Khrushchev Nikita Sergeevich - biography. General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
Comrades! In the Report of the Central Committee of the Party to the 20th Congress, in a number of speeches by delegates to the Congress, as well as earlier, at the Plenums of the Central Committee, much was said about the cult of personality and its harmful consequences.
After Stalin's death, the Central Committee of the Party began to strictly and consistently pursue a policy of explaining the inadmissibility of exalting one person, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, turning him into some kind of superman with supernatural qualities, like a god. This man supposedly knows everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do everything; he is infallible in his actions.
This notion of man, and, speaking specifically, of Stalin, has been cultivated in our country for many years.
This report does not aim to give a comprehensive assessment of the life and work of Stalin. Quite a sufficient number of books, pamphlets, and studies have been written about the merits of Stalin during his lifetime. The role of Stalin in the preparation and conduct of socialist revolution, in the civil war, in the struggle to build socialism in our country. This is well known to everyone. Now we are talking about a question of great importance both for the present and for the future of the party, we are talking about how the cult of personality of Stalin gradually took shape, which at a certain stage turned into a source of a number of major and very serious distortions of party principles, party democracy, revolutionary legality.
Due to the fact that not everyone still realizes what the cult of personality led to in practice, what enormous damage was caused by the violation of the principle of collective leadership in the Party and the concentration of immense, unlimited power in the hands of one person, the Central Committee of the Party considers it necessary to report to the XX Congress Communist Party of the Soviet Union materials on this issue.
Allow me, first of all, to remind you how severely the classics of Marxism-Leninism condemned any manifestation of the personality cult. In a letter to the German politician Wilhelm Blos, Marx stated:
“... Out of dislike for any cult of personality, during the existence of the International, I never made public the numerous appeals in which my merits were recognized and with which I was annoyed from different countries, I never even answered them, except occasionally scolded for them . The first entry of Engels and myself into the secret society of communists took place on the condition that everything that promotes superstitious worship of authorities would be thrown out of the statutes (Lassalle subsequently acted just the opposite).
Somewhat later, Engels wrote:
“Both Marx and I, we have always been against any public demonstrations in relation to individuals, except only in those cases when it had some significant purpose; and most of all we were against such demonstrations, which in our lifetime would concern us personally.
The greatest modesty of the genius of the revolution Vladimir Ilyich Lenin is known. Lenin always emphasized the role of the people as the creator of history, the leading and organizing role of the Party as a living, self-active organism, and the role of the Central Committee.
Lenin mercilessly castigated all manifestations of the personality cult, waged an uncompromising struggle against the Socialist-Revolutionary views of the “hero” and the “crowd”, alien to Marxism, against attempts to oppose the “hero” to the masses, the people.
Lenin taught that the strength of the party lies in its inseparable connection with the masses, in the fact that the people are behind the party: workers, peasants, intelligentsia. “Only he will win and retain power,” said Lenin, “who believes in the people, who plunges into the spring of living folk art.”
Lenin proudly spoke of the Bolshevik, Communist Party as the leader and teacher of the people, he called for bringing all the most important questions to the judgment of class-conscious workers, to the judgment of his party; he declared: "We believe in her, in her we see the mind, honor and conscience of our era."
Lenin resolutely opposed any attempt to belittle or weaken the leading role of the party in the system of the Soviet state. He worked out the Bolshevik principles of party leadership and the norms of party life, emphasizing that the highest principle of party leadership is its collectivity. Even in the pre-revolutionary years, Lenin called the Central Committee of the Party a collective of leaders, the guardian and interpreter of the principles of the Party. “The principles of the party,” Lenin pointed out, “are observed from congress to congress and are interpreted by the Central Committee.”
Emphasizing the role of the Central Committee of the Party, its authority, Vladimir Ilyich pointed out: "Our Central Committee has formed into a strictly centralized and highly authoritative group."
During Lenin's lifetime, the Central Committee of the Party was the true expression of the collective leadership of the Party and the country. As a militant Marxist-revolutionary, always implacable on matters of principle, Lenin never forced his views on his comrades at work. He persuaded, patiently explained his opinion to others. Lenin always strictly saw to it that the norms of Party life were carried out, that the Rules of the Party were observed, that Party congresses and plenums of the Central Committee were convened in a timely manner.
In addition to all the great things that V.I. Lenin did for the victory of the working class and the working peasantry, for the victory of our party and the implementation of the ideas of scientific communism, his insight was also manifested in the fact that he timely noticed in Stalin precisely those negative qualities which later led to dire consequences. preoccupied further destinies party and the Soviet state, V.I. Lenin gave a completely correct characterization of Stalin, pointing out that it was necessary to consider the issue of moving Stalin from the post of general secretary due to the fact that Stalin was too rude, insufficiently attentive to his comrades, capricious and abused power .
Vladimir Ilyich, addressing the next Party Congress, wrote:
"Tov. Stalin, having become General Secretary, has concentrated immense power in his hands, and I am not sure whether he will always be able to use this power with sufficient caution.
This letter, the most important political document, known in the history of the party under the name of Lenin's "testament", was distributed to the delegates of the 20th Party Congress. You have read it and will probably read it again and again. Think about Lenin's simple words, which express Vladimir Ilyich's concern for the Party, for the people, for the state, for the further direction of the Party's policy.
Vladimir Ilyich said:
“Stalin is too rude, and this shortcoming, which is quite tolerable in the environment and in communications between us communists, becomes intolerable in the position of general secretary. Therefore, I suggest that the comrades consider a way to move Stalin from this place and appoint another person to this place, who in all other respects differs from Comrade. Stalin with only one advantage, namely, more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and more attentive to comrades, less capriciousness, etc.”
This Leninist document was read out to the delegations of the 13th Party Congress, who discussed the question of moving Stalin from the post of general secretary. The delegations spoke in favor of keeping Stalin in this post, bearing in mind that he would take into account the critical remarks of Vladimir Ilyich and be able to correct his shortcomings, which inspired serious fears in Lenin.
Comrades! It is necessary to report to the Party Congress about two new documents that supplement Lenin's characterization of Stalin given by Vladimir Ilyich in his "testament".
These documents are: a letter from Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya to Kamenev, who chaired the Politburo at that time, and a personal letter from Vladimir Ilyich Lenin to Stalin.
I read these documents:
Letter from N.K. Krupskaya:
“Lev Borisych, regarding a short letter written by me under the dictation of Vladimir Ilyich with the permission of the doctors, Stalin allowed a rude trick towards me yesterday. I'm in the party for more than one day. For all 30 years I have not heard a single rude word from a single comrade, the interests of the party and Ilyich are no less dear to me than to Stalin. Now I need maximum self-control. I know better than any doctor what can and cannot be discussed with Ilyich. I know what worries him, what does not, and, in any case, better than Stalin. I appeal to you and Grigory, as Vladimir Ilyich's closest comrades, and ask you to protect me from gross interference in my personal life, unworthy abuse and threats. I have no doubts about the unanimous decision of the Control Commission, which Stalin allows himself to threaten, but I have neither the strength nor the time that I could waste on this stupid squabble. I am also alive and my nerves are tense to the extreme.
This letter was written by Nadezhda Konstantinovna on December 23, 1922. Two and a half months later, in March 1923, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin sent the following letter to Stalin:
"To Comrade STALIN.
Copy: Kamenev and Zinoviev.
Dear Comrade Stalin,
You were rude to call my wife to the phone and scold her. Although she agreed to forget what was said to you, nevertheless, this fact became known through her to Zinoviev and Kamenev. I do not intend to forget so easily what was done against me, and it is useless to say that I consider what was done against my wife to be done against me. Therefore, I ask you to consider whether you agree to take back what was said and apologize or prefer to break off relations between us.
Sincerely:
Comrades! I will not comment on these documents. They speak eloquently for themselves. If Stalin could behave this way during Lenin's lifetime, he could treat Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya in this way, whom the Party knows well and highly appreciates as true friend Lenin and an active fighter for the cause of our party from the moment of its inception, one can imagine how Stalin treated other workers. These negative qualities of his developed more and more and in recent years have become completely intolerable.
As subsequent events showed, Lenin's anxiety was not in vain: for the first time after Lenin's death, Stalin still considered his instructions, and then began to neglect the serious warnings of Vladimir Ilyich.
If we analyze the practice of leading the party and the country on the part of Stalin, if we think about everything that was allowed by Stalin, one becomes convinced of the validity of Lenin's fears. Those negative features of Stalin, which under Lenin appeared only in embryonic form, developed in recent years into serious abuses of power on the part of Stalin, which caused incalculable damage to our party.
We must seriously examine and analyze this question correctly in order to exclude any possibility of a repetition of even any semblance of what took place during the life of Stalin, who showed complete intolerance for collectivity in leadership and work, allowed gross violence against everything that did not only contradicted him, but what seemed to him, with his capriciousness and despotism, contrary to his attitudes. He acted not by persuasion, explanation, painstaking work with people, but by imposing his own attitudes, by demanding unconditional obedience to his opinion. Anyone who resisted this or tried to prove his point of view, his innocence, he was doomed to exclusion from the leadership team, followed by moral and physical destruction. This was especially evident in the period after the 17th Party Congress, when many honest, devoted to the cause of communism, outstanding party leaders and ordinary workers of the party became victims of Stalin's despotism.
It should be said that the party waged a great struggle against the Trotskyists, the rightists, the bourgeois nationalists, and ideologically defeated all the enemies of Leninism. This ideological struggle was carried out successfully, in the course of which the Party became even stronger and more tempered. And here Stalin played his positive role.
The Party held a big ideological political struggle against those people in their ranks who came out with anti-Leninist positions, with a political line hostile to the party and the cause of socialism. It was a stubborn, hard, but necessary struggle, because the political line of both the Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc and the Bukharinites essentially led to the restoration of capitalism, to capitulation to the world bourgeoisie. Let us imagine for a moment what would have happened if in our party in 1928-1929 the political line of the right deviation, the emphasis on "chintz industrialization, the stake on the kulak, and the like" had won. We would not then have had a powerful heavy industry, there would have been no collective farms, we would have found ourselves disarmed and powerless in the face of the capitalist encirclement.
That is why the Party waged an irreconcilable struggle from an ideological standpoint, explaining to all Party members and non-Party masses the harm and danger of the anti-Leninist actions of the Trotskyist opposition and Right opportunists. And this enormous work of clarifying the line of the party bore fruit: both the Trotskyists and the right-wing opportunists were politically isolated, the overwhelming majority of the party supported the Leninist line, and the party was able to inspire and organize the working people to carry out the Leninist line of the party, to build socialism.
It is noteworthy that even in the midst of a fierce ideological struggle against the Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites and others, extreme repressive measures were not applied to them. The struggle was waged on an ideological basis. But a few years later, when socialism had already been basically built in our country, when the exploiting classes were basically liquidated, when the social structure Soviet society, the social base for hostile parties, political movements and groups was sharply reduced, when the ideological opponents of the party were politically defeated long ago, repressions began against them.
And it was during this period (1935-1937) that mass repressions began along the state line, first against the opponents of Leninism - the Trotskyists, Zinovievites, Bukharinites, who had long been politically defeated by the party, and then against many honest communists, against those party cadres who endured on their shoulders the civil war, the first, most difficult years of industrialization and collectivization, which actively fought against the Trotskyists and the right, for the Leninist line of the party.
Stalin introduced the concept of "enemy of the people". This term immediately exempted from the need for any evidence of the ideological wrongness of the person or people with whom you are arguing: it gave the opportunity to anyone who disagrees with Stalin in some way, who was only suspected of hostile intentions, anyone who was simply slandered, subjected to the most cruel repressions, in violation of all norms of revolutionary legality. This concept - "enemy of the people" in essence already eliminated, excluded the possibility of any ideological struggle or expressing one's opinion on certain issues, even of practical importance. The main and, in fact, the only proof of guilt was, contrary to all the norms of modern legal science, the “confession” of the accused himself.
This led to flagrant violations of revolutionary legality, to the fact that many completely innocent people who in the past supported the party line suffered.
It should be said that even in relation to people who at one time opposed the line of the party, there were often no serious enough grounds to physically destroy them. To justify the physical destruction of such people, the formula "enemy of the people" was introduced.
After all, many people who were subsequently destroyed, declaring them enemies of the party and the people, during the life of V. Ilenin worked together with Lenin. Some of them made mistakes even under Lenin, but despite this, Lenin used them at work, corrected them, tried to ensure that they remained within the party spirit, led them along.
In this regard, the delegates to the Party Congress should be familiarized with an unpublished note by V. I. Lenin to the Politburo of the Central Committee in October 1920. Defining the tasks of the Control Commission, Lenin wrote that this Commission must be made a real "organ of the Party and proletarian conscience."
“As a special task of the Control Commission,” Lenin pointed out, “to recommend an attentively individualizing attitude, often even a direct kind of treatment in relation to representatives of the so-called opposition who have suffered a psychological crisis due to failures in their Soviet or party career. We must try to calm them down, explain the matter to them in a comradely manner, find them (without the method of ordering) a suitable psychological characteristics work, give advice and instructions at this point to the Organizing Bureau, the Central Committee, and the like.
Everyone is well aware of how irreconcilable Lenin was towards the ideological opponents of Marxism, towards those who deviated from the correct party line. At the same time, as can be seen from the read out document, from all the practice of his leadership of the party, Lenin demanded the most attentive party approach to people who showed hesitation, had deviations from the party line, but who could be returned to the path of party membership. Lenin advised to patiently educate such people, without resorting to extreme measures.
This was the manifestation of Lenin's wisdom in his approach to people, in his work with cadres.
A completely different approach was characteristic of Stalin. Lenin's traits were completely alien to Stalin, to work patiently with people, stubbornly and painstakingly educate them, be able to lead people not by coercion, but by influencing them as a whole team from ideological positions. He discarded the Leninist method of persuasion and education, moved from the position of ideological struggle to the path of administrative suppression, to the path of mass repressions, to the path of terror. He acted more widely and more persistently through punitive bodies, often violating all existing moral norms and Soviet laws.
The arbitrariness of one person encouraged and allowed the arbitrariness of other persons. Mass arrests and exiles of thousands and thousands of people, extrajudicial executions and normal investigations gave rise to uncertainty in people, caused fear and even anger.
This, of course, did not help unite the ranks of the party, all sections of the working people, but, on the contrary, led to the destruction, cutting off from the party of honest workers, but objectionable to Stalin.
Our party fought for the implementation of Lenin's plans for building socialism. It was an ideological struggle. If a Leninist approach had been shown in this struggle, a skillful combination of party principles with a sensitive and attentive attitude towards people, a desire not to push people away, not to lose people, but to win them over to our side, then we probably would not have had such a gross violation of revolutionary legality. , the use of methods of terror against many thousands of people. Exceptional measures would be applied only to those persons who committed actual crimes against the Soviet system.
Let's look at some historical facts.
In the days leading up to the October Revolution, two members of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, Kamenev and Zinoviev, opposed Lenin's plan for an armed uprising. Moreover, on October 18, in the Menshevik newspaper New life They published their statement that the Bolsheviks were preparing an uprising and that they considered the uprising an adventure. Kamenev and Zinoviev thereby disclosed to the enemies the decision of the Central Committee on the uprising, on the organization of this uprising in the near future.
This was a betrayal of the cause of the party, the cause of the revolution. V. Ilenin wrote in this connection: "Kamenev and Zinoviev betrayed to Rodzianko and Kerensky the decision of the Central Committee of their party on an armed uprising." He raised the question of expelling Zinoviev and Kamenev from the party before the Central Committee.
But after the accomplishment of the Great October Socialist Revolution, as is known, Zinoviev and Kamenev were promoted to leading positions. Lenin enlisted them to carry out the most important assignments of the Party, to work actively in leading Party and Soviet bodies. It is known that Zinoviev and Kamenev committed many other major mistakes during Lenin's lifetime. In his "testament" Lenin warned that "the October episode of Zinoviev and Kamenev, of course, was not an accident." But Lenin did not raise the question of their arrest and, moreover, of their execution.
Or take, for example, the Trotskyists. Now that a sufficient historical period has passed, we can talk about the struggle against the Trotskyists quite calmly and quite objectively examine this matter. After all, there were people around Trotsky who by no means came from the bourgeoisie. Some of them were party intelligentsia, and some were workers. One could name a number of people who at one time joined the Trotskyists, but they also took an active part in the labor movement before the revolution and during the October Socialist Revolution itself, and in strengthening the gains of this greatest revolution. Many of them broke with Trotskyism and went over to Leninist positions. Was there a need for the physical destruction of such people? We are deeply convinced that if Lenin were alive, then such an extreme measure would not have been taken against many of them.
These are just some of the facts of history. But is it really possible to say that Lenin did not dare to apply the most cruel measures to the enemies of the revolution, when it was really required? No, no one can say that. Vladimir Ilyich demanded cruel reprisals against the enemies of the revolution and the working class, and when the need arose, he used these measures with all ruthlessness. Just remember Lenin's struggle against the Socialist-Revolutionary organizers of anti-Soviet uprisings, against the counter-revolutionary kulaks in 1918 and others, when Lenin, without hesitation, took the most decisive measures against his enemies. But Lenin used such measures against really class enemies, and not against those who err, who err, who can be led and even retained in the leadership by ideological influence on them.
Lenin applied harsh measures in the most necessary cases, when there were exploiting classes that madly resisted the revolution, when the struggle according to the principle of "who wins" inevitably took on the most acute forms, up to civil war. Stalin, on the other hand, applied the most extreme measures, mass repressions, already when the revolution had won, when the Soviet state had strengthened, when the exploiting classes had already been liquidated and socialist relations were established in all spheres of the national economy, when our party had become politically stronger and tempered both quantitatively and ideologically. . It is clear that here Stalin displayed intolerance, rudeness, and abuse of power in a number of cases. Instead of proving his political correctness and mobilizing the masses, he often followed the line of repression and physical destruction not only of real enemies, but also of people who did not commit crimes against the party and Soviet power. There is no wisdom in this, except for the manifestation of brute force, which so worried V.I. Lenin.
Recently, especially after the exposure of the Beria gang, the Central Committee of the Party has considered a number of cases fabricated by this gang. At the same time, a very unsightly picture of gross arbitrariness associated with wrong actions Stalin. As the facts show, Stalin, taking advantage of unlimited power, committed many abuses, acting on behalf of the Central Committee, without asking the opinion of members of the Central Committee and even members of the Politburo of the Central Committee, often without informing them of the decisions taken by Stalin alone on very important party and state issues.
In considering the question of the cult of personality, we must first of all find out what damage this has done to the interests of our party.
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin always stressed the role and importance of the party in leading the socialist state of workers and peasants, seeing this as the main condition for the successful building of socialism in our country. Pointing to the enormous responsibility of the Bolshevik Party as the ruling party of the Soviet state, Lenin called for the strictest observance of all the norms of party life, for the implementation of the principles of collective leadership of the party and the country. Collective leadership stems from the very nature of our party, built on the principles of democratic centralism.
“This means,” Lenin said, “that all the affairs of the Party are conducted, directly or through representatives, by all members of the Party, on equal rights and without any exception; moreover, all officials, all leading boards, all institutions of the party are elected, accountable, replaceable.
It is known that Lenin himself set an example of the strictest observance of these principles. There was no such important issue on which Lenin would make a decision alone, without consulting and without obtaining the approval of the majority of the members of the Central Committee or members of the Politburo of the Central Committee.
In the most difficult periods for our party and country, Lenin considered it necessary to regularly hold congresses, conferences of the party, plenums of its Central Committee, at which all the most important questions were discussed and decisions comprehensively worked out by a team of leaders were adopted.
Let us recall, for example, the year 1918, when the threat of invasion by imperialist invaders hung over the country. Under these conditions, the 7th Party Congress was convened to discuss the vital and urgent question of peace. In 1919, at the height of the civil war, the 8th Party Congress was convened, at which a new party program was adopted, such important issues as the question of attitude towards the main masses of the peasantry, the building of the Red Army, the leading role of the party in the work of the Soviets, improvement of the social composition of the party and others. In 1920, the 9th Party Congress was convened, which determined the tasks of the Party and the country in the field of economic construction. In 1921, at the 10th Party Congress, the new economic policy developed by Lenin and the historic decision "On the Unity of the Party" were adopted.
During Lenin's lifetime, party congresses were held regularly, at every sharp turn in the development of the party and the country, Lenin considered, first of all, that it was necessary for the party to widely discuss the fundamental issues of domestic and foreign policy, party and state building.
It is quite characteristic that Lenin addressed his last articles, letters and notes precisely to the Party Congress, as the highest organ of the Party. From congress to congress, the Central Committee of the Party acted as a highly authoritative collective of leaders, strictly observing the principles of the Party and carrying out its policy.
So it was during the life of Lenin.
Were these Leninist principles sacred to our Party observed after the death of Vladimir Ilyich?
If in the first years after Lenin's death party congresses and plenums of the Central Committee were held more or less regularly, then later, when Stalin began to abuse power more and more, these principles began to be flagrantly violated. This was especially evident in the last fifteen years of his life. Can it be considered normal that more than thirteen years have passed between the 18th and 19th Party Congresses, during which our Party and country have experienced so many events that urgently required the Party to make decisions on questions of national defense in the conditions of the Patriotic War and on issues of peaceful construction in the post-war years. Even after the end of the war, the congress did not meet for more than seven years.
Almost no Plenums of the Central Committee were convened. Suffice it to say that in all the years of the Great Patriotic War not a single Plenum of the Central Committee was held. True, there was an attempt to convene a Central Committee Plenum in October 1941, when members of the Central Committee were specially summoned to Moscow from all over the country. For two days they waited for the opening of the Plenum, but did not wait. Stalin did not even want to meet and talk with members of the Central Committee. This fact shows how demoralized Stalin was in the first months of the war. At the same time, this fact shows how arrogant and dismissive Stalin was towards the members of the Central Committee.
In this practice, Stalin's disregard for the norms of party life, his violation of the Leninist principle of the collectivity of the party leadership, found expression.
Stalin's arbitrariness in relation to the party, to its Central Committee, was especially manifested after the 17th Party Congress, held in 1934.
The Central Committee, having at its disposal numerous facts testifying to gross arbitrariness in relation to party cadres, singled out a party commission consisting of comrades. Pospelov, Aristov, Shvernik and Komarov, whom he instructed to carefully investigate the question of how mass repressions against the majority of the members and candidates of the Central Committee of the Party elected by the 17th Congress of the CPSU (b) were possible.
The commission got acquainted with a large number of materials in the archives of the NKVD, with other documents and established the facts of falsified, false accusations, flagrant violations of socialist legality, as a result of which innocent people died. It turns out that many party, Soviet, economic workers, who were declared “enemies” in 1937-1938, in reality were never enemies, spies, wreckers, that they, in essence, always remained honest communists, but were slandered, and sometimes , unable to withstand the brutal tortures, they slandered themselves (under the dictation of falsifying investigators) all sorts of grave and incredible accusations. The Commission submitted to the Presidium of the Central Committee a large documentary material on mass repressions against delegates to the 17th Party Congress and members of the Central Committee elected by this congress. This material was considered by the Presidium of the Central Committee. The Central Committee considers it necessary to report to the 20th Congress the main facts on this question.
It has been established that out of 139 members and candidate members of the Central Committee of the Party elected at the 17th Party Congress, 98 people, that is, 70 percent, were arrested and shot (mainly in 1937-1938).
What was the composition of the delegates of the 17th Congress? It is known that 80 percent of the members of the 17th Congress with the right to vote joined the party during the years of the revolutionary underground and the civil war, that is, until 1920 inclusive. By social status the bulk of the delegates to the congress were workers (60 percent of the delegates with the right to vote).
Therefore, it was completely inconceivable that a congress of such a composition would elect a Central Committee in which the majority6 would turn out to be enemies of the party. Only as a result of the fact that honest communists were slandered and accusations against them were falsified, that monstrous violations of revolutionary legality were committed, 70 percent of the members and candidates of the Central Committee elected by the 17th Congress were declared enemies of the party and people.
Such a fate befell not only the members of the Central Committee, but also the majority of the delegates to the 17th Party Congress. Of the 1966 congress delegates with a decisive and advisory vote, significantly more than half - 1108 people - were arrested on charges of counter-revolutionary crimes. This fact alone shows how absurd, wild, contrary to common sense were the accusations of counter-revolutionary crimes brought against, as it now turns out, the majority of the participants in the 17th Party Congress.
It must be recalled that the 17th Party Congress went down in history as a congress of victors. Active participants in the construction of our socialist state were elected delegates to the congress, many of them waged a selfless struggle for the cause of the party in the pre-revolutionary years in the underground and on the fronts of the civil war, they bravely fought enemies, more than once looked into the eyes of death and did not flinch. How can one believe that such people, in the period after the political defeat of the Zinovievites, Trotskyists and Rights, after the great victories of socialist construction, turned out to be "double-dealers", went over to the camp of the enemies of socialism?
This happened as a result of the abuse of power by Stalin, who began to use mass terror against the party cadres.
Why did mass repressions against activists intensify more and more after the 17th Party Congress? Because by that time Stalin had risen so far above the party and the people that he no longer took any account of either the Central Committee or the party. If before the 17th Congress he still reckoned with the opinion of the collective, then after the complete political defeat of the Trotskyists, Zinovievites, Bukharinites, when as a result of this struggle and the victories of socialism the Party was united, the people were united, Stalin more and more ceased to reckon with the members of the Central Committee. party and even with members of the Politburo. Stalin believed that he could now manage all his grandfather himself, and he needed the rest as extras, he kept all the others in such a position that they had only to listen and praise him.
After the villainous murder of Comrade Kirov, mass repressions and gross violations of socialist legality began.
On the evening of December 1, 1934, on the initiative of Stalin (without the decision of the Politburo, this was formalized by a poll only 2 days later), the secretary of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Yenukidze signed the following resolution:
1) Investigative authorities to conduct cases of those accused of preparing or committing terrorist acts in an expedited manner;
2) Judicial authorities not to delay the execution of sentences of capital punishment because of the petitions of criminals of this category for pardon, since the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR does not consider it possible to accept such petitions for consideration;
3) The bodies of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs to carry out the execution of the sentence of capital punishment against criminals of the above categories immediately after the pronouncement of court verdicts.
This decision served as the basis for mass violations of socialist legality. In many falsified investigative cases, the accused were accused of "preparing" terrorist acts, and this deprived the accused of any opportunity to check their cases even when they renounced their forced "confessions" in court and convincingly refuted the charges against them.
It should be said that the circumstances surrounding the murder of Kirov are still fraught with many incomprehensible and mysterious things and require the most thorough investigation. There are reasons to think that the murderer of Kirov helped Nikolaev with someone from the people who were obliged to protect Kirov. A month and a half before the murder, Nikolaev was arrested for suspicious behavior, but was released and not even searched. It is extremely suspicious that when the Chekist attached to Kirov was taken for interrogation on December 2, 1934, he was killed in a car “accident”, and none of the persons accompanying him were injured. After the assassination of Kirov, the leaders of the Leningrad NKVD were removed from work and subjected to very mild punishments, but in 1937 they were shot. One might think that they were shot in order to cover up the traces of the organizers of the murder of Kirov.
Mass repressions intensified sharply from the end of 1936 after a telegram from Stalin and Zhdanov from Sochi dated September 25, 1936, addressed to Kaganovich, Molotov and other members of the Politburo, which stated the following:
“We consider it absolutely necessary and urgent to appoint Comrade Yezhov to the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. Yagoda was clearly not up to the task of exposing the Trotskyite-Zinovievist bloc. The OGPU was 4 years late in this matter. All party workers and the majority of regional representatives of the NKVD speak about this.
This Stalinist attitude that “the NKVD was 4 years late” with the use of mass repressions, that it was necessary to quickly “catch up” for what was lost, directly pushed the NKVD workers to mass arrests and executions.
It should be noted that this attitude was also imposed on the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1937. The resolution of the Plenum on Yezhov's report "Lessons of sabotage, sabotage and espionage by Japanese-German-Trotskyist agents" stated:
“The Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks believes that all the facts revealed during the investigation into the cases of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist center and its supporters in the field show that the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs was late in exposing these worst enemies of the people.
Mass repressions were carried out at that time under the flag of the struggle against the Trotskyists. Did the Trotskyists really pose such a danger to our party and the Soviet state at that time? It should be recalled that in 1927, on the eve of the 15th Party Congress, only 4,000 people voted for the Trotskyist-Zinoviev opposition, while 724,000 voted for the party line. In the 10 years that passed from the 15th Party Congress to the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee, Trotskyism was completely defeated, many former Trotskyists renounced their former views and worked in various sectors of socialist construction. It is clear that there were no grounds for mass terror in the country under the conditions of the victory of socialism.
In Stalin's report at the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee of 1937, "On the Shortcomings of Party Work and Measures to Eliminate Trotskyist and Other Double Dealers," an attempt was made to theoretically substantiate the policy of mass repressions under the pretext that, as we move forward towards socialism, the class struggle must supposedly become more and more and become more aggravated. At the same time, Stalin argued that this is how history teaches, this is how Lenin teaches.
In fact, Lenin pointed out that the use of revolutionary violence is caused by the need to crush the resistance of the exploiting classes, and these instructions of Lenin referred to the period when the exploiting classes existed and were strong.
It is important to note that as soon as the political situation in the country improved, after Rostov was taken by the Red Army in January 1920 and the main victory over Denikin was won, Lenin instructed Dzerzhinsky to abolish mass terror and to abolish the death penalty. Lenin substantiated this important political event of the Soviet power in the following way in his report at the session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on February 2, 1920:
“Terror was imposed on us by the terrorism of the Entente, when the world-powerful powers attacked us with their hordes, stopping at nothing. We could not have held out even two days if these attempts by the officers and the White Guards had not been answered in a merciless manner, and this meant terror, but this was imposed on us by the terrorist methods of the Entente. And as soon as we won a decisive victory, even before the end of the war, immediately after the capture of Rostov, we abandoned the use of the death penalty and thus showed that we treat our own program as promised. We say that the use of violence is motivated by the task of crushing the exploiters, of crushing the landlords and capitalists; when this is allowed, we will renounce all exclusive measures. We have proven it in action."
Stalin retreated from these direct and clear program instructions from Lenin. After all the exploiting classes in our country had already been liquidated and there were no serious grounds for the mass application of exceptional measures, for mass terror, Stalin oriented the party, oriented the organs of the NKVD towards mass terror.
This terror turned out to be actually directed not against the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes, but against honest cadres of the party and the Soviet state, who were presented with false, slanderous, senseless accusations of "double dealing", "espionage", "sabotage", preparation of any fictitious "assassination attempts" etc.
At the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee (1937), in the speeches of a number of members of the Central Committee, doubts were essentially expressed about the correctness of the outlined course towards mass repressions under the pretext of fighting "double-dealers".
These doubts were most clearly expressed in the speech of Comrade. Postyshev. He said:
“I reasoned: such tough years of struggle had passed, rotten members of the party broke down or went to the enemies, healthy ones fought for the cause of the party. These are the years of industrialization, collectivization. I had no idea that, after going through this steep period, Karpov and his ilk would fall into the camp of the enemy. But according to the testimony allegedly Karpov since 1934 was recruited by the Trotskyists. I personally think that in 1934 it is unbelievable for a healthy member of the Party, who has gone through a long path of fierce struggle with enemies for the cause of the Party, for socialism, to fall into the camp of enemies. I don't believe this... I can't imagine how one can go through difficult years with the Party and then go to the Trotskyists in 1934. It's strange..."
Using Stalin's attitude that the closer to socialism, the more enemies will foul, therefore, the more enemies there will be, using the resolution of the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee on Yezhov's report, provocateurs who made their way into the state security organs, as well as unscrupulous careerists became in the name of the Party, to cover up mass terror against the cadres of the Party and the Soviet state, against ordinary Soviet citizens. Suffice it to say that the number of those arrested on charges of counter-revolutionary crimes increased in 1937 in comparison with 1936 by more than ten times!
It is known what gross arbitrariness was also committed against the leading workers of the Party. The Party Rules, adopted by the 17th Congress, proceeded from Lenin's instructions from the period of the 10th Party Congress and said that the condition for applying to members of the Central Committee, candidates for membership of the Central Committee and members of the Party Control Commission such an extreme measure as expulsion from the Party "should be the convening of the Plenum of the Central Committee with an invitation all candidates for membership of the Central Committee and all members of the Party Control Commission," that only on the condition that such a general meeting of responsible leaders of the party by two-thirds1 votes recognizes this as necessary, could a member or candidate of the Central Committee be expelled from the party.
Most of the members and candidates of the Central Committee, elected by the 17th Congress and arrested in 1937-1938, were illegally expelled from the party, in gross violation of the Party Rules, since the issue of their exclusion was not raised for discussion by the Plenum of the Central Committee.
Now that some of these supposed "spies" and "saboteurs" have been investigated, the cases have been found to be fraudulent. Confessions of many arrested people accused of hostile activities were obtained through cruel, inhuman torture.
At the same time, according to members of the Politburo of that time, Stalin did not send them such statements of a number of slandered politicians when they retracted their testimony at the trial of the Military Collegium and asked for an objective investigation of their case. And there were many such statements, and Stalin, undoubtedly, was acquainted with them.
The Central Committee considers it necessary to report to the congress about a number of falsified "cases" against members of the Central Committee of the Party elected at the 17th Party Congress.
An example of vile provocation, malicious falsification, criminal violations of revolutionary legality is the case of the former candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, one of the prominent figures in the party and the Soviet state, Comrade Eikhe, a member of the party since 1905.
Tov. Eikhe was arrested on April 29, 1938 on the basis of slanderous materials without the sanction of the USSR prosecutor, which was received only 15 months after his arrest.
The investigation into the Eikhe case was carried out in an atmosphere of gross distortions of Soviet legality, arbitrariness and falsification.
Eikhe, under torture, was forced to sign interrogation protocols drawn up in advance by investigators, in which accusations of anti-Soviet activities were raised against him and a number of prominent party and Soviet workers.
On October 1, 1939, Eikhe filed a statement addressed to Stalin, in which he categorically denied his guilt and asked to deal with his case. In a statement, he wrote:
"There is no more bitter torment than to be in prison under the regime for which you have always fought."
The second statement of Eikhe, sent by him to Stalin on October 27, 1939, has been preserved, in which he convincingly, based on facts, refutes the slanderous accusations brought against him, shows that these provocative accusations are, on the one hand, the work of real Trotskyists, whose arrest he sanctioned, as the first secretary of the West Siberian Regional Committee of the Party, gave and who conspired to take revenge on him, and on the other hand, the result of a dirty falsification of fictitious materials by investigators.
Eikhe wrote in his statement:
“On October 25 of this year, I was announced the end of the investigation in my case and was given the opportunity to familiarize myself with the investigative material. If I were guilty, at least in a hundredth part, even of one of the crimes brought against me, I would not dare to turn to you with this dying statement, but I did not commit any of the crimes incriminated to me and I never had a shadow of meanness in my heart. I have never told you a half word of lies in my life, and now, being with both feet in the grave, I am not lying to you either. My whole case is a model of provocation, slander and violation of the elementary foundations of revolutionary legality...
The testimonies available in my investigative file that incriminate me are not only absurd, but on a number of points contain slander on the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars, since the correct decisions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars taken not on my initiative and without my participation are portrayed as sabotage acts counter-revolutionary organization carried out at my suggestion...
Now I turn to the most shameful page of my life, writes Eikhe, and to my really grave guilt before the Party and before you. This is about my confessions in counter-revolutionary activities ... The situation was as follows: unable to withstand the torture that Ushakov and Nikolaev applied to me, especially the first, who deftly used the fact that after the fracture my spine was still poorly overgrown and caused me unbearable pain, made me slander myself and other people.
Most of my testimony was prompted or dictated by Ushakov, and the rest I copied from memory the NKVD materials on Western Siberia, attributing all these facts given in the NKVD materials to myself. If something didn’t stick in the legend created by Ushakov and signed by me, then I was forced to sign another version. So it was with Rukhimovich, who was first enrolled in a reserve center, and then, without even telling me anything, was deleted, it was also with the chairman of the reserve center, allegedly created by Bukharin in 1935. At first I recorded myself, but then I was offered to record Mezhlauk, and many other moments ...
I ask and beg you to instruct me to investigate my case, and this is not in order to be spared, but in order to expose the heinous provocation that, like a snake, has entangled many people, in particular because of my cowardice and criminal slander. I never cheated on you and the party. I know that I am dying because of the vile, vile work of the enemies of the party and the people, who created a provocation against me.
It would seem that such an important statement should have been necessarily discussed in the Central Committee. But this did not happen, the statement was sent to Beria and the brutal reprisal against the slandered candidate for membership in the Politburot. Eihe continued.
On February 2, 1940, Eikhe was put on trial. In court, Eikhe pleaded not guilty and stated the following:
“In all allegedly my testimony, there is not a single letter I named, with the exception of the signatures at the bottom of the protocols, which were signed by force. The testimony was given under pressure from the investigator, who from the very beginning of my arrest began to beat me. After that, I began to write all sorts of nonsense ... The main thing for me is to tell the court, the party and Stalin that I am not guilty. Never been part of a conspiracy. I will also die with faith in the correctness of the party's policy, as I believed in it throughout my entire work.
On February 4, Eikhe was shot. At present, the falsification of the Eikhe case has been indisputably established.
A candidate member of the Politburotov completely retracted his forced testimony at the trial. Rudzutak, party member since 1905, who spent 10 years in the tsarist hard labor. The minutes of the court session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court recorded the following statement by Rudzutak:
“... His only request to the court is to bring to the attention of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks that in the organs of the NKVD there is an abscess that has not yet been uprooted, which artificially creates cases, forcing innocent people to plead guilty. That there is no verification of the circumstances of the accusation and no opportunity is given to prove one's non-involvement in those crimes that are put forward by certain testimonies of various persons. The methods of the investigation are such that they force them to invent and slander innocent people, not to mention the defendant himself. He asks the court to give him the opportunity to write all this for the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. He assures the court that he personally never had any bad thought against the policy of our party, since he always fully shared all the policy of the party, which was carried out in all areas of economic and cultural development.
This statement of Rudzutak was ignored, although Rudzutak, as is known, was at one time the chairman of the Central Control Commission, which was created, according to Lenin's idea, to fight for the unity of the party.
A thorough check carried out in 1955 established that the case against Rudzutak was falsified and he was convicted on the basis of slanderous materials. Rudzutak was posthumously rehabilitated.
How various “anti-Soviet centers” and “blocs” were created by former NKVD workers by artificially provocative methods can be seen from the testimony of Comrade Rosenblum, a party member since 1906, who was arrested by the Leningrad Department of the NKVD in 1937.
When the case of the former NKVD investigator Komarov was checked in 1955, Rosenblum reported the following fact: when he, Rosenblum, was arrested in 1937, he was subjected to severe torture, during which false testimony was extorted from him, both on himself and on other persons. Then he was brought to the office of Zakovsky, who offered him release on the condition that he give false evidence in court in connection with the “case of the Leningrad sabotage, espionage, sabotage, terrorist center” fabricated in 1937 by the NKVD. With incredible cynicism, Zakovsky revealed the vile "mechanics" of the artificial creation of fake "anti-Soviet conspiracies."
“For clarity,” Rosenblum said, “Zakovsky unfolded in front of me several options for the proposed schemes of this center and its branches ...
After familiarizing me with these schemes, Zakovsky said that the NKVD was preparing a file on this center, and the process would be open.
The head of the center of 4-5 people will be put on trial: Chudov, Ugarov, Smorodin, Pozern, Shaposhnikova, etc., and 2-3 people from each branch ...
The case of the Leningrad Center must be presented in a solid manner. This is where witnesses matter. Here plays an important role and social position (in the past, of course), and the party experience of the witness.
You yourself, - said Zakovsky, - will not have to invent anything. The NKVD will compile for you a ready summary for each branch separately, your job is to memorize it, remember well all the questions and answers that may be asked in court. This case will be prepared for 4-5 months, or even six months. All this time you will prepare so as not to let the investigation and yourself down. Your further fate will depend on the course and outcome of the trial. If you drift off and start to fake - blame yourself. If you endure, you will save a head of cabbage (head), we will feed and dress until death at the state expense.
The falsification of investigation cases was even more widely practiced in the regions. NKVD Directorate for Sverdlovsk region"revealed" the so-called "Ural insurgent headquarters, an organ of the bloc of rightists, Trotskyists, Social Revolutionaries, churchmen", allegedly led by the secretary of the Sverdlovsk regional party committee and a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) Kabakov, a member of the party since 1914. According to the materials of the investigative cases of that time, it turns out that in almost all territories, regions and republics there were supposedly widely branched "Right-Trotskyist espionage-terrorist, sabotage and sabotage organizations and centers" and, as a rule, these "organizations" and "centers" why some were headed by the first secretaries of the regional committees, regional committees or the Central Committee of the national communist parties.
As a result of this monstrous falsification of such "cases", as a result of the fact that they believed various slanderous "testimonies" and forced slanders of themselves and others, many thousands of honest, innocent communists perished. In the same way, “cases” were fabricated against prominent party and statesmen- Kosior, Chubar, Postyshev, Kosarev and others.
In those years, unjustified repressions were carried out on a massive scale, as a result of which the party suffered heavy losses in personnel.
There was a vicious practice when the NKVD compiled lists of persons whose cases were subject to consideration at the Military Collegium, and the measure of punishment was determined in advance. These lists were sent by Yezhov personally to Stalin to authorize the proposed penalties. In 1937-1938, 383 such lists were sent to Stalin for many thousands of party, Soviet, Komsomol, military and economic workers, and his sanction was received.
A significant number of these cases are now being reviewed, and a large number of them are dismissed as unfounded and falsified. Suffice it to say that from 1954 to the present, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court has already rehabilitated 7,679 people, and many of them have been rehabilitated posthumously.
The mass arrests of Party, Soviet, economic and military workers have caused enormous damage to our country and to the cause of socialist construction.
Mass repressions had a negative effect on the moral and political state of the party, gave rise to uncertainty, contributed to the spread of painful suspicion, and sowed mutual distrust among the communists. All sorts of slanderers and careerists became active.
The resolutions of the January Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1938 brought a certain improvement to the party organizations. But widespread repression continued into 1938.
And only because our party has great moral and political strength, it was able to cope with the difficult events of 1937-1938, to survive these events, to grow new cadres. But there is no doubt that our progress towards socialism and preparation for the defense of the country would have been carried out more successfully if it were not for the huge losses in personnel that we suffered as a result of massive, unjustified and unjust repressions in 1937-1938.
We accuse Yezhov of the perversions of 1937, and we accuse him correctly. But it is necessary to answer such questions: how could Yezhov himself, without the knowledge of Stalin, arrest, for example, Kosior? Was there an exchange of views or a decision of the Politburo on this issue? No, it wasn't, just as it wasn't in relation to other similar cases. How could Yezhov decide such important issues as the fate of prominent party leaders? No, it would be naive to consider this the work of Yezhov alone. It is clear that such cases were decided by Stalin, without his instructions, without his sanction, Yezhov could not do anything.
We have now sorted out and rehabilitated Kosior, Rudzutak, Postyshev, Kosarev and others. On what basis were they arrested and convicted? The study of the materials showed that there were no grounds for this. They were arrested, like many others, without the sanction of the prosecutor. Yes, in those conditions, no sanction was required; what else could be a sanction when everything was allowed by Stalin. He was the chief prosecutor in these matters. Stalin gave not only permission, but also instructions on arrests on his own initiative. This should be said so that there is complete clarity for the Congress delegates, so that you can give a correct assessment and draw the appropriate conclusions.
The facts show that many abuses were committed on Stalin's orders, regardless of any norms of Party and Soviet legality. Stalin was a very suspicious person, with morbid suspicion, as we were convinced while working with him. He could look at a person and say: “something your eyes are running around today,” or: “why do you often turn away today, don’t look directly into your eyes.” Painful suspicion led him to a sweeping distrust, including in the prominent figures of the party, whom he had known for many years. Everywhere and everywhere he saw "enemies", "double-dealers", "spies".
Having unlimited power, he allowed cruel arbitrariness, suppressed not only the physical qualities of a person, but also moral ones.
A situation was created in which a person could not show his will.
When Stalin said that such and such should be arrested, it was necessary to take it on faith that this is already an "enemy of the people." And the gang of Beria, who was in charge of the state security organs, climbed out of their skin to prove the guilt of the arrested persons, the correctness of the materials they fabricated. And what evidence was put into play? Confessions of the arrested. And the investigators got these "confessions". But how can you get a confession from a person in crimes that he never committed? Only one way: the use of physical methods of influence, through torture, deprivation of consciousness, deprivation of reason, deprivation of human dignity. This is how imaginary "confessions" were obtained.
When the wave of mass repressions in 1939 began to weaken, when the leaders of local party organizations began to accuse the NKVD workers of using physical force on those arrested, on January 10, 1939, Stalin sent an encrypted telegram to the secretaries of the regional committees, regional committees, the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, the people's commissars of internal affairs, and the heads of the NKVD departments . This telegram said:
“The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks explains that the use of physical force in the practice of the NKVD has been allowed since 1937 with the permission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ... It is known that all bourgeois intelligence services use physical force against representatives of the socialist proletariat and, moreover, use it in the most ugly forms. The question is why socialist intelligence should be more humane towards inveterate agents of the bourgeoisie, sworn enemies of the working class and collective farmers. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers that the method of physical influence must continue to be applied, as an exception, in relation to obvious and non-disarming enemies of the people, as an absolutely correct and expedient method.
Thus, the most gross violations of socialist legality, torture and torment, which led, as was shown above, to slander and self-slander of innocent people, were sanctioned by Stalin on behalf of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.
Recently, just a few days before this congress, we summoned to a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee and interrogated investigator Rhodes, who at one time conducted an investigation and interrogated Kosior, Chubar and Kosarev. This is a worthless person, with a chicken outlook, in moral terms, literally a degenerate. And such a person determined the fate of well-known leaders of the party, and determined the policy in these matters, because, proving their "criminality", he thereby provided material for major political conclusions.
The question is, how could such a person himself, with his mind, conduct an investigation in such a way as to prove the guilt of such people as Kosior and others. No, he couldn't do much without appropriate instructions. At a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, he told us this: “I was told that Kosior and Chubar were enemies of the people, so I, as an investigator, had to extract from them a confession that they were enemies.”49
This he could achieve only through prolonged torture, which he did, receiving detailed instructions from Beria. It should be said that at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, Rhodes cynically stated: "I believed that I was fulfilling the instructions of the party." This is how Stalin's instruction to apply methods of physical coercion to prisoners was carried out in practice.
These and many similar facts testify to the fact that all norms for the correct party solution of problems were eliminated, everything was subordinated to the arbitrariness of one person.
Stalin's autocracy led to particularly grave consequences during the Great Patriotic War.
If we take many of our novels, films and historical "research", then they portray the question of Stalin's role in the Patriotic War in a completely implausible way. Usually such a scheme is drawn. Stalin foresaw everything and everything. The Soviet Army, almost according to Stalin's pre-drawn strategic plans carried out the tactics of the so-called "active defense", that is, the tactics that, as you know, allowed the Germans to reach Moscow and near Stalingrad. Using this tactic, the Soviet Army, only thanks to the genius of Stalin, went over to the offensive and defeated the enemy. The world-historical victory won by the Armed Forces of the Soviet country, our heroic people, is attributed in such novels, films and "research" entirely to the military genius of Stalin.
We need to look into this issue carefully, because it is of great, not only historical, but, above all, political, educational, and practical significance.
What are the facts in this matter?
Before the war, in our press and throughout educational work a boastful tone prevailed: if the enemy attacks the sacred Soviet land, then we will respond to the enemy’s blow with a triple blow, we will wage the war on enemy territory and win it with little bloodshed. However, these declarative statements were by no means fully supported by practical deeds in order to ensure the real impregnability of our borders.
During the war and after it, Stalin put forward the thesis that the tragedy that our people experienced in the initial period of the war was allegedly the result of the "sudden" attack of the Germans on the Soviet Union. But this, comrades, is completely untrue. As soon as Hitler came to power in Germany, he immediately set himself the task of crushing communism. The Nazis spoke about this directly, without hiding their plans. To carry out these aggressive plans, various pacts, blocs, and axes were concluded, such as the notorious Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis. Numerous facts of the pre-war period eloquently proved that Hitler was directing all his efforts to unleash a war against the Soviet state and concentrated large military formations, including tank ones, near the Soviet borders.
From the documents now published, it can be seen that as early as April 3, 1941, Churchill, through the British ambassador to the USSR Cripps, made a personal warning to Stalin that German troops had begun to redeploy in preparation for an attack on the Soviet Union. Churchill indicated in his message that he asked "to warn Stalin in order to draw his attention to the danger threatening him." Churchill insistently emphasized this in the telegrams of April 18 and the following days. However, Stalin ignored these warnings. Moreover, there were instructions from Stalin not to trust information of this kind in order not to provoke the start of hostilities.
It should be said that this kind of information about the impending threat of the invasion of German troops into the territory of the Soviet Union came from our army and diplomatic sources, but due to the prevailing prejudice against this kind of information in the leadership, it was each time furnished with reservations.
So, for example, in a report from Berlin dated May 6, 1941, the naval attache in Berlin, Captain 1st Rank Vorontsov reported: “Soviet citizen Bozer ... informed the assistant of our naval attache that, according to one German officer from Hitler’s headquarters , the Germans are preparing an invasion of the USSR through Finland, the Baltic states and Latvia by May 14. At the same time, powerful air raids on Moscow and Leningrad and the landing of paratroopers in border centers are planned ... "
In his report dated May 22, 1941, the assistant military attaché in Berlin, Khlopov, reported that "... the offensive of the German troops was allegedly scheduled for June 15, and possibly will begin in early June ...".
In a telegram from our embassy from London dated June 18, 1941, it was reported: “As for the current moment, Cripps is firmly convinced that a military clash between Germany and the USSR is inevitable, and, moreover, no later than mid-June. According to Cripps, today the Germans have concentrated on the Soviet borders (including air forces and auxiliary forces of units) 147 divisions ... ".
Despite all these extremely important signals, sufficient measures were not taken to prepare the country well for defense and exclude the moment of surprise attack.
Did we have time and opportunities for such preparation? Yes, there were both time and opportunities. Our industry was at such a level of development that it was able to fully provide the Soviet Army with everything necessary. This is confirmed by the fact that when almost half of our entire industry was lost during the war, as a result of the occupation by the enemy of Ukraine, the North Caucasus, the western regions of the country, important industrial and grain regions, Soviet people managed to organize the production of military materials in the eastern regions of the country, to put into use equipment exported from the western industrial regions there and to provide our Armed Forces with everything necessary to defeat the enemy.
If our industry had been mobilized in time and really to provide the army with weapons and the necessary equipment, then we would have suffered immeasurably fewer casualties in this difficult war. However, such mobilization was not carried out in a timely manner. And from the very first days of the war it became clear that our army was poorly armed, that we did not have enough artillery, tanks and aircraft to repulse the enemy.
Before the war, Soviet science and technology provided excellent models of tanks and artillery. But the mass production of all this was not established, and we began the rearmament of the army, in essence, on the very eve of the war. As a result, at the time of the enemy attack on Soviet soil, we did not have the required quantities of either the old equipment that we were withdrawing from service, or the new equipment that we were going to introduce. It was very bad with anti-aircraft artillery, the production of armor-piercing shells for fighting tanks was not established. Many fortified areas turned out to be helpless by the time of the attack, since the old weapons had been removed from them, and the new ones had not yet been introduced.
Yes, the matter, unfortunately, is not only in tanks, artillery and aircraft. By the time of the war, we did not even have a sufficient number of rifles to arm the people called up for the active army. I remember how in those days I called Comrade from Kyiv. Malenkov and told him:
“People have joined the army and demand weapons. Send us weapons."
Malenkov replied to this:
“We can’t send weapons. We transfer all the rifles to Leningrad, and you arm yourself.”
Such was the case with weapons.
It is impossible not to recall in this connection such, for example, a fact. Shortly before the attack of the Nazi armies on the Soviet Union, Kirponos, who later died at the front, wrote to Stalin that the German armies had approached the Bug, were intensively preparing everything for the offensive, and in the near future, apparently, they would go on the offensive. Considering all this, Kirponos suggested creating a reliable defense, withdrawing 300 thousand people from the border regions and creating several powerful fortified zones there: dig anti-tank ditches, create shelters for fighters, and so on.
To these proposals from Moscow the answer was given that it was a provocation, that no preparatory work should be done on the border, that there was no need to give the Germans a reason to open hostilities against us. And our borders were not truly prepared to repulse the enemy.
When the fascist troops had already invaded Soviet soil and began hostilities, an order was issued from Moscow not to answer the shots. Why? Yes, because Stalin, contrary to obvious facts, believed that this was not yet a war, but a provocation by individual undisciplined parts of the German army, and that if we respond to the Germans, this will serve as a pretext for starting a war.
This fact is also known. On the eve of the invasion of the Nazi armies into the territory of the Soviet Union, a German ran across our border and said that German troops received an order on June 22, at 3 o'clock in the morning, to launch an offensive against the Soviet Union. This was immediately reported to Stalin, but this signal was also ignored.
As you can see, everything was ignored: the warnings of individual military leaders, and the testimony of defectors, and even the obvious actions of the enemy. What kind of foresight is this of the leader of the party and the country at such a crucial moment in history?
And what did such carelessness, such ignorance of obvious facts lead to? This led to the fact that in the very first hours and days the enemy destroyed in our border areas a huge amount of aviation, artillery, other military equipment, destroyed a large number of our military personnel, disorganized the command and control of the troops, and we were unable to block his path into the interior of the country.
Very grave consequences, especially for the initial period of the war, also had the fact that during 1937-1941, as a result of Stalin's suspicion, numerous cadres of army commanders and political workers were exterminated on slanderous accusations. During these years, several layers of command personnel were repressed, starting literally from the company and battalion to the highest army centers, including those command personnel who had gained some experience in waging war in Spain and the Far East were almost completely destroyed.
The policy of extensive repression against army cadres also had the grave consequences that it undermined the basis of military discipline, since for several years commanders of all levels and even soldiers in party and Komsomol cells were taught to “expose” their senior commanders as disguised enemies. Naturally, this had a negative effect on the state of military discipline in the first period of the war.
But before the war we had excellent military cadres, boundlessly devoted to the Party and the Motherland. Suffice it to say that those of them who survived, I mean such comrades as Rokossovsky, Gorbatov, Meretskov, Podlas and many, many others, despite the heavy torment they endured in prisons, from the very first days of the war showed themselves real patriots and selflessly fought for the glory of the Motherland. But after all, many of these commanders died in camps and prisons, and the army did not see them.
All this taken together led to the situation that was created at the beginning of the war for our country and which threatened the fate of our Motherland with the greatest danger.
It would be wrong not to say that after the first heavy setbacks and defeats on the fronts, Stalin believed that the end had come. In one of his conversations these days, he stated:
“What Lenin created, we have irretrievably lost all this.”
After that, for a long time he did not actually direct military operations and returned to leadership only when some members of the Politburo came to him and said that such and such measures must be taken without delay in order to improve the state of affairs at the front.
Thus, the formidable danger that hung over our Motherland in the first period of the war was largely the result of the vicious methods of leading the country and the party on the part of Stalin himself.
But the point is not only the very moment of the beginning of the war, which seriously disorganized our army and inflicted heavy damage on us. Already after the start of the war, the nervousness and hysteria that Stalin showed when he interfered in the course of military operations inflicted heavy damage on our army.
Stalin was very far from understanding the real situation that was developing on the fronts. And this is natural, since during the entire Patriotic War he was not on any sector of the front, in any of the liberated cities, except for the lightning-fast exit to the Mozhaisk highway with a stable state of the front, about which so many literary works have been written with all kinds of fiction and so many colorful paintings. At the same time, Stalin directly intervened in the course of operations and gave orders that often did not take into account the real situation on a given sector of the front and which could not but lead to colossal losses of human lives.
In this connection I will allow myself to cite one characteristic fact showing how Stalin led the fronts. Present at the congress here is Marshal Baghramyan, who at one time was the head of the operations department of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front and who can confirm what I will tell you now.
When exceptionally difficult conditions developed for our troops in the Kharkov region, we made the right decision to stop the operation to encircle Kharkov, since in the real situation of that time, the further implementation of an operation of this kind threatened fatal consequences for our troops.
We reported this to Stalin, declaring that the situation required a change in the plan of action in order to prevent the enemy from destroying large groupings of our troops.
Contrary to common sense, Stalin rejected our proposal and ordered the continuation of the operation to encircle Kharkov, although by this time a very real threat of encirclement and destruction hung over our numerous military groups.
I call Vasilevsky and beg him:
“Take, I say, a map, Alexander Mikhailovich, show Comrade Stalin what the situation is. After all, it is impossible under these conditions to continue the previously planned operation. For the good of the cause, it is necessary to change the old decision.
Vasilevsky answered me that Stalin had already considered this question and that he, Vasilevsky, would no longer report to Stalin, since he did not want to listen to any of his arguments on this operation.
After talking with Vasilevsky, I called Stalin at the dacha. But Stalin did not answer the phone, but Malenkov took it. I tell Malenkov that I am calling from the front and want to personally talk to Stalin. Stalin sends through Malenkov that I speak with Malenkov. I declare for the second time that I want to personally report to Stalin on the difficult situation that has arisen at our front. But Stalin did not consider it necessary to pick up the phone, but once again confirmed that I should speak to him through Malenkov®.
"Having listened" thus to our request, Stalin said:
"Leave everything the same!"
What came of it? And it turned out the worst of what we expected. The Germans managed to encircle our military groups, as a result of which we lost hundreds of thousands of our troops. Here is the military "genius" of Stalin!
Once after the war, at a meeting between Stalin and members of the Politburo, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan once said that, they say, Khrushchev was right then when he called about the Kharkov operation, that they didn’t support him then in vain.
You should have seen how angry Stalin was! How is it possible to admit that he, Stalin, was wrong then! After all, he is a "genius", and a genius cannot be wrong. Anyone can make mistakes, but Stalin believed that he was never wrong, that he was always right. And he never admitted to anyone in any of his big or small mistakes, although he made many mistakes both in theoretical questions and in his practical activities.
The tactics that Stalin insisted on, not knowing the nature of combat operations, cost us a lot of blood, after we managed to stop the enemy and go on the offensive.
The military knows that already from the end of 1941, instead of conducting large-scale maneuver operations with outflanking the enemy, with calls to his rear, Stalin demanded continuous frontal attacks in order to take village after village. And we suffered huge losses on this until our generals, who bore the brunt of the war on their shoulders, managed to change the state of affairs and go over to conducting flexible maneuver operations, which immediately led to a serious change in the situation on the fronts in our favor.
All the more shameful and unworthy was the fact when, after our great victory over the enemy, which was given to us at a very heavy price, Stalin began to smash many of those generals who had made their considerable contribution to the victory over the enemy, since Stalin ruled out any possibility that merits won at the fronts were attributed to anyone other than himself.
In this regard, Stalin himself very intensely popularized himself as a great commander, by all means introduced into the minds of people the version that all the victories won by the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War are the result of Stalin's courage, valor, genius and no one else.
Indeed, take our historical and military films. After all, they are all designed to promote this particular version, to glorify Stalin as a brilliant commander. Recall at least the painting "The Fall of Berlin". Only Stalin acts there: he gives instructions in a hall with empty chairs, and only one person comes to him and reports something - this is Poskrebyshev.
Where is military leadership? Where is the Politburo? Where is the government? What do they do and what do they do? This is not in the picture. Stalin alone acts for all, without regard or consulting with anyone. In such a perverted form, all this is shown to the people. For what? In order to glorify Stalin, and all this is contrary to the facts, contrary to historical truth.
The question is, where are our military, who bore the brunt of the war on their shoulders? They are not in the film, there was no place left for them after Stalin.
Not Stalin, but the party as a whole, the Soviet government, our heroic army, its talented commanders and valiant warriors, the entire Soviet people - that's what ensured victory in the Great Patriotic War.
Members of the Central Committee of the party, ministers, our business executives, figures of Soviet culture, leaders of local party and Soviet organizations, engineers and technicians - each was at his post and selflessly gave his strength and knowledge to ensure victory over the enemy.
Exceptional heroism was shown by our rear - the glorious working class, our collective farm peasantry, the Soviet intelligentsia, who, under the leadership of party organizations, overcoming incredible difficulties and hardships of wartime, devoted all their strength to the cause of defending the Motherland.
The greatest feat in the war was accomplished by our Soviet women, who bore on their shoulders the enormous burden of production work in factories and collective farms, in various sectors of the economy and culture, as well as our courageous youth, who made their invaluable contribution to the cause in all sectors of the front and rear. defense of the Soviet fatherland, in the cause of defeating the enemy.
Immortal are the merits of Soviet soldiers, our military commanders and political workers of all levels, who in the very first months of the war, having lost a significant part of the army, did not lose their heads, but managed to reorganize on the move, create and temper during the war a mighty and heroic army and not only repel the onslaught of a strong and an insidious enemy, but also to defeat him.
The greatest feat of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, which saved hundreds of millions of people in the East and West from the threat of fascist enslavement hanging over them, will live in the memory of grateful mankind for centuries and millennia.
The main role and the main merit in the victorious conclusion of the war belongs to our Communist Party, the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, the millions and millions of Soviet people educated by the Party.
Comrades! Let's look at some other facts. The Soviet Union is rightfully considered a model multinational state, because we have in fact ensured the equality and friendship of all the peoples inhabiting our great Motherland.
All the more flagrant are the actions initiated by Stalin and which represent a gross violation of the basic Leninist principles of the national policy of the Soviet state. We are talking about mass eviction from their native places of entire peoples, including all communists and Komsomol members without any exceptions. Moreover, this kind of eviction was in no way dictated by military considerations.
So, already at the end of 1943, when a lasting turning point in the course of the war in favor of the Soviet Union was determined on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, a decision was made and implemented to evict all Karachais from the occupied territory. In the same period, at the end of December 1943, exactly the same fate befell the entire population of the Kalmyk Autonomous Republic. In March 1944, all Chechens and Ingush were evicted from their homes, and the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was liquidated. In April 1944, all Balkars were evicted from the territory of the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Republic65 to remote places, and the republic itself was renamed the Kabardian Autonomous Republic.
In the minds of not only a Marxist-Leninist, but also any sane person, such a situation does not fit - how can one lay responsibility for the hostile actions of individuals or groups on entire peoples, including women, children, the elderly, communists and Komsomol members, and subject them to mass repressions, deprivation and suffering.
After the end of the Patriotic War, the Soviet people proudly celebrated the glorious victories achieved at the cost of great sacrifices and incredible efforts. The country experienced a political upsurge. The Party emerged from the war even more united, and the cadres of the Party were tempered in the fire of the war. Under these conditions, no one could even think of the possibility of any kind of conspiracy in the Party.
And during this period, the so-called “Leningrad case” suddenly arises. As has now been proven, this case was falsified. Innocently died tg. Voznesensky, Kuznetsov, Rodionov, Popkov and others.
It is known that Voznesensky and Kuznetsov were prominent and capable workers. At one time they were close to Stalin. Suffice it to say that Stalin nominated Voznesensky as First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Kuznetsov was elected Secretary of the Central Committee. The mere fact that Stalin entrusted Kuznetsov with the supervision of the state security organs speaks of the confidence he enjoyed.
How did it happen that these people were declared enemies of the people and destroyed?
The facts show that the “Leningrad case” is also the result of the arbitrariness that Stalin allowed in relation to the cadres of the party.
If there were a normal situation in the Central Committee of the Party, in the Politburo of the Central Committee, in which such questions would be discussed, as it should be in the Party, and all the facts would be weighed, then this case would not have arisen, just as other similar cases would not have arisen.
It must be said that in the post-war period the situation became even more complicated. Stalin became more capricious, irritable, rude, his suspicions especially developed. The mania of persecution increased to incredible proportions. Many workers became enemies in his eyes. After the war, Stalin further fenced himself off from the team, acted exclusively on his own, without regard for anyone or anything.
The vile provocateur, the vile enemy of Beria, who exterminated thousands of communists, honest Soviet people, cleverly used Stalin's incredible suspicion. The nomination of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov scared Beria. As it is now established, it was Beria who planted to Stalin the materials concocted by him and his henchmen in the form of statements, anonymous letters, in the form of various rumors and conversations.
The Central Committee of the Party checked the so-called "Leningrad case", the innocent victims have now been rehabilitated, the honor of the glorious Leningrad Party organization has been restored. The falsifiers of this case, Abakumov and others, were put on trial, they were tried in Leningrad and they got what they deserved.
The question arises, why are we now able to sort out this matter, and did not do it earlier, during the life of Stalin, in order to prevent the death of innocent people? Because Stalin himself gave direction to the "Leningrad case" and most members of the Politburo of that period did not know all the circumstances of the case and, of course, could not intervene.
As soon as Stalin received some materials from Beria and Abakumov, he, without understanding the essence of these fakes, gave instructions to investigate the “case” of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov. And this already sealed their fate.
Instructive in this regard is also the case of a Mingrelian nationalist organization that allegedly existed in Georgia. On this issue, as is known, decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU were adopted in November 1951 and March 1952. These decisions were made without discussion in the Politburo. They raised grave accusations against many honest communists. On the basis of forged materials, it was alleged that a nationalist organization allegedly exists in Georgia, which aims to eliminate Soviet power in this republic with the help of imperialist states.
In connection with this, a number of responsible party and Soviet officials of Georgia were arrested. As it was established later, it was a slander against the Georgian party organization.
We know that in Georgia, as in some other republics, at one time there were manifestations of local bourgeois nationalism. The question arises, maybe, indeed, during the period when the above-mentioned decisions were made, nationalist tendencies grew to such an extent that there was a threat of Georgia's secession from the Soviet Union and its transition to the Turkish state?
This, of course, is nonsense. It is difficult even to imagine how such assumptions could come to mind. Everyone knows how Georgia has risen in its economic and cultural development over the years Soviet power.
The industrial output of the Georgian Republic is 27 times greater than the production of pre-revolutionary Georgia. Many branches of industry that were not there before the revolution - ferrous metallurgy, the oil industry, mechanical engineering and others - have been recreated in the republic. The illiteracy of the population has long been eliminated, while in pre-revolutionary Georgia, illiterates accounted for 78 percent.
Comparing the situation in their republic with the plight of the working people in Turkey, could Georgians aspire to join Turkey? In Turkey in 1955, steel smelted per capita was 18 times less than in Georgia. Georgia produces electricity per capita 9 times more than Turkey. According to the 1950 census, 65 percent of the Turkish population was illiterate, and among women about 80 percent. There are 19 higher education institutions in Georgia with about 39 thousand students, which is 8 times more than in Turkey, whose population is six times the population of Georgia. In Georgia, during the years of Soviet power, the material well-being of the working people has risen immeasurably.
It is clear that in Georgia, with the development of the economy and culture, the growth of the socialist consciousness of the working people, the soil on which bourgeois nationalism feeds is increasingly disappearing.
And as it turned out, in fact, there was no nationalist organization in Georgia. Thousands of innocent Soviet people became victims of arbitrariness and lawlessness. And all this was done under the "brilliant" leadership of Stalin, "the great son of the Georgian people," as the Georgians liked to call their countryman.
Stalin's arbitrariness made itself felt not only in resolving issues of the country's internal life, but also in the region. international relations Soviet Union.
At the July Plenum of the Central Committee, the causes of the conflict with Yugoslavia were discussed in detail. At the same time, the very unseemly role of Stalin was noted. After all, the "Yugoslav case" was invented and inflated by Stalin. There were no serious grounds for the emergence of this "case", it was quite possible to prevent a break with this country. This does not mean, however, that the Yugoslav leaders did not have mistakes or shortcomings. But these mistakes and shortcomings were monstrously exaggerated by Stalin, which led to a break in relations with our friendly country.
I remember the first days when the conflict between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia began to be artificially inflated.
Once, when I arrived from Kyiv to Moscow, Stalin invited me to his place and, pointing to a copy of a letter sent to Tito not long before, asked:
And without waiting for an answer, he said:
“Here, I move my little finger, and there will be no Tito. He'll fly..."
This "moving the little finger" cost us dearly. Such a statement reflected Stalin's megalomania, because he acted like that: I move my little finger, and Kosior is gone, I move my little finger again, and there is no Postyshev, Chubar, I move my little finger again, and Voznesensky, Kuznetsov and many others disappear.
But with Tito it did not work out that way. No matter how much Stalin moved not only with his little finger, but with everything he could, Tito did not fly off. Why? Yes, because in the dispute with the Yugoslav comrades there were no issues that could not be resolved through a comradely party discussion, because the state stood behind Tito, stood the people who went through the harsh school of struggle for their freedom and independence, the people who supported their leaders.
This is what Stalin's megalomania led to. He completely lost his sense of reality, showed suspicion, arrogance in relation not only to individuals within the country, but also in relation to entire parties and countries.
Now we have carefully sorted out the question of Yugoslavia and have found the correct solution, which is approved by the peoples of both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as well as by all the working people of the countries of people's democracy, by all progressive mankind. The liquidation of abnormal relations with Yugoslavia has been carried out in the interests of the entire camp of socialism, in the interests of strengthening peace throughout the world.
We should also recall the "case" of pest doctors. Actually, there was no “case”, except for the statement of the doctor Timashuk, who, perhaps under the influence of someone or at the direction (after all, she was an unspoken employee of the state security organs), wrote a letter to Stalin in which she stated that the doctors allegedly used the wrong methods treatment.
It was enough for such a letter to Stalin, as he immediately concluded that there were pest doctors in the Soviet Union and instructed to arrest a group of prominent specialists in Soviet medicine. He himself gave instructions on how to conduct an investigation, how to interrogate those arrested. He said: "Put shackles on Vinogradov, beat such and such." Here is the delegate of the congress, former minister State Security Comrade Ignatiev. Stalin told him directly:
"If you do not achieve the recognition of doctors, then your head will be taken off."
Stalin himself called the investigator, instructed him, indicated the methods of investigation, and the methods were the only ones - to beat and beat.
Some time after the arrest of the doctors, we, the members of the Politburo, received protocols with the doctors' confessions. After these protocols were sent out, Stalin told us:
"You are blind, kittens, what will happen without me, the country will perish, because you cannot recognize the enemies."
The case was staged in such a way that no one had the opportunity to verify the facts on the basis of which the investigation is being conducted. There was no way to verify the facts by contacting the people who made these confessions.
But we felt that the case with the arrest of doctors is a dirty business. We personally knew many of these people, they treated us. And when, after Stalin's death, we looked at how this case was created, we saw that it was false from beginning to end.
This shameful "deed" was created by Stalin, but he did not have time to bring it to the end, and therefore the doctors remained alive. Now all of them have been rehabilitated, they are working in the same positions as before, treating senior officials, including members of the Government. We give them full confidence, and they conscientiously fulfill their official duty, as before.
In organizing various dirty and shameful deeds, a vile role was played by the terrifying enemy of our party, the agent of foreign intelligence, Beria, who ingratiated himself with Stalin's confidence. How was this provocateur able to achieve such a position in the party and the state that he became the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union and a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee? It is now established that this scoundrel walked up the state stairs through the many corpses on each step.
Were there any signals that Beria was a person hostile to the party? Yes they were. Back in 1937, at the Plenum of the Central Committee, the former People's Commissar for Health Kaminsky said that Beria worked in Musavat intelligence. No sooner had the Plenum of the Central Committee ended than Kaminsky was arrested and then shot. Did Stalin verify Kaminsky's statement? No, because Stalin believed Beria and that was enough for him. And if Stalin believed, then no one could say anything contrary to his opinion; whoever thought to object would suffer the same fate as Kaminsky.
There were other signals as well. Of interest is Comrade Snegov's statement to the Central Committee of the Party (by the way, recently rehabilitated after 17 years in the camps). In his statement, he writes:
“In connection with raising the question of the rehabilitation of the former member of the Central Committee Kartvelishvili-Lavrentyev, I gave detailed evidence to the representative of the State Security Committee about the role of Beria in the massacre of Kartvelishvili and the criminal motives that Beria was guided by.
I consider it necessary to restore an important fact in this matter and report it to the Central Committee, since I considered it inconvenient to place it in the investigative documents.
On October 30, 1931, at a meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a report was made by Secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee Kartvelishvili. All the members of the regional committee bureau were present, of which I am the only one alive. At this meeting, at the end of his speech, Stalin made a proposal to form a secretariat of the Zakkraykom consisting of: the first secretary of Kartvelishvili, the second Beria (this was the first time in the history of the party that the name Beria was named as a candidate for a party post), Kartvelishvili immediately stated that he knew Beria well and therefore categorically refuses to work with him. Then Stalin proposed to leave the question open and solve it in working order. After 2 days, it was decided to nominate Beria for party work and to leave Kartvelishvili from Transcaucasia.
Mikoyan and Kaganovich, who were present at this meeting, can confirm this.
The longstanding hostile relationship between Kartvelishvili and Beria was widely known; their origins come from the time of Comrade. Sergo in Transcaucasia, since Kartvelishvili was Sergo's closest assistant. They served as a basis for Beria to falsify the "case" against Kartvelishvili.
It is characteristic that Kartvelishvili is accused of a terrorist act against Beria in that “case”.
The indictment in the case of Beria details his crimes. But something is worth recalling, especially since, perhaps, not all delegates to the congress have read this document. Here I want to recall Beria's brutal reprisals against Kedrov, Golubev and Golubev's adoptive mother Baturina, who tried to bring Beria's treacherous activities to the attention of the Central Committee79. They were shot without trial, and the verdict was issued after the execution retroactively. Here is what Comrade wrote to the Central Committee of the Party. Andreev, the old communist comrade Kedrov:
“From the gloomy cell of the Lefortovo prison I appeal to you for help. Hear the cry of horror, do not pass by, intercede, help destroy the nightmare of interrogations, open the mistake.
I suffer innocently. Believe me. Time will tell. I am not an agent provocateur of the tsarist secret police, not a spy, not a member of an anti-Soviet organization, which I am accused of, based on slanderous statements. And I have never committed any other crimes against the Party and the Motherland. I am an untainted old Bolshevik who honestly fought (almost) 40 years in the ranks of the Party for the good and happiness of the people...
Now I, a sixty-two-year-old man, are being threatened by investigators with even more severe and cruel and humiliating physical measures. They are no longer able to realize their mistake and recognize the illegality and inadmissibility of their actions against me. They seek to justify it by portraying me as the worst, non-disarming enemy, insisting on increased repression. And let the Party know that I am not guilty and no measures will be able to turn the faithful son of the Party, devoted to it to the grave of life, into an enemy.
But I have no choice. I am powerless to turn away the approaching new, heavy blows.
Everything, however, has a limit. I am completely exhausted, - Comrade writes further. Kedrov. - Health is undermined, strength and energy are running out, the denouement is approaching. To die in a Soviet prison with the stigma of a contemptible traitor and traitor to the Motherland - what could be worse for an honest person. Horrible! Boundless bitterness and pain constrict the heart with a spasm. No no! It won't happen, it shouldn't happen, I scream. And the Party, and the Soviet government, and People's Commissar Beria will not allow that cruel, irreparable injustice to happen.
I am convinced that with a calm, impartial investigation, without disgusting abuse, without malice, without terrible bullying, the groundlessness of the accusations will be easily established. I deeply believe that truth and justice will prevail. I believe, I believe,” Comrade wrote at the end of his letter. Kedrov.
The Military Collegium acquitted the old Bolshevik Comrade Kedrov. But, despite this, he was shot by order of Beria.
Beria also committed a brutal reprisal against the family of Comrade Ordzhonikidze. Why? Because Ordzhonikidze interfered with Beria in the implementation of his insidious plans. Beria cleared his way, getting rid of all the people who could interfere with him. Ordzhonikidze was always against Beria, about which he spoke to Stalin. Instead of sorting it out and taking the necessary measures, Stalin allowed the destruction of Ordzhonikidze's brother, and brought Ordzhonikidze himself to such a state that the latter was forced to shoot himself. This is what Beria was like.
Beria was exposed by the Central Committee of the Party shortly after Stalin's death. As a result of a thorough trial, the monstrous atrocities of Beria were established, and he was shot.
The question is why Beria, who destroyed tens of thousands of party and Soviet workers, was not exposed during Stalin's lifetime? He had not been exposed before because he skillfully exploited Stalin's weaknesses, kindling a feeling of suspicion in him, pleasing Stalin in everything, acting with his support.
Comrades!
The cult of personality acquired such monstrous proportions mainly because Stalin himself encouraged and supported the exaltation of his person in every possible way. Numerous facts testify to this. One of the most characteristic manifestations of Stalin's self-praise and lack of elementary modesty is the publication of his Brief Biography, which was published in 1948.
This book is an expression of the most unbridled flattery, an example of the deification of a person, turning him into an infallible sage, the most "great leader" and "the unsurpassed commander of all times and peoples."
There is no need to quote the nauseatingly flattering characterizations piled on top of each other in this book. It should only be emphasized that all of them were approved and edited personally by Stalin, and some of them were personally entered by him into the layout of the book.
What did Stalin find it necessary to include in this book? Perhaps he sought to moderate the ardor of flattery of the compilers of his "Short Biography"? No. He strengthened precisely those places where the praise of his merits seemed to him insufficient.
Here are some characteristics of Stalin's activities, inscribed by the hand of Stalin himself:
“In this struggle with those of little faith and capitulators, Trotskyists and Zinovievists, Bukharins and Kamenevs, after Lenin’s failure, that leading nucleus of our party finally took shape ... which defended the great banner of Lenin, rallied the party around Lenin’s precepts and led the Soviet people onto a wide road industrialization of the country and the collectivization of agriculture. The leader of this core and the leading force of the party and state was Comrade. Stalin."
And this is written by Stalin himself! And adds:
“Skillfully fulfilling the tasks of the leader of the party and the people, having the full support of the entire Soviet people, Stalin, however, did not allow in his activities even a shadow of conceit, arrogance, narcissism.”
Where and when could any figure so glorify himself? Is this worthy of a figure of the Marxist-Leninist type? No. It was precisely this that Marx and Engels opposed so resolutely. This is what Vladimir Ilyich Lenin always sharply condemned.
The layout of the book contained the following phrase: "Stalin is Lenin today." This phrase seemed to him clearly insufficient, and Stalin himself recasts it as follows:
"Stalin is a worthy successor to the work of Lenin, or, as they say in our party, Stalin is Lenin today."
One can cite many such self-praiseful characteristics, introduced into the layout of the book by the hand of Stalin. He was especially zealous in lavishing praise on his address about his military genius, his military leadership talents.
Let me give you one more insert made by Stalin in relation to the Stalinist military genius:
“Comrade Stalin,” he writes, “further developed the advanced Soviet military science. Comrade Stalin worked out a position on the constantly operating factors that decide the fate of a war, on active defense and the laws of counteroffensive and offensive, on the interaction of military branches and military equipment in modern war conditions, on the role of large masses of tanks and aircraft in modern warfare, on artillery as the most mighty branch of the military. At different stages of the war, Stalin's genius found the right solutions, fully taking into account the peculiarities of the situation.
“Stalin's military art manifested itself both in defense and in the offensive. Comrade Stalin unraveled the plans of the enemy with brilliant insight and repulsed them. In the battles in which Comrade Stalin led the Soviet troops, outstanding examples of military operational art were embodied.
This is how Stalin was glorified as a commander. But by whom? By Stalin himself, but no longer acting as a commander, but as an author-editor, one of the main compilers of his laudatory biography.
Such, comrades, are the facts. Needless to say, these are disgraceful facts.
And one more fact from the same “Short Biography” of Stalin. It is known that a commission of the Central Committee of the party worked on the creation of the "Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)". This work, by the way, is also very saturated with the cult of personality, was compiled by a certain team of authors. And this provision was reflected in the layout of Stalin's Brief Biography in the following wording:
“The Commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, under the leadership of Comrade Stalin, with his personal active participation, creates a “Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).”
However, this formulation could no longer satisfy Stalin, and in the published "Brief Biography" this place is replaced by the following provision:
“In 1938, the book “History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks” was published. Short Course, written by Comrade Stalin and approved by the Commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
As you can see, there has been a striking transformation of the work created by the collective into a book written by Stalin. There is no need to say how and why such a transformation took place.
A legitimate question arises: if Stalin is the author of this book, then why did he need to glorify the personality of Stalin so much, and, in fact, make the entire post-October period in the history of our glorious Communist Party only a background for the acts of the “Stalinist genius”?
Did this book adequately reflect the efforts of the Party for the socialist transformation of the country, the building of a socialist society, the industrialization and collectivization of the country, and other measures taken by the Party, firmly following the path outlined by Lenin? It mainly talks about Stalin, his speeches, his reports. Everything, without any exception, is connected with his name.
And when Stalin himself declares that it was he who wrote the "Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks", then this cannot but cause at least surprise and bewilderment. How can a Marxist-Leninist write about himself like that, raising the cult of his personality to the skies?
Or take the question of the Stalin Prizes. Even the kings did not establish such prizes that they would call their names.
Stalin himself recognized as the best the text of the National Anthem of the Soviet Union, in which there is not a word about the Communist Party, but there is the following unparalleled glorification of Stalin: “Stalin raised us to be loyal to the people,
He inspired us to work and exploits.”
In these lines of the anthem, all the enormous educational, leading and inspiring activity of the great Leninist party is attributed to Stalin alone. This, of course, is a clear retreat from Marxism-Leninism, a clear belittling and belittling of the role of the party.
But without Stalin's knowledge, was his name assigned to many major enterprises and cities, was Stalin's monuments erected all over the country without his knowledge - these "monuments during his lifetime"? After all, it is a fact that on July 2, 1951, Stalin himself signed a decree of the Council of Ministers on the construction of a monumental sculpture of Stalin on the Volga-Don Canal, and on September 4 of the same year issued an order to release 33 tons of copper for the construction of this monument. Judge for yourself whether Stalin wrote correctly in his biography that he “did not allow in his activities even a shadow of conceit, arrogance, narcissism”?
At the same time, Stalin showed disrespect for the memory of Lenin. It is no coincidence that the Palace of Soviets, as a monument to Vladimir Ilyich, the decision to build which was made over 30 years ago, was not built, and the question of its construction was constantly postponed and forgotten. We must correct this situation.
It is impossible not to recall the decision of the Soviet government of August 14, 1925 “On the establishment of V.I. Lenin prizes for scientific work". This decision was published in the press, but there are still no Lenin Prizes. This also needs to be fixed.
During the life of Stalin, thanks to the well-known methods, which I have already spoken about, citing the facts, as it was written at least " short biography Stalin”, all events were covered in such a way that Lenin seemed to play a secondary role even during the October Socialist Revolution. In many films, in works of fiction, the image of Lenin is illuminated incorrectly, unacceptably belittled,
All this must be resolutely reconsidered so that the role of V.I. Lenin, the great deeds of our Communist Party and the Soviet people, the people-creator, the people-creator, find their correct reflection in history, literature, works of art.
Comrades! The cult of personality contributed to the spread of vicious methods in party building and economic work, gave rise to gross violations of inner-party and Soviet democracy, bare administration, all sorts of perversions, covering up shortcomings, varnishing reality. We have divorced a lot of sycophants, hallelujahs, swindlers.
It is also impossible not to see that as a result of numerous arrests of Party, Soviet and economic workers, many of our cadres began to work uncertainly, with caution, to be afraid of the new, to beware of their own shadow, and began to show less initiative in their work.
And take the decisions of party and Soviet bodies. They began to be drawn up according to a template, often without taking into account the specific situation. Things got to the point that the speeches of party and other workers, even at the smallest meetings, meetings on any issues, were pronounced according to a cheat sheet. All this gave rise to the danger of rendering party and Soviet work, bureaucratization of the apparatus.
Stalin's detachment from life, his ignorance of the actual state of affairs on the ground can be clearly illustrated by the example of the management of agriculture.
Everyone who was even slightly interested in the situation in the country saw the difficult state of agriculture, but Stalin did not notice this. Did we talk about this to Stalin? Yes, we talked, but he did not support us. Why did it happen? Because Stalin did not travel anywhere, did not meet with workers and collective farmers, and did not know the real situation on the ground.
He studied the country and agriculture only from films. And films embellished, varnished the state of affairs in agriculture. Collective farm life in many films was portrayed in such a way that the tables cracked from the abundance of turkeys and geese. Apparently, Stalin thought that in reality it was so.
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin looked at life differently, he was always closely connected with the people; received peasant walkers, often spoke at factories and plants, traveled to villages, talked with peasants.
Stalin fenced himself off from the people, he did not go anywhere. And so it went on for decades. His last trip to the countryside was in January 1928, when he traveled to Siberia on grain procurement matters. How could he know the situation in the village?
And when Stalin was told in one of his conversations that the situation in agriculture is difficult in our country, the situation in the country with the production of meat and other livestock products is especially bad, a commission was created, which was instructed to prepare a draft resolution "On measures to further development animal husbandry in collective farms and state farms. We have developed such a project.
Of course, our proposals at that time did not cover all the possibilities, but ways were outlined for the development of public animal husbandry. At that time it was proposed to raise procurement prices for livestock products in order to increase the material interest of collective farmers, MTS and state farm workers in the development of animal husbandry. But the project developed by us was not accepted, in February 1953 it was postponed.
Moreover, when considering this project, Stalin made a proposal to increase the tax on collective farms and collective farmers by another 40 billion rubles, since, in his opinion, the peasants live richly, and by selling only one chicken, the collective farmer can fully pay off the state tax.
Do you just think what that meant? After all, 40 billion rubles is such a sum that the peasants did not receive for all the products they handed over. In 1952, for example, the collective farms and collective farmers received 23,200,000,000 rubles for all their products handed over and sold to the state.
Was such Stalin's proposal based on any data? Of course not. Facts and figures in such cases did not interest him. If Stalin said something, it means that it is so - after all, he is a "genius", and a genius does not need to count, it is enough for him to look at it to immediately determine everything as it should be. He said his word, and then everyone should repeat what he said and admire his wisdom.
But what was wise in the proposal to increase the agricultural tax by 40 billion rubles? Absolutely nothing, since this proposal did not come from a real assessment of reality, but from the fantastic fabrications of a person cut off from life.
Now in agriculture we have begun to gradually extricate ourselves from a difficult situation. The speeches of the delegates to the 20th Party Congress please each of us when many delegates say that there are all conditions for fulfilling the tasks of the Sixth Five-Year Plan for the production of basic livestock products not in five years, but in 2-3 years. We are confident in the successful fulfillment of the tasks of the new five-year plan.
Comrades!
When we now sharply oppose the cult of personality, which became widespread during Stalin's lifetime, and talk about the many negative phenomena generated by this cult alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, some people may have a question: how is it, after all, Stalin was at the head of the party and countries for 30 years, major victories were achieved under him, how can you deny this? I believe that only people who are blinded and hopelessly hypnotized by the personality cult, who do not understand the essence of the revolution and the Soviet state, who do not truly understand, in the Leninist way, the role of the party and people in the development of Soviet society, can put the question in this way.
The socialist revolution was carried out by the working class in alliance with the working peasantry, it was carried out by the people led by the Bolshevik Party. Lenin's great merit lies in the fact that he created a militant party of the working class, armed it with a Marxist understanding of the laws of social development, the doctrine of the victory of the proletariat in the struggle against capitalism, he tempered the party in the fire of the revolutionary battles of the masses. In the course of this struggle, the party consistently defended the interests of the people, became its tried and tested leader, led the working people to power, to the creation of the world's first socialist state.
You well remember the wise words of Lenin that the Soviet state is strong by the consciousness of the masses, that history is now being made by millions and tens of millions of people.
We owe our historic victories to the organizational work of the Party, its numerous local organizations, and to the selfless labor of our great people. These victories are the result of the enormous activity of the people and the party as a whole, they are not at all the fruit of the leadership of Stalin alone, as they tried to present during the period of the prosperity of the personality cult.
If we approach the essence of this question in a Marxist, Leninist way, then we must state with all frankness that the practice of leadership that developed in the last years of Stalin's life became a serious brake on the development of Soviet society.
Stalin did not consider many of the most important and urgent questions of the life of the Party and the country for many months. Under Stalin's leadership, our peaceful relations with other countries were often jeopardized, since individual decisions could and sometimes did cause great complications.
In recent years, when we have freed ourselves from the vicious practice of the cult of personality and have outlined a number of measures in the field of domestic and foreign policy, everyone can see how activity is growing literally before our eyes, the creative initiative of the broad masses of working people is developing, how beneficially this is beginning to affect the results of our economic and cultural building.
Some comrades may ask the question: what were the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee looking at, why did they not oppose the cult of personality in a timely manner and do so only recently?
First of all, it must be borne in mind that the members of the Politburo looked at these questions differently in different periods. At first, many of them actively supported Stalin, because Stalin is one of the strongest Marxists and his logic, strength and will had a great impact on the cadres, on the work of the party.
It is known that after the death of V. Ilenin, especially in the early years, Stalin actively fought for Leninism, against the perverters and enemies of Lenin's teachings. Proceeding from Lenin's teaching, the party, headed by its Central Committee, launched a great deal of work towards the socialist industrialization of the country, the collectivization of agriculture, and the implementation of the cultural revolution. At that time, Stalin won popularity, sympathy and support. The party had to fight against those who tried to lead the country off the only correct, Leninist path with the Trotskyists, Zinovievists and right-wing, bourgeois nationalists. This fight was necessary. But then Stalin, abusing his power more and more, began to crack down on prominent figures of the party and the state, to use terrorist methods against honest Soviet people. As already mentioned, this is exactly what Stalin did with the prominent figures of our party and state, Kosior, Rudzutak, Eikhe, Postyshev, and some others.
Attempts to speak out against unfounded suspicions and accusations led to the fact that the protester was subjected to reprisals. In this respect, the story of Comrade Postyshev is characteristic.
In one of the conversations, when Stalin showed dissatisfaction with Postyshev and asked him a question:
"Who are you?"
Postyshev firmly stated, with his usual rounding accent:
“I am a Bolshevik, Comrade Stalin, a Bolshevik!”
And this statement was regarded at first as disrespect for Stalin, and then as a harmful act, and subsequently led to the destruction of Postyshev, declared without any reason to be an "enemy of the people."
It is clear that such a situation put any member of the Politburo in an extremely difficult position. If, moreover, we take into account that in recent years the Plenums of the Central Committee of the Party have not actually been convened, and meetings of the Politburo have been held from time to time, then it becomes clear how difficult it was for any member of the Politburo to speak out against this or that unjust or wrong measure, against obvious mistakes and shortcomings in management practice.
As already noted, many decisions were made individually or by poll, without collective discussion.
Everyone knows sad fate Politburo member Comrade Voznesensky, who became a victim of Stalin's repressions. It is characteristic to note that the decision to withdraw him from the Politburo was not discussed anywhere, but was carried out by a poll. Also, the poll made decisions on the dismissal of comrades Kuznetsov and Rodionov from their posts.
The role of the Politburo of the Central Committee was seriously belittled, its work was disorganized by the creation of various commissions within the Politburo, the formation of the so-called “fives”, “sixes”, “sevens”, “nines”. Here, for example, is the decision of the Politburo of October 3, 1946:
"Comrade's proposal. Stalin.
1. To instruct the Foreign Affairs Commission under the Politburo (Six) to continue, along with questions of a foreign policy nature, also questions of internal construction and domestic policy.
2. To replenish the composition of the six with the chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR comrade. Voznesensky to continue to call the six the seven.
Secretary of the Central Committee I. Stalin.
It is clear that the creation of such commissions of "fives", "sixes", "sevens" and "nines" within the Politburo undermined the principle of collective leadership. It turned out that some members of the Politburo were thus removed from solving the most important issues.
One of the oldest members of our Party, Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov, was placed under unbearable conditions. For a number of years, he was actually deprived of the right to take part in the work of the Politburo. Stalin forbade him to appear at meetings of the Politburo and send him documents. When the Politburo met and comrade. Voroshilov found out about this, then every time he called and asked permission if he could come to this meeting. Stalin sometimes allowed, but always expressed dissatisfaction. As a result of his extreme suspiciousness and suspicion, Stalin came to such an absurd and ridiculous suspicion that Voroshilov was a British agent.
Stalin single-handedly also removed from participation in the work of the Politburo another member of the Politburo, Andrei Andreyevich Andreev.
It was the most unbridled arbitrariness.
And take the first Plenum of the Central Committee after the 19th Party Congress, when Stalin spoke and at the Plenum he gave a characterization of Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov and Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, presenting unfounded accusations against these oldest leaders of our party.
It is possible that if Stalin had been in leadership for a few more months, Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan might not have spoken at this party congress.
Stalin, apparently, had his own plans for reprisals against the old members of the Politburo. He repeatedly said that it was necessary to change the members of the Politburo. His proposal after the 19th Congress to elect 25 people to the Presidium of the Central Committee pursued the goal of eliminating the old members of the Politburo, bringing in less experienced ones so that they would praise him in every possible way.
Comrades!
In order not to repeat the mistakes of the past, the Central Committee strongly opposes the cult of personality. We believe that Stalin was exalted beyond measure. It is indisputable that in the past Stalin had great merits before the party, the working class and before the international labor movement.
The issue is complicated by the fact that everything mentioned above was accomplished under Stalin, under his leadership, with his consent, and he was convinced that this was necessary to protect the interests of the working people from the intrigues of enemies and the attacks of the imperialist camp. He considered all this from the standpoint of defending the interests of the working class, the interests of the working people, the interests of the victory of socialism and communism. This is the real tragedy!
Comrades! Lenin repeatedly emphasized that modesty is an essential quality of a true Bolshevik. And Lenin himself was a living personification of the greatest modesty. It cannot be said that in this matter we are following Lenin's example in everything. Suffice it to say that numerous cities, factories and plants, collective farms and state farms, Soviet and cultural institutions have been given the names of various state and party leaders, who are still healthy and prosperous, as private property, so to speak. Isn't it time for us to put an end to this "private property" and carry out the "nationalization" of factories and plants, collective farms and state farms. The cult of personality is also reflected in such facts.
We must take the question of the cult of personality seriously. We cannot even take this question out of the congress, let alone into the press. That is why we are reporting it at a closed session of the congress.
Comrades! We must resolutely, once and for all, debunk the cult of the individual, and draw appropriate conclusions both in the field of ideological and theoretical work and in the field of practical work.
For this you need:
First, in a Bolshevik way, to condemn and eradicate the cult of personality as alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and incompatible with the principles of party leadership and the norms of party life, to wage a merciless struggle against all and every attempt to revive it in one form or another.
To restore and consistently implement in all our ideological work the most important propositions of the teaching of Marxism-Leninism about the people as the creator of history, the creator of all the material and spiritual wealth of mankind, about the decisive role of the Marxist party in the revolutionary struggle for the transformation of society, for the victory of communism.
In this regard, we have to do a lot of work to critically examine and correct from the positions of Marxism-Leninism the erroneous views associated with the cult of personality that have become widespread in the field of historical, philosophical, economic and other sciences, as well as in the field of literature and science. art. In particular, work must be carried out in the near future to create a full-fledged Marxist textbook on the history of our Party, compiled with scientific objectivity, textbooks on the history of the Soviet state, books on the history of the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War.
Secondly, to consistently and persistently continue the work carried out in recent years by the Central Committee of the Party on the strictest observance in all Party organizations, from top to bottom, of the Leninist principles of Party leadership and, above all, the highest principle of collective leadership, on observing the norms of Party life, enshrined in the Rules of our Party, for the development of criticism and self-criticism.
Thirdly, to fully restore the Leninist principles of Soviet socialist democracy, expressed in the Constitution of the Soviet Union, to fight against the arbitrariness of persons who abuse power. It is necessary to fully correct the violations of revolutionary socialist legality that have accumulated over a long period as a result of the negative consequences of the personality cult.
Comrades!
The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union demonstrated with renewed vigor the indestructible unity of our Party, its solidarity around its Central Committee, its determination to carry out the great tasks of communist construction. And the fact that we are now raising in all its breadth the fundamental questions of overcoming the cult of personality alien to Marxism-Leninism and of eliminating the grave consequences caused by it, speaks of the great moral and political strength of our Party.
There is no doubt that our Party, armed with the historic decisions of its 20th Congress, will lead the Soviet people along the Leninist road to new successes, to new victories.
RGANI. F. 1. On. 1. D. 17. L. 1-88. Script. Typescript.
Draft report to the XX Party Congress "On the cult of personality and its consequences", sent by N. S. Khrushchev on February 23, 1956 to members, candidates for membership of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Typewritten copy. RGANI. F. 1. Op. 2. D. 16. L. 1-79.
Draft report to the XX Party Congress "On the cult of personality and its consequences" dated February 23, 1956, copy M.A. Suslova. Typewritten copy. Editing - manuscript. RGANI. F. 1. Op. 2. D. 16. L. 80-163.
Draft report to the XX Party Congress "On the cult of personality and its consequences" dated February 23, 1956, copy by D.T. Shepilov. Typewritten copy. Editing-manuscript. RGANI. F. 1. Op. 2. D. 16. L. 164-171.
Comrade Khrushchev's report "On the cult of personality and its consequences", sent for familiarization to a number of leaders of foreign communist parties who were present at the XX Congress of the CPSU, dated February 27. RGANI. Typescript. F. 1. Op. 2. D. 18. L. 117-187.
Edited text of the report to the XX Party Congress "On the cult of personality and its consequences", presented by N.S. Khrushchev to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on March 1, 1956. Typescript. RGANI. F. 1. Op. 2. D. 18. L. 1-91. Published: News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. Ns 3, pp. 128-170.
The final text of the report to the XX Party Congress "On the cult of personality and its consequences" dated March 7, 1956. A copy of Khrushchev's assistant G. T. Shuisky, who apparently took part in the preparation of the report. Typescript. RGANI. F. 1. Op. 2. D. 16. L. 172-254.
"On the cult of personality and its consequences". Report of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU comrade. Khrushcheva N.S. XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on February 25, 1956. For distribution to party organizations. Printed copy with editing. RGANI. F. 1. Op. 2. D. 18. L. 95-115.
"On the cult of personality and its consequences". Report of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU comrade. Khrushcheva N.S. XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on February 25, 1956. For distribution to ambassadors and envoys of the USSR in foreign countries and the Central Committee of foreign communist parties. Printed copy with editing. RGANI. F. 1. Op. 2. D. 18. L. 188-210.
Nikita Khrushchev was born on April 15, 1894 in the village of Kalinovka, Kursk region. His father, Sergei Nikanorovich, was a miner, his mother, Ksenia Ivanovna Khrushcheva, he also had a sister, Irina. The family was poor, in many ways they were in constant need.
In winter he attended school and learned to read and write, in summer he worked as a shepherd. In 1908, when Nikita was 14 years old, the family moved to the Uspensky mine near Yuzovka. Khrushchev became an apprentice locksmith at the Machine-Building and Iron Foundry Eduard Arturovich Bosse. Since 1912, he began to work independently as a mechanic at the mine. In 1914, during the mobilization to the front of the First World War, and as a miner, he received an indulgence from military service.
In 1918 Khrushchev joined the Bolshevik Party. Participates in the Civil War. In 1918 he headed the Red Guard detachment in Rutchenkovo, then the political commissar of the 2nd battalion of the 74th regiment of the 9th rifle division of the Red Army on the Tsaritsyno front. Later, an instructor in the political department of the Kuban army. After the end of the war, he was engaged in economic and party work. In 1920 he became a political leader, deputy manager of the Rutchenkovskoye mine in the Donbass.
In 1922, Khrushchev returned to Yuzovka and studied at the workers' faculty of the Don Technical School, where he became the party secretary of the technical school. In the same year, he met Nina Kukharchuk, his future wife. In July 1925 he was appointed party leader of the Petrov-Maryinsky district of the Stalin district.
In 1929 he entered the Industrial Academy in Moscow, where he was elected secretary of the party committee.
Since January 1931, 1 secretary of the Baumansky, and since July 1931 of the Krasnopresnensky district committees of the CPSU (b). Since January 1932, he was the second secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.
From January 1934 to February 1938 - First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. From January 21, 1934 - Second Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. From March 7, 1935 to February 1938 - First Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.
Thus, from 1934 he was the 1st secretary of the Moscow City Committee, and from 1935 he simultaneously held the position of the 1st secretary of the Moscow Committee, he replaced Lazar Kaganovich in both positions, and held them until February 1938.
In 1938, N.S. Khrushchev became the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine and a candidate member of the Politburo, and a year later a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In these positions, he proved himself as a merciless fighter against the "enemies of the people." In the late 1930s alone, more than 150,000 party members were arrested in Ukraine under him.
During the Great Patriotic War, Khrushchev was a member of military councils southwestern direction, Southwestern, Stalingrad, Southern, Voronezh and 1st Ukrainian fronts. He was one of the culprits of the catastrophic encirclement of the Red Army near Kyiv and Kharkov, fully supporting the Stalinist point of view. In May 1942, Khrushchev, together with Golikov, made the decision of the Headquarters on the offensive of the Southwestern Front.
The Headquarters clearly stated: the offensive would end in failure if there were not sufficient funds. On May 12, 1942, the offensive began - the Southern Front, built in linear defense, moved back, because. soon the Kleist tank group launched an offensive from the Kramatorsk-Slavyansky region. The front was broken through, the retreat to Stalingrad began, more divisions were lost along the way than during the summer offensive of 1941. On July 28, already on the outskirts of Stalingrad, Order No. 227 was signed, called “Not a step back!”. The loss near Kharkov turned into a big disaster - the Donbass was taken, the Germans' dream seemed a reality - they failed to cut off Moscow in December 1941, a new task arose - to cut off the Volga oil road.
In October 1942, an order signed by Stalin was issued abolishing the dual command system and transferring commissars from command staff to advisers. Khrushchev was in the front command echelon behind Mamaev Kurgan, then at the tractor factory.
He finished the war with the rank of lieutenant general.
In the period from 1944 to 1947 he worked as chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, then he was again elected first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine.
Since December 1949 - again the first secretary of the Moscow regional and city committees and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.
On the last day of Stalin's life on March 5, 1953, at the joint meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces, chaired by Khrushchev, it was recognized as necessary for him to focus on work in the Central Committee of the party.
Khrushchev acted as the leading initiator and organizer of the removal from all posts and the arrest of Lavrenty Beria in June 1953.
In 1953, on September 7, at the plenum of the Central Committee, Khrushchev was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In 1954, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decided to transfer the Crimean region and the city of union subordination of Sevastopol to the Ukrainian SSR.
In June 1957, during a four-day meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, it was decided to release N.S. Khrushchev from the duties of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. However, a group of Khrushchev's supporters from among the members of the Central Committee of the CPSU, headed by Marshal Zhukov, managed to intervene in the work of the Presidium and achieve the transfer of this issue to the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU convened for this purpose. At the June plenum of the Central Committee in 1957, Khrushchev's supporters defeated his opponents from among the members of the Presidium.
Four months later, in October 1957, at the initiative of Khrushchev, Marshal Zhukov, who supported him, was removed from the Presidium of the Central Committee and relieved of his duties as Minister of Defense of the USSR.
Since 1958, simultaneously Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The apogee of the reign of N.S. Khrushchev is called the XXII Congress of the CPSU and the new party program adopted at it.
The October Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1964, organized in the absence of N. S. Khrushchev, who was on vacation, relieved him of party and government posts "for health reasons."
While in retirement, Nikita Khrushchev recorded multi-volume memoirs on a tape recorder. He denounced their publication abroad. Khrushchev died on September 11, 1971
The period of Khrushchev's rule is often called the "thaw": many political prisoners were released, compared to the period of Stalin's rule, the activity of repressions significantly decreased. Decreased influence of ideological censorship. The Soviet Union has made great strides in space exploration. Active housing construction was launched. During his reign, the highest tension of the Cold War with the United States falls. His policy of de-Stalinization led to a break with the regimes of Mao Zedong in China and Enver Hoxha in Albania. However, at the same time, the People's Republic of China was provided with significant assistance in the development of its own nuclear weapons and a partial transfer of the technologies for their production existing in the USSR was carried out. During the reign of Khrushchev, there was a slight turn of the economy towards the consumer.
Awards, Prizes, Political actions
Exploration of the whole land.
The fight against the cult of personality of Stalin: a report at the XX Congress of the CPSU, condemning the "cult of personality", mass de-Stalinization, the removal of Stalin's body from the Mausoleum in 1961, the renaming of cities named after Stalin, the demolition and destruction of monuments to Stalin (except for the monument in Gori, which was dismantled by the Georgian authorities only in 2010).
Rehabilitation of victims of Stalinist repressions.
Transfer of the Crimean region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR (1954).
Forceful dispersal of rallies in Tbilisi caused by Khrushchev's report at the XX Congress of the CPSU (1956).
Forceful suppression of the uprising in Hungary (1956).
World Festival of Youth and Students in Moscow (1957).
Full or partial rehabilitation of a number of repressed peoples (except for the Crimean Tatars, Germans, Koreans), restoration of the Kabardino-Balkarian, Kalmyk, Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics in 1957.
The abolition of sectoral ministries, the creation of economic councils (1957).
Gradual transition to the principle of "permanent personnel", increasing the independence of the heads of the union republics.
The first successes of the space program - the launch of the first artificial satellite of the Earth and the first manned flight into space (1961).
Erection of the Berlin Wall (1961).
Novocherkassk execution (1962).
Deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba (1962, led to the Cuban Missile Crisis).
The reform of the administrative-territorial division (1962), which included
division of regional committees into industrial and agricultural ones (1962).
Meeting with US Vice President Richard Nixon in Iowa.
Anti-religious campaign 1954-1964.
Lifting the ban on abortion.
Hero of the Soviet Union (1964)
Three times Hero of Socialist Labor (1954, 1957, 1961) - the third time he was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor for leading the creation of the rocket industry and preparing the first manned flight into space (Yu. A. Gagarin, April 12, 1961) (the decree was not published).
Lenin (seven times: 1935, 1944, 1948, 1954, 1957, 1961, 1964)
Suvorov I degree (1945)
Kutuzov I degree (1943)
Suvorov II degree (1943)
Patriotic War I degree (1945)
Labor Red Banner (1939)
"In commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the birth of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin"
"Partisan of the Patriotic War" I degree
"For the Defense of Stalingrad"
"For the Victory over Germany"
"Twenty Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945"
"For Valiant Labor in the Great Patriotic War"
"For the restoration of ferrous metallurgy enterprises of the south"
"For the development of virgin lands"
"40 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR"
"50 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR"
"In memory of the 800th anniversary of Moscow"
"In memory of the 250th anniversary of Leningrad"
Foreign awards:
Golden Star of the Hero of the NRB (Bulgaria, 1964)
Order of Georgy Dimitrov (Bulgaria, 1964)
Order of the White Lion 1st class (Czechoslovakia) (1964)
Order of the Star of Romania, 1st class
Order of Karl Marx (GDR, 1964)
Order of Sukhe Bator (Mongolia, 1964)
Order of the Nile Necklace (Egypt, 1964)
medal "20 years of the Slovak national uprising" (Czechoslovakia, 1964)
commemorative medal of the World Peace Council (1960)
International Lenin Prize "For strengthening peace between peoples" (1959)
State Prize of the Ukrainian SSR named after T. G. Shevchenko - for a great contribution to the development of the Ukrainian Soviet socialist culture.
Cinema:
"Playhouse 90" "Playhouse 90" (USA, 1958) episode "The Plot to Kill Stalin" - Oskar Homolka
Zotz Zotz! (USA, 1962) - Albert Glasser
"Rockets of October" The Missiles of October (USA, 1974) - Howard DaSilva
"Francis Gary Powers" Francis Gary Powers: The True Story of the U-2 Spy Incident (USA, 1976) - David Thayer
"Suez, 1956" Suez 1956 (England, 1979) - Aubrey Morris
"Red Monarch" Red Monarch (England, 1983) - Brian Glover
"Far from Home" Miles from Home (USA, 1988) - Larry Pauling
"Stalingrad" (1989) - Vadim Lobanov
"Law" (1989), Ten years without the right to correspond (1990), "General" (1992) - Vladimir Romanovsky
"Stalin" (1992) - Murray Evan
"Cooperative "Politburo", or It will be a long farewell" (1992) - Igor Kashintsev
"Gray Wolves" (1993) - Rolan Bykov
"Children of the Revolution" (1996) - Dennis Watkins
"Enemy at the Gates" (2000) - Bob Hoskins
"Passion" "Passions" (USA, 2002) - Alex Rodney
"Time Watch" "Timewatch" (England, 2005) - Miroslav Neinert
"Battle for Space" (2005) - Constantine Gregory
"Star of the era" (2005), "Furtseva. The Legend of Catherine "(2011) - Viktor Sukhorukov
"Georg" (Estonia, 2006) - Andrius Vaari
"The Company" "The Company" (USA, 2007) - Zoltan Bersenyi
"Stalin. Live" (2006); "House of Exemplary Content" (2009); "Wolf Messing: who saw through time" (2009); "Hockey Games" (2012) - Vladimir Chuprikov
Brezhnev (2005), And Shepilov who joined them (2009), Once Upon a Time in Rostov, Mosgaz (2012), Son of the Father of Nations (2013) - Sergey Losev
"Bomb for Khrushchev" (2009)
"Miracle" (2009), "Zhukov" (2012) - Alexander Potapov
"Comrade Stalin" (2011) - Viktor Balabanov
"Stalin and Enemies" (2013) - Alexander Tolmachev
"K blows the roof" (2013) - Academy Award nominee Paul Giamatti
Documentaries
"Coup" (1989). Production by Tsentrnauchfilm studio
Historical chronicles (a series of documentaries about the history of Russia, aired on the Rossiya TV channel since October 9, 2003):
57th series. 1955 - "Nikita Khrushchev, the beginning ..."
61st series. 1959 - Metropolitan Nicholas
63rd series. 1961 - Khrushchev. Beginning of the End
"Khrushchev. The first after Stalin "(2014)
L. I. Brezhnev was elected to this position. At the XXIII Congress of the CPSU, held in 1966, changes were adopted in the Charter of the CPSU, and the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU was abolished. Also, the former - abolished in 1934 - the name of the position of the first person in the Central Committee of the party, the General Secretary, was returned.
Chronological list of actual leaders of the CPSU
| Supervisor | With | on | Job title |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich | October 1917 | 1922 | informal leader |
| Stalin, Joseph Vissarionovich | April 1922 | 1934 | General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks |
| 1934 | March 1953 | Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) | |
| Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich | March 1953 | September 1953 | |
| September 1953 | October 1964 | First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU | |
| Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich | October 1964 | 1966 | |
| 1966 | November 1982 | General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU | |
| Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich | November 1982 | February 1984 | |
| Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich | February 1984 | March 1985 | |
| Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich | March 1985 | August 1991 |
see also
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Books
- General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the first President of the USSR Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, Tamara Krasovitskaya. Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev is the first and last president of the USSR to stop the Cold War. He is remembered and honored all over the world, but in his homeland his name is associated with the Chernobyl disaster, ...
- First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, Elena Zubkova. Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev is considered among us one of the most eccentric heads of the USSR. He is reminded of the wholesale imposition of planting corn from the Black Sea to the White Sea, the pogrom ...
Plan
Introduction
1 Joseph Stalin (April 1922 - March 1953)
1.1 Post of General Secretary and Stalin's victory in the struggle for power (1922-1934)
1.2 Stalin - the sovereign ruler of the USSR (1934-1951)
1.3 The last years of Stalin's rule (1951-1953)
1.4 Death of Stalin (5 March 1953)
1.5 March 5, 1953 - Stalin's associates dismiss the leader an hour before his death
2 Struggle for power after Stalin's death (March 1953 - September 1953)
3 Nikita Khrushchev (September 1953 - October 1964)
3.1 Post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
3.2 First attempt to remove Khrushchev from power (June 1957)
3.3 Removal of Khrushev from power (October 1964)
4 Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1982)
5 Yuri Andropov (1982-1984)
6 Konstantin Chernenko (1984-1985)
7 Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991)
7.1 Gorbachev - general secretary
7.2 Election of Gorbachev as Chairman of the USSR Supreme Council
7.3 Position of Deputy Secretary General
7.4 Ban on the CPSU and the abolition of the post of general secretary
8 List of General (First) Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Party - officially holding such a position
Bibliography
Introduction
Party history
October Revolution
war communism
New economic policy
Stalinism
Khrushchev thaw
The era of stagnation
perestroika
The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (in informal use and everyday speech is often abbreviated to General Secretary) is the most significant and the only non-collegiate position in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The position was introduced as part of the Secretariat on April 3, 1922 at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), elected by the XI Congress of the RCP (b), when I. V. Stalin was approved in this capacity.
From 1934 to 1953, this position was not mentioned at the plenums of the Central Committee during the elections of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. From 1953 to 1966, the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was elected, and in 1966 the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was again established.
Post of General Secretary and Stalin's victory in the struggle for power (1922-1934)
The proposal to establish this post and appoint Stalin to it was made, on the idea of Zinoviev, by a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, Lev Kamenev, in agreement with Lenin, Lenin was not afraid of any competition from the uncultured and politically insignificant Stalin. But for the same reason, Zinoviev and Kamenev made him general secretary: they considered Stalin a politically insignificant person, they saw him as a convenient assistant, but by no means a rival.
Initially, this position meant only the leadership of the party apparatus, while Lenin, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, formally remained the leader of the party and government. In addition, leadership in the party was considered inextricably linked with the merits of the theorist; therefore, following Lenin, Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev and Bukharin were considered the most prominent "leaders", while Stalin was not seen to have either theoretical merits or special merits in the revolution.
Lenin highly valued Stalin's organizational skills, but Stalin's despotic demeanor and his rudeness towards N. Krupskaya made Lenin repent of his appointment, and in the "Letter to the Congress" Lenin declared that Stalin was too rude and should be removed from the post of general secretary. But due to illness, Lenin retired from political activity.
Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev organized a triumvirate based on opposition to Trotsky.
Before the beginning of the XIII Congress (held in May 1924), Lenin's widow Nadezhda Krupskaya handed over the Letter to the Congress. It was announced at a meeting of the Council of Elders. Stalin announced his resignation at this meeting for the first time. Kamenev proposed to resolve the issue by voting. The majority voted in favor of keeping Stalin in the post of general secretary, only Trotsky's supporters voted against.
After the death of Lenin, Leon Trotsky claimed the role of the first person in the party and the state. But he lost to Stalin, who masterfully played the combination, winning Kamenev and Zinoviev over to his side. And Stalin's real career begins only from the moment when Zinoviev and Kamenev, desiring to seize Lenin's inheritance and organize the struggle against Trotsky, chose Stalin as an ally who must be had in the party apparatus.
On December 27, 1926, Stalin submitted his resignation from the post of General Secretary: “I ask you to release me from the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee. I declare that I can no longer work in this post, unable to work in this post anymore. The resignation was not accepted.
Interestingly, Stalin official documents never signed with the full title of the position. He signed as "Secretary of the Central Committee" and was addressed as Secretary of the Central Committee. When the Encyclopedic reference book "The Figures of the USSR and the Revolutionary Movements of Russia" (prepared in 1925-1926) came out, there, in the article "Stalin", Stalin was presented as follows: "since 1922, Stalin is one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the party, in what position he remains even now. ”, that is, not a word about the post of general secretary. Since the author of the article was Stalin's personal secretary Ivan Tovstukha, it means that such was Stalin's desire.
By the end of the 1920s, Stalin had concentrated such significant personal power in his hands that the position became associated with the highest post in the party leadership, although the Charter of the CPSU (b) did not provide for its existence.
When Molotov was appointed Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in 1930, he asked to be relieved of his duties as Secretary of the Central Committee. Stalin agreed. And the duties of the second secretary of the Central Committee began to be performed by Lazar Kaganovich. He replaced Stalin in the Central Committee..
Stalin - the sovereign ruler of the USSR (1934-1951)
According to R. Medvedev, in January 1934, at the 17th Congress, an illegal bloc was formed mainly from the secretaries of the regional committees and the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, who, more than anyone, felt and understood the fallacy of Stalin's policy. Proposals were made to move Stalin to the post of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars or the Central Executive Committee, and to elect S.M. Kirov. A group of congress delegates discussed this with Kirov, but he resolutely refused, and without his consent the whole plan became unrealistic.
Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich 1977: “ Kirov is a weak organizer. He is a good crowd. And we treated him well. Stalin loved him. I say that he was Stalin's favorite. The fact that Khrushchev cast a shadow on Stalin, as if he had killed Kirov, is vile ».
Despite the importance of Leningrad and Leningrad region their leader Kirov was never the second man in the USSR. The position of the second most important person in the country was occupied by the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Molotov. At the plenum after the congress, Kirov, like Stalin, was elected secretary of the Central Committee. 10 months later, Kirov died in the Smolny building from a shot by a former party worker.
Since 1934, the mention of the post of General Secretary has disappeared from the documents altogether. At the Plenums of the Central Committee held after the 17th, 18th and 19th Party Congresses, Stalin was elected Secretary of the Central Committee, in fact performing the functions of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. After the XVII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, held in 1934, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks elected the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, consisting of Zhdanov, Kaganovich, Kirov and Stalin. Stalin, as chairman of the meetings of the Politburo and the Secretariat, retained the general leadership, that is, the right to approve this or that agenda and determine the degree of readiness of the draft decisions submitted for consideration.
Stalin continued in official documents to sign as "Secretary of the Central Committee" and continued to be addressed as Secretary of the Central Committee.
Subsequent updates of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1939 and 1946 were also held with the election of formally equal secretaries of the Central Committee. The Charter of the CPSU, adopted at the 19th Congress of the CPSU, did not contain any mention of the existence of the post of "general secretary".
In May 1941, in connection with the appointment of Stalin as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Politburo adopted a resolution in which Andrei Zhdanov was officially named Stalin's deputy for the party: “In view of the fact that Comrade. Stalin, remaining, at the insistence of the Politburo of the Central Committee, the first Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, will not be able to devote sufficient time to work on the Secretariat of the Central Committee, appoint comrade. Zhdanova A.A. Deputy Comrade. Stalin on the Secretariat of the Central Committee.
Vyacheslav Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich, who previously actually performed this role, were not awarded the official status of deputy leader for the party.
The struggle among the leaders of the country escalated as Stalin increasingly raised the question that in the event of his death he needed to select successors in the leadership of the party and government. Molotov recalled: “After the war, Stalin was about to retire and said at the table: “Let Vyacheslav work now. He's younger."
For a long time, Molotov was seen as a possible successor to Stalin, but later Stalin, who considered the post of head of government the first post in the USSR, in private conversations suggested that he sees Nikolai Voznesensky as his successor in the state line
Continuing to see in Voznesensky his successor in the leadership of the country's government, Stalin began to look for another candidate for the post of party leader. Mikoyan recalled: “I think it was 1948. Once, Stalin pointed to 43-year-old Alexei Kuznetsov and said that future leaders should be young, and in general, such a person could someday become his successor in leadership of the party and the Central Committee.
By this time, two dynamic rival groups had formed in the country's leadership. Further, events turned tragically. In August 1948, the leader of the "Leningrad group" A.A. died suddenly. Zhdanov. Almost a year later, in 1949, Voznesensky and Kuznetsov became key figures in the "Leningrad case". They were sentenced to death and executed by firing squad on October 1, 1950.
This abbreviation, almost never used now, was once known to every child and was pronounced almost with reverence. Central Committee of the CPSU! What do these letters mean?
About the name
The abbreviation we are interested in means or is simpler than the Central Committee. Considering the importance of the Communist Party in society, its governing body could well be called the kitchen in which the fateful decisions for the country were “cooked”. Members of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the main elite of the country, are the “cooks” in this kitchen, and the “chef” is the General Secretary.
From the history of the CPSU
The history of this public entity began long before the revolution and the proclamation of the USSR. Until 1952, its names changed several times: RCP(b), VKP(b). These abbreviations reflected both the ideology, which was specified every time (from the Social Democracy of the Workers to the Communist Party of the Bolsheviks), and the scale (from Russian to All-Union). But the names are not the point. From the 1920s to the 1990s, a one-party system functioned in the country, and the Communist Party had an absolute monopoly. In the Constitution of 1936, it was recognized as the governing core, and in the main law of the country of 1977, it was even proclaimed the leading and guiding force of society. Any directives issued by the Central Committee of the CPSU instantly acquired the force of law.
All this, of course, did not contribute to the democratic development of the country. In the USSR, inequality along party lines was actively propagated. Only members of the CPSU could apply for even small leadership positions, from whom one could also ask for mistakes along the party line. One of the most terrible punishments was the deprivation of the membership card. The CPSU positioned itself as a party of workers and collective farmers, so there were rather strict quotas for its replenishment with new members. It was hard to be in the party ranks for a representative of the creative profession or a mental worker; no less strictly the CPSU followed its national composition. Thanks to such a selection, the really best did not always get into the party.
From the party charter
In accordance with the Charter, all the activities of the Communist Party were collegiate. In the primary organizations, decisions were made at general meetings, but in general, the congress held every few years was the governing body. Approximately once every six months, a party plenum was held. The Central Committee of the CPSU in the intervals between plenums and congresses was the leading unit responsible for all party activities. In turn, the highest body that led the Central Committee itself was the Politburo, headed by the General (First) Secretary.
The functional duties of the Central Committee included personnel policy and local control, spending the party budget and managing the activities of public structures. But not only. Together with the Politburo, the Central Committee of the CPSU determined all ideological activity in the country and resolved the most responsible political and economic issues.
It's hard for people who haven't lived to understand. In a democratic country where a number of parties operate, their activities are of little concern to the average man in the street - he remembers them only before the elections. But in the USSR the leading role of the Communist Party was even emphasized constitutionally! In factories and collective farms, military units and in creative teams, the party organizer was the second (and often the first in importance) head of this structure. Formally, the Communist Party could not manage economic or political processes: the Council of Ministers existed for this. But in fact, the Communist Party decided everything. Nobody was surprised by the fact that both the most important political problems and the five-year plans for the development of the economy were discussed and determined by party congresses. The Central Committee of the CPSU directed all these processes.
About the main person in the party
Theoretically, the Communist Party was a democratic entity: from the time of Lenin until the last moment, there was no unity of command in it, there were no formal leaders either. It was assumed that the secretary of the Central Committee was just a technical position, and the members of the governing body were equal. The first secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU, or rather the RCP (b), were indeed not very noticeable figures. E. Stasova, Ya. Sverdlov, N. Krestinsky, V. Molotov - although their names were well known, these people had nothing to do with practical leadership. But with the advent of I. Stalin, the process went differently: the “father of peoples” managed to subdue all power for himself. There was also a corresponding post - Secretary General. It must be said that the names of the party leaders changed periodically: the Generals were replaced by the First Secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee, then vice versa. With the light hand of Stalin, regardless of the name of his position, the party leader at the same time became the main person of the state.
After the death of the leader in 1953, N. Khrushchev and L. Brezhnev were in this post, then for short term the position was held by Yu. Andropov and K. Chernenko. The last party leader was M. Gorbachev - concurrently the only President of the USSR. The era of each of them was significant in its own way. If many consider Stalin a tyrant, then Khrushchev is usually called a voluntarist, and Brezhnev is the father of stagnation. Gorbachev went down in history as a man who first destroyed and then buried a huge state - the Soviet Union.
Conclusion
The history of the CPSU was an academic discipline mandatory for all universities in the country, and every student in the Soviet Union knew the main milestones in the development and activities of the party. Revolution, then civil war, industrialization and collectivization, victory over fascism and post-war restoration of the country. And then virgin lands and flights into space, large-scale all-Union construction projects - the history of the party was closely intertwined with the history of the state. In each case, the role of the CPSU was considered dominant, and the word "communist" was synonymous with a true patriot and just a worthy person.
But if you read the history of the party differently, between the lines, you get a terrible thriller. Millions of repressed peoples, exiled peoples, camps and political murders, reprisals against objectionable people, persecution of dissidents... It can be said that the author of every black page in Soviet history is the Central Committee of the CPSU.
In the USSR, they liked to quote Lenin's words: "The Party is the mind, honor and conscience of our era." Alas! In fact, the Communist Party was neither one, nor the other, nor the third. After the putsch of 1991, the activities of the CPSU in Russia were banned. Is the Russian Communist Party the successor of the All-Union Party? Even experts find it difficult to explain this.
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