The structure of the engineering troops of the German Army (2015). Pontoon company (PonR)

Organization of the fulfillment of the task by the commander of an engineer-sapper platoon to make passages in mine-explosive barriers in front of the front line of enemy defense

Moscow Order of the Red Labor

Znamya Mining University.

Military Department.

COURSE WORK

for special tactical training

topic: "Organization of the task by the commander of an engineering platoon

for making passages in

minefields in front of

front line of enemy defenses.

I've done the work:

platoon student 343

Supervisor:

lieutenant colonel

V. A. Skorobogatov

Platoon student 343

for course work on tactical and special training.

Topic: "Organization of the execution of the task by the commander of an engineer-sapper platoon to make passages in mine-explosive barriers in front of the enemy's front line of defense."

Option N6.

I. Initial situation.

Card 25000, sheets

U-32-108-V-g, U-32-108-G-v, U-32-108-G-g,

U-33-97-V-v, U-32-120-B-a, U-32-120-A-b,

U-32-120-B-b, U-33-109-A-a.

The commander of 2 isr 1 isb at 16.00 on 20.07 in the alignments of the passages set the task for the commander of 1 isv.

commander of 2 isr 1 isb to make passages in minefields in front of the front line of defense by a platoon.

1. 4 MPB of the enemy takes up defense with the forward edge along:

eastern edge of Rosenhorst (83-04), eastern edge of Borstel (81-03).

2. 12 SMEs go on the offensive immediately on the left flank of the defense sector of 45 SMEs (its 2 SMEs).

3. 2 isr 1 isb ordered on the night of 20.07 to make 2 passes in the minefields of the enemy.

4. Passages N 7.8 suits 1 SV, NN 9.10

5. I order: 1 sv on the night of 20.07 to make passes NN 7.8 in enemy minefields. Readiness of the completed passages by 5.00 21.07. Organize a commandant's service on the completed passages by the forces of one department. On the left, he makes passes 2 ivum. Obtain the necessary funds for making passages at the warehouse of VTI 45 MSP in the area with a mark of 56.5 (81-06) and from the foreman of the company in the area where the company is located (mark 56.0 (81-06)).

I will be in the area where the company is located. Communication with me - connected.

My assistant is you.

Directions

commander of the 2nd ISR for organizing interaction and various types of support.

1. Coordinate the actions of the platoon in place and time with the commander of the defending 6th MSR 45 SME, which is entrusted with combat cover for the platoon's actions.

2. Subdivisions of 1st motorized brigade of 12 SMEs will advance along the aisles of NN 7,8, with which to organize interaction on the following issues: the place and time of making the aisles, their designations, the designation of the ways of advancing to the aisles.

3. In the platoon, have an observer for the actions of the enemy and the signals of the senior commander.

Warning signals installed in the shelf:

Chemical attack of the enemy and radioactive contamination of the area - two red rockets, in the voice of "Atom";

The appearance of an air enemy - two green rockets, with the voice "Air".

4. Personnel have gas masks with them, OZK - at the places where the task is performed.

II. Additional information

The personnel, means of engineering weapons and transport are fully staffed. All machines have one

refueling fuel.

III. Execute

The student to study the task and, in the role of the commander of the AI, organize the execution of the received task by the platoon.

State in an explanatory note:

Clarification of the task by the platoon commander;

Calculation and distribution of time;

advance directives;

Assessment of the situation with the necessary calculations;

Conclusions from the assessment of the situation and reconnaissance;

Decision to complete the task;

Combat order to subordinate units and crews, and instructions on various types of support.

On a separate sheet, submit:

The initial situation from the map with a scheme for organizing the actions of the UIS during the execution of the task;

Scheme of actions of departments for making passages;

Scheme of the organization of the commandant's service on the aisles;

Designation of passages.

IV. Guides and manuals.

1. Guide to the device and overcoming engineering barriers.

2. Tactical-special training. Textbook for cadets of military engineering schools.

3. Plyaskin V.Ya. etc. Engineering support of combined arms combat.

Deadline 1.04.97.

Coursework Supervisor

lieutenant colonel

V. A. Skorobogatov

“___” _______________ 1997

Order issuance time: 16.00 20/07

Ready time: 5.00 21/07

I. Clarification of the task by the platoon leader.

Operational time: 16.00 - 16.10

Location: aisles.

1. The enemy defends with the front line of defense along the line: the eastern outskirts of Rasenhorst, the eastern outskirts of Bortsel.

12 SMEs go on the offensive immediately on the left flank of the defense sector of 45 SMEs. 2 isr 1 isb ordered on the night of 20.07 to make 2 passes in the minefields of the enemy.

2. 1 SV was tasked to make passages 7.8 up to 100 m deep by 05.00 21.07. The method of making - manually. Organize a commandant's service on the aisles.

3. Get the necessary funds to complete the task from the foreman of the company.

4. Fire cover for the actions of the platoon is entrusted to the commander of the 6th MSR.

Organize interaction with the commander of the 6th MSR on the following issues:

What funds are allocated to cover the actions of the platoon;

Call signals and ceasefire by means of cover;

The start and end time of the platoon's actions to make passes in enemy minefields. The commander of the 2nd isr will be in the area where the company is located. Communication with him connected. Deputy

commander of 1 isr - Ya.

II. Calculation and distribution of time.

Operational time: 16.10 - 16.15

Now 16.00 20/07. Submit the report by 5.00 21/07.

Total time available to prepare and complete the task

13:00 min.

Light time - 6 hours. 00min. from 16.00 to 22.00,

Dark time - 7h.00min. from 22.00 to 5.00

The task will take up to 4 hours to complete. To start the task at 21.40 20/07.

Available time to allocate:

1. Clarification of the task .......... 16.00 - 16.10

2. Calculation and distribution of time ........ 16.10 - 16.15

3. Movement of the commander to the area of ​​concentration

platoon ................................................ 16.10 - 16.30

4. Advance Directives........ 4.30 pm - 4.35 pm

4.a Obtaining and checking the VTI from

foremen of the company .................................... 16.35 -18.10

4.b Rest of personnel

and eating ............................... 10/18-10/19

4.c Preparing for the task......10/19-21/20

5. Advancing to the area of ​​​​execution of the task of the commander

ditch of squads and platoon commander...... 16.35 - 16.55

6. Assessment of the situation, taking into account the time spent on

organization of interaction with the commander of the I SME

and reconnaissance ................................. 16.55 -18.30

7. Movement of the commander to the platoon concentration area .............................................. ............... 18.30-18.50

8. Making a decision to complete the task ....................................................... ..............18.50 - 18.55

9. Setting a task for commanders

branches ........................ 21.20 - 21.30

9. Issuing a combat order ..................... 21.30 - 21.40

10. Advancing to the area of ​​the mission.......

21.40 - 22.00

11. Completion of the task by departments..... 22.00 - 02.30

12. Report on the completion of the task ............ 04.55 - 05.00

III. Advance directives.

Operational time: 16.30 - 16.35

Our platoon was ordered to make manual passes 7.8 in the enemy minefields up to 100 m deep by 5.00 on 21.07. and organize a commandant service on the aisles.

To the deputy platoon commander, before 21.40 20.07, receive from the foreman of the company and check the completeness and serviceability of 3 sets of KRI, 18 pointers and 18 lights to indicate passages.

Platoon by 21.40 to arrive in the area of ​​the mission.

All personnel should have weapons, personal protective equipment and gas masks.

At 16.55 squad commanders to depart with me from the area where the company is located for reconnaissance.

IV. Issues to be resolved during the reconnaissance.

Operational time: 16.55 - 18.30

A. Plan of reconnaissance.

During the reconnaissance, determine:

Locations, directions and landmarks of the proposed passages.

Locations of mine barriers.

Organize interaction with the commander of the Imsb.

Ways to designate passages.

B. Organization of interaction.

In the course of organizing interaction with the commander of small and medium-sized units, the following questions are clarified:

The order of designation and fencing of passages.

Signals are set for interaction with Imsb.

B. Conclusions from the reconnaissance.

Conclusions from the assessment of the enemy:

In connection with possible application enemy weapons mass destruction be ready for action in conditions of radioactive contamination of the area, have anti-chemical protection equipment at the ready;

When performing the task, have observers for the air and ground enemy and warning signals;

Conclusions from the assessment of their strengths:

The platoon is staffed with personnel, engineering weapons, transport is staffed according to the state, fuel and lubricants - one refueling, no losses;

The platoon is able to complete the task in 7 hours;

1.2 crews make passages 7.8, respectively, then 1 and 2 iso carry out commandant service;

Conclusions from the assessment of terrain and time:

The terrain is open, allowing you to complete the task only at night;

The time of day contributes to the successful completion of the task;

V. Decision to complete the task

Operational time: 18.50 - 18.55

1. Make passes manually, moving in a plastunsky way, with a ledge to the right.

2. 1.2 crews make passages, respectively, 7.8 in enemy minefields up to 100 m deep, after completing this task, 1 and 2 Iso carry out commandant service. While doing

passages 6 MSR provides fire cover for the actions of the platoon. Start the task at 21.40 and finish at 4.30 21.07,

Until then, prepare for the task.

3. Interaction with the commander of the 6th MSR is organized on the following issues:

The location of the passages being made has been agreed;

Issues of fire interaction in the event of the appearance of the enemy were agreed;

Agreed on the start and end time of the task;

Communication with the commander of the 6 MSR liaison;

4. I will be located with 1 iso, communication with me personally and connected.

VI. battle order

Operational time: 21.30-21.40

1. The enemy defends along the line: the eastern outskirts of Rasenhorst (8304), the eastern outskirts of Bortsel (8103).

2. 12 SMEs go on the offensive immediately on the left flank of the defense sector of 45 SMEs. 2 isr 1 isb ordered on the night of 26.07 to make 2 passes in enemy minefields up to 100 m deep.

3. Our platoon was ordered to make passages 7.8 in the enemy minefields in front of the front line of defense by 5.00 21.07. Fire cover for the actions of the platoon is entrusted to the commander of the 6th MSR.

4. On the left, passes are made by the 2nd ivum.

5. Perform the task at night manually, moving in a plastunsky way. When illuminating the area, stop all movements. When performing the task, strictly observe camouflage.

I order:

At 21.40, the squads concentrate in the first trench of our positions and at 21.40 directly proceed to the task, starting to do: 1 calculation - passage 7, 2 calculation

Pass 8.1 and 2 ISO after completion by a platoon

tasks organize the commandant's service on the passes made.

Complete the task by 4.30 21.07, until this time prepare for the task.

At each passage, leave two people with mine barriers in readiness to close the passages in the event of an enemy going on the attack.

Removed mines and fuses should be concentrated at the regiment's ammunition point and placed under guard.

7. Prepare and check all necessary means.

In each department to have: 1 KRI and mine detectors for each.

8. I will be located with 1 iso, communication with me personally and connected.

9. My deputy is a full-time one.

10. Warning signals installed in the shelf:

Chemical attack of the enemy and radioactive contamination of the area - two red rockets, in the voice of "ATOM";

The appearance of an air enemy - two green rockets, with the voice "AIR";

Interaction signals with 6 msr:

calling fire -

turn tracer in the direction of the target.

Feedback when returning to the trench-

Lieutenant Colonel A. Balshoy

The engineering troops, which are part of each branch of the US armed forces, are designed to perform tasks engineering support. It involves the implementation of a set of measures to create the necessary conditions for the daily activities of troops (forces) and the successful completion of combat missions by them in peacetime and war time, as well as to provide assistance to federal ministries and departments to ensure the internal security of the country, the preservation of the environment, rational use natural resources, etc.

According to the nature of the tasks performed, the engineering support of the US Armed Forces is divided into three types: general engineering support, geospatial support, and engineering support for combat operations.

General engineering support is aimed at the construction, maintenance and restoration of sea and river ports, automobile and railways, bridges, military camps (forward bases), refugee camps, prisoner of war camps, as well as logistics of military operations and environmental protection. Their implementation involves mainly civilian personnel on a contract basis.

Geospatial engineering support involves solving such problems as the formation and maintenance of a geospatial database, the assessment of the terrain and the creation of its visual image, the distribution of geospatial information among consumers.

Engineering support for combat operations is a set of measures to increase the maneuverability of friendly troops (forces) and ensure their survivability, as well as to reduce the maneuverability of enemy troops. They are carried out, as a rule, by engineering units that are part of combat formations and associations of branches of the US armed forces.

Organizational structure of engineering command ground forces USA

* The total number of personnel of the US Army Engineering Command (excluding attached formations) is 245 military personnel (officers - 96, warrant officers - 7, soldiers and sergeants - 142). Typical structure of the engineering command (in theater)

Typical structure of an engineering team

Typical structure of an engineering battalion

Typical structure of an engineer company

Typical structure of a mobility support company

Typical structure of a pontoon-bridge company

The solution of the tasks of engineering support in the US Armed Forces is entrusted to the corresponding formations of the types of the Armed Forces, which are represented by engineering (engineering and construction) commands (directions) and regular units that are part of the formations and formations of regular forces and reserve components.

In the Army (SW), the main structure that decides the issues of general and geospatial engineering support is the engineering command (headquarters in Washington, federal district Colombia), which reports to the Minister of the Army. It consists of about 650 servicemen and up to 37,000 civilian specialists.

This command has the following main tasks:
- planning, design, construction of dams and other flood protection systems;
- design and construction management of military facilities;
- restoration and protection of the environment (cleansing the territory of former military facilities from hazardous waste and ammunition, restoration of the ecosystem, water areas, etc.).

Engineering Command includes: Headquarters, Humphreys Engineering Center, Nine regional offices(45 districts), financial center, engineering and logistics center, research institute water resources, a waterworks design center, a research and development center, a geospatial information collection center, and the 249th Engineer Battalion of Power Equipment. When the command is deployed to remote theaters, it is given units and subunits of the 412th and 416th engineering commands (in theaters) of the army reserve.

The engineering support of combat operations of the US Army is entrusted to the regular engineering formations of formations, formations and units of regular forces and reserve components. They are subdivided into four types: control bodies of engineering formations during engineering operations, subunits as part of combat formations, main and special engineering formations.

The control bodies of engineering formations include the headquarters of engineering commands in the theater of operations, engineering brigades and engineering battalions. They manage the engineering forces and facilities in the area of ​​the respective operations.

Engineering Command is deployed in a war zone in the interests of an area command or a joint operational formation ( army corps) and provides, if necessary, all types of engineering support. When deployed in a theater of operations, it includes units and subunits (including other types of aircraft) necessary to carry out the intended engineering operation.

Engineering brigade is part of the engineering command in the theater of operations or is deployed separately to conduct the corresponding operation in the interests of the operational-tactical formation (division).

The brigade is a modular formation, which can include up to five engineering battalions and carry out all types of engineering support if the appropriate forces and means are available. In addition, other units may be subordinate to the headquarters of the formation in order to effective solution some tasks (for example, organizing a cordon and adjusting traffic when crossing water barriers).

Engineer Battalion may be part of the theater engineering command, engineering brigade or maneuver support brigade, or deployed separately when conducting a minor (in terms of scale) engineering operation in the interests of brigade or division level formations. Depending on the operation being carried out, the battalion headquarters are assigned up to five engineering companies of the appropriate direction (engineer-sapper, construction engineer, pontoon-bridge, etc.). In addition, when a battalion is deployed separately, a forward support company is included in its composition. All engineer battalions of the US Army (with the exception of the 249th Engineer Battalion of Power Equipment) are capable of solving tasks of two types of engineering support: general and combat support.

The main and special engineering formations must carry out specific activities, the most important of which are: equipment, maintenance and restoration of communication lines; construction of protective shelters and other structures; construction of runways; production of continuous demining; water intake equipment.

The main engineering formations of the US Army include companies: engineering and sapper, mobility, pontoon bridge, sapper, engineering and construction, construction, as well as companies of engineering equipment and equipment.

Engineering sapper company designed to conduct engineering reconnaissance, increase maneuverability and ensure the survivability of friendly troops and facilities, as well as to reduce the maneuverability of enemy troops. The number of personnel of the company is 103 military personnel (five officers, 98 soldiers and sergeants). As special equipment, it is armed with demining systems based on the Husky G2 armored car, M9 ACE universal engineering vehicles and M104 Volverin tank bridge layers.

The unit can be attached to the headquarters battalions of combat brigades or brigades of the US Army aviation, and also organizationally be part of the engineer battalion of the US Army engineer brigade. In accordance with American regulations, an engineer company is capable of:
- Deploy from two to five mobile groups (engineering and sapper, barriers, sappers or bridge layers) to solve specific tasks of engineering support in certain areas;
- lay a column track with a total length of up to 120 km per day;
- make passages in minefields and blockages (to overcome on foot - six and on vehicles - three);
- to ensure the performance of engineering work by forces at the rate of 660 people per day;
- act as an infantry unit (if necessary). The mobility support company is used to conduct engineering reconnaissance, increase the maneuverability of friendly troops and reduce the maneuverability of enemy troops. Its number is 118 military personnel (five officers, 113 soldiers and sergeants). As special equipment, the company is armed with M139A1 Volkeno minelayers, M9 ACE universal engineering vehicles and Ml04 Volverin tank bridge layers.

The unit is attached to the headquarters battalions of combat brigades (one company in the light or mechanized Stryker brigade, two in the armored brigade), and also organizationally be part of the engineering battalion of the engineering brigade or the US Army maneuver support brigade.

The mobility support company is capable of:
- Deploy from two to five mobile groups (engineer-sapper, engineer-assault or barriers) to solve specific tasks of engineering support in certain areas;
- make passages in minefields and blockages (to overcome them on foot - four, on vehicles - from two to four 1 );
- deploy four tactical bridges to overcome ditches and ravines;
- install more than 4.4 thousand linear meters of wire fences;
- act as an infantry unit (if necessary).

Pontoon Bridge Company designed for preparation, deployment and operation of pontoon-bridge systems when forcing water barriers and overcoming sections of rough terrain. The number of personnel is 185 military personnel (five officers, one warrant officer and 179 soldiers and sergeants). As special equipment, the company is armed with M9 ACE universal engineering vehicles, Ml04 Volverin tank bridge layers, DSB heavy mechanized bridges and an IRB pontoon bridge kit.

The unit may be organizationally part of the engineering battalion of the US Army Engineering Brigade. When carrying out operations to force various obstacles, pontoon-bridge companies are included in the engineering battalions at the rate of one unit for two combat brigades.

In accordance with American regulations, a pontoon bridge company is capable of:
- install one heavy mechanized bridge with a length of up to 40 m and a carrying capacity of up to 80 tons 2 to overcome ditches and water barriers or eight bridges 20 m long and 4.3 m wide;
- expand through water barrier IRB pontoon bridge set up to 210 m long or six ferries 35 m each 3 .

Sapper company provides mine clearing of routes of advance and locations of formations of the US ground forces. The number of its personnel is 191 military personnel (six officers, 185 soldiers and sergeants).

The unit may be attached to the headquarters battalions of combat brigades or army aviation brigades, as well as organizationally be part of an engineer battalion or an engineer brigade of the US Army (based on one unit for four combat brigades).

In accordance with American regulations, a sapper company is capable of:
- deploy from three to five mobile sapper groups to solve specific tasks of engineering support in certain areas;
- during the day, check and clear mines of two routes for the advancement of troops with a total length of up to 225 km;
- within 24 hours to check and demining the territory with a total area of ​​up to 8000 m 2 .

Engineering and construction company is engaged in carrying out repair and restoration work of the roadway and runways of airfields, activities for the preparation of construction sites for the construction of military infrastructure facilities on them, as well as the laying of pipelines and the creation of a drainage system. The number of its personnel is 161 military personnel (five officers and 156 soldiers and sergeants).

The unit can be organizationally part of the engineering battalion of the engineering brigade of the US Army, at the rate of one company per division (in defense, at the rate of one company per combat brigade).

construction company designed for installation and construction work on the construction or repair of military infrastructure, including sewerage, water supply and connection of energy systems. The number of personnel of the company is 162 military personnel (five officers, three warrant officers and 154 soldiers and sergeants).

The unit may be organizationally part of the engineering battalion of the US Army Engineering Brigade. The company is able to ensure the performance of construction work at the rate of 1000 people per hour per day.

Engineering machinery and equipment company should carry out work on the fortification equipment of the positions of ground forces units, clearing sites (without mine clearance), and also provide the necessary technical support to other engineering units. The number of personnel of the company is 122 people (five officers, 117 soldiers and sergeants).

The unit may organizationally be part of the engineering battalion of the SV engineering brigade.
In accordance with American regulations, a company of engineering equipment and equipment is capable of:
- prepare within an hour 18 double trenches for standing shooting or 12 positions for group weapon crews;
- erect a protective shaft up to 200 m long within an hour;
- ensure the performance of engineering and construction work at the rate of 1,000 people per hour per day.

Special engineering formations of the US Army are narrow-profile units that are used only as part of engineering commands, brigades and battalions or are attached to engineering companies of combat formations to increase their capabilities in solving assigned tasks. Special engineering formations include: power equipment companies; topographic companies; platoons of earth-moving machines; quarrying platoons; groups of construction management, planning and development of engineering projects; concreting departments; advanced engineering teams; fire departments; pavers teams, divers and real estate teams. In addition, these can be well drilling units, service dogs units and units for working with explosive substances, geodetic information processing centers.

The US Army Corps of Engineers is a branch of the military that is unique in composition and tasks. One of their priority areas further development is the formation of an engineer battalion as part of each combat brigade, which will significantly increase the connectivity. In addition, it is planned to reorganize the divisional and corps-level engineering units. .

Another important direction in the development of engineering troops involves the use of weapons and military equipment in them, which, taking into account the experience of military conflicts, allows last decade to more effectively carry out work on demining and restoring the destroyed infrastructure of settlements.

According to the US command, the experience of using the ground forces engineering units in Iraq and Afghanistan showed the high functionality of the existing structure of this type of troops and confirmed the correctness of approaches to its use in modern types wars and armed conflicts.

1 For armored brigades - two, for light and mechanized brigades "Stryker" - up to four.

2 If it is necessary to increase the carrying capacity up to 110 tons, two twin axles are installed. Eight people deploy one bridge 40 m long in 1.5 hours (during daylight hours).

3 The carrying capacity of the bridge is up to 100 tons. When crossing units on multi-purpose off-road vehicles of the Humvee type, two-lane traffic is organized (at a current speed of up to 3.5 km/h). There are 56 vehicles in the company for the transportation of bridge structures. The installation of bridge structures and the movement of ferries are carried out using 14 boats.

Soviet military miracle 1941-1943 [Revival of the Red Army] Glantz David M

ENGINEERING (ENGINEERING) TROOPS

ENGINEERING (ENGINEERING) TROOPS

Engineer and sapper regiments and battalions

Throughout the war, the engineering troops of the Red Army included sapper troops as part of the active fronts and sappers under the authority of the leadership of the RGK or RVGK, which were allocated by the Stavka to the active fronts and armies as needed. Both those and others were supposed to be engaged in the construction and renovation of defensive structures and the provision of various kinds of engineering support to field troops during offensive and defensive operations.

The engineering troops as part of the active troops of the Red Army included separate engineer battalions (squadrons) in rifle and cavalry divisions, motorized engineer battalions in mechanized corps, engineer battalions (squadrons) in rifle and cavalry divisions, pontoon bridge battalions in tank divisions, light engineer battalions in motorized rifle divisions, sapper companies or platoons in rifle and cavalry regiments and in tank and motorized rifle regiments and brigades, as well as sapper platoons in regiments of the RVGK and corps artillery.

The sapper battalions of corps and divisions consisted of three sapper companies of three platoons and a technical company in battalions of a corps or technical platoon in battalions of divisional subordination, a bridge-building platoon and a platoon of secret weapons and a small rear service. The total number of corps engineer battalion was 901 people, divisional - 521 people. Depending on the division to which they belonged, these battalions moved either on foot or on horseback. On June 22, 1941, the field forces of the Red Army included over 200 engineer battalions, all of which retained their pre-war structure until December 1941, when the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO) reduced the size of the battalion to two companies, mainly due to the creation within the RVGK larger and more efficient engineering and sapper troops.

The engineering troops of the RGC included 19 engineering and 15 pontoon-bridge regiments stationed in military districts, which the NCO formed in the first half of 1941 from 22 separate engineer battalions and 21 separate pontoon-bridge battalions. Of this number, ten engineer and eight pontoon-bridge regiments, seven engineer battalions and two engineer battalions were attached to active fronts, two engineer and two engineer battalions were directly subordinate to the RGC, and the rest were in military districts and inactive fronts.

The engineering regiment of the RGC consisted of a headquarters, two engineering battalions (one of them motorized), a technical battalion with electrical, electro-protective, hydraulic and camouflage companies, a light pontoon-bridge park (NPL), 35 engineering vehicles, 48 ​​trucks and 21 tractors. The pontoon-bridge regiment included a headquarters, three pontoon-bridge battalions (but only one personnel), a technical company with platoons for laying roads, building bridges, lumberjacks, electrical and field water supply, an H2P pontoon-bridge park and an officer school equipped with pontoon bridges and technical equipment.

On the eve of the war, the military plans of the General Staff required NPOs to have in each field army at least one independent motorized engineer battalion, one motorized pontoon bridge battalion and separate companies field water supply, disguise, electrical and hydraulic support, a training unit for sappers and a separate reserve pontoon-bridge park equipped with a H2P kit. In addition, each field army should have a reserve engineer regiment and a separate reserve technical company for special engineering tasks.

However, in addition to the general shortage of engineering troops in the engineering regiments and battalions of the RGC existing on June 22, 1941, from 35 to 60 percent of the regular command staff, from 20 to 70 percent of the regular sergeant and senior staff were absent. They lacked an average of 35 percent of their regular strength and about 50 percent of their regular equipment.

In addition to the engineering troops, on the eve of the war, the People's Commissariat of Defense also had 25 military construction departments. 23 of them were engaged in the construction of fortified areas and field defenses in the western military districts, along with the majority of engineering and sapper troops belonging to future fronts. As a result, with the beginning of the war, most of the combat formations were deprived of the necessary engineering support.

When the Wehrmacht troops inflicted a brutal defeat on the Red Army during Operation Barbarossa, the already fragile Soviet engineer troops suffered great losses. The NPO reacted to this by hastily and practically from scratch starting the formation of new engineer-sapper battalions for the RGK (later - RVGK) with their subsequent allocation to the active fronts. For example, in July 1941, all engineer and pontoon-bridge regiments of the RGK were disbanded, and their remnants were used to form 100 small sapper battalions equipped only with rifles and other hand weapons, as well as entrenching tools, explosives and anti-tank mines. 25 such battalions were assigned to rifle corps, and another 75 to rifle divisions.

As a result total number Engineer-sapper and pontoon-bridge battalions in the Red Army constantly grew, from 20 on July 1 to 178 on November 1, including 140 attached to active fronts. However, during the same period, engineering support rifle divisions decreased markedly. For example, on July 29, the NPO disbanded technical and pontoon platoons in the engineer battalions of rifle divisions, and in July 1942, after the liquidation of three battalion engineer companies in December, it reduced the strength of the battalion by 60 fighters, also reducing the number of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.

Starting from the first months of 1942, the NPO began to compensate for the shortage of engineer troops by giving the active fronts and armies one or two new engineer or engineer battalions, and the fronts with new pontoon-bridge battalions. Separate engineer battalions could be either on foot or motorized, they consisted of three engineer companies with three engineer or motorized platoons and one technical platoon in each (the latter had power supply, lumberjacks and transport sections). The total strength of the battalion was 405 people. Separate sapper battalions had two or three sapper companies with a total strength of approximately 320 people.

While the number of separate engineer and pontoon-bridge battalions in the Red Army increased during the described period from 82 and 46 on January 1, 1942 to 184 and 68, respectively, on January 1, 1944, the number of separate engineer battalions decreased from 78 to three .

Sapper brigades and armies

Although in time initial stages German operation "Barbarossa" the number of engineering troops of the Red Army was greatly reduced, the State Defense Committee (GKO) ordered

Headquarters to build new strategic defensive lines and positions to slow down the offensive of the Wehrmacht, using the newly created engineering and sapper units for this. For example, on June 24, the GKO ordered the construction of a strategic defensive line along the Luga River south of Leningrad, on June 25, a second line from Nevel through Vitebsk and Gomel along the Dnieper to Dnepropetrovsk, and on June 28, a third line from Ostashkov through Olenino, Dorogobych and Yelnya along the Desna to Zhukovka, 50 kilometers west of Bryansk.

When the offensive of the Wehrmacht accelerated, the State Defense Committee in mid-July ordered the Stavka to build two more large defensive lines, the first to protect Odessa, Crimean peninsula and Sevastopol, the second - to protect the approaches to Moscow. The Moscow line, which blocked the Wehrmacht offensive in the Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets directions, started from Rzhev, went through Vyazma, south from the Moscow reservoir along the Lama River, then through Borodino and Kaluga to Tula.

The Headquarters assigned responsibility for the construction of these defensive lines to Main military engineering department NGOs and the Main Department of Hydrotechnical Construction ( Glavgidrostroy) under the NKVD. The first was to use military construction battalions for the construction of lines, which were subordinate to the front and army departments of military field construction in the areas allotted to them; in turn, the latter was to use its construction troops to build defensive lines in the deeper rear. When such an organization of work proved ineffective, on August 22 GKO transformed Glavgidrostroy into the Main Directorate of Defense Works (GUOBR) under the NKVD and made it responsible for coordinating the construction of rear defensive lines.

Despite all the efforts of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters, the Wehrmacht's rapid offensive inflicted heavy damage on the engineering troops of the Red Army, preventing most of them from taking part in the construction of defensive lines. The Germans preempted many of the Stavka's attempts to build defensive lines. August and September German troops overcame the Vitebsk-Gomel and Luga lines of the Red Army, and in early October they broke through the strategic defenses in the Vyazma and Bryansk sectors, surrounding and destroying large forces Soviet troops. Alarmed by the possibility of the Germans reaching Moscow, the Headquarters formed the Moscow Defense Zone on October 12, which was to consist of a series of defensive belts around the city. The most important of them passed through Khlebnikovo, Skhodnya, Zvenigorod, Kubinka and Naro-Fominsk, along Pakhra and the Moscow River.

Since the Red Army did not have the engineering and construction troops necessary for the construction of these and other defensive lines, on October 13, the GKO ordered the NPO to form six engineer armies, consisting of engineer brigades, by November 1, 1941, and transferred all engineering and construction troops to the Red Army as part of active fronts and in the rear under the command of the GUOBR (NKVD). Received numbers from 1st to 6th, these armies were formed in Vologda, Gorky, Ulyanovsk, Saratov, Stalingrad and Armavir, their total strength amounted to 300,000 people.

The GKO made the GDOBR responsible for creating by December 10 all rear defensive lines and positions, especially to the west of Moscow, and ordered it to prepare all personnel attached to the newly formed sapper armies and other engineering troops of the Red Army.

Each sapper army was to have approximately 50,000 men, mostly reservists under the age of 45. It was supposed to involve in them the personnel of engineering and construction units from the zones of the active fronts, as well as other specialists mobilized in the rear. The sapper brigades consisted of 19 sapper battalions, one autotractor battalion and one mechanized detachment. By order of the GKO, the sapper army was to have 3,000 trucks, 90 cars, 1,350 caterpillar tractors and 2,350 tractors with trailers, 12,000 wagons of construction materials and the full number of necessary construction tools. In addition, the departments of other commissariats and the civilian population were involved in the construction of defensive lines.

By order of the State Defense Committee, the local population was mobilized for the construction. Mostly they were women, old people, schoolchildren and adolescents of pre-conscription age. By order of the military councils of the fronts and military districts, as well as regional and district party and administrative bodies, work battalions [mobilized] were formed from them, which were then subordinated to sapper armies.

In the end, nine sapper armies were formed, numbered from 1st to 9th. These armies consisted of 30 engineer brigades and had a total of 570 engineer battalions, numbered 1200 to 1465 and 1543 to 1771. The total number of sapper armies on November 1, 1941 was 299,730 people. However, an acute shortage of engineering and construction troops limited the size and capabilities of these armies and brigades.

Each of the first nine sapper armies consisted of a headquarters and two to four separate sapper brigades. The sapper brigade included a headquarters, 19 separate sapper battalions, divided into three companies with four platoons each and a total battalion strength of 497 people, a mechanized detachment with one road and one bridge platoon, a lumberjack platoon, a position construction platoon and an automobile and tractor platoon with four branches. Although the strength of each sapper brigade was supposed to be 9979 fighters, most of the brigades remained understaffed. As a result, the personnel of the engineer battalions, who were supposed to be engaged in construction work for 12 hours a day and military training for another two hours, were forced to work on the construction of defensive structures for 12-14 hours a day and did not go through any military training. The tenth sapper army, which received the number 1, completed its deployment on the Western Front in January 1942, consisted of ten sapper brigades with eight sapper battalions each - a total of 80 sapper battalions and 45,160 fighters.

Initially, the sapper armies were subordinate to the GUOBR under the NKVD, but they worked under the direct supervision of the Main Military Engineering Directorate of the NPO. However, such a command organization was not entirely effective, and on November 28, the Headquarters subordinated these armies to the head of the engineering troops of the Red Army. In December 1942, the head of the engineering troops attached nine sapper armies and 29 sapper brigades to military districts and active fronts (two to the Western Front and one to the Karelian Front). By mid-January 1942, the structure of the engineering troops of the Red Army expanded, now they had ten sapper armies, 40 sapper brigades, three engineering regiments and 82 engineer-sapper, 78 sapper and 46 pontoon-bridge battalions.

These sapper armies and brigades were primarily responsible for erecting strategic defensive lines in the deep rear of the Red Army. The first of these lines, located in the Moscow, Stalingrad, North Caucasian and Volga military districts, were of a permanent nature and consisted of a complex system of fortified battalion defensive areas and company strongholds located in the likely directions of the German offensive and around large cities. However, on December 27, 1941, after the victory of the Red Army near Moscow, the GKO ordered a halt to defensive work around Moscow so that more resources could be allocated to transport refugees, grain and bread for the needy population, and limited construction works on other defensive lines.

In addition to fulfilling their construction duties, the sapper armies also served as a training base for the engineering troops of the Red Army as a whole. For example, in November-December 1941, the NPO assigned two, and then three battalions in each brigade, the designation of training and eventually transferred over 90 of these battalions to the active fronts. Having been trained as ordinary engineer, pontoon-bridge or road-bridge battalions and equipped with the most experienced personnel, the units intended for transfer to the front immediately stopped all defensive work and engaged in intensive field training. After their departure to the front, sapper brigades formed new battalions and companies to replace those who left. However, the chaos caused by the constant flow of personnel between the sapper armies and the active fronts had a negative effect on the effectiveness of the actions of the former.

The ten sapper armies proved their worth during the Red Army's winter offensive of 1941-1942, helping to maintain security in the rear, increasing the engineering and sapper capabilities of the fronts. However, they turned out to be clumsy, ineffective and difficult to control, especially in a constantly changing combat situation. Therefore, in February 1942, the State Defense Committee ordered the NKO to disband half of the sapper armies and brigades, assign the rest to the active fronts, and use the personnel of the disbanded troops to assist in the formation of new rifle divisions and brigades.

In February-March, the NPO disbanded the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 9th and 10th sapper armies and six sapper brigades, increasing the strength of the 7th and 8th sapper armies of the Southwestern Front, respectively, to five and ten brigades. In addition, he gave the active armies and the Moscow defense zone four sapper armies, three separate sapper brigades and many newly formed special engineering units.

At the same time, the Main Directorate for the Formation and Manning of the Red Army Troops under the NPO withdrew command personnel from the engineer armies and brigades for transfer to the active troops, and also reduced the number and strength of the engineer battalions in the engineer brigades. The NPO took its second step in April, reducing the strength of the engineer battalions from 497 to 405 men, replacing the autotractor battalions with companies with four automobile and one tractor platoon each, and reducing the strength of the engineer brigades to seven battalions with one autotractor company, out of a total brigade strength of 3,138 people.

At the end of June, two months after the completion of this reorganization, the NPO faced the difficult task of stopping the Wehrmacht's new summer offensive, Operation Blau. In addition to providing support for the active fronts, the 1st, 3rd, 6th and 8th NPO sapper armies were supposed to strengthen defensive lines west of Moscow, build new lines to defend the approaches to Stalingrad and the Caucasus and separate manpower from their ranks to compensate for losses in the Red Army troops.

The five sapper armies were building these defenses at an accelerated pace, but on 26 July the GKO ordered the NPO to withdraw 400,000 men from non-combat units by 20 August, including 60,000 sappers to be assigned to combat formations. The remaining sapper armies and brigades were supposed to be reduced, since they "too large and organizationally immobile and cannot effectively fulfill their tasks of engineering support for the combat operations of our troops, especially in offensive operations".

The GKO intended to create more flexible and efficient engineering troops, which the Headquarters could use in defensive and offensive operations in the most critical sectors in the late summer and autumn of 1942. As a result, it was decided to disband the remaining sapper armies and part of the sapper brigades, and to transform another part of the brigades into specialized engineering brigades designed to support the active fronts.

By order of August 17, 1942, the NPO began the transformation of the remaining five sapper armies and 27 sapper brigades into defense departments (see the Construction Troops section below). Six sapper brigades were reorganized into RVGK engineering brigades subordinate to the active fronts, and 8 more were disbanded. 30,000 people from the former 1st, 7th and 8th sapper armies were transferred to staff the newly formed rifle divisions. Later, already in September, the 1st, 3rd, 6th and 7th sapper armies were reorganized into the UOS (Defense Construction Directorate), the 8th sapper army became the UOS in October. 12 sapper brigades became engineering brigades as part of active fronts (see table 9). The remaining 18 sapper brigades, assigned on October 15 to the active fronts, now performed dual functions, providing front troops with engineering support and serving as bases for the formation of new, more specialized engineering brigades and battalions.

Sapper armies and brigades made a significant contribution to the Red Army's victories at Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad, preparing defensive lines, providing active fronts with engineering support and serving as a base for the formation of other, more specialized engineering troops transferred to active fronts. For example, in 1941, nine sapper armies organized, trained and sent more than 150 specialized engineer battalions to the active troops; in 1942, sapper armies and brigades formed 27 specialized RVGK engineering brigades, 23 of which served until the end of the war, and five still exist today. Finally, the sapper armies contributed more than 150,000 men to staff and form new rifle divisions.

Engineering teams

In disbanding its sapper armies in the spring of 1942, the NPO at the same time took into account the demands of the front commanders who proposed the formation of specialized and flexible engineering brigades that would better meet their needs. Therefore, the creation of a wide range of new engineering brigades and battalions began at the same time. For example, responding to the March demand of the head of the engineering troops of the Western Front, the NPO began to form special-purpose engineering brigades (IBON) from April 18. The first of these, the 33rd Special Purpose Engineer Brigade of the Western Front, formed in May from the 33rd Engineer Brigade of the 1st Engineer Army, consisted of six engineer battalions of barriers, two electrical engineering battalions, one searchlight battalion, an electrification detachment, an electric generator convoy, a special technical engineering company, a motor transport company and four electrical companies (seconded), with a total brigade strength of 4757 people. Ultimately, the NPO formed six special-purpose engineering brigades by July 1 and eight more by November 1, giving them to the field forces one brigade per active front.

Although the structure of these special-purpose engineering brigades could vary, most of them consisted of a headquarters, an autotractor company, five to eight engineer battalions of the barrier, one of which was converted in October 1942 into a special mine battalion, an electrical battalion and an electrification detachment, with a total number of 3097 people per 5-battalion brigade. the main task The brigades consisted of performing special tasks, such as laying and removing minefields, placing controlled minefields, creating electrified and other barriers, but they often had to perform more dangerous combat missions. For example, the 33rd Special Purpose Engineer Brigade of the Volkhov Front, during a breakthrough in January 1943 of the blockade of Leningrad, used its engineering barrier battalions as assault groups.

In addition to these special purpose engineer brigades, the NPO also formed separate mine engineer battalions in April 1942. One such battalion was assigned to each of the anti-tank brigades of the Red Army with the task of building anti-tank barriers and destroy enemy tanks together with artillery troops.

The NPO continued this process at the end of the summer of 1942, when the formation of the Guards mine battalions began - the most interesting and most secret of all specialized types of engineering troops. In August, two Guards mine battalions were deployed on the Voronezh and North Caucasian fronts. By October 1, the field forces already had ten such battalions - as a rule, one battalion per active front. Formed specifically to carry out sabotage operations behind enemy lines, the battalions usually operated in small sabotage groups.

In addition to the guards mine battalions, on August 17, the NPO formed a guards mine brigade in the Moscow Military District, subordinating it to the direct leadership of the Headquarters. Formed from two sapper battalions of the 37th sapper brigade of the 1st sapper army, the 1st guards mine brigade consisted of a headquarters group, a control company and five guards mine battalions with a total brigade strength of 2281 people. Like individual battalions, this brigade not only laid and removed mines, but also formed and deployed small groups to carry out sabotage operations (often in conjunction with partisans) against German lines of communication and important rear installations.

In the summer of 1942, the NPO also created wide range smaller specialized units, including five high-explosive flamethrower companies, several field water supply companies and an artesian well drilling group to provide drinking water to active troops.

In preparing the Red Army for major counter-offensives and the subsequent winter campaign, the Stavka ordered the NPO to form larger and more specialized engineering troops to support these offensives. As a result, many of the existing engineer battalions in October were consolidated into engineer-sapper brigades (isbr), each of which consisted of four to five engineer-sapper battalions, an NLP light pontoon-bridge fleet and a motorized engineer reconnaissance company. Several of these brigades were formed as mining engineering brigades, subdivided into four mountain engineering sapper battalions capable of operating effectively in mountainous terrain.

On November 12, responding to the request of the head of the engineering troops of the Red Army, Major General M.P. Vorobyov, the NPO transformed part of the sapper brigades into 15 mine engineering brigades (IMBR), which received numbers from 1st to 15th. These brigades, responsible for setting up operational barrier zones, consisted of a headquarters, a headquarters company and seven mine engineering battalions, with a total strength of 2,903 men.

In addition, on November 26, 1942, the NPO ordered that five sapper brigades of the Transcaucasian Front be converted in November-December into mountain engineering mine brigades of the RVGK (from the 1st to the 5th). Each such brigade (gimbr) consisted of five mountain engineering mine battalions, whose companies and platoons had not tractors, but horses and donkeys as vehicles, the total number of the brigade was 2344 people.

In the autumn of 1942, the NPO began to form larger and more effective pontoon-bridge units - primarily because the Stavka considered the consolidation of bridge-building units an important condition for achieving success in expanded offensive operations. In early autumn, the NPO sent reinforcements to the active fronts and armies in the form of 11 separate RVGK pontoon-bridge parks, and in November 1942 formed two pontoon-bridge brigades and gave them to the Stalingrad Front for use in the counteroffensive near Stalingrad. These brigades consisted of a headquarters company, three to seven (usually four) H2P motorized pontoon-bridge battalions, one DMP-42 pontoon-bridge battalion with a total bridge carrying capacity of 50 tons, and several diving detachments for underwater work. When the winter offensive unfolded, in January 1943, the NPO attached the third pontoon-bridge brigade to the Leningrad Front. In February, four new heavy pontoon-bridge regiments were added to these brigades, each of which consisted of two battalions equipped with new TMP pontoon bridges with a 100-ton load capacity.

During 1942, the NPO not only formed and transferred to the active troops an impressive number of new engineering brigades, but also strengthened the existing engineering forces, including new engineering units in existing structures. For example, sapper battalions were included in all new guards rifle and mechanized corps, and in new tank corps- engineering mine companies.

Thus, by February 1, 1943, the structure of the engineering troops of the Red Army expanded and included 13 special-purpose engineering brigades, one sapper brigade, 17 sapper brigades (including five mountain), 15 mine engineering brigades, 185 separate engineering battalions, ten separate engineer battalions, one guards mine brigade, 11 guards mine battalions, three pontoon bridge brigades, four pontoon bridge regiments and 78 pontoon bridge battalions.

All these special-purpose engineering brigades, engineer-sapper, engineer-mine, pontoon-bridge brigades and the guards mine brigade, as well as pontoon-bridge regiments and mine-sapper and pontoon-bridge battalions, together with the guards mine battalions, were created by the NPO specifically to carry out specific combat missions during offensive operations, either as part of the active fronts and armies, or under the direct control of the Headquarters.

In 1943, the NCO continued to expand and improve the structure of its engineering troops. For example, in February, the formation of five rear barrier brigades began, consisting of five to seven engineer battalions each. The task of such brigades was to clear the liberated territory from mines and obstacles. After a long process of formation, in December 1943, the Stavka transferred one of these brigades to the Moscow Military District, two to the newly formed Kharkov Military District, and one each to the North Caucasus and Ural Military Districts.

And more importantly, given the growing intensity of ground fighting and the increased strength of the defense of the Wehrmacht, the NPO began on May 30 to create assault engineer-sapper brigades. Transformed from existing engineer brigades, these new brigades consisted of a headquarters, five assault engineer battalions, one motorized engineer reconnaissance company, a light fleet for crossing rivers, a demining company (which included mine-searching dogs) and a small rear service. These new brigades were to assist the infantry and tank forces in overcoming well-prepared enemy defensive lines and fortified positions.

When the Red Army in late summer - early autumn 1943 began new offensive operations, clearing minefields has become more important than laying mines. Therefore, the NPO began to replace the RVGK engineer-mine brigades with the RVGK engineer-sapper brigades, creating new and reorganizing existing engineer-sapper brigades to increase their effectiveness. As a result, the number of mine engineer brigades in the structure of the RVGK decreased from 15 on February 1 to 12 on July 1, and by December 31 - to zero, but at the same time the number of engineer brigades increased from 12 on February 1 to 13 on July 1, and finally - until December 22 to December 31, 1943. In addition, by July 1, 15 new assault engineer-sapper brigades were created, and by December 31 there were already 20 of them.

Finally, in June 1943, the NPO commissioned new tank regiments equipped with 22 T-34 tanks and 18 PT-3 minesweeps. Formally, these regiments were not part of the structure of the engineering troops, but their main task was to clear passages through the numerous minefields laid by the Germans throughout their defenses.

Thanks to these NPO efforts, the number and diversity of the structure of the engineering troops of the Red Army increased dramatically in two years - from 32 sapper brigades, three engineering regiments and 206 battalions various kinds on January 1, 1942 to 68 brigades different types, six pontoon-bridge regiments and 270 engineer and pontoon-bridge battalions on December 31, 1943. When the Red Army began the 1944 campaign, the structure of its engineering troops already fully met the increased operational needs.

1. Ground forces Before the Manchurian incident, the Japanese army consisted of 17 divisions according to peacetime plans, and 30 divisions according to wartime plans. With the emergence of the Manchurian conflict in 1931 and especially in connection with the growth of military power Soviet Union