Losses of the Japanese Navy in World War II. Ships at the logging site

“I will die on the deck of the Nagato, by which time Tokyo will have been bombed 3 times”
- Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto

The defeat of Japan in World War II seems so natural that there can be no options and discrepancies here. The total superiority of the United States in natural, human and industrial resources, multiplied by a powerful economy and high level development of science - in such conditions, America's victory in the war became only a matter of time.

If everything is extremely obvious with the general reasons for the defeat of the Japanese Empire, then the purely technical side is of genuine interest. naval battles in the Pacific Ocean: The Imperial Japanese Navy, once one of the most powerful fleets in the world, perished under the blows of numerically superior enemy forces. He died in terrible agony, suffering and torment. Armor warped and rivets flew out, plating burst, and streams of gushing water collided in a roaring whirlpool on the decks of the doomed ship. The Japanese fleet was leaving for immortality.

Nevertheless, before their tragic death, the Japanese sailors were marked by a number of bright victories. "Second Pearl Harbor" off Savo Island, a pogrom in the Java Sea, a daring raid by aircraft carriers into the Indian Ocean ...

As for the famous attack on the Pearl Harbor naval base, the role of this operation is largely exaggerated by American propaganda: the US leadership needed to rally the nation in the face of the enemy. Unlike the Soviet Union, where every child understood that a terrible war was taking place on the territory of his own country, the United States had to wage a naval war on foreign shores. This is where the tale of the “terrible attack” on the American military base came in handy.

Memorial on the hull of the lost "Arizona" (the battleship was launched in 1915)

At the same time, not a single bomb fell on:

Power plant, shipyards, port cranes and mechanical workshops. This allowed the Yankees to begin restoration work within an hour after the end of the raid.

Giant 10/10 dry dock for battleship and aircraft carrier repairs. The unforgivable mistake of the Japanese carrier-based aviation will become fatal in all subsequent battles in the Pacific: with the help of their superdock, the Americans will repair damaged ships in a matter of days.

4,500,000 barrels of oil! The tank capacity of the U.S. Naval refueling station at Pearl Harbor at that time exceeded all the fuel reserves of the Imperial Japanese Navy.

Fuel, hospitals, berths, ammunition depots - Japanese pilots "gave" the US Navy the entire infrastructure of the base!

There is a legend about the absence of two US Navy aircraft carriers in Pearl Harbor on the day of the attack: they say, if the Japanese had sunk the Lexington and the Enterprise, the outcome of the war could have been different. This is an absolute delusion: during the years of the war, the US industry handed over 31 aircraft carriers to the fleet (many of which did not even have to participate in battles). If the Japanese had destroyed all aircraft carriers, battleships and cruisers in the Pearl Harbor, along with Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands, the outcome of the war would have been the same.

We should dwell separately on the figure of the "architect of Pearl Harbor" - the Japanese admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. There is no doubt that he was an honest military and competent strategist, who more than once warned the leadership of Japan about the futility and disastrous consequences of the coming war with the United States. The admiral argued that even with the most favorable development of events, the Imperial Japanese Navy would last no more than a year - then the inevitable defeat and death of the Japanese Empire would follow. Admiral Yamamoto remained true to his duty - if Japan is destined to die in an unequal battle, he will do everything so that the memory of this war and the exploits of Japanese sailors enter forever.

Japanese aircraft carriers en route to Hawaii. In the foreground - "Jikaku". Ahead - "Kaga"

The only successful operation planned by the admiral - the attack on Pearl Harbor - demonstrated a complete lack of logic in the choice of targets and disgusting coordination of Japanese aviation. Yamamoto was planning a "stunning blow". But why were the fuel storage and infrastructure of the base untouched? - the most important objects, the destruction of which could really complicate the actions of the US Navy.

"They don't take a hit"

As Admiral Yamamoto predicted, the Japanese military machine moved forward uncontrollably for six months, bright flashes of victories one after another illuminated the Pacific Theater of Operations. Problems began later - the continuous strengthening of the US Navy slowed down the pace of the Japanese offensive. In the summer of 1942, the situation almost got out of control - the tactics of Admiral Yamamoto with the splitting of forces and the separation of "shock" and "anti-ship" groups of carrier-based aviation led to a disaster at Midway.

But the real nightmare began in 1943 - the Japanese fleet suffered defeat one after another, the shortage of ships, aircraft and fuel was becoming more and more acute. The scientific and technical backwardness of Japan made itself felt - when trying to break through to the squadrons of the US Navy, Japanese aircraft fell from the sky like cherry blossoms. At the same time, the Americans confidently flew over the very masts of the Japanese ships. There were not enough radars and sonar stations - more and more often Japanese ships became victims of American submarines.

The Japanese defensive perimeter was bursting at the seams - colossal reserves allowed the Americans to land troops simultaneously in different regions Pacific Ocean. In the meantime ... more and more new ships appeared in the vastness of the Pacific theater of operations - the US industry daily handed over to the fleet a couple of new combat units (destroyers, cruisers, submarines or aircraft carriers).

The ugly truth about the Imperial Japanese Navy has been revealed: Admiral Yamamoto's bet on an aircraft carrier fleet has failed! In the conditions of the total superiority of the enemy, the Japanese aircraft carriers died as soon as they reached the combat zone.

Japanese carrier-based aviation achieved notable success in raiding operations - a raid on Ceylon or Pearl Harbor (if you do not take into account missed opportunities). The surprise factor and the large combat radius of aviation made it possible to avoid return fire and return to base after the successful completion of the mission.

The Japanese had an equal chance of winning squadrons with the US Navy (Battle of the Coral Sea, Midway, Santa Cruz). Here everything was decided by the quality of training of pilots, crews of ships and, most importantly, His Majesty Chance.

But in conditions of numerical superiority of the enemy (i.e., when the probability of getting under return fire was equal to 100%), the Japanese aircraft carrier fleet did not even have a ghostly hope for any favorable outcome of the situation. The principle of “winning not by numbers, but by skill” turned out to be useless - any fire contact ended in the imminent and inevitable death of an aircraft carrier.

It turned out that the once formidable aircraft carriers completely "do not hold a blow" and drown like puppies, even with a weak effect of enemy fire. Sometimes, a few hits from conventional bombs were enough to sink an aircraft carrier. It was a death sentence for the Imperial Navy - aircraft carriers and carrier-based aircraft proved to be extremely ineffective in a defensive war.

The battle of Midway Atoll best of all told about the disgusting survivability of aircraft carriers: a group of 30 Dontless dive bombers, under the command of Captain McCluskey, who broke through, literally in a minute burned down two Japanese attack aircraft carriers, Akagi and Kaga (burned through boxes of hulls sank by evening ). A similar fate befell the aircraft carriers Soryu and Hiryu on the same day.

American attack aircraft carrier Bellow Wood after a kamikaze attack

It’s even scary to imagine what would happen if large aircraft carriers were in place of the Yamato and Nagato battleships - a hail of small-caliber bombs would cause uncontrolled fires on the flight and hangar decks, and then the quick death of ships from internal explosions.

The reason for the poor condition of the Nagato add-ons is a nuclear explosion with a power of 23 kt.
The old Japanese battleship turned out to be stronger than nuclear fire!

On June 19, 1944, the heavy aircraft carrier Taiho was sunk. A single torpedo hit from the submarine Albacore did not cause significant damage, but caused a depressurization of the fuel line. A minor imperceptible problem turned into a disaster - 6.5 hours after the torpedo attack, the Taiho was torn to shreds by an explosion of gasoline vapors (1650 dead sailors).
The trick was that the brand new Taiho aircraft carrier was destroyed in its first military campaign, just three months after launching.

A day later, on June 20, 1944, under similar circumstances, the strike aircraft carrier "Hiyo" was lost. The only difference is that the carrier-based aircraft dropped the fatal torpedo.

The fantastic sinking of the supercarrier Sinano 17 hours after its first entry into the sea is just a common curiosity in the history of naval battles. The ship was not completed, the bulkheads were not sealed, and the crew was not trained. However, in every joke there is a share of a joke - eyewitnesses reported that one of the torpedo hits fell exactly in the area of ​​jet fuel tanks. Perhaps the crew of the aircraft carrier was very lucky - at the time of the sinking, the Sinano was empty.

It seems that the aircraft carrier "Shokaku" has problems with the flight deck

The song about the rapid death of Japanese aircraft carriers would not be complete without mentioning their opponents. The Americans faced the same problem - the slightest impact of enemy fire caused terrible fires aboard aircraft carriers.

In October 1944, just from the hit of two 250-kg bombs, the light aircraft carrier Princeton completely burned down.

In March 1945, the aircraft carrier Franklin was heavily damaged - only two 250-kg bombs hit the ship, which caused one of the largest US Navy tragedies in terms of the number of victims. Bombs fell in the center of the flight deck - the fire instantly engulfed 50 fully fueled and ready to fly aircraft. Result: 807 dead, a completely destroyed air wing, uncontrolled fires on all decks of the ship, loss of speed, a 13-degree list to port and readiness to sink the aircraft carrier.
The Franklin was saved only due to the absence of the main enemy forces nearby - in a real battle, the ship would certainly have been flooded.

The aircraft carrier "Franklin" has not yet decided whether to stay afloat or sink
Survivors pack their bags and prepare to evacuate

Kamikaze got the aircraft carrier "Interpid"

Fire on the aircraft carrier "Saint Lo" as a result of a kamikaze attack (the ship will die)

But the real madness began with the advent of Japanese kamikaze. The “live bombs” falling from the sky could not damage the underwater part of the hull, but the consequences of their fall on the flight deck lined with aircraft were simply terrible.

The incident on the strike aircraft carrier Bunker Hill became a textbook: on May 11, 1945, the ship was attacked by two kamikaze off the coast of Okinawa. In a terrible fire, Bunker Hill lost its entire air wing and more than 400 crew members.

From all these stories, the obvious conclusion follows:

The Imperial Japanese Navy was doomed - building a heavy cruiser or battleship instead of the Taiho aircraft carrier would have made no difference. The enemy had a 10-fold numerical superiority, coupled with overwhelming technical superiority. The war was already lost by the time the Japanese planes struck Pearl Harbor.

Nevertheless, it can be assumed that having highly protected artillery ships instead of aircraft carriers, the Imperial Navy, in the situation in which it found itself by the end of the war, could prolong its agony and cause additional damage to the enemy. The American fleet easily smashed the Japanese aircraft carrier groups, but every time they met with a heavy Japanese cruiser or battleship, the US Navy had to pretty "tinker".

Admiral Yamamoto's bet on aircraft carriers proved disastrous. But why did the Japanese continue to build aircraft carriers until the very end of the war (even rebuilt the last Yamato-class battleship into the Shinano aircraft carrier)? The answer is simple: the dying industry of Japan could not build anything more complicated than an aircraft carrier. It will sound incredible, but 70 years ago an aircraft carrier was structurally quite simple and cheap, much simpler than a cruiser or battleship. No electromagnetic supercatapults or nuclear reactors. The simplest steel box for servicing the same small and simple aircraft.

True, an aircraft carrier trough will sink even from small-caliber bombs, but the aircraft carrier's crew hopes that they will have to fight only against a deliberately weak and unprepared enemy. Otherwise - the manner of "overkill".

Epilogue

Low survivability is inherent in the very idea of ​​​​an aircraft carrier. Aviation needs SPACE - instead, it is driven onto the cramped decks of a rocking ship and forced to carry out takeoff and landing operations with a runway length three times shorter than required. The dense layout and overcrowding of aircraft inevitably serves as a source of increased accident rate of an aircraft carrier, and the general lack of security and constant work with flammable substances lead to a natural result - a serious sea battle is contraindicated for an aircraft carrier.

8-hour fire aboard the aircraft carrier Oriskani (1966). The explosion of a magnesium flare (!) led to a massive fire in the hangar, with the death of all aircraft in it and 44 sailors from the crew of the ship.

The terrible fire on the aircraft carrier Forrestal (1967), which became the largest tragedy in terms of the number of victims in the post-war history of the US Navy (134 dead sailors).

A repetition of similar events aboard the aircraft carrier Enterprise (1969).

Urgent measures were taken to increase the survivability of aircraft carriers, appeared automatic systems deck irrigation and other special equipment. It would seem that all the troubles behind.

But ... 1981, an unsuccessful landing of an electronic warfare aircraft EA-6B Prowler. On the flight deck nuclear aircraft carrier Explosions rumble on the Nimitz, flames rise above the ship's superstructure. 14 victims, 48 ​​wounded. In the fire, in addition to the Prowler itself and its crew, three F-14 Tomcat interceptors burned down. Ten Corsair II and Intruder attack aircraft, two F-14s, three Viking anti-submarine aircraft and a Sea King helicopter were seriously damaged. "Nimitz" at one point lost a third of its wing.

A similar case on the aircraft carrier "Midway"

Battleship ... This word is associated with a huge armored ship, with its whole mass deeply settled in the water. It bristles with the barrels of cannons, of which there may be more than 200. The most impressive are the cyclopean towers of the main caliber.

Suffice it to recall the Japanese "Yamato". With a displacement of more than 72 thousand tons, it carried nine 457-mm guns in three turrets as the main caliber. The length of the barrel was 20 meters. The weight of the tower exceeded 2500 tons. This giant could send shells weighing about 1.5 tons for 45 kilometers. Against this background, the famous "Stalin's sledgehammer" - 203-mm B-4 ("Long-lived Howitzer") - fired seeds: some 100 kilograms at a distance of about 17 kilometers. The booking of the mastodon was also appropriate. The main belt reached 650 millimeters. The thickness of the armored decks, the conning tower, the main caliber towers was measured in hundreds of millimeters. The constructive anti-torpedo protection system also looked impressive - more than eight meters in total depth.

“Only the absence of high-explosive shells for main caliber guns on battleships saved American aircraft carriers from total annihilation"

To match the "Japanese" were his opponents - US battleships. The most advanced of them, the Iowa type, with 65,000 tons of full displacement, had nine 406-mm main-caliber guns. In constructive protection, the "American" was inferior to the Japanese giant by no more than 10-20 percent, if we take its depth and armor thickness.

But World War II is believed to have put an end to the history of battleships. Their gravediggers, according to naval experts, were aircraft carriers, which began to dominate the sea and ocean spaces. Although the beginning of the departure of battleships in history should be considered the First World War. The fact that the classic general battle of the fleets, which decides the outcome of the struggle at sea, will no longer exist in the world, became obvious following the results of the famous Battle of Jutland, when the main linear forces of the two fleets converged in a limited area (as the situation developed) - English and German. The result was negligible compared to the scale of the forces involved: several capital ships sunk on each side. The time of the classic battles of the fleets, when the opponents, lining up opposite each other, during an artillery duel (at that time they still called “competitions”) decided who would be the master of the sea, has passed. But it was for such a battle that battleships were created. The very name battleship is an abbreviation for a ship of the line, that is, intended for artillery combat in a line.

Who is in charge of the sea

However, military experts did not see an alternative to battleships in the interwar period. Aviation as a whole, deck aviation in particular, was still very weak and was not considered a serious opponent for a freely maneuvering ship. Therefore, battleships as a class continued to develop in all the most developed countries. Naturally, we were no longer talking about a general battle and a classic linear battle. But the battleship, as the most powerful surface ship that determines the outcome of any surface battle in terms of scale, remained the main one in all fleets. The strike of British carrier-based aviation on the base of the Italian fleet in Taranto, the battle in the Coral Sea, the sinking of the Bismarck and other battles showed that another main player appeared - His Majesty the aircraft carrier. And they immediately turned away from the battleships. attach great importance these ships became a sign of bad taste, retrograde.

Meanwhile, battleships faded into the background only in terms of solving one of the tasks of the fleet - gaining superiority at sea by destroying the forces of the enemy fleet, and even then not completely. The landing operations of the American and British fleets were carried out with the active participation of the line forces, which destroyed the powerful fortifications of the enemy with their large-caliber artillery. And far from always, aviation could become a substitute - bombs of a weight comparable to battleship shells were lifted only by heavy bombers. However, in accuracy they were significantly inferior to the first-class artillery of battleships. Aviation was far from always able to “work” according to weather conditions, and battleships fired in any weather.

Their role remained significant in naval battles. Battleships ensured the combat stability of aircraft carrier and other naval formations. The absence of such a large artillery ship sometimes ended fatally even for aircraft carriers. So, during the British attempt to repel the German invasion of Norway on June 8, 1940, the British aircraft carrier Glories, guarded by two destroyers, was sunk by fire from the main caliber of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. The battle on October 25, 1944 near the island of Samar, where the main battle forces of the Japanese fleet entered the area in which the US aircraft carriers were covered by destroyers, almost ended in the death of most of them. Only the absence of high-explosive shells for the main caliber guns on the battleships of the Japanese fleet and the erroneous decisions of Commander Admiral Kurita saved the American formation from complete destruction.

“The weight of 16 volleys of the battleship Iowa corresponds to the daily work of the Nimitz air group”

The battleships of the Second World War had powerful air defense weapons - from 16 to 24 universal caliber guns (105–127 mm) and from 40–60 to 120–150 MZA barrels (20–40 mm). It was anti-aircraft artillery, combined with air defense systems of other large artillery ships - cruisers, that was the main means of repelling enemy bombers and torpedo bombers that broke through the fighter screens. The destroyers of that time had incomparably less powerful weapons - from 4-8 to 12-18 MZA guns and could not have a significant impact on the outcome of anti-aircraft combat. In the United States, this role of battleships was very well understood, so the main operational carrier formations of the American fleet (38th and 58th) included battleships in their composition.

However, after the end of World War II, the construction of battleships ceased. Some exception was conservative England, which after the war completed the construction of battleships of the Vanguard type. However, these ships were withdrawn from the British fleet by 1958 and cut into metal. By 1961, there were no battleships left. Only Turkey kept combat strength fleet battlecruiser "Yavuz", the former "Goeben", built in 1911 without significant upgrades, however, it was more of a museum value. True, the United States retained the most advanced of the battleships (the Iowa type) by transferring them to the reserve.

The final cross on the fate of the battleships was put by two circumstances: nuclear weapon, guided anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles. The first made it senseless to create a powerful constructive defense of the ship. Rockets have devalued large caliber artillery. All classes of large artillery ships were out of work. Along with the battleships, the classic cruisers also became a thing of the past. In the USA, the last were Salem, in the USSR - the 68-bis project (Sverdlov), completed by the beginning of the 60s. Although it was the battleships that demonstrated exceptionally high resistance to the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion. Thus, the "Pennsylvania" built during the First World War stayed afloat, being just a kilometer from the epicenter of an underwater nuclear explosion on Bikini Atoll. And the anti-ship missile warheads in the usual equipment for battleships were not as destructive as for ships of other classes, including aircraft carriers.

We weigh the volleys

Meanwhile, it turned out that the conquest of dominance at sea was by no means the only task of the fleets. Behind them is fire support of the coastal flank of the army, landing of amphibious assault forces, strikes against naval bases and other important objects in the coastal strip. In the United States, it was supposed to solve these problems with the main forces of carrier-based aviation. In the USSR, they relied on coastal-based naval aviation, whose actions in this direction were essentially no different from front-line and long-range ones. However, limitations associated with the available flight resource, the ability to act on weather conditions, the accuracy of the weapons used, the reaction time and the organization of interaction with ground forces were forced to return to large surface artillery ships. In the USSR, the cruisers of the 68-bis project remained in the fleet almost until the beginning of the 90s. And the United States several times introduced battleships into the combat strength from the reserve for operations in local wars and armed conflicts. These ships were noted in Vietnam. The destructive power of shells weighing 1200 kilograms was amazing. Armor-piercing pierced up to nine meters of concrete floors. And the high-explosive one created a funnel in dense soil with a depth of six and a diameter of 15 meters. When firing at the jungle, the explosion of such a projectile felled trees in an area up to 180 meters, forming a platform for landing helicopters. American battleships also participated in other local wars, in particular against Iraq in 1991 and 2003, providing operational amphibious landings.

It is interesting to compare the fire performance of the Iowa-class battleship with the capabilities of the Nimitz air wing (Battle of Aircraft Carriers). The latter carries 60 shock F / A-18C. Taking into account the allocation of the aircraft resource for solving the air defense tasks of the AUG, the possibility of two strikes per day by 40 deckers remains. Applying bombs free fall with a load of four tons per attack aircraft and by concentrating half of the strike air group on combat support tasks, the aircraft carrier is able to bring down 160 tons of bombs on the enemy. And one volley of a battleship weighs about 10 tons (9 shells of 1200 kg each). Making one shot in two minutes, he will solve such a fire problem in half an hour. At the same time, the price of two raids from an aircraft carrier is more than 20 times higher (and this is without taking into account possible losses) than 32 volleys of a battleship. True, the depth of impact is incomparably greater - 800 kilometers against 42.

No better deal with high-precision weapons long range when hitting well-protected objects. This was demonstrated Syrian air defense, reflecting the strikes of American and Israeli missiles. But each Tomahawk costs about two million dollars. So the use of the WTO and aviation in modern conditions is associated with significant material losses. And they have to go if there is no other way to solve the combat mission.

However, there are tasks that, using such weapons, are the same as hammering nails with a computer: expensive, and most importantly, inconvenient. We are talking about areal targets - airfields, strongholds of defense units ground forces, areas of concentration of strike groups and reserves, the location of formations and units logistic support, representing a set of objects that are relatively easy to hit, but distributed over a large area and often capable of maneuvering with varying intensity. The size of such targets varies widely: from 1-1.5 square kilometers (company stronghold in the defense) to 10-20 (airfield or battalion in the concentration area).

To suppress a company in defense, it will be necessary to allocate up to two units of attack aircraft, which is 10 percent of the daily resource of an air wing. The suppression of the battalion in the concentration area will require the involvement of 20-30 vehicles, or 50-70 percent of the daily resource of carrier-based aviation. And we must bear in mind that there will be losses of aircraft. The consumption of SLCMs and ALCMs to hit such targets is enormous. This can be judged from Syria - at the Shayrat airfield, the Americans launched 59 Tomahawks worth about $ 120 million (Bearded Tomahawks). The battleship "Iowa" solves such fire missions with the consumption of ammunition of the main caliber of two or three and 10-15 percent, respectively.

What do we have today in the Russian Navy? The largest caliber of naval artillery is 130 millimeters on destroyers of project 956. The weight of the projectile is about 30 kilograms with a firing range of up to 30 kilometers. With this weapon, the most powerful Russian ship in terms of artillery can, at best, solve the problem of suppressing two company strongholds to the depth of tactical antiamphibious defense from the water's edge. This follows directly from a comparison of the area of ​​the kill zone of a 130-mm high-explosive projectile, the destroyer's ammunition load, and the size of a company stronghold of an American or other foreign army. Such a projectile cannot hit fortifications made of thick reinforced concrete and other heavily protected objects, in particular tanks. Therefore, it is necessary to say that our fleet (like, indeed, any other, with the exception of the United States, which retains its battleships as museums, but is ready to return to service at any moment) does not have ships capable of providing effective fire support the coastal flank of the army or the landing force during the landing, especially to escort the latter in the operational depth. And there is a need for this.

Who fought in numbers, and who fought with skill. The monstrous truth about the losses of the USSR in World War II Sokolov Boris Vadimovich

Japanese losses

Japanese losses

According to the American researcher John Dower, the losses of the Japanese army amounted to 2803 killed and died of wounds in French Indochina, in battles against the Americans - 485,717, in battles against the British and Dutch - 208,026, in battles against the Australians - 199,511, in battles against the Red Army. Army in August - September 1945 - 7483 killed and died from wounds, in other overseas territories - 23 388, in the territory of Japan proper - 10 543. The losses of the fleet in 1941-1945 amounted to 414 879 killed and died from wounds. J. Dauer estimates the losses of the Japanese army in China in 1937-1941 at 185,647 killed and died from wounds, and in 1942-1945 - at 202,958 dead. It seems to us that there is some error in Dauer's data here. The fact is that Chinese losses in killed and wounded in 1937-1941 amounted to 2398.9 thousand people, and in 1942-1945 - only 719 thousand people. Thus, Chinese losses in killed and wounded in 1942-1945 were only 30.0% of their losses in 1937-1941, while Japanese losses in China in 1942-1945 were 109.3% of those in 1937. -1941. Then we will have to admit that in relation to one killed or wounded Chinese, Japanese losses in killed increased by 3.6 times in 1942-1945, which seems absolutely incredible. The quality of the Chinese army after 1941 could not have improved so significantly, given that the most experienced cadres were knocked out in 1937-1941.

Japanese casualties

This estimate includes 170,000 civilian casualties who died or died after the end of the war in Manchuria, China and Korea, 165,000 died on Okinawa, and 24,000 died after the end of the war in Japan itself, mainly way from hunger. As can be understood, the category of killed and missing servicemen includes those who died from wounds and diseases, but does not include those who died in Soviet captivity.

In the future, more careful calculations made it possible to increase the number of dead Japanese military personnel, including those who died in Soviet captivity.

The distribution of Japanese casualties by service and theater of operations, according to an official estimate made in 1964, was as follows:

Losses of the Japanese armed forces killed in the main theaters of operations (China - 1937-1945, other theaters - 1941-1945)

It should be noted that, according to clarifications made between 1964 and 1976, during the battle on Iwo Jima (Ogasawara Islands), 4,700 people died more - 12,850 in the army and 7,050 people in the navy. According to the same data, not 62,100, but 65,000 servicemen died in Okinawa. The only campaign for which official Japanese data on the number of wounded is given is the battles on Iwo Jima - 736 in the army and 297 in the navy, for a total of 1033 people. There is also a higher estimate of the number of Japanese soldiers killed on Iwo Jima - about 22 thousand people. So far, only about 8,700 bodies have been found, and about 13,000 more burials are expected to be found. The Japanese government is going to allow civilian searchers to search for the remains of the dead on Iwo Jima. So far, only military facilities are located on the island, and civilians are not allowed to enter there. With these higher estimates, assuming an estimate of 19,900 deaths on the Ogasawara Islands, the total number of Japanese military deaths can be estimated at 2,128,600. The Americans and their allies captured 41,000 Japanese prisoners before surrendering.

In addition, in 1938, during the battles near Lake Khasan against the Red Army, the Japanese lost 526 killed and died from wounds and 914 wounded. In 1939, during a much larger clash with Soviet troops near the Khalkhin Gol River (according to Japanese terminology - the Nomongan Incident), Japanese losses in May-July amounted to 159 killed, 119 wounded, 12 missing, and in August - early September - 7696 killed, 8647 wounded and 1021 missing. Thus, the total number of Japanese dead during the battles at Khalkhin Gol, taking into account the fact that from Soviet captivity 160 Japanese and 44 Manchu troops returned, can be estimated at 8684 people. However, out of the 10,301 names carved on the monument, 9471 out of the 10,301 names carved on the monument, were those who fell during the Nomongan incident. It can be assumed that the difference of 813 people refers to those who died from wounds, diseases and other causes.

The losses of the Soviet troops in the battles near Khasan amounted to 759 killed, 100 died from wounds and diseases, 6 people died as a result of accidents and 95 missing, and in total - 960 dead, 2752 wounded and 527 sick. Soviet irretrievable losses were 1.8 times more than the Japanese.

The losses of the Red Army during the fighting on the Khalkhin-Gol River amounted to 6472 killed, 1152 died from wounds, 8 died from diseases, 2028 people were missing, and 43 people died as a result of accidents. Taking into account the fact that 89 Red Army soldiers returned from Japanese captivity, the total losses of Soviet troops in killed and dead can be estimated at 9614 people. This is 1.015 times more than the losses of the Japanese-Manchurian troops in the dead and dead. In addition, during the fighting at Khalkhin Gol, the allied Red Army Mongolian troops lost, according to official figures published in November 1939, 165 killed and 401 wounded. However, according to later studies by the Mongolian historian Tamir Ganbold, the losses of the Mongolian army amounted to 895 people, of which 234 people were killed and died. Of this number, 1 Mongol soldier died in Japanese captivity. Taking into account irretrievable losses Soviet-Mongolian and Japanese-Manchurian troops, the ratio turns out to be 1.04:1.

The losses of Soviet troops at Khalkhin Gol were 15,251 wounded and at least 2,287 sick, of which 701 were treated in the Trans-Baikal Military District, and the vast majority of the rest in Mongolia.

We do not include the losses of the Japanese in the battles of Khasan and Khalkhin Gol in the losses during the Second World War, just as we do not include the losses of the Red Army in these battles in the losses in the Second World War.

In total, the Japanese armed forces at the time of surrender numbered 6983 thousand people in 154 divisions and 136 brigades of the ground army and 20 formations of the Navy. Of this number, 3532 thousand people were in the territory of the Japanese Islands proper. In addition, there were about 3 million Japanese civilians outside of Japan in the theaters of operations.

Japan officially believes that the victims of the Soviet invasion in August - September 1945 were approximately 220 thousand Japanese, both military and civilians. Probably, this may include not only the Japanese, but also the Chinese, Manchus, Koreans and representatives of other nationalities who served in the Japanese armed forces and either died in battles with the Red Army or died in Soviet captivity. At the beginning of 1949, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs registered 590,830 Japanese prisoners of war. Of this number, 440,387 people had been repatriated by that time, 6,357 people were recognized as civilian prisoners, 52,165 people died, and 91,276 people remained in prisoner of war camps. 49 Japanese were convicted by military tribunals, 427 were sent to prisons and the Gulag, 56 fled, and another 113 people left for other reasons. The figure of 52,165 dead prisoners of war is close to the official Japanese figure of 52,700 servicemen who died in Soviet captivity. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Japanese prisoners of war remained in Soviet camps until 1956, and it is hard to believe that only 535 Japanese died in 7 years. According to official Soviet data, 609,448 Japanese were captured, of which 61,855 people died. It is possible that the difference in 18,618 prisoners and 9,690 dead was formed at the expense of civilian prisoners. It is also possible that the difference was nevertheless formed due to the actual Japanese prisoners of war. In a certificate prepared by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in October 1956, which first spoke about 609,448 Japanese prisoners of war and that 61,855 of them died, it was specifically noted that “for Japanese prisoners of war repatriated directly at the fronts, before they were brought to the territory of the USSR , as well as for those who died at the front-line assembly points, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs does not have personal lists. It can be assumed that the difference in the figures of 1949 and 1956 was formed due to the repatriated and those who died directly at the fronts, even before the prisoners entered the NKVD system. It is possible that these 9690 Japanese prisoners of war who died directly at the front are included in the Japanese official losses among those who died during the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. For other nationalities who served in the Japanese army (Chinese, Koreans, etc.), there is no discrepancy in the number of prisoners between the documents of 1949 and 1956, and in the number of those who died in captivity there is a slight discrepancy only for the Chinese (respectively 135 and 138 people). Therefore, we will give data on the death rate of prisoners based on materials from 1956:

Of the 16,150 Chinese, 138 died.

Out of 10,312 Koreans, 71 died.

Out of 3633 Mongols, 4 people died.

Out of 5 Buryats, 1 person died.

486 Manchus, 58 Russians and 2 Tungus were liberated directly on the fronts. None of them died in captivity.

According to Japanese official figures, 393,367 civilian casualties during the American air raids, including approximately 210,000 victims of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and 97,031 deaths during the bombing of Tokyo with conventional bombs. About 150,000 more civilians died or committed suicide during the fighting in Okinawa, and 10,000 on the island of Saipan from the Northern Mariana Islands. There is another estimate of casualties among the Japanese civilian population during the fighting on Saipan and Okinawa - respectively 22 thousand and 77 thousand dead. It should be noted that many Japanese civilians, following the example of the military, committed collective suicide in order not to be captured by the enemy. It is likely that the number of civilian casualties in Okinawa and Saipan is still closer to 100 thousand, and not to 160 thousand people, or even 180 thousand, according to Japanese official data. With adjustments made, we estimate the total number of civilian casualties in Japan, including 393,400 bombing victims, 100,000 casualties in Okinawa and Saipan, 24,000 deaths in mainland Japan, and 170,000 dead and missing in Manchuria, China and Korea, 687.4 thousand people.

Japan held about 100,000 American prisoners, captured mainly in the Philippines. Java also held about 300,000 military and civilian prisoners. All of them were supposed to be destroyed in the event of an American invasion. This invasion was supposed at the end of October 1945. At the same time, American generals assumed that during the first month of fighting on the Japanese islands, American losses would amount to 500-800 thousand people killed and wounded, and the level of losses remained the same in each subsequent month until the cessation Japanese resistance. At the same time, Japanese losses were estimated at 1.5-4 times more than American ones.

In the event of a landing, atomic bombs would be used in tactical support for the landing, against large concentrations of Japanese troops. In September - October 1945, the production of atomic bombs was supposed to be 3-4 bombs per month, and by December it would have reached 7 bombs per month. By the end of October, when it was supposed to start landing on the Japanese islands, at least 7 atomic bombs were to be at the disposal of the American armed forces.

We estimate Japan's total losses in World War II at 2,816,000 dead, of which 2,128,600 were killed or died by the armed forces.