Military science at the present stage.

The emergence of new types of weapons and military equipment, new types of troops, the rearmament and reorganization of old ones, as well as the transition of fascist states in the mid-1930s to direct acts of aggression, put forward new tasks for Soviet military science. The victory of socialism in the USSR, the successes of the cultural revolution contributed to the solution of these problems.

Soviet military science, which was formed together with the Soviet Army, is a system of developing knowledge about the nature and characteristics of armed struggle, its objective laws and principles of military art, methods and forms military protection socialist fatherland. It is called upon to develop the theoretical foundations and practical recommendations for building up the Armed Forces and preparing them for a possible war. In unity with practice, Soviet military science determines ways to improve existing and create new means of armed struggle.

Having absorbed all the best from the military-theoretical heritage of the past and the first combat experience in defending the country of socialism, Soviet military science, rapidly developing and enriching itself with new theoretical positions and conclusions, avoided the one-sidedness inherent in the military theories of the capitalist states, and surpassed the latter in the development of many problems. .

Lenin developed the most important provisions that form its basis: the features and nature of the wars of the new era; about the nature and essence of the military organization of the socialist state; the need for close military unity of the socialist republics and the militant alliance of the working classes; the transformation of the country in a military situation into a single military camp; the significance and decisive influence on the fate of the war of economic, moral-political, ideological, scientific-technical and military factors proper; the basic laws of modern warfare and their use, taking into account the advantages of a socialist society; on the decisive role Communist Party in the organization of the armed defense of the socialist Fatherland and the successful solution of defense tasks, and others.

The assertion of Lenin's theses in the theory of military affairs took place in a sharp struggle against the Trotskyists, the left and right opportunists, the conservative wing of the old military specialists.

The development of Soviet military science was guided by the collective wisdom of the Central Committee of the Party, which summarized everything new in the practice and theory of military affairs.

The wonderful works of M. V. Frunze were an example of the creative application of Marxism-Leninism to military affairs, party and deeply scientific analysis of the most complex problems of military theory and practice. A true Leninist, he was an unsurpassed master of applying the Marxist method to all branches of the military. scientific knowledge. In his works, he substantiated a number of fundamental provisions of the Soviet military theory.

M. V. Frunze argued that the system of military development and defense of the state should be based on a clear and accurate idea of ​​the nature of a future war; on a correct and accurate account of the forces and means that our potential adversaries will have at their disposal; on the same account of our own resources. MV Frunze developed Lenin's thesis that modern wars are waged by peoples, stressed that their scope in space and duration will inevitably increase. He pointed out the need to prepare for war not only the army, but the whole country, to rapidly develop industry, especially heavy industry, as the material basis for the military might of the socialist state.

A valuable contribution to the development of Soviet military science was made by A. S. Bubnov, K. E. Voroshilov, S. I. Gusev, A. I. Egorov, S. S. Kamenev, I. V. Stalin, V. K. Triandafillov, M. H. Tukhachevsky, B. M. Shaposhnikov. An important role was played by military academies, the Headquarters (and then the General Staff) of the Red Army, which were major centers of military-theoretical thought, as well as the commanders and headquarters of military districts.

The most important part of Soviet military science is the theory of military art, in which the leading place is rightfully occupied by a strategy designed to solve the problems of using all the country's armed forces and resources to achieve the ultimate goals of war.

The development of the strategy and the revision of its concepts were reflected in the country's defense plans, which were developed by the General Staff and approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government. Each such plan corresponded to the socio-economic condition of the country, as well as its resources and international position, was based on the developed strategic forms and methods, using which it would be possible to achieve the greatest results with the least expenditure of material and human resources.

In the second half of the 1930s, the imperialist bloc of fascist powers led by Nazi Germany, which aspired to world domination, became the main enemy of the Soviet Union. In the capitalist world he was opposed by a bloc of "democratic" bourgeois powers. Second World War could arise both as a war within the capitalist world and as a war against the USSR.

Soviet military science took into account both possibilities. It did not rule out that in the coming world war, as the Comintern pointed out, the most unexpected situations were possible, for which it was necessary to prepare in advance. Various combinations of efforts of freedom-loving states and peoples were also possible. Under the threat of fascist enslavement hanging over Europe, the prospect of a series of national liberation wars, not only of the oppressed masses of the colonies and semi-colonies, but also of the European peoples, became quite real. Such a prospect was foreseen and scientifically substantiated by V. I. Lenin. He considered the general democratic national liberation movement as a favorable prerequisite for the subsequent struggle for socialism. It was perfectly obvious that the Soviet Union, invariably true to its international policy and its revolutionary duty, would be a class ally of the peoples waging a national liberation struggle. The forms of realization of this union depended on the specific historical situation.

The indisputable merit of Soviet military-theoretical thought in the mid-1930s was that it did not rule out the possibility of a coalition war against the aggressor, such a war in which the socialist state would fight together with peoples and governments capable of defending in one way or another the national independence of their countries from fascist aggressors. The practical development of issues of conducting coalition actions took place in the preparation of the system collective security in the 30s, during joint hostilities with the Mongolian People's Republic in the area of ​​the Khalkhin-Gol River against Japanese aggression and in the course of preparing the conclusion of a military convention with England and France in the summer of 1939.

From the mid-1930s, the Soviet Union had to be ready to fight on two fronts: in the west against Nazi Germany and its satellites, and in the east against Japan. It was also unreliable south direction- from Turkey. The most powerful grouping of enemy forces was in the west. Therefore, in terms of the defense of the country, the Western European theater of war was considered the main one, where it was planned to concentrate the main forces. Soviet troops. Thus, ensuring the security of the USSR became much more complicated: the Soviet Armed Forces had to be ready to inflict a decisive defeat on the aggressor both in the west and in the east, and if necessary, in the south. A strategic deployment on two fronts was becoming inevitable.

The Soviet military strategy, based on Marxist-Leninist methodology, believed that in the fight against the aggressor coalition, achieving the final goals of the war would require powerful strategic efforts on several fronts (simultaneously or sequentially).

While recognizing the likelihood of a long and difficult war, Soviet military theory did not rule out the possibility of fleeting armed clashes. As a result, she paid great attention to the study of the methods of mobilization deployment of the armed forces, the likely methods of unleashing the war by the aggressors, the features of its initial period, and the problems of leadership.

The imperialists, seeking to disguise their aggression, avoided an open declaration of war and practiced "crawling" into it. This was convincingly evidenced by the Japanese-Chinese war, the wars in Ethiopia and Spain, the capture of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The mobilization of the aggressor's forces for the implementation of their actions was carried out partly in advance, in stages, and ended already in the course of the war.

Covert preparations and the sudden unleashing of war by the imperialists significantly increased the role of its initial period. This, in turn, required, wrote M. N. Tukhachevsky, "to be especially strong and energetic" in the initial operations (629) . He noted: “The first period of the war must be correctly foreseen even in peacetime, correctly assessed even in peacetime, and one must properly prepare for it” (630). The aggressors assigned the operations of the initial period of the war to the invading army, well equipped with mechanized formations and aviation. Hence, the side threatened by the attack must take preventive measures so that the enemy cannot disrupt the mobilization in the border areas and the advance of the mass army to the front line (631).

Views on the content and duration of the initial period of a future war were refined and developed. If in the 1920s, according to the experience of the First World War, it included mainly preparatory measures for decisive operations, then in subsequent years, the operations themselves began to be considered the main event of this period.

Many works of Ya. I. Alksnis, R. P. Eideman, V. F. Novitsky, A. N. Lapchinsky and others were devoted to the study of the nature of the initial period of the future war. A. I. Egorov, E. A. Shilovsky, L. S. Amiragov, V. A. Medikov, S. N. Krasilnikov and others considered the theoretical solution to the problems of preparing and conducting the first operations of the war.

In the summer of 1933, the Chief of Staff of the Red Army, A.I. Egorov, presented to the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR theses on new operational and tactical problems, in which attention was drawn to the qualitative and quantitative growth of powerful technical means of combat, forcing to solve the issues of the initial period of the war and the conduct of modern operations in a different way . According to A. I. Egorov, the enemy, using covert mobilization, can quickly concentrate a strong army of large mechanized, infantry, airborne units, cavalry masses and combat aircraft and suddenly invade foreign territory. Military operations will immediately cover space to a depth of 400-600 km and will cause significant damage to communications, military depots and bases, air and sea forces. With such a strike, the enemy is capable of destroying the covering troops, disrupting mobilization in the border areas, hindering the deployment of the army, and occupying economically important areas. However, he wrote, an invading army alone cannot decide the outcome of a war (632).

AI Yegorov's theses summarized the most important conclusions reached by Soviet military thought as early as the first half of the 1930s, significantly outpacing the development of military theory in the capitalist countries.

These conclusions were improved and developed by a whole galaxy of Soviet military theorists. One of them, E. A. Shilovsky, assessed the course of the initial period of a possible future war as follows. “A fierce struggle ... will unfold from the first hours of hostilities in a larger space of the theater of operations along the front, in depth and in the air ... At the same time, one should not count on the lightning defeat of the armies of class enemies, but prepare for a stubborn and fierce struggle,” in the course of which only final victory can be achieved. However, he acknowledged, the use of new means of combat at the beginning of a war can "shock the enemy so strongly that the result of their actions will have a decisive effect on the course of subsequent operations and perhaps even on the outcome of the war" (633) .

Shilovsky recommended massive use of aviation, subordinating its main forces to the main and front commands, and conducting the training of the country's armed forces in such a way that in short term deploy a massive army equipped modern technology capable of carrying out major operations from the first day of the initial period of the war (634).

L. S. Amiragov in his article “On the nature of a future war” proceeded from the fact that a coalition consisting of Germany, Japan and other states, the main carriers of open imperialist expansion, would oppose the USSR. The aggressors will strive to unleash a war suddenly and end it as soon as possible, they will try "to attach decisive importance to the initial period of the war, which in turn presupposes the widespread use of maneuverable forms of struggle" (635) .

S. N. Krasilnikov also wrote about the operations of the initial period. Taking into account the lessons of aggression against Ethiopia and China, he assumed that a future war could begin "as a sudden attack by heavy bomber aircraft from the air on the vital centers of the country, combined with a deep invasion of large motorized ... masses, supported by the actions of light combat aircraft on railways and vehicles necessary for the concentration of combat forces "(636) .

Consequently, in the content of the initial period of the war, Soviet military thought included not only preparatory measures, but also extensive military operations on land, in the air and at sea, in advance mobilized and deployed in the border regions of the invasion armies and cover armies. In the course of these battles, the initial period of the war will develop directly and gradually into the period of operations of the main forces.

Thus, long before the Second World War, Soviet military theory correctly determined the methods of its preparation, unleashing and waging that would be applied by the imperialist aggressors, taking into account the new military-technical factors. It promptly gave appropriate recommendations for the development of plans for the defense of the USSR.

However, these recommendations were not fully implemented at that time. Soviet military theory, as is inherent in any genuine science, looked far into the future. Under the conditions of that time, the Soviet state did not yet have the proper material means to implement its conclusions. The economic potential of the country did not yet make it possible, along with the high rates of socialist construction, to equip the Armed Forces with such a quantity of the latest weapons and military equipment as was required according to the conclusions of military theory.

An important advantage of the Soviet military theory in comparison with the bourgeois ones was the correct assessment of the importance of the moral factor. The Soviet people and its Armed Forces were morally prepared by the Party for the trials that could fall to their lot in the event of a military attack by the aggressors, were in complete patriotic readiness to repulse any enemy.

Based on the conclusions drawn by military science, Soviet military doctrine provided that victory at the front in a future war could be achieved only through purposeful, joint efforts of all branches of the armed forces and combat arms, with their close interaction. At the same time, the decisive role was assigned to the ground forces, saturated with artillery, tanks and aircraft (637). Great importance was attached to the air force, which, on the one hand, was supposed to provide solid ground troops from the air, and on the other, to conduct independent operations. The navy was called upon to assist the ground forces in delivering strikes along the coast, as well as to carry out independent operations against enemy ships on sea lanes.

The decisive type of strategic action was considered to be an offensive carried out by means of large-scale strategic front-line offensive operations carried out in the main operational-strategic axes. The Field Manual of 1939 stated that in one theater of operations the forces of several armies and large air formations could be used under the unified leadership of the front command to fulfill a common strategic task.

Strategic defense was also considered a natural type of armed struggle, which was placed in a subordinate position in relation to the offensive. In defensive operations, the troops had to stubbornly hold the occupied areas or cover a certain operational direction in order to repel the enemy offensive, defeat him and create favorable conditions for a counteroffensive.

Such a type of action as an operational withdrawal was not rejected, in order to withdraw troops from the blow of superior enemy forces, create a new operational grouping and ensure the transition to the defensive. It was believed that the last two types of armed struggle would find application mainly at the operational-tactical level.

The direct leadership of the armed struggle and the activities of the rear of the country was to be carried out by the supreme body of the state and the Headquarters of the High Command subordinate to it.

The study of the organization and conduct of front-line and army operations designed to ensure the achievement of strategic goals was mainly dealt with by operational art and tactics. At the same time, special attention was paid to the problems of operational art. The theory of successive decaying operations and group tactics, which met the conditions of the 1920s, did not meet the requirements of a future war. An urgent task arose to develop a fundamentally new theory of combat and operations, to find such methods and methods of combat operations that would make it possible to successfully overcome the strong fire screen of a continuous enemy front, in a short time to defeat his groupings and achieve strategic success. The fulfillment of this responsible task was entrusted to the General Staff, the central directorates of the armed forces, the Combat Training Directorate, the military academies, the headquarters of the military districts, with the involvement of the military scientific community. The foundations of the new theory, later called the theory of deep combat and operation, were developed for almost six years (1929-1935). As a result of painstaking research, the first official "Instruction for Deep Combat" was created, approved by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on March 9, 1935.

At the same time, the Red Army Headquarters prepared a draft Operations Manual - a kind of operational charter for the entire army. This eliminated the gap between operational art and tactics that had existed for a long time. The development of new provisions, their generalization and thorough testing in practice was carried out by P. A. Belov, P. E. Dybenko, A. I. Egorov, M. V. Zakharov, G. S. Isserson, K. B. Kalinovsky, N. D. Kashirin, A. I. Kork, D. A. Kuchinsky, K. A. Meretskov, I. P. Obysov, A. I. Sedyakin, S. K. Timoshenko, V. K. Triandafillov, M. N. Tukhachevsky, I. P. Uborevich, I. F. Fedko, B. M. Shaposhnikov, E. A. Shilovsky and other theorists and military leaders. The study of the theory of deep combat was given a prominent place in the educational and scientific plans of military academies. The Operations Department of the MV Frunze Military Academy, the Academy of the General Staff, and the academies of military branches have done a great job of systematizing, applying and designing many of its provisions. The first stage in the development of the theory of deep combat and operation ended with the release of the Provisional Field Manual of the Red Army in 1936, in which this theory received official recognition.

The theory of deep operation covered the forms of armed struggle used on the front and army scales, while the theory of deep combat embraced the types of combat operations of units and formations. Front operations could be both offensive and defensive. Their tasks must be solved by the efforts of several field armies in cooperation with large mechanized formations, air and naval forces.

Simultaneous suppression of the enemy throughout the entire depth of his formation was most fully considered on the scale of a front-line operation carried out in the interests of achieving strategic goals in a specific theater of military operations.

The army operation was considered as part of a front-line operation. Usually it was carried out in one operational direction and solved a particular operational problem. On the axes of the main blows inflicted by the front, it was envisaged to use well-equipped shock armies, and on the auxiliary axes, armies of ordinary composition.

Offensive operations were considered the decisive means of achieving success in armed struggle, in which the troops performed two tasks: breaking through the enemy defenses with a simultaneous strike to its entire tactical depth and developing tactical success into operational action by swift actions of mobile troops, airborne assault forces and aviation. For an offensive with decisive goals, a deep operational formation of troops was envisaged, consisting of the first ground echelon (attack echelon), the second ground echelon (breakthrough development echelon), an air echelon with a range of 300-500 km and subsequent echelons - operational reserves. In an oncoming battle, the advanced (vanguard) ground echelon could stand out.

To conduct the operation, there were two options for the operational formation of troops: if the enemy's defense was strong, rifle formations advanced in the first echelon, and mobile formations in the second; with weak enemy defenses rifle divisions operated in the second tier. The width of the offensive zone of the front was set at 300-400 km, the depth of the operation - 150-200 km. For the shock army, respectively, 50 - 80 km and 25 - 30 km. The duration of an army operation is 5-6 days, the average daily rate of advance is 5-6 km.

Possible forms offensive operation front could be a blow by the concentrated forces of two or three of its adjacent armies in one sector or by several armies of two adjacent fronts in a continuous sector (200 - 250 km), simultaneous crushing blows in several directions on a wide front, a blow in converging directions (double breakthrough using favorable front configuration). The most important conditions for the success of a deep offensive operation of the front were considered to be the gaining of air supremacy, the isolation of the battle area from suitable enemy reserves, and the disruption of the delivery of materiel to his attacked troops.

In an army operation, blows could be used by the center, one of the flanks, by all the forces of the army when it advanced in a narrow sector on the main direction of the front; in special cases, the army could strike on both flanks.

Recognition of the offensive as the main and decisive form of struggle did not exclude the need to use all types of defensive combat and operations. "The defense must withstand the superior forces of the enemy, attacking at once to the full depth" (638), - indicated in the field manuals of 1936 and 1939.

Soviet military science has developed a theory of operational and tactical defense much deeper than the military thought of the capitalist countries. A. I. Gotovtsev, A. E. Gutor, N. Ya. Kapustin, D. M. Karbyshev, M. G. Knyazev, F. P. Sudakov and others (639) took part in its development and improvement.

In general, the defense was supposed to be deep and anti-tank in order to save time and effort, hold especially important areas and objects, and pin down the advancing enemy. The defense was divided into stubborn (positional), created on a normal or wide front, and mobile (maneuverable). The army defensive area 70-100 km wide and 100-150 km deep consisted of four defensive zones: forward, tactical, operational and rear. The forward zone had a strip of developed engineering barriers, the tactical zone had the main and rear (second) strips (640), the operational zone had a barrier strip, and the rear zone was intended for the deployment and operation of army rear areas. An important place in the defense was assigned to the organization of a system of artillery and aviation counter-preparation, counterattacks and counterattacks.

For the uninterrupted supply of troops in offensive and defensive operations, it was planned to create an army rear, which included special units and institutions.

The theory of deep combat and operation was partially tested on large army maneuvers of 1935 - 1937, during the hostilities that had to be carried out Soviet army in 1938 - 1939

The combat and training practice of the troops, the achievements of science and technology have raised in a new way the question of the use of tanks, artillery and aviation in combat.

A. A. Ignatiev, P. I. Kolomeitsev, P. D. Korkodinov, M. K. Nozdrunov, V. T. Obukhov, A. I. Stromberg and others.

The previously adopted scheme for the use of tanks in three groups - NPP, DPP, DD (641) - in the conditions of the increased strength of anti-tank defense could not ensure the fulfillment of combat missions. Therefore, tank groups DPP and DD were excluded from the combat formations of the advancing troops. Instead of these groups, a reserve of tanks was created (with sufficient supply of the troops of the first echelons), intended to reinforce, if necessary, the tank group of the NPP or, in case of a successful attack, to develop it to the full depth order of battle enemy. The transformation of tactical success into an operational one and the achievement of a decisive goal in the main direction were assigned to armored formations - tank brigades and tank groups of operational significance (642).

Practice has shown that light, high-speed tanks with bulletproof armor have become unacceptable for combat missions under the new conditions; it was necessary to expand the production of medium and heavy tanks with anti-ballistic armor, powerful cannon armament and a large power reserve.

Experience has confirmed that of all the ground combat arms, artillery has the greatest power and range of fire action, which is called upon to clear the path for advancing troops and crush the enemy in defense with massive strikes. Modern Combat more and more became a fire contest of the opposing sides. Numerous and diverse fire weapons took part in it, for the destruction and suppression of which mobile long-range artillery of various combat missions was needed.

The best use of artillery in combat was greatly facilitated by the successes achieved in such branches of artillery science as internal and external ballistics and artillery shooting. Scientific research of artillery scientists D. A. Wentzel, P. A. Gelvikh, I. P. Grave, V. D. Grendal, N. F. Drozdov, V. G. Dyakonov, D. E. Kozlovsky, V. V. Mechnikova, Ya. M. Shapiro made it possible by the autumn of 1939 to create new firing tables, firing rules for military and anti-aircraft artillery, to revise the manual on fire training and artillery firing course, as well as other manuals.

The draft Field Manual of 1939, in addition to artillery support groups for infantry, long-range and artillery of destruction, introduced subgroups of artillery to support units of the first echelon, separate groups of close combat artillery (consisting of mortars), anti-aircraft artillery groups, long-range groups in the corps (643) . The density of artillery per kilometer of the attack front increased from 30 - 35 to 58 - 136 guns (without anti-tank artillery) (644) . Artillery support for the offensive was divided into periods: artillery preparation, attack support, fighting in the depths of the defensive zone (645).

By the mid-1930s, the theory combat use air forces. Soviet aviation, having completed a complex evolution, it turned from a separate type of weapon into an independent branch of the armed forces, and then soon into one of the types of armed forces. In parallel with this process, the operational art of the air force was developing, which was engaged in the study of the theory of preparation and conduct of combat operations by large aviation formations and formations in the interests of achieving operational and operational-strategic goals. The founder of this theory is Professor A. N. Lapchinsky, whose fundamental works - "Air Forces in Combat and Operations" (1932) and "Air Army" (1939) - gave it the necessary harmony and clarity. He also worked out in detail the problems of the struggle for air supremacy. In 1936, the theory of the preparation and conduct of air operations was set out in the form of practical recommendations in the Provisional Instructions for Independent Operations of the Air Forces of the Red Army.

In a study presented to the leadership, Commander V. V. Khripin and Colonel P. I. Malinovsky outlined the tasks of aviation in the initial period of the war (646) . In order to test the provisions put forward by them, maneuvers were carried out in 1937, during which the actions of the aviation of the fronts and the aviation army of the High Command were practiced in the initial period of the war and in the conditions of an expanded operation of the front. Important principles of the operational art of aviation were reflected in the field manuals of 1936 and 1939. They emphasized that the main condition for the success of the Air Force is their massive use (647); during decisive periods of hostilities, all types of aviation must concentrate their efforts to promote "the success of ground forces in combat and operation ... in the main direction" (648) .

Great importance was attached to the continuity of the impact of aviation on enemy troops. To this end, during the period of preparation for the operation, it was envisaged to gain air supremacy, disrupt enemy transports, exhaust his troops and disrupt control. During the period of deployment of hostilities, first, aviation preparations for the offensive were carried out in close cooperation with artillery, which later developed into support of the advancing battle formation throughout the entire depth of the breakthrough. At the same time, aviation was supposed to disrupt the enemy’s control and communications, hit his reserves, frustrate counterattacks and prevent him from occupying the second defensive line (649) .

The theory of the combat use of aviation, in addition to operational art, also had tactics as its component, which was divided into the general tactics of the air force and the tactics of individual branches of aviation. Several works are devoted to these issues: in 1935, A. K. Mednis's textbook "Attack Aviation Tactics" was published, in 1936 - the work of M. D. Smirnov "Military Aviation", in 1937 - a large scientific study by A. N. Lapchinsky "Bomber Aviation", in 1939 - the book of P. P. Ionov "Fighter Aviation".

The analysis of everything new that appeared in the naval art was devoted to the studies of V. A. Alafuzov, S. S. Ramishvili, I. S. Isakov, V. A. Belli, Yu. A. Panteleev, A. V. Tomashevich and others.

The theory of "small war" at sea with elements of linearity, which relied on the widespread use of submarines, aircraft and light surface forces, was replaced by the theory of typical naval operations carried out both independently and jointly with ground forces. These operational views were subsequently summarized in the manual on the conduct of naval operations, published in 1940. Particular attention was paid to the organization of interaction between the branches of the armed forces: ground forces, fleet and aviation, as well as the branches of the naval forces - underwater and surface - with aviation and coastal artillery. Offensive actions at sea were given the main place. The role of strike forces on maritime communications were to be carried out by submarines and aircraft. The carriers of the greatest offensive and defensive power of the sea and ocean fleets were considered battleships, capable of a long-term combat effect on the enemy in interaction with other classes of ships.

On the eve of the Second World War, a theory was formed of the operational use of naval forces to achieve ultimate goals in the maritime theater, mainly through concentrated strikes delivered by heterogeneous fleet forces against the enemy fleet in the course of a series of successive and parallel operations connected by the unity of the strategic task. Based on the experience of military operations in the First World War, taking into account the actions of naval forces in connection with the wars in Spain and China, the foundations were developed for conducting mine-protecting, landing and anti-amphibious operations, as well as operations against enemy bases and to provide fire support for the coastal flank of land armies.

A great achievement was the creation in 1937 of the Combat Charter of the Navy, in the development of which I. S. Isakov and V. A. Alekin took an active part. It reflects the issues of interaction of maneuverable formations for various purposes, combining their efforts for a joint strike against the enemy on the high seas and at mine-artillery positions created in narrow spaces and on the approaches to naval bases. Raid actions on the enemy coast were studied and practiced in order to destroy fortified objects, strike at enemy convoys, anti-submarine barrages, groupings of ships in coastal waters, ports and naval bases.

There were also shortcomings in the development of Soviet military theory on the eve of World War II. Correctly focusing on conducting strong retaliatory strikes against the aggressor, Soviet military art was unable to fully develop the methods of combat operations of the cover echelon and the strategic deployment of the main forces in the face of the threat of a sudden strike by strong and mobile enemy groupings.

The possibility of a deep breakthrough by the enemy of the strategic defense was considered unlikely. For this reason, the theory of preparing and conducting strategic defensive operations has not received a comprehensive development. The theoretical foundations of the operational-strategic interaction of fronts and types of forces in the conditions of a future major war were also considered in general terms, mainly in the interests of resolving practical issues related to planning the defense of state borders. There was no complete clarity on how to gain air supremacy in the course of initial operations in the theater of operations.

However, the necessary prerequisites for resolving these issues in subsequent years were basically created.

In 1936 - 1939. the results of large-scale maneuvers of the Kyiv, Belorussian, Moscow and Leningrad military districts, as well as the combat experience of the Soviet troops near Lake Khasan and on the Khalkhin Gol River, military operations in local wars unleashed by the imperialists in Ethiopia, Spain, China, aggressive acts to seize Austria, Czechoslovakia and Albania. The military press widely informed the public about the nature of the struggle in these wars and armed clashes (650).

In the second half of the 1930s, military theorists and major military leaders of the capitalist countries not only recognized the achievements of the Soviet Armed Forces, but also borrowed a lot from their experience. The head of the Italian military mission, General Graziolini, who was present at the “big Russian maneuvers,” wrote: “The Red Army is organized and equipped in a modern way ...” In his opinion, the Russians have a “great passion for mobile troops,” “are fond of large mechanized formations and conduct numerous exercises with their use.

An interesting assessment of the Soviet Army was given by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the French Army, General Loizeau: “I ... saw a powerful, serious army, of very high quality both technically and morally. Her moral level and physical condition are admirable. The technique of the Red Army is at an unusually high level. With regard to tanks, I would think it right to consider the army of the Soviet Union in the first place. The parachute landing of a large military unit, which I saw near Kyiv, I consider a fact that has no precedent in the world. The most characteristic, of course, is the closest and truly organic connection between the army and the population, the love of the people for the Red Army soldiers and commanders. I will say frankly, I have never seen such a powerful, exciting, beautiful sight in my life” (651) .

Hitler's General G. Guderian paid special attention to "combat groups operating in depth", which "pursued operational targets, struck against the flanks and rear, and simultaneously paralyzed the enemy throughout the entire depth of his defense" (652) . “The mass of tank forces,” he wrote, “should be expediently combined into combat corps, as is the case in England and Russia ...” (653) Guderian, creating the German version of the theory of deep operation, copied many of the provisions of Soviet military theorists.

Soviet military science was the first to develop methods of application airborne troops. Present at the maneuvers of the Kyiv Military District in 1935, the English General (later Field Marshal) Wavell, reporting to the government on the use of a large air assault by the Russians, said: “If I myself had not witnessed this, I would never have believed that such an operation was even possible » (654) . The massive use of airborne troops during the maneuvers of the Soviet Army in 1936 astonished many representatives of the military delegations of France, Italy, Japan and other countries. A few years later, one of the American military observers, summing up the use of airborne landings by the Nazis in Western Europe, wrote: demonstrated these methods on a large scale during the maneuvers of 1936. (655) .

Wide display at military maneuvers and exercises 1935 - 1937. achievements of Soviet military science and technology pursued quite specific goals: to test by practice the correctness of the basic theoretical provisions developed by Soviet military science, and also to clearly show that the war against the USSR is a serious and dangerous matter for its organizers, and thereby contribute to the preservation of peace. In subsequent years (1938 - 1939), the defensive power of the USSR was demonstrated in battles with the Japanese invaders in the Far East.

On the whole, the level of Soviet military science on the eve of World War II met the requirements of the time. Relying on the provisions developed by military science, the party aimed design thought at the fastest possible development of modern, promising models of military equipment and weapons.

Topic 1-1

d) No true statement

a) Air Force, Navy, SV

b) Aerospace Defense, Navy, SV

c) VKS, Navy, SV

d) Airborne Forces, Navy, SV

b) Air Force Tactics Theory

c) Air Force practice theory

d) military doctrine of the RF Armed Forces

a) strategy

b) operational art

c) military art

d) tactics

a) strategy

b) operational art

c) military art

d) tactics

a) strategy

b) operational art

c) military art

d) tactics

a) strategy

b) operational art

c) military art

d) tactics

a) internal

b) large scale

c) regional

d) external

e) interstate

f) local

b) according to the means used

c) by scale

a) an armed incident

b) local war

c) armed conflict

d) armed action

a) local

b) regional

c) large scale

What kind of war is being waged by groupings of troops (forces) deployed in the conflict area, with their reinforcement, if necessary, due to the transfer of troops from other directions?

a) local

b) regional

c) large scale

Which of the following parameters does NOT determine the nature of modern wars?

a) military-political goals

b) the method of conducting armed struggle

c) the military-strategic nature of the war

d) the scale of hostilities

What stage in the development of Air Force tactics does the description refer to: World War II and the period until the early 1960s. - the formation of the principles of combat use, the development of air combat tactics and air strikes?

Topic 1-1

1. Choose the correct definition:

a) Operational art (intermediate area of ​​​​Martial Art) - explores the tasks of formations and units

b) Tactics (the highest area of ​​​​Martial Art) - determines the goals and objectives of conducting operations (combat actions), time, scale, indicators of operations

c) Military strategy (the lowest area of ​​​​Martial Art) - determines the role and place of each kind of wax in battle and, based on combat properties and capabilities, establishes the order and methods of combat use

d) No true statement

2. Select the types of troops that are part of the RF Armed Forces:

a) Air Force, Navy, SV

b) Aerospace Defense, Navy, SV

c) VKS, Navy, SV

d) Airborne Forces, Navy, SV

3. Choose the correct components of "Air Force Tactics":

a) Air Force Tactics and Land Forces Tactics Theory

b) Air Force Tactics Theory

c) Air Force practice theory

d) Air Force Tactics Theory and Air Force Practice Theory

4. Choose what the theory of practice of the Air Force studies:

a) laws and principles of military operations

b) forms and methods of tactical use of aviation

c) prospects for the development of enemy ground equipment

d) military doctrine of the RF Armed Forces

5. Choose what the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation defines:

a) military-political, military-strategic, military-economic foundations for ensuring the security of the Russian Federation

b) military-political, military-tactical, military-economic foundations for ensuring the security of the Russian Federation

c) military-tactical, military-strategic, military-economic foundations for ensuring the security of the Russian Federation

d) military-political, military-strategic, military-tactical foundations for ensuring the security of the Russian Federation

6. Choose what determines Air Force tactics:

a) solves the problem of determining the activities of commanders and staffs during the conduct of hostilities

b) determines the content, nature and patterns of combat, develops methods (forms) of preparing and conducting combat

c) determines the role and place of each kind of wax in battle and, based on the combat properties and capabilities, establishes the order and methods of combat use

d) there is no correct answer

7. The theory and practice of preparing and conducting military operations on land, at sea, in the air and in near-Earth space is ...

a) strategy

b) operational art

c) military art

d) tactics

8. An integral part of military art, its highest area, covering the theory and practice of providing military security countries, including the prevention of war, the preparation of the country and the Armed Forces to repel aggression, the planning and conduct of strategic operations and war in general - this is ...

a) strategy

b) operational art

c) military art

d) tactics

9. An integral part of military art, the theory and practice of preparing and conducting military operations of an operational scale (operations, battles) by associations of the branches of the Armed Forces is ...

a) strategy

b) operational art

c) military art

d) tactics

10. An integral part of military art, covering the theory and practice of preparing and conducting combat by subunits, units and formations of various types of the Armed Forces, military branches and special forces is ...

a) strategy

b) operational art

c) military art

d) tactics

11. Select the full list of types of military conflicts when classifying wars by scale:

a) internal

b) large scale

c) regional

d) external

e) interstate

f) local

By what type are modern wars with the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction classified?

a) for military-political purposes

b) according to the means used

c) by scale

13. Border conflict is a special form:

a) an armed incident

b) local war

c) armed conflict

d) armed action

14. What kind of war can be the result of an escalation of a local war or an armed conflict and be waged with the participation of two or more states (groups of states) of one region?

a) local

b) regional

c) large scale

“Forties, fatal,” said a famous poet, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, about the first half of the “forties”. But for the ideological atmosphere of Soviet society, the second half of this decade also turned out to be fatal. Yudin B.G. Methodological analysis as a direction in the study of science. M., 1986

The price of victory is, of course, the key problem in the history of the War. However, our historiography still reduces matters only to the meaning of victory. The ideas known from wartimes, “what a war without victims”, “war will write off everything”, “winners are not judged”, have not yet been outlived. Whatever the victims, the great minds of that time, expressing their opinion, unlike the opinion of the ruling elite, or a simple soldier who gave his life for the future of his homeland, or in general a simple person. And although today it is already difficult to convince anyone that there were no gross miscalculations by the leadership of the USSR on the eve and during the war, unjustified repressions against workers of science and the intelligentsia, we often still try to combine good and evil in its history under lofty words " heroic and tragic. Science played an exceptional role and the exceptional courage of the army and people, their ability to surpass the enemy in science, technology and the art of war. Until now, the exact number of dead military personnel, dead in the camps of scientists, shot oppositionists is unknown. Although during the Great Patriotic War it was science that made a significant contribution to the development of the defense potential of the USSR. In the second half of 1941, 182 corresponding members of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 76 research institutes, which included 118 academicians and thousands of researchers, were evacuated to the east. Their activities were directed by the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences, relocated to Sverdlovsk. In the city of Sverdlovsk, in May 1942, at the general meeting of the academy, the tasks that confronted scientists during the war were discussed. The leading areas of scientific research were the development of military-technical problems, scientific assistance to industry, and the mobilization of raw materials, for which intersectoral commissions and committees were created. So, at the end of 1941, a commission was created to mobilize the resources of the Urals, which also oversees the reserves of Siberia and Kazakhstan. The commission was headed by academicians Baykov A.A., Bardin I.P., Strumilin S.G., Pavlov M.A. , casting high quality steel, obtaining a new standard of rolling. Somewhat later, a special commission of scientists headed by academician E.A. Chudakov made important proposals for mobilizing the resources of the Volga and Kama regions. Thanks to the scientists geologists A.E. Fersman, K.I. Satpaev, Obruchev V.A. and other scientists, new deposits were explored iron ore in Kuzbass. New sources of oil were found in Bashkiria, as well as a molybdenum ore deposit in Kazakhstan. The contribution of mathematicians P.S. Alexandrova, S.N. Bernstein, I.M. Vinogradova, N.I. Muskhelishvili. Physicists A.F. actively worked for the defense. Ioffe, S.I. Vavilov, P.L. Kapitsa, L.I. Mandelstam, chemists N.D. Zelinsky, I.V. Grebenshchikov, A.N. Nesmeyanov, A.E. Favorsky, N.N. Semenov. Scientists A.P. Aleksandrov, B.A. Gaev, A.R. Regel and others successfully solved the problem of mine protection for ships. In 1943, the technology for separating plutonium from irradiated uranium was developed. In the autumn of 1944, under the leadership of Academician I.V. Kurchatov, a version of the atomic bomb with a spherical detonation "inside" was created, and at the beginning of 1945 a plutonium production plant was launched. Scientists of the Soviet Union at that time achieved significant success in the field of biology, medicine and agriculture. They found new vegetable types of raw materials for industry, sought out ways to increase the yield of food and industrial crops. So, in the eastern regions of the country, the cultivation of sugar beet was urgently mastered. Of great importance was the activity of medical scientists such as N.N. Burdenko, A.N. Bakuleva, L.A. Orbeli, A.I. Abrikosov, including S.S. Yudin and A.V. Vishnevsky and others, who introduced into practice new methods and means of treating sick and wounded soldiers. V.K.Modestov doctor medical sciences made a number of important defense inventions, including the replacement of absorbent cellulose wool, the use of turbine oil as the basis for the manufacture of ointments and other materials. A necessary condition for successful development National economy country was the continuous training of new personnel in universities and technical schools. In 1941, the number of universities decreased from 817 thousand to 460 thousand, admission to them was halved, the number of students decreased by 3.5 times, and the terms of study ranged from 3 to 3.5 years. However, by the end of the war, the number of students, especially as a result, increased with the admission of women and approached the pre-war level. Yudin B.G. Methodological analysis as a direction in the study of science. M., 1986.

During the war years, although it was very difficult, the creators of weapons and military equipment. Particular attention was paid to improving the quality of artillery systems and mortars. In this area, great merit belongs to scientists and designers V. G. Grabin, I. I. Ivanov, M. Ya. Krupchatnikov, and others. Success in production small arms were achieved with the leading role of designers N. E. Berezina, V. A. Degtyarev, S. G. Simonov, F. V. Tokarev, G. S. Shpagin. Also, Soviet scientists managed to reduce the time for the development and implementation of new types of weapons many times over. Thus, the well-established 152 howitzer was designed and manufactured in 1943 in 18 days, and its mass production was mastered in 1.5 months. Where has this been seen! About half of all types small arms and the vast majority of new types of artillery systems in service with active army in 1945, were created and launched in a series during the war. The calibers of tank and anti-tank artillery have almost doubled, and the armor penetration of shells has increased by about 5 times. The USSR surpassed Germany in terms of the average annual production of field artillery by more than 2 times, mortars by 5 times, and anti-tank guns by 2.6 times. Through the efforts of Soviet tank builders, especially the workers and engineers of the Ural "Tankograd", the enemy's advantage in armored vehicles was relatively quickly overcome. By 1943, the preponderance of the Soviet Armed Forces in tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts began to grow. Domestic tanks and self-propelled guns in their combat characteristics significantly exceeded foreign analogues. A huge merit in their creation belonged to N.A. Astrov, N.L. Dukhov, J. Ya. Kotin, M. I. Koshkin, V.V. Krylov, N.A. Kucherenko, A.A. Morozov, L.S. Troyanov and others. Since the second half of 1942, the production of aircraft and aircraft engines has been steadily increasing. The Il-2 attack aircraft became the most massive aircraft of the Soviet Air Force. Most of the Soviet combat aircraft outperformed the aircraft of the German Air Force. During the war, 25 aircraft models (including modifications), as well as 23 types of aircraft engines, entered mass production. Aircraft designers, M.I. Gurevich, S.V. Ilyushin, S.A. Lavochkin, A.I. Mikoyan, V.M. Myasishchev, V.M. Petlyakov, N.N. Polikarpov, P.O. Dry, A.N. Tupolev, A.S. Yakovlev, creators of aircraft engines, V. Ya. Klimov, A. A. Mikulin, S. K. Tumansky.

military science

a system of knowledge about the preparation and conduct of war by states, coalitions of states or classes to achieve political goals. Soviet V. n. explores character possible wars, laws of war and methods of its conduct. It develops the theoretical foundations and practical recommendations on the organizational development of the Armed Forces, their preparation for war, determines the principles of military art, the most effective forms and methods of conducting military operations by groupings of the Armed Forces, as well as their comprehensive support. Based on political goals, assessments of a potential enemy and one's own forces, scientific and technological achievements and economic capabilities of the state and its allies, V. n. in unity with practice determines ways to improve existing and create new means armed struggle. The constituent parts of modern Soviet V. n. are: the theory of military art (See Military art) (strategy, operational art and tactics), which develops provisions and recommendations for the preparation and conduct of military operations; theory of the construction of the Armed Forces, which studies the issues of their organization, technical equipment, recruitment and mobilization; theory of military training and education of personnel of the Armed Forces; theory of party-political work in the Armed Forces; the theory of military economy, which studies the use of material, technical and financial means to ensure the activities of the Armed Forces; military geography (see military geography); Military History, studying the history of wars and the art of war; military-technical sciences, with the help of which various types of weapons, military equipment and means of material support of the Armed Forces are developed. Soviet V. n. serves the interests of the armed defense of the Soviet socialist state. It is based on Marxist-Leninist theory and relies on the progressive Soviet state and social system, the leading and guiding force of which is the CPSU.

The fundamental difference between bourgeois V. n. from Soviet V. n. lies in its reactionary ideological basis and class essence. Bourgeois V. n. serves both the aggressive foreign and reactionary domestic policies of the ruling exploiting classes of the capitalist states; is in the service of an aggressive imperialist policy directed chiefly against the socialist countries and the national liberation movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The modern scientific and technological revolution causes intensive differentiation and integration of scientific knowledge, which leads to the emergence of new branches, directions and disciplines in most sciences. A similar process is natural for V. n. V.'s development n. occurs on the basis of a generalization of the historical experience of waging wars, an analysis of all types of practical activities of troops in peacetime, foresight of the development of new means of war and probable forms and methods of waging it in the future, a comprehensive study of a potential adversary, as well as trends in the development of international relations.

V. n. evolved and developed over a long historical period. Its elements originated in antiquity, when during the period of the slave-owning society in Egypt, Persia, China, Greece and Rome, generals and military theorists raised and resolved some issues related to strategy, tactics, military geographical conditions, organization and education of troops, as well as analyzed and summarized the experience of battles and campaigns. V. n. continued to develop in the Middle Ages. As the productive forces of society grew, weapons and military equipment improved, command and control of troops and military art in general became more complicated, and military historical experience accumulated. All this ultimately led to the design of V. n. as a certain system of knowledge.

The formation of bourgeois V. n. modern military researchers attribute it to the 18th and early 19th centuries, when the rapid development of the political, economic, and natural sciences began on the basis of the developing capitalist mode of production. At this time, military theory was further developed in various countries. One of the first representatives of foreign bourgeois V. n. in the 18th century was the English General G. Lloyd. He outlined some general fundamentals theory of war, pointed out the connection of war with politics and emphasized the importance of the moral and political factor. However, he believed that V. n. applicable only to prepare the army for war. The course and outcome of the war, in his opinion, depend entirely on the genius of the commander, since this area has no regularities and, therefore, is not related to military science.

Serious progress in the development of Russian V. n. at the beginning of the 18th century. associated with the name statesman and commander Peter I, who carried out military reforms, created a regular army and navy. Peter I was the creator of the new "Military Regulations", which outlined the generalized experience of the battles and battles carried out, issues of military administration and education of military personnel. He laid the foundation for an independent Russian national military school. Great contribution to V. n. introduced by major military leaders of Russia in the second half of the 18th century. P. A. Rumyantsev, A. V. Suvorov and F. F. Ushakov. Rumyantsev paid much attention to improving the organization of the Russian army, increasing its mobility and improving the combat training of troops. He introduced the principle of decisive battle as the main way to achieve victory. Rumyantsev's work "Rite of Service" (1770) was adopted as the charter of the Russian army, and his "Memorandum to Catherine II on the organization of the army" (1777) formed the basis for further improvement in the organization of the army. Suvorov had a great influence on the formation of the military art of the Russian army, on improving the training and education of troops. He sharply opposed the cordon strategy and linear tactics that dominated the West. In his "The Science of Victory" (1795-96), Suvorov developed a number of important rules on military training, indoctrination and combat operations. Ushakov developed and put into practice new forms and methods of military operations at sea, which proved the advantages of maneuverable offensive tactics over linear tactics that dominated foreign fleets.

The experience of wars in defense of the Great French Revolution had a decisive influence on military theory. V. I. Lenin pointed out: “Just as inside the country the French revolutionary people then for the first time showed a maximum of revolutionary energy unprecedented for centuries, so in the war of the end of the 18th century they showed the same gigantic revolutionary creativity, recreating the entire system of strategy, breaking all the old laws and the customs of war and creating, instead of the old troops, a new, revolutionary, people's army and a new conduct of the war ”(Poln. sobr. soch., 5th ed., vol. 32, pp. 79-80). A significant contribution to the theory and practice of military art was made by the French commander Napoleon I. He gave a more harmonious organization to divisions and corps, sharply reduced the convoys, thanks to which the army acquired greater mobility. The main goal of military operations, Napoleon I set the defeat of the enemy's manpower in one pitched battle, constantly sought to destroy the enemy in parts, achieving maximum superiority of forces in the direction of the main attack.

In the development of Russian V. n. The military skill of M. I. Kutuzov, who managed to defeat one of the first-class armies of the early 19th century, was of great importance. - the army of Napoleon I. Among the military theorists of the 18th - early 19th centuries. in Germany, a prominent place was occupied by G. D. Bulow, who made an attempt to theoretically generalize everything new that was created in the era of the Great French Revolution. He correctly believed that military strategy is subject to politics and fulfills its requirements, but he did not understand the class content of politics. V. n. he divided into strategy and tactics and thus reduced it to only the art of war.

The development of bourgeois V. n. 1st half of the 19th century is closely connected with the names of A. Jomini (a Swiss by birth) and K. Clausewitz (a German theorist), who served in the Russian army for a considerable time and made full use of its experience in their historical and theoretical works. Jomini believed that military art could and should have its own scientific theory, but at the same time he recognized the dominance in military art of the “eternal principles” inherent in wars of all times, and thus deprived the theory he created of a genuine scientific basis. He erroneously asserted that the influence of politics on strategy is limited only to the moment of making a decision, and that in the course of a war, strategy allegedly does not depend on politics. The theoretical provisions of Jomini, his ideas, which emphasized the importance of military theory, found followers in various armies of the world. The merit of Clausewitz lies in the fact that he deeply revealed the connection between war and politics and many phenomena of war (the nature and essence of war, armed forces, offensive, defense, war plan, etc.). He attached great importance to the material, geographical and moral factors in the war, as well as the role of the commander. Being a bourgeois military thinker, Clausewitz could not reveal the class content of politics, defined it as an expression of the interests of the whole society and did not connect it with classes and class struggle.

The question of the subject and content of V. n. constantly attracted the attention of Russian military theorists. Back in 1819, Major General I. G. Burtsev, in his article “Thoughts on the Theory of Military Knowledge” (see Military Journal, book 2, 1819, pp. 55, 63), pointed out the connection between politics and war, believed that V. n. cannot be limited to the framework of military art and must include in its subject the study of regularities in military affairs. Major-General A. I. Astafiev in his work “On Modern Military Art” (part 1, 1856) also believed that the subject of military science was wider than martial arts. Astafiev criticized Lloyd, Bulow and other foreign military theorists for their desire to turn the art of war into a code of immutable rules. Prominent Russian military theorists of the second half of the 19th century who influenced the development of military science were Minister of War D. A. Milyutin, Admiral G. I. Butakov, generals G. A. Leer, M. I. Dragomirov, Rear Admiral S. O. Makarov. Under the leadership of Milyutin, military reforms of the 1860-70s were carried out in Russia. aimed at overcoming backwardness and routine in the army. In the work "The First Experiences of Military Statistics" (1847-48), Milyutin was the first in V. n. outlined the basics of military statistics (military geography). Butakov in his work "New Foundations of Steamship Tactics" (1863) summarized the experience of combat operations of ships of the steam fleet and proposed rules for their restructuring in a squadron for naval combat. These rules have received recognition in all fleets of the world. Leer recognized the unity of politics and strategy with the leading role of the former. In the works Notes of Strategy (1867), Method of Military Sciences (1894), Applied Tactics (1877-80), Leer critically summarized the most common views on solving many issues of strategy and tactics and developed a military theory based on a generalization of military historical experience. Dragomirov widely covered issues of tactics, education and training of troops. His Textbook of Tactics (1879) served as the main textbook at the Academy of the General Staff for 20 years. Makarov's work had a significant impact on the development of domestic and foreign naval thought. Makarov's book Discourses on Naval Tactics (1897) was the first major work on the naval tactics of a steam-powered armored fleet. At the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries. definition of the subject V. n. given in Russian encyclopedias - "Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Sciences" (vol. 2, 1885) and "Military Encyclopedia" (vol. 6, 1912); the latter defines that “military science is engaged in a comprehensive study of wars. It studies: 1) phenomena in the life of society and 2) forces, means and methods for waging a struggle" (p. 476).

In the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries. With the further development of technology, means of communication, means of communication, with the advent of more advanced weapons for the ground forces and the armored steam navy, the strategy, tactics of the ground forces, and naval art are intensively developed. The complication of command and control required the creation of general staffs, which began to determine the general direction of development of military-theoretical views, military science. generally. Assessing the military capabilities of both their own and other states, they to a certain extent influenced the policy of their states.

Along with the development of bourgeois V. n. in the 2nd half of the 19th century. the foundations of VN began to be laid, which considered phenomena from a dialectical-materialist point of view. The discovery by Marx and Engels of the materialistic understanding of history produced a revolutionary revolution in the social sciences, including the military one. For the first time, the dependence of the methods of waging war, the organization of the army, its weapons, strategy and tactics on the nature of the economic system of society and its political superstructure was scientifically revealed. F. Engels was one of the first Marxist military theorists; his works are devoted to the development of the doctrine of war and the army, their origin and class essence, questions of military science. and the history of military art. The manuscript "Possibilities and preconditions for the war of the Holy Alliance against France in 1852" outlines the theoretical provisions on the development of military art in various socio-economic formations, and especially in the period of the proletarian revolution and classless society. The proletarian revolution, as Marx and Engels showed, requires the destruction of the old, bourgeois state apparatus and the creation of a new, and consequently new, socialist military organization in the interests of the armed defense of the dictatorship of the proletariat. For the New American Encyclopedia, Engels for the first time gave a materialistic coverage of the history of military theory and practice, showed the dependence of the development of military art on the growth of productive forces, the development of social relations and on major revolutionary upheavals in society. In contrast to the then prevailing theory of the "free role of the commander," Engels formulated the law: "... the entire organization of armies and the methods of combat used by them, and along with this victory and human material and from weapons, therefore - from the quality and quantity of the population and from technology ”(Marx K. and Engels F., Soch., 2nd ed., vol. 20, p. 175).

Great influence on the development of bourgeois V. n. had the 1st World War 1914-18. In the course of this war, military-technical means of combat continued to be improved, new types of troops appeared (aviation, tank, chemical troops); rich experience was gained in the field of organization of wars, operational art and tactics. After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution main task bourgeois V. n. began the development of methods of waging war, ensuring the rapid defeat of the Soviet state and the revolutionary movement in their countries.

In the 20-30s. 20th century theories of warfare were created, which took into account the possibility of equipping the armies with qualitatively new, more effective military equipment and replacing man with machine. The bourgeois military theories of the "small army" (J. Fuller, Liddell Hart - in Great Britain, H. Seeckt - in Germany) and "air warfare" (J. Douhet - in Italy, Mitchell - in the USA) were widely known at that time. . Fuller first laid out his views in Tanks in the Great War 1914-1918. (1923). It overestimates the role of technology and underestimates the role of man. The theory of "air warfare" assigned the decisive role in the war to the air fleet. It was believed that the achievement of victory in the war could be ensured only by gaining air supremacy, after which the air fleet should quickly crush the resistance of the enemy country with broad offensive operations. The ground forces were assigned only occupying functions in a country that had been destroyed by aviation.

V. n. Nazi Germany was aimed mainly at developing the theory of "blitzkrieg", which provided for a surprise attack and the rapid advance of tank groups with the support of aviation in order to "blitzkrieg" defeat the enemy. The plans of German imperialism, calculated to win world domination, were based on the theory of "total war", previously developed by the military ideologist of German imperialism, E. Ludendorff. He believed that such a war would be of a lightning-fast nature, but in its scope would cover the entire territory of the warring states, and in order to achieve victory, it was necessary to participate in the war not only of the armed forces, but of the entire people. In French V. n. the concept of “positional warfare” dominated: defense was considered more effective than offensive. Great hopes were placed on the long-term structures of the Maginot Line and the Belgian fortified areas. The basis of warfare was considered a continuous front, based on a developed system of fortification. In the United States and Great Britain, the theory of "sea power" was most widely used, according to which the main attention was paid to the fleet as the most important branch of the armed forces.

After the Great October Socialist Revolution, Soviet military science began to take shape. It was based on the provisions of Marxism-Leninism on war and the army, developed by Lenin in relation to the new conditions of the era of imperialism. He revealed the economic basis of wars and gave their classification. Lenin pointed out that “... there are wars, just and unjust, progressive and reactionary, wars of advanced classes and wars of backward classes, wars that serve to consolidate class oppression, and wars that serve to overthrow it” (Poln. sobr. soch., 5 ed., vol. 38, p. 337).

Based on a generalization of the experience of armed uprisings of the proletariat and wars of the era of imperialism, Lenin developed many questions of Marxist military theory: on the decisive role of the masses of the people, economic and moral-political factors in modern war, about the connection of military organization and military art with the social and state system, the state and development of military equipment, about the patterns, methods and forms of military operations, about the unity of political and military leadership in war. He created a coherent and coherent doctrine of a new type of army and the defense of the socialist Fatherland, pointed out specific ways of building the Soviet Armed Forces, developed the principles of training and education of soldiers in the army and navy, unity of the army and people, front and rear, leadership of the Communist Party of the Armed Forces, centralism, unity of command and collective leadership, efficiency in command and control of troops, control over execution, selection and placement of personnel, and conscious military discipline. Lenin taught us to take a creative approach to solving problems of protecting the socialist Fatherland, to take into account the real balance of our forces and the forces of potential opponents, economic and socio-political factors, and the state of the Armed Forces. In developing the theoretical foundations of military development, Lenin wrote that "... without science, a modern army cannot be built..." (ibid., vol. 40, p. 183). During the Civil War, Lenin was directly involved in directing military operations. During these years, the formation and development of Soviet V. n. The works of V. I. Lenin, as well as his practical activities, are of inestimable importance for the development of Soviet military science. The Marxist-Leninist principles of purposefulness, activity, determination, courage, combined with the high art of conducting military operations, were of great importance in all the military victories of the Soviet people.

A great contribution to the development of Soviet V. n. made by prominent military figures of the Soviet state: M. V. Frunze, M. N. Tukhachevsky, B. M. Shaposhnikov, as well as N. E. Varfolomeev, V. K. Triandafillov, V. A. Alafuzov, I. S. Isakov and others. An advanced Soviet military-theoretical school gradually took shape. A special role belongs to Frunze's works The Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army, The Front and the Rear in the War of the Future, and others. the basics of training and education of personnel of the Armed Forces, etc. In his three-volume work "The Brain of the Army" (vols. 1-3, 1927-29), B. M. Shaposhnikov analyzed a large historical material, showed the role and functions of the General Staff, put forward valuable proposals on the theory of military strategy, the development of war plans and strategic leadership. In 1929, V. K. Triandafillov’s work “The Character of the Operations of Modern Armies” was published, in which the author made a deep scientific analysis of the state and development prospects of the armies of that time, revealed the patterns of their technical equipment and organization. Triandafillov noted the increased role of tanks and considered them one of the most powerful offensive means of a future war. He studied the offensive and defensive capabilities of a division, corps, army, army group, the approach of troops to the battlefield, the initiation and conduct of the battle, the duration and depth of the operation. In 1930-37, M. N. Tukhachevsky published military-theoretical articles on the nature of a future war, on the foundations of strategy and operational art, both in theory and in practice. Tukhachevsky proved that new forms of deep battle were emerging. He defended the provisions on the inseparable connection of military art with the social system of the country and its production base, studied the initial period of the future war.

An outstanding achievement of Soviet V. n. was the development of the theory of a deep offensive operation, the foundations of which were set forth in the Instructions for Conducting a Deep Battle (1932). This theory contributed to the way out of the positional impasse created during the First World War. Soviet military theory received concrete expression in the Provisional Field Manual of the Red Army (1936). The charter emphasized the decisive nature of Soviet military art: creating superiority over the enemy in the main direction, the interaction of all branches of the military, surprise and speed of action, skillful maneuvering. In recommendations for the development of the Armed Forces, Soviet military-theoretical thought proceeded from the likelihood of a war with fascist Germany and its allies. A deep analysis of the state and prospects for the development of the Armed Forces of a potential adversary allowed Soviet military science. it is reasonable to assume that the war will be tense and prolonged and will require the mobilization of the efforts of the entire people, the country as a whole. The main type of strategic actions was considered to be an offensive, ensuring a decisive defeat of the enemy on his territory. The defense was assigned a subordinate role as a forced and temporary phenomenon, ensuring the subsequent transition to the offensive.

In the views on the initial period of the war, Soviet V. n. proceeded from the fact that wars are not declared in the modern era and that aggressive states tend to surprise attacks on the enemy. Under these conditions, military operations from the very beginning will take the form of decisive operations and will be predominantly maneuverable. However, positional forms of struggle in some theaters of military operations and strategic directions were not excluded. Soviet V. n. an important place was given to the development of the theory of the use in operations of the air force, mechanized formations and methods of conducting modern warfare at sea.

Great Patriotic War 1941-45 showed that developed by the Soviet V. n. views on the nature and methods of military operations were basically correct. From the beginning of the war, it became necessary to further develop such important problems of the theory of Soviet military art and practice of conducting operations as the leadership of the Armed Forces in the situation of the initial period of the war, in the context of general mobilization, the deployment of groupings of the Armed Forces and the transfer of the national economy to a war footing, as the centralization of control groupings of the Armed Forces operating in various theaters of military operations (directions), and coordination of their efforts. The war enriched the Soviet Armed Forces with vast combat experience. In the course of it, the following problems were comprehensively developed: the choice of the direction of the main attack, taking into account not only the provisions of the theory of military art, but also the requirements of politics and economics; organizing and conducting a strategic offensive and strategic defense; breaking through the enemy's strategic front; strategic use of the branches of the Armed Forces and coordination of their efforts to jointly solve important strategic tasks; covert creation, use and restoration of strategic reserves; use of the factor of strategic surprise; organizing and conducting operations to encircle and destroy large enemy groupings; leadership of the partisan movement, etc. The high level of Soviet military art was especially clearly manifested in the battles near Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk, in operations in the Right-Bank Ukraine and in Belarus, Iasi-Kishinev and Vistula-Oder, Berlin and Manchuria.

The American and British armed forces during the years of the 2nd World War gained experience in strategic bombing, large-scale air operations and combat operations at sea; conducting operations by field armies and army groups in cooperation with large aviation forces, mainly in conditions of overwhelming superiority over the enemy. V. n. questions were developed: conducting large-scale amphibious landing operations with the participation of ground forces, navy, aviation and airborne assault forces; organization of strategic coalition leadership of troops; planning and ensuring operations, etc.

Postwar development of Soviet V. n. relied on a generalization of the experience of World War II and followed the line of further improvement of the theory of military art, taking into account the development of armaments, combat equipment, and the organization of the Armed Forces. A great contribution to the development of the theoretical foundations of V. n. and the practice of military art during the war years and in the post-war period was introduced by Soviet military leaders, commanders and naval commanders who advanced during the war, theoretical scientists, generals, admirals and officers of the General Staff, the Main Staffs of the Armed Forces and the headquarters of the armed forces, military educational institutions, military scientific bodies, headquarters of formations and units of the army, aviation and navy.

V.'s development n. in the most developed countries characterized by studies of a wide range of problems associated with the emergence in the 50s. 20th century nuclear weapons, which caused a change in the nature of war, methods and forms of warfare, new methods of training and education of personnel. The role has increased psychological preparation soldiers and officers to the war, the development of methods of propaganda and counter-propaganda in the conditions of "psychological warfare", etc. (see Military psychology).

In various capitalist countries V. n. develops differently. The most extensive development in the 2nd half of the 20th century. it received in such capitalist powers as the USA, Great Britain, France. Other capitalist countries in the area of ​​V. n. borrow a lot from them.

Soviet V. n. in the postwar years, she developed new theoretical views on the nature of a future war, on the role and significance of the branches of the Armed Forces and means of armed struggle, and on methods of conducting battles and operations. It became obvious that the war, if it could not be prevented, would be waged by qualitatively new means. beneficial effect on the development of Soviet V. n. provided the provisions of the Program of the CPSU, decisions and documents of party congresses and plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The role and significance of economic, socio-political and moral-psychological factors in achieving victory in modern warfare have been deeply studied. Soviet V. n. revealed and substantiated the nature of a possible future world war and created a theoretical basis for the formation of a modern military doctrine of the state.

The aggressive policy of the imperialist states, their preparation for a new war against the countries of socialism, and the unrestrained arms race demand from Soviet military science. further development of effective ways to ensure the constant high readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces to defeat any aggressor.

Lit.: Marks K. Civil War in France, K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch., 2nd ed., vol. 17; Engels F., Chosen. military works, M., 1958, pp. 3-29, 195-305, 623-49; Lenin V.I., The Fall of Port Arthur, Poln. coll. soch., 5th ed., v. 9; his, Revolutionary Army and Revolutionary Government, ibid., vol. 10; his, Lessons of the Moscow uprising, ibid., vol. 13; his, Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution, ibid., vol. 30; his own, Impending catastrophe and how to deal with it, ibid., vol. 34; his same, Seventh emergency Congress of the Russian Communist Party(b), ibid., v. 36; his own, vol. 38, p. 139; v. 39, p. 45-46; v. 41, p. 81; Program of the CPSU, M., 1967, part 2, sec. 3; Marxism-Leninism about the war and the army, 5th ed., M., 1968, p. 262-80, 288-300; Methodological problems of military theory and practice, M., 1966; Malinovsky R. Ya., On guard of the Motherland, M., 1962; 50 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR, M., 1968, p. 520-27; Frunze M.V., Unified military doctrine and the Red Army, M., 1965; Tukhachevsky M.N., Izbr. Prod., vol. 2, 1964, p. 3-8, 180-198; Zakharov M. V., On the scientific approach to the leadership of troops, M., 1967; Milstein M.A., Slobodenko A.K., On bourgeois military science, 2nd ed., M., 1961. See also lit. to articles

In the Renaissance in culture, rational, philosophical and scientific ideas again come to the fore, as in the era of antiquity, from the point of view of which medieval concepts begin to be rethought. Other important feature Renaissance culture - a new understanding of man. The Renaissance man no longer recognizes himself as a creature of God, but as a free master, placed in the center of the world, who, by his own will and desire, can become either a lower or a higher being. Although a person recognizes his Divine origin, he himself feels himself a creator.

Both of these features of the Renaissance culture also lead to a new understanding of nature, science and human action. Natural laws gradually take the place of Divine laws, hidden natural processes take the place of hidden Divine forces, processes and energies, and created and creative nature turns into the concept of nature as a source of hidden natural processes that obey the laws of nature. Science and knowledge are now understood not only as describing nature, but also as revealing and establishing its laws. In this case, the identification of the laws of nature is only partly their description, more importantly, the identification of the laws of nature presupposes their constitution. In the concept of the law of nature, ideas of creation, as well as similarities between the natural and the human (nature is fundamentally cognizable, its processes can serve man) are visible.

Finally, a necessary condition for human activity aimed at using the forces and energies of nature is a preliminary knowledge of the "laws of nature." Another necessary condition is the definition of human triggering actions, so to speak, releasing, triggering the processes of nature. However, the Renaissance only creates the prerequisites for the formation of science in its modern sense, and its worldview foundations and methodological principles are formulated in the works of philosophers of the New Age. F. Bacon declares nature the main object of the new science and the condition for practical (engineering) action that produces " new nature", a source of natural processes, however, caused (launched) by practical actions of a person. From this period, an understanding of nature begins to form as an endless reservoir of materials, forces, energies that a person can use, provided that he describes the laws of nature in science. This is how the foundations for the formation engineering attitude to the world.

The main components of engineering activity are design and design. Design is a type of engineering work that is carried out in various areas of human activity: in the design of technical systems, design, clothing modeling, etc. In engineering, design is an obligatory part of the design process and is associated with the development of the design of a technical system, which then materializes during manufacturing in production . Design includes analysis and synthesis various options designs, their calculations, execution of drawings, etc. The development of design options is usually associated with the formulation and solution of problems of technical creativity. At the level of design, the implementation of a technical idea takes place within the framework of experimental design, which is associated with the formulation and solution of problems of technical creativity. In the design process, a drawing of a technical product or system is created, specific specifications and specific implementation conditions are fixed (nature of the material, productivity, degree of environmental friendliness, economic efficiency, etc.). The result of design development - technical product, finished construction. Design is combined with the development of appropriate technological conditions, i.e. methods and technical conditions for the implementation of a particular model. Therefore, design is associated with technology, which reveals the mechanism for organizing the process for the production of a particular product. Design - the activity of a person or organization to create a project, that is, a prototype, a prototype of a proposed or possible object, state; a set of documentation designed to create a specific object, its operation, repair and liquidation, as well as to verify or reproduce intermediate and final solutions on the basis of which this object was developed.

Specialized knowledge was required for engineering activities. At first, it was knowledge of two kinds - natural science (selected or specially constructed) and actually technological (description of structures, technological operations, etc.). As long as it was about individual inventions, there were no problems. However, starting from the 18th century, industrial production and the need to replicate and modify invented engineering devices (steam boilers and spinning machines, machine tools, engines for steamships and steam locomotives, etc.) took shape. The amount of calculations and design increases dramatically due to the fact that more and more often an engineer is dealing not only with the development of a fundamentally new engineering object (i.e. invention), but also with the creation of a similar (modified) product (for example, a machine of the same class, but with other characteristics - different power, speed, dimensions, weight, design, etc.). In other words, the engineer is now busy both creating new engineering objects and developing a whole class of engineering objects similar to those invented. In a cognitive sense, this meant the emergence of not only new problems due to the increased need for calculations and design, but also new opportunities. The development of the field of homogeneous engineering objects made it possible to reduce one case to another, one group of knowledge to another. If the first samples of an invented object were described using knowledge of a certain natural science, then all subsequent, modified ones were reduced to the first samples. As a result, certain groups of natural science knowledge and schemes of engineering objects begin to stand out (reflect) - those that are combined by the reduction procedure itself. In fact, these were the first knowledge and objects of technical sciences, but not yet existing in their own form: knowledge in the form of grouped natural science knowledge participating in information, and objects in the form of engineering object diagrams, to which such groups of natural science knowledge belonged. Two other processes were superimposed on this process: ontologization and mathematization.

Ontologization is a step-by-step process of schematization of engineering devices, during which these objects were divided into separate parts and each was replaced by an "idealized representation" (scheme, model). For example, in the process of invention, calculations and design of machines (lifting, steam, spinning, mills, clocks, machine tools, etc.) by the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries, they were divided, on the one hand, into large parts (for example, J. Christian singled out the engine, transmission mechanism, tool) in the car), and on the other hand, into smaller ones (the so-called "simple machines" - an inclined plane, block, screw, lever, etc.). Such idealized representations were introduced in order to apply to an engineering object, on the one hand, mathematical knowledge on the other hand, natural sciences. In relation to an engineering object, such representations were schematic descriptions of its structure (or the structure of its elements), in relation to natural science and mathematics, they specified certain types of ideal objects (geometric figures, vectors, algebraic equations, etc.; motion of a body along an inclined planes, addition of forces and planes, body rotation, etc.).

The replacement of an engineering object with mathematical models was necessary both in itself as a necessary condition for the invention, design and calculation, and as a stage in the construction of the ideal objects of natural science necessary for these procedures.

Overlapping each other, the three main processes described here (information, ontologization and mathematization) lead to the formation of the first ideal objects and theoretical knowledge of technical science.

The further development of technical science took place under the influence of several factors. One factor is the reduction of all new cases (i.e. homogeneous objects of engineering activity) to those already studied in technical science. Such a reduction presupposes the transformation of objects studied in technical science, the acquisition of new knowledge (relations) about them. Almost from the first steps in the formation of technical science, the ideal of organization of fundamental science was extended to it. In accordance with this ideal, the knowledge of relations was treated as laws or theorems, and the procedures for obtaining it were treated as proofs. Carrying out the proofs implied not only the reduction of new ideal objects to the old ones already described in the theory, but also the division of knowledge acquisition procedures into compact, visible parts, which always entails the allocation of intermediate knowledge. Similar knowledge and objects, resulting from the splitting of long and cumbersome proofs into simpler (clearer ones), formed the second group of knowledge of technical science (in the theory itself, of course, they did not separate into separate groups, but alternated with others). The third group included knowledge that made it possible to replace cumbersome methods and procedures for obtaining relations between the parameters of an engineering object with simple and elegant procedures. For example, in some cases, cumbersome transformation procedures and information obtained in two layers are greatly simplified after the original object is replaced first with the help of equations of mathematical analysis, then in graph theory, and transformations are carried out in each of the layers. It is characteristic that the successive replacement of the object of technical science in two or more different languages ​​leads to the fact that the corresponding divisions and characteristics of such languages ​​(more precisely, their ontological representations) are projected onto the object. As a result, several types of characteristics are "fused" (through the mechanism of reflection and awareness) in the ideal object of technical theory: conductors, resistances, capacitances and inductances, and all these elements are interconnected in a certain way); b) characteristics directly or indirectly transferred from fundamental science (knowledge of currents, voltages, electrical and magnetic fields, as well as the laws that bind them); c) characteristics taken from the mathematical language of the first, second ..., n-th layer (for example, in the theory of electrical engineering they talk about the very general interpretation Kirchhoff equations given in the language of graph theory). All these characteristics in the technical theory are so modified and rethought (some incompatible ones are omitted, others are changed, others are attributed, added from the outside) that a fundamentally new object arises - the actually ideal object of technical science, which in its structure recreated in a compressed form all of the listed types characteristics. The second process that significantly influenced the formation and development of technical science is the process of mathematization. From a certain stage in the development of technical science, researchers move from the use of individual mathematical knowledge or fragments of mathematical theories to the use of entire mathematical apparatuses (languages) in technical science. They were driven to this by the need to carry out, in the course of invention and design, not only analysis, but also the synthesis of individual processes and the structural elements that provide them. In addition, they sought to explore the entire field of engineering possibilities, i.e. we tried to understand what other characteristics and relations of an engineering object can be obtained, what calculations can, in principle, be made. During the analysis, the research engineer seeks to gain knowledge about engineering objects, describe their structure, functioning, individual processes, dependent and independent parameters, relationships and relationships between them. In the process of synthesis, on the basis of the performed analysis, he constructs and conducts the calculation (however, the operations of synthesis and analysis alternate, defining each other).

What are the conditions for the use of mathematical apparatus in the technical sciences? First of all, for this it is necessary to introduce the ideal objects of technical sciences into the ontology of the corresponding mathematical language, i.e. represent them as consisting of elements, relations and operations characteristic of objects of mathematics of interest to the engineer. But, as a rule, the ideal objects of technical science differed significantly from the objects of the chosen mathematical apparatus. Therefore, a long process of further schematization of engineering objects and ontologization begins, ending with the construction of such new ideal objects of technical science that can already be introduced into the ontology of a certain mathematics. From this moment, the research engineer gets the opportunity to: a) successfully solve the problems of synthesis-analysis, b) explore the entire area of ​​engineering objects under study for theoretically possible cases, c) reach the theory of ideal engineering devices (for example, the theory of an ideal steam engine, the theory of mechanisms , the theory of radio engineering devices, etc.). The theory of an ideal engineering device is the construction and description (analysis) of a model of engineering objects of a certain class (we called them homogeneous), made, so to speak, in the language of ideal objects of the corresponding technical theory. An ideal device is a construction that a researcher creates from the elements and relationships of ideal objects of technical science, but which is precisely a model of engineering objects of a certain class, since it imitates the main processes and constructive formations of these engineering devices. In other words, not just independent ideal objects appear in technical science, but also independent objects of study of a quasi-natural nature. The construction of such model structures greatly facilitates engineering activities, since the research engineer can now analyze and study the main processes and conditions that determine the operation of the engineering object he creates (in particular, the ideal cases themselves).

If we now briefly summarize the considered stage in the formation of technical sciences of the classical type, we can note the following. The impetus for the emergence of technical sciences is the emergence as a result of the development industrial production areas of homogeneous engineering objects and application in the course of inventions, design and calculations of knowledge of natural sciences. The processes of information, ontologization and mathematization determine the formation of the first ideal objects and theoretical knowledge of technical science, the creation of the first technical theories. The desire to apply not individual mathematical knowledge, but entirely certain mathematicians, to explore homogeneous areas of engineering objects, to create engineering devices, so to speak, for the future leads to the next stage of formation. New ideal objects of technical sciences are being created, which can already be introduced into mathematical ontology; on their basis, systems of technical knowledge are developed and, finally, the theory of the "ideal engineering device" is created. The latter means the appearance in the technical sciences of a specific quasi-natural object of study, i.e. technical science finally becomes independent.

The last stage in the formation of technical science is connected with the conscious organization and construction of the theory of this science. By extending the logical principles of scientific character developed by the philosophy and methodology of sciences to the technical sciences, researchers identify in the technical sciences the initial principles and knowledge (the equivalent of the laws and initial provisions of fundamental science), derive secondary knowledge and provisions from them, and organize all knowledge into a system. However, unlike natural science, technical science also includes calculations, descriptions of technical devices, and methodological instructions. The orientation of representatives of technical science towards engineering forces them to indicate the "context" in which the provisions of technical science can be used. Calculations, descriptions of technical devices, methodological instructions just define this context.

Technical sciences were formed in close interaction with the development engineering education. Let's consider this process on the example of Russia.

Technical education in Russia was initiated by the Engineering (1700) and Mathematical and Navigation Schools (1701). The teaching methodology was more of a craft apprenticeship: practical engineers explained to individual students or small groups of students how to build one or another type of structure or machine, how to carry out practically one or another type of engineering activity. New theoretical information was communicated only in the course of such explanations, the textbooks were descriptive. At the same time, the profession of an engineer was becoming more complex and practice made new demands on the training of qualified engineering personnel.

Only after the founding by G. Monge in 1794 of the Paris Polytechnic School, which from the very beginning of its foundation was oriented towards high theoretical training of students, did the situation in engineering education change. Many engineering educational institutions in Germany, Spain, Sweden, and the USA were built on the model of this school. In Russia, on its model, in 1809 the Institute of the Corps of Railway Engineers was created, the head of which was appointed Monge's student A.A. Betancourt. He developed a project, in accordance with which schools were established for the training of secondary technical personnel: a military construction school and a school for conductors of communications in St. Petersburg. Later (in 1884) this idea was developed and implemented by the outstanding Russian scientist, member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences I.A. Vyshnegradsky, according to whose idea technical education should be extended to all stages of industrial activity, higher schools, preparing engineers, secondary, preparing technicians (the closest assistants to engineers), and schools for craftsmen, factory and factory workers. To late XIX century scientific training engineers, their special, namely higher technical education, become urgently needed. By this time, many trade, secondary technical schools were transformed into higher technical schools and institutes, in which much attention was paid to the theoretical training of future engineers.

In addition to educational institutions, the dissemination of technical knowledge was aimed at various technical societies. For example, the Russian Technical Society, formed in 1866, in accordance with its charter, had the goal of promoting the development of technology and the technical industry in Russia both "through readings, meetings and public lectures on technical subjects" and through "petitions to the government for adoption measures that may have a beneficial effect on the development of the technical industry.

Questions for control and self-examination:

1. What are the reasons for the emergence and separation of technical sciences?

2. Describe the main characteristics of the classical technical sciences.

3. How is the formation and development of technical sciences related to engineering education?