear weapons. Their weapons are nuclear-powered cruise missiles.

Russian arsenal of operational-tactical nuclear weapons

The Russian arsenal of operational-tactical nuclear weapons is smaller than what the Soviet Union once had. Russia is believed to have at least 2,000 deployed operational-tactical nuclear weapons. But if we take into account non-deployed weapons, then it has up to five thousand such warheads. It is believed that the Soviet Union was armed with from 15 to 25 thousand units of operational-tactical nuclear weapons.

These weapons are used by Russia to compensate for the relative weakness of its non-nuclear forces. But now it is not completely clear how many such weapons she has in service. It should be noted that operational-tactical nuclear weapons are not covered by the START treaties.

Russia can carry out the delivery of such weapons to the target in various ways. One of the delivery vehicles is the 9K720 Iskander short-range ballistic missile (pictured). These weapons could be deployed in places such as the Kaliningrad region on the Baltic coast to, for example, strike US missile defense sites in Poland.

In recent years, Russia has continued the process of modernizing its strategic forces ground-based nuclear deterrence. The PC-24 Yars, known to NATO as the SS-27 Mod 2, is Russia's latest intercontinental ballistic missile. Its multiple reentry vehicle can carry up to four individually targetable warheads. A rocket can be launched either from a silo or from a mobile launcher based on a wheeled vehicle.

Russia is also developing a heavy intercontinental ballistic missile "Sarmat", which should overcome the enemy's anti-missile defense systems. Almost nothing is known about this missile, except that it will be liquid-fueled and will be able to carry 15 warheads. It is believed that "Sarmat" will replace the rocket of the era cold war R-36M (Satan in NATO classification).

Dave Majumdar has been covering the military since 2004. He currently writes for the U.S. Naval Institute, Aviation Week, The Daily Beast and more. He has previously covered national security issues for Flight International, Defense News and C4ISR Journal. Majumdar did strategic studies at the University of Calgary and is currently studying naval history.