Moscow divisions of the people's militia. The death of the Moscow people's militia

NATALIA KOVSHOVA AND MARIA POLIVANOVA, VOLUNTEERS FROM THE MOSCOW PEOPLE'S MILITARY “To tell the truth, I was not at all happy when I was appointed regiment commander in the militia division,” Major Stanislav Alexandrovich Dovnar writes in his memoirs. -

perestroika National economy The program for the military restructuring of the national economy of the USSR is exhaustively given in the speeches of Comrade Stalin, primarily in his speech - an appeal to the people on July 3, 1941 on the radio and in a report on November 6, 1941 on the 24th anniversary of the Great October Revolution.

The Balance of the National Economy The needs of the military economy of the USSR were met on the basis of a planned redistribution of productive forces for the needs of the Patriotic War. The redistribution of productive forces and material assets can be seen from a comparison

Operation with the participation of the Moskovskiye Novosti newspaper When perestroika began with the advent of Gorbachev and the country felt the wind of change, the last dissidents began to stir, many of whom had already found themselves in the West. They stirred because with the offensive in the country

A. Orlov "MOSCOW PROCESSES". LIQUIDATION OF BERRIES (From the book of Alexander Orlov " secret history Stalinist

02-12-2001

(To the 60th anniversary of the Battle of Moscow - version)

Gavriil Popov - President International University(in Moscow)

On July 7, 1941, the State Defense Committee (GKO) made the decision to create a people's militia in Moscow consisting of 12 divisions. It would seem that, Russian history gave vast experience in the creation and use of the people's militia. I do not remember the times when, in fact, the entire army was a kind of militia. After the creation of a regular army, the people's militia was resorted to in difficult times for the country. So, Alexander I in the summer of 1812, with his manifesto, supported the initiative of the Smolensk nobles and announced the organization of three militia structures: Moscow, St. Petersburg and reserve.

An 1891 law defined militias as citizens under the age of 43, capable of bearing arms, but exempt from conscription. Each company of militia was supposed to include two experienced regular soldiers. In parts of the militia there were two chiefs: one elected by the militia and one appointed by the tsarist authorities. Provision was made for advance training of the militias. By the way, the legislation on the militia (landsturm) in the German Empire of those years was just as thorough.

Against the background of such a legacy, everything that happened to the people's militia in 1941 seems strange.

On July 7, they "reported" to Stalin about the presence of 12 divisions provided for by the GKO. It is hardly possible now to establish what part of the militia was formed from volunteers. Which one - of those who did not dare to refuse to record during the meetings of their teams (held under the supervision of representatives of the district committees and, most importantly, the NKVD). And, finally, which of those who were simply "taken" on the streets.

In Moscow, the newly created units of the people's militia, instead of military training, were immediately sent - just four days later - to dig trenches and build defensive structures.

Shakhova, secretary of the Kuibyshev District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, wrote to the Moscow City Committee that when the district division of the people’s militia was sent on July 12, 1941 to build defensive structures, “the division left without weapons. was shod: in white shoes, slippers, etc. The division worked 12 hours a day. Training was not carried out, and they were not prepared for hostilities."

Another reference - about the Leningrad division of the people's militia: "On July 7-8, there were no weapons in the division yet ... military training was carried out exclusively through combat, as well as political training" , Translating into a simple language: they marched and listened to speeches. The result noted by the headquarters of the 33rd Army is logical: "35 people fired from rifles, only 6 did the exercise."

In addition to the lack of training, the militia also suffered from a lack of weapons. "When leaving for the battle lines, parts of the division had 245 rifles and 13,600 rounds of ammunition". With the number of one division of the people's militia on average 9-10 thousand people - this meant 1.5 rounds per fighter.

But even where there were more weapons - what kind of weapons were they! Worker and destroyer battalions, numbering 30 thousand fighters on October 24, 1941, had 5569 rifles, of which there were 2312 Polish, 1489 French, 1249 Russian, 42 British, 201 Canadian, 152 German. there were flies. The cartridges of some did not fit the others.

Personal. The story of the teacher of the economics department of Moscow State University. A. Sokolov.

“I signed up for the militia right at the meeting. We were immediately sent to the formation point of the district division. Then, to dig trenches. They didn’t teach anything at work. ", fortunately, before the fighting we had a few days. And during this time we learned to disassemble rifles, load, shoot at targets in the trees in the forest. I think that it was these exercises that saved our regiment. We opened fire, repulsed the German attack, managed withdraw in an organized manner."

Mass arises why? Why didn't they train the people's militia? Why were shovels instead of weapons? Why were rifles brought to the militia almost from museums?

Not enough rifles? But before the battle, they suddenly turned out to be enough. So it's not about the lack of rifles. It's about something else. And without understanding this other, we will not understand the fate of the Moscow people's militia.

The initiative to create it belongs to the Moscow leadership. But it turned out that Stalin was not at all enthusiastic about this idea. Stalin knew how to think big. And the main danger in the unfortunate initial period he did not see the war in the Germans.

During the celebration of the Victory in May 1945, he allowed himself a very atypical frankness for him: "Another people could say to the government: you have not lived up to our expectations, go away, we will put another government that will make peace with Germany and ensure our peace" ( J.V. Stalin, Op. 15, p. 228).

It is clear that the leader, who thought about this kind of danger, could not help but analyze where it could come from. He did not suspect the security agencies - they are up to their ears in blood. Environment? The same story as with the authorities, plus responsibility for the country's unpreparedness for war. Army? Shamefully retreats. There is no opposition, everyone was taken before the war. There remains the middle link of the party itself - the district committees and city committees. In Leningrad and especially in Moscow. First of all, in Moscow. Are the contenders for the new Russian government creating an armed base in the form of a militia for themselves?

Stalin well remembered the fate of Nicholas II, who armed millions of peasants and workers during the First World War. He, of course, remembered how the Russian dictatorship of the proletariat threw the slogan of universal arming into the dustbin and came up with a different system: to arm the minority in order to force the unarmed majority.

There was another factor that determined Stalin's attitude towards the people's militia. The army was formed by carefully mixing conscripts from different regions. Control over a heterogeneous mass was facilitated: for commanders, and for commissars, and for security agencies. And the people's militia was made up of people who knew each other. With their authority, formal and informal leaders, the structures, having received weapons, could become dangerous.

Stalin could not help but remember that it was the Red Guard, formed in 1917 in Petrograd according to a scheme similar to the Moscow militia, that played a decisive role in both the Bolsheviks taking the capital of Russia under their control and in the overthrow of Kerensky. Did the Moscow leaders who put forward the idea of ​​a militia have intentions consistent with Stalin's fears? I think that they were, everything was skillfully presented as a traditional desire to distinguish themselves before Stalin.

The first thing that catches your eye is that the MGK decided to form a militia long before the danger for Moscow appeared - at the end of June 1941. Just when it became clear that the leader long years country, the Stalinist group, which promised to wage war on foreign territory, went bankrupt, and Stalin was not even seen or heard for several days.

The Moscow leadership consisted of individuals who were not burdened with direct responsibility either for collectivization or for the terror of 1937. They were "young wolves". And they could not stop thinking about their fate.

In addition, the leader of the Moscow party apparatus, A.S. Shcherbakov, clearly had his own concept of warfare. It was he who was one of the main authors of the patriotic ideas of liberation from "Jewish dominance" and so on. True, the term "Great Patriotic War" was proposed not by him, but by Metropolitan Sergius of Moscow and Kolomna.

If not the politician, but the scientist V.I. Vernadsky - as can be seen from his diary notes - he thought about the problem of the new government, then how could the same Shcherbakov not think about it? After all, there was an example of Lenin - the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, To give, as in 1918, to the Germans the entire Baltic states, Ukraine and Belarus, the entire Caucasus and preserve Russia itself. This Leninist idea of ​​1918, the idea of ​​salvation Soviet power in Russia, at the cost of abandoning all "non-Russian" parts of the country, it was revived again in 1991 - in order to save the power of the nomenklatura and for the same price. Moreover, this idea could not but arise in the minds of the Great Russian, primarily Moscow, nomenklatura in 1941. But for this it was necessary to replace the Stalinist leadership. To do this with a hundred thousand armed militias is a very real thing.

Perhaps Stalin, with his intuition, sensed something, and perhaps he was informed about some conversations. And Stalin began to act. At first, in his July 3 speech, Stalin seemed to support the Muscovites' initiative to create a people's militia. But he immediately made a significant explanation: the militia must be convened where a threatening situation develops. It turned out a strange picture: as long as there is no "threatening" situation, it is not worth forming a militia. And when it arises, it is usually too late to do something serious.

The Moscow chiefs realized that Stalin was on to something. They knew that Stalin was not to be trifled with. And they, sensing something was wrong, were frightened to death. And in a panic they began to "correct" their initiative.

Firstly, the entire militia does not remain in the capital, but immediately, immediately, leaves it to dig trenches. As you know, in 1917 the Red Army categorically refused to leave St. Petersburg anywhere - no matter what happened at the front. And then we went out.

Secondly, we are not asking the State Defense Committee for any weapons. We will make do with internal reserves, which, as Stalin well knew, did not exist. In a different situation, Stalin would hardly have been satisfied with such an "adjustment", he would have staged a massacre in the Moscow leadership. But the enemy was at the gate, and I had to pretend to calm down.

Stalin would not have been Stalin if he had not secured himself. Apparently, the army command received an order at the first opportunity to move the militias away from Moscow and throw them into the first "meat grinder", using them as cannon fodder. So the militia ended up hundreds of kilometers from Moscow, near Vyazma.

But the MGK prevented the vengeful Stalin from "grinding" in the battles an asset of the Moscow organization that had joined the militia. A total of 140,000 volunteers signed up. For digging trenches it was necessary to put up 120 thousand. Only 90,000 came to the trenches. 50,000 "non-appearances" is a lot. Every third. But, oddly enough, no one dealt with this, no one (from those who evaded and from the authorities) was punished. This is in those days!

The thought arises that it was on the unspoken instructions of the Moscow City Committee that 50,000 "friends", mainly apparatchiks and activists, were urgently "taken away" from the militia. For the militia stationed in Moscow as a "reserve" of the MGK, these 50 thousand were very necessary, but with shovels, they had nothing to do. Instead, the MGK and the RK began to look for "replenishment" on the streets of Moscow.

Personal. The story of my wife's father, Vasily Ivanovich, a career worker, a foreman at one of the defense factories in Moscow:

“People were seized on the streets of Moscow and sent to the militia. The workers were hunted right at the entrance factories. They didn’t take into account the reservation, they didn’t take into account anything -“ we have an order - everyone in the militia. ”I was one of the best welders of the plant. The director forbade me and the shift worker to leave the factory so that we would not be sent to the militia ... "I have a defense factory, we repair tanks. Without welders, nothing will work. They will be able to dig trenches without you." So we slept right in the shop until the end of December 1941."

The fate of A.S. Shcherbakov is noteworthy. Already in 1941, he, it would seem, who was in the super-responsible post of first secretary of the Moscow Committee and the Moscow City Committee, was simultaneously appointed head of the Soviet Information Bureau, and in 1942 - secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and head of the Main political management Red Army. He is clearly being gradually "loaded" in order to have a reason to move from the post of leader of Moscow. But he was moved radically - in 1945 he dies at the age of only 44 years. It is known that death does not spare even the young, but it is no less known that Stalin never forgot anything and spared no more than death.

What the battles cost the militias, who became the object of the intrigues of Stalin and the CIM, can be seen from such figures. On October 27, 1941, the 110th division of the people's militia remained: in the composition of one regiment - 220 people, the second regiment - 280 people and the third regiment - 691 people. Now there were enough rifles for everyone.

Personal. The story of a miraculously surviving comrade of my father about the Timiryazev Academy:

"Our division was surrounded almost immediately. The Germans did not take us prisoner: they believed that the militia consisted of commissars, Jews, regular workers and Russian intellectuals. None of them will be needed by victorious Germany, because she will only need working cattle for work under the supervision of German overseers".

The losses of the people's militia in the Moscow battle were so grandiose that five divisions had to be disbanded altogether - each of them had several hundred, or even dozens of fighters left.

I am afraid that the almost universal heroic death of five divisions of the Moscow people's militia near Vyazma, and the reasons for this, will not be remembered at this anniversary.

How many militiamen died in total? Every second? Three out of four? It hasn't been said yet. On the conscience of Stalin, the Moscow party nomenklatura and the military command lies the death of tens of thousands of the best people of Moscow, unjustified by objective factors, on an unprecedented scale. No one has answered this so far.

Sometimes circumstantial evidence speaks volumes. So it is with the people's militia. Here is a division awarded the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov. It entered the annals of the Patriotic War under the name "Gorodetskaya", having received this name in 1944. But you will not find behind this name the fundamental principles of this division - and after all, this is a division of the people's militia of the Leningrad region of Moscow.

173rd rifle division fought at Stalingrad. 56 fighters and division commanders became Heroes of the Soviet Union for crossing the Dnieper. For the exemplary performance of combat missions, the division was awarded the title "77th Guards". She was awarded the Orders of the Red Banner and Suvorov and received the name "Chernihiv". And again, nowhere is it noted that this is a division of the people's militia of the Kyiv region.

In general, not a single division of the Moscow people's militia has retained its name. This cannot be an accident.

Although now there is a Narodnogo Opolcheniya street in Moscow, there is a monument to the militias, although it was published a quarter of a century ago good book"The militia in defense of Moscow" - the full truth about the Moscow people's militia is still waiting in the wings.

2nd division of the Moscow people's militia - formation of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War

Connection history:

On the night of 2nd July 1941 th year, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks invited local party organizations to lead the creation of a people's militia, and on the same day the Military Council of the Moscow Military District adopted a "Resolution on the voluntary mobilization of residents of Moscow and the region into the people's militia." According to the decree, in Moscow the mobilization plan was 200 thousand people, in the region - 70 thousand people. They planned to equip 25 militia divisions. Mobilization and formation of units were carried out on a territorial basis. Each administrative district of Moscow formed its own division, which was understaffed with militia groups from certain areas of the Moscow region.

It was formed from July 2, 1941 as the 2nd division of the people's militia, in the Stalinsky district of Moscow, replenished with militias from the Balashikha district, Serpukhov district, Shatursky district of the Moscow region and partly with militias of the 22nd division of the Kominternovsky district of Moscow, as well as conscripts from the construction army from the Kalinin and Ryazan regions. The formation took place at school No. 434 on Shcherbakovskaya Street, house 36. It was made up of volunteers from the Electrocombinat, the factory named after. Shcherbakov, machine-building plants of the region.

Major General Vashkevich Vladimir Romanovich was appointed commander of the division. Colonel I.P. Alferov became chief of staff of the 2nd bottom. On the morning of July 3, preparations began for the reception, accommodation and meals of the division's personnel. On July 5, about 400 young lieutenants arrived, promoted ahead of schedule to commanders from second-year cadets of military schools. They formed the main body of company and battery commanders, as well as their deputies. In addition, the missing contingent of commanders and the entire political staff were called up from the reserve. The day of July 5 was spent on the placement of command personnel and familiarizing them with the procedure for receiving militias and deploying regiments. On the same day in the evening, already formed, numbering about 800 people, a battalion of the people's militia from the Balashikha district of the Moscow region arrived. He formed the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Infantry Regiment. This battalion consisted of workers, engineering and technical and economic workers of the Balashikha and Reutov cotton factories, the Balashikha cloth factory, the Savvinskaya spinning factory, the Kuchinsky brick factory, students and teachers of the fur institute, collective farmers.

On July 6, the people's militias enrolled in the division gathered at their places of work. Their commanders arrived there for them. Then the volunteers, accompanied by parents, wives, children and friends, gathered at their quarters. On July 6 and 7, the division command organized units and subunits, the soldiers received training weapons, clothing items, and sapper tools. Rifle regiments were formed in the division under the numbers: 4th, 5th and 6th. The district committee of the party allocated two cars and 170 trucks for the division.

On July 7, the formation of the division, in rough outline, was completed. It numbered over 12 thousand people. All the militias were people of non-conscription age. Not most of enlisted personnel participated in the First World War and civil wars. The overwhelming majority of the militias military training was absent altogether. Officers also proved to be heterogeneous in its preparation. Regimental commanders, regimental chiefs of staff, battalion and artillery battalion commanders were career officers. Some of them had combat experience. Company and battery commanders consisted of young lieutenants, yesterday's cadets of military schools. Platoon commanders were mostly volunteers - militias with little military training.

On the night of July 7-8, the division set out from Moscow to the Khimki-Skhodnya-Kryukovo area. Here she was to receive military uniforms, weapons and transport. This first crossing of 20 - 25 kilometers was the first for the militias serious test. Although a three-hour halt was organized half way, in the Khovrin area, and small 10-15-minute halts were appointed every 40 minutes of the journey, the entire march ended well after noon on July 8th. Older militias showed chronic diseases, and most of the sixteen, seventeen-year-old boys were not physically trained enough. The dropout amounted to about 3,500 people, which greatly reduced the number of companies and batteries. About 8,500 men remained in the division. In the Khimki region, the division received full uniforms and partly weapons.

On the night of July 10-11, using rail and road transport, the division also crossed the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe cities of Klin and Vysokovsky. Here, two new battalions of the people's militia, formed in Kalininskaya and Ryazan regions. Each of the battalions consisted of about 800 people. The division brought its companies and battalions almost to the state. On July 12, the 2nd bottom came out to the west. The division was assigned a strip of terrain from 12 to 20 kilometers along the front and 4 to 6 kilometers deep. In this lane, mainly on the roads along which enemy tanks could attack, it was necessary to build anti-tank obstacles - ditches, scarps and forest blockages. In addition, it was required to build main and reserve rifle, machine-gun and gun trenches, command posts and warehouses for a full-time rifle division. According to the existing statutory norms, such a strip was erected by a personnel rifle division in seven days. For divisions of the people's militia, the terms were reduced to five days. The general military situation, which continued to deteriorate, spurred on. The hot summer of 1941 dried up the loams near Moscow. The earth was like a stone. She was taken with great difficulty only by a crowbar and a pickaxe. In order to meet the allotted time, they worked day and night. Four to five hours were allotted for sleep. Only one or two morning hours were spent on combat training every day. The combat training of squads, platoons and the formation of companies had to be carried out one by one, leading them to the nearest rear and to the shooting range.

During the 13th - 15th of July, the division erected a defense line in the Kuzminskoye - Teryaeva Sloboda - Lyubyatino section with a total length of 15 kilometers. On July 17, she crossed the Lama River. Here, by July 25, the defensive line was completed in the Osheikino - Yaropolets - Ivanovskoye section (northwest of Volokolamsk). This strip formed the northern section of the Mozhaisk defensive line, which played a role in repelling the first German offensive on Moscow in October 1941. On July 17, the division became part of the 32nd army of the front of the Mozhaisk line of defense. And on July 25, the 2nd division of the people's militia received an order from the headquarters of the 32nd Army to reach the Vyazma River by July 31, prepare and take up defense with a front line on this river from Ordulev to Serizhan - a total length of 18 kilometers along the front. The army and, accordingly, the division became part of the Reserve Front, formed on July 30th. The division made the transition from Lama to the Vyazma River (190 kilometers) in five days with one day. Physical hardening, acquired in heavy trench work, helped. On the Vyazma River, about 2 thousand soldiers and sergeants of military age arrived in the division. This made it possible to replenish the companies and batteries, to create a divisional school for the training of sergeants numbering 800 from soldiers of young ages, who, moreover, already had combat training. According to 32A on July 30, 1941. the division was armed with 7130 rifles, 105 light machine guns, 308 machine guns, 27 50mm mortars, 22 45mm guns, 30 76mm guns.

In August, the division and its regiments were reorganized according to the states of the regular troops of the Red Army and received a general army numbering. The division became the 2nd Infantry Division. The 4th regiment was renamed the 1282nd, the 5th - the 1284th, the 6th - the 1286th rifle regiments, and the artillery regiment - the 970th artillery regiment. Weapons have been received. Rifle squads were issued two SVT rifles and light machine guns. Each machine gun company received 12 heavy machine guns, and a mortar company received six mortars. The regimental batteries received four 76-mm cannons of the 1927 model each. The artillery regiment parted with their old cannons, receiving in return 24 domestic 76-mm guns, eight howitzers and four mortars. The division's vehicles were also replenished. Thus, in the division there was both regimental and divisional artillery, which was not in other divisions of the people's militia. The transport problem was largely resolved, but tractors for the guns were still missing. Only at the end of September, already on the Dnieper, artillery horses entered the division. Artillery ammunition, however, was not obtained.

On the Vyazma River, the division built the main line of defense with a front line along this river and a barrage, as well as a second (rear) line of defense. This strip had a leading edge along the line Lama - Maryino - Pekarevo - Bogoroditskoye and further to the southeast along the eastern bank of the swampy stream Bebrya, with a total length of about 18 kilometers. Here, too, soldiers dug trenches day and night in dry clay soil and created anti-tank obstacles. If the work on Lama proceeded in a relatively calm environment, then on Vyazma there was almost no day when single enemy aircraft, and sometimes entire groups, would not fire at working soldiers from machine guns. For combat training, as before, two hours in the morning were allotted. The companies and batteries were taken one by one to the rear to the shooting ranges and the firing range. By mid-August, the division already represented a formalized military unit. On August 16, 2nd occupied the line of Staroe Selo, Khozhaevo.

On September 1, the 2nd Rifle Division replaced the 133th Siberian Rifle Division on the Dnieper, which went to the Yelnya region, to participate in the counterattack of the 24th Army. The division was stationed at the Serkovo-Spichino-Yakovlevo section, riding the motorway and the Moscow-Minsk railway. She extended her left flank 2 kilometers south of railway. The strip occupied for defense by the 2nd Infantry Division was given special importance. She covered the direct direction to Moscow. Highway reinforced concrete and railway bridges across the Dnieper were prepared for the explosion, fire and electrical means. The subversive teams, which consisted of sappers from the reserve of the High Command, joined the division. Two divisions of naval guns were located on both sides of the highway. They were intended for anti-tank defense of this direction. The guns were served by a detachment of Black Sea sailors consisting of 800 people. Two more regiments of 85-mm guns were used as anti-tank weapons. anti-aircraft guns. Each battalion defense area had two to four pillboxes armed with anti-tank guns. The construction of pillboxes continued. Throughout the valley of the left bank of the Dnieper, two strips of barbed wire were erected and densely mined with anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. Between the first and second positions of the main line of defense in the areas of Shatilovo - Yakovlevo and Goryainovo - Kostenki, electrified wire networks were installed. The cell trenches built by the 133rd division were turned into solid trenches with communication passages that connected all the positions of the main line of defense. Machine-gun and gun trenches were replenished with two or three spare positions. Each platoon had a reliable dugout. The command post of the division and two rifle regiments consisted of long-term reinforced concrete structures. On September 2, the division occupied the line of Masalovo, Yakovlevo, Filimonovo, Goryainovo, Zvyagino. The division was given the 57th heavy artillery division and the 596th howitzer artillery regiment. The amount of ammunition reached eight sets (!) For small arms and up to six sets for artillery weapons. Thus, the division's defense zone was a developed and heavily fortified field position with elements of long-term defensive structures, with a high density of artillery and machine-gun fire. But sadly, the main blow of the German army group "Center" to Moscow fell not along the Minsk highway, but to the south and north of it. As a result, all these built defensive lines turned out to be unclaimed by our troops.

There was a very difficult situation. She was the most difficult Westbound where the enemy rushed to Moscow. In the Western regions of Belarus and the Smolensk region Red Army suffered heavy losses, many formations and units were completely defeated or were surrounded. At this troubled time, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks proposed to the local party and Soviet bodies to lead the creation of formations and units of the people's militia.

On July 2, 1941, the Military Council of the Moscow Military District adopted " Decree on the voluntary mobilization of residents of Moscow and the region into the people's militia". On its basis, the mobilization plan for Moscow amounted to more than 200 thousand people, for the Moscow region - 70 thousand. It was planned to create and equip 25 divisions of the people's militia ( bottom ). During the month of July, the first 12 divisions of the people's militia were formed and sent to the front.

The formation of formations and units was carried out on a territorial basis; each district of Moscow completed its own division, which was joined by separate units formed in the Moscow region.

One of the first divisions formed in the capital was ( 13 bottom) Rostokinsky district. The formation of the division was carried out by volunteers of enterprises located on the territory of the current regions of the North-Eastern administrative district- Alekseevsky, Ostankinsky, Rostokino, Marfino, as well as on the territory of the Meshchansky district of the Central Administrative District.

One of the parts of the division was staffed Moscow plant "Caliber". From the second to the sixth of July 1941, 750 volunteers from among the workers of this plant formed a regiment. The headquarters of the regiment was located in the premises of the party committee of the plant. Only on the first day of formation, 500 people signed up as volunteers.

Management and headquarters 13th division located in the building of the district committee of the CPSU (b) on the street. Sretenka, house 11. The rest of the units and subdivisions were formed in the buildings of schools No. 284 (Prospect Mira, 87, now gymnasium No. 1518), 270 (Sukonnaya st., 1, now school 1470, Novomoskovskaya st., 9). Some divisions were formed in the building of the Moscow Financial Institute (Kibalchicha St., 1, now Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation).

From workers All-Union Agricultural Exhibition(now VDNH) to the people's militia ( 13 bottom) entered 260 people. Members of the party became the inspirers and organizers of the recording of volunteers. Division units were formed in the park. F.E. Dzerzhinsky (now Ostankino park) and a number of people's commissariats and enterprises. From the people's commissariats of trade, Agriculture, the textile industry came 200 - 250 people. One of the battalions of the division was formed at school No. 270, which included teachers and students of the tenth grade, as well as workers and employees printing houses of Goznak and other institutions.

One of the most large groups volunteers consisted of workers of a mechanical plant, workers plant "Ressora", workers tram depot. N.E. Bauman, as well as many other businesses and schools. From VGIK 70 people came - professors, teachers, students. From the workers of Mosestrada, a team of the propaganda team was organized, the political instructor of which was the actor I.I. Bogdanov.

The command of the division was appointed from the staff, who were transferred from other military units and institutions. The division commander was Colonel Morozov Pavel Efremovich, head of the department Military Academy. M.V. Frunze, chief of staff - teacher of the academy, Colonel S.S. Musatov. Captain A.V. was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff. Popov, head of intelligence - senior lieutenant G.I. Nigreeva. However, initially, command posts were occupied by party workers and commanders called up from the reserve. Personnel from military educational institutions and units arrived already in the course of the division's deployment in areas near the front.

Citizens from 17 to 55 years old were recorded in the division of the people's militia. More than 60% of the personnel 13th division was over 50 years old. The division selected more than 10 thousand people.

There were some problems with the provision of volunteers hot food. The personnel of units and divisions of the division at first had to eat food brought from home. The district committee of the party, in spite of all formal obstacles, obliged canteen trust feed the militias in the area's several canteens.

Also, the bodies that form the divisions of the people's militia were tasked with providing the division with weapons and equipment. Orders were received for 17 vehicles (all needed repairs), 30 rifles (only for arming sentries) and 300 rounds of ammunition for them. At the same time, an order was received for 1000 outfits, but without overcoats and raincoats, and for the same amount infantry shovels.

On the night of July 7-8, the 13th division of the people's militia received an order to leave Moscow towards the front. The order set the task of making a thirty-five-kilometer march and reaching the line: the village of Snegiri (Volokolamsk Highway) - the village of Kozino (Staro Pyatnitskoye Highway). At the time of leaving the city, the division lacked more than a third of commanders of various levels. Therefore, the understaffing of the division with personnel and personnel commanders took place along the way. Only in August and September did the battalion and company commanders arrive.

During the advance to the concentration area near the Firsanovka station, workers joined the division. "Hammer and Sickle" plant and militias from other suburban areas. It should be noted that, ideologically, the militias were ready to meet the enemy and defend the capital, but they were not ready for hostilities. From the first days the division was in the field, the personnel had to face many difficulties. The lack of shovels (2 per company) made it impossible to equip dugouts and dugouts. The lack of uniforms, overcoats, tents made it problematic to organize the rest of the militias. Later, with the help of the Moscow party and Soviet bodies, this situation was partially corrected.

Intensified combat training began in the area where the division was deployed. The personnel received weapons, uniforms, and were trained in military affairs. Particular attention was paid to tactics - actions in defense and offensive, reconnaissance, guarding, meeting combat. The militias got acquainted with the methods of fighting tanks, enemy landings, reconnaissance and sabotage groups of the enemy. Firearms training was also a major subject in militia training. The fighters not only studied the material part of the weapon, but also learned how to properly use it, how to aimed shooting, eliminate possible faults and delays in firing.

During combat training, they were taught to throw live grenades. The fighters and commanders treated each occupation with great diligence and zeal, strove to master military affairs as soon as possible. However, the limited availability of ammunition did not allow conducting fire training classes at the proper level. With the help of the military department of the district party committee and the district council Osoaviahima several machine guns, rifles and other visual aids in the form of posters and brochures were collected for the division. Time for the study of weapons was allotted in such a way that it was a rest from physical work, and that the limited number of visual aids does not lead to disruption of classes.

First batch small arms(rifles and machine guns), which accounted for a quarter of the need, entered the division in the second half of August. These were Mauser rifles, Browning machine guns (Polish trophies of 1939). They were not familiar to either the fighters or the commanders. The regiments of the division were fully equipped with small arms of the same system only in mid-September. At the same time, Bofors guns (trophies of the Polish campaign of 1939) were received. combat training The 13th division of the people's militia continued after the transfer in late July - early August 1941 to the area west of Vyazma, Smolensk region.

Moscow City Party Committee established in the division and its regiments battle flags. This action was supposed to strengthen military discipline and raise the morale of the personnel. Presumably the presentation of battle banners and acceptance military oath took place at the beginning of August 1941. 13th People's Militia Division September 26, 1941 by order Supreme High Command was renamed to 140th Rifle Division and included in the regular troops of the Red Army. From the beginning of October, the fate of the personnel of the division was inextricably linked with 32nd Army of the Reserve Front. At this time, she took up defenses northwest of Vyazma along Holm-Zhirkovsky.

The combat path of the division was short, but responsible and very difficult. September 30, 1941 began offensive Nazi troops to capture Moscow under the code name "Typhoon". Soviet troops held the Vyazemskaya defensive operation in order to delay the offensive of the troops of Army Group Center and create conditions for the defense of the capital. Rostokinskaya division (140 sd), which is part of 32nd Army, defending on the right flank, on October 2, she entered into battle with superior enemy forces.

On October 2-5, the Nazis, after bombing and artillery raids, repeatedly went over to the attack on the positions of the regiments of the division. They had to bring in more and more new forces against the volunteers, who were poorly armed and poorly prepared for hostilities. For a week, the Rostokinites held back the offensive of the Nazi shock troops on one of the critical sectors of the front. They did everything in their power to prevent the enemy from reaching the borders of their native city.

Ultimately the defense Western and Reserve fronts was broken through by superior enemy forces, and most of the formations of the Red Army were surrounded. One of them was 140th Rifle Division. The last mention of the battles Rostokinskaya division refers to October 7, but its units and subunits stubbornly defended themselves in the encirclement until October 9. The time that was delayed militia enemy troops, made it possible to delay the rapid capture of Moscow. Despite the huge losses and fighting in the environment, the spirit of resistance was not broken, scattered units and subunits fought to the last bullet and shell. In small groups, the militia left the encirclement until the end of October.

At the cost of heavy losses, the Rostokinites 140th division, who showed heroism and steadfastness, contributed to the historic victory over fascism, showing selfless devotion and love for their homeland. In the end of November 140th division