Financial control and state audit - new standards for the digital age (video). Membership Requirements

On January 17, within the framework of the Gaidar Forum, an expert discussion was held on the new standards of state financial control, as well as formats for interaction between state control institutions and business. The discussion was started by its moderator, Deputy Director of the RANEPA, who noted that the financial control system is in the process of changing and becoming more transparent. “All participants in the system need to be ready for change, for this new form transparency,” concluded the moderator.

Valery Goreglyad, Chief Auditor of the Central Bank of Russia, in his speech identified problems and challenges for control in the field of public finance, as well as external and internal audit. “State audit is doomed to change quickly in order to adequately respond to challenges,” the expert emphasized, stating that only with the active use of IT technologies can the tasks be successfully solved. In addition, he expressed his opinion on the importance of the transition from a retrospective assessment to analysis, continuous monitoring and development of analytical competencies of audit staff.

The idea of ​​the need to automate routine control tasks and develop new skills among employees was also supported by Anna Arkhangelskaya, director of EY, head of the group for the provision of consulting services in the field of regulatory compliance. She also noted such functions of audit in the digital age as the use of a risk-based approach in the transformation of the financial business, as well as the significant contribution of internal audit to the development of the financial sector.

Yevgeny Danchikov, head of the Main Control Department of the city of Moscow, expressed the opinion that in recent times more powers appear at the state audit. “Today, technologies in the field of state control are outdated: we control in the same way as ten and fifty years ago,” the expert emphasized. He also noted that the audit should be "invisible, imperceptible for the objects of control" in order to be not a brake on the economy, but its assistant.

Tatyana Blinova, Auditor of the Accounts Chamber, shared her vision of the new standards of public audit Russian Federation. “If we are talking about digitalization, resources should contribute to the consolidation of all levels of audit in order to achieve efficiency. The fact that this will require a change in the system of requirements for personnel is also a fact, and we should not forget that the sooner we improve the quality of human resources, the sooner we will achieve the desired result,” the expert concluded.

Arina Kargina

Organizers of the X Gaidar Forum:

Russian Academy National economy and public service under the President of the Russian Federation, Institute of Economic Policy named after E.T. Gaidar and the Association of Innovative Regions of Russia.

The general partners of the forum are PJSC Gazprom, JSC Gazprombank. Strategic partners are Prosveshchenie Publishing House, Coca-Cola, Pharmstandard Group of Companies, Russian Textbook Corporation, SANOFI, ACIG Group of Companies, Novartis, Johnson&Johnson, Russian Railways, MSD, Mastercard. Partners - EY, Cisco, Russian Direct Investment Fund. The partners of the discussion will be Philips, Cherkizovo, RVC JSC.

The general media partners of the Gaidar Forum are Russia 24, Forbes, TASS, and RBC. The official news agency is MIA Rossiya Segodnya. The general radio partner is Business FM. Strategic media partners are Kommersant Publishing House, Russia Today, Interfax and Gazeta.ru. The main media partners are Izvestia, Profile, RIA FederalPress, Invest-Foresight magazine. International information partners - Sputnik, Cision. Media partners - AEI PRIME, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, RNS news agency, Ekho Moskvy radio station, News.Ru, Polit.ru, Parlamentskaya Gazeta, PRO BUSINESS TV channel, Strategy, AK&M, BRICS, Economics and Life weekly, National Banking Journal, Expert Tatarstan magazine, Smart Country information platform, Financial One, NAANS-MEDIA, public service scientific and political journal.

It so happened that his central theme(inspired by recently released documents) - unlimited presidential power in Russia and possible mechanisms to prevent its usurpation- remained, in the opinion of the author of these lines, without deserving attention from respected commentators, who were carried away primarily by other topics. The repeated attempts made during the discussion to bring the attention of the community back to main topic texts had only limited success. In this regard, I am also taking an unusual step for this blog, re-posting here the second part of the previous post, dedicated to the most important Russian issue - institutional measures to limit presidential power in Russia.

The main political issue facing Russian society- not only and not so much about specific individuals who turned out to be, who may be in the future at the top of state power in the country, not only and not so much about who exactly will replace the person holding this post in 2024 (or then when it happens).

The main political issue that is in dire need of a nationwide discussion and prompt solution is the issue of about presidential power in Russia. About her nature. About its boundaries and their absence. On the nature of the relationship between presidential power and society. About changing the relationship between society and the president. About the tragedies and catastrophes regularly generated by the actions of the presidential power. About what happens to different, at first (before coming to power), seemingly “normal” persons (B. Yeltsin, A. Sobchak, A. Chubais, V. Yumashev, T. Dyachenko, V. Putin, D. Medvedev) when they find themselves at the pinnacle of state power or close to that pinnacle. About what will inevitably happen when history sooner or later makes its next turn, and at the top of the Russian state power there will be a new “normal” person who appeared there as a result of either its peaceful change, or a coup, or a revolution. The fact that if we do not change the institutions of power, we will again find ourselves doomed to tragedies and catastrophes, due to the actual unlimitedness of the highest state power, which will be in the hands of a new person.

Like nothing else, Russian history shows that the most dangerous thing in Russian presidential power is its unlimitedness and uncontrollability. Power turns out to be a monstrous evil, constantly plunging the country into tragedies and catastrophes; exclusively dangerous weapon, the victims of which are hundreds of thousands and millions of people - both at home and in other countries. An overripe demand in relations between Russian society and the authorities is becoming prevention of the ongoing usurpation of state power by certain individuals or groups of individuals who were next to her. The most important task society advocates fundamental limitation of the power of the state, reducing the scope of its use, ensuring the most careful use of state tools, regardless of whose hands they end up in.

Accumulated historical experience recalls that in order to reduce the likelihood of usurpation of state power, to limit the damage from its use, to minimize the catastrophic consequences of its use, a set of more than once tested institutional instruments is recommended. Among them, in particular, there are the following:

Expanding the number of presidential electors,

Expanding the number of presidential candidates

Deprivation of certain categories of persons of the right to be in the presidency,

Reducing the number of presidential terms,

Reducing the length of the presidential term,

Reducing the powers of the president

The conclusion of the contract of the presidential candidate with his electors with strict guarantees of its execution.

1. The need to expand the number of presidential electors.

Under M. Gorbachev, there was a radical expansion of the number of electors of the supreme power, and under B. Yeltsin and V. Putin, it was even more radically reduced.

In March 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev General Secretary The CPSU Central Committee elected a 19-member Politburo. The approval of his candidacy by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was of a formal nature.

In March 1990, Gorbachev was elected President of the USSR by the votes of 1329 people at the Congress people's deputies USSR.

In June 1990, Boris Yeltsin became Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR thanks to the support of 535 deputies of the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR.

In July 1991, Yeltsin was elected President of Russia by the votes of 45.5 million voters, and the outcome of the elections was unknown before the summing up of their results.

In August 1999, Vladimir Putin was elected (more precisely: appointed) by 3 people (B. Yeltsin, V. Yumashev, T. Dyachenko) as the President of Russia, then this choice was approved by a group of no more than 9 people. Subsequent voting on the so-called. presidential elections in March 2000 had the character of a formal approval, since their main result - Putin's victory - was predetermined by the work of the state and propaganda machines.

In December 2007, Dmitry Medvedev was elected President of Russia by 1 (one) person. Subsequent so-called. electoral procedures were formal in nature, since their main result was a foregone conclusion.

In September 2011, V. Putin was elected President of Russia by 1 (one) person - Putin himself. The subsequent procedures were of a formal nature, since their main result was a foregone conclusion.

2. Expanding the number of presidential candidates.

The circle of potential candidates for the highest public office in Russia has been extremely narrow over the past two decades. Realistic candidates for the post of Russian president (unlike the presidential elections of 1991 and 1996) were exclusively members of a very narrow circle of representatives of the highest state bureaucracy - acting and former prime ministers and first deputy prime ministers (V. Chernomyrdin, A. Chubais, S. Kiriyenko , S. Stepashin, E. Primakov, V. Putin, D. Medvedev).

3. Depriving certain categories of persons of the right to become president

Current and former employees of power (professionally specializing in the use of violence against fellow citizens) bodies, including special services, of the USSR and Russia do not have the right to occupy the highest positions of state power in the country. This principle is being established now, as early as possible, so that persons who are currently active or former employees of law enforcement agencies, including special services, as well as “young and young women considering their future career prospects”, would not experience any illusions about the possibility of being at the top of state power in the way that the person who currently holds this position did. For the entire future history of the country, V. Putin has more than fully utilized the chance of occupying the post of President of Russia by a member of the secret services; never again will such a chance be given to a native of the special services.

4. Reducing the number of presidential terms

Dramatic collisions with interpretations of the term "in a row", accidentally found in the text of the Russian Constitution in terms of the number of presidential terms, have only one indisputable solution - the removal of this word from the Constitution. At the same time, the possibility of re-election of the same person to the presidency is completely excluded. As experience shows, one presidential term is quite enough for any person to implement his election program - if there is one. The second term, not to mention any subsequent ones, turns out to be too heavy a burden both for the person at the top of power and for other citizens of the country.

5. Reducing the duration of the presidential term.

Since the presidential work is accompanied by exceptionally high physical, mental and other stresses on the person who finds himself in this post (in the case of V. Putin, this is recognized by him - “ plowed like a galley slave”, in the case of B. Yeltsin, this led to a serious cardiovascular disease), then, at least for humane purposes, the period during which outstanding Russian citizens can be subjected to such hardships and such high risks.

In Switzerland, as you know, the president is elected for one year. Judging by the level of well-being of Swiss citizens, by the quality of their life, by the highest indicators of development in almost all areas public life, such a limitation of the presidential term does not in the least hinder, and, it seems, even greatly helps the prosperity of Switzerland.

In the Republic of Ragusa (known to millions Russian tourists under the name of Dubrovnik) for five centuries the rector (head of the republican government) was elected for only one month. True, he could still be re-elected for a second term, but such re-election could not occur earlier than two years after the rector completed his previous term. To prevent a possible conspiracy to seize power, the rector could leave the rector's palace and enter the city only accompanied by at least two representatives of the opposition factions represented in the city council. Judging by the incredible wealth of the republic, the outstanding architectural monuments of the city, including its unique walls and towers, which naturally earned Dubrovnik the fame of the “pearl of the Adriatic”, a strict system of restriction political power the rector brought quite tangible results.

A nationwide debate over exactly how much to shorten the maximum horizon of a single presidential term in Russia - to the Swiss or to the Ragusian level - could reveal the prevailing preferences in the country. A very conservative option in the form of, for example, two or three years could also be considered.

6. Reducing the scope of presidential powers

This point no longer causes much public discussion. Overloading the person holding the presidency with his immense powers has become the subject of consensus among specialists in constitutional law. It is also quite obvious that the president, in principle, should not, as it turned out to be written in the current version of the Russian Constitution, be above all three branches of state power and be their arbiter.

7. The contract of a presidential candidate with his electors and guarantees of its execution.

Not a single presidential election in Russia in the past three decades has been without an obvious (or supposed) contract between a candidate and his electors (voters). Unfortunately, serious shortcomings were revealed both in the contracts concluded earlier and in their execution. The unwritten contract of 1991 between B. Yeltsin and Russian voters (in terms of his election promises) remained largely unfulfilled. The 1999 contract between V. Putin and B. Yeltsin, V. Yumashev, T. Dyachenko, who appointed him, on ensuring the personal security of B. Yeltsin and members of his family, as well as the 2007 contract between V. Putin and D. Medvedev (" Dmitry Anatolyevich and I agreed...”), although they are impeccably executed by the parties that concluded them, they are nonetheless unacceptable to citizens modern Russia.

The main mechanisms that ensure the content, quality, and observance of future contracts between society and the presidency are the rule of law, the legislative and judicial branches of state power independent of the executive branch, a developed politic system, including political parties, non-state and non-profit organizations, powerful civil society, independent media, federal system, municipal representation and management. As well as many other elements of the political and legal system of the future free Russia.

The author, of course, has no illusions that the seven basic institutional changes outlined above will be implemented tomorrow in Russian life. BUT political life in the country, starting the day after tomorrow, will go in strict accordance with these rules. Nevertheless, a meaningful discussion of these principles, their clarification and regular public reproduction on discussion platforms could contribute to their gradual perception by Russian society as completely natural, their consistent consolidation in the basic rules of socio-political morality, as well as their embodiment over time in national legal rules, including constitutional ones.