Ground-based air defense radars of NATO countries. NATO portable anti-aircraft missile systems TTX of modern radar stations of the NATO armed forces

The Blue Berets have a technological breakthrough

The airborne troops are rightfully the flagship Russian army, including in the field of supply the latest weapons and military equipment. Now the main task airborne units- ability to lead fighting offline behind enemy lines, which, among other things, implies that the “winged infantry” after landing should be able to defend themselves from attacks from the sky. Boss air defense VDV Vladimir Protopopov told MK what difficulties airborne anti-aircraft gunners are now facing, what complexes are being used by the “blue berets”, and also about where specialists are trained for this kind of troops.

- Vladimir Lvovich, how did the formation of air defense units of the Airborne Forces begin?

The first air defense units in the Airborne Forces were formed during the Great Patriotic War, back in 1943. These were separate anti-aircraft artillery battalions. In 1949, air defense control bodies were created in the Airborne Forces formations, which included a group of officers with an air observation, warning and communications post, as well as a P-15 all-round radio engineering station. The first head of the air defense of the Airborne Forces was Ivan Savenko.

If we talk about the technical equipment of air defense units of the Airborne Forces, then for the past 45 years we have been armed with a twin ZU-23 anti-aircraft gun, with which you can fight not only low-flying targets, but also lightly armored ground targets and firing points at a distance of up to 2 km. In addition, it can be used to defeat enemy manpower as open areas, and located behind light field-type shelters. The effectiveness of the ZU-23 has been repeatedly proven in Afghanistan, as well as during the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus.

The ZU-23 has been in service for 45 years.

In the 80s, the air defense of the Airborne Forces switched to better weapons, so our units began to receive portable anti-aircraft guns. missile systems"Needle", which allowed to lead effective fight with all types of aircraft, even if the enemy used thermal interference. The air defense units of the Airborne Forces, armed with ZU-23 and MANPADS installations, successfully carried out combat missions in all "hot spots" starting from Afghanistan.

You talked about the ZU-23 installation, is it effective as a means of self-cover in modern anti-aircraft combat?

I repeat, the ZU-23 has been in service with us for more than 45 years. Of course, the installation itself has no modernization potential. Its caliber - 23 mm - is no longer suitable for hitting air targets, it is ineffective. But these installations remain in the airborne brigades, however, its purpose now is not entirely for combating air targets, but mainly for combating accumulations of enemy manpower and lightly armored ground targets. In this matter, she has proven herself very well.

It is clear that with a firing range of up to 2 km and an altitude of 1.5 km, it is not very effective. If we compare it with the new anti-aircraft missile systems that are now supplied to the Airborne Forces, then, of course, the difference is huge, the ZU-23 has a low destruction efficiency. For example, three anti-aircraft installations form one target channel. Let me explain, the target channel is the ability of the complex to detect, identify and hit a target with a probability not lower than a given one. That is, I repeat, three installations make up one target channel, and this is a whole platoon. And, for example, one Strela-10 combat vehicle makes up one target channel. In addition, the combat vehicle is capable of detecting, identifying and firing at the target itself. And at the ZU-23, the fighters must identify the target visually. In conditions when time becomes a key factor, it becomes ineffective to use these installations in the fight against air targets.

Strela-10 complexes are very reliable. If the operator has caught the target, then this is a guaranteed hit.

- ZU-23, MANPADS "Igla" ... What is replacing these means of protection against air attacks?

Now the air defense of the Airborne Forces, as well as the Airborne Forces themselves, are actively rearming. I myself have been serving since 1986 and cannot remember such an active surge in the supply of the latest equipment and weapons, which has now been taking place in the troops since 2014.

Within two years, the Airborne Forces received 4 Verba divisional MANPADS systems with the latest Barnaul T automation systems. Also, two formations have been re-equipped with modernized Strela-10MN air defense systems. This complex has now become all-day, it can conduct combat work both day and night. The Strela-10 complexes are very unpretentious and reliable. If the operator has caught the target, then this is a guaranteed direct hit. In addition, a new identification system has appeared on the Verba MANPADS, and on the Strela-10MN air defense systems. Among other things, all batteries armed with MANPADS receive small-sized radar detectors MRLO 1L122 "Harmon". This portable radar detector is designed to detect low-flying targets, to be hit by anti-aircraft missile systems.

The Verba MANPADS have a homing missile, of the “fire and forget” type.

If we talk about the Verba, then this MANPADS, unlike the previous ones, already has the appropriate operating modes that allow it to hit air targets that use heat traps. Now they are no longer an obstacle to the destruction of aircraft. Also appeared such a mode as the destruction of small targets. Now MANPADS can work both on drones and on cruise missiles, this was not the case before. In addition, this complex has an increased range, and the height of the defeat has grown to almost five kilometers, and the missile is homing, of the “fire and forget” type.

One of the main tasks of the Airborne Forces is to conduct combat operations behind enemy lines, how did the latest complexes prove themselves in such conditions?

As for operations behind enemy lines, our weapons, as you know, are mobile. Of course, during the exercises we checked the operation of MANPADS after landing, the complexes are very reliable. As for the Strela-10MN, we did not land this complex, but in terms of its dimensions it is completely air transportable and can be transported by various military transport aircraft. By the way, now the outdated armored personnel carrier is being replaced by the newest - "Shell". In this modern version already provided for the placement of ammunition "Verba" and a set of automation equipment for the division of anti-aircraft gunners. The machine allows launching combat missiles both on the move with a short stop, and from a place. In general, our complexes are fully adapted for operations behind enemy lines.

Military experts say that the role of air defense in modern warfare has increased markedly, do you agree with this?

Everything is correct. According to many Russian and foreign military analysts, all armed conflicts start from the air, a soldier never sets foot on a territory until the battlefield is cleared in order to avoid unnecessary human losses and minimize them. Therefore, the role of air defense is really increasing at times. Here we can recall the words of Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, who said: "Grievous grief awaits the country that will be unable to repel an air strike." Now these words are more relevant than ever. All armed conflicts in which the leading armies of the world take part are primarily built on achieving air superiority. In addition, combat unmanned aerial vehicles are now increasingly being used, which themselves are already capable of conducting combat operations at long ranges. No longer a pilot, but an operator on the ground performs combat missions. For example, leads aerial reconnaissance or keeps the UAV in the air for hours and waits for this or that object to appear on which to attack. The pilot's life is no longer in danger. That is why the role of air defense is growing. But, of course, you must understand that the air defense of the Airborne Forces is not complex and large systems like the S-300 and S-400. We are means of self-cover. These are the air defense units that directly cover the troops on the battlefield.

- Tell us how willingly young guys are now going to serve in the air defense of the Airborne Forces, do you have problems with personnel?

In our specialty, air defense officers are trained at the Military Academy of Military Air Defense of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Marshal Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. Every year we recruit about 17 people. They study for five years and then go to serve with us in the Airborne Forces. I want to say that we have no refusals, everyone wants to serve. Now, when rearmament is being actively carried out, new equipment and weapons are coming to the unit, the guys are interested in studying new complexes. Indeed, earlier in the air defense of the Airborne Forces there were no reconnaissance means, there were no automated systems management, and now it all appeared. Again, people began to understand that the role of air defense is increasing, so we have no problems with personnel.

- Is it possible to compare air defense units of the Airborne Forces with similar units of the leading NATO countries in terms of armament?

I think this will be somewhat incorrect. After all, they are far behind us in this direction, there is nothing to compare with. They are still armed with obsolete MANPADS, there are simply no automation tools like ours. In 2014-2015, the air defense units of the Airborne Forces really experienced a technological breakthrough in terms of new and modernized weapons. We have gone far ahead, and this reserve needs to be developed.

The recent developments in the situation in Europe (the events in the Balkans) are of a very dynamic nature, both in the political and military fields. As a result of the implementation of the principles of new thinking, it became possible to reduce NATO's armed forces in Europe, while simultaneously increasing the qualitative state of the NATO system, as well as starting to reorganize the system itself.

A significant place in these reorganization plans is given to the issues of combat and logistic support of hostilities, as well as the creation of reliable air defense (air defense), without which, according to foreign experts, one cannot count on success in combat in modern conditions. One of the manifestations of NATO's efforts in this direction was the unified air defense system created by Europe, which includes active forces and assets allocated by NATO countries, as well as the Neige automated system.

1. Organization of a unified NATO air defense system

NATO command the following purpose of the unified air defense system is definitely:

to prevent the intrusion of aircraft assets of a possible enemy into the airspace of NATO countries in peacetime;

to maximally prevent them from delivering strikes in the course of hostilities in order to ensure the functioning of the main political and military-economic centers, strike groups of the Armed Forces, RTS, aviation assets, as well as other objects of strategic importance.

To accomplish these tasks, it is considered necessary:

provide advance warning of the command of a possible attack by continuously monitoring the airspace and obtaining intelligence data on the state of the enemy's means of attack;

cover from air strikes of nuclear forces, the most important military-strategic and administrative-economic facilities, as well as areas of concentration of troops;

maintaining high combat readiness of the maximum possible number of air defense forces and means to immediately repel an attack from the air;

organization of close interaction of forces and means of air defense;

in the event of a war - the destruction of enemy air attack means.

The creation of a unified air defense system is based on the following principles:

covering not individual objects, but entire areas, bands

allocation of sufficient forces and means to cover the most important directions and objects;

high centralization of command and control of air defense forces and assets.

The overall management of the NATO air defense system is carried out by the Supreme Commander of the NATO Allied Forces in Europe through his Deputy for the Air Force (he is also the Commander-in-Chief of the NATO Air Force), i.e. commander in chief The Air Force is the commander of the air defense.

The entire area of responsibility of the joint NATO air defense system is divided into 2 air defense zones:

northern zone;

southern zone.

Northern air defense zone occupies the territories of Norway, Belgium, Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and coastal waters countries and are subdivided into three air defense regions ("North", "Center", "Northeast").

Each region has 1-2 air defense sectors.

Southern air defense zone occupies the territory of Turkey, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, the Mediterranean and Black Seas and is subdivided into 4 air defense areas

"Southeast";

"South Center";

"Southwest;

Air defense areas have 2-3 air defense sectors. In addition, 2 independent air defense sectors have been created within the boundaries of the Southern Zone:

Cypriot;

Maltese;

For air defense purposes:

fighters - interceptors;

SAM long, medium and short range;

anti-aircraft artillery (FOR).

A) armed NATO air defense fighters The following groups of fighters are composed:

group - F-104, F-104E (capable of attacking one target at medium and high altitudes up to 10000m from the rear hemisphere);

group - F-15, F-16 (capable of destroying one target from all angles and at all heights),

group - F-14, F-18, "Tornado", "Mirage-2000" (capable of attacking several targets from different angles and at all heights).

Air defense fighters are tasked with intercepting air targets at the highest possible strike heights from their base over enemy territory and outside the SAM zone.

All fighters are cannon and missile armed and are all-weather, equipped with a combined weapon control system designed to detect and attack air targets.

This system typically includes:

radar interception and aiming;

counting device;

infrared sight;

optical sight.

All radars operate in the range λ=3–3.5cm in pulsed (F–104) or pulsed Doppler mode. All NATO aircraft have a radar radiation receiver operating in the range λ = 3–11.5 cm. Fighters are based at airfields 120-150 km from the front line.

B)Fighter tactics

When performing combat missions, fighters use three ways to fight:

interception from the position "On duty at the road";

interception from the “Air watch” position;

free attack.

"On duty at the a / d"- the main type of combat missions. It is used in the presence of a developed radar and provides energy savings, the presence of a full supply of fuel.

Flaws: displacement of the interception line to its territory when intercepting low-altitude targets

Depending on the threatening situation and the type of alert, the duty forces of air defense fighters can be in the following degrees of combat readiness:

Got. No. 1 - departure in 2 minutes, after the order;

Got. No. 2 - departure in 5 minutes, after the order;

Got. No. 3 - departure in 15 minutes, after the order;

Got. No. 4 - departure in 30 minutes, after the order;

Got. No. 5 - departure 60 minutes after the order.

The possible boundary of the meeting of the military-technical cooperation with a fighter from this position is 40–50 km from the front line.

"Air Watch" – used to cover the main group of troops in the most important objects. At the same time, the band of the army group is divided into duty zones, which are assigned to air units.

Duty is carried out at medium, low and high altitudes:

-In PMU - by groups of aircraft up to the link;

-In the SMU - at night - by single planes, change of cat. produced in 45–60 minutes. Depth - 100-150 km from the front line.

Flaws: - the ability to quickly detect areas of duty by the enemy;

forced to more often adhere to defensive tactics;

the possibility of creating superiority in forces by the enemy.

"Free Hunt" – for the destruction of air targets in a given area that do not have a continuous cover of the air defense system and a continuous radar field. Depth - 200–300 km from the front line.

Air defense and TI fighters, equipped with radar detection and aiming, armed with air-to-air missiles, use 2 methods of attack:

Attack from the front HEMISPHERE (under 45–70 0 to the target's course). It is used when the time and place of interception is calculated in advance. This is possible with longitudinal target wiring. It is the fastest, but requires high pointing accuracy both in place and in time.

Attack from the rear HEMISPHERE (within the heading angle sector 110–250 0). It is used against all targets and with all types of weapons. It provides a high probability of hitting the target.

With a good weapon and moving from one method of attack to another, one fighter can perform 6–9 attacks , which makes it possible to break 5–6 BTA aircraft.

A significant disadvantage air defense fighters, and in particular the radar of fighters, is their work, based on the use of the Doppler effect. There are so-called "blind" heading angles (approach angles to the target), in which the fighter's radar is not able to select (select) the target against the background of interfering ground reflections or passive interference. These zones do not depend on the attacking fighter flight speed, but are determined by the target flight speed, heading angles, approach angles and the minimum radial component of the relative approach speed ∆Vbl., set by the performance characteristics of the radar.

Radar is capable of isolating only those signals from the target that have a certain Doppler ƒ min. Such ƒ min is for radar ± 2 kHz.

In accordance with the laws of radar ƒ = 2 V2 ƒ 0

where ƒ 0 is the carrier, C–V light. Such signals come from targets with V 2 =30–60 m/s. => 790–110 0, and 250–290 0, respectively.

The main air defense systems in the joint air defense system of NATO countries are:

Long-range air defense systems (D≥60 km) - "Nike-Hercules", "Patriot";

Medium-range air defense systems (D = from 10-15 km to 50-60 km) - improved "Hawk" ("U-Hawk");

Short-range air defense systems (D = 10–15 km) - Chaparel, Rapier, Roland, Indigo, Crotal, Javelin, Avenger, Adats, Fog-M, " Stinger, Bluepipe.

NATO anti-aircraft defenses principle of use subdivided into:

Centralized use, applied according to the plan of the senior chief in zone , area and air defense sector;

Military air defense systems that are part of the ground forces according to the state and are used according to the plan of their commander.

To funds applied according to plans senior leaders include long-range and medium-range air defense systems. Here they work in automatic guidance mode.

The main tactical subdivision of anti-aircraft weapons is a division or equivalent units.

Long-range and medium-range air defense systems, with a sufficient number of them, are used to create a zone of continuous cover.

With a small number of them, only individual, most important objects are covered.

Short-range air defense systems and FOR used to cover the ground forces, a / d, etc.

Each anti-aircraft weapon has certain combat capabilities for firing and hitting a target.

Combat capabilities - quantitative and qualitative indicators that characterize the capabilities of the air defense system units to carry out combat missions at the set time and in specific conditions.

The combat capabilities of the SAM battery are estimated by the following characteristics:

Sizes of zones of fire and damage in vertical and horizontal planes;

The number of simultaneously fired targets;

System reaction time;

The ability of the battery to conduct a long fire;

The number of launches during the shelling of this target.

These characteristics can only be predetermined for a non-maneuvering target.

fire zone - a part of space, at every point of which missile guidance is possible.

Kill zone - part of the firing zone within which the missile meets the target and is hit with a given probability.

The position of the affected area in the firing zone may change depending on the direction of the target's flight.

When the air defense system is operating in the mode automatic guidance the affected area occupies a position in which the bisector of the angle limiting the affected area in the horizontal plane always remains parallel to the direction of flight towards the target.

Since the target can be approached from any direction, the affected area can occupy any position, while the bisector of the angle limiting the affected area rotates following the turn of the aircraft.

Consequently, a turn in the horizontal plane at an angle greater than half the angle limiting the affected area is equivalent to the exit of the aircraft from the affected area.

The affected area of any air defense system has certain boundaries:

according to H - lower and upper;

on D from start. mouth - far and near, as well as restrictions on the heading parameter (P), which determines the lateral boundaries of the zone.

Lower limit of the affected area - determined Hmin firing, which provides a given probability of hitting the target. It is limited by the influence of the reflection of the radiated from the ground on the operation of the RTS and the angles of closing positions.

Position closing angle ( α ) – is formed in the presence of an excess of the terrain and local objects over the position of the batteries.

Top and Data Bounds zones of lesions are determined by the energy resource of the river.

near border the affected area is determined by the time of uncontrolled flight after launch.

Side borders the affected areas are determined by the heading parameter (P).

Heading parameter P - the shortest distance (KM) from the position of the battery and the projection of the aircraft track.

The number of simultaneously fired targets depends on the amount of radar irradiation (illumination) of the target in the batteries of the air defense system.

The reaction time of the system is the time elapsed from the moment an air target is detected to the moment the missile is admitted.

The number of possible launches on the target depends on the early detection of the target by the radar, the heading parameter P, H of the target and Vtarget, T of the system reaction and the time between missile launches.

Not so long ago, the head of the operational department of the Russian General Staff, Lieutenant-General Viktor Poznikhir, told reporters that the main goal of creating American system ABM is a significant neutralization of the strategic nuclear capability Russia and the almost complete elimination of the Chinese missile threat. And this is far from the first sharp statement by Russian high-ranking officials on this score; few US actions cause such irritation in Moscow.

Russian military and diplomats have repeatedly stated that the deployment of the American global missile defense system will upset the delicate balance between nuclear states that has been established since the Cold War.

The Americans, in turn, argue that global missile defense is not directed against Russia, its goal is to protect the "civilized" world from rogue states, for example, Iran and North Korea. At the same time, the construction of new elements of the system continues at the most Russian borders in Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania.

Expert opinions on missile defense in general and the US missile defense system in particular differ greatly: some see America's actions as a real threat to Russia's strategic interests, while others speak of the ineffectiveness of US missile defense against the Russian strategic arsenal.

Where is the truth? What anti-missile system USA? What does it consist of and how does it work? Does Russian missile defense exist? And why clean defensive system causes such an ambiguous reaction from the Russian leadership - what's the catch?

History of missile defense

Missile defense is a whole complex of measures aimed at protecting certain objects or territories from being hit by missile weapons. Any missile defense system includes not only systems that directly destroy missiles, but also systems (radar and satellites) that provide missile detection, as well as powerful computers.

In the mass consciousness, the missile defense system is usually associated with countering the nuclear threat posed by ballistic missiles with a nuclear warhead, but this is not entirely true. In fact, missile defense is a broader concept, missile defense is any kind of protection against enemy missile weapons. It can also be attributed active protection armored vehicles from ATGMs and RPGs, and air defense systems capable of destroying tactical ballistic and cruise missiles enemy. So it would be more correct to divide all missile defense systems into tactical and strategic ones, as well as to single out self-defense systems against missile weapons into a separate group.

Rocket weapons first began to be massively used during World War II. The first anti-tank missiles, MLRS, German V-1 and V-2 killed the inhabitants of London and Antwerp. After the war, the development of rocket weapons went at an accelerated pace. It can be said that the use of missiles has radically changed the way warfare is fought. Moreover, very soon missiles became the main means of delivering nuclear weapons and became the most important strategic tool.

Appreciating the experience of the Nazis in the combat use of V-1 and V-2 missiles, the USSR and the USA almost immediately after the end of World War II began to create systems capable of effectively combating the new threat.

In the United States in 1958, they developed and adopted the MIM-14 Nike-Hercules anti-aircraft missile system, which could be used against enemy nuclear warheads. Their defeat also occurred due to the nuclear warhead of the anti-missile, since this air defense system was not particularly accurate. It should be noted that the interception of a target flying at great speed at an altitude of tens of kilometers is a very difficult task even at the current level of technology development. In the 1960s, it could only be solved with the use of nuclear weapons.

A further development of the MIM-14 Nike-Hercules system was the LIM-49A Nike Zeus complex, its testing began in 1962. Zeus anti-missiles were also equipped with a nuclear warhead, they could hit targets at an altitude of up to 160 km. Successful tests of the complex were carried out (without nuclear explosions, of course), but still the effectiveness of such missile defense was a very big question.

The fact is that in those years the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the USA were growing at an unthinkable pace, and no missile defense could protect against the armada of ballistic missiles launched in the other hemisphere. Moreover, in the 1960s nuclear missiles learned to throw out numerous false targets, which were extremely difficult to distinguish from real warheads. However, the main problem was the imperfection of the anti-missiles themselves, as well as target detection systems. The deployment of the Nike Zeus program was supposed to cost the American taxpayer $10 billion, a gigantic amount at the time, and this did not guarantee sufficient protection against Soviet ICBMs. As a result, the project was abandoned.

In the late 60s, the Americans launched another missile defense program, which was called Safeguard - "Precaution" (originally it was called Sentinel - "Sentry").

This missile defense system was supposed to protect the deployment areas of silo-based American ICBMs and, in case of war, provide the possibility of inflicting a retaliatory missile attack.

The Safeguard was armed with two types of anti-missiles: the heavy Spartan and the light Sprint. The Spartan anti-missiles had a radius of 740 km and were supposed to destroy enemy nuclear warheads while still in space. The task of the lighter Sprint missiles was to "finish" those warheads that could get past the Spartans. In space, warheads were supposed to be destroyed using streams of hard neutron radiation, more effective than megaton nuclear explosions.

In the early 70s, the Americans began the practical implementation of the Safeguard project, but they built only one complex of this system.

In 1972, one of the most important documents in the field of nuclear arms control, the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, was signed between the USSR and the USA. Even today, almost fifty years later, it is one of the cornerstones of the global nuclear safety in the world.

According to this document, both states could deploy no more than two missile defense systems, the maximum ammunition of each of them should not exceed 100 anti-missiles. Later (in 1974) the number of systems was reduced to one unit. The United States covered the ICBM deployment area in North Dakota with the Safeguard system, and the USSR decided to protect the capital of the state, Moscow, from a missile strike.

Why is this treaty so important for the balance between the largest nuclear states? The fact is that approximately from the mid-60s it became clear that a large-scale nuclear conflict between the USSR and the USA would lead to the complete destruction of both countries, therefore nuclear weapon became a kind of deterrent. Having deployed a sufficiently powerful missile defense system, any of the opponents could be tempted to strike first and hide from the "response" with the help of anti-missiles. The refusal to defend their own territory in the face of imminent nuclear destruction guaranteed an extremely cautious attitude of the leadership of the signatory states to the "red" button. This is also why NATO's current deployment of missile defenses is such a concern in the Kremlin.

By the way, the Americans did not begin to deploy the Safeguard missile defense system. In the 70s, they had Trident sea-based ballistic missiles, so military leadership The United States considered it more appropriate to invest in new submarines and SLBMs than to build a very expensive missile defense system. And Russian units still defend the skies of Moscow today (for example, the 9th anti-missile defense division in Sofrino).

The next stage in the development of the American missile defense system was the SDI program (“Strategic defense initiative”), initiated by the fortieth US President Ronald Reagan.

It was a very large-scale project for a new US missile defense system that was in complete contradiction to the 1972 Treaty. The SDI program provided for the creation of a powerful, layered missile defense system with space-based elements, which was supposed to cover the entire territory of the United States.

In addition to anti-missiles, this program provided for the use of weapons based on other physical principles: lasers, electromagnetic and kinetic weapons, railguns.

This project was never realized. Numerous technical problems arose before its developers, many of which have not been resolved to this day. However, the developments of the SDI program were later used to create the US national missile defense, the deployment of which continues to this day.

Immediately after the end of World War II, the creation of protection against missile weapons was also taken up in the USSR. Already in 1945, specialists from the Zhukovsky Air Force Academy began work on the Anti-Fau project.

The first practical development in the field of missile defense in the USSR was System A, work on which was carried out in the late 50s. A whole series of tests of the complex was carried out (some of them were successful), but due to the low efficiency of System A, it was never put into service.

In the early 60s, the development of a missile defense system for the protection of the Moscow Industrial District began, it was called A-35. From that moment until the very collapse of the USSR, Moscow was always covered by a powerful anti-missile shield.

The development of the A-35 was delayed; this missile defense system was put on combat duty only in September 1971. In 1978, it was upgraded to the A-35M modification, which remained in service until 1990. Radar complex"Danube-3U" was on alert until the early 2000s. In 1990, the A-35M missile defense system was replaced by the A-135 Amur. The A-135 was equipped with two types of anti-missiles with a nuclear warhead and a range of 350 and 80 km.

The A-135 system should be replaced by newest complex anti-missile defense A-235 "Airplane-M", now it is at the testing stage. It will also be armed with two types of anti-missiles with a maximum range of 1,000 km (according to other sources, 1,500 km).

In addition to the above systems, in the USSR in different time work was also carried out on other projects for protection against strategic missile weapons. One can mention the Chelomeev missile defense system "Taran", which was supposed to protect the entire territory of the country from American ICBMs. This project involved installing several powerful radar stations in the Far North that would control the most possible trajectories of American ICBMs - through the North Pole. It was supposed to destroy enemy missiles with the help of the most powerful thermonuclear charges (10 megatons) mounted on anti-missiles.

This project was closed in the mid-60s for the same reason as the American Nike Zeus - the missile and nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the USA grew at an incredible pace, and no missile defense could protect against a massive strike.

Another promising Soviet missile defense system that never entered service was the S-225 complex. This project was developed in the early 60s, later one of the S-225 anti-missiles was used as part of the A-135 complex.

American missile defense system

Currently, several missile defense systems (Israel, India, Japan, the European Union) are deployed or are being developed in the world, but all of them have a short or medium range. Only two countries in the world have a strategic missile defense system - the United States and Russia. Before turning to the description of the American strategic missile defense system, a few words should be said about general principles operation of such complexes.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (or their warheads) can be shot down in different parts of their trajectory: in the initial, intermediate or final stages. Hitting a rocket on takeoff (Boost-phase intercept) looks like the simplest task. Immediately after the launch, the ICBM is easy to track: it has a low speed and is not covered by decoys or interference. With one shot, you can destroy all the warheads that are installed on the ICBM.

However, interception at the initial stage of the missile's trajectory also has significant difficulties, which almost completely negate the above advantages. As a rule, the deployment areas of strategic missiles are located deep in enemy territory and are reliably covered by anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense systems. Therefore, it is almost impossible to approach them at the required distance. In addition, the initial stage of the missile's flight (acceleration) is only one or two minutes, during which it is necessary not only to detect it, but also to send an interceptor to destroy it. It's very difficult.

Nevertheless, the interception of ICBMs at the initial stage looks very promising, so work on the means of destroying strategic missiles during acceleration continues. The most promising are space-based laser systems, but the existing systems similar weapons does not yet exist.

Missiles can also be intercepted in the middle section of their trajectory (Midcourse intercept), when the warheads have already separated from the ICBM and continue to fly in outer space by inertia. Mid-segment interception also has both advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage of destroying warheads in space is the large time interval available to the missile defense system (according to some sources, up to 40 minutes), but the interception itself is associated with many complex technical issues. Firstly, warheads are relatively small, have a special anti-radar coating and do not emit anything into space, so they are very difficult to detect. Secondly, to further complicate the work of missile defense, any ICBM, except for the warheads themselves, carries a large number of false targets indistinguishable from real ones on radar screens. And thirdly: anti-missiles capable of destroying warheads on space orbit, are very expensive.

Warheads can also be intercepted after their entry into the atmosphere (Terminal phase intercept), or in other words, at their last stage of flight. It also has its pros and cons. The main advantages are: the ability to deploy a missile defense system on its territory, the relative ease of tracking targets, and the low cost of interceptor missiles. The fact is that after entering the atmosphere, lighter decoys are eliminated, which makes it possible to more confidently identify real warheads.

However, interception at the final stage of the trajectory of warheads also has significant disadvantages. The main one is the very limited time that the missile defense system has - on the order of several tens of seconds. The destruction of warheads at the final stage of their flight is, in fact, the last line of missile defense.

In 1992, US President George W. Bush initiated a program to protect the United States from a limited nuclear strike - this is how the non-strategic missile defense project (NMD) was born.

The development of a modern national missile defense system began in the United States in 1999 after the signing of the relevant bill by President Bill Clinton. The goal of the program was declared to be the creation of such a missile defense system that could protect the entire territory of the United States from ICBMs. In the same year, the Americans conducted the first test as part of this project: A Minuteman missile was intercepted over the Pacific Ocean.

In 2001, the next owner of the White House, George W. Bush, said that the missile defense system would protect not only America, but also its main allies, the first of which was named the United Kingdom. In 2002, after the NATO summit in Prague, the development of a military-economic justification for the creation of a missile defense system for the North Atlantic alliance began. The final decision on the creation of a European missile defense was taken at the NATO summit in Lisbon, held at the end of 2010.

It has been repeatedly emphasized that the purpose of the program is to protect against rogue states like Iran and North Korea, and it is not directed against Russia. Later, a number of Eastern European countries joined the program, including Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania.

Currently, NATO missile defense is a complex complex consisting of many components, which includes satellite systems for tracking ballistic missile launches, ground and sea missile launch detection systems (RLS), as well as several systems for destroying missiles at different stages of their trajectory: GBMD, Aegis ("Aegis"), THAAD and Patriot.

GBMD (Ground-Based Midcourse Defense) is ground complex, designed to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles in the middle section of their trajectory. It includes an early warning radar that monitors the launch of ICBMs and their trajectory, as well as silo-based anti-missiles. Their range is from 2 to 5 thousand km. To intercept ICBM warheads, the GBMD uses kinetic warheads. It should be noted that at the moment GBMD is the only fully deployed US strategic missile defense system.

The kinetic warhead for the rocket was not chosen by chance. The fact is that in order to intercept hundreds of enemy warheads, a massive use of anti-missiles is necessary, the operation of at least one nuclear charge in the path of warheads creates a powerful electromagnetic pulse and guaranteed to blind missile defense radars. However, on the other hand, a kinetic warhead requires much greater pointing accuracy, which in itself is a very difficult technical problem. And taking into account the equipping of modern ballistic missiles with warheads that can change their trajectory, the effectiveness of interceptors is even more reduced.

So far, the GBMD system can "boast" 50% of accurate hits - and then during the exercises. It is believed that this missile defense system can only work effectively against monoblock ICBMs.

Currently, GBMD anti-missiles are deployed in Alaska and California. It is possible that another system deployment area will be created on the US Atlantic coast.

Aegis ("Aegis"). Usually, when people talk about American missile defense, they mean the Aegis system. Back in the early 1990s, the idea was born in the United States to use the Aegis shipborne CMS for missile defense, and to adapt an excellent anti-aircraft missile"Standard", which was launched from a standard Mk-41 container.

In general, the placement of elements of the missile defense system on warships is quite reasonable and logical. In this case, missile defense becomes mobile, gets the opportunity to operate as close as possible to enemy ICBM deployment areas, and, accordingly, shoot down enemy missiles not only in the middle, but also in the initial stages of their flight. In addition, the main direction of the flight of Russian missiles is the area of the Arctic Ocean, where there is simply nowhere to place anti-missile silos.

In the end, the designers managed to place more fuel in the anti-missile and significantly improve the homing head. However, according to experts, even the most advanced modifications of the SM-3 anti-missile will not be able to intercept the latest maneuvering warheads of Russian ICBMs - they simply do not have enough fuel for this. But these anti-missiles are quite capable of intercepting a conventional (non-maneuvering) warhead.

In 2011, the Aegis missile defense system was deployed on 24 ships, including five Ticonderoga-class cruisers and nineteen Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. In total, the US military plans to equip 84 US Navy ships with the Aegis system by 2041. Based on this system, the ground-based Aegis Ashore system has been developed, which is already deployed in Romania and will be deployed in Poland by 2019.

THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense). This element of the American missile defense system should be attributed to the second echelon of the US national missile defense. This is a mobile complex, which was originally developed to deal with medium and short-range missiles, it cannot intercept targets in outer space. Warhead missiles of the THAAD complex is kinetic.

Part of the THAAD systems are located on the US mainland, which can only be explained by the ability of this system to fight not only against medium and short-range ballistic missiles, but also to intercept ICBMs. Indeed, this missile defense system can destroy warheads of strategic missiles in the final section of their trajectory, and it does this quite effectively. In 2013, the American national missile defense exercise was held, in which the Aegis, GBMD and THAAD systems took part. The latter showed the greatest efficiency, shooting down 10 targets out of ten possible.

Of the minuses of THAAD, one can note its high price: one interceptor missile costs $30 million.

PAC-3 Patriot. "Patriot" is a tactical-level anti-missile system designed to cover military groups. The debut of this complex took place during the first american war in Persian Gulf. Despite the extensive PR campaign of this system, the effectiveness of the complex was found to be not very satisfactory. Therefore, in the mid-90s, a more advanced version of the Patriot appeared - PAC-3.

The most important element of the American missile defense system is the SBIRS satellite constellation, designed to detect ballistic missile launches and track their trajectories. The deployment of the system began in 2006 and should be completed by 2019. Its full complement will consist of ten satellites, six geostationary and four in high elliptical orbits.

Does the American missile defense system threaten Russia?

Can a missile defense system protect the United States from a massive nuclear strike from Russia? The unequivocal answer is no. The effectiveness of the American missile defense system is estimated by experts in different ways, but it will definitely not be able to ensure the guaranteed destruction of all warheads launched from Russian territory.

The ground-based GBMD system has insufficient accuracy, and so far only two such complexes have been deployed. The shipborne Aegis missile defense system can be quite effective against ICBMs at the booster (initial) stage of their flight, but it will not be able to intercept missiles launched from the depths of Russian territory. If we talk about the interception of warheads in the middle leg of the flight (outside the atmosphere), then it will be very difficult for SM-3 anti-missiles to deal with the maneuvering warheads of the latest generation. Although obsolete (non-maneuverable) blocks may well be hit by them.

Domestic critics of the American Aegis system forget one very important aspect: The deadliest element of the Russian nuclear triad are ICBMs deployed on nuclear submarines. The missile defense ship may well be on duty in the area where missiles are launched from nuclear submarines and destroy them immediately after launch.

Destroying warheads in the mid-flight (after they have been separated from the missile) is a very difficult task, it can be compared with an attempt to hit another bullet flying towards it with a bullet.

At present (and in the foreseeable future), the American missile defense system will be able to protect US territory from only a small number of ballistic missiles (no more than twenty), which is still a very serious achievement, given the rapid spread of missile and nuclear technologies in the world.

If you have any questions - leave them in the comments below the article. We or our visitors will be happy to answer them.

Compact and poor Georgia with a population of about 3.8 million people continues to develop its air defense system, focusing on the modern and very expensive standards of the leading NATO countries. The other day, Georgian Defense Minister Levan Izoria declared that 238 million lari (more than $96 million) was allocated for the development of air defense in the 2018 budget. A few months earlier, she began retraining specialized military specialists.

Contract documents are classified as "secret", but everyone knows that high-tech air defense products are very expensive. own funds not enough, and Georgia intends to pay for expensive defense systems in debt or in installments, for many years. One billion dollars for weapons after August 2008 was promised to Tbilisi by the United States and parts of it are fulfilling the promise. A five-year loan (with a floating rate ranging from 1.27 to 2.1%) for 82.82 million euros was favorably guaranteed by a private Insurance Company COFACE (Compagnie Francaise d "Assurance pour le Commerce Exterieur), which provides export guarantees on behalf of the French government.

Under the terms of the agreement, 77.63 million euros out of 82.82 million euros are directed to the purchase of modern air defense systems from the American-French company ThalesRaytheonSystems: ground-based radars and control systems - more than 52 million euros, anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) of the MBDA group - about 25 million euros and another 5 million euros Georgia will spend on compensation for other expenses of COFACE. Such an air defense system is clearly redundant for Georgia. American patronage is worth a lot.

precious iron

What does Tbilisi get? A family of versatile, multi-purpose ground-based radars based on common units and interfaces. A fully digital radar system simultaneously performs air defense and surveillance functions. Compact, mobile and multifunctional, the Ground Fire radar deploys in 15 minutes and offers a high level of performance, tracking air, ground, surface targets.

The Ground Master GM200 multi-range medium-range radar is capable of simultaneously monitoring the air and the surface, detecting air targets within a radius of up to 250 kilometers (in combat mode - up to 100 kilometers). GM200 has an open architecture with the ability to integrate with other Ground Master (GM 400) systems, control systems and air defense strike systems. If the pricing policy of ThalesRaytheonSystems has not changed much since 2013, when the UAE purchased 17 GM200 radars worth $396 million, then one radar (without missile weapons) costs Georgia about $23 million.

The Ground Master GM403 airborne early warning radar station on a Renault Truck Defense chassis was first demonstrated in Tbilisi on May 26, 2018, in connection with the 100th anniversary of the independence of the republic. The GM403 radar is capable of monitoring airspace at ranges up to 470 kilometers and at altitudes up to 30 kilometers. According to the manufacturer, the GM 400 operates in a wide range of targets - from highly maneuverable low-flying tactical aircraft to small objects, including unmanned aerial vehicles. The radar can be installed by a crew of four in 30 minutes (the system is placed in a 20-foot container). After being deployed on the spot, the radar can be connected to work as part of the joint air defense, has a remote control function.

Radar line of Ground Master in Georgia is supplemented combat vehicles Israeli SPYDER anti-aircraft missile system with Rafael Python 4 anti-aircraft guided missiles, German-French-Italian SAMP-T air defense systems, which supposedly can be shot down Russian missiles(OTRK) Iskander, as well as third-generation French Mistral anti-aircraft missile systems and other strike weapons.

Radius of action

The republic has a maximum length from west to east of 440 kilometers, from north to south - less than 200 kilometers. From a national security point of view, it makes no sense for Tbilisi to spend huge amounts of money on airspace control within a radius of up to 470 kilometers over the western part of the Black Sea and neighboring countries, including the South of Russia (to Novorossiysk, Krasnodar and Stavropol), all of Armenia and Azerbaijan (as far as the Caspian Sea). ), Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nobody threatens Georgia, neighbors have no territorial claims. Obviously, a modern and developed air defense system in Georgia is necessary, first of all, to cover up the probable (prospective) deployment of NATO troops and further aggressive actions of the alliance in the South Caucasus region. The scenario is all the more realistic given that there are hopes in Tbilisi for revenge in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Turkey is becoming an increasingly unpredictable partner for NATO.

I believe that is why, at the 51st International Air Show in Le Bourget in the summer of 2015, Georgian Defense Minister Tinatin Khidasheli signed a contract for the purchase of ThalesRaytheonSystems radar stations, and later a second contract was signed in Paris, directly related to rocket launchers capable of shooting down enemy aircraft. At the same time, Khidasheli promised: "The sky over Georgia will be completely protected, and our air defense will be integrated into the NATO system."

Earlier, former Defense Minister Irakli Alasania spoke about the supply of anti-missiles to Georgia, capable of shooting down even the missiles of the Russian operational-tactical complex Iskander. Such cooperation between Georgia and a number of countries of the North Atlantic Alliance in neighboring Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia is naturally perceived as real and is forced to react to a change in the military-political situation.

The development of the Georgian air defense system does not make the life of all the peoples of the South Caucasus any safer.