Systems of centralized control of the military organization. Military command and control system
The subordination of all forces and means to a single command does not depend on the name of the control body in the theater of operations (TVD). For a scientifically based solution of this issue, it is desirable to take into account firstly, positive and negative sides from the experience of the past, and Secondly, - and this is the main thing - to clearly define for the solution of what defense tasks and in what conditions of the conduct of armed struggle a new system of military command and control is being created.
SOME LESSONS FROM THE PAST
Back in the late nineteenth - early twentieth centuries. (in Franco-Prussian, Russian-Turkish, Russo-Japanese Wars) several separate armies operated on the battlefields, united by command in the theater of operations. With the increase in the scope of the armed struggle during the First World War, when 8-10 armies acted on the line of the Russian-German confrontation on both sides, it became necessary to create front commands (army groups), which included 3-4 armies each. In the Russian army - the Northern, Western and South-Western fronts, the control of the fronts was carried out by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command through the field headquarters.
In World War II the scope of the armed struggle increased even more and from the Soviet side in the army in different periods it was necessary to create up to 10-15 front commands (as organs of the operational-strategic level), including 5-9 combined arms armies, 40-70 rifle divisions, 1-3 tank armies, 1-2 air armies with a total strength of up to 800 thousand people.
At the same time, it was necessary to manage several fleets, separate formations of the Air Force, Air Defense, large formations of the reserve of the Supreme High Command and other troops. All this complicated and hampered the operational control of the Armed Forces. In addition, before the start of the war, the very organization of the strategic command and control of the Armed Forces had not been sufficiently thought out.
It was proposed that, as in the period of the Civil War, the head of state would head the Defense Council (GKO) of the country, and the main military command would be headed by the people's commissar of defense. But since he, without the knowledge of Stalin, could not make any decisions and this slowed down the management process, the latter stood at the head of the Stavka Supreme High Command. The command and control of the services, branches of the Armed Forces, logistics, technical and other services remained very low and fragmented.
In connection with this, the current situation has demanded an increase in the efficiency and effectiveness of command and control of the Armed Forces in two directions.
Firstly, emphasis was placed on enhancing the role of the General Staff as the main (and not "working") body of strategic control of the Armed Forces, freeing it from some secondary functions of recruiting and providing troops (forces). The position and status were raised, the rights and functional duties of the commands of the types of the Armed Forces, the branches of service and, above all, the Air Force, artillery, armored troops, communications, engineering troops were expanded, and a centralized rear of the Armed Forces was created. These measures have fully justified themselves.
Secondly, in order to improve control and coordination of the actions of the fronts, on 07/10/1941 it was decided to create high commands in strategic directions.
In the first, most difficult period of the war, they brought some benefit, but they did not fully justify themselves, and in September 1942 they were abolished. First of all, because they could not be turned into an ordinary governing body with the functions of planning operations and setting tasks for the fronts assigned to them. The appearance of such an intermediate link between the Headquarters and the fronts would sharply (by 2-3 days) reduce the efficiency of command and control.
All strategic operations were planned by the General Staff and operational directives were issued on behalf of the Headquarters. In addition, having no directly subordinated forces and means at their disposal, they could not significantly influence the course of operations.
However, during the war, for the first time, such a new form strategic actions, as a group of fronts operation, where the efforts of several fronts, fleets, air armies and air defense formations were combined to achieve certain strategic goals. To coordinate the efforts of the fronts and other formations in such operations, it was necessary to introduce the institution of representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Most often, G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky, N.N. Voronov, S.K. Timoshenko and others.
Military command and control bodies and their system
General management of the Armed Forces Russian Federation is carried out by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation through the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which is the main body of operational control of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. This follows from the analysis of the Regulations on the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of August 16, 2004 No. 1082.
The Ministry of Defense of Russia leads and unites the system of military control bodies of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which is being created in relation to the main links in the organizational structure of the Armed Forces. This system consists of:
a) the central bodies of military administration, which are part of the Russian Ministry of Defense;
b) bodies of military control of the branches of the Armed Forces;
c) bodies of military command and control of the arms of the Armed Forces;
d) bodies of military command and control of military districts;
e) bodies of military command and control of formations and military units;
f) local bodies of military administration (military commissariats).
The Ministry of Defense of Russia is a federal executive body that exercises the functions of developing and implementing state policy, legal regulation in the field of defense, other functions in this area established by federal constitutional laws, federal laws, acts of the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation, as well as authorized federal executive body in the field of management and disposal of property of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and subordinated to the Ministry of Defense of Russia.
The maximum number of the central apparatus of the Russian Ministry of Defense is set at 10,523 units (without personnel for the protection and maintenance of buildings).
The main tasks of the Russian Ministry of Defense are:
1) development and implementation of state policy in the field of defense;
2) legal regulation in the field of defense;
3) legal regulation of the activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and federal executive bodies subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Defense;
4) coordination of the activities of federal executive authorities and executive authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation on defense issues, coordination of the activities of the troops, military formations and bodies for the performance of tasks in the field of defense, as well as the coordination of the construction of troops and military formations;
5) coordination and control of the activities of federal executive bodies subordinate to the Ministry of Defense of Russia;
6) organization of the use of the Armed Forces in accordance with federal constitutional laws, federal laws and international treaties of the Russian Federation;
7) maintaining the necessary readiness of the Armed Forces;
8) implementation of measures for the construction of the Armed Forces;
9) ensuring social protection of military personnel, civilian personnel of the Armed Forces, citizens discharged from military service, and members of their families;
10) development and implementation of state policy in the field of international military cooperation of the Russian Federation with foreign states and international organizations and military-technical cooperation of the Russian Federation with foreign states and international organizations.
The Ministry of Defense of Russia is headed by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, who is appointed and dismissed by the President of the Russian Federation on the proposal of the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation.
The Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation reports directly to the President of the Russian Federation, and on issues referred by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal constitutional laws, federal laws and decrees of the President of the Russian Federation to the jurisdiction of the Government of the Russian Federation, to the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation.
The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.
The Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation bears personal responsibility for solving the tasks and exercising the powers assigned to the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and carries out his activities on the basis of unity of command.
The Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation has ten deputies, including two first deputies and one Secretary of State - Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. The first deputies of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation are granted the right to sign orders and directives of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation (with the exception of orders subject to state registration). The determination of the duties of the first deputies and deputy ministers of defense of the Russian Federation is carried out by the minister of defense of the Russian Federation of the Russian Federation.
In accordance with Art. 1 of the Regulations on the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the structure of the Russian Ministry of Defense includes central military command and control agencies and other units subordinate to the respective deputies in accordance with the areas of responsibility determined by them (see Fig. 9).
Rice. 9. The structure of the central bodies of military control of the Russian Ministry of Defense
The Deputy Ministers of Defense of the Russian Federation represent the Russian Ministry of Defense on certain issues in its areas of activity, organize and coordinate the exercise of the powers of the Russian Ministry of Defense in accordance with the Regulations, the distribution of duties between the Deputy Ministers of Defense of the Russian Federation and other legal acts of the Russian Ministry of Defense, as well as instructions from the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.
Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation in accordance with the distribution of duties:
a) interacts (including correspondence) with public authorities and local governments, citizens and organizations, as well as the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation and the Office of the Government of the Russian Federation;
b) directs and controls the activities of subordinate military command and control bodies, gives instructions to their leaders;
c) organizes and conducts meetings with representatives of state authorities, local governments and organizations;
d) considers appeals, documents and materials received by the Russian Ministry of Defense;
e) considers and endorses draft documents submitted for signature to the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation;
f) coordinate draft acts and other documents, and in cases established by the legislation of the Russian Federation, sign conclusions on them;
g) exercise other powers provided for by the legislation of the Russian Federation and legal acts of the Ministry of Defense of Russia.
The types of military command and control bodies are:
– headquarters- command and control body of the troops (forces), responsible for the timely organization of combat operations and the daily life of the troops (forces), their firm and continuous control in all conditions of the situation;
– command- set officials leading a military formation (institution);
– management (headquarters)- a structural subdivision of the Russian Ministry of Defense, formed according to the functional principle, which manages the corresponding direction of the activities of the troops (forces);
– department- a structural subdivision of the Russian Ministry of Defense, which performs supporting functions in a certain field of activity (financial, logistical, educational, housing and other types of support).
In accordance with the regulations on the military command and control body, job regulations, instructions of higher officials of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the head of the military command and control body:
a) exercises direct leadership of the military command and control body, bears personal responsibility for the fulfillment of the tasks and functions assigned to the military command body, as well as for the state of executive discipline;
b) interacts with other bodies of military command;
c) interacts (including correspondence) with structural subdivisions of other executive authorities;
d) ensures the preparation of draft acts and other documents in the prescribed manner;
e) ensures consideration of appeals received by the Russian Ministry of Defense, draft acts and other documents, as well as the preparation of conclusions on them;
f) provides consideration of individual and collective appeals of citizens and organizations and signs the responses to them;
g) distributes duties among his deputies, and also determines the functions of structural units and job responsibilities of directly subordinate officials;
h) ensures, in accordance with the established procedure, the implementation of activities related to the passage of military and state civil services, including submitting proposals for appointment and dismissal, temporary performance of duties, advanced training, promotion of subordinate military personnel and civilian personnel and the imposition of penalties on them;
i) involve, if necessary, in the prescribed manner, to study issues related to the areas of activity of the Ministry of Defense of Russia, scientific and other organizations, scientists and specialists;
j) signs on behalf of the Ministry of Defense of Russia on the basis of powers of attorney issued in accordance with the established procedure, contracts and other documents of a civil law nature;
k) holds meetings with representatives of state authorities, local self-government bodies and organizations on issues within its competence;
l) exercises other powers established by the regulations on the military command and control body and instructions (instructions) of higher officials of the Russian Ministry of Defense.
As mentioned above, among the central bodies of military control is General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which is the main body of operational control of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The General Staff coordinates the activities of other troops, military formations and bodies to carry out tasks in the field of defense, construction and development of the Armed Forces, as well as their use.
An important place in the system of military command and control bodies is occupied by permanent advisory bodies of military command and control. These bodies include the collegium of the Russian Ministry of Defense and military councils.
Board of the Ministry of Defense of Russia It is formed as part of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation (Chairman of the Board), his first deputies and deputies, commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, included in it ex officio, as well as other persons.
The number of members of the Board of the Ministry of Defense of Russia and its composition (except for persons included in it ex officio) are approved by the President of the Russian Federation on the proposal of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.
The Board at its meetings considers the most important issues of the activities of the Russian Ministry of Defense.
Decisions of the collegium are taken by a majority of votes of its members and are documented in minutes. If necessary, orders and directives of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation may be issued on the basis of the Board's decisions.
In case of disagreements between the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation and other members of the Board, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation puts into effect his decision and reports the disagreements that have arisen to the President of the Russian Federation. Members of the collegium have the right to report their opinion to the President of the Russian Federation.
If necessary, joint meetings of the collegiums of the Russian Ministry of Defense and other federal executive bodies are held.
Decisions adopted at joint meetings of the collegiums of the Russian Ministry of Defense and other federal executive bodies are documented in minutes and, if necessary, implemented by joint orders of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation and the heads of the relevant federal executive bodies.
military councils in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, civil defense troops are created by the President of the Russian Federation and are permanent advisory bodies.
Military councils are created:
- in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation: in the types of the Armed Forces (arms) - in the amount of 13 - 15 people; in military districts and railway troops - in the amount of 11 - 13 people; in groups of troops, armies, fleets and flotillas (commands) - in the amount of 7 - 11 people;
- in the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia: in the High Command of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia - in the amount of 11 - 13 people; in the operational-territorial formations of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia - in the amount of 9 - 11 people;
- in the civil defense troops - in the amount of 9 - 11 people.
The military councils created in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are headed respectively by the commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces, the commanders of the formations of the Armed Forces, the commander of the railway troops (chairmen of the military councils). Chiefs of the main staffs (headquarters), deputy commanders-in-chief (commanders) are members of the respective military councils as members of the military council.
The military councils created in the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia are headed respectively by the commander-in-chief of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the commanders of the troops of the operational-territorial association of internal troops (chairmen of military councils). The chief of the main headquarters of the internal troops, the chiefs of staff of the operational-territorial formations of the internal troops, the deputies of the commander-in-chief of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia and the commanders of the troops of the operational-territorial formation of the internal troops are members of the respective military councils as members of the military council.
The Military Council of the Civil Defense Troops is headed by the Minister of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergency Situations and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters (Chairman of the Military Council). The First Deputy and Deputy Ministers of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergency Situations and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters are members of the Military Council as members of the Military Council.
Other officials of the military command and control bodies are included in the military councils respectively by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Minister of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergency Situations and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters on the basis of the proposal of the relevant military council.
The President of the Russian Federation includes in the military councils:
- representatives of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation and federal executive authorities - to the military councils of the branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (arms of the armed forces), the High Command of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the civil defense troops;
- plenipotentiaries of the President of the Russian Federation in the federal districts and their deputies, representatives of the executive authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation (as agreed) - to the military councils of military districts, armies, fleets and flotillas (commands), operational-territorial formations of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia;
- representatives of the command and control bodies of other troops, military formations and bodies stationed in the territories of military districts - to the military councils of military districts.
– practical implementation of the state military policy in the troops (navies);
– construction and development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia;
- development and organization of the implementation of measures to maintain troops (fleets) in high combat and mobilization readiness;
- ensuring the high quality of combat and moral-psychological training of personnel;
- maintaining law and order, organization and military discipline in the troops (navies), strengthening unity of command;
– implementation of measures to ensure the preservation of life and health of personnel, trouble-free operation of weapons and military equipment;
– coordination of interaction with federal government authorities, government authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and local governments to ensure the implementation of legislative and other regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation in the field of national defense and state security, social and legal protection of military personnel, for the preparation of territories and communications in for purposes of defense, on issues of mobilization, conscription for military service and military training, on planning and implementing measures in the field of civil and territorial defense, as well as on other issues of organizing defense in the territories of deployment of branches of the Armed Forces, other troops, associations;
– participation in the selection, training, placement and education of personnel;
– consideration of issues of assignment military ranks and awarding state awards of the Russian Federation;
- introduction and development in the troops (navies) of new types of weapons and military equipment, coordination of military scientific work;
- solution of other issues of the activities of the troops (fleets).
The final decision on issues considered at a meeting of the military council, taking into account the adopted resolution, is taken in the prescribed manner, respectively, by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Minister of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergency Situations and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters, the commander of the troops , commander-in-chief (commander) of the relevant central body (body) of military command, association.
The management structure of a separate military unit and the main duties of its officials are determined by the UVS of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The governing bodies of an association, formation and military units function directly in associations, formations and military units.
The internal service in a military unit is managed by the commander of the military unit, and in the location of the unit - by the unit commander. The direct organizer of the internal service in the military unit is the chief of staff, and in the location of the company - the foreman of the company. Responsibility for the state of internal service in subordinate troops rests with all direct commanders.
Thus, activities to implement the functions of the Ministry of Defense of Russia and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are carried out by military bodies united in the system of the Ministry of Defense of Russia, which are established by the state, are part of the system of state (executive) authorities and are called upon to solve tasks determined by the competent state authorities. The activity of these bodies is an integral part of the exercise of the federal executive power. At the same time, in the Russian Federation there are both central bodies of military command (the Russian Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) and command bodies of associations, formations, and military units. Their activity reflects the specifics of the exercise of power in the military sphere and is an integral part of the federal executive power. The subjects and objects of the military command and control bodies of military units and formations have their own specific characteristics. The subjects of military command and control are officials and bodies that have authority (in view of their service activities) in relation to subordinate objects of command. The objects of military command and control of military units and formations are relations that develop in the process of organizing military command, life, life and activities of troops.
All military command and control bodies are created on the basis of existing regulatory legal acts. Questions of their creation and functioning are studied by military law. The presence of competent military command and control bodies in our country makes it possible to ensure the necessary combat readiness of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies in order to ensure Russia's national security.
As a result of the transformations carried out in recent years in order to separate operational and administrative functions in the Russian Defense Ministry, two functional areas of responsibility have been formed: the first is planning for the use and development of the Armed Forces, the second is planning for the comprehensive provision of troops (forces). A transition has been made to a three-level principle of responsibility: the main commands of the branches, formations and formations are responsible for combat training, and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the joint strategic commands and formations are responsible for operational training. As a result of the reforms carried out, the General Staff was freed from duplicating functions and became a full-fledged strategic planning body that organizes and manages the Armed Forces in the performance of assigned tasks. The main commands of the branches concentrate their efforts on the construction of branches, the organization of combat training, the training of junior specialists, the planning of peacekeeping activities and the provision of special types. The joint strategic command of the military district, which is designed to plan and manage all formations, formations and military units that are part of the interspecific grouping of troops in the strategic direction, with the exception of those that are part of the Strategic Nuclear Forces, becomes the interspecific control body. The commander of the troops of the military district is personally responsible for ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation within the established boundaries.
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MILITARY ADMINISTRATION: A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE
The concept of " military administration” (the power-administrative function of state authorities and officials in managing people engaged in military activities) has long been entrenched in scientific and political language. One of the first interpretations of it can be found in the "Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Sciences" late XIX in. “Military management,” it says there, “embraces numerous and versatile branches, for the management of which the appropriate special bodies are established ...” It is also widely used in modern official documents, for example, in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, the Federal Laws of the Russian Federation "On Defense", "On Martial Law", etc. True, in spirit, and often in the letter of the law, we are talking about a pair of "public authorities and military command", or in other words, about the institution of command and control of the Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and bodies.
Often the subject of analysis of military command and control, if not exclusively, then mainly, is the question of command and control of troops. Perhaps a logically complete formula for this approach was proposed by A.G. Yermishyan. According to him, military control (ideally) is an integral part of military art, ensured by the creation and functioning of military open organizational, technical and automatic control systems for various purposes and nature. Yermishyan believes that the military command and control bodies are the headquarters of military formations, as well as special bodies - direct executive units, groups or individual officials of these headquarters. But if this phrase is taken literally, then even the commander to whom the headquarters is subordinated is taken out of the framework of the military command and control system.
However, military administration is a much broader category. Its full and comprehensive coverage has not yet received due coverage in the literature. Suffice it to say that there is no article devoted to this concept in the two-volume Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, published by the Bolshoy Russian encyclopedia”, nor in the published Military Encyclopedia, seven of the eight volumes of which have already been published. Military command and control appears as a multifaceted, multifactorial and multifunctional phenomenon and, by virtue of this, already acts as an object of study in various branches of knowledge: philosophy and psychology, sociology and pedagogy, history and ergonomics, computer science and jurisprudence, etc. Military management problems are also developed within the framework of operations research, game theory, management, image science, marketing, and many other applied disciplines.
Political science also makes its contribution to the study of military administration. It has its own perspective of analysis, in which the following areas can be distinguished: the influence of politics on the nature, content and methods of military command (the political determination of military command); political aspects of military management decisions (the political content of military management activities); the place and role of military command and control in the activities of various political actors (military policy imperatives); military administration as a tool for implementing policy and a factor in increasing its effectiveness (military policy).
In order for the subsequent conversation to be substantive, it seems necessary to define the initial concepts.
Management - a type of human activity, which consists in a conscious and purposeful impact on people, objects and - through them - on processes in the interests of giving them the desired parameters of functioning and development (character, direction, dynamics, etc.). The epithet "military" characterizes everything related to the war and the army, related to the war and the army. And military command and control is a power-administrative function of state authorities and officials (more broadly, political actors) to manage people engaged in military activities. It is a special type of social regulation that ensures the creation, preservation and development of a military organization.
(in the broad sense of the word), quantitatively and qualitatively corresponding to real threats, as well as maintaining the regime of its activities.
Military activities in the state are carried out by persons who are functionally and organizationally included in its military organization: a) personnel of armed and paramilitary state formations, including irregular ones; b) representatives of state authorities and administration directly involved in the issues of defense and security of the country; c) employees of enterprises and institutions who are fully or partially engaged in the creation of weapons, military equipment and their provision to the armed forces; d) the institutions themselves and bodies related to the military organization of the state.
In this sense, it is quite legitimate to single out military-economic, military-financial, military-scientific, military-administrative, military-pedagogical and other types of military activities. However, it must be borne in mind that they acquire a military character not because military people are engaged in them (one can give any number of examples of the inclusion in military activities of purely civilians and institutions), but because they are deployed in the interests of providing effective combat training in peacetime and the successful conduct of military operations or special operations in the event of military conflict, which ( combat training and military operations) constitute a system-forming element of military activity, of all its types. It follows from this that, on the one hand, military activity is not limited solely to the conduct of armed struggle or, as one of the authors writes, "the totality of the organized use of forces and means to achieve the goals" and, on the other hand, not all military activities, in including the managerial level is of a military nature. It is characteristic that in terms of holding a general meeting (military-scientific conference) of the Academy of Military Sciences, among the main issues submitted for consideration and discussion, the following was also posed: “The increased share and importance of socio-political, economic, informational, military-technical components in the organization and implementation of military control.
S. Huntington at one time raised the question: "Is there any special skill inherent in all military officers, but not characteristic of any of the civilian groups?" In response, he wrote: "The special talent of an officer is manifested in the leadership, management and control of an organized mass of people, whose main function is the use of violence." A. Vladimirov formulated this idea even more harshly: "A military professional is a specialist in managing violence, and only an officer can be one." It is difficult to agree with such categoricalness.
First, the most important decisions on the use of armed violence are made not by professional officers, but by politicians. And we are talking not only about strategic decisions and the top military leadership of the country. There are many situations when the actions of the commander of the operational and even tactical level are regulated by political considerations.
Secondly, an officer is the person of the commanding staff of the armed forces, as they say, a regular military man. But even a junior commander can direct the use of violence, and even (in militia, partisan army, etc.) is not a military person.
Thirdly, the ability, right and duty to make a decision to fight, to manage a fight does not exhaust the peculiarity of an officer, more broadly, a military profession. There are areas of the military sphere that are not directly related to the use of violence (the creation and maintenance of defense infrastructure, medical support, pension service, educational work, public relations, etc.). By the way, Huntington understands this and therefore emphasizes that the activity of a military officer differs from other specialists existing in the armed forces. "Those people who, like doctors, do not possess the skill of" violence management ", but are members of the officer corps, are usually distinguished by special titles and insignia, and they are not allowed to command positions." However, a military doctor, military engineer, military lawyer, educator, etc. not only differ from the commander (military officer), but also have something in common with him, differing from a civilian doctor, engineer, lawyer, etc. The purpose, the nature of the armed forces determine those special duties, areas of responsibility, requirements and standards that must be observed by all military personnel.
Military activity, we repeat, is not limited to the use of military violence. Accordingly, military command and control extends to various spheres, it has moments of economic and political, organizational and technological, legal and pedagogical, etc. character. It is organically related to the types and directions that are deployed in the military sphere, but are not directly related to the conduct of military operations and are not military in the literal sense of the word. Semantically, these types are denoted by compound words in which their main content is emphasized by a second word: military-economic, military-financial, military-administrative, etc. types of management. The same part of management, which is associated with the preparation and use of violence, is called without the prefix "military": strategic, operational, combat, etc. management.
Accordingly, the objects of military control are the defense sphere and the military organization of the state and, consequently, the population, territory, economy, countries, the entire system of social relations and institutions, ordered in a certain way in the interests of ensuring military security. At the same time, managerial efforts are concentrated on the Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and bodies. Their immediate and direct object is military personnel and citizens.
In military administration, both narrow departmental isolation, which covers its conservatism with ambitious claims to exclusivity and infallibility, and the unprofessionalism of amateurs, always ready for dubious innovations, are out of place. The development and implementation of new solutions in this area should be the result of an equal dialogue between political and military figures, civil and military communities. The annual general meeting of the AVN specifically emphasized "the diversity and complexity of managerial issues and problems and the need for a combination of military and civilian specialists in this regard." At the same time, however, one should not allow purely professional issues related to the internal competence of the military leadership to become the subject of political discussions.
Semantically, the epithet "military" in the phrase "military administration" carries a double meaning. So they say about the management of society, which is carried out by military bodies and their officials or by military methods. This is always an “abnormal” situation, not typical of a democratic state. However, "abnormal" does not mean illegal. AT certain cases military administration is legal, has legal basis. Such cases include, in particular:
a) the authority of the military authorities in the territory where hostilities are being waged or martial law has been declared. Thus, the Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On Martial Law” provides that the martial law regime is carried out by state authorities and military command and control bodies, and in the territory where hostilities are taking place, it can be entrusted to military command bodies by decree of the President of the Russian Federation. At the same time, "citizens are obliged to comply with the requirements of ... military command and control bodies," which expands the powers of the latter, the scope of their competence beyond the Armed Forces.
b) power and administrative measures of the military administration for mobilization work, civil defense, pre-conscription training of youth, etc. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, in accordance with the current legislation, coordinates the activities of federal executive authorities, executive authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation on defense issues, and military commissariats, for example, designed to organize and conduct military mobilization and registration and conscription work and created by the Ministry of Defense as local military command and control bodies, work on the rights of departments (departments) of the relevant state authorities and local government
c) the activities of the occupying troops in the occupied territory. According to the 1907 Hague Convention, a territory is considered occupied when it is actually under the control of the enemy's armed forces. International humanitarian law defines the rights and obligations of the occupying power in relation to the local population, administration, etc.
However, there are situations when the military administration is established and operates in violation of democratic norms and procedures. Examples of this kind are open military dictatorships; militarization (militaryization) of government and administration, the economy and the entire public life; the inclusion of the military in power structures, etc.
Secondly, military management is the management of the country's military organization, people and structures engaged in military activities. B.M. Shaposhnikov, who knew firsthand the functions and capabilities of both the army and its headquarters, which he called the brain of the army, wrote: “The leadership in preparing for war on the political and economic fronts should be represented by a special body of the state, and not by the army, and by no means by the general staff .
On the whole, war is being prepared, waged and responsible for success or failure, not by the general staff, but by the government, which itself or through a special body (the defense council) cements the preparations on various lines. M.A. writes about the same thing today. Gareev: "Issues of military-political leadership of the armed struggle cannot be entrusted to the General Staff."
Military administration has several levels or types and forms.
1. Military policy. Its main meaning and purpose is to determine the possibility and limits of the use of military violence for political purposes, the organization and management of military development, the development and implementation of plans for the use of the Armed Forces, territorial and civil defense, the transfer of government bodies and the country's economy to work in wartime, tasks by accumulation material assets state and mobilization reserves of the Russian Federation, other defense programs. Military policy, in the interests of creating and maintaining, and, if necessary, using military force, has a regulatory effect, and in certain cases, to a certain extent, subordinates to itself the economy and administration, culture and science, education and health systems, organizing them in the interests of solving problems using military force. . Its practical side covers decision-making, development of plans and programs for the development of the military sphere; creation and maintenance of the necessary military power of the country; staffing the Armed Forces and other troops, ensuring their combat and mobilization readiness; creation of operational-strategic groupings; establishing interaction between the Armed Forces, other troops, bodies and paramilitary formations; organizing the production of weapons and military equipment; mobilization training of authorities and administration, enterprises, institutions and organizations; creation and development of defense infrastructure; operational equipment of the territory; formation of moral and psychological readiness of citizens to defend the country; creation and accumulation of mobilization resources and reserves; implementation of civil and territorial defense measures; international military cooperation in the interests of national and international security; legal regulation of defense and all military-political activities; organization of civilian control over the military sphere, etc.
2. Troop control. This is the activity of commanders, commanders, headquarters and other command and control bodies to maintain constant combat readiness of troops (forces), prepare operations (combat operations) and lead troops (forces) in the performance of their assigned tasks. It includes: (a) continuous acquisition, collection, study, display, analysis and assessment of situational data; (b) making a decision on an operation (combat); (c) setting tasks for the troops (forces); (d) planning of an operation (combat); (e) organization and maintenance of interaction and all types of support; (e) management organization; (g) preparation of subordinate command and control bodies and troops (forces) for combat operations; (h) organizing control and providing assistance to subordinate commanders (commanders), headquarters, troops (forces); (i) direct control of the actions of troops (forces) in the performance of their combat missions.
3. Management activities of military personnel. The right and duty to make a decision to fight and direct the fight does not exhaust the managerial functions of military personnel. They own a vital role in the implementation of such tasks of the Armed Forces, formulated in the official publication of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, as the organization and conduct of information confrontation; prevention and suppression of sabotage and terrorist acts; prevention of environmental disasters and other emergencies, elimination of their consequences; involvement of military science in the development and examination of military-political decisions through the relevant committees of the State Duma and the Security Council; improvement of the provision of pensions for servicemen; rehabilitation of invalids of military service; military-patriotic work among citizens, especially young people; participation in solving the problems of homeless and neglected children, etc. And the organization of the daily life of the troops requires a lot of managerial decisions that are not directly related to the use of armed violence or its support.
4. Moral and psychological support for the activities of the troops. The degree of psychological stability of personnel, their moral readiness to conduct combat operations is an integral part and a necessary condition for the combat capability of troops, and in this sense, moral and psychological support is constituent element troop control. At the same time, this area of activity is broader than command and control. “The burden of war,” wrote military figure and theorist A.E. Snesarev, - only part of the population, that is, the military, cannot bear it, but the entire population must bear it, and for this ... it must go through not only the stage of technical military education that is inevitable in the event of war, it must understand and think through its spiritual side, understand its inevitability, importance, evaluate its state meaning, that is, comprehend the philosophy of war. Almost the same is said in the official publication of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: “High fighting spirit and morale of military personnel do not suddenly and immediately arise. They are the result of a conscious, purposeful and systematic impact on the worldview, intellect, morality and psyche of both the whole people and individual citizens. These qualities are not formed by a group of narrow specialists assigned specifically to educate people. They arise in the family, and then patiently nurtured, encouraged and improved by many institutions of the state, public organizations, and the media.” The moral and psychological state of military personnel is influenced by the socio-political situation in the country and the activities of the media, public and religious associations, cultural and educational organizations, etc.
At all four levels, military administration appears as an activity determined by the possibility of war and the existence of the army. But war and the army are inherently political phenomena, and therefore military administration cannot but have a political character, a political content. Not everything in it fits into the political parameters: there are quite a few operational-strategic, organizational-technical, administrative, economic and other tasks of a non-political nature. Nevertheless, it is characteristic that in the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation the first of the three sections is called “Military-Political Foundations”, and the already mentioned document of the Ministry of Defense emphasizes the need for federal level develop and implement a program of military-political education of Russian citizens and military-political education of military personnel, which would allow each citizen to clearly understand how wars arise, are waged, what wars lead to and what they cost peoples and states.
What is within the political is investigated by political science. Political science is the science of politics. This is an independent scientific and educational discipline, which has its own clearly defined subject of research and study. At the same time, this concept denotes a certain discourse, or a paradigm of the analysis of phenomena and processes that reveal their two-way connection with politics. In the phrase "political science of military command" the term political science does not mean science, but its inherent procedures and research results. In a more detailed and precise formula, one should speak of the political components of military command and control. By the way, it is in this sense that the phrases “philosophy of military command”, “sociology of military command”, “psychology of military command”, “culture (culturology) of military command”, etc. are legitimately used. What is "political"? What determines and expresses its nature, its specificity in comparison with non-political phenomena? How does the political reveal itself and manifest itself in the sphere of military administration?
There are several alternative approaches in interpreting the relationship between politics and governance and, accordingly, in understanding the political content of governance.
The first is characterized by the separation and, in a sense, the opposition of politics and management. Its supporters believe that politics is the business of a small group of people who are at the head of the state (tops), and management is a function of organizational structures that are outside of politics. In Western political thought, this idea is expressed in the formula: "Politicians are engaged in politics, and officials are in control." At the same time, it is understood that the adoption of important decisions for society belongs to management, and the provision of their legitimacy belongs to politics. Meanwhile, as O. Shabrov writes, the official, through whose actions the state controls the destinies of people, does not function in an imaginary political vacuum. As a layman, he is influenced public opinion, own political predilections, material interests. As a functionary, he is included in the implementation of the policy that is currently declared state. In relation to military administration, the Russian military thinker A.M. wrote about this at the beginning of the last century. Volgin: “Changing laws is not the job of the army; its task is one thing - to protect those laws and the political system that exist "today." The army must protect them until the day when the legitimate authority cancels "today's" law and replaces it with a new one, then the army will protect this new law or order.
In the second approach, a special part is singled out in the management system - political management, which is understood as the regulation of power relations, ultimately concentrating around the issues of the structure and functioning of the state. In this sense, political administration differs from other types of administration, according to the principle that separates politics and economics, politics and law, politics and war, etc. According to the followers of this approach, it is characterized by specific political terms and management methods: hearings, negotiations, statements, agreements, etc. They believe that political management develops and implements decisions acceptable to all political actors, based on consensus or compromise. There is no place for coercion, forceful pressure or restraint. Such an understanding of political management echoes the idea of M. Weber, who saw in politics not the use of power, but only “the desire to participate in power or to influence the distribution of power” ... It follows, for example, from the recognition that pedagogical methods political problems are not solved, or the demand for the abandonment of administrative methods in politics.
There are no words: the organization of society's vital activity is not exhausted by political management. Much of it is provided by the structures and mechanisms of non-political governance. Coercion in relation to criminals, traffic control, determining the organizational structure of a military unit or the daily routine in it, like so many other things, are in themselves devoid of political content. However, it has long been said that there is nothing that would not be related to politics in one way or another, just as there is nothing that would be fully included in politics. The line between political and non-political governance is not so impenetrable. Its vagueness is explained, firstly, by the fact that political power sometimes takes upon itself the regulation of issues that are not related to the system of power. Second, the unresolved or inadequate regulation of private matters can be a cause of public concern and require policy intervention.
Political management cannot abstract from the fact that the main thing in politics is the division of people into opposite groups in their attitude to power, its formation, organization, administration. No managerial decision can equally affect different groups population. And it is not at all accidental that the state in its policy during internal plan last but not least, it relies on law and enforcement agencies, and externally, it ensures sovereignty and territorial supremacy, including the ability to protect them by military means. At the same time, any purely economic, purely administrative, purely ecological, etc., and in this case a purely military managerial decision has some political content or another. A problem and its solution have a political character if it: (1) concerns the issue of state power; (2) affects the interests and is in the sphere of attention of the general population; (3) has a legal dimension and requires a legal definition and decision; (4) the public authority, its structures and persons recognize the right to solve this problem or the masses demand such a solution from them; (5) citizens show their attitude towards it through traditional mechanisms political participation; (6) becomes an object (subject) of rivalry and struggle for power between different political groups.
The foregoing fully applies to military command and control. In the military command and control system, policy and strategy, operational and administrative functions are closely interconnected, although they have relative independence. At the very least, the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security states that each signatory state will constantly provide and maintain effective leadership and control over their military, paramilitary and security forces by constitutionally established authorities with democratic legitimacy and create leverage to ensure that such authorities fulfill their constitutional and legal obligations.
Political in military management is as follows.
First, the content and nature of military command, its direction and scope, like many other parameters, are "given" by politics. It is she who determines the purpose of the army, its functions and tasks, the procedure and rules for its use, including in cases not related to ensuring military security. The decision on the use of force and, if it is made, the choice of the right moment for its use, is in the hands of political leaders. Military administration serves to implement their decisions. Its scope includes creating the framework within which such decisions can be made, preparing options, planning for contingencies and ensuring the highest degree of effectiveness of the military organization and the armed forces as its core. At the same time, political attitudes determine not only the goals of military command, but also its principles, specific tasks, methods, and so on.
It is clear, after all, that the possibilities and limits of military control differ significantly in conditions when politics is oriented towards subordinating the entire life of the country to the task of creating and maintaining an army (“first priority in meeting the needs of defense”, “guns instead of butter”) and when it seeks to solve socio-economic problems of society due to the curtailment of the defense efforts of the state (“the residual principle of ensuring the defense sphere”, “oil instead of guns”). Of course, between these extremes there is a so-called golden mean. In the Russian Federation, for example, "development and military planning are now based on the geopolitical needs of the Russian Federation and the principle of defense sufficiency, and not on the actually existing potential." The change of these principles of military development, the transition from one to another is determined not by the maturity of the armed forces, not by the military command's own considerations, but by the political position and decisions of the state authorities.
The subordination of military control to political control in its most open and hypertrophied form manifests itself during periods of social upheaval and political transformations, when direct control over military leaders by the authorities is introduced. This control can be exercised by commissars, as was the case during the civil war in France and Russia, by political agencies operating in the Soviet army, and by other institutions. In a stable, consolidated and democratic society, there is no need for such control. However, even in it the army cannot be and is not a self-sufficient entity. The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security establishes that each participating State will at all times ensure and maintain effective leadership and control of its military, paramilitary and security forces by constitutionally established authorities with democratic legitimacy, clearly defining functions and tasks of such forces and create leverage to ensure that such bodies fulfill their constitutional and legal obligations, and will not allow the existence of forces that are not accountable to their constitutionally established authorities or are not controlled by them, and will not support such forces. It sees democratic political control of military and paramilitary forces, internal security forces, and intelligence services and police as an indispensable element of stability and security.
However, civilian control cannot be regarded as a kind of counterbalance to military control, much less as an alternative to it. Meanwhile, in our country there are attempts of such absolutization. Thus, in the State Duma of the last convocation, the draft law “On civilian control and management of military organization and activities” was discussed. In its name, control and management are completely unlawfully combined. After all, such a formulation, in essence, takes military professionals beyond the framework of developing, adopting and implementing military and military-political decisions. It is quite natural that civilian control, so understood, does not, to put it mildly, find support among those who understand the meaning of unity of command, the significance of state secrets, the peculiarities of army operational and administrative activities, and so on. Quite rightly, the report of the Ministry of Defense emphasizes that the effectiveness of civilian control over the military sphere depends on the fact that the subjects of control have solid military knowledge, without which even well-intentioned creativity in this matter will be subject to superficial or distorted ideas and judgments about the state of affairs in the army, may take ugly forms or fall under the influence of pacifist myths about the "original sinfulness" of all the military in general.
Secondly, as a specific type of activity, military management assumes, includes a realistic assessment of the geopolitical and geostrategic situation in the world and possible trends in its development, understanding the associated place of the armed forces in the life of society, internal and foreign policy states. It is deployed with a focus on the outside world: based on the existing peaceful conditions, it also takes into account all possible, that is, theoretically permissible options for the outbreak of wars and armed conflicts and the corresponding requirements for the army. It has long been said that the behavior of an army that does not strive to master all the means, all the methods of struggle that the enemy has or can have is unreasonable or even criminal. Military management is effective, which takes into account the trends in the development of military affairs in the world, adequately responds to the military efforts of other states and guarantees the military security of the country. At the same time, in conditions where the limited capabilities of the state do not allow reaching the required level of its defense capability, one has to look for non-standard solutions that can ensure the country's military security, whether it is the creation of a nuclear deterrence potential, the organization of collective self-defense, or hope for peace as a reward for curtailing any there was no military effort of its own. But both that, and another, and the third belong to the sphere of politics.
Thirdly, military construction, although relatively independent, is an integral part of the state's defense efforts and, as such, cannot be a self-sufficient process. It is conducted on the basis of and taking into account the demographic, economic, scientific, technical and other possibilities of the country. The creation and maintenance of military power includes all aspects of all areas of state building. Because of this, on the one hand, its content is decisively influenced by the nature of the political regime established in the country, the history and culture of the people, the level of institutional and socio-economic development of society, etc. These factors in each state have specific content and forms, which determines variety of approaches to security problems. On the other hand, various bodies of state power and local self-government are involved in solving the defense tasks of the state, and, consequently, in military administration. In the Russian Federation, their functions and powers in this area are defined in the laws "On Defense", "On the State of War", the Concept of National Security and other documents. As for the military leaders themselves, they are appointed to the post by the political authorities and must be loyal to it. This is not about personal loyalty, but about loyalty to the regime. In the United States, Congress formally approves every appointment and production of officers. In our country, according to the Constitution, the President appoints and dismisses the high command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
Fourthly, military administration is carried out on a strictly legitimate and legal basis, it is built in accordance with and through law, which has a special branch - military law. Military practice cannot be discretionary. Signatory States to the above-mentioned Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security committed themselves to ensuring that the commanding staff of the armed forces comply with national laws and international law, and that they are aware of the possibility of individual liability under these laws for the unlawful exercise of such powers. Orders contrary to national law and international law, should not be given away. At the same time, the responsibility of superiors in no way relieves subordinates of their own individual responsibility. At the same time, the political and military leadership must ensure public agreement on the measures taken in the military field. Such agreement is achieved by the justification of the measures themselves, as well as by explanatory work on their necessity and content.
Fifthly, management activities are public in nature. The Armed Forces are, first of all, people and their management is carried out by people, has as its object a mass of military personnel. The military organism does not depersonalize military personnel. Each of them in their activities is guided by certain personal interests, guided by consciousness and feelings, adheres to moral standards, one way or another conforms to legal requirements. All this inevitably leaves an imprint on the motivation of behavior and the very behavior of people, their attitude to military duty and thus on the appearance and capabilities of the armed forces.
That is why the inalienable and important part military construction and management is information and ideological support. "Basic Provisions military doctrine of the Russian Federation" emphasize the need to implement a set of state measures to increase the prestige of military service; creation and improvement of the system of military-patriotic education and pre-conscription training; formation of the moral and psychological readiness of citizens to defend the Fatherland; creation and improvement of the system of education of servicemen of the Armed Forces and other troops. The effectiveness of military construction is largely determined by the value orientations and attitudes of people entering the military system. “The first need of the army,” wrote Russian General R.A. Fadeev, - the high opinion of the military about their rank, which finds a sympathetic response in society. If a society is fully aware of itself as a nation, then (in the state of the world that continues for the time being) it must highly value its army, in which national power is exercised; to appreciate the army means to appreciate the people who make it up. That's why the number important tasks military management activities include ensuring the development and introduction into the public consciousness of the country of the positive idea of the army.
Military theory and practice are not self-sufficient quantities. In their content, character, forms, the nature of the era, the level of development of military affairs, sociocultural factors, historical traditions and national characteristics of peoples, the political goals of states, etc. are refracted in a certain way. Accordingly, military administration is not a given quantity once and for all.
It can be based on different worldview foundations (for example, secular or religious), philosophical trends and schools (materialistic or idealistic, behaviorist or existentialist), military-political attitudes and priorities (here the extremes are militarism(a set of economic political, ideological means aimed at preparing for war) and pacifism(unconditional condemnation of any war, renunciation of war), as well as aggressive, militaristic, aggressive, defensive, hegemonic, expansionist, pacifist and other premises, etc.
However, in any case, we are talking about the sum of rules that are by no means arbitrary, but constitute an organic integrity, the obligatory adherence to which expands the possibilities in foresight, understanding and resolving constantly arising problems in military organizational development.
In 1997, the Air Defense Forces and the Air Force were transformed into a single branch of the Armed Forces
With this material, "VKO" completes a series of articles that dealt with the formation and development of the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces - from 1992 until their unification into one branch of the Armed Forces - the Air Force. The readers of the journal are offered analytical material reflecting the state of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces on the eve of the unification, some aspects of the merger, as well as the initial appearance of the new Air Force.
The essence of the military reform of the late 1990s. there was a significant reduction in the number and transition of the Armed Forces to a new specific structure. On July 16, 1997, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 725 "On priority measures to reform the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and improve their structure."
WHAT IS SUPPOSED
The presidential decree ordered:
Rocket troops strategic purpose, Military Space Forces and Space Rocket Defense Troops of the Air Defense Forces in the form of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - Strategic Missile Forces, consisting of missile armies, military units and launch and control institutions spacecraft, associations and formations of the rocket and space defense forces.
Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces - to the Main Directorate ground forces, directorate of missile troops and artillery of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, military air defense of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, army aviation.
to transform the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces into a branch of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - the Air Force;
give the military districts the status of operational-strategic (operational-territorial) commands of the RF Armed Forces in the corresponding strategic directions. Assign to the military districts within their borders the functions of operational leadership of formations, formations and military units of the types and types of troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies on national defense issues.
It took the Ministry of Defense almost 20 days to comprehend the presidential decree and prepare the corresponding order. Only on August 3, 1997, Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev signed an order that determined the procedure for implementing Decree No. 725 in the Armed Forces. We emphasize that even the ideology of the development of the Armed Forces was behind the above-mentioned documents - the Concept for the construction of the Armed Forces was developed and approved only on August 7, 1997.
The latter provided for "implementation of the unification of branches of the Armed Forces - Air Force and Air Defense Forces - related in terms of tasks, methods, areas of application and basics of command and control." This was supposed to allow "comprehensive use of their operational-strategic capabilities, the capabilities of the combat arms of the air defense and aviation forces according to a single concept and plan and under a single leadership."
As part of the unification of the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces, the principle of single responsibility for fighting the enemy in the aerospace sphere was laid down. It was assumed that on this basis the tasks of operational training of troops and forces, organization of command and control, improvement of the forms and methods of their use, and combat duty in air defense would be solved more effectively. At the same time, narrow-departmental approaches should have been excluded. It was planned that all types of air defense troops and aviation forces should develop in a balanced way in order to achieve a single goal - ensuring the national security of the state in the air, and then in the aerospace sphere.
In the area of armaments, it was planned to pursue a unified military-technical policy. On this basis, duplication in the development of advanced weapons, dispersal of material resources was to be excluded, the unification of the created weapons and their compatibility in a single ACS was to be ensured, and the range of weapons was reduced. It was planned to reduce the cost of developing and purchasing weapons and military equipment. In addition, it was planned to create favorable conditions for the formation of unified systems of support and training of personnel, which would also make it possible to use resources more economically.
The Air Force was to become the most important strike offensive-defensive and the main maneuver branch of the Armed Forces. The main goal of the Air Force, as the military leadership assumed at that time, was to be the conquest and retention of air supremacy in military conflicts of any scale (it was somehow forgotten about solving air defense tasks for a certain period of time).
Almost all the tasks that had before the unification of the Air Defense Forces and the Air Force separately had been assigned to the new type of the Armed Forces. The contribution of the Air Force to the solution of tasks of the Armed Forces using conventional weapons, according to military experts and scientists, should have been 35-60% in general, and up to 80% in theater operations. To do this, it was necessary to have an appropriate grouping of aviation and air defense forces, and the Ministry of Defense to ensure, not in words, but in deeds, their priority development - to allocate up to 25-30 billion rubles. annually, i.e. 30-35% of the budget of the Moscow Region.
This was in line with the practice of allocating appropriations in the developed countries of the world. In fact the new kind The Russian Armed Forces not only did not receive the funds that two types of Armed Forces had before their merger, but even one and a half times less than the Air Force alone before the merger with the Air Defense Forces.
HOW UNITED
Work on the creation of a unified air force lasted a year and a half. The first step was to determine the ideology of creating a new species. In 1997, the Air Force Construction Plan was developed by the forces of two commanders-in-chief (Air Defense Forces and Air Force). He determined the content and order of priority measures until 2001. Before January 1, 1999, it was supposed to complete the transformation of the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces into a qualitatively new Air Force.
Three meetings of the joint plenums of the scientific and technical committees of the Air Defense Forces and the Air Force were held, at which the ways of developing and improving the control system of the future Air Force, the development of aviation, and the prospects for the development of radar equipment were discussed and ultimately determined.
At the same time, the State Defense Order was adjusted taking into account the needs of the combined type within the allocated appropriations.
By March 1998, the directorates of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Air Force (Moscow) and the Air Defense Forces (Zheleznodorozhny) were reorganized into the Directorate of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Zheleznodorozhny). The number of two headquarters was almost a thousand military personnel and just over 250 civilian personnel. The new main command was formed with a total number of about 950 people, of which 78% were military personnel.
None of the former leaders of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces (Generals P.S. Deinekin, V.A. Prudnikov, V.P. Sinitsyn) stood at the head of a new type of armed forces. Since March 1998, the aviator (but earlier - the commander of the Moscow Air Defense District) General A.M. Kornukov.
By November 1998, the development of the Concept for the construction of the Air Force was at the final stage and was coordinated in the structures of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. This document was developed taking into account the size limits established for the Air Force and took into account the long-term aspects of the construction of the Air Force for the period after 2005. Subsequently, this concept was refined twice - in 2000 and 2003.
The document determined that the purpose of building the Air Force is to transform the Air Force into a qualitatively new type of Armed Forces, having a rational structure and balanced combat strength, equipped with modern equipment and weapons, capable of solving problems in various types of military conflicts using both conventional and nuclear weapons.
To achieve this goal, it was envisaged: clarification of the tasks of the Air Force; bringing the strength of the Air Force to the established level; improving the structure of the Air Force; increasing the combat readiness of the Air Force by improving the systems for operating and repairing weapons and military equipment, modernizing it and gradually re-equipping it with new equipment and weapons; creation of unified systems of management, provision, training of personnel and reserves; improving the training of Air Force formations for combat operations; improvement of the military-scientific complex, development of the theory of construction, training and use of the Air Force; creation of a new regulatory framework for the Air Force, including combat manuals, manuals and manuals, as well as other documents regulating the preparation and conduct of operations and combat operations by formations, formations, units and subunits of the Air Force.
The formation of a new structure of the combat strength of the combined type was carried out in the conditions of the separate existence of the main command offices of the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces (with the direct participation of the GOMU and the GOU of the General Staff). The new structure of the unified Air Force was approved on January 27, 1998. The total strength of the Air Force was subject to a one-time reduction by almost half (by 1.7 times), and the share of combat strength from the established strength limit should be unchanged and amount to 60%. The task of reaching the established combat strength and strength had to be solved before the end of 1998.
Under these conditions, the leadership of the newly created Air Force High Command determined the most important directions for reforming the governing bodies, associations, formations and institutions of the new service of the Armed Forces. They were: maintaining the combat readiness and combat readiness of aviation and air defense groupings in the main strategic directions, their ability to perform operational tasks to ensure security and protect national interests. The optimization of the structure of the Air Force control bodies was carried out by increasing the centralization of command and control, eliminating parallel and duplicating structures, increasing the efficiency of the command and control system, and clarifying the network of military educational institutions.
In carrying out this task, measures were taken to revise the composition and structure of army and corps sets, units and subunits; the storage base of the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces, the structure of bases for the storage and repair of weapons and equipment was transferred to a new number, mainly in terms of storage conditions; the number of communication centers and RTOs has been reduced; the total number of engineering, engineering-aerodrome and training parts; the structure and composition of military educational institutions of the Air Force was revised.
Of the reduced number (about 125 thousand military personnel) due to the exclusion from the combat strength of two types of armed forces, 14 division directorates, 36 aviation regiments, 26 anti-aircraft missile regiments, 12 radio engineering units, were reduced and transferred to other types Armed Forces of the Russian Federation up to 66 thousand military personnel. The rest of the number had to be found at the expense of the supply units of the governing bodies, rear and technical units, and military educational institutions.
For this, 620 units for various purposes (not included in the combat strength) were disbanded, including 79 units for providing military command and control, 6 training units, 7 military educational institutions. More than 40,000 individual military positions have been cut.
The system of military education suffered serious damage. As part of the new type at the time of the merger, there were 20 universities. In March 1998, more than 4,500 young officers were graduated from the Air Force universities, and since March 1, 1998, officer training has been carried out only in ten universities and four branches, including the academy, two military universities, and seven military institutes . Thus, the training network of both types was reduced by almost 30%.
Despite the most difficult conditions, in the new form of the Armed Forces, it was possible to basically preserve combat aviation, the control system, parts of electronic and radar reconnaissance in the main directions, and direct anti-aircraft missile cover for certain important objects of the country and the Armed Forces.
Moreover, in 1998, opportunities were found to form the directorates of the 14th A Air Force and Air Defense (Novosibirsk), the 16th SAK (Kubinka), the 41st Air Defense Division (Ob) and seven personnel of air defense , five of which were later deployed to a reduced strength. Subsequently, in 2000, a heavy bomber was additionally formed aviation regiment using aircraft strategic aviation received from Ukraine. The Air Force grouping in the North Caucasus has been significantly strengthened.
In the conditions of a sharp reduction in the number of leadership of a new type, it was forced to follow the path of unification of the control bodies of the operational level - the structures of the directorates of the air armies and the directorates of individual air defense armies merged. At the same time, they tried to maintain the maximum possible number of combat units of the branches of aviation and the branches of the air defense forces.
Significant differences in the new organizational structure of the Air Force in comparison with the previous structure were:
the abolition of the Long-Range Aviation and Military Transport Aviation commands, instead of which the 37th VA VGK (SN) and the 61st VA VGK (VTA) were formed, respectively;
instead of air armies and individual armies (districts) of air defense, new operational formations were formed - armies (districts) of the air force and air defense.
The merger of associations of types of the Armed Forces - air armies and individual air defense armies - was not provided for by decree of the President of the Russian Federation in 1997 No. 725. But for those who put into practice the strict requirements of the General Staff on the number of troops (and the inexpediency of such a deep reduction in the combat and numerical strength of the Air Force, with all the ensuing consequences, has been repeatedly proved at all levels), there was no other way out either.
The dilemma: either leave the governing bodies, or - those military organisms that decide the fate of military operations on the battlefield decided in favor of the latter. Not all veterans (including former executives) The Air Force and Air Defense Forces are aware of this even today, accusing the specialists involved in this almost of a crime.
The unification of armies was carried out according to the territorial principle:
in the North-Western Air Defense Zone - the 6th Air Defense Division and the 76th Air Force Air Force;
in the Central Air Defense Zone - the Air Defense Ministry and the 16th Air Force Air Force;
in the North Caucasian air defense zone - the 12th Air Defense OK and the 4th Air Force Air Force;
in the Siberian Air Defense Zone - the 14th Air Defense OA and the 23rd Air Force Air Force;
in the Eastern Air Defense Zone - the 11th Air Defense OA and the 1st Air Force Air Force.
The distances between the locations of the VA FN and KP OA (OK) Air Defense departments (with the exception of the 23rd VA and the 14th Air Defense Division) made it possible to unify. At the same time, they tried to avoid a significant breakdown of the existing combat command and control system and, at minimal cost, create a unified command and control system for formations and units of the Air Defense Forces and air armies within the boundaries of the indicated air defense zones.
An important issue was the choice of a base for creating a command post of the newly organized structure. There were two options: to use for this the existing command posts of the air armies or individual armies (corps) of the air defense.
The control posts of the VA FN were, as a rule, semi-buried and poorly protected structures. They were intended to accommodate small numbers of combat crews. The tasks of controlling the combat operations of front-line aviation were solved in a non-automated way.
Refinement of these CPs for solving air defense tasks required significant investments. So, for example, when deploying the command post of the formation of the Air Defense Forces and the Air Force (which includes the troops and forces of the Air Defense Ministry and the 16th VA) on the basis of the 16th VA (Kubinka), the following additional costs were required (in 1994 prices): construction of a new CP - 3-3.5 billion rubles; purchase, installation and commissioning of CSA equipment - 2.5 billion rubles; equipment (lease) of additional communication, control and warning channels - 1.2 billion rubles; construction of barracks and housing stock - 230 million rubles.
The total costs of combining the VA FN and OA (OK) Air Defense into new formations and the creation of a command post of associations of the Air Defense Forces and the Air Force on the basis of the existing command posts of the VA FN amounted to at least 37.15 billion rubles.
The option of using the KP OA (OK) air defense base was more preferable. The absence at that time of an automated control system for front-line aviation facilitated the task of combining the directorates of the VA and the OA (OK) of the air defense on the basis of the OA (OK) of the air defense.
This entailed the costs associated with the additional equipment of individual elements of the command post of air defense formations in the interests of accommodating combat crews of aviation command posts, the introduction of additional channels and communication lines for control and warning, as well as the construction of a barracks and housing stock in addition to those already available at the command post OA (OK) air defense. In total, this amounted to 1.15 billion rubles.
The difference in the required investments for the creation of a command and control system for formations of a new type of armed forces by more than 30 times unambiguously determined the deployment of command posts (CPs and headquarters) of the Air Force and Air Defense armies.
After the completion of the organizational measures planned for 1998, the combat composition of the Air Force included: 1 operational-strategic (Moscow District of the Air Force and Air Defense) and 7 operational formations (37th and 61st VA VGK, 4, 6, 11, 14th Army of the Air Force and Air Defense, 5th OK Air Force and Air Defense), 28 operational-tactical (tactical) formations (air defense corps - 6, mixed aviation corps - 1, air defense divisions - 5, air defense brigades - 4, aviation divisions - 12), aviation regiments - up to 70, anti-aircraft missile regiments - up to 40, radio engineering units - 25, formations and units of intelligence and electronic warfare - up to 10.
The most important issue in the construction of the Air Force was to determine the rational ratio of the shock and defensive components of the Air Force. By the end of 1998, in terms of the number of units, there was an approximate equality in the composition of the strike (heavy bomber, bomber and attack air regiments), air defense (fighter air regiments) and ground defense (anti-aircraft missile regiments) components of the Air Force. At the same time, the ratio of strike aircraft and fighter aviation as of January 1, 1999, it was 0.87:1, which testified to the relative weakness of the shock component.
In the future, it was supposed to provide for an increase in the impact component by 10-20%. This could be achieved by increasing the number of long-range, bomber and attack aircraft in the structure of the Air Force aviation fleet, modernizing the IA for operations on ground targets, and re-equipping the Air Force after 2005 with fifth-generation multi-purpose aircraft. Such measures made it possible to quickly switch from predominantly defensive to offensive operations and vice versa with the aim of the most rational use of forces in a specific situation.
Today it can be stated that the main goal - the creation of a qualitatively new Air Force, incorporating balanced DA and VTA groups, combined groups of attack front-line and fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft missile and radio engineering troops, intelligence and electronic warfare formations and units, has basically been achieved.
In terms of quantitative parameters, the Air Force was at the level necessary to solve the problems of repelling aggression on a local and, to a very limited extent, regional scale using conventional weapons. However, in fact, in view of the low level of training of personnel, the equipment of control systems, the technical condition and serviceability of weapons and military equipment, the state of infrastructure and the serviceability of airfields, the capabilities of the groupings created by the Air Force could be realized by no more than 30%. The share of modern technology was: in aviation - 30%, in RTV - up to 50%, and only in ZRV - 100%.
In the course of organizational and regular activities, the strongest blow was dealt to the air defense system and, above all, to the anti-aircraft missile forces. Compared to 1998, the ZRV grouping was reduced by 46%. This made it necessary to move from a layered defense system for covered objects, built on the basis of anti-aircraft missile formations and units of a mixed composition (air defense systems and air defense systems S-200, S-300, S-75 and S-125), to building a system for covering objects based on only one SAM type.
It was decided to abandon the air defense systems of the old park. First, air defense systems of the S-200 and S-75 types, which have liquid-propellant missiles, were withdrawn from the combat composition of the air defense missile systems. Then - S-125 air defense systems with solid-propellant missiles. Relatively new and multi-channel anti-aircraft missile systems S-300 of the PT, PS, PM modification with solid-fuel missiles remained on the cover of the most important objects of the country and the Armed Forces. Today, the ZRV groupings as part of the S-300PS and S-300PM air defense systems are actually already creating two lines of defense on the outskirts of the facility.
The level of training of personnel of all military branches in the late 1990s. (with the exception of RTV) has steadily declined. The average annual flight time of aviation crews did not exceed 10-15 hours (for comparison, in NATO countries for the same period it was at least 120 hours). The training of other specialists did not meet modern requirements. Due to the sharp decline in prestige military service training for the Air Force was difficult.
The actual state of funding for the Air Force was at the level of 40-50% of what was required for their maintenance and development. In practice, this made it possible to complete only 15-20% of the ongoing R&D in 1998. The purchase of weapons at the same time amounted to no more than 3-5% of the required. With such a combat strength and the pace of rearmament, the Air Force grouping in quantitative and qualitative terms was practically unable to solve the tasks set in the National Security Concept and the Basics of Military Doctrine. This was brought to the attention of the leadership of the General Staff.
The lack of forces was supposed to be compensated by the rationality of their structure, the improvement of the control system, the optimization of the forms and methods of their application. Four control bodies of the former Air Force were disbanded - the aviation commands of DA, VTA, FA and Reserve and training, which were considered operational-strategic associations.
Fundamentally new formations for the RF Armed Forces also appeared in the structure of the Air Force - a district, armies and a separate corps of the Air Force and Air Defense. And if before the unification of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces in the former structure they had their own operational art and forms of application, then the newly created associations did not yet have such even in theory.
Another feature also influenced their development and development. In fact, the merger of two main commands was carried out, one of which previously (GK Air Force) had only administrative functions, and the second (GK Air Defense Forces) was endowed with both administrative and operational functions. The High Command of the Air Defense Forces planned and carried out, under the general supervision of the General Staff, a strategic operation to repel an enemy aerospace attack. This required the endowment of the united main command with new functions and, in turn, made appropriate demands on the leadership.
The very structure of the Air Force High Command has undergone significant changes. The types of troops (forces) were determined by aviation, anti-aircraft missile and radio engineering troops. All previously existing types of aviation (BA, IBA, IA, SHA, RA, TrA) were eventually consolidated into one department - the department of the chief of aviation of the Air Force, while the departments of the chiefs of the ZRV and RVT remained the same. An independent "barrel" of air defense, which combined air defense aviation (IA), ZRV and RTV, was not created.
An essential feature was also a serious difference in the level of development of the control systems of the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces. If the Air Defense Forces always worked in real time and had a centralized automated system command and control from the Central Command Center of the Air Defense Forces to the subdivision of the branch of service, and the automation of weapon control was practically carried out from a part (compound) of the branch of service to the means of destruction, the Air Force did not have such a system. Even the principles of building control systems for the Air Defense Forces and the Air Force differed significantly.
In addition, the established subordination of the new Air Force formations should also be taken into account. Presidential Decree No. 725 of 1997 gave military districts the status of "operational-strategic (operational-territorial) commands of the RF Armed Forces in the corresponding strategic directions."
Thus, the Air Force and Air Defense armies, remaining directly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, were operationally subordinate to the commander of the troops of the military districts, as the commander of the troops of the operational-strategic commands of the RF Armed Forces.
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FORMS OF APPLICATION
The development and mastering by the troops of new forms of employment of the Air Force and their formations took a long time. This issue remains not fully resolved, including due to the further improvement of the command and control system for groupings of troops in strategic directions (SN) and the creation of regional commands.
The most significant role in the development of the forms of employment of qualitatively new Air Forces, oddly enough, was not made by the VVA im. Gagarina Yu.A., and Military Academy VKO them. Marshal Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov.
A significant reduction in the number of air defense forces and means, as well as the inclusion of the RKO troops in the Strategic Missile Forces, and then the Space Forces, led to the fact that the previously existing form of strategic actions to defeat the enemy's air and space attack - there was nothing to provide with a strategic operation to repel an enemy aerospace attack . Instead, the theory of the strategic aerospace operation (SVKO) was developed, which had a number of significant features.
Due to the decrease in the total number of available forces, the goals and objectives of a modern operation could not be as decisive as before, and the number of operations simultaneously conducted within its framework could only be smaller. The scope of the operation was also narrowed down to one or part of two strategic aerospace directions. The necessary concentration of troops (forces) for its conduct could be achieved only by maneuvering troops (forces) from other regions and directions, but this already became a strategic maneuver of troops and forces.
At the same time, the proposals of the Air Force Commander-in-Chief on the forms of use of Air Force formations by the General Staff were taken into account only partially, thereby significantly restricting the initiative of the commanders: the Air Force formations were assigned the main form of their use - military operations. The operation of the Air Force formations (VA VGK (SN), Air Force and Air Defense armies) has sunk into oblivion.
However, objectively, the content of the actions of aviation and air defense troops (forces) on the SN, as well as the number of forms of troop actions on the SN (theatre) had to change, so the scientists of the Air Force continued to work.
In the VA Air Defense (today the VA VKO - Tver), a team of scientists led by Doctor of Military Sciences, Lieutenant General Barvinenko V.V. a possible long-term system of basic strategic and operational forms of action in aerospace was developed and their connection with other forms of military action was shown.
The conducted studies have shown that instead of the whole variety of forms of military operations at the operational-strategic and operational level (air operations in the theater of operations, air operations in strategic directions, combat operations of aviation and air defense forces of the fronts), it is advisable to ensure the transition to a single form of combat in the air sphere - air operations in a strategic direction.
Such an operation should become both an integral part of a combined arms operation in a strategic direction and a part of a strategic aerospace operation. In terms of its content, organization and conduct, it would fully correspond to the previously existing anti-aircraft and air operations in the theater.
At the operational level, instead of the existing forms of application, new forms of action were proposed: the operations of the Air Force and Air Defense armies and the operation of the Special Purpose Command. In terms of content, these should be fundamentally new forms of using troops and forces, since, according to a single concept and plan, they combined the efforts of shock forces in defensive actions, and the defensive troops and forces of the same formation in shock actions. In addition, they fully correspond to the features and necessary conditions developed by military theory for the implementation of such a form of military action as an operation.
Such an approach made it possible to ensure the further development of the forms of employment of troops and forces in the prospective command and control system of the RF Armed Forces.
In the course of further improvement of the command and control system of the RF Armed Forces, with the inclusion in it of such command and control bodies as "regional command" and "command of aviation and air defense forces on the frontline", the content of the forms of employment of aviation and air defense forces should also be specified.
A qualitative change in the content of the forms of application of the prospective Air Force formation - the command of aviation and air defense forces on the SN - is due to a significant change in its structure, an increase in combat strength (especially in wartime when additional significant aviation and air defense forces are transferred to it from other strategic directions), as well as the need directing actions according to a single concept and plan of other troops and forces operationally subordinate to the command.
The structure of the control body is changing due to the formation, on the basis of the directorates of the Air Force and Air Defense armies and the directorates of the air defense of military districts, of the commands of aviation and air defense forces on the SN as operational (operational-strategic) formations of the Air Force.
The increase in the combat strength of the air defense troops of the air force and air defense armies is carried out by including in their composition front-line and, in certain areas, army sets of air defense troops of military districts. At the same time, the air defense forces of combined arms formations and formations (already in their refined structure - without front-line (district) and, possibly, army sets of air defense forces in their current understanding), as well as aviation and air defense forces of fleets, aviation and air defense forces of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, regional departments of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Emergency Situations and the EU ATM bodies in these areas should be operationally subordinate to the created command of aviation and air defense forces on the SN.
A change in the structure of the command and control agencies for aviation and air defense forces in the SN and the composition of troops and forces subordinate to it, in turn, can change the content of the air operation in the strategic direction.
In order to streamline the issues of organization and responsibility for air defense, the formation of a unified military-technical policy, the improvement of the personnel training system, the optimization of the number and structure of air defense universities, the targeted development of the air defense system in the face of a significant reduction in the number of the RF Armed Forces, it is advisable to include control military air defense RF Armed Forces to the Air Force High Command.
In this case, in its composition, by analogy with the Directorate of the Chief of Aviation, it will be possible to form an independent “trunk” of command and control of the Air Defense Forces - the Directorate of the Chief of the Air Defense Forces, which combines the Directorate of the Chief of the Military Air Defense of the RF Armed Forces and the Directorate of Air Defense Forces and RTV of the Air Force. Similar control trunks for aviation and air defense forces will need to be created in the air force and air defense armies (in the commands of aviation and air defense forces on the frontline) and in the aviation and air defense forces of regional commands.
This restructuring of the military command and control bodies will not require additional numbers, and with a reasonable approach to the formation of these military command and control bodies, it will be possible to ensure a reduction in their total number by 12-15%.
At present, the further development and search for the most effective forms and methods of using the air force continues. And reliance on the historical path of the formation and development of a qualitatively new Air Force should largely help this.
Sergey VOLKOV
consultant of the General Staff of the Air Force,
reserve colonel, candidate of military sciences,
Senior Researcher,
Professor of the Academy of Military Sciences of the Russian Federation.
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