Roman Alekhin airborne troops history of the Russian landing. Airborne troops

In addition to parachute units and formations, in the airborne troops, ground forces (SV) of the USSR Armed Forces there were also air assault units and formations, but they were subordinate to the commander of the troops of military districts (groups of troops), armies or corps. They did not differ in anything, except for tasks, subordination and OShS. Methods of combat use, combat training programs for personnel, weapons and uniforms for military personnel were the same as for paratrooper units and formations of the Airborne Forces (central subordination). Air assault formations were represented by separate air assault brigades (ODSHBr), separate air assault regiments (ODSHP) and separate air assault battalions (ODSHB).

The reason for the creation of air assault units in the late 60s was the revision of tactics in the fight against the enemy in the event of a full-scale war. The stake was placed on the concept of using massive landings in the near rear of the enemy, capable of disorganizing the defense. The technical possibility for such a landing was provided by the fleet of transport helicopters in army aviation, which had significantly increased by this time.
By the mid-80s, the USSR Armed Forces included 14 separate brigades, two separate regiments and about 20 separate battalions. The brigades were deployed on the territory of the USSR according to the principle - one brigade per one military district, which has land access to the State border of the USSR, one brigade in the inner Kiev Military District (23 ODSHBr in Kremenchug, subordinate to the High Command of the southwestern direction) and two brigades for groups of Soviet troops abroad (35 ODShBr in the GSVG in the city of Cottbus and 83 ODShBr in the SGV in the city of Bialogard). 56 Guards. The ODShBr in OKSVA, stationed in the city of Gardez of the Republic of Afghanistan, belonged to the Turkestan Military District, in which it was formed.
Individual air assault regiments were subordinate to the commanders of individual army corps.
The difference between the parachute and airborne assault formations of the Airborne Forces was as follows:
- In the presence of standard airborne armored vehicles (BMD, BTR-D, self-propelled guns "Nona", etc.). In the airborne assault units, only a quarter of all units were equipped with it - in contrast to 100% of its staffing in the paratrooper units.
- In the subordination of the troops. Airborne assault units, operationally, were subordinate to the command of military districts (groups of troops), armies, and corps. The parachute units were subordinate to the command of the Airborne Forces, whose headquarters was in Moscow.
- In the assigned tasks. It was assumed that the air assault units, in the event of the start of large-scale hostilities, would be used to land in the enemy's near rear, mainly by helicopter landing method. Parachute units were supposed to be used in a deeper rear of the enemy with a parachute landing from VTA aircraft. At the same time, airborne training with planned training parachute landings of personnel and military equipment was mandatory for both types of airborne forces.
- Unlike the Guards parachute units of the Airborne Forces deployed to the full state, some air assault brigades were cadre (special staff) and were not guards. The exception was three brigades that received the names of the Guards, created on the basis of the 105th Vienna Red Banner Guards Airborne Division disbanded in 1979 - the 35th, 38th and 56th.
In the mid-80s, the following brigades and regiments were part of the Airborne Forces of the USSR Armed Forces: 9
- 11 ODShbr in Zabaykalsky IN ( Zabaykalsky Krai Mogocha and Amazar),
- 13 ODShBr in the Far Eastern Military District (Amur Region, Magdagachi and Zavitinsk),
- 21 ODShBr in the Transcaucasian Military District (Georgian SSR, Kutaisi),
- 23 ODShbr of the South-Western direction (on the territory of the Kyiv Military District), (Ukrainian SSR, Kremenchug),
- 35gv. ODSHBR in the Group Soviet troops in Germany (German Democratic Republic, Cottbus),
- 36 ODShBr in the Leningrad Military District ( Leningrad region, village Garbolovo),
- 37 ODShbr in the Baltic VO ( Kaliningrad region, Chernyakhovsk),
- 38 Guards. ODSHBr in the Belorussian Military District (Belarusian SSR, Brest),
- 39 ODShBr in the Carpathian Military District (Ukrainian SSR, Khyriv),
- 40 ODSHBr in Odessa Military District (Ukrainian SSR, Nikolaev),
- 56 Guards. ODShBr in the Turkestan Military District (formed in the city of Chirchik, Uzbek SSR and introduced into Afghanistan),
- 57 ODShBr in the Central Asian Military District (Kazakh SSR, Aktogay township),
- 58 ODSHBr in the Kiev Military District (Ukrainian SSR, Kremenchug),
- 83 ODShBr in the Northern Group of Forces, (Polish People's Republic, Bialogard),
- 1318 ODSHP in the Belarusian Military District (Belarusian SSR, Polotsk) subordinate to the 5th separate army corps.
- 1319 ODSHP in the Trans-Baikal Military District (Chita region, Kyakhta) subordinate to the 48th separate army corps.
These brigades included a command, 3 or 4 air assault battalions, one artillery battalion and combat support units and logistic support. The personnel of the deployed brigades reached 2,500 military personnel. For example, the staff strength of the 56th Guards. On December 1, 1986, the ODShBr consisted of 2,452 military personnel (261 officers, 109 ensigns, 416 sergeants, 1,666 soldiers).
The regiments differed from the brigades in the presence of only two battalions: one paratrooper and one air assault (on the BMD), as well as a somewhat reduced composition of the regimental units.

AT Afghan war from the airborne and air assault formations of the USSR Armed Forces, one airborne division (103rd Guards Airborne Division), one separate airborne assault brigade (56th Guards ODSHBr), one separate parachute regiment(345th Guards OPDP) and two air assault battalions as part of separate motorized rifle brigades (66 separate motorized rifle brigade and 70 motorized rifle brigade). In total, for 1987, these were 18 "linear" battalions (13 paratroopers and 5 airborne assaults), which accounted for a fifth of the total number of all "linear" OKSVA battalions (which included another 18 tank and 43 motorized rifle battalions) .

Training of officers for the airborne troops.

Officers were trained by the following military educational establishments in the following military registration specialties (VUS):
- Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School - commander of an airborne (airborne assault) platoon, commander of a reconnaissance platoon.
- Landing Department of the Ryazan Higher Military Automobile Engineering School - commander of an automobile / transport platoon.
- Landing Department of the Ryazan Higher Military Command School of Communications - commander of a communications platoon.
- Airborne Department of the Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined Arms School - Deputy Company Commander for Political Affairs ( educational work).
- Landing Department of the Kolomna Higher Artillery Command School - commander of an artillery platoon.
- Airborne Department of the Leningrad Higher Anti-Aircraft Missile Command School - commander of an anti-aircraft missile platoon.
- Landing department of the Kamenetz-Podolsky Higher Military Engineering Command School - commander of an engineering platoon.
In addition to graduates of these educational institutions, in the Airborne Forces they were often appointed to the positions of platoon commanders, graduates of higher combined arms schools (VOKU) and military departments, who prepared for the commander of a motorized rifle platoon. This was due to the fact that the specialized Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School (RVVDKU), which produced an average of about 300 lieutenants every year, was not able to fully meet the needs of the Airborne Forces (at the end of the 80s they had about 60,000 personnel ) in platoon commanders. For example, the former commander of the 247th Guards. RAP, Hero Russian Federation Em Yuri Pavlovich, who began his service in the Airborne Forces as a platoon commander, graduated from the Alma-Ata Higher Combined Arms Command School.
For a long time, military personnel of units and units of the Special Forces (the so-called now army special forces) were mistakenly and deliberately called paratroopers. This is due to the fact that in the Soviet period, as now, there were no troops in the Russian Armed Forces special purpose, but there were and are units and units of the Special Purpose (SpN) of the GRU of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. The phrase “special forces” or “commandos” was mentioned in the press and in the media only in relation to the troops of a potential enemy (“Green Berets”, “Rangers”, “Commandos”).
Starting with the emergence of these units in the USSR Armed Forces in 1950 until the end of the 80s, the existence of such units and units was completely denied. Up to the point that conscripts learned about their existence only when they were accepted into the personnel of these units and units. Officially, in the Soviet press and on television, units and units of the Special Forces of the GRU of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces were announced either as parts of the Airborne Forces - as in the case of the GSVG (officially there were no Special Forces units in the GDR), or as in the case of OKSVA - separate motorized rifle battalions (OMSB). For example, the 173rd Separate Special Purpose Detachment (173 OOSpN), stationed near the city of Kandahar, was called the 3rd Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion (3 OMSB).
In everyday life, servicemen of subunits and units of the Special Forces wore full dress and field uniforms adopted in the Airborne Forces, although they did not belong to the Airborne Forces either in terms of subordination or in terms of the assigned tasks of reconnaissance and sabotage activities. The only thing that united the Airborne Forces and units and units of the Special Forces was most of officers - graduates of the RVVDKU, airborne training and possible combat use behind enemy lines.

Acquisition

To create and staff the "second wave" of air assault units, it was decided to disband the 105th Guards Airborne Division and the 80th Guards. pdp 104th airborne division. Officers and soldiers of military districts and groups of troops were sent for resupplying. So, the 36th brigade was formed on the basis of the 237th guards infantry regiment (it was cadred), which allocated officers and units of the Leningrad Military District; 38th Vienna - based on the officers of the headquarters of the 105th Guards Airborne Division, as well as officers and soldiers of the military unit of the Belarusian Military District.
In the air assault units of the military districts, most of the officers were from the military districts: for the airborne troops, only commanders were selected from the airborne forces, the rest from the districts; in the odshb groups of troops, the deputy battalion commander was added to the battalion commander, as well as, in part, the company commanders. To staff the newly created units, in 1979, in military schools training officers for the Airborne Forces, recruitment was increased, and from 1983-84. already most of the officers went to the DShV being trained under the Airborne Forces program. Basically, they were appointed to the Oshbr of groups of troops, less often - to the Oshbr of districts, and even less often to the Oshb. In 1984-85. officers were shuffled in groups of troops - almost all officers were replaced in the DShV. All this increased the percentage of airborne officers (plus - replacements in Afghanistan). But at the same time, the most prepared graduates of military schools and academies were always distributed in the Airborne Forces.
With regard to recruitment by conscripts, the same medical requirements and other selection rules were applied to the DShCh as for the Airborne Forces. The most healthy and physically developed draft contingent was singled out. High selection requirements (height - not less than 173 cm; physical development - not lower than average; education - not lower than average, no medical restrictions, etc.) led to fairly high opportunities for combat training.
Unlike the Airborne Forces, which had their own large "Gayzhunai training" - the 44th Airborne Division; The DShV were staffed with junior commanders and specialists who had mostly graduated from the training divisions of the Ground Forces and, to a lesser extent, from the Gaizhunai "training school", the air assault battalion of the 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade was also replenished from the Fergana "training school, military unit 52788

16.02.2018, 13:30

For more than a quarter of a century, the village of Magdagachi was the landing capital of the Amur region. Thousands of Soviet, and later Russian guys went through a difficult soldier's school in the 13th Airborne Assault Brigade. At one time, such units cooled the ardor of those who wanted to unleash the Third World War in the Far East. On August 2, veterans of the brigade can be found not only on the streets of Blagoveshchensk, but also in many cities throughout the post-Soviet space. Even decades later, they reverently pronounce the name of Pavel Borisovich Gladshtein. It was he, a Stalingrad boy and a pupil of Vasily Margelov himself, who stood at the origins of the foundation of the famous military unit. Today he is 90, but he continues to live according to the laws of the main motto of the Airborne Forces: "No one but us!"

Stay in line

Pavel Borisovich Gladshtein starts every day with a check Email. Despite his venerable age, he remains an active Internet user. He likes to Skype with colleagues from all over the former Soviet Union, and his Odnoklassniki account is a page of memories. Veterans of the 13th air assault brigade recognize each other decades later, remember how they saw each other off to Afghanistan and slept with weapons in Damansky's troubled days.

In this rhythm, he lives for two decades. It was then, in the year of his 70th birthday, that his relatives gave him a computer. They say they noticed some kind of sadness in the eyes of their father and grandfather. They hit, as they say, the bull's-eye - the signs of boredom instantly evaporated. The active landing nature of Pavel Borisovich allowed not only to quickly understand high technologies himself, but also to teach computer literacy to children and grandchildren. Staying in the ranks is his life credo, implicated in the German bombing and service under the flags of the Airborne Forces.

Childhood in kerosene solution

Stalingrad, the boiling Volga and tanks going out of the gates of the tractor factory. 14-year-old Pavel watched this picture from the workshop and clearly understood: tomorrow the equipment, lined and crumpled, would be dragged back again. And he, together with the same juvenile volunteers, will restore it. They were instructed to bring tank fuel pumps to mind. I had to customize every detail, wash it in a kerosene solution.

In 1994, the 13th Magdagachin Airborne Assault Brigade was relocated to Orenburg. A year later, its units entered into battle with Dudayev's militants in Chechnya.

The fighting took place on the very outskirts of the city, and the boys, exhausted by hard work, received a cup of porridge for lunch, a glass of tea, and by the end of the 12-hour shift, they literally fell off their feet. Bread in the city has long been issued in limited portions. Workers received 800 grams per day, non-workers - half as much. After work, he ran home, had a hasty supper, and went to spend the night in the basement with his mother and sisters. The Germans regularly bombed the boiler room next to the house. The tall chimney was taken as a landmark.

— Incendiary bombs were constantly dropped on the roofs of houses. If you do not put out the fire in time, then nothing will save you from the fire. Therefore, adults were on duty on the roofs and attics. They picked up German "lighters" with large metal tongs, threw them into barrels of water, - Pavel Borisovich recalls his childhood. - In the morning they left the basement and did not know if our apartment was intact. They got together and went back to their jobs. I got to the plant straight from school. In May 1942 he graduated from the seventh grade. A representative of the enterprise came and said bluntly - men are at the front, there are not enough workers. My friends and I got together and went to forge victory.

Simple General Uncle Vasya

The Margelov family left Stalingrad the day before the arrival of the Germans. Father, the head of a large trust, was given the task of taking the plant's equipment to the Urals at any cost. On the Baikal-Amur Mainline, railroad tracks were urgently dismantled, the rails were taken to Stalingrad. Of these, they built a road that led straight from the workshop to the Volga. There is a train ferry. The last echelon of the enterprise crossed to a safe shore, and the next day, fighting was already going on throughout the city.

At Yurga station Kemerovo region machines were installed directly in the open air. The son of a big boss, Pavel Gladshtein, worked as a locksmith. Two years after the victory, he graduated from a technical school and became a specialist in the production of artillery systems. He returned to his native destroyed Stalingrad, in order to literally escape from it after a while.

The management of the Barrikady plant, where Pavel Gladshtein headed the workforce, saw him as a promising specialist. When did he mention desire military career, threats immediately poured in. He was frightened by the court for unwillingness to restore National economy- after the war, every specialist was worth its weight in gold. Pavel fled to Kyiv, entered the military school of self-propelled artillery.

He dreamed of volleys of guns, but, to his own surprise, he was assigned to the Airborne Forces. At first, however, I had a chance to serve in my specialty: in the 125th Kostroma Guards Airborne Division there was a self-propelled artillery division. However, less than a year later, the artillery had to say goodbye. On April 1, 1952, Lieutenant Gladshtein was sent to the Far East. The joke was successful. The new duty station was Kuibyshevka-Vostochnaya, now Belogorsk, Amur Region. The airborne corps was stationed here under the command of Vasily Margelov himself.

- Hero of the Soviet Union, lieutenant general, founder of the Airborne Forces ... A person who is honored in all respects and at the same time completely easy to communicate with. I was worried before talking with him, and he meets every young officer, explains to him in an accessible way the specifics of service in the Far East. Himself in an ordinary cap and a flight leather jacket without shoulder straps, - Pavel Borisovich recalls the details of the historical meeting.

Fall on the enemy's head

At the end of the sixties of the last century, the newspapers wrote little about the events on the Soviet-Chinese border. Soviet citizens lived ordinary life, and only the military understood what the complication of the situation was fraught with. The summer of 1968 in the border areas of the Union turned out to be restless, less than a year remained before the main bloodshed on Damansky Island.

Against this background, paratrooper officers began to arrive in the Amur village of Magdagachi from all over the country. They were entrusted with a serious task - to cover 400 kilometers state border. The lane of responsibility is from Erofey Pavlovich station to Shimanovskaya station. The theater of possible military operations of unprecedented extent, even before the combined arms formations, such tasks have never been set.

The emphasis was on high mobility and a completely new type landing units. They had to land on small military transport helicopters and operate in the near rear of a potential enemy. Simply put, fall directly on the enemy's head.

- In July 1968, the chief of staff of the 98th Guards Svir Red Banner Airborne Division Mikhail Timofeevich Reznikov was summoned to the General Staff. We set the task of forming a separate airborne assault brigade. Everything hinged on lack of time. The brigade had to be formed at an accelerated pace,” Pavel Gladshtein describes the events of the alarming 1968.

He was among the first officers who arrived at the Magdagachi station. I did not even imagine that his fate would be connected with the 13th Airborne Assault Brigade for more than ten years. The older generation of paratroopers remember this brave major, who two years later became chief of staff, and then led the brigade. It was a powerful mobile fist, which included mortar, anti-aircraft, anti-tank and even howitzer units. Only people with rich worldly and military experience could effectively command such a formation.

We have nothing to fear

In March 1969, the snow of Damansky was saturated with the blood of soldiers and officers. However, the matter never came to the Third World War. The enemy did not have to jump on his head. On the other side of the Amur, they knew perfectly well what kind of reception would be prepared in the event of a full-scale aggression.

In Stalingrad, after work, Pavel ran home, had a hasty supper and, together with his mother and sisters, went to spend the night in the basement. The Germans regularly bombed the boiler room next to the house.

In July 1978, the commander of the Far Eastern Military District, General of the Army Tretyak, conducted exercises with the troops of the 35th Army (Amur Region). The 13th ODShBR was alerted and ordered to advance to the area, which was located 300 kilometers from the place of permanent deployment.

- Paratroopers on Mi-8 and Mi-6 helicopters landed in the indicated areas and took up defense. At the analysis of the exercises, the commander noted that the brigade participated in such exercises for the first time and coped with its tasks. Score 13th ODSHBR - good. The rest of the formations of the 35th Army are satisfactory, ”recalls Pavel Borisovich. - After the analysis of the exercises, the commander called me and said that he would not sign my resignation letter, which I filed in connection with the 50th anniversary. I must serve until a candidate for the position of brigade commander is determined. It was only found two years later.

OPINION

Clara Gladshtein, wife of Pavel Borisovich, famous Amur restaurateur:

- Despite his venerable age, Pavel Borisovich remains an indisputable authority for all family members. In addition to two children, he has six grandchildren and as many great-grandchildren. He is demanding of everyone, but first of all to himself, therefore he is always collected and obligatory. He is never late anywhere and teaches loved ones to do the same. He real example for imitation, well versed in all life issues. You can talk to him on political topics and receive purely worldly advice.

Pavel Borisovich still drives a car, he has very strong, confident hands that can fix anything in the house. He lives without resentment for life and claims to his own difficult fate. He follows all the events in the country and the world and knows for sure that as long as there are Airborne Troops in Russia, we have nothing to fear.

History of DShB 13 ​

None of the spheres of human activity develops as dynamically and rapidly as military affairs. There are new types of weapons, tactics and even types of armed forces. The Soviet Union can be called the birthplace of the Airborne Forces. Similar units existed in other armies of the world, but nowhere was this type of troops given so much attention.

At the end of the 30s of the last century, landing corps were formed in the USSR, each of which had a strength of more than 10 thousand people. The landing force was considered the elite of the army, the most skilled and trained fighters served in it. The airborne troops took part in the most important battles against the Nazi invaders; several large-scale airborne operations were carried out during the war.

After the war, the Airborne Forces became separate view troops, they reported directly to the Minister of Defense of the USSR. An important milestone in the development of this type of troops was the creation in the mid-60s of air assault units, which were subordinate to the command of military districts. The air assault units did not have any other special differences from the usual parts of the Airborne Forces (weapons, uniforms, training programs).

The history of the creation of the 13th ODShBr

The idea to form air assault units was born after a revision of the tactics of the Airborne Forces in the event of a full-scale war. Soviet strategists decided to rely on the use of massive landings in the immediate rear of the enemy, which were supposed to completely disorganize his defenses.

At that time, the army had a significant fleet of transport aircraft (primarily helicopters) and could perform a similar task. It was planned that the air assault units would land in the immediate rear of the enemy from helicopters and operate in small groups. Parachute troops were supposed to be used in the deep rear of the enemy, landing them by parachute.
In 1969, two airborne assault brigades were formed in the Far Eastern District: the 11th and 13th Airborne Brigade, each of which had a helicopter regiment. In the event of a war, these units were to operate in hard-to-reach areas.

The region in which the 13th Airborne Brigade was deployed gave a complete picture of what a "hard-to-reach area" is. The cities of Magdagachi and Zavitinsk, where the unit was located, can be safely called one of the most severe corners of the Soviet Union. You have to be there to fully understand it.

The temperature in summer often reached +40 degrees, and in winter the thermometer dropped to -55 degrees. Daily temperature fluctuations sometimes reached 30-35 degrees. And in these conditions it was necessary not only to live, but also to conduct high-quality combat training of paratroopers. Not in vain, in translation from the Evenk language, the name "Magdagachi" means "place of dead trees."

Brigade Combat Training

To become a paratrooper, you need not only strength and endurance. The landing party always fights in extremely harsh conditions, behind enemy lines, without the support of the main forces, the supply of ammunition and the evacuation of the wounded. You have to rely only on yourself. Therefore, every paratrooper must be a skilled fighter.

In the 13th ODShBr, much attention was paid to the constant honing of the combat skills of military personnel, not forgetting about physical training. The 13th Air Assault Brigade has always been one of the exemplary units Far Eastern District, only paratroopers from the 11th ODShBr could compete with it.

A lot of attention was paid to the combat training of military personnel from the air assault brigades for a reason: the Far East was the territory of a possible conflict. Nearby was the border with China, with which the USSR had very tense relations. In 1969, the confrontation between the two countries led to a border conflict on Damansky Island, which almost became the beginning of big war. So the paratroopers were preparing at any moment to repel enemy attacks.

A clear confirmation high level training of fighters of the 13th ODShBr began the exercises with a landing on the island of Iturup, which took place in August 1988. The brigade was given the task of landing a landing group consisting of two battalions and a battery of mountain artillery on the island. The landing took place from Mi-6 and Mi-8 helicopters.

Helicopters Mi-6 (left) and Mi-8 (right).

Suddenly, fire was opened on the first landing group with live ammunition, it was fired from the guard of the air defense point that covered the airfield on the island. It turned out that due to bad weather, the garrison was not warned about the upcoming exercises. Only thanks to the excellent training and good training of the paratroopers there were no casualties.

After this incident, the leadership of the brigade received a commendation from the Minister of Defense Yazov, and the 13th Airborne Brigade was awarded a pennant.

Last years

In the late 80s, the country began to change rapidly, and in 1991 the USSR ceased to exist. The "dashing" 90s began. Of course, the armed forces could not remain aloof from these processes. Numerous reorganizations were carried out, funding was significantly cut, many parts were simply disbanded.

Already in August 1990, the 13th Airborne Brigade was withdrawn from the command of the Far Eastern District and subordinated directly to the headquarters of the Airborne Forces in Moscow. The air assault brigade became the 13th separate airborne brigade (13 OVDBr). Two artillery batteries (anti-tank and mountain) were disbanded, they were replaced by a division of D-30 howitzers.

At the end of 1996, the 13th OVDBr was disbanded. This happened according to the plan to reduce the airborne forces.

Airborne troops are one of the strongest components of the army of the Russian Federation. In recent years, due to the tense international situation, the importance of the Airborne Forces has been growing. The size of the territory of the Russian Federation, its landscape diversity, as well as the borders with almost all conflict states, indicate that it is necessary to have a large supply of special groupings of troops that can provide the necessary protection in all directions, which is the air force.

In contact with

Because air force structure extensive, the question often arises of the Airborne Forces and the DSB are the same troops? The article understands the differences between them, history, goals and military training both organizations, composition.

Differences between troops

The differences lie in the names themselves. The DShB is an air assault brigade organized and specializing in attacks on the enemy's close rear in the event of large-scale military operations. Air assault brigades subordinate to the Airborne Forces - airborne troops, as one of their divisions and specialize only in assault seizures.

Airborne Forces are landing troops, whose tasks are the capture of the enemy, as well as the capture and destruction of enemy weapons and other air operations. The functionality of the Airborne Forces is much wider - reconnaissance, sabotage, assault. For a better understanding of the differences, consider the history of the creation of the Airborne Forces and the Airborne Forces separately.

History of the Airborne Forces

The Airborne Forces began its history in 1930, when an operation was carried out near the city of Voronezh on August 2, where 12 people parachuted from the air as part of a special unit. This operation then opened the eyes of the leadership to new opportunities for paratroopers. The following year, based Leningrad Military District, a detachment is being formed, which received a long name - airborne and consisted of about 150 people.

The effectiveness of the paratroopers was obvious and the Revolutionary Military Council decides to expand it by creating airborne troops. The order saw the light at the end of 1932. In parallel, in Leningrad, instructors were trained, and later they were distributed to the districts by special-purpose aviation battalions.

In 1935, the military district of Kyiv demonstrated to foreign delegations the full power of the Airborne Forces, arranging an impressive landing of 1200 paratroopers, who quickly captured the airfield. Later, similar exercises were held in Belarus, as a result of which the German delegation, impressed by the landing of 1,800 people, decided to organize their own airborne detachment, and then a regiment. In this way, The Soviet Union is rightfully the birthplace of the Airborne Forces.

In 1939, our landing troops there is an opportunity to show themselves in practice. In Japan, the 212th brigade was landed on the Khalkin Gol River, and a year later the 201st, 204th and 214th brigades will be involved in the war with Finland. Knowing that the Second World War would no longer pass us by, 5 air corps of 10 thousand people each were formed and the Airborne Forces acquired a new status - guards troops.

The year 1942 was marked by the largest airborne operation during the war years, which took place near Moscow, where about 10 thousand paratroopers were dropped into the German rear. After the war, it was decided to attach the Airborne Forces to the Supreme High Command and appoint the commander of the Airborne Forces of the USSR SV, this honor falls to Colonel General V.V. Glagolev.

Big innovations in airborne troops came with "Uncle Vasya". In 1954 V.V. Glagolev is replaced by V.F. Margelov and holds the post of commander of the Airborne Forces until 1979. Under Margelov, the Airborne Forces are supplied with new military equipment, including artillery installations, combat vehicles, special attention is paid to work under the conditions of a surprise attack by nuclear weapons.

Airborne units took part in all the most significant conflicts - the events of Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, North and South Ossetia. Several of our battalions carried out UN peacekeeping missions in Yugoslavia.

In our time, the ranks of the Airborne Forces include about 40 thousand fighters, when conducting special operations - paratroopers form its basis, since the Airborne Forces are a highly qualified component of our army.

The history of the formation of the DShB

Air assault brigades began their history after it was decided to rework the tactics of the Airborne Forces in the context of the unleashing of large-scale hostilities. The purpose of such air defenses was to disorganize opponents by mass landings close to the enemy, such operations were most often carried out from helicopters in small groups.

Toward the end of the 60s in the Far East, it was decided to form the 11th and 13th brigades with helicopter regiments. These regiments were involved mainly in hard-to-reach areas, the first attempts at landings took place in northern cities Magdachi and Zavitinsk. Therefore, in order to become a paratrooper of this brigade, strength and special endurance were needed, since weather were almost unpredictable, for example, in winter the temperature reached -40 degrees, and in summer there was abnormal heat.

The location of the first DShB not just because the Far East was chosen. It was a time of difficult relations with China, which became even more aggravated after the clash of interests on the island of Damascus. The brigades were ordered to prepare to repel an attack from China, which could attack at any time.

The high level and significance of the DSB was demonstrated during exercises in the late 80s on the island of Iturup, where 2 battalions and artillery landed on MI-6 and MI-8 helicopters. The garrison, due to weather conditions, was not warned about the exercises, as a result of which they opened fire on the landers, but thanks to the highly qualified training of the paratroopers, none of the participants in the operation was injured.

In the same years, the DSB consisted of 2 regiments, 14 brigades, about 20 battalions. One brigade attached to one military district, but only to those who had access to the border by land. Kyiv also had its own brigade, 2 more brigades were given to our units located abroad. Each brigade had an artillery battalion, rear and combat units.

After the USSR ceased to exist, the country's budget did not allow the mass maintenance of the army, so there was nothing left to do but to disband some parts of the DSHB and the Airborne Forces. The beginning of the 90s was marked by the withdrawal of the DSB from the subordination of the Far East and the transfer to full subordination to Moscow. Air assault brigades are being transformed into separate airborne brigades - 13 OVDbr. In the mid-90s, the plan to reduce the Airborne Forces disbanded the composition of the 13th Airborne Brigade.

Thus, from the foregoing, it can be seen that the DSB was created as one of the structural divisions of the Airborne Forces.

Composition of the Airborne Forces

The composition of the Airborne Forces includes the following units:

• airborne;
• air assault;
• mountain (which operate exclusively on mountain hills).

These are the three main components of the Airborne Forces. In addition, they consist of a division (76.98, 7, 106 Guards Air Assault), brigades and regiments (45, 56, 31, 11, 83, 38 Guards Airborne). In Voronezh, a brigade was created in 2013, which received the number 345.

Personnel of the Airborne Forces prepared in educational institutions military reserve of Ryazan, Novosibirsk, Kamenetz-Podolsk, in Kolomenskoye. The training was conducted in the areas of paratrooper (airborne assault) platoon, commanders of reconnaissance platoons.

The school produced about three hundred graduates annually - this was not enough to satisfy the personnel requirements of the airborne troops. Consequently, it was possible to get into the military personnel of the Airborne Forces by graduating from the landing faculties in special areas of such schools as combined arms and military departments.

Training

The commanders of the DShB were most often selected from the Airborne Forces, and the battalion commanders, deputy battalion commanders, company commanders from the nearest military districts. In the 70s, due to the fact that the leadership decided to repeat their experience - to create and staff the DShB, the planned enrollment in educational institutions is expanding who trained future officers of the Airborne Forces. The mid-80s were marked by the fact that officers were issued for service in the Airborne Troops, having been trained according to the educational program for the Airborne Forces. Also in these years, a complete rearrangement of officers was underway, it was decided to replace almost all of them in the DShV. At the same time, excellent students went to serve mainly in the Airborne Forces.

To get into the service in the Airborne Forces, as in the DSB, you must meet specific criteria:

• height 173 and above;
• average physical development;
• secondary education;
• without medical restrictions.

If everything matches, then the future fighter begins training.

Particular attention is paid, of course, to the physical training of airborne paratroopers, which is carried out constantly, begins with a daily rise at 6 in the morning, hand-to-hand combat ( special program training) and ends with long forced marches of 30–50 km. Therefore, each fighter has a huge endurance and endurance, besides, guys who were engaged in any kind of sport that develops that very endurance are selected into their ranks. To check it, they pass an endurance test - in 12 minutes a fighter must run 2.4-2.8 km, otherwise there is no point in the Airborne Forces service.

It is worth noting that it is not for nothing that they are called universal fighters. These people can operate on various terrains in any weather conditions absolutely silently, can disguise themselves, own all types of weapons of both their own and the enemy, manage any type of transport, means of communication. In addition to excellent physical training, psychological is also required, since the fighters have to overcome not only long distances, but also “work with their heads” to get ahead of the enemy, throughout the entire operation.

Intellectual fitness is determined using tests compiled by experts. It is mandatory to take into account psychological compatibility in the team, the guys are included in a certain detachment for 2-3 days, after which the old-timers evaluate their behavior.

Psychophysical training is being carried out, which implies tasks with increased risk, where there is both physical and mental stress. Such tasks are aimed at overcoming fear. At the same time, if it turns out that the future paratrooper does not experience, in general, a feeling of fear, then he is not accepted for further training, since this feeling is quite naturally taught to control him, and not completely eradicated. Airborne training gives our country a huge advantage in the face of fighters over any enemy. Most of the VDVeshnikov lead an already familiar lifestyle even after retirement.

Armament of the Airborne Forces

Concerning technical equipment, combined arms equipment and specially designed for the nature of this type of troops are involved in the Airborne Forces. Some of the samples were created during the USSR, but the bulk was developed after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

To cars Soviet period relate:

• landing combat vehicle - 1 (the number reaches - 100 units);
• BMD-2M (about 1 thousand units), they are used both in ground and in parachute landing methods.

These techniques were tested over many years and took part in multiple armed conflicts that took place on the territory of our country and abroad. In our time, in conditions of rapid progress, these models are outdated both morally and physically. A little later, the BMD-3 model came out, and today the number of such equipment is only 10 units, since production has been discontinued, they plan to gradually replace it with the BMD-4.

The Airborne Forces are also armed with armored personnel carriers BTR-82A, BTR-82AM and BTR-80 and the most numerous tracked armored personnel carrier - 700 units, and it is also the most outdated (mid-70s), it is gradually being replaced by an armored personnel carrier - MDM "Rakushka". There are also anti-tank guns 2S25 "Sprut-SD", an armored personnel carrier - RD "Robot", and anti-tank systems: "Competition", "Metis", "Fagot", and "Cornet". air defense represented by missile systems, but a special place is given to the novelty, which not so long ago appeared in service with the Airborne Forces - the Verba MANPADS.

Not so long ago, new models of technology appeared:

• armored car "Tiger";
• Snowmobile A-1;
• truck KAMAZ - 43501.

As for communication systems, they are represented by locally developed Leer-2 and 3 electronic warfare systems, Infauna, system management is represented by air defense"Barnaul", "Andromeda" and "Flight-K" - automation of command and control.

Weapon represented by samples, for example, the Yarygin pistol, the PMM and the PSS silent pistol. The Soviet Ak-74 assault rifle is still the personal weapon of the paratroopers, but is gradually being replaced by the latest AK-74M, and the silent Val assault rifle is also used in special operations. There are both Soviet and post-Soviet parachute systems that can parachute large batches of soldiers and all the military equipment described above. Heavier equipment includes automatic grenade launchers AGS-17 "Flame" and AGS-30, SPG-9.

Armament DShB

DShB had transport and helicopter regiments which included:

• about twenty mi-24s, forty mi-8s and forty mi-6s;
• the anti-tank battery was armed with a mounted anti-tank grenade launcher 9 MD;
• the mortar battery included eight 82mm BM-37s;
• in the anti-aircraft missile platoon, there were nine Strela-2M MANPADS;
• also included several BMD-1s, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers for each airborne assault battalion.

The armament of the brigade-artillery group consisted of GD-30 howitzers, PM-38 mortars, GP 2A2 cannons, the Malyutka anti-tank missile system, SPG-9MD, anti-aircraft gun ZU-23.

Heavier equipment includes automatic grenade launchers AGS-17 "Flame" and AGS-30, SPG-9 "Spear". Aerial reconnaissance is carried out using the domestic Orlan-10 drone.

One interesting fact took place in the history of the Airborne Forces, for quite a long time, thanks to erroneous information from the media, special forces soldiers (SpN) were not rightfully called paratroopers. The fact, what is in the Air Force of our country in the Soviet Union, as well as in the post-Soviet Union, there were no special forces troops, but there are units and units of the Special Forces of the GRU of the General Staff, which arose in the 50s. Until the 1980s, the command was forced to completely deny their existence in our country. Therefore, those who were appointed to these troops learned about them only after they were accepted into service. For the media, they were disguised as motorized rifle battalions.

Airborne Forces Day

Paratroopers celebrate the birthday of the Airborne Forces, like the DSB since August 2, 2006. This kind of gratitude for the effectiveness of the air units, the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation was signed in May of the same year. Despite the fact that the holiday was declared by our government, the birthday is celebrated not only in our country, but also in Belarus, Ukraine and most of the CIS countries.

Every year, veterans of the Airborne Forces and active soldiers meet in the so-called "meeting place", in each city it has its own, for example, in Astrakhan "Brotherly Garden", in Kazan "Victory Square", in Kyiv "Hydropark", in Moscow "Poklonnaya Gora", Novosibirsk Central Park. Demonstrations, concerts and fairs are organized in large cities.

Air assault troops of the USSR

"... The nature of war can have a significant impact on the ratio of various branches of the military."
K. Clausewitz, "On War"

From the author
In this article, the author tried to summarize his knowledge of the airborne assault units of the Soviet Army and, briefly formulating, lay them out for public viewing and study. Please note that this study is not definitive. First of all, this is due to the fact that there is still not a single official open (i.e. not secret) publication on the history of the DShV, their combat strength, not to mention their organizational and staffing structures, methods and methods of combat use and etc. Everything you read here was collected bit by bit, from many different sources - the overwhelming majority of the work is based on surveys of veterans of the DShV, people who came into contact with them by occupation, as well as a number of official documents.
Therefore, I ask you to judge me strictly, but fairly, because "... if in this book my rudeness or negligence is written, I pray you: do not despise my reproach, do not curse, but correct, it was not an angel of God who wrote, but a sinful person and full of ignorance..."

The author expresses his deep gratitude to everyone who helped him by providing his memory and took the time to answer.
The author will be grateful to everyone who will express their opinion about the article, point out inaccuracies, inaccuracies, or vice versa, will be able to confirm the author's analysis (which was indispensable).

ON THE ESSENCE OF AIRDRESSING

The moment the idea of ​​​​airborne assaults appeared, like inlets military formations behind enemy lines by air arose it is not known when. However, for a long time it had a strictly fantastic character, and only during the First World War, was it able to receive at least some kind of material basis in the form of the creation of an air vehicle - an airplane-airplane. And if at first, the idea was exclusively of a sabotage and reconnaissance nature, then soon, in connection with the rapid development of aviation during the war years, with the creation of sufficiently reliable and capacious aircraft, it began to take on a larger-scale logical form, which led to Mitchel's idea of ​​landing in the rear of the German troops first divisions, and then the whole "airborne" army. However, we can only guess whether this project would have been realized, whether the war would have lasted another year or two, or not. In any case, after the end of the war, this idea, although it did not receive a serious material embodiment, continued to soar in the air, exciting the minds. The "positional nightmare" of the Western Front was in full view, and many innovative military theorists (or who consider themselves so) were persistently looking for innovative ways to prevent such a situation in the future.

Thus, for the airborne troops (VDV), the main, defining goal was immediately revealed - to assist the advancing groupings of ground forces. Almost the entire subsequent history of the use of airborne assaults (AD) confirms this thesis *.

* A special position is occupied by the VD to the islands. As a rule, they are carried out as part of assistance to amphibious assaults or in general as part of various-scale military operations at sea. That is, the role of the Ground Forces in this case is played by the Navy.
The absolute exception is the scandalous Cretan Airborne Operation (VDO), which did not have a rigid link with the actions of either ground or naval forces; thus having a strictly independent character. However, if linkage with the Ground Forces was not possible for completely understandable and objective reasons, then weak communication with the fleet was forced.
Within the framework of such a goal, the Airborne Forces were also tasked with the task, which consisted, as a rule, in capturing a certain area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe terrain (usually behind the line of contact) and then holding it for a while (for example, until the approach of advancing ground forces).

specific combat mission determines the methods and methods of action of the Airborne Forces, which consist in landing (dropping, disembarking), offensive (attack, assault) and defense.

This leads to a general definition of the combat capabilities of the VD formation, which are:
1. in the ability to capture a certain territory (a piece of land, an object), incl. attack and destroy (knock out) the enemy located there;
2. in the ability to organize an effective defense of the captured territory (object) for a certain period;
3. but, all this is subject to the condition of having the ability to be airlifted.

I needed such a lengthy introduction so that the reader (perhaps a completely outsider, but interested in the issue) immediately grasped the essence of the combat use of airborne assault forces.

BACKGROUND

The appearance of DShV is tightly linked with the appearance of helicopters, more precisely, with the creation of samples with the necessary set of properties. This has already happened in military history, when technological progress brought new types and types of armed forces to the arena of battles. However, there was another forerunner, which consisted in the peculiarities of the forms of combat use of the VD, expressed in their use as an integral part of operations on an operational-tactical scale.

... Alas, but apparently it is worth recognizing that the first air assault operations (actions) associated with the landing of relatively small landing forces were carried out by the Germans during the Second World War. Here is their list of some of them: Vordingborg Bridge (Denmark, 1940), Fort Eben-Emael (Belgium, 1940), bridges over the Albert Canal (Belgium, 1940), a complex of bridges across the Meuse (Holland, 1940), bridges through Zap. Dvina and Berezina (USSR, 1941). All of them fully fall under the definition of air assault operations, although they were carried out by the forces of the German Airborne Forces and special forces. All of them were carried out within the framework of the macro goal - to ensure the fastest possible advance of our ground troops, to block (detain) enemy troops in their positions, etc. The methods of landing at the same time were very different: parachute, landing on gliders, landing on airplanes. But in the subsequent years of the war, such landings were not actually used. The belligerents became interested in larger-scale VDOs, which, by themselves, are capable of influencing the overall operational-strategic situation at the front. In the same vein, post-war development continued, incl. and Soviet, the theory of the use of the Airborne Forces.

The reasons why the Soviet military command did not conduct tactical airborne assaults during the offensives of 1944-45. are not clear. There are likely three main factors involved.

Firstly, the failures of large-scale VDOs somewhat undermined faith in the effectiveness of landings in general (in any case, with the existing material and technical base and the general level of organization).

Secondly, the very idea of ​​​​small landings probably seemed wrong; their possible results were not seen as effective (although such were envisaged by the "Instructions for the Combat Use of the Airborne Forces" of 1943 *).

Thirdly, the command simply did not consider it necessary to use them - i.e. believed that it was better to manage with tried and tested purely ground-based methods.

But this is all just speculation. Personally, it seems to the author quite possible to single out several dozens of excellent Li-2 and S-47 military transport aircraft from the many hundreds already available by 1944 (more than 1000 in 1945) and throw them along the same paths along the parachute battalion supplies or to capture river bridgeheads - in some cases this could already significantly facilitate the actions of ground forces. But what was, was.

... In the late 1940s, unexpectedly for everyone, helicopters just burst onto the scene - new class aircraft. Helicopters (which at this point reaches a level of technical excellence sufficient for combat use) successfully proved themselves in the Incheon amphibious assault operation (MDO) and in subsequent actions of American troops in Korea. Hurrying domestic designers present a rather successful car - the Mi-4 - which starts from 1953. enlist in the army en masse.
Already in 1954, the first large-scale experimental landing was carried out from 36 infantry helicopters with vehicles and artillery. A number of experimental exercises were also carried out (including with the real use of nuclear weapons) to land helicopter landings of a battalion and regimental scale behind enemy lines ... However, the matter died out on that. That is, no organizational measures for the creation of specialized formations were adopted.
The reasons for this appear to be the following:

Firstly, the "Khrushchev-rocket" factor played a negative role.

Secondly, the overdimension of the Airborne Forces - they were in the first half of the 1950s. have as many as 15 divisions; and to have some other airborne units is already impudence, especially since the "Khrushchev" general reduction of the Armed Forces has begun.

Thirdly, the nuclear paranoia that had finally struck the world by this time did not leave a place in the battle formations for clean (without the protection of armored personnel carriers) riflemen-infantry; the helicopter was seen as too "fragile" compared to the armored personnel carrier.

Fourth, in addition to the paratrooper units of the Airborne Forces, until 1957 there were in abundance and rifle divisions, units of both, could, if such a task was set, be parachuted from helicopters behind enemy lines.

And finally fifth, brought up on the power of tank armored fists to Soviet military leaders, clumsy, slow and poorly protected flying cuttlefish with a propeller on top (this is in the age of "jet speeds" and swift licked aerodynamics!) Did not seem to be the means that could give the troops new hitherto unseen opportunities.

TRIAL STEP

Capitalists

In general, the Americans had a similar situation with the theory of VDO. The following phrase of the American Airborne Forces General James Gavin from his book "Airborne Warfare" can serve as a better illustration: "...<воздушно-десантные>troops should be used en masse, not in small groups. and only where their actions can have a decisive influence, and not in many points where they are able to achieve only local tactical successes. "However, their experience of the war on what later became known as" poorly equipped theater of war, i.e. e. on the Korean Peninsula, forced the American command to think about it and act more flexibly.The helicopter proved to be a very promising means of transportation in conditions of mountainous wooded terrain and lack of roads.The number of helicopters jumps greatly - by the end of the war, there were already 1140 units in the army aviation., while at the beginning there were only 56 units.The American command is also creating an experimental formation - the 11th Air Assault Division (Air Assault Division) Based on it and on the basis of two more formations (10th Air Transport Brigade and 2nd Infantry Division) in July 1965, the 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) Division - Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was created (more precisely, reorganized from the existing one). the fact that helicopters were introduced into the composition of its combat units for the first time as a transport and combat vehicle total number up to 434 (428 according to other data) units. The division was deployed to Vietnam at the end of the same month. And even despite the lack of a proper theoretical study of airmobile (helicopter-landing) operations, not to mention the corresponding practical exercises, it showed itself from the best side. Of course, not only this division had helicopters. All American divisions in Vietnam had a large number of helicopters. So if in ser. 1967 was ok. 2000 units, then in 1968 their number reached 4200 units!

Generally speaking, if in Korea helicopters only announced their existence and their prospects were rather vague, then the Vietnam War elevated the helicopter to the zenith of fame and popularity. Until that time, they were still perceived rather as a kind of exotic, purely auxiliary purposes. The Americans fell in love with helicopters so much that some hotheads began to argue about the decline of parachute (from aircraft) landing as such.

We have

Such an active and such a successful use of helicopters made an impression on the Soviet command. The idea is being revived - in the course of the Dnepr-67 strategic exercises, mainly on the basis of the 51st Guards. PDP formed an experimental consolidated 1st airborne brigade under the command of the beginning. Department of Combat Training of the Airborne Forces Major-General Kobzar. It is used to capture a bridgehead across the Dnieper, where a motorized rifle battalion deployed by helicopters with attached self-propelled guns also participates. In a specially created working group at the General Staff, theoretical developments and experiments are carried out. And now, according to the results of these works, no later than the end of 1967. a decision is made to form completely new military formations for the Soviet Army - separate air assault brigades (ovshbr). Based on the directive of the General Staff of May 22, 1968. in June 1968, the formation of the 11th (ZBVO) and 13th (FAR) brigades begins. By mid-July, the brigades had already been formed. (According to other data, the 13th brigade was finally formed only by July-August 1970). In 1973, a third brigade was added to them - the 21st in Kutaisi (WKVO).

The brigades were formed, as they say, from scratch. Officers and soldiers from the districts were sent to staff them, and officers from the Airborne Forces were appointed only to the positions of specialists in the airborne service (VDS) and to the positions of brigade commanders (for example, the former commander of 51 1st Guards PDP Colonel Reznikov).

But even here, a number of subjective factors of the peculiarities of Soviet military thought played a role. Due to the distrust of the Soviet military leadership in the infantry, the underestimation of its combat capabilities, especially on an operational scale, such brigades were considered not strong enough to operate on EuroTVD. That is why they were deployed in areas with a lesser threat compared to the western one - it was considered expedient to have them only for operations on mountainous-wooded (taiga) terrain, difficult for ground equipment, where the focality of hostilities was inevitable. Both Far Eastern brigades were intended not so much to carry out landings behind enemy lines in the usual way, but to cover a large section of the Soviet-Chinese border. (There was even a poster of visual propaganda with a somewhat surreal inscription: "Attack paratrooper - time limit.") The aviation component of each of the brigades was represented by an air group consisting of two full-time helicopter regiments. At the same time, the air and ground components had different administrative subordination: the ground component - to the High Command of the Army, and the air - to the High Command of the Air Force; which inevitably created a number of serious problems in the organization of interaction.

For the implementation of air operational-tactical and tactical landings on EuroTV, it was planned to attract ordinary paratroopers or motorized rifle units (companies and battalions), pulling them out of airborne and combined arms divisions.

A little about terminology should also be said here. It is not good to use the terms created by the capitalists, and by 1971, domestic names and terminology were selected; brigades and their battalions; as well as the methods of their combat use were renamed air assault. Thus, the American terms "air assault" and "airmobile" gradually ceased to be applied to Soviet DShCh and began to be mentioned in official documents only in relation to foreign formations of this type.

By the end of 1971, all existing brigades were reorganized into air assault brigades with changes in the organizational and staffing structure (OShS).

IDEA PAVES THE WAY

"Volumes"

In the 70s. behind the thick walls of the buildings of the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense and research institutions, a scientific discussion, obviously serious in its intensity and extremely important in its consequences, was unfolding, combined with an undercover and undercover struggle of opinions, calculations and ambitions ...

In 1975, a working group led by Lieutenant General I. Yurkovskiy put forward the idea of ​​creating a new type of operation - the so-called. "bulk operation" instead of, as they claimed, the obsolete concept of "deep operation". Its essence was not to "gnaw through" the enemy's defense, but to "jump" over it, bypassing the infection zones and defense nodes - thus the pace of the offensive increased sharply. The idea was supported by some military leaders (lieutenant generals I. Dzhordzhadze and G. Demidkov) and deepened. The question was raised about the global change of the entire theory of operations; the creation of a fundamentally new "air echelon" of ground forces.

The implementation of such an idea required a radical change in priorities in military development and fundamentally pushed back the positions of the supporters of armored armadas who dominated the military leadership. However, instead of an objective assessment of the military perspective, instead of an understanding of the dialectics of development, departmentalism and inflexibility prevailed, and the "volumes" were crushed...
New wave

And yet, the "traditionalists" still had to make room a little - painfully interesting arguments were presented by the "volumizers". In the middle of 1978 the new head of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, it was decided to form, in addition to the already existing three brigades (11th, 13th and 21st), a second wave of air assault units of two types.
Firstly, eight separate air assault brigades of district (group) subordination:

July 11, 1968 Trans-Baikal Military District Mogocha and Amazar (Chita region)*
July 13, 1968 Far Eastern Military District Magdagachi (Amur Region)*
21 odshbr 1973 Transcaucasian Military District Kutaisi and Tsulukidze (Georgia)
35 Guards. odshbr December 1979 Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Cottbus (GDR) **
36 odshbr December 1979 Leningrad VO township. Garbolovo (Leningrad region)
December 37, 1979 Baltic Military District Chernyakhovsk (Kaliningrad region)
38 Guards. Vienna December 1979 Belarusian Military District Brest (Belarus)
odshbr
December 39, 1979 Carpathian Military District Khyrov (Ukraine)
40 odshbr December 1979 Odessa Military District with. Velyka Korenikha - Nikolaev (Ukraine)
56 Guards. odshbr December 1979 Turkestan Military District settlement. Azadbash (district, Chirchik, Uzbekistan) ***
57 odshbr December 1979 Central Asian VO town. Aktogay (Taldy-Kurgan region, Kazakhstan)

Notes:
* Elements of the air groups of these brigades could be deployed separately.
** Literally ok. month, the brigade was originally referred to as the 14th Guards, and only in January 1980 received the 35th number.
*** Formally, the 56th Guards. the brigade is considered to be formed in Chirchik on the basis of 351 guards. pdp. However, de facto, its deployment for entry into Afghanistan was carried out separately in four centers (Chirchik, Kapchagay, Fergana, Iolotan), and brought together into a single whole just before the entry into Afghanistan in Termez. The headquarters of the brigade (or officer cadre), as its formal cadre, was originally stationed in Chirchik.

Secondly, twenty separate LH battalions:

48 odshb December 1979 Turkestan Military District,
1st AK / 40th OA (*) location unknown

139 odshb December 1979 Baltic Military District,
11th Guards. OA Kaliningrad (Kaliningrad region)
145 odshb December 1979 Far Eastern Military District,
5th OA settlement Sergeevka (Primorsky Territory)
899 odshb December 1979 Group of Soviet troops in Germany,
20th Guards OA Burg (GDR)
900 odshb December 1979 Group of Soviet troops in Germany,
8th Guards OA Leipzig - Schinau (GDR)
901 odshb December 1979 The Central Group of Forces in the district of the settlement. Riechki (Czechoslovakia)
902 odshb December 1979 Southern Group of Forces of Kecskemét (Hungary)
903 odshb December 1979 Belarusian Military District,
28th OA, Brest (Southern), since 1986 - Grodno (Belarus)
904 odshb December 1979 Carpathian Military District,
13th OA Vladimir-Volynsky (Ukraine)
905 odshb December 1979 Odessa Military District,
14th OA, Bendery (Moldova)
906 odshb December 1979 Trans-Baikal Military District,
36th OA settlement Khada-Bulak (Chita region, district of Borzya)
907 odshb December 1979 Far Eastern Military District,
43rd AK / 47th OA Birobidzhan (Jewish Autonomous Region)
908 odshb December 1979 Kyiv Military District,
1st Guards OA of Konotop, since 1984 - town. Goncharovo (Ukraine, Chernihiv region)
1011 odshb December 1979 Belarusian Military District,
5th Guards TA Art. Maryina Gorka - Pukhovichi (Belarus)
1044 odshb December 1979 Group of Soviet troops in Germany,
1st Guards TA city of Neuss-Lager (GDR, in the region of Königsbrück)
1156 odshb December 1979 Carpathian Military District,
8th TA Novograd-Volynsky (Ukraine, Zhytomyr region)
1179 odshb December 1979 Leningrad Military District,
6th OA, Petrozavodsk (Karelia)
1151 odshb December 1979 Belarusian Military District,
7th TA Polotsk (Belarus)
1185 odshb December 1979 Group of Soviet troops in Germany,
2nd Guards TA Ravensbrück (GDR)
1604 odshb December 1979 Trans-Baikal Military District,
29th OA of Ulan-Ude (Buryat Autonomous District)

Notes:

* Literally a few months after the formation, 48 odshb (or, presumably, the 148th) was merged into the 66th brigade (omsbr) in Afghanistan. In general, as part of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces (OKSV) in Afghanistan, there were two brigades of a special organization known "among the people" as the 66th and 70th separate motorized rifle (but in reality bearing the name "detachment combined arms brigade" - brig.) . In their composition there was one odshb.

During August-December 1979, these units were basically created.

In 1984, 83 odshbr and two separate regiments were formed - the 1318th and 1319th odshp for full-time Operational-Maneuvering Groups (OMG) - they are also the so-called. Separate army corps (UAC). And in 1986, several more brigades were formed - the 23rd, 128th and 130th.

23 odshbr 1986 High command southwestern direction(GK YuZN) Kremenchug (Ukraine)
58 odshbr 1986 (assumed) Kyiv Military District Kremenchug (Ukraine)
83 odshbr 1984 Northern Group of Forces Bialogard (Poland)
128 odshbr 1986 (assumed) High Command South direction(GK YUN) Stavropol (Stavropol AK)
130 odshbr 1986 (assumed) High Command of the Far East Troops (GK VDV) Abakan (Khakas Autonomous Okrug)
1318 odshp 1984 Belarusian Military District, 5th Guards. UAC Borovuha-1 - Borogla (Polotsk region, Belarus)
1319 odshp 1984 Trans-Baikal Military District, N-th KLA, Kyakhta (Chita region)

Thus, at the end of 1986, the Soviet Army had 16 brigades, 2 regiments and 20 detachments. battalions. The total staffing of DShCh for war time was 65-70 thousand people. However, in peacetime, the units were kept in a greatly reduced composition - an average of approx. 31-34 thousand people At the same time, along with well-equipped brigades and battalions, many had only a frame for mobilization deployment.

The principle by which the numbering of brigades and regiments was carried out is not known to me. But, it can be argued with a certain accuracy that it was the same for odshbr, obrSpN and omsbr - i.e. within all SWs. The differences in the numbering of the odshb are due to the three consecutive orders by which they were formed. However, these explanations I have heard seem insufficient.
Subordination

Many are interested in the question - were the DShCh part of the Airborne Forces? In short, no, they didn't. DShCh were part of the High Command of the SV (GK SV). Does this mean in this case that the military personnel of the DShCh are not airborne? Does not mean. The organizational, administrative affiliation of the DShCh to the GK SV is simply a feature of the existing Soviet military organization. Being subordinate to the GK SV DShCh, they were directly subordinate to the command of combined arms formations - corps, armies, fronts in wartime, military districts and groups of troops - in peacetime. Moreover, the same situation was repeated with them as with special forces - there were such combat units, but there were no such troops. There was the command of the commander of the tank troops, motorized rifle, but there was no command of the commander of the air assault troops. Formally speaking, there were no such troops themselves, just as there were no special forces. This situation affected the DShV in the most unfavorable way. They became the stepson of two stepmothers at once - on the one hand, the Airborne Forces, and on the other hand, the Civil Code of the SV. The "second-class" (this was especially true in the first years of its existence) position in the secret intra-army hierarchy also led to corresponding unpleasant consequences: worse attention to problems, worse supplies, less attention to recruiting and training, etc. In the minds of the officers of both the Airborne Forces and the SV, their definition in the DShV was often considered a "link" (perhaps with the exception of units in groups of troops - there, all places, of course, were valued higher).

In operational terms (combat use), parts of the DShV were subordinate to the command of combined arms formations - armies and fronts (districts, groups of troops). The development of methods and forms of their combat use of DShV units and their training was in charge of the combat training department of the Civil Code of the SV together with the BP department of the Airborne Forces command. General principles combat use of the DShV lay on the conscience of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

In December 1989, a decision was made to transfer the LH units to the administrative and operational subordination of the Airborne Forces command.

This had two opposite consequences.
On the one hand, this had a positive effect in the sense that DShCh thus found a "father" instead of a suspicious stepfather and an evil stepmother, and their status immediately increased and acquired a "legitimate" look.
But on the other hand, the close interaction of the headquarters of the DShCh with the previously superior, and now unknown as related, headquarters of the combined arms formations was disrupted. DShV, designed to act in the interests of combined arms formations, ceased to obey their command, which, in my opinion, drastically reduced the effectiveness of their combat use. Apparently the best solution would be such a subordination scheme: administratively - to the commander of the Airborne Forces (manning, development of methods and forms of action, weapons and military equipment, uniforms and equipment), operationally (combat use) - to the commander of operational and operational-strategic formations in whose interests this formation expected to be used.
However, when it began in 1989. collapse of the Soviet Armed Forces All this played little role. But that's another story…

Differences between the Airborne Forces and the DShV

If, according to the established opinion, the Airborne Forces are characterized by their use in the form of large-scale (1-2 airborne divisions) airborne operations (ADO) with goals and objectives of an operational and operational-strategic nature to a great depth (up to 100-150 km and more) , then the idea of ​​\u200b\u200busing DShV lies in the area rather purely tactical or, at most, operational-tactical. If, for the Airborne Forces, the issue of organizing interaction with the Ground Forces (SV) is not tough - they are thrown out in the interests of at least the front (a group of fronts), and even the Supreme High Command (VGK), then for the DShV this is very urgent. As a matter of fact, DShCh do not even have their own goals, but only a task. (They operate within the framework of the goal set by their senior commander - the combined arms commander. This "macro-target" determines the "micro-target" of the landing forces, it also determines the task, composition of forces, method of application.) is produced in accordance with the goals and objectives of the ground combined arms command authority, as a rule, at the level of the army-corps, or, in some cases, even divisions. The hierarchically younger the command instance, the smaller, as a rule, the scale of the forces involved by the LH. If the Airborne Forces operate in divisions, then the DShV - in companies and battalions, less often - in a brigade / regiment.
Acquisition

To create and staff the "second wave" of the DShCh, it was decided to disband the 105th Guards. airborne division and 80th guards. pdp 104th airborne division. Officers and soldiers of military districts and groups of troops were sent for resupplying. So, the 36th brigade was formed on the basis of the 237th guards. PDP (he was framed) who singled out the officers and units of the Leningrad Military District; 38th Vienna - based on the staff officers of the 105th Guards. Airborne Forces, as well as officers and soldiers of the military unit of the Belarusian Military District.

In the DShCh military districts, most of the officers were from the military districts: for the odshb, only commanders were selected from the Airborne Forces, the rest from the districts; in the odshb groups of troops, the deputy battalion commander was added to the battalion commander, as well as, in part, the company commanders. To complete the newly created parts, in 1979. in military schools preparing officers for the Airborne Forces, recruitment was increased, and from 1983-84. already most of the officers went to the DShV being trained under the Airborne Forces program. Basically, they were appointed to the Oshbr of groups of troops, less often - to the Oshbr of districts, and even less often to the Oshb. In 1984-85. officers were shuffled in groups of troops - almost all officers were replaced in the DShV. All this increased the percentage of airborne officers (plus - replacements in Afghanistan). But at the same time, the most prepared graduates of military schools and academies were always distributed in the Airborne Forces. True, it was not without patronage, but this only concerned distribution into groups of troops - there was a war in Afghanistan, airborne officers went there in the second circle, and the temptation to attach their own away was great.

With regard to recruitment by conscripts, the same medical requirements and other selection rules were applied to the DShCh as for the Airborne Forces. The most healthy and physically developed draft contingent was singled out. High selection requirements (height - not less than 173 cm; physical development - not lower than average; education - not lower than average, no medical restrictions, etc.) led to fairly high opportunities for combat training.

Unlike the Airborne Forces, which had their own large "Gayzhunai training" - the 44th Airborne Division; The DShVs were staffed by junior commanders and specialists who had mostly graduated from the training divisions of the Ground Forces and, to a lesser extent, by the Gayzhunay pupils.
Outfit and equipment

Due to the fact that DShV were organizationally part of Ground Forces, initially their uniforms, equipment and allowances almost completely corresponded to those in motorized rifle troops. The command did not want to pay attention to the inconsistency of a number of elements of the combined arms uniform and equipment with the landing specifics, it did not take into account the moral factor either. In general, until ser. 1983, the entire l / s DShV went in the usual form of motorized riflemen - however, for a very obvious discrepancy, the standard duffel bags-sidors were replaced with RD-54 landing backpacks. However, at the same time, there were also "hazing" deviations from this rule. So, one could see airborne "birds" on red buttonholes, and those who were dismissed from active service tried to get a "normal" paratrooper uniform - with a vest and a beret - and in this form go "for demobilization". For parachute jumps, so-called. "Jump" overalls of the Airborne Forces.

In the summer of 1983, literally before the death of the Secretary General of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev, it was decided to normalize the situation and transfer the DSHV to supply standards and the form of the Airborne Forces, which was done almost everywhere by the spring of next year. Both soldiers and officers willingly put on blue berets and vests, quickly getting rid of the hateful and despised "red color".

For a combat situation, you can outline the standard view of a Soviet paratrooper as follows. Underwear incl. and a vest (T-shirt, with long sleeve and a double-knitted vest, i.e. insulated); so-called greenish-olive jumpsuit; a head-hugging cloth helmet (in winter - insulated with a lining), boots with side lacing (or, less often, with belts); finally - camouflage KZS (protective mesh suit) or a special camouflage suit. In winter, a warm suit was worn, consisting of a short jacket and trousers; all khaki. Equipment (ammunition) - depending on the specialty. Mandatory for everyone - the backpack of the paratrooper RD-54. In addition to it, there could be: additional combined-arms pouches for AK magazines, a pouch for magazines for SVD sniper rifles, cases for carrying shots for RPGs, etc. For parachute jumps, special cases were used under weapon and cargo container GK-30.

Also, in Ser. In the 80s, to supply the DShV, a BVD transport and unloading vest was developed that was structurally reminiscent of the GeDeer landing vest. However, he never entered the army en masse.
ORGANIZATION AND WEAPONS

Speaking about the organizational and staffing structure (OShS) and the equipment of subunits and units of the DShV with weapons and equipment (AME), the following reservations should immediately be made. Firstly, the same rules and features apply to the DShV that were characteristic of the entire SA, namely, some differences in the OShS and equipment of weapons and military equipment from part to part. Secondly, changes over time - the OShS and the equipment of weapons and military equipment gradually changed. This applied both to the lower divisions and the general structure of the units. Thirdly, the author has not yet been able to establish the OSH with 100% accuracy in accordance with time periods and local features; which is connected with the notorious regime of secrecy in force in the USSR Armed Forces.
All this makes the problem of restoring the historical OShS DShV quite problematic and requires a separate serious study. Below, I give only the principal structure of the ODSHBR and ODSHB.

Unfortunately, in detail, the initial organization of the air assault brigades is not known to me. Therefore, we will have to limit ourselves only to the general structure. Structurally, the brigade consisted of: an air group consisting of two helicopter regiments - combat (bvp) and transport-combat (tbvp), a total of 80 Mi-8T, 20 Mi-6A and 20 Mi-24A; three paratroopers (airborne standard for the Airborne Forces OShS) and one air assault (the airborne assault had the original OShS reinforced compared to the airborne assault rifle) battalion. The brigades also had artillery, anti-tank, anti-aircraft and special units. It is believed that the brigades had a fairly powerful composition, in general, not typical for the Soviet landing units of that period. The brigade had the status of a tactical association - i.e. was equal to the division.

Organizational structure of the 11th, 13th and 21st divisions for the 1970s:

brigade management
- three air assault companies (SPG-9D, AGS-17, PK, RPG-7D, RPKS, AKMS)
- anti-tank battery (SPG-9MD)
- platoons: reconnaissance, anti-aircraft missile (MANPADS Strela-2M), communications, support, first-aid post.
- an air group (until 1977, from this year - only a helicopter regiment), consisting of:
- combat helicopter regiment (Mi-24, Mi-8)
- transport and combat helicopter regiment (Mi-8 and Mi-6)
- a separate battalion of airfield technical support (two companies of communications and RT support, two technical units, a security company)
- mortar battery (120 mm M PM-38)
- anti-tank battery (12 anti-tank systems "Malyutka", later - "Fagot")
- jet battery (140-mm MLRS RPU-16) - soon disbanded
- reconnaissance company
- communication company
- engineering sapper company

- repair company

- commandant's platoon
- orchestra.

Notes:
1. Battalions, air group and helicopter regiments had their own numbers:
- in 11 odshbr: 617, 618 and 619 dep. air assault battalions; 211 air group consisting of 307 and 329 helicopter regiments (until 1977, from this year - only 329 helicopter regiments).
- at 13 odshbr: ..., ... and ... dep. air assault battalions, ... an air group consisting of 825 and ... helicopter regiments (until 1977).
- in 21 odshbr: 802, 803 and 804 dep. air assault battalions, 1171 air groups consisting of 292 and 325 helicopter regiments (until 1977, from this year - only 325 helicopter regiments).
2. In addition to those indicated in the brigade, there were also the following units: a company of young soldiers (RMS), a club, a special department of the KGB with a security platoon, economic structures.

Organizational structure of the 23rd, 35th Guards, 36th, 37th, 38th Guards, 39th, 40th, 57th, 58th and 128th Airborne Brigade for 1979-88 :

brigade management
- three airborne companies (ATGM "Metis", 82-mm M, AGS-17, RPG-16, PK, AKS-74, RPKS-74)

- platoons: anti-aircraft missile (Strela-2M / -3), communications, support, first-aid post.
- one (4th) air assault (in armored vehicles) battalion:
- three air assault companies (BMD-1 / -1P, BTRD, 82-mm M, RPG-16, PK, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- from 1981 - a mortar battery (120-mm M PM-38) was added, and from the beginning. 1983 it is replaced by a self-propelled artillery battery (120 mm SAO 2S9 Nona) *
- platoons: grenade launcher (AGS-17), anti-aircraft missile (Strela-2M / -3), communications, support, first-aid post.

- reactive battery (122-mm MLRS BM-21V Grad-V)
- mortar battery (120 mm M)
- anti-aircraft missile division (in some brigades since 1982) **:
- two anti-aircraft missile batteries (SZRK Strela-10M)
- anti-aircraft missile battery (MANPADS Strela-3)
- platoons: management, support.
- anti-aircraft missile- artillery battery(ZU-23, Strela-3) - until 1982.
- anti-tank battery (BTR-RD, Fagot)
- reconnaissance company (BMD-1, BTRD, SBR-3)
- communication company
- engineering sapper company
- landing support company
- automobile company
- medical company
- repair company
- transport and economic company (since 1986)
- a platoon of radiochemical reconnaissance, and since 1984, in part of the brigades - a company of radiochemical and biological protection
- command platoon of the chief of artillery
- commandant's platoon
- orchestra.

Notes:
* Initially (1979-81), there was no minbatr in the dshb.
** The anti-aircraft division was in the majority of the odshbr since 1983. For some time, the ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" was also in the 35th guards odshbr.

The total number of the brigade deployed in wartime states reached 2.8-3.0 thousand people.

Some brigades had a structure different from the one presented above. So, the organizational structure of the 83rd brigade was distinguished by the presence of only two paratroopers (1st and 2nd) and one airborne assault (3rd) battalions. And the organizational structure of the 56th Guards. brigade fought in 1980-89. in Afghanistan, it was distinguished by the presence of three airborne assault (1st, 2nd, 3rd) and one paratrooper (4th) battalions. The brigade had a non-standard organization, moreover, changing over time.

Organizational structure of the 11th, 13th and 21st divisions for 1979-88:

brigade management
- three (1st, 2nd, 3rd) separate air assault (foot) battalions:
- three air assault companies (82-mm M, ATGM Fagot, AGS-17, PK, RPG-7D, RPKS-74, AKS-74)
- anti-tank battery (ATGM Fagot, SPG-9MD)
- mortar battery (82 mm M)
- platoons: reconnaissance, anti-aircraft missile (MANPADS Strela-3), communications, support, first-aid post.
- transport and combat helicopter regiment (Mi-8 and Mi-6) - until 1988.
- howitzer artillery battery (122-mm G D-30)
- mortar battery (120 mm M)
- mountain gun battery (76-mm GP 2A2 arr. 1958)
- anti-aircraft battery (23 mm ZU-23, MANPADS Strela-2M)
- reconnaissance company
- communication company
- engineering sapper company
- landing support company
- brigade medical center
- repair company
- transport and economic company
- radiochemical reconnaissance platoon
- command platoon of the chief of artillery
- commandant's platoon
- orchestra.

Notes:
* Battalions and helicopter regiments had their own numbers:
in 11 odshbr: 617, 618 and 619 dep. air assault battalions; 329th Helicopter Regiment (withdrawn from the brigade at the beginning of 1988).
at 13 odshbr: ..., ... and ... dep. air assault battalions, ... a helicopter regiment (at the beginning of 1988 it was withdrawn from the brigade).
in 21 odshbr: 802, 803 and 804 dep. air assault battalions, 325 helicopter regiment (withdrawn from the brigade at the beginning of 1988).
For some time there were no ZRVs in the battalions - the ZROs were part of the DSHR.
The 802nd (1st) odshb 21 odshbr had a different organization from the standard.

The organizational structure of the ODShP differed from the brigades by the presence of only two battalions: the 1st paratrooper (foot) and the 2nd airborne assault (on BMD), as well as a somewhat reduced composition of the regimental units. The total number of the regiment deployed in wartime states reached 1.5-1.6 thousand people.

The organizational structure of the odshb on the European theater of operations and the Far East theater of operations was generally similar to the OShS of the infantry brigade of brigades, but also included a fourth company - an airborne assault (on BMD) and a platoon (either with BMD or on UAZ-469), and in a mortar battery the number of trunks increased to 8 units. The total number of battalions deployed in wartime states reached 650-670 people.

In the winter-spring of 1988, organizational changes began, which were completed by the summer of 1990, i.e. by the time when the brigades were renamed airborne and reassigned to the command of the USSR Airborne Forces. The brigade was significantly lightened by removing all armored vehicles from there and removing the airborne assault battalion on the BMD / BTRD from its composition.

Organizational Structure for 1990-91:

brigade management
- three (1st, 2nd, 3rd) airborne (foot) battalions:
- three airborne companies (ATGM "Metis", 82-mm M, AGS-17, RPG-7D, GP-25, PK, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- anti-tank battery (ATGM Fagot, SPG-9MD)
- mortar battery (82 mm M)
- platoons: anti-aircraft missile (Strela-3 / Needle), communications, support, first-aid post.
- howitzer artillery battalion:
- three howitzer batteries (122 mm G D-30)
- platoons: management, support.
- mortar battery (120 mm M)
- anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery (ZU-23, Strela-3/Igla)
- anti-tank battery (ATGM "Fagot")
- anti-aircraft battery (23 mm ZU-23, MANPADS Strela-2M)
- reconnaissance company (UAZ-3151, PK, RPG-7D, GP-25, SBR-3)
- communication company
- engineering sapper company
- landing support company
- automobile company
- medical company
- repair company
- material support company
- radiochemical biological protection company
- command platoon of the chief of artillery
- commandant's platoon
- orchestra.

Organizational structure of 224 UTs for 1990-91:

brigade management
- 1st training paratrooper battalion:
- three training paratrooper companies (RPG-7D, GP-25, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- training reconnaissance company (PK, AKS-74, SVD)
- 2nd training paratrooper battalion:
- 1st training automobile company (for Ural-4320)
- 2nd training automobile company (for GAZ-66)
- training medical company
- communications training company
- training artillery battalion:
- training howitzer battery (122-mm G D-30)
- training mortar battery (120 mm M)
- training anti-tank battery (ATGM Fagot, SPG-9MD)
- training anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery (ZU-23, Strela-3 / Needle)
- a company of training vehicles (Ural-4320, GAZ-66)
- communication company
- medical company
- repair company
- material support company
- landing support platoon
- commandant's platoon
- orchestra.

HELICOPTERS ARE THE MAIN PROBLEM

Domestic DShV had many problems, both internal and external. One of these third-party problems that directly and most strongly influenced the combat effectiveness of the DShV was to provide them with an aviation component, in other words, helicopters.

Massively formed in 1979 "second wave" DShN consisted only of the ground component - i.e. unlike their older counterparts - the "first wave" brigades - there were no helicopter regiments in their composition. This situation can be explained by several theses.

Firstly, this was contrary to the doctrine of the use of helicopters. The Soviet military command believed that helicopter regiments were a means of operational and operational-strategic unification (armies and fronts). This means that organizationally they should be included in their composition for centralized management them with a concentration of efforts to use in the chosen direction. Theoretically, apparently, the correct desire to give helicopter forces to each association, in fact, led to the dispersion of helicopters over very numerous formations in view of the overall immensity of the SA. Here it was necessary either to eliminate unnecessary (or not superfluous?) Associations, or to deprive some of them of a significant number of helicopters, or to force the production of helicopters in order to saturate the troops with them to the maximum.

Secondly, the production of helicopters, like any other type of weapon, depends on the prevailing this moment doctrine. As mentioned above, the "volumizers" who advocated the creation of a rise in the air of part of the ground forces, and therefore a sharp increase in the number of air vehicles needed for this, were defeated in the fight against the supporters of the traditional doctrine. And although the production of helicopters increased by the beginning. 80s, however, this was a consequence of rather objective prerequisites, the objective course of development of the country's Armed Forces, and not a doctrinal stage-by-stage revolution.

Thirdly, the very fact of combining air and ground components in a tactical formation caused, apparently, objections from many military leaders - and not only subjective, but also quite justified. Being part of such a formation, the helicopters would actually be withdrawn from the reserve of the commander of the operational formation, "binding" solely to ensure the actions of the airborne troops. It seems to the author of the article that the high military command incorrectly assessed the dependence of the airborne troops on helicopter support, considering it to be similar to the support of the airborne forces by military aircraft, not paying attention to the specifics expressed in a much closer and mandatory symbiosis of the landing force with helicopters without which the effectiveness of the first falls. Moreover, according to operational calculations and the experience of the exercises, it turned out that about 70% of the resource of transport helicopters was supposed to be used for landing missions in any case. And what could prevent the use of these helicopters if they do not participate in the DSHO / DShD?

Finally, fourthly, as it is commonly believed, the number of helicopters themselves was also insufficient in order, like the Americans, to equip all the formations with which they can come in handy, and even have a reserve. However, there seems to be a lot of confusion here. Namely. Consider the production of Mi-8 helicopters in the USSR. According to official figures, 11,000 units were manufactured between 1962 and 1997. Moreover, the absolute majority (up to 90%) in the period 1966-91. According to the authors' calculations, this means that at least 5,500 of these helicopters should have been delivered to the Armed Forces during this period, only counting transport and transport-combat modifications. There is no official domestic data on the Mi-8 fleet in the open press. The authoritative magazine "Military Balance" for 1991 gives the number of transport and transport-combat modifications of the Mi-8 for 1990/91. respectively 1000 and 640 units. Let the losses in Afghanistan and in the disasters amount to 400 units, let 1000 machines that have exhausted their resources be disabled, but then where did the remaining 2500 units go? In general, as they say, the topic is waiting for its researcher.

So, theoretically, air assault brigades, being an ideal means, with a focal (non-linear) nature of hostilities, due to the lack of an aviation component that imparts maneuverability in their composition, sharply reduced their potential, becoming, in fact, parts of light infantry. A fundamental way out of the current situation could be the creation of special operational-tactical formations - air assault corps of brigade-regimental composition - subordinated to front-line departments in wartime. This connection would include a ground component (DShCh from the SV or Airborne Forces) and an air helicopter component (from the DIA). Such a construction scheme would make it possible to achieve high combat effectiveness and, at the same time, all interested departments "keep their own sheep."

Let's look at an example of how helicopters were supposed to be distributed for DShV. We accept standard conditions as initial ones - frontal offensive four armies. The grouping consists of one transport and combat helicopter regiment (otbvp), six combat helicopter regiments (obvp), as well as one detachment. air assault brigade (3rd battalion) and three det. air assault battalion. In addition, in each of the combined arms divisions, one motorized rifle battalion was trained to act as part of the TakVD. An analysis of the possible content of the operation and the tasks characteristic of airborne assaults in the course of it show that within the framework of the DShD in 10 days it may be necessary to land an airborne brigade as an ATIA and eight to ten TakVD as part of an airborne assault brigade and reinforced small and medium armored personnel carriers.
The average allocation rates for troop-carrying helicopters are: ATS - up to four regimental sorties (p / a) rebvp *; TakVD as part of the odshb - one p / in otbvp; reinforced SSB - one p / b bvp without a squadron (ve). In addition, a detachment of escort combat helicopters is needed.
Estimated composition: otbvp - 40 Mi-8T / MT, 20 Mi-6A; obvp - 40 Mi-24V / P and 20 Mi-8T / MT.

* Here it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the presence of one of the battalions on armored vehicles in the odshbr dramatically increased the required outfit of helicopters for transportation, and above all heavy Mi-6A. Transport ok. 60 units BTT occupied the lion's share in total Mi-6A helicopter sorties and in real life Mi-6 squadrons would need to make more sorties. Only mass production of Mi-26 helicopters capable of taking on board 2 units. BTT class BMD / BTRD (for the Mi-6A only 1 unit) changed the situation in better side. In general, the author doubts the possibility of transferring the entire BTT dshb by Mi-6A helicopters.

It would be superfluous to prove that landing three flights, let alone four, of the ATMO is tantamount to suicide. It is necessary to ensure the transfer by no more than two flights (echelons). And here it is impossible to do without the withdrawal of transport and combat helicopters from the air force for the period of its operations (total for 1-2 p / a), i.e., they will have to be left without Mi-8T / MT.

The duration of the disembarkation of the ATC in two flights is, as a rule, 12-16 hours. Taking into account the subsequent training of helicopters, only in a day can we count on them repeated actions(in the same Afghanistan, helicopters made much more conclusions, but - the calculations were made based on only two sorties per day). During the specified time, the air defense units remain without the Mi-8 and support the troops without their participation. If during the same day it is required to land at least one or two more TakVDs as part of a battalion, then practically all the air defense forces are left without troop-carrying helicopters. Taking into account the duration of the operation and the recovery time of the combat capability of the odshbr, the re-landing of the airborne division is practically not feasible.
In the remaining nine days of the operation, it is possible to land eight or nine more TakVDs as part of the special air defense unit / us.msb. However, modern experience shows that up to 30% of the flight resource of transport helicopters will have to be spent on solving tasks not related to landing. Consequently, only armies in the direction of the main attack will be able to use landings. This was considered an acceptable norm for the decentralized application of TakVD.
Although not quite. Nevertheless, it was necessary to involve transport aircraft of the VTA Air Force for the landing of the DShV - mainly An-12. This created additional inconvenience. So, the dshb on the BTT had to independently follow to such an initial landing area, where there were airfields capable of ensuring the rise of aircraft with troops on board.
Quality

A certain problem was the suitability of domestic helicopters of the Mi-8 and Mi-6 family for air assault operations and, more broadly, for airborne landing in general. In the future, a separate article will be devoted to this.

RESULTS

As mentioned earlier, in 1989-90, in connection with the transfer of LH units to the composition of the Airborne Forces, major changes were made. Most of the air assault brigades are being reorganized into airborne brigades that are greatly lightened in terms of armament (the actual process of lightening was started earlier); at the same time, several brigades are disbanded (the 57th and 58th), and the 39th is transformed into the 224th training center of the Airborne Forces. Separate air assault battalions, it was decided to disband all. In the summer of 1990, all major changes had already been made. The brigades have been reorganized, and most of the battalions have been disbanded. As of November of this year, only 5 battalions remained from the former.
big picture transformations can be seen in the data below:

11 airborne brigade of the city of Mogocha and Amazar (Chita region) * In 1988, the helicopter regiment was withdrawn from the composition. And by 1 Aug. 1990 transferred to the states air-dec. brigades.
13th Airborne Brigade of the city of Magdagachi (Amur Region) * In 1988, a helicopter regiment was withdrawn from the composition. In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades.
21 Airborne Brigade Kutaisi and Tsulukidze (Georgia) In 1988, the helicopter regiment was withdrawn from the structure. In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades.
23 odshbr Kremenchug (Ukraine) In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades.
35 Guards. odshbr city of Cottbus (GDR) ** In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades.
36 odshbr village Garbolovo (Leningrad region). In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades.
37 odshbr city of Chernyakhovsk (Kaliningrad region). In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades.
38 Guards. Vienna city of Brest (Belarus) In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades.
odshbr
39 airborne brigade Khyrov (Ukraine) In the spring of 1990, it was reorganized into the 224 training center of the Airborne Forces.
40 odshbr s. Velyka Korenikha - Nikolaev (Ukraine) In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the state air-dec. brigades. And completely relocated to Nikolaev.
56 Guards. odshbr pos. Azadbash (district of the city of Chirchik, Uzbekistan) *** In the winter of 1989, it was bred from Afghanistan to the city of Iolotan (Turkmenistan). In the summer of 1990 transferred to the states
air - des. brigades.
57 odshbr town. Aktogay (Taldy-Kurgan region, Kazakhstan) Transferred to the village. Georgievka, Semipalatinsk region (Kazakhstan) and disbanded there in 1989.
58 odshbr Kremenchug (Ukraine) Disbanded in December 1989.
83 odshbr Bialogard (Poland) Transferred to Ussuriysk (Primorsky Territory) in 1989. In the summer of 1990 transferred to the states
air-dec. brigades.
128 odshbr Stavropol (Stavropol AK) Disbanded in the beginning. 1990.
130 odshbr Abakan (Khakass Autonomous Okrug) Disbanded at the beginning. 1990.
1318 odshp Borovuha-1 - Borogla (Polotsk region, Belarus) Disbanded in August 1989.
1319 odshp city of Kyakhta (Chita region) Disbanded in March 1988.

With individual battalions, they acted as follows: in 1989 (maximum beginning of 1990), all battalions with PPD on the territory of the USSR were disbanded while simultaneously redeploying to the USSR those in groups of forces in Europe. Then, before the beginning 1991 they were also disbanded. Only the 901st battalion survived.

139 odshb city of Kaliningrad (Kaliningrad region) Disbanded no later than 1989.
145 odshb pos. Sergeevka (Primorsky Territory) Disbanded no later than 1989.
899 odshb city of Burg (GDR) In 1989 he was transferred to the town. Bear Lakes (Moscow region). Disbanded no later than early 1991.
900 odshb city of Leipzig - Schinau (GDR) Withdrawn to the territory of the USSR in 1989 and disbanded.
901 odshb in the district of the settlement Riechki (Czechoslovakia) In 1989 he was transferred to the city of Aluskene (Latvia). In the beginning. 1991 disbandment began, but,
soon, the battalion was re-deployed * and in May 1991 was transferred to Abkhazia (the city of Gudauta).
902 odshb city of Kecskemét (Hungary) In 1989 he was transferred to the city of Grodno (Belarus).
903 odshb Grodno (Belarus) Disbanded no later than 1989.
904 odshb Vladimir-Volynsky (Ukraine) Disbanded no later than 1989.
905 odshb Bendery (Moldova) Disbanded no later than 1989.
906 odshb pos. Khada-Bulak (Chita region, district of the city of Borzya) Disbanded no later than 1989.
907 odshb Birobidzhan (Jewish Autonomous Region) Disbanded no later than 1989.
908 odshb town. Goncharovo (Ukraine, Chernihiv region) Disbanded no later than 1989.
1011 odshb st. Maryina Gorka - Pukhovichi (Belarus) Disbanded no later than 1989.
1044 odshb city of Neuss-Lager (GDR, in the region of Königsbrück) Transferred in 1989 to the city of Tuarage (Lithuania). Disbanded no later than Jan. 1991.
1156 odshb Novograd-Volynsky (Ukraine, Zhytomyr region) Disbanded no later than 1989.
1179 odshb city of Petrozavodsk (Karelia) Disbanded no later than 1989.
1151 odshb city of Polotsk (Belarus) Disbanded no later than 1989.
1185 odshb Ravensbrück (GDR) Transferred in 1989 to Võru (Estonia). Disbanded no later than Jan. 1991.
1604 odshb city of Ulan-Ude (Buryat Autonomous Okrug) Disbanded no later than 1989

Notes:

* By this time, it was already referred to as a separate paratrooper battalion.

Thus, at the beginning of 1991, the former airborne assault units as part of the Airborne Forces were represented by eleven separate airborne brigades.

In 1989, it was decided to transfer the main part of the helicopters from the Air Force to the SV and, thus, significantly improve the capabilities of the air assault troops. However, following this, at the beginning of December 1989, an order was issued to reassign the DShV to the command of the Airborne Forces, thus leveling the formation of army aviation that was positive for the DShV. Coordination between the air assault formations and the command of the combined arms formations in the interests of which they were supposed to act turned out to be broken. The reasons for the transfer of the Airborne Forces to the administrative and operational subordination of the Airborne Forces are not clear. Without a doubt, the existing similarity in acquisition and training does not explain everything. It is possible that the reason lies (as often happens) in non-military matters proper. The inattention of the command of the Airborne Forces to the development of the doctrine of the use of helicopter landings in the early and middle stages (60s-early 80s) resulted in a kind of "envy" of the "competitor"; all the more so since the successes of the "helicopter landing" doctrine were on the face, both with us and with NATO. In principle, the logical (and theoretically correct) decision to concentrate all airborne forces under one administrative command was unjustifiably supplemented by their operational unification. The command incorrectly assessed the dependence of the DShV on helicopter support, considering it to be similar to the support of the airborne forces by VTA aircraft and not paying attention to the mandatory symbiosis of the landing force with helicopters, without which the effectiveness of the landing drops sharply.

Abbreviations and abbreviations

VDV - airborne troops
SW ̵