What was the essence of the American SDI program? Soviet Star Wars through the Eyes of Americans Soy Star Wars Program.

The US Missile Defense Agency is “not opposed” to the development of space-based ballistic missile interceptors, previously proposed by US lawmakers.

“We are working on options in case the state decides that such funds are needed,” General Samuel Greaves, director of the agency, said recently, noting that now the legal basis for conducting such work has been created by Congress.

Indeed, the military budget bills for 2018 and 2019 included an article stating that the agency is “permitted” (depending on the internal system of priorities and needs for missile defense tasks) to launch the development of a space-based interception system that acts on ballistic missiles in the active site trajectories. Presumably, by 2022, the first prototype of such a system can be demonstrated in practice, if there are no problems with scientific and technical groundwork or financial constraints.

The system, as noted, should be of a “regional” nature, which, together with the discussions that took place in US political and expert circles in 2016–2017, first of all points to the problem of the outstanding progress that North Korean missilemen have recently demonstrated. However, the creation of missile defense systems of a fundamentally new type of basing also creates global problems.

Pebbles in orbit

The missile defense space strike echelon immediately evokes memories of Ronald Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative" - ​​SDI. At that time, the United States, at least on paper, set the task of creating a multi-layered system of dense defense against an equal opponent. This caused a rather nervous reaction in the USSR and forced many billions to be spent on symmetrical (creation of its own missile defense system) and asymmetric (development of countermeasures) steps.

By the way, the rocket-building industry has held out well on this scientific and technical reserve since the 1990s: modern missile systems bear the stamp of that time, and their technical specifications took into account "promising missile defense systems of a potential adversary."

In addition to fanciful designs such as nuclear-explosive X-ray orbital lasers (that is, a direct violation of the Outer Space Treaty), in the late 1980s, the US began to seriously consider the concept of mass deployment of orbital platforms with small homing interceptors that were supposed to attack Soviet ballistic missiles, emerging from under the atmosphere. The project was named Brilliant Pebbles (“Brilliant pebbles”).

It was criticized, defended, the architecture was reworked, the feasibility study was recalculated. As a result, he entered the year 1991, when SDI as a dense missile defense system from a massive missile attack completely lost its relevance. In its place came the GPALS project (Global Limited Strike Protection), whose effective buffer capacity was calculated based on about 200 warheads attacking the US continental territory. Brilliant Pebbles were to be a key element of GPALS.

But he also remained on paper. By 1999, the United States moved to the deployment of a "national missile defense" project, which to this day provides only extremely limited protection of US territory from single launches. The European (third) positional area was supposed to be a copy of the two American ones, but Barack Obama canceled the plans by installing SM-3 anti-missiles there, the current (deployed and being tested) modifications of which are not yet capable of resisting intercontinental missiles at all, but only missiles medium range. There was no place for space strike weapons in these plans.

However, the ideas of the space interception echelon remained on the agenda and periodically (whenever Iran or the DPRK demonstrated another rocket-building success) surfaced in the press and reports on initiative projects. This applied both to orbital interceptors and more recently to talk about space laser systems.

Are your opponents ready?

Many American experts have criticized and continue to criticize the idea of ​​a space echelon of missile defense weapons, and from different points of view. The economic utopianism of the project, the immaturity of technologies, and the clearly destabilizing nature of the system are also noted.

The latter should be especially noted. The space echelon deployed to confidently destroy Iranian and North Korean missiles, as experts note, will also cover large areas of Eurasia, including China. This immediately creates tension in relations with Beijing. Recall that one of the areas of combat patrols of Russian submarine missile carriers in the Far East, according to the US military, is located in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, and in this case, space weapons could potentially threaten it.

As we have already written, space strike missile defense systems as an idea are not at all new and solutions for domestic fifth-generation missile systems (Topol-M, Bulava, Yars, Sarmat) provide for the possibility of deploying such systems by the enemy. In particular, we are talking about adaptive acceleration modes with maneuvering and flat trajectories, in which the rocket does not leave the atmosphere for as long as possible in comparison with the optimal flight profiles. This increases the requirements for the energy of the rocket, reduces the payload, but increases the likelihood of its delivery.

But not so long ago, we were also shown a means that fundamentally (based on current and future technologies) excludes the impact of the missile defense space attack echelon. These are rocket-gliding systems with hypersonic gliders - for example, the Russian Avangard.

Glider does not move after acceleration ballistic trajectory in airless space (as in the case of ballistic missiles, whose apogee load can reach up to 1200-1500 km altitude), but dives back and glides in the atmosphere at an altitude of only 50-60 km. This precludes the use of orbital interceptor missiles as they were conceived to counter ballistic targets.

For a "pebble" type system, another platform is already needed, including a "return part" with thermal protection and other requirements for mechanical strength. This increases and complicates the final product (of which a lot is needed) and increases the cost of the entire orbital defense complex by an order of magnitude. Difficulties also arise when orbital-based lasers are used against atmospheric targets (power requirements increase, defocusing increases).

The system is being built

Nevertheless, if the strike echelon of missile defense systems still looks hypothetical (as in previous visits), then the decision to fundamentally upgrade the space echelon of missile defense information assets in the United States has been made irrevocably.

The US military points out that the architecture of the current orbital surveillance systems was basically formed several decades ago and in modern conditions already looks archaic, especially with the likely deployment of hypersonic weapons.

Recall that the classic scheme for warning about a missile attack looks like fixing by space means the launch of missiles from enemy territory with the clarification of the situation using the ground echelon of radar stations at the moment when the missiles rise above the radio horizon to a high altitude, that is, 10–15 minutes before hitting the target. goal.

However, as we showed above, this algorithm does not work in the case of hypersonic gliders: it is possible for satellites to detect the start of the booster of the rocket-planning system, but the radars currently available will not see anything until the glider approaches the flying distance of 3-5 minutes. At the same time, the glider has the ability to sweep along the course, unlike ballistic weapons, which completely confuses the definition of not only its ultimate goal on the territory of the defender, but also the very fact of an attack on him.

Therefore, space detection tools are becoming a key element in the defense system against an enemy armed with gliders. The situation looks similar with the detection of purely atmospheric cruise missiles with hypersonic speed: the space echelon is also extremely important here, since such products are already quite noticeable (unlike modern "stealth objects", low-altitude and subsonic).

This creates confusion not only with the hypothetical missile defense strike echelon, but also with countermeasures. AT last years many countries (in particular, Russia and China) are actively developing anti-satellite systems, the effectiveness of which in countering space missile defense systems (it does not matter, informational or strike) is difficult to overestimate. At the same time, this, in turn, further destabilizes the situation: the party that received a blow to critical components of the satellite infrastructure must make a difficult choice about further escalation of the conflict (in this case, it is possible that already in a nuclear form).

The context of organizational events

It should be noted that all this is happening in the conditions of frontal punching by Donald Trump of the decision to create in the United States separate species armed forces - space troops. Met at first with friendly resistance from the military and congressmen, the idea is gradually being integrated into the working process of the Washington bureaucracy.

So, on August 7, one of Trump's main opponents in the past on this line, Secretary of Defense James Mattis, radically changed his position. "Mad Dog", who had previously commented skeptically on the topic of space forces, suddenly came out in support of their creation.

“It is necessary to continue to consider outer space as one of the theaters of military operations, and the creation of a combat command is one of the steps in this direction that can now be taken. We fully agree with the President's concerns about the protection of our space infrastructure, and we are dealing with this issue at a time when other countries are creating military means to attack it," he said.

At the same time, Mattis deftly evaded the question of whether he was talking about creating a new type of armed forces (following the president) or about strengthening existing organizational structures.

Thus, it is very likely that the 11th (Space) Combat Command in the military structure will be transformed into the sixth branch of the force, along with the US Army (ground forces), navy, air force, corps marines and the Coast Guard. Fortunately, as we can see, the scope of work for him is already serious.

The successful launch of the first Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile "R-7" in August 1957 initiated a number of military programs in both powers. The United States, immediately after receiving intelligence about the new Russian missile, began the creation of an aerospace defense system for the North American continent and the development of the first Nike-Zeus anti-missile system equipped with anti-missiles with nuclear warheads (I already wrote about it in Chapter 13).

The use of an anti-missile with a thermonuclear charge significantly reduced the requirement for pointing accuracy.

It was assumed that the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion of an anti-missile would make it possible to neutralize the warhead of a ballistic missile, even if it was two to three kilometers away from the epicenter. In 1962, in order to determine the influence of damaging factors, the Americans conducted a series of nuclear test explosions at high altitudes, but soon work on the Nike-Zeus system was stopped.

However, in 1963, the development of the next generation missile defense system, the Nike-X (Nike-X), began. It was necessary to create such an anti-missile complex that was capable of providing protection against Soviet missiles for an entire area, and not a single object. To destroy enemy warheads at distant approaches, the Spartan missile was developed with a range of 650 kilometers, equipped with a 1 megaton nuclear warhead. A charge of such enormous power was supposed to create in space a zone of guaranteed destruction of several warheads and possible decoys.

Tests of this anti-missile began in 1968 and lasted three years. In the event that part of the warheads of enemy missiles overcome the space protected by Spartan missiles, complexes with shorter-range Sprint anti-missiles were included in the missile defense system. The Sprint anti-missile was supposed to be used as the main means of protecting a limited number of objects. She was supposed to hit targets at altitudes up to 50 kilometers.

The authors of the American missile defense projects of the 60s considered only powerful nuclear charges to be a real means of destroying enemy warheads. But the abundance of anti-missiles equipped with them did not guarantee the protection of all protected areas, and if they were used, they threatened to contaminate the entire United States with radioactive contamination.

In 1967, the development of a zoned limited missile defense system "Sentinel" ("Sentinel") began. Her kit included all the same "Spartan", "Sprint" and two RAS: "PAR" and "MSR". By this time, the concept of anti-missile defense began to gain momentum in the United States not of cities and industrial zones, but of the areas where strategic nuclear forces and the National Control Center for them were based. The Sentinel system was urgently renamed "Safeguard" and modified in accordance with the specifics of solving new problems.

The first complex of the new missile defense system (out of the planned twelve) was deployed at the Grand Forks missile base.

However, some time later, by decision of the American Congress, these works were also terminated as insufficiently effective, and the built missile defense system was mothballed.

The USSR and the United States sat down at the negotiating table on limiting missile defense systems, which led to the conclusion of the ABM Treaty in 1972 and the signing of a protocol to it in 1974.

It would seem that the problem is over. But it was not there…

On March 23, 1983, US President Ronald Reagan, addressing his compatriots, said:

“I know that all of you want peace. I want him too.[…] I turn to scientific community of our country, to those who gave us nuclear weapons, with a call to devote their great talents to the benefit of mankind and world peace and to put at our disposal the means that would make nuclear weapons useless and obsolete. Today, in accordance with our obligations under the ABM Treaty and recognizing the need for closer consultations with our allies, I am taking an important first step.

I am ordering a comprehensive and vigorous effort to establish the content of a long-term research and development program that will begin our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat from nuclear-capable strategic missiles.

This may open the way to arms limitation measures that will lead to the total elimination of these weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only goal - and it is shared by all the people - is to find ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war.

Not everyone understood then that the President was overturning the ideas that had developed over almost two decades about ways to prevent nuclear war and ensure stable peace, the symbol and basis of which was the ABM Treaty.

What happened? What has changed Washington's attitude towards missile defense so dramatically?

Let's go back to the 60s. Here is how the well-known columnist for the American magazine Time S. Talbot described the way of thinking that the American military-political leadership adhered to in those years regarding the ABM Treaty: “At that time, some observers found the agreement reached somewhat strange. Indeed, the two superpowers made a solemn commitment not to defend themselves. In reality, however, they reduced the possibility of attacking each other. The ABM Treaty was an important achievement. […] If one of the parties is able to defend itself against the threat nuclear strike, it receives an incentive to spread its geopolitical weight to other areas, and the opposing side finds itself forced to create new, better models of offensive weapons and at the same time improve its defense. Therefore, the proliferation of defensive weapons is as much a curse on arms control as the proliferation of offensive weapons. […] ABM is "destabilizing" for a number of reasons: it stimulates competition in defensive arms, with each side striving to equal and perhaps outperform the other side in ABM; it stimulates competition in the field of offensive weapons, with each side seeking to be able to "overcome" the other side's missile defense system; ABM can finally lead to illusory or even real overall strategic superiority.”

Talbot was not a military specialist, otherwise he would not have missed another consideration that guided the parties when deciding to limit missile defense systems.

No matter how strong the missile defense system is, it cannot become absolutely impenetrable. In reality, missile defense is calculated on a certain number of warheads and decoys launched by the other side. Therefore, missile defense is more effective against a retaliatory strike by the other side when a significant, and perhaps even overwhelming, part of the enemy's strategic nuclear forces has already been destroyed as a result of the first disarming strike. Thus, in the presence of large missile defense systems, each of the opposing sides, in the event of a heated confrontation, has an additional incentive to launch a nuclear attack first.

Finally, a new round of the arms race is a new burdensome expenditure of resources, of which humanity is becoming less and less.

It is unlikely that the people who prepared Ronald Reagan's speech on March 23, 1983 did not analyze all the negative consequences of the declared program. What prompted them to such an unreasonable decision? They say that the initiator of the program "Strategic Defense Initiative" ("SDI", "Strategic Defense Initiative") is the main creator of the American thermonuclear bomb Teller, who has known Reagan since the mid-60s and has always been an opponent of the ABM Treaty and any agreements that limit the ability of the United States to build up and improve its military-strategic potential.

At the meeting with Reagan, Teller spoke not only on his own behalf. He relied on the powerful support of the US military-industrial complex. Fears that the SDI program might initiate a similar Soviet program were dismissed: it would be difficult for the USSR to accept the new American challenge, especially in the face of already emerging economic difficulties. If the Soviet Union did decide to do so, then, as Teller reasoned, it would most likely be limited, and the United States could gain the much-desired military superiority. Of course, SDI is unlikely to ensure complete impunity for the United States in the event of a Soviet retaliatory nuclear strike, but it will give Washington additional confidence in conducting military-political actions abroad. Politicians also saw another aspect in this - the creation of new colossal burdens for the economy of the USSR, which would further complicate the growing social problems and reduce the attractiveness of the ideas of socialism for developing countries. The game seemed tempting.

The President's speech was timed to coincide with the congressional debate on the military budget for the next fiscal year. As the speaker of the House of Representatives O "Neill noted, it did not concern national security at all, but the military budget. Senator Kennedy called the speech "reckless plans for star wars." nobody called the plan of star wars. They tell such a curious incident that happened at one of the press conferences at the Center foreign press At the National Press Club in Washington, the anchorman, who introduced Lt. Gen. Abrahamson (Director of the SDI Implementation Organization) to reporters, joked: "Whoever asks the general and avoids using the words 'Star Wars' wins a prize."

There were no applicants for the prize - everyone preferred to say “Star Wars Program” instead of “SDI”.) Nevertheless, in early June 1983, Reagan established three expert commissions that were supposed to assess the technical feasibility of his idea. Of the materials prepared, the report of the Fletcher Commission is the most famous. She came to the conclusion that, despite the major unsolved technical problems, the achievements of the last twenty years in the field of technology in relation to the problem of creating missile defense look promising. The commission proposed a scheme for a layered defense system based on the latest military technologies. Each echelon of this system is designed to intercept missile warheads at various stages of their flight. The Commission recommended that a research and development program be initiated with a view to culminating in the early 1990s with a demonstration of basic missile defense technologies.

Then, based on the results obtained, decide whether to continue or close work on the creation of a large-scale defense system against ballistic missiles.

The next step towards the implementation of SDI was Presidential Directive No. 119, which appeared at the end of 1983. It marked the beginning of research and development that would answer the question of whether it is possible to create new space-based weapon systems or any other defensive means, able to repel a nuclear attack on the United States.

As it quickly became clear, the allocations for SDI provided by the budget could not ensure the successful solution of the grandiose tasks set for the program. It is no coincidence that many experts estimated the real costs of the program during the entire period of its implementation at hundreds of billions of dollars. According to Senator Presler, SDI is a program that requires costs ranging from 500 billion to 1 trillion dollars (!) to complete. The American economist Perlo called an even more significant amount - 3 trillion dollars (!!!).

However, already in April 1984, the Organization for the Implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (OSDI) began its activities. It was the central office of a large research project, in which, in addition to the organization of the Ministry of Defense, organizations of civilian ministries and departments, as well as educational institutions, participated. Approximately 100 people were employed in the central office of the OOSOI. As a program management body, the OOSOI was responsible for developing the goals of research programs and projects, supervised the preparation and execution of the budget, selected the executors of specific work, and maintained daily contacts with the US President's office, Congress, and other executive and legislative authorities.

At the first stage of work on the program, the main efforts of the JSOI were focused on coordinating the activities of numerous participants research projects on issues divided into the following five most important groups: the creation of means of observation, capture and tracking of targets; creation of technical means using the effect of directed energy for their subsequent inclusion in interception systems; creation of technical means using the effect kinetic energy for their further inclusion in interception systems; analysis of theoretical concepts on the basis of which specific weapon systems and means of controlling them will be created; ensuring the operation of the system and increasing its efficiency (increasing the lethality, security of the system components, power supply and logistics of the entire system).

What did the SDI program look like in the first approximation?

The efficiency criteria after two or three years of work under the SDI program were officially formulated as follows.

First, a defense against ballistic missiles must be capable of destroying a sufficient portion of the aggressor's offensive forces to deprive him of confidence in achieving his goals.

Secondly, defensive systems must perform their task to a sufficient extent even under the conditions of a series of serious blows against them, that is, they must have sufficient survivability.

Third, defensive systems should undermine the potential enemy's belief in the possibility of overcoming them by building up additional offensive weapons.

The strategy of the SDI program was to invest in a technological base that could support the decision to enter the full-scale development phase of the first phase of the SDI and prepare the basis for entering the conceptual development phase of the subsequent phase of the system. This staging, formulated only a few years after the promulgation of the program, was intended to create a basis for building up primary defensive capabilities with the introduction of promising technologies in the future, such as directed energy weapons, although the authors of the project initially considered it possible to implement the most exotic projects from the very beginning.

Nevertheless, in the second half of the 1980s, such elements as the space system for detecting and tracking ballistic missiles in the active part of their flight trajectory were considered as elements of the first stage system; space system for detecting and tracking warheads, warheads and decoys; ground detection and tracking system; space-based interceptors that ensure the destruction of missiles, warheads and their warheads; anti-missiles for atmospheric interception of ballistic targets ("ERIS"); combat control and communications system.

The following were considered as the main elements of the system at subsequent stages: space-based beam weapons based on the use of neutral particles; interceptor missiles for intercepting targets in the upper atmosphere ("HEDI"); an onboard optical system that provides detection and tracking of targets in the middle and final sections of their flight trajectories; ground-based RAS ("GBR"), considered as an additional means for detecting and tracking targets in the final section of their flight trajectory; a space-based laser installation designed to disable ballistic missiles and anti-satellite systems; ground-based gun with projectile acceleration up to hypersonic speeds("HVG"); ground-based laser installation for the destruction of ballistic missiles.

Those who planned the SDI structure thought of the system as a multi-tiered system capable of intercepting missiles during the three stages of ballistic missile flight: during the acceleration stage (the active part of the flight trajectory), the middle part of the flight trajectory, which mainly accounts for flight in space after how the warheads and decoys separated from the missiles, and at the final stage, when the warheads rush towards their targets on a downward trajectory. The most important of these stages was considered the acceleration stage, during which the warheads of multiply-charged ICBMs had not yet separated from the missile, and they could be disabled with a single shot. The head of the SDI department, General Abrahamson, said that this is the main point of "star wars".

Due to the fact that the US Congress, based on real assessments of the state of work, systematically cut (reductions to 40-50% annually) the administration's requests for project implementation, the authors of the program transferred its individual elements from the first stage to subsequent ones, work on some elements was reduced and some disappeared altogether.

Nevertheless, non-nuclear ground-based and space-based anti-missiles were the most developed among other projects of the SDI program, which makes it possible to consider them as candidates for the first stage of the current anti-missile defense of the country's territory.

Among these projects are the ERIS anti-missile for hitting targets in the atmospheric area, the HEDI anti-missile for short-range interception, as well as a ground-based radar, which should provide the task of monitoring and tracking in the final section of the trajectory.

The least advanced were projects on directed energy weapons, which combine research on four basic concepts considered promising for multi-layer defense, including ground-based and space-based lasers, space-based booster (beam) weapons, and directed-energy nuclear weapons.

For works that are practically initial stage, projects related to complete solution tasks.

For a number of projects, only problems have been identified that need to be addressed. This includes projects for the creation of space-based nuclear power plants with a capacity of 100 kW with power extension up to several megawatts.

The SDI program also required an inexpensive, versatile aircraft capable of launching a 4,500-kilogram payload and a crew of two into polar orbit. The DOE required firms to review three concepts: vertical launch and landing, vertical launch and horizontal landing, and horizontal launch and landing.

As it was announced on August 16, 1991, the winner of the competition was the design of the Delta Clipper with vertical launch and landing, proposed by McDonnell-Douglas. The layout resembled a greatly enlarged Mercury capsule.

All this work could continue indefinitely, and the longer the SDI project would be implemented, the more difficult it would be to stop it, not to mention the steadily increasing almost in geometric progression allocations for these purposes. On May 13, 1993, US Secretary of Defense Espin officially announced the cessation of work on the SDI project. It was one of the most serious decisions made by a Democratic administration since it came to power.

Among the most important arguments in favor of this step, the consequences of which were widely discussed by experts and the public around the world, President Bill Clinton and his entourage unanimously named the collapse of the Soviet Union and, as a result, the irretrievable loss of the United States of its only worthy rival in the confrontation between the superpowers.

Apparently, this is what makes some modern authors argue that the SDI program was originally conceived as a bluff aimed at intimidating the enemy leadership. Say, Mikhail Gorbachev and his entourage took the bluff at face value, got scared, and lost out of fear cold war which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

It is not true. Not everyone in the Soviet Union, including the top leadership of the country, accepted on faith the information disseminated by Washington regarding SDI. As a result of research conducted by a group of Soviet scientists led by Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Velikhov, Academician Sagdeev and Doctor of Historical Sciences Kokoshin, it was concluded that the system advertised by Washington "is clearly not capable, as its supporters claim, of making nuclear weapons" powerless and obsolete", to provide reliable cover for the territory of the United States, and even more so for its allies in Western Europe or in other parts of the world." Moreover, the Soviet Union had long been developing its own missile defense system, elements of which could be used in the Anti-SDI program.

In the Soviet Union, the problem of missile defense began to pay attention immediately after the end of World War II. In the early 1950s, NII-4 of the USSR Ministry of Defense and NII-885, which were engaged in the development and use of ballistic missiles, conducted the first studies on the possibility of creating missile defense systems. In these works, schemes were proposed for equipping antimissiles with two types of guidance systems. For anti-missiles with remote control, a fragmentation warhead with low-velocity fragments and a circular destruction field was proposed.

For homing missiles, it was proposed to use a directional warhead, which, together with the missile, was supposed to turn towards the target and explode according to information from the homing head, creating the highest fragment field density in the direction of the target.

One of the first projects of the country's global missile defense was proposed by Vladimir Chelomey.

In 1963, he proposed using the UR-100 intercontinental missiles developed in his OKB-52 to create the Taran missile defense system. The proposal was approved and by a resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated May 3, 1963, the development of a project for the Taran missile defense system was assigned to intercept ballistic missiles in the atmospheric trajectory.

The system was supposed to use the UR-100 (8K84) missile in the anti-missile version with a super-powerful thermonuclear warhead with a capacity of at least 10 megatons.

Its dimensions are: length - 16.8 meters, diameter - 2 meters, launch weight - 42.3 tons, warhead weight - 800 kilograms.

The anti-missile could hit targets at altitudes of about 700 kilometers, the range of hitting a target would be up to 2,000 thousand kilometers. Probably, in order to guarantee the destruction of all targets, it was necessary to deploy several hundred launchers with anti-missile systems of the Taran system.

A feature of the system was the lack of correction of the UR-100 anti-missile during the flight, which would be ensured by accurate target designation of the radar.

The new system was supposed to use the radar facilities of the Danube-3 system, as well as the TsSO-S multi-channel radar, located 500 kilometers from Moscow towards Leningrad. According to this radar, operating in the wavelength range from 30 to 40 centimeters, enemy missiles were to be detected and the coordinates of the interception points and the moment the targets arrived at these points were to be prolonged. The station "TsSO-S" was switched on by the signals of the nodes of the missile attack warning system "RO-1" (Murmansk city) and "RO-2" (Riga city).

In 1964, work on the Taran system was stopped - a significant role in the history of the creation of this system was played by the resignation of Nikita Khrushchev. However, Vladimir Chelomey himself later admitted that he abandoned the Taran system due to the vulnerability of the early warning radar system, which was a key link in his system.

In addition, the anti-missile needed a launch booster - a similar ballistic missile is not suitable as an anti-missile due to limitations in speed and maneuverability with a hard time limit for intercepting a target.

Others have been successful. In 1955, Grigory Vasilyevich Kisunko, the chief designer of SKB-30 (a structural subdivision of a large organization for missile systems SB-1), prepared proposals for the ground experimental missile defense system "A".

Calculations of the effectiveness of anti-missiles carried out in SB-1 showed that, with the existing guidance accuracy, the defeat of one ballistic missile is ensured by the use of 8-10 anti-missiles, which made the system ineffective.

Therefore, Kisunko proposed to apply a new method for determining the coordinates of a high-speed ballistic target and an anti-missile - triangulation, that is, determining the coordinates of an object by measuring the distance to it from a radar station spaced a long distance from each other and located at the corners of an equilateral triangle.

In March 1956, SKB-30 produced a draft design of the A missile defense system.

The system included the following elements: radars "Danube-2" with a target detection range of 1200 kilometers, three radars for precise guidance of anti-missiles on a target, a starting position with launchers of two-stage anti-missiles "V-1000", the main command and computing center of the system with a lamp computer "M-40" and radio relay communication lines between all means of the system.

The decision to build the tenth state test site for the needs of the country's air defense was made on April 1, 1956, and in May a State Commission was created under the leadership of Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky to select its location, and already in June, military builders began to create a test site in the Betpak desert. Dala.

The first work of the "A" system to intercept the R-5 anti-missile ballistic missile was successful on November 24, 1960, while the anti-missile was not equipped with a warhead. This was followed by a whole cycle of tests, some of which ended unsuccessfully.

The main test took place on March 4, 1961. On that day, an anti-missile with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead successfully intercepted and destroyed at an altitude of 25 kilometers the warhead of the R-12 ballistic missile launched from the State Central Test Range. The anti-missile warhead consisted of 16 thousand balls with a tungsten carbide core, TNT filling and a steel shell.

Successful test results of the "A" system made it possible by June 1961 to complete the development of a draft design of the A-35 missile defense system designed to protect Moscow from American intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The combat system was supposed to include a command post, eight sectoral RAS "Danube-3" and 32 firing systems. It was planned to complete the deployment of the system by 1967 - the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution.

Subsequently, the project has undergone changes, but in 1966 the system was still almost completely ready to be put on combat duty.

In 1973, General Designer Grigory Kisunko substantiated the main technical solutions for an upgraded system capable of hitting complex ballistic targets. Before the system "A-35" was placed combat mission to intercept one but complex multi-element target containing, along with warheads, light (inflatable) and heavy decoys, which required significant improvements to the system's computer center.

This was the last revision and modernization of the A-35 system, which ended in 1977 with the presentation of the new A-35M missile defense system to the State Commission.

The A-35M system was withdrawn from service in 1983, although its capabilities allowed it to be on combat duty until 2004.

In addition to the creation of traditional missile defense systems in the Soviet Union, research was carried out to develop completely new types of anti-missile defense systems. Many of these developments have not yet been completed and are already the property of modern Russia.

Among them, the Terra-3 project stands out in the first place, aimed at creating a powerful ground-based laser system capable of destroying enemy objects at orbital and suborbital heights. Work on the project was carried out by the Vympel Design Bureau, and since the late 60s, a special position for testing has been built at the Sary-Shagan test site.

The experimental laser installation consisted of the actual lasers (ruby and gas), a beam guidance and retention system, an information complex designed to ensure the functioning of the guidance system, as well as a high-precision laser locator "LE-1", designed to accurately determine the coordinates of the target. The capabilities of the "LE-1" made it possible not only to determine the range to the target, but also to obtain accurate characteristics of its trajectory, object shape and size.

In the mid-1980s, laser weapons were tested at the Terra-3 complex, which also included shooting at flying targets. Unfortunately, these experiments have shown that the power of the laser beam is not enough to destroy the warheads of ballistic missiles.

In 1981, the United States launched the first space shuttle, the Space Shuttle. Naturally, this attracted the attention of the USSR government and the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. In the fall of 1983, Marshal Dmitry Ustinov suggested that Votintsev, the commander of the Missile Defense Forces, use a laser system to escort the Shuttle. And on October 10, 1984, during the thirteenth flight of the Challenger shuttle, when its turns in orbit passed in the area of ​​the test site "A", the experiment took place when the laser installation was operating in the detection mode with a minimum radiation power. The height of the ship's orbit at that time was 365 kilometers. As the Challenger crew later reported, during the flight over the Balkhash region, the ship suddenly lost communication, equipment malfunctioned, and the astronauts themselves felt unwell. The Americans began to understand. Soon they realized that the crew was subjected to some kind of artificial influence from the USSR, and they made an official protest.

At present, the Terra-3 complex is abandoned and rusting - Kazakhstan was unable to raise this object.

In the early 70s, research and development work was carried out in the USSR under the Fon program in order to create a promising missile defense system. The essence of the program was to create a system that would make it possible to keep all American nuclear warheads "at gunpoint", including even those based on submarines and bombers. The system was supposed to be based in space and hit American nuclear missiles before they were launched.

Work on the technical project was carried out at the direction of Marshal Dmitry Ustinov at NPO Kometa.

In the late 70s, the Fon-1 program was launched, providing for the creation various kinds beam weapons, electromagnetic guns, anti-missiles, including multiply charged ones with submunitions, systems salvo fire. However, soon many designers at one of the meetings decided to curtail the work, since, in their opinion, the program had no prospects: in the Central Research Institute "Kometa" as a result of work on the "Fon" program, they came to the conclusion that to destroy the entire nuclear capability USA on all types of carriers (10 thousand charges) in 20–25 minutes of flying time is impossible.

Since 1983, the Fon-2 program has been launched. The program included in-depth research into the use of alternative means capable of neutralizing American SDI with “non-lethal weapons”: an electromagnetic pulse that instantly disrupts the operation of electronic equipment, laser exposure, powerful microwave field changes, and so on. As a result, quite interesting developments appeared.

From 1983 to 1987, within the framework of the Terra-3 project, tests were carried out on a laser installation weighing about 60 tons, installed on the Il-76MD (A-60) USSR-86879 flying laboratory.

To power the laser and related equipment, additional turbogenerators were installed in the fairings on the sides of the fuselage, as on the Il-76PP.

The regular weather radar was replaced with a bulb-shaped fairing on a special adapter, to which a smaller oblong fairing was attached from below. Obviously, the aiming system antenna was located there, which turned in any direction, catching the target. From the extensive glazing of the navigational cabin, only two windows remained on each side.

In order not to spoil the aerodynamics of the aircraft with another fairing, the optical head of the laser was made retractable.

The top of the fuselage between the wing and the keel was cut out and replaced with huge flaps consisting of several segments.

They retracted inside the fuselage, and then a turret with a cannon climbed up.

Behind the wing there were fairings protruding beyond the contour of the fuselage with a profile similar to that of the wing. The cargo ramp was preserved, but the cargo hatch doors were removed, and the hatch was sewn up with metal.

The finalization of the aircraft was carried out by the Taganrog Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex named after Beriev and the Taganrog Engineering Plant named after Georgy Dimitrov, which produced the A-50 and Tu-142 anti-submarine aircraft. Nothing is known about the course of tests of the domestic combat laser, since they remain top secret.

After the testing program, the A-60 laboratory was located at the Chkalovsky airfield, where it burned down in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, this project can be revived if the need suddenly arises ...

A mobile laser complex for destroying enemy satellites and ballistic missiles was created by the efforts of the design team of the Troitsk Institute for Innovation and Thermonuclear Research (Moscow region).

The complex is based on a 1 MW carbon laser. The complex is based on two platform modules created from serial trailers of the Chelyabinsk plant. The first platform houses a laser radiation generator, which includes an optical resonator unit and a gas discharge chamber. A beam forming and guidance system is also installed here. Nearby is the control cabin, from where software or manual guidance and focusing is carried out. On the second platform there are elements of the gas-dynamic path: aviation turbojet engine"P29-300", which has exhausted its flight resource, but is still capable of serving as an energy source; ejectors, exhaust and noise suppression devices, a tank for liquefied carbon dioxide, a fuel tank with aviation kerosene.

Each platform is equipped with its own KrAZ tractor and is transported to almost any place where it can go.

When it turned out that this complex would not be used as a weapon, a team of specialists from the Troitsk Institute, together with colleagues from NPO Almaz, the Efremov Research Institute of Electrophysical Equipment, and the Conversiya State Innovative Small Enterprise, developed the MLTK-50 laser technological complex on its basis. ". This complex showed excellent results in extinguishing a fire at a gas well in Karachaevsk, demolishing a rock mass, decontaminating the surface of concrete at a nuclear power plant by peeling, burning an oil film on the surface of the water area, and even destroying hordes of locusts.

Another interesting development is related to the creation of a plasma missile defense system capable of hitting targets at altitudes up to 50 kilometers.

The operation of this system is based on a long-known effect.

It turns out that plasma can be accelerated along two, as a rule, rather long tires - current conductors, which are parallel wires or plates.

The plasma clot closes the electrical circuit between the conductors, and an external magnetic field acts perpendicular to the busbar plane. The plasma accelerates and flows off the ends of the tires in the same way as a metal conductor sliding along the tires would accelerate. Depending on the conditions, the outflow can occur in different ways: in the form of a strongly expanding plume, jets, or in the form of successive plasma toroid rings - the so-called plasmoids.

The accelerator is called in this case a plasmoid gun; typically, the plasma is formed from the material of the consumable electrodes. Plasmoids resemble smoke rings produced by skilled smokers, but they do not fly flat in the air, but sideways, at speeds of tens and hundreds of kilometers per second. Each plasmoid is a ring of plasma contracted by a magnetic field with a current flowing in it and is formed as a result of the expansion of the current loop under the action of its own magnetic field, sometimes amplified with the help of jumpers - metal plates in an electrical circuit.

The first plasma gun in our country was built by the Leningrad professor Babat back in 1941. Currently, research in this area is being conducted at the Research Institute of Radio Instrumentation under the leadership of Academician Rimily Avramenko. A plasma weapon capable of hitting any targets at altitudes up to 50 kilometers has been practically created there.

According to the academician, a plasma missile defense weapon will not only cost several orders of magnitude cheaper than the American missile defense system, but will also be many times easier to create and manage.

Plasmoid directed ground means ABM creates an ionized area in front of the flying warhead and completely disrupts the aerodynamics of the object's flight, after which the target leaves the trajectory and collapses from monstrous overloads. In this case, the damaging factor is delivered to the target at the speed of light.

In 1995, specialists from the Research Institute of Radio Instrumentation developed the concept of the international experiment "Trust" ("Trust") for joint testing of plasma weapons with the United States at the American Kwajelein anti-missile test site.

Project "Confidence" was to conduct an experiment with a plasma weapon that can hit any object moving in the Earth's atmosphere. This is carried out on the basis of an already existing technological base, without launching any components into space. The cost of the experiment is estimated at $300 million.

The ABM Treaty no longer exists. On December 13, 2001, US President George W. Bush notified the President Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty of 1972. The decision was related to the Pentagon's plans to conduct new tests of the National Missile Defense (NMD) system no later than six months later in order to protect against attack from the so-called "rogue states". Before that, the Pentagon had already conducted five successful tests of a new anti-missile capable of hitting Minuteman-2 intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The days of SOI are back. America is once again sacrificing its reputation on the world stage and spending huge amounts of money in pursuit of the illusory hope of obtaining a missile defense "umbrella" that will protect it from the threat from the sky. The senselessness of this undertaking is obvious. After all, the same claims can be made against the NMD systems as against the SDI systems. They do not provide a 100% guarantee of security, but they can create its illusion.

And there is nothing more dangerous for health and life itself than the illusion of security...

The US NMD system, according to the ideas of its creators, will include several elements: ground-based missile interceptors (“Ground leased Interceptor”), combat control system (“Battle Management / Command, Control, Communication”), high-frequency missile defense radars (“Ground Based Radiolocator”), missile attack warning system radar (EWS), high-frequency missile defense radar (“Brilliant Eyes”) and SBIRS satellite constellation.

Ground-based missile interceptors or anti-missiles are the main missile defense weapon. They destroy ballistic missile warheads outside earth's atmosphere.

The combat control system is a kind of brain of the missile defense system. In the case of missile launches on US territory, it will be she who will control the interception.

Ground-based high-frequency missile defense radars track the flight path of the missile and warhead. They send the received information to the combat control system. The latter, in turn, gives the command to the interceptors.

The SBIRS satellite constellation is a two-layer satellite system that will play a key role in the control system of the NMD complex. The upper echelon - space - in the project includes 4-6 satellites of the missile attack warning system. The low-altitude echelon consists of 24 satellites located at a distance of 800-1200 kilometers.

These satellites are equipped with optical range sensors that detect and determine the movement parameters of targets.

According to the Pentagon, the initial stage in the creation of the NMD should be the construction radar station on Shemiya Island (Aleutian Islands). The place to start the deployment of the NMD system was not chosen by chance.

It is through Alaska, according to experts, that most of the flight trajectories of missiles that can reach US territory pass. Therefore, it is planned to place about 100 anti-missiles there. By the way, this radar, which is still in the project, is completing the creation of a tracking ring around the United States, which includes a radar in Tula (Greenland), the Flyindales radar in the UK and three radars in the United States - Cape Cod, Claire and "Bil". All of them have been operating for about 30 years and will be modernized in the course of the creation of the NMD system.

In addition, the radar station in Vard (Norway), located just 40 kilometers from the Russian border, will also perform similar tasks (tracking missile launches and warning of a missile attack).

The first anti-missile test took place on July 15, 2001. It cost the US taxpayer $100 million, but the Pentagon successfully destroyed an intercontinental ballistic missile 144 miles above the Earth's surface.

A one and a half meter striking element of an interceptor missile launched from the Kwajelein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, approaching a Minuteman ICBM launched from the Vandenberg Air Force Base, hit it with a direct hit, resulting in a dazzlingly bright flash in the sky, which caused the jubilation of the American military and technical experts shaking their fists admiringly.

"By initial estimates, everything worked as it should, - said the head of the missile defense department of the US Department of Defense, Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish - We hit very accurately ... We will insist on the next test as soon as possible.

Since the money for NMD is being allocated without delay, US military experts have launched a storm of activity. Development is being carried out in a number of directions at once, and the creation of interceptor missiles is not yet the most difficult element in the program.

A space-based laser has already been tested. This happened on December 8, 2000. A comprehensive test of the Alpha HEL hydrogen fluoride laser manufactured by TRW and the optical beam control system developed by Lockheed Martin was carried out as part of the SBL-IFX program ( "Space Based Laser Integrated Flight Experiment" - Demonstrator for integrated flight tests of a space-based laser) at the Capistrano test site (San Clement, California).

The beam guidance system included an optical unit (telescope) with a system of mirrors "LAMR" ("LAMP"), using adaptive optics technology ("soft mirrors").

The primary mirror has a diameter of 4 meters. In addition, the beam control system included the ATP (ATP) detection, tracking and guidance system. Both the laser and the beam control system were placed in a vacuum chamber during testing.

The purpose of the tests was to determine the ability of the telescope's metrological systems to maintain the required direction to the target and provide control of the primary and secondary optics during high-energy laser radiation. The tests ended in complete success: the ATP system worked even with greater accuracy than required.

According to official information, the launch of the SBL-IFX demonstrator into orbit is scheduled for 2012, and its testing on launching intercontinental rockets is scheduled for 2013. And by 2020, an operational grouping may be deployed spacecraft with high-energy lasers on board.

Then, as experts estimate, instead of 250 interceptor missiles in Alaska and North Dakota, it will be enough to deploy a constellation of 12-20 spacecraft based on SBL technologies in orbits with an inclination of 40°. It will take only 1 to 10 seconds to destroy one missile, depending on the altitude of the target. Changeover to new target takes only half a second. The system, consisting of 20 satellites, should provide almost complete prevention of the missile threat.

As part of the NMD program, it is also planned to use an airborne laser system developed under the ABL project (short for Airborne Laser).

Back in September 1992, Boeing and Lockheed received contracts to determine the most suitable existing aircraft for the ABL project. Both teams came to the same conclusion and recommended that the US Air Force use the Boeing 747 as the platform.

In November 1996, the US Air Force awarded a $1.1 billion contract to Boeing, Lockheed, and TRV for the development and flight testing of the ABL weapons system. On August 10, 1999, the assembly of the first 747-400 Freighter for ABL began. On January 6, 2001, the YAL-1A aircraft made its first flight from the Everett airfield. A combat test of the weapon system is scheduled for 2003, during which an operational-tactical missile is to be shot down. It is envisaged to destroy missiles at the active stage of their flight.

The basis of the weapon system is an iodine-oxygen chemical laser developed by TRV. The High Energy Laser (“HEL”) has a modular design and extensive use of the latest plastics, composites and titanium alloys to reduce weight. The laser, which has a record chemical efficiency, uses a closed circuit with recirculation of reagents.

The laser is installed in the 46th section on the main deck of the aircraft. To ensure strength, thermal and chemical resistance, two titanium skin panels of the lower fuselage are installed under the laser. The beam is transmitted to the nose turret through a special pipe passing along the upper part of the fuselage through all bulkheads. Shooting is carried out with a bow turret weighing about 6.3 tons. It can rotate 150° around a horizontal axis to track a target. Focusing the beam on the target is carried out by a 1.5-meter mirror with a viewing sector in azimuth of 120 °.

In the event of successful tests, it is planned to produce three such aircraft by 2005, and by 2008 the air defense system should be completely ready. A fleet of seven aircraft will be able to localize a threat anywhere in the world within 24 hours.

And that's not all either. Information is constantly leaking into the press about tests of powerful ground-based lasers, about the revival of ASAT-type air-launched kinetic systems, about new projects to create hypersonic bombers, and about the upcoming update of the early warning satellite system. Who is this all against? Is it really against Iraq and North Korea, which still cannot build a workable intercontinental missile?..

It must be admitted that such a defiant activity of American military specialists in the field of creating an NMD is frightening.

I'm afraid we are entering that phase of human development after which flights to the Moon, to Mars and the creation of orbital cities will become simply impossible ...

"Once upon a time, in a galaxy far, far away..." - the world-famous movie "Star Wars" by George Lucas began with this caption. Over time, this phrase became so commonplace that no one was surprised when they began to designate quite real programs for creating space-based armed forces.

The book that you are holding in your hands is dedicated to the history of "star wars", but not fictitious, raging in a distant galaxy, but real ones that began here on Earth, in the silence of design offices and computer centers. You will read about the rocket planes of the Luftwaffe, the Red Army and the US Air Force, about space bombers and orbital interceptors, about the missile defense program and how to overcome it.

And at the present time, the history of military astronautics has not yet come to an end. We are experiencing another episode of "Star Wars", and it is not yet clear who will emerge victorious from the eternal battle between good and evil.

SOI Program

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SOI Program

The successful launch of the first Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile "R-7" in August 1957 initiated a number of military programs in both powers.

The United States, immediately after receiving intelligence data about the new Russian missile, began the creation of an aerospace defense system for the North American continent and the development of the first Nike-Zeus anti-missile system equipped with anti-missiles with nuclear warheads.

The use of an anti-missile with a thermonuclear charge significantly reduced the requirement for pointing accuracy. It was assumed that the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion of an anti-missile would make it possible to neutralize the warhead of a ballistic missile, even if it was 2–3 km away from the epicenter.

In 1963, the development of the next generation anti-missile defense system, Nike-X (Nike-X), began. It was necessary to create such an anti-missile system that was capable of providing protection against Soviet missiles for an entire area, and not a single object. To destroy enemy warheads at distant approaches, the Spartan missile was developed with a range of 650 km, equipped with a nuclear warhead with a capacity of 1 megaton. Its explosion was supposed to create in space a zone of guaranteed destruction of several warheads and possible decoys. Tests of this anti-missile began in 1968 and lasted three years.

In the event that part of the warheads of enemy missiles overcome the space protected by Spartan missiles, the missile defense system included complexes with short-range Sprint anti-missiles. The Sprint anti-missile was supposed to be used as the main means of protecting a limited number of objects. She was supposed to hit targets at altitudes up to 50 km.

The authors of the American missile defense projects of the sixties considered only powerful nuclear charges to be a real means of destroying enemy warheads. But the abundance of anti-missiles equipped with them did not guarantee the protection of all protected areas, and if they were used, they threatened to contaminate the entire United States with radioactive contamination.

In 1967, work began on the zonal limited missile defense system "Guardian" ("Sentinel"). Her kit included all the same "Spartan", "Sprint" and two radars: "PAR" and "MSR". By this time, the concept of anti-missile defense began to gain momentum in the United States not of cities and industrial zones, but of the areas where strategic nuclear forces and the National Control Center for them were based. The "Sentinel" system was urgently renamed "Protection" ("Safeguard") and modified in accordance with the specifics of solving new problems.

The first complex of the new missile defense system (out of the planned twelve) was deployed at the Grand Forks missile base.

However, some time later, by decision of the American Congress, these works were also terminated as insufficiently effective, and the built missile defense system was mothballed. and the United States sat down at the negotiating table to limit missile defense systems, which led to the conclusion of the ABM Treaty in 1972 and the signing of its protocol in 1974.

It would seem that the problem is over. But it was not there…

On March 23, 1983, US President Ronald Reagan, addressing his compatriots, said:

“I know that all of you want peace, I want it too.<…>I appeal to the scientific community of our country, to those who gave us nuclear weapons, to use their great talents for the benefit of mankind and world peace and to put at our disposal the means that would make nuclear weapons useless and obsolete. Today, in accordance with our obligations under the ABM Treaty and recognizing the need for closer consultations with our allies, I am taking an important first step. I am ordering a comprehensive and vigorous effort to establish the content of a long-term research and development program that will begin our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat from nuclear-capable strategic missiles. This may open the way to arms limitation measures that will lead to the total elimination of these weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only goal - and it is shared by all the people - is to find ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war.

Not everyone understood then that the President was overturning the ideas that had developed over almost two decades about ways to prevent nuclear war and ensure stable peace, the symbol and basis of which was the ABM Treaty.

What happened? What has changed Washington's attitude towards missile defense so dramatically?

Let's go back to the sixties. Here is how a well-known columnist for the American magazine "Time" described the way of thinking that the American military-political leadership adhered to in those years in relation to the ABM Treaty:

“At the time, some observers found the agreement a bit strange. Indeed, the two superpowers made a solemn commitment not to defend themselves. In reality, however, they reduced the possibility of attacking each other. The ABM Treaty was an important achievement.<… >If one side is able to defend itself against the threat of a nuclear strike, it gets an incentive to spread its geopolitical weight to other areas, while the other side is forced to create new, better models of offensive weapons and at the same time improve its defense. Therefore, the proliferation of defensive weapons is as much a curse on arms control as the proliferation of offensive weapons.<…>ABM is “destabilizing” for a number of reasons: it stimulates competition in defensive arms, with each side striving to equal and perhaps even outperform the other side in ABM; it stimulates competition in the field of offensive weapons, with each side seeking to be able to "overcome" the other side's missile defense system; ABM can finally lead to illusory or even real overall strategic superiority.”

This observer was not a military specialist, otherwise he would not have missed another consideration that guided the parties when deciding to limit missile defense systems.

No matter how strong the missile defense system is, it cannot become absolutely impenetrable. In reality, missile defense is calculated on a certain number of warheads and decoys launched by the other side. Therefore, missile defense is more effective against a retaliatory strike by the other side when a significant, and perhaps even overwhelming, part of the enemy's strategic nuclear forces has already been destroyed as a result of the first disarming strike. Thus, in the presence of large missile defense systems, each of the opposing sides, in the event of a heated confrontation, has an additional incentive to launch a nuclear attack first.

Finally, a new round of the arms race is a new burdensome expenditure of resources, of which humanity is becoming less and less.

It is unlikely that the people who prepared Ronald Reagan's speech on March 23, 1983 did not analyze all the negative consequences of the declared program. What prompted them to such an unreasonable decision?

It is said that the initiator of the Strategic Defense Initiative program (SDI, Strategic Defense Initiative) is one of the creators of the American thermonuclear bomb, Edward Teller, who has known Reagan since the mid-1960s and has always opposed the ABM Treaty and any agreements limiting the ability of the United States to build up and improve its military-strategic potential.

At the meeting with Reagan, Teller spoke not only on his own behalf. He relied on the powerful support of the US military-industrial complex. Fears that the SDI program might initiate a similar Soviet program were dismissed: it would be difficult for the USSR to accept the new American challenge, especially in the face of already emerging economic difficulties. If the Soviet Union did decide to do so, then, as Teller reasoned, it would most likely be limited, and the United States could gain the much-desired military superiority. Of course, SDI is unlikely to ensure complete impunity for the United States in the event of a Soviet retaliatory nuclear strike, but it will give Washington additional confidence in conducting military-political actions abroad.

Politicians also saw another aspect in this - the creation of new colossal burdens for the economy of the USSR, which would further complicate the growing social problems and reduce the attractiveness of the ideas of socialism for developing countries. The game seemed tempting.

The President's speech was timed to coincide with the congressional debate on the military budget for the next fiscal year. As Speaker of the House O'Neill noted, it was not about national security at all, but about the military budget. Senator Kennedy called the speech "the reckless plans of Star Wars."

Since then, no one has called Reagan's speech anything other than a "star wars plan". They talk about a curious incident that occurred at one of the press conferences at the National Press Club in Washington. The anchorman, who introduced Lt. Gen. Abrahamson (Director of the SDI Implementation Organization) to reporters, joked, "Whoever asks the general and avoids using the words 'Star Wars' wins a prize." There were no contenders for the prize - everyone preferred to say "Star Wars Program" instead of "SOI".

Nevertheless, in early June 1983, Reagan established three expert commissions to evaluate the technical feasibility of his idea. Of the materials prepared, the report of the Fletcher Commission is the most famous. She came to the conclusion that, despite the major unsolved technical problems, the achievements of the last twenty years in the field of technology in relation to the problem of creating missile defense look promising. The commission proposed a scheme for a layered defense system based on the latest military technologies. Each echelon of this system is designed to intercept missile warheads at various stages of their flight. The Commission recommended that a research and development program be initiated with a view to culminating in the early 1990s with a demonstration of core missile defense technologies. Then, based on the results obtained, decide whether to continue or close work on the creation of a large-scale defense system against ballistic missiles.

The next step towards the implementation of SDI was Presidential Directive No. 119, which appeared at the end of 1983. It marked the beginning of research and development that would answer the question of whether new space-based weapons systems or any other defensive means capable of repelling nuclear attack on the USA.

It quickly became clear that the allocations for SDI provided by the budget could not ensure the successful solution of the grandiose tasks set for the program. It is no coincidence that many experts estimated the real costs of the program during the entire period of its implementation at hundreds of billions of dollars. According to Senator Presler, SDI is a program that requires costs ranging from 500 billion to 1 trillion dollars (!) to complete. The American economist Perlo called an even more significant amount - 3 trillion dollars (!!!).

However, already in April 1984, the Organization for the Implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (OSDI) began its activities. It was the central apparatus of a large research project, in which, in addition to the organization of the Ministry of Defense, organizations of civilian ministries and departments, as well as educational institutions, participated. Approximately 100 people were employed in the central office of the OOSOI. As a program management body, the OOSOI was responsible for developing the goals of research programs and projects, supervised the preparation and execution of the budget, selected the executors of specific work, and maintained daily contacts with the US Presidential Administration, Congress, and other executive and legislative authorities.

At the first stage of work on the program, the main efforts of the JOSOI were focused on coordinating the activities of numerous participants in research projects on issues divided into the following five most important groups: the creation of means of observation, capture and tracking of targets; creation of technical means using the effect of directed energy for their subsequent inclusion in interception systems; creation of technical means using the effect of kinetic energy for their further inclusion in interception systems; analysis of theoretical concepts on the basis of which specific weapon systems and means of controlling them will be created; ensuring the operation of the system and increasing its efficiency (increasing the lethality, security of the system components, power supply and logistics of the entire system).

What did the SDI program look like in the first approximation?

The efficiency criteria after two or three years of work under the SDI program were officially formulated as follows.

First, a defense against ballistic missiles must be capable of destroying a sufficient portion of the aggressor's offensive forces to deprive him of confidence in achieving his goals.

Secondly, defensive systems must perform their task to a sufficient extent even under the conditions of a series of serious blows against them, that is, they must have sufficient survivability.

Third, defensive systems should undermine the potential enemy's belief in the possibility of overcoming them by building up additional offensive weapons.

The strategy of the SDI program was to invest in a technology base that could support the decision to enter the full-scale development phase of the first stage of the SDI and prepare the basis for entering the conceptual development phase of the next stage of the system. This staging, formulated only a few years after the promulgation of the program, was intended to create a basis for building up primary defensive capabilities with the introduction of promising technologies in the future, such as directed energy weapons, although the authors of the project initially considered it possible to implement the most exotic projects from the very beginning.

Nevertheless, in the second half of the 1980s, such elements as the space system for detecting and tracking ballistic missiles in the active part of their flight trajectory were considered as elements of the first stage system; space system for detecting and tracking warheads, warheads and decoys; ground detection and tracking system; space-based interceptors that ensure the destruction of missiles, warheads and their warheads; anti-missiles for atmospheric interception of ballistic targets ("ERIS"); combat control and communications system.

The following were considered as the main elements of the system at subsequent stages: space-based beam weapons based on the use of neutral particles; interceptor missiles for intercepting targets in the upper atmosphere ("HEDI"); an onboard optical system that provides detection and tracking of targets in the middle and final sections of their flight trajectories; ground-based radar (“GBR”), considered as an additional means for detecting and tracking targets in the final section of their flight path; a space-based laser installation designed to disable ballistic missiles and anti-satellite systems; ground-based cannon with projectile acceleration to hypersonic speeds ("HVG"); ground-based laser installation for the destruction of ballistic missiles.

Those who planned the SDI structure thought of the system as a multi-tiered system capable of intercepting missiles during the three stages of ballistic missile flight: during the acceleration stage (the active part of the flight path), the middle part of the flight path, which mainly accounts for flight in space after how the warheads and decoys separated from the missiles, and at the final stage, when the warheads rush towards their targets on a downward trajectory. The most important of these stages was considered the acceleration stage, during which the warheads had not yet separated from the missile and they could be disabled with a single shot. The head of the SDI department, General Abrahamson, said that this is the main point of "star wars".

Due to the fact that the US Congress, based on real assessments of the state of work, systematically curtailed (reductions to 40-50% annually) the administration's requests for project implementation, the authors of the program transferred its individual elements from the first stage to subsequent ones, work on some elements was reduced, and some disappeared altogether.

Nevertheless, non-nuclear ground-based and space-based anti-missiles were the most developed among other projects of the SDI program, which allows us to consider them as candidates for the first stage of the current anti-missile defense of the country's territory. Among these projects are the ERIS anti-missile for hitting targets in the atmospheric area, the HEDI anti-missile for short-range interception, as well as a ground-based radar, which should provide the task of monitoring and tracking in the final section of the trajectory.

The least advanced were projects on directed energy weapons, which combine research on four basic concepts considered promising for multi-layer defense, including ground-based and space-based lasers, space-based booster (beam) weapons, and directed-energy nuclear weapons.

Projects related to the complex solution of the problem can be classified as works that are practically at the initial stage.

For a number of projects, only problems have been identified that need to be addressed. This includes projects for the creation of space-based nuclear power plants with a capacity of 100 kW with power extension up to several megawatts.

The SDI program also needed an inexpensive, versatile aircraft capable of launching a payload of 4,500 kg and a crew of two into polar orbit. The DOE required firms to review three concepts: vertical launch and landing, vertical launch and horizontal landing, and horizontal launch and landing.

As announced on August 16, 1991, the winner of the competition was the project of the device "Delta Clipper" ("Delta Clipper") with a vertical launch and landing, proposed by McDonnell-Douglas.

All this work could continue indefinitely, and the longer the SDI project would be implemented, the more difficult it would be to stop it, not to mention the steadily increasing allocations for these purposes almost exponentially.

On May 13, 1993, US Secretary of Defense Espin officially announced the termination of work on the SDI project. It was one of the most serious decisions made by a Democratic administration since it came to power. Among the most important arguments in favor of this step, the consequences of which were widely discussed by experts and the public around the world, President Bill Clinton and his entourage unanimously named the collapse of the Soviet Union and, as a result, the irretrievable loss of the United States of its only worthy rival in the confrontation between the superpowers.

Apparently, this is what makes some modern authors argue that the SDI program was originally conceived as a bluff aimed at intimidating the enemy leadership. They say that Mikhail Gorbachev and his entourage took the bluff at face value, got scared, and lost the cold war because of fear, which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

It is not true. Not everyone in the Soviet Union, including the top leadership of the country, took on faith the information disseminated by Washington regarding SDI. As a result of research conducted by a group of Soviet scientists led by Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Velikhov, Academician Sagdeev and Doctor of Historical Sciences Kokoshin, it was concluded that the system advertised by Washington "is clearly not capable, as its supporters claim, of making nuclear weapons" powerless and obsolete”, to provide reliable cover for the territory of the United States, and even more so for its allies in Western Europe or in other parts of the world. Moreover, the Soviet Union had long been developing its own missile defense system, elements of which could be used in the Anti-SDI program.

Years long-term program of research and development work. The main goal of SDI was to create a scientific and technical reserve for the development of a large-scale anti-missile defense system (ABM) with space-based elements, excluding or limiting the possible destruction of ground and sea targets from space. The program looked so incredible in its goals and methods of achieving them that the media (at the suggestion of Senator Edward Moore Kennedy) dubbed it the Star Wars program, after the famous Star Wars fantasy film project directed by George Lucas.

Its ultimate goals are to gain dominance in space, to create an anti-missile "shield" for the United States to reliably cover the entire territory of North America by deploying several echelons of strike space weapons capable of intercepting and destroying ballistic missiles and their warheads in all areas of flight.

According to some military experts, the name more accurately conveying the essence of the program would be "strategic initiative defense", that is, defense that involves the implementation of independent active actions, up to an attack.

Description

The main elements of such a system were to be based in space. In order to hit a large number of targets (several thousand) within a few minutes, the missile defense system under the SDI program provided for the use of active weapons based on new physical principles, including beam, electromagnetic, kinetic, microwave, as well as a new generation of traditional rocket weapons "earth-to-space", "air-to-space".

The problems of launching missile defense elements into reference orbits, recognizing targets in conditions of interference, convergence of beam energy at large distances, aiming at high-speed maneuvering targets, and many others are very complex. Such global macrosystems as missile defense, which have a complex autonomous architecture and a variety of functional connections, are characterized by instability and the ability to self-excite from internal faults and external disturbing factors. Possible in this case, unauthorized operation of individual elements of the space echelon of the missile defense system (for example, putting it on high alert) can be regarded by the other side as preparation for a strike and can provoke it into preemptive actions.

Work under the SDI program is fundamentally different from the outstanding developments of the past - such as, for example, the creation of an atomic bomb (the "Manhattan Project") or the landing of a man on the moon (the Apollo Project). When solving them, the authors of the projects overcame fairly predictable problems caused only by the laws of nature. When solving problems on a promising missile defense system, the authors will also have to fight against a reasonable adversary capable of developing unpredictable and effective countermeasures.

An analysis of the capabilities of SDI shows that such a missile defense system does not fully solve the problem of protecting US territory from ballistic missiles and is strategically inexpedient and economically wasteful. In addition, the deployment of missile defense under the SDI program in itself is undoubtedly capable of initiating a strategic offensive arms race by Russia/USSR and other nuclear states. In particular, the SDI project caused serious concern among the leadership of the USSR in 1983-86.

The creation of a space-based missile defense system, in addition to solving a number of complex and extremely expensive scientific and technical problems, is connected with overcoming a new socio-psychological factor - the presence of powerful, all-seeing weapons in space. It was the combination of these reasons (mainly the practical impossibility of creating the SDI) that led to the refusal to continue work on the creation of the SDI in accordance with its original plan. At the same time, with the coming to power in the United States of the Republican administration of George W. Bush (Jr.), these works were resumed as part of the creation of a missile defense system - see US missile defense.

see also

Literature

• Tarasov E.V. et al., US Strategic Defense Initiative. Concepts and problems” M.: VINITI, 1986. - 109 p.
• Zegveld W. Strategic Defense Initiative: Technological Breakthrough or Economic Adventure? : Per. from English. / V. Zegveld, K. Enzing; Tot. ed. and after. I. I. Isachenko. - M.: Progress, 1989. - 302, p. ISBN 5-01-001820-9
• Kireev A.P. Who will pay for Star Wars? : Economy aspects of the imperialist. plans for the militarization of space / A. P. Kireev. - M. : Intern. relations, 1989. - 261, p. ISBN 5-7133-0014-5
• Kokoshin A. A. SOI. 5 years behind. What's next? : [Translation] / Andrey Kokoshin, Alexey Arbatov, Alexey Vasiliev. - M.: Publishing house of the Novosti Press Agency, 1988. - 78, p.
• Kotlyarov I. I."Star World" against "Star Wars": (Political and Legal Problems) / I. I. Kotlyarov. - M.: Intern. relations, 1988. - 221, p. ISBN 5-7133-0031-5

Links

• Shmygin A.I. SDI through the eyes of a Russian colonel (also reviewed by Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V. S. Burtsev)

Categories:

• War economy
• Military history of the United States
• Military-industrial complex
• US foreign policy
• Ronald Reagan
• US nuclear missiles
• space weapon

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See what the "Strategic Defense Initiative" is in other dictionaries:

- (SDI) a long-term program to create an anti-missile defense system (ABM) with space-based elements, which also allows hitting ground targets from space. Proclaimed by US President R. Reagan in March 1983. See Treaty on ... ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary

- (Strategic Defense Initiative) See: Cold War. Politics. Dictionary. Moscow: INFRA M, Ves Mir Publishing House. D. Underhill, S. Barrett, P. Burnell, P. Burnham, et al. Osadchaya I.M.. 2001 ... Political science. Dictionary.

- (SDI), a long-term program to create an anti-missile defense system (ABM) with space-based elements, which also allows hitting ground targets from space. Proclaimed by US President R. Reagan in March 1983. See Treaty on ... ... encyclopedic Dictionary

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE- announced by US President R. Reagan on March 23, 1983, a long-term R&D program, the main goal of which was to create a scientific and technical reserve for the development of a large-scale missile defense system with space-based elements, ... ... War and peace in terms and definitions

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)- Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) (Strategic Defense Initiative), the proposed US system of protection against a possible nuclear attack. The beginning of developments on the SDI project, known under the name. Star Wars, was put in place by President Reagan... The World History

SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative)- (SDI, Strategic Defense Initiative), research, creation and deployment in space of missile defense systems equipped with lasers, electromagnets. guns, beam weapons, etc. The program, colloquially known as star wars, was ... ... Peoples and cultures

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI Strategic Defense Initiative) announced by US President Ronald Reagan on March 23, 1983 is a long-term research and development program whose main goal is ... ... Wikipedia

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Battle for the stars-2. Space Confrontation (Part II) Anton Ivanovich Pervushin

SOI program

SOI program

As it quickly became clear, the allocations for SDI provided by the budget could not ensure the successful solution of the grandiose tasks set for the program. It is no coincidence that many experts estimated the real costs of the program during the entire period of its implementation at hundreds of billions of dollars. According to Senator Presler, SDI is a program that requires costs ranging from 500 billion to 1 trillion dollars (!) to complete. The American economist Perlo called an even more significant amount - 3 trillion dollars (!!!).

However, already in April 1984, the Organization for the Implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (OSDI) began its activities. It was the central office of a large research project, in which, in addition to the organization of the Ministry of Defense, organizations of civilian ministries and departments, as well as educational institutions, participated. Approximately 100 people were employed in the central office of the OOSOI. As a program management body, the OOSOI was responsible for developing the goals of research programs and projects, supervised the preparation and execution of the budget, selected the executors of specific work, and maintained daily contacts with the US President's office, Congress, and other executive and legislative authorities.

At the first stage of work on the program, the main efforts of the JOSOI were focused on coordinating the activities of numerous participants in research projects on issues divided into the following five most important groups: the creation of means of observation, capture and tracking of targets; creation of technical means using the effect of directed energy for their subsequent inclusion in interception systems; creation of technical means using the effect of kinetic energy for their further inclusion in interception systems; analysis of theoretical concepts on the basis of which specific weapon systems and means of controlling them will be created; ensuring the operation of the system and increasing its efficiency (increasing the lethality, security of the system components, power supply and logistics of the entire system).

What did the SDI program look like in the first approximation?

The efficiency criteria after two or three years of work under the SDI program were officially formulated as follows.

First, a defense against ballistic missiles must be capable of destroying a sufficient portion of the aggressor's offensive forces to deprive him of confidence in achieving his goals.

Secondly, defensive systems must perform their task to a sufficient extent even under the conditions of a series of serious blows against them, that is, they must have sufficient survivability.

Third, defensive systems should undermine the potential enemy's belief in the possibility of overcoming them by building up additional offensive weapons.

The strategy of the SDI program was to invest in a technological base that could support the decision to enter the full-scale development phase of the first phase of the SDI and prepare the basis for entering the conceptual development phase of the subsequent phase of the system. This staging, formulated only a few years after the promulgation of the program, was intended to create a basis for building up primary defensive capabilities with the introduction of promising technologies in the future, such as directed energy weapons, although the authors of the project initially considered it possible to implement the most exotic projects from the very beginning.

Nevertheless, in the second half of the 1980s, such elements as the space system for detecting and tracking ballistic missiles in the active part of their flight trajectory were considered as elements of the first stage system; space system for detecting and tracking warheads, warheads and decoys; ground detection and tracking system; space-based interceptors that ensure the destruction of missiles, warheads and their warheads; anti-missiles for atmospheric interception of ballistic targets ("ERIS"); combat control and communications system.

The following were considered as the main elements of the system at subsequent stages: space-based beam weapons based on the use of neutral particles; interceptor missiles for intercepting targets in the upper atmosphere ("HEDI"); an onboard optical system that provides detection and tracking of targets in the middle and final sections of their flight trajectories; ground-based RAS ("GBR"), considered as an additional means for detecting and tracking targets in the final section of their flight trajectory; a space-based laser installation designed to disable ballistic missiles and anti-satellite systems; ground-based cannon with projectile acceleration to hypersonic speeds ("HVG"); ground-based laser installation for the destruction of ballistic missiles.

Those who planned the SDI structure thought of the system as a multi-tiered system capable of intercepting missiles during the three stages of ballistic missile flight: during the acceleration stage (the active part of the flight trajectory), the middle part of the flight trajectory, which mainly accounts for flight in space after how the warheads and decoys separated from the missiles, and at the final stage, when the warheads rush towards their targets on a downward trajectory. The most important of these stages was considered the acceleration stage, during which the warheads of multiply-charged ICBMs had not yet separated from the missile, and they could be disabled with a single shot. The head of the SDI department, General Abrahamson, said that this is the main point of "star wars".

Due to the fact that the US Congress, based on real assessments of the state of work, systematically cut (reductions to 40-50% annually) the administration's requests for project implementation, the authors of the program transferred its individual elements from the first stage to subsequent ones, work on some elements was reduced and some disappeared altogether.

Nevertheless, non-nuclear ground-based and space-based anti-missiles were the most developed among other projects of the SDI program, which makes it possible to consider them as candidates for the first stage of the current anti-missile defense of the country's territory.

Among these projects are the ERIS anti-missile for hitting targets in the atmospheric area, the HEDI anti-missile for short-range interception, as well as a ground-based radar, which should provide the task of monitoring and tracking in the final section of the trajectory.

The least advanced were projects on directed energy weapons, which combine research on four basic concepts considered promising for multi-layer defense, including ground-based and space-based lasers, space-based booster (beam) weapons, and directed-energy nuclear weapons.

Projects related to the complex solution of the problem can be classified as works that are practically at the initial stage.

For a number of projects, only problems have been identified that need to be addressed. This includes projects for the creation of space-based nuclear power plants with a capacity of 100 kW with power extension up to several megawatts.

The SDI program also required an inexpensive, versatile aircraft capable of launching a 4,500-kilogram payload and a crew of two into polar orbit. The DOE required firms to review three concepts: vertical launch and landing, vertical launch and horizontal landing, and horizontal launch and landing.

As it was announced on August 16, 1991, the winner of the competition was the design of the Delta Clipper with vertical launch and landing, proposed by McDonnell-Douglas. The layout resembled a greatly enlarged Mercury capsule.

All this work could continue indefinitely, and the longer the SDI project would be implemented, the more difficult it would be to stop it, not to mention the steadily increasing allocations for these purposes almost exponentially. On May 13, 1993, US Secretary of Defense Espin officially announced the cessation of work on the SDI project. It was one of the most serious decisions made by a Democratic administration since it came to power.

Among the most important arguments in favor of this step, the consequences of which were widely discussed by experts and the public around the world, President Bill Clinton and his entourage unanimously named the collapse of the Soviet Union and, as a result, the irretrievable loss of the United States of its only worthy rival in the confrontation between the superpowers.

Apparently, this is what makes some modern authors argue that the SDI program was originally conceived as a bluff aimed at intimidating the enemy leadership. They say that Mikhail Gorbachev and his entourage took the bluff at face value, got scared, and lost the Cold War out of fear, which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

It is not true. Not everyone in the Soviet Union, including the top leadership of the country, accepted on faith the information disseminated by Washington regarding SDI. As a result of research conducted by a group of Soviet scientists led by Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Velikhov, Academician Sagdeev and Doctor of Historical Sciences Kokoshin, it was concluded that the system advertised by Washington "is clearly not capable, as its supporters claim, of making nuclear weapons" powerless and obsolete", to provide reliable cover for the territory of the United States, and even more so for its allies in Western Europe or in other parts of the world." Moreover, the Soviet Union had long been developing its own missile defense system, elements of which could be used in the Anti-SDI program.