The main provisions of the strategy of social development of the armed forces. On the implementation of the social development strategy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

2011-06-03 / Vitaly Ivanovich Tsymbal - retired colonel, doctor technical sciences; Andrey Anatolyevich Privetkin - reserve lieutenant colonel, candidate of economic sciences.


The spring of this year has finally brought some intelligible hope for the fulfillment of the long-standing promises of the military-political leadership of Russia - to make monetary allowance (DD) and the status of our military personnel in general such that it fully corresponds to the ideas of a powerful army, modern state. Of course, the path to such a goal is not easy. We recall that an attempt to solve this problem, undertaken in 2002, was useful, but was reduced mainly to equalizing the military commanders' DD with the monetary allowance (DS) of the upper echelons of civil bureaucracy.

O junior officers then they didn't really care. Therefore, many cadets of military schools and graduates, feeling deceived, began to quit - as best they could. And to the people of private and junior command staff (RMKS), even to those who served under the contract, the legislators reacted completely dismissively. Servicemen of the RMKS, bearing the bulk of the hardships and hardships military service, in status equated to referents ... of the lowest rank of the bureaucratic hierarchy.

To conclude a contract, they did not have before, and did not have any significant incentives.

Therefore, in 2003, when justifying the federal target program(FTP) for the transfer of military units constant readiness mainly for voluntary recruitment under the contract, it was decided to introduce a new "stimulating" allowance for the RMKS, and at the same time for junior and middle-level officers commanding them. However, senior officers, especially in the central apparatus (CA) of the Ministry of Defense, felt as if "offended." They turned to the then Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov with a request-proposal to introduce another allowance - exclusively for them. The allowance is not simple, but long-term acting in their "favor". The results of such a policy are illustrated at the bottom of the page in a graph.

It shows that the size of the DD, expressed in current prices for the period 2002-2008, grew for all servicemen. But among the employees of the central apparatus, they "soared up." Each increase in salary by position (with indexation parrying inflation) led (due to allowances) to an increase in the DD of “apparatchiks” by an amount exceeding not only the increase in DD for soldiers and sergeants, but also the size of the entire DD of the RMKS military personnel. It all the years remained less than the average salary in the country. Time passed, the ruble depreciated, the cost of the federal target program grew when it was adjusted, but not a “stimulating” supplement.

A GOOD INTENTION TURNED INTO TROUBLE

It was this situation with DD that was accepted from Sergey Ivanov by his successor new minister Defense of the Russian Federation Anatoly Serdyukov. And no matter what ill-wishers say about his incompetence in military affairs, one cannot fail to note the noble initiative of the civilian manager: under him, the development of the “Strategy social development Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020. In April 2008, it was approved. At the same time, by order of the Minister of Defense No. 241 dated April 28, 2008, a commission was established to implement the strategy.

The plans were grandiose. Recall, in particular, the intention to include the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the "five best armies of the world, including in terms of basic socio-economic indicators", and military personnel serving under the contract - into the "middle class of the country". For this, as expected, their DD should exceed the average wages(SFP) across the country by 25%, and military pensions (VP) should rise to the level of 80% of DD. Another promise was also made: "For the first time, civil society will be able to take part in monitoring the implementation of activities and programs that ensure the implementation of the strategy." True, the next statement - that "the army is becoming truly open" did not harmonize with the factual behind-the-scenes work of the commission and the closed nature of drafting bills on changes in the army, even when they were discussed in the State Duma.

However, shortly after the strategy was approved, negative distracting developments occurred. This is the August 2008 war, during which the RF Armed Forces defended their peacekeepers and civilians South Ossetia. At the same time, an economic crisis broke out.

In the fall of 2008, the President of the Russian Federation, at the suggestion of military leaders, announced a transition to a “new look” for our army, we note, also behind the scenes developed, secretly from the majority, not only civilians but also military personnel.

For a short time, the interests of contractors, who were previously forced to sign a “voluntary” contract, and military leaders, who allowed coercion instead of making the service attractive, coincided, including at the expense of a decent DD. The contractors began to scatter, and the generals escaped responsibility for the failure of the FTP by accusing the contractors of lack of patriotism.

Under these conditions, in order to save budget funds, it was decided to fill the bulk of the positions of the RMKS (700 thousand people) by conscription. The fact that it would not be possible to call up so many young men in the current demographic situation was neglected. And the fact that the combat effectiveness of persons undergoing military service for only one year is extremely low was also neglected. The generals convinced the deputies of the legitimacy to send military personnel into battle, who served only 3 months. And such an amendment was made to the law.

But everyone, it would seem, knows the impact on security traffic hastily trained young drivers Vehicle. Even if they do not drive in combat vehicles, but in comfortable foreign cars. The appearance of the term "teapot" in relation to them is not accidental. And so, in relation to our army, it turned out that it began to consist mainly of "dummies". A joking suggestion suggests itself: the leading commanders who justified such a transition to such a look of the RF Armed Forces should be renamed "bosses". But if it were only a matter of how we call them! And from the point of view of the country's defense capability, there is no time for jokes.

As for the size of the DD, then, having saved on military personnel of the lower level of the military hierarchy (after replacing contract soldiers with conscripts), some people wanted to transfer these funds to the more “needy”. Under plausible pretexts, a number of ministerial orders were developed to “bonuse money” for some military personnel according to criteria that were not entirely clear. The ill-fated orders still excite the military personnel and their families, and the main result of the undertaking was reduced to confusion and a split in the ranks of the “military brotherhood”.

BACKGROUND LEGISLATION IS CRAZY

The apotheosis of higher care officials The Ministry of Defense about themselves became Order No. 115 of March 28, 2009, deftly called “On additional measures to improve the efficiency of the use of monetary allowance funds for military personnel and remuneration of civilian personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Clause 7 of the “Procedure” attached to this order announced that the specific amounts of “incentives are determined within the limits of budgetary funds ... based on the results of the performance of official duties by military personnel and civilian personnel and are not limited to maximum sizes.” It is impossible to show such an unlimited increase in DD after 2008 on the above graph, as well as to link it with any indicators of the combat capability of the troops and the country's defense capability. How the effectiveness of the use of DD funds has increased remains a mystery. But the income of many military and civilian officials at the end of the budget year exceeded the income of not only regular troops, but also the Supreme Commander-in-Chief! The bewildering meaning of this order was then corrected by the order of the Minister of Defense No. 1010 of 26.07. 2010.

Let us give an example of a completely different attitude of our authorities to payments Money servicemen. This example applies to most military personnel. The Ministry of Finance, with its letter No. 03-04-08-01/9 dated January 27, 2009, signed by the director of the Department of Tax and Customs Tariff Policy, initiated the withholding of income tax individuals(personal income tax) with one of the compensation payments to military personnel. We are talking about compensation provided for in Article 16 of the Federal Law of 1998 No. 76-FZ “On the Status of Military Personnel”. Unfortunately, this compensation does not have official name. It is provided either “for”, or “for” sanatorium treatment, and if in meaning, then “besides” it. Without delving into the game of pretexts, the Ministry of Finance decided that personal income tax should be collected from this compensation. The calculation was that, firstly, the amounts of these compensations of 600 and 300 rubles per year (for a serviceman and family members, respectively) against the background of DD are insignificant, so the losses are not very noticeable, and secondly, the military are people accustomed to infringements . They grumble and calm down. There are enough other problems (both personal and official). Yes, and much larger problems in the system of monetary allowance continue to disturb the military ...

So it’s not the conjectures of critics, not the “subversive” activities of human rights activists, but life itself has shown and continues to show the fallacy of behind-the-scenes development of plans and the procedure for implementing them, especially in the systems of DD and army recruitment. Therefore, in February 2011, the parameters of the "new look" of the RF Armed Forces were again changed. It was also said about the necessary increase in the staffing of the RMKS under the contract, the approximate number was named, although there is no program for this yet.

True, the president and prime minister regularly reminded officials of the need to adopt a law on a new DD for military personnel. For some time, a draft of such a law “hung” on the Internet, but then it disappeared. Perhaps this is due to the fact that high-ranking officials in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense are quite satisfied with the current procedure, since the high size and continuous growth of their DD guarantees it anyway. It seems that the implementation of the strategy mentioned above was stalled from the military department itself.

Many in the Russian Federation discussed the current situation, as well as the reasons for the slowdown in the strategy. This was done by military and civilian experts, in particular from the IEP.

Only after March 17 of this year, when the preliminary consideration of the draft law on DD in the Committee State Duma on defense, and the materials were partially published in the media, the discussion of the new DD system was updated.

Most recently, the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation submitted a draft law to the Russian government, and at its meeting on May 26, as it was announced, they were going to consider the document in order to then send it to the State Duma. But, we note, there is still little time left for the passage of the future law through all instances by the promised date of introduction - 01/01/2012. After all, by-laws will also be needed. At speeds, it's hard to fix anything. But the officials who developed the bills can report that they have carried out the president's order.

The following materials are now available for independent review:

1. Draft federal law "On monetary allowance and certain payments to military personnel" and the explanatory note and financial and economic justification accompanying this bill.

2. Information about the draft federal law “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts Russian Federation in connection with the adoption of the Federal Law "On monetary allowance and individual payments to military personnel" and the documents accompanying this bill.

3. A number of other documents accompanying the bills, but not included in them, as well as publications that are indirectly related to the problem. There are many retellings of the presented materials in the media, but there is little analytics.

What did the results of our independent study show?

ANALYSIS OF THE SUSTAINABILITY AND PURPOSE OF BILLS

The appearance of the bills under consideration should certainly be considered a favorable event. They contain provisions that deserve support, but in general, as analysis has shown, support cannot be unconditional. It does not follow from the bills that they correspond to the main thing:

The aspirations of the majority of citizens of the Russian Federation;

The course announced by the President of the Russian Federation for the modernization of society, including the comprehensive involvement in innovation activities youth, as well as to curb corruption;

The socially significant interests of military personnel, at least in the form in which they were set out in the “Strategy for the Social Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020”.

Neither the explanatory notes to the bills, nor the certificates prepared for the meeting of the State Duma Committee on Defense, give an answer to the question of what caused the need for a radical change in the military personnel's DD. The explanatory notes are based on a purely bureaucratic approach - a listing of some instructions and instructions from the leadership, in pursuance of which the bills were developed. However, this list cannot be considered complete, much less accessible for analysis by independent experts.

At the same time, as shown in the following table, the state has official documents on the problem under consideration, which should have been completed long ago. And this is not counting the strategy mentioned above, which, as a departmental document, could not be mentioned by the drafters of laws due to the status sign. The table includes some of the current documents top level associated with the need to increase the attractiveness of military service. There are those who long years were not carried out, their text was corrected, but not in the right direction. Perhaps someone has forgotten them. The time has come, in our opinion, to remember and fulfill.

Documents not mentioned by the developers, but also enforceable documents Comments
1 Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of November 30, 1992 No. 918 on the beginning of the transition to voluntary recruitment The execution was interrupted in 1995, among other reasons, due to the lack of attractiveness of military service.
2 Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation of May 16, 1996 No. 722 and of November 25, 1996 No. 1592 on the completion of the transition to exclusively voluntary manning of the RF Armed Forces and, to a limited extent, to other troops. Execution is deferred until “creation necessary conditions”, which, first of all, depend on ensuring the attractiveness of military service. It's time to create them.
3 military doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by the President of the Russian Federation on February 5, 2010 (subparagraph “g”, paragraph 30) The need for "training highly professional servicemen devoted to the Fatherland, increasing the prestige of military service" was noted. You can't do without the growth of DD.

In any case, it is incompetent to forget about the interests of military personnel of any category, as well as about true reasons DD reforms. The table below shows their indicative list, which is formed on the basis of publicly available information. And we should also add the requirement for the highest rates of recruitment military organization the state with highly professional military personnel and building up the combat capability of the troops.

Reasons for the need for legislative reform DD Comments
1 The impossibility of solving (within the framework of the previous order and sizes of DD) the problem of voluntary recruitment of regular troops of the RF Armed Forces by such citizens who would be interested and able to solve all military tasks in peacetime and wartime This is evidenced by the failure of the first stage of the acquisition of the Armed Forces after 1992, then the failure of the FTP of 2004-2007, which was observed early dismissal from the Armed Forces of young officers and cadets
2 The corruption of conscription and the preservation in it, as in the rudiment of the Russian serf past, of the inequality of citizens of the Russian Federation and the transfer of this inequality to DD This is evidenced by the materials of the military prosecutor's office and the data of the committees of soldiers' mothers.
3 The impossibility of Russia's entry into the group (five) of states with the best modern armies, including socio-economic indicators Russia from this year will remain in the G8 G8 the only state that retains the conscription
4 Unmotivated violation of the constitutional principles of equality of citizens, including civil servants (civil / military; under contract / conscription; serving in various federal executive authorities, etc.) There are regular facts that the DD of military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation lags behind DD in some other troops, as well as from the monetary content of civil civil servants
5 Lack of legislative linkage of military personnel’s DD with the average salary(FFP) in the country The sizes of DD and SZP, their growth rates are not linked, which leads to the loss of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the competitive labor market
6 Incorrect from a socio-economic point of view, the proportions of the ratios of the maximum and minimum DD within existing order(up to 10 times when taking into account all allowances), which leads to an increase in social discontent and is fraught with negative consequences. The bills are contrary to the National Security Council-2020, in which such ratios (maximum income to minimum) are elevated to the number of the most important indicators of socio-economic security
7 A general decrease in the prestige of military service, contrary to the entry of contract servicemen into the category of the “middle class of the country”, declared in the Strategy, which is designed to solve the problem of staffing the country's defense capability Simultaneously with the decrease in DD and VP, other incentives have fallen, which in other countries make military service attractive, and social status soldier high

There is another group of reasons that make it necessary to reform not only the system of DD for military personnel, but also the provision of pensions for military pensioners, but this requires a separate analysis, and not a passing mention. Although it is probably worth noting that the government is still trying to establish an unacceptable procedure for calculating pensions for the vast majority of retired military men. In a press release for the meeting on May 26, it was stated as follows: “The procedure for calculating the pensions of citizens who have served in the military is being changed in such a way that, by reducing the amount of monetary allowance accepted for calculating pensions, in order to ensure an increase in the pensions themselves, on average, by at least 1.5 times." This is much less than what military pensioners expect, and directly contradicts what was stated in Serdyukov's strategy.

MAIN CONCLUSIONS FROM THE RESULTS OF THE EXAMINATION OF BILLS

The considered bills are an attempt to implement the instructions of the top military-political leadership of the Russian Federation on the introduction of new, significantly increased sizes of military personnel's allowances from 2012. Such an attempt deserves support in principle. Undoubtedly positive in the bill is, for example, the establishment of lump-sum benefits in the amount of 3 and 2 million rubles. and further descending by 500 thousand rubles. - solid, although it is not clear from what considerations the developers proceeded.

At the same time, the bills do not solve many problems that are among the most relevant for citizens and society, as well as for the state:

1. According to the main parameters of DD and VP, the bills do not contain direct action laws - instead of them, references are made to future by-laws. The published tables of the future sizes of DD and VP, given as supposedly illustrating the submitted bills, in fact, have no direct relation to the law - the mentioned sizes are not fixed by law. This means that the DD parameters actually promised to citizens after the adoption of laws will not receive guaranteed grounds. And by-laws, due to established traditions, will be drawn up without proper public (and even parliamentary) control. And whether the parameters they introduced will meet today's promises is a big question.

2. The general impression of future laws, if we abandon solid promises, is that in terms of their content and semantic load, these are not independent new laws, but modified versions of Articles 12 and 13 of the 1998 Law No. 76-FZ “On the Status of Military Personnel” and a number of changes in other articles of the said and other laws.

3. Separate legal provisions are not productive, not precise or even clearly erroneous, they contain provisions that look like they contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993 (paragraph 2 of article 19 and paragraph 2 of article 55), and therefore need justification, which not in the explanatory note. There are also discrepancies with existing laws, while their provisions are not proposed to be canceled in connection with the entry into force of new laws.

4. Prerequisites are laid for the destruction of the unity of the system public service in the Russian Federation, provided for by the Federal Law of 2003 No. 58-FZ “On the System of the Public Service of the Russian Federation” (clause 1, article 3), in particular, due to the deepening of the discrepancies between the system of DD for military personnel and the DS system for civil servants. The previously formulated requirements of Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 2002 No. 249 "On measures to improve the system of monetary allowances for military personnel" are called into question. This even applies to such a provision as the status of an official who establishes the size of the DD of military personnel and DS of state civil servants. Now they are different. Article 12 of the Federal Law No. 76 of 1998 “On the status of military personnel” (clause 2, part 3) states: “Salaries for standard military positions of military personnel, salaries for military ranks of military personnel serving under a contract, and additional payments determined by the Government of the Russian Federation on the proposal of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (another federal executive body in which federal law military service is provided for) in compliance with the condition of unity of the basic norms of the monetary allowance of military personnel. And in Article 50 of the Federal Law No. 58 of 2003 "On the State Civil Service of the Russian Federation" it is written that "the size of official salaries and salaries for the class rank of federal civil servants are established by decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the proposal of the Government of the Russian Federation."

The preservation of this distinction proposed in the bill actually lowers the status of servicemen.

In the same way, the proposed division of military personnel into "grades" corresponding to their departmental affiliation is a violation.

Most of all, the rights of low-paid categories of military personnel to a decent DD are ignored, which undermines the plans for the accelerated transfer of regular Russian troops to voluntary military service under a contract by recruiting the necessary specialists on a competitive basis; Ultimately, the achievement of the goal set in the Address of the President of the Russian Federation is not ensured.

5. Some legal norms regulated by other laws are abolished; changes in a number of existing norms are not stipulated; there are still opportunities for sub-legislative expansion of the supposedly “final” list of payments and the finite number of categories of citizens to whom the bill applies, in particular, this applies to the “equal persons” mentioned in the bill.

WHAT CAN YOU OFFER IN THE CURRENT SITUATION

The authors of this publication attempted two possible answers to the question posed. The first is the development of a new alternative project and proposals for its wide open discussion. The second is the formulation of conceptual (fundamental) provisions, which the introduced laws must comply with when they are finalized. Materials on both attempts were handed over to a number of officials involved in solving this problem, in due course.

For implementation, the second answer seems more realistic. His wording, proposed by us, about the size of DD is as follows.

The sizes of DD military personnel annually (during the development federal budget) are established (corrected) by the President of the Russian Federation on the proposal of the Government of the Russian Federation with the participation of all federal executive bodies in which the law provides for military service, based on the following values ​​achieved:

a) the size of the SZP in the country - this size is most important for citizens concluding the first contract for service in the regular forces (with a coefficient exceeding DD over SZP of 1.25, which can be specified when preparing the draft federal budget);

b) the size of the DS of civil servants - these sizes are important for all (especially for high-ranking) contracted military personnel who are reassigned to new positions and (or) renegotiate contracts, in accordance with the updated scale of correspondence between the positions of military and civil servants.

The specified data is used to adjust the mesh tariff categories and, accordingly, salaries.

Citizens called to fulfill their constitutional duty to defend the Fatherland and perform military service on conscription are assigned the following DD:

During the period of study in educational military units(centers) for preparation for further service in the regular troops or for staying in a military training reserve (reserve) - corresponding to standard state student scholarships;

During the period of further conscription service in the positions of soldiers, sailors and sergeants in the regular troops - the corresponding DD of military personnel undergoing the same service under the contract.

All servicemen doing military service in the Russian Federation receive DD in accordance with the same scales of official salaries, salaries according to military rank and all allowances, except for the allowance for special conditions of military service. It may be different for various authorities in which military service is provided for by federal law.

And, of course, we cannot ignore the problem of anti-corruption expertise of the submitted bills. Indeed, the methodology for conducting anti-corruption expertise of regulatory legal acts and draft regulatory legal acts, which was approved by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 2010 No. 96 “On anti-corruption expertise of regulatory legal acts and draft regulatory legal acts”, defines the following as corruption factors: wording like “right” and excessive freedom of sub-legislative rule-making.

This is exactly what the bill under consideration does. So, for example, the draft law contains the phrase “have the right to establish ... in larger size than the upper limit set by the future law. When listing possible payments, words are suddenly added that "other payments may be established." They are a temptation to develop new orders, rewarding especially valuable officials with bonuses for their especially effective activities.

At an expanded meeting of the State Council on February 8 this year, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, speaking about the choice further way Russia, announced the need to develop a long-term strategy for the period up to 2020. The only real strategy is called innovative development based on one of our main competitive advantages - the realization of human potential. The result should be Russia's entry into the ranks of world leaders. This path is ambitious, it will require maximum efforts from all institutions of society, but we have no alternative. We are moving from a period of survival to a period of development. The task is to achieve cardinal changes in the economy and social sphere of the country, to achieve a qualitative improvement in life.

The Armed Forces cannot stand aside and must join in the fulfillment of the task set by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

In order to effectively counter modern challenges and threats, a mobile, compact and highly professional army is needed. In other words, we need a new type of Armed Forces, an army that is among the five best armies in the world, including in terms of key socio-economic indicators.

This is the first time such a task has been set before the army.

At the direction of the Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov, a Strategy for the Social Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020 was developed. Its main goal is to meet the social needs of military personnel, civilian personnel, as well as citizens discharged from military service and their families, which will help strengthen the country's defense capability and develop human capital.

Achieving this goal necessitates solving the problems of improving culture and leisure, physical culture and sports, information and commercial and consumer services for military personnel, civilian personnel, citizens discharged from military service, and members of their families; preservation and promotion of the health of military personnel, civilian personnel, citizens discharged from military service, and members of their families; improving the security of military service; improving the living conditions of military families; increasing the size and improving the quality of the provision of monetary allowances to military personnel, wages to civilian personnel and pensions to citizens dismissed from military service; ensuring social protection of military personnel, civilian personnel, citizens discharged from military service, and members of their families.

There is three important moments . The first- prioritization of tasks. Of course, from the point of view of today's problems, the order should be different: monetary allowance, housing, etc. However, in the long term, we must prioritize the full development of the individual - culturally, physically and professionally. Therefore, for the first time, the task of improving culture, leisure, sports, everyday life, etc. has been defined as a priority. At the same time, all tasks are solved in a complex way.

Second- the task of ensuring social protection. It is integrating, since it systematically includes elements of other tasks. Its selection was made in order to focus targeted attention on the most socially vulnerable groups, which was done for the first time.

Third- for the first time the results of the implementation of the Strategy are presented in the form of specific target values. They are substantiated by similar indicators of the social development of the armies of the leading states, as well as by logic and expert assessments.

Ekaterina Gennadievna, in the Concept of the long-term socio-economic development of the Russian Federation, one of the most important strategic priorities for the period up to 2020 is the transition of the country to an innovative path, which sets as the main goal the achievement of leadership positions in the economy, the social sphere, and ensuring the country's security. As I understand it, these plans will be taken into account in the military department?

To effectively counter modern challenges and threats, we need a mobile, compact and highly professional army. In other words, we need an innovative army - an army that is among the five best armies in the world, including in terms of key socio-economic indicators.

What were the main priorities of this strategy?

At the center of the Social Development Strategy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is the individual and the satisfaction of his needs in the most important areas of social development. Among them are culture and sports, education, medicine, safety of passage military service, housing issue, monetary allowance, wages and pensions, social protection.

We have a clear understanding of what we want to achieve in each of these areas and how to do it.

How difficult was the work on developing the strategy?

I had to work hard. At the system level, the adopted national and sectoral concepts and strategies, federal targeted programs and national projects were studied, and the experience of strategic management was analyzed. social sphere in the defense departments of NATO countries, as well as dissertations prepared over the past 10 years related to the social development of the Armed Forces.

By order of the Ministry, a large-scale sociological study was carried out, which made it possible to comprehensively assess state of the art military social sphere and determine key directions its reform. Questioning of military personnel, civilian personnel, citizens discharged from military service, and members of their families also helped us a lot.

At the development stage, the materials of the strategy were openly discussed and found support not only within the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, but also among the majority of state and public organizations defending the interests of military personnel and citizens discharged from military service, and members of their families. Including in the Defense Committee of the State Duma, the Defense and Security Committee of the Federation Council, the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, Public Council under the Ministry of Defense, in veteran organizations, the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers.

The strategy defines not only the general goal, objectives, expected results, but also the principles, stages, a set of main activities, the necessary conditions, risks and a mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the strategy.

Ekaterina Gennadievna, who will benefit from the implementation of this strategy?

The strategy clearly identifies the main categories that social transformations are aimed at - military personnel (conscripted and contracted), civilian personnel, citizens discharged from military service, members of their families, including the most socially unprotected categories - children, veterans families that have lost their breadwinner.

The strategy not only sets the vector for the social development of the Armed Forces, but also determines what exactly each of these categories will receive in the most important areas of social development.

Very specifically, taking into account the Russian and foreign experience the criteria for achieving the general goal and objectives, as well as the estimated indicators and the algorithm for their calculation are determined.

They were determined on the basis of similar targets of leading foreign defense departments (for example, the "proportion of healthy military personnel" indicator of 90% corresponds to the indicator of NATO armies), legal requirements (for example, training of civil servants 30%); best world practice (for example, the level of satisfaction with the quality of social services is 90%).

Behind each indicator is a program or a set of program activities that ensure the achievement of the specified target values.

These programs, as I understand it, are divided into temporary stages?

Quite right. The implementation of the strategy is expected in three stages, which correspond to the stages of implementation of the Concept of long-term socio-economic development of the Russian Federation: 2008-2012; 2013-2017; 2018-2020 years.

Ekaterina Gennadievna, what are the guarantees for the fulfillment of such grandiose plans?

Still under development in social strategy a fundamentally important component was laid down, on which the success of the implementation of the developed strategy largely depends - a clear mechanism for monitoring its implementation.

Among other control activities, it is planned to organize a monitoring system that allows tracking the implementation of indicators that characterize the achievement of the general goal and the solution of the objectives of the strategy.

We also plan to create a special working body - the Strategy Implementation Commission, which will include representatives of the main stakeholders, including government authorities of the Russian Federation, public and scientific organizations.

For the first time, civil society will be able to take part in monitoring the implementation of activities and programs that ensure the implementation of the strategy. The army becomes truly open.

Obviously, the adoption of this strategy is only the beginning of a big and hard work on the implementation of specific programs aimed at achieving the set goals:

Already today, the Ministry of Defense has begun to form the first stage of departmental targeted programs aimed at implementing the strategy. These programs will later be included in the Defense Department's 2009-2011 Results and Key Activities Report.

We understand that much remains to be done in order to bring the Armed Forces to a fundamentally new level social development, meeting the new tasks set for the Russian Ministry of Defense. But we are ready for such a large-scale work.

The “Strategy for the Social Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020” (hereinafter referred to as the Strategy) was developed in order to meet the social needs of military personnel, civilian personnel, military pensioners and their families and was approved on March 28, 2008 by the decision of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. It was planned to implement the Strategy in three stages, the first stage covers 2008-2012.

The leadership of the Russian Federation pays special attention to the social development of the Armed Forces (AF) of the Russian Federation. Therefore, it would seem that everything that is done within the framework of the Strategy should be known not only to all military personnel, but to the whole society. However, the text of the Strategy has been published in a minor edition (cf. Military railroad. - 2008. - No. 19 and No. 20). On the website of the Ministry of Defense, only the name of the document is indicated. Civilian specialists can find it on a specialized website or on the ConsultantPlus website, where the order of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation dated April 28, 2008 No. 241 is posted.

At the same time, the Strategy provides for the solution of a number of critical tasks in various areas of social policy in the following order:
1) culture and leisure, physical culture and sports, information and commercial services;
2) military education;
3) healthcare;
4) increasing the security of military service;
5) solution of the housing problem;
6) increase in monetary allowance (DD) and pensions;
7) ensuring social protection.

It seems to us that the procedure for solving problems in these areas should be different, since the size of the DD has highest value in improving the material support of military personnel. However, preparation management decisions according to DD is delayed. An increase in the size of the DD should have entailed an increase in military pensions, but changes in this area are even more problematic, and therefore are being postponed.

The main conclusions on the problems of improving the DD of military personnel and military pensions are as follows:

  • at present, the problem of a decent DD has been solved only for the military personnel of the Central Apparatus of the Ministry of Defense and, selectively, for a smaller part of the officers of the regular troops;
  • the problem of increasing the DD of the bulk of the military has not yet been resolved, and in the period remaining before the promised deadline for its solution, it may remain unresolved;
  • in relation to military pensions, there are trends of both a steady decrease in its level compared to the DD for military personnel, and convergence with the standards for pensions for the majority of the population of the Russian Federation.
The second most important social problem for servicemen is providing them with housing. The following results are evident here:
  • per last years families of servicemen and military pensioners are provided with an unprecedented a large number of apartments in the property (up to 100 thousand annually);
  • on the official website of the Ministry of Defense, a section appeared "Housing for military personnel", which contains information about ready-made and under construction housing with reference to regions, legislative and regulations relating to housing. An important innovation of the section was the creation of the Unified Register of military personnel recognized as in need of housing;
  • providing military personnel and their families with apartments should be considered as the most important action of the state, which has a “dual (military and civilian)” purpose, contributing to the growth of the well-being of the whole people;
  • housing for military personnel, which is attractive to corrupt officials, can become an area for developing a number of effective mechanisms for introducing public control to fight corruption.
For other areas social problems military personnel are also characterized by certain achievements and problems, but in comparison with the two considered, they fade into the background.

E.V. Trofimova- Ph.D., senior researcher military economics laboratories

The spring of this year has finally brought some intelligible hope for the fulfillment of the long-standing promises of the military-political leadership of Russia - to make the monetary allowance (DD) and the status of our military personnel in general such that it fully corresponds to the ideas of the army of a powerful, modern state.

Of course, the path to such a goal is not easy. We recall that an attempt to solve this problem, undertaken in 2002, was useful, but was reduced mainly to equalizing the military commanders' DD with the monetary allowance (DS) of the upper echelons of civil bureaucracy.

The junior officers were not really taken care of then. Therefore, many cadets of military schools and graduates, feeling deceived, began to quit - as best they could. And to the people of private and junior command staff (RMKS), even to those who served under the contract, the legislators reacted completely dismissively. The servicemen of the RMKS, who bear the bulk of the hardships and hardships of military service, were equated in status with referents ... of the lowest rank of the bureaucratic hierarchy.

To conclude a contract, they did not have before, and did not have any significant incentives.

Therefore, in 2003, when substantiating the federal target program (FTP) for the transfer of permanent readiness military units mainly to voluntary recruitment under the contract, it was decided to introduce a new “stimulating” allowance for the RMKS, and at the same time for junior and middle-level officers commanding them. However, senior officers, especially in the central apparatus (CA) of the Ministry of Defense, felt as if "offended." They turned to the then Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov with a request-proposal to introduce another allowance - exclusively for them. The allowance is not simple, but long-term acting in their "favor". The results of such a policy are illustrated at the bottom of the page in a graph.

It shows that the size of the DD, expressed in current prices for the period 2002-2008, grew for all servicemen. But among the employees of the central apparatus, they "soared up." Each increase in salary by position (with indexation parrying inflation) led (due to allowances) to an increase in the DD of “apparatchiks” by an amount exceeding not only the increase in DD for soldiers and sergeants, but also the size of the entire DD of the RMKS military personnel. It all the years remained less than the average salary in the country. Time passed, the ruble depreciated, the cost of the federal target program grew when it was adjusted, but not a “stimulating” supplement.

A GOOD INTENTION TURNED INTO TROUBLE

It was precisely this situation with DD that was accepted from Sergei Ivanov by the new Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Anatoly Serdyukov, who replaced him at the post. And no matter what ill-wishers say about his incompetence in military affairs, one cannot fail to note the noble initiative of the civilian manager: under him, the development of the "Strategy for the Social Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020" began. In April 2008, it was approved. At the same time, by order of the Minister of Defense No. 241 dated April 28, 2008, a commission was established to implement the strategy.

The plans were grandiose. Recall, in particular, the intention to introduce the Russian Armed Forces into the “five best armies in the world, including in terms of key socio-economic indicators”, and the military personnel serving under the contract into the “middle class of the country”. To do this, as expected, their AP should exceed the average wage (AW) in the country by 25%, and military pensions (MP) should rise to 80% of the AP. Another promise was also made: "For the first time, civil society will be able to take part in monitoring the implementation of activities and programs that ensure the implementation of the strategy." True, the next statement - that "the army is becoming truly open" did not harmonize with the factual behind-the-scenes work of the commission and the closed nature of drafting bills on changes in the army, even when they were discussed in the State Duma.

However, shortly after the strategy was approved, negative distracting developments occurred. This is the August 2008 war, during which the Russian Armed Forces defended their peacekeepers and civilians in South Ossetia. At the same time, an economic crisis broke out.

In the fall of 2008, the President of the Russian Federation, at the suggestion of military leaders, announced a transition to a “new look” for our army, we note, also behind the scenes, secretly from the majority of not only civilians, but also military personnel.

For a short time, the interests of contractors, who were previously forced to sign a “voluntary” contract, and military leaders, who allowed coercion instead of making the service attractive, coincided, including at the expense of a decent DD. The contractors began to scatter, and the generals escaped responsibility for the failure of the FTP by accusing the contractors of lack of patriotism.

Under these conditions, in order to save budget funds, it was decided to fill the bulk of the positions of the RMKS (700 thousand people) by conscription. The fact that it would not be possible to call up so many young men in the current demographic situation was neglected. And the fact that the combat effectiveness of persons undergoing military service for only one year is extremely low was also neglected. The generals convinced the deputies of the legitimacy to send military personnel into battle, who served only 3 months. And such an amendment was made to the law.

But everyone, it would seem, knows the impact on road safety of hastily trained young drivers of vehicles. Even if they do not drive in combat vehicles, but in comfortable foreign cars. The appearance of the term "teapot" in relation to them is not accidental. And so, in relation to our army, it turned out that it began to consist mainly of "dummies". A joking suggestion suggests itself: the leading commanders who justified such a transition to such a look of the RF Armed Forces should be renamed "bosses". But if it were only a matter of how we call them! And from the point of view of the country's defense capability, there is no time for jokes.

As for the size of the DD, then, having saved on military personnel of the lower level of the military hierarchy (after replacing contract soldiers with conscripts), some people wanted to transfer these funds to the more “needy”. Under plausible pretexts, a number of ministerial orders were developed to “bonuse money” for some military personnel according to criteria that were not entirely clear. The ill-fated orders still excite the military personnel and their families, and the main result of the undertaking was reduced to confusion and a split in the ranks of the “military brotherhood”.

BACKGROUND LEGISLATION IS CRAZY

Order No. 115 of March 28, 2009, deftly titled "On Additional Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Using Funds for the Monetary Allowance of Military Personnel and Remuneration of Civilian Personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation," became the apotheosis of the concern of the highest officials of the Ministry of Defense for themselves. Clause 7 of the “Procedure” attached to this order announced that the specific amounts of “incentives are determined within the limits of budgetary funds ... based on the results of the performance of official duties by military personnel and civilian personnel and are not limited to maximum sizes.”

It is impossible to show such an unlimited increase in DD after 2008 on the above graph, as well as to link it with any indicators of the combat capability of the troops and the country's defense capability. How the effectiveness of the use of DD funds increased remains a mystery. But the income of many military and civilian officials at the end of the budget year exceeded the income of not only regular troops, but also the Supreme Commander-in-Chief! The bewildering meaning of this order was then corrected by the order of the Minister of Defense No. 1010 of 26.07. 2010.

Let us give an example of a completely different attitude of our authorities to the payment of funds to military personnel. This example applies to most military personnel. The Ministry of Finance, in its letter No. 03-04-08-01/9 dated January 27, 2009, signed by the director of the Department of Tax and Customs Tariff Policy, initiated the withholding of personal income tax (PIT) with one of the compensation payments to military personnel. We are talking about compensation provided for in Article 16 of the Federal Law of 1998 No. 76-FZ “On the Status of Military Personnel”.

Unfortunately, this compensation does not have an official name. It is provided either “for”, or “for” sanatorium treatment, and if in meaning, then “besides” it. Without delving into the game of pretexts, the Ministry of Finance decided that personal income tax should be collected from this compensation. The calculation was that, firstly, the amounts of these compensations of 600 and 300 rubles per year (for a serviceman and family members, respectively) against the background of DD are insignificant, so the losses are not very noticeable, and secondly, the military are people accustomed to infringements . They grumble and calm down. There are enough other problems (both personal and official). Yes, and much larger problems in the system of monetary allowance continue to disturb the military ...

So it’s not the conjectures of critics, not the “subversive” activities of human rights activists, but life itself has shown and continues to show the fallacy of behind-the-scenes development of plans and the procedure for implementing them, especially in the systems of DD and army recruitment. Therefore, in February 2011, the parameters of the "new look" of the RF Armed Forces were again changed. It was also said about the necessary increase in the staffing of the RMKS under the contract, the approximate number was named, although there is no program for this yet.

True, the president and prime minister regularly reminded officials of the need to adopt a law on a new DD for military personnel. For some time, a draft of such a law “hung” on the Internet, but then it disappeared. Perhaps this is due to the fact that high-ranking officials in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense are quite satisfied with the current procedure, since the high size and continuous growth of their DD guarantees it anyway. It seems that the implementation of the strategy mentioned above was stalled from the military department itself.

Many in the Russian Federation discussed the current situation, as well as the reasons for the slowdown in the strategy. This was done by military and civilian experts, in particular from the IEP.

Only after March 17 this year, when the preliminary consideration of the draft law on DD in the State Duma Committee on Defense took place, and the materials were partially published in the media, the discussion of the new system of DD was updated.

Most recently, the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation submitted a draft law to the Russian government, and at its meeting on May 26, as it was announced, they were going to consider the document in order to then send it to the State Duma. But, we note, there is still little time left for the passage of the future law through all instances by the promised date of introduction - 01/01/2012. After all, by-laws will also be needed. At speeds, it's hard to fix anything. But the officials who developed the bills can report that they have carried out the president's order.

The following materials are now available for independent review:

1. Draft federal law "On monetary allowance and certain payments to military personnel" and the explanatory note and financial and economic justification accompanying this bill.

2. Information about the draft federal law “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in Connection with the Adoption of the Federal Law “On Monetary Allowance and Certain Payments to Military Personnel” and the documents accompanying this bill.

3. A number of other documents accompanying the bills, but not included in them, as well as publications that are indirectly related to the problem. There are many retellings of the presented materials in the media, but there is little analytics.

What did the results of our independent study show?

ANALYSIS OF THE SUSTAINABILITY AND PURPOSE OF BILLS

The appearance of the bills under consideration should certainly be considered a favorable event. They contain provisions that deserve support, but in general, as analysis has shown, support cannot be unconditional. It does not follow from the bills that they correspond to the main thing:

- the aspirations of the majority of citizens of the Russian Federation;

- the course announced by the President of the Russian Federation for the modernization of society, including the full involvement of young people in innovative activities, as well as the suppression of corruption;

- socially significant interests of military personnel, at least in the form as they were set out in the "Strategy for Social Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the period until 2020."

Neither the explanatory notes to the bills, nor the certificates prepared for the meeting of the State Duma Committee on Defense, give an answer to the question of what caused the need for a radical change in the military personnel's DD. The explanatory notes are based on a purely bureaucratic approach - a listing of some instructions and instructions from the leadership, in pursuance of which the bills were developed. However, this list cannot be considered complete, much less accessible for analysis by independent experts.

At the same time, as shown in the table below, there are official documents in the state on the problem under consideration, which should have been completed long ago. And this is not counting the strategy mentioned above, which, as a departmental document, could not be mentioned by the drafters of laws due to the status sign. The table includes some current top-level documents that are related to the need to increase the attractiveness of military service. There are those that have not been implemented for many years, their text has been corrected, but not in the right direction. Perhaps someone has forgotten them. The time has come, in our opinion, to remember and fulfill.

No. Documents not mentioned by the developers, but also subject to execution Comments
1. Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of November 30, 1992 No. 918 on the beginning of the transition to voluntary recruitment The execution was interrupted in 1995, among other reasons, due to the lack of attractiveness of military service.
2. Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation of May 16, 1996 No. 722 and of November 25, 1996 No. 1592 on the completion of the transition to exclusively voluntary manning of the RF Armed Forces and, to a limited extent, to other troops. Implementation has been deferred until “the creation of the necessary conditions”, which, first of all, depend on ensuring the attractiveness of military service. It's time to create them.
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by the President of the Russian Federation on February 5, 2010 (subparagraph “g”, paragraph 30) The need for "training highly professional servicemen devoted to the Fatherland, increasing the prestige of military service" was noted. You can't do without the growth of DD.

In any case, it is incompetent to forget about the interests of military personnel of any category, as well as about the true reasons for the reform of the DD. The table below shows their indicative list, which is formed on the basis of publicly available information. And we should also add the demand for the highest rates of staffing the military organization of the state with highly professional military personnel and building up the combat capability of the troops.

No. Reasons for the need for legislative reform DD Comments
1. The impossibility of solving (within the framework of the previous order and sizes of DD) the problem of voluntary recruitment of regular troops of the RF Armed Forces by such citizens who would be interested and able to solve all military tasks in peacetime and wartime This is evidenced by the failure of the first stage of recruiting the Armed Forces after 1992, then the failure of the FTP of 2004-2007, the observed early dismissal of young officers and cadets from the Armed Forces
2. The corruption of conscription and the preservation in it, as in the rudiment of the Russian serf past, of the inequality of citizens of the Russian Federation and the transfer of this inequality to DD This is evidenced by the materials of the military prosecutor's office and the data of the committees of soldiers' mothers.
3. The impossibility of Russia's entry into the group (five) of states with the best modern armies, declared in 2008 in the Social Development Strategy of the RF Armed Forces, including in terms of socio-economic indicators Russia from this year will remain in the G8 G8 the only state that retains the conscription
4. Unmotivated violation of the constitutional principles of equality of citizens, including civil servants (civil / military; under contract / conscription; serving in various federal executive authorities, etc.) There are regular facts that the DD of military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation lags behind DD in some other troops, as well as from the monetary content of civil civil servants
5. Lack of legislative linkage of military personnel’s DD with the average wage (SWP) in the country The sizes of DD and SZP, their growth rates are not linked, which leads to the loss of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the competitive labor market
6. Incorrect from a socio-economic point of view, the proportions of the ratios of the maximum and minimum DD within the existing order (up to 10 times when taking into account all allowances), which leads to an increase in social discontent and is fraught with negative consequences. The bills are contrary to the National Security Council-2020, in which such ratios (maximum income to minimum) are elevated to the number of the most important indicators of socio-economic security
7. A general decline in the prestige of military service, contrary to the inclusion of contract servicemen in the category of the “middle class of the country”, stated in the Strategy, which is designed to solve the problem of staffing the country's defense capability Simultaneously with the decrease in DD and VP, other incentives have fallen, which in other countries make military service attractive, and the social status of a serviceman is high.

There is another group of reasons that make it necessary to reform not only the system of DD for military personnel, but also the provision of pensions for military pensioners, but this requires a separate analysis, and not a passing mention. Although it is probably worth noting that the government is still trying to establish an unacceptable procedure for calculating pensions for the vast majority of retired military men.

In a press release for the meeting on May 26, it was stated as follows: “The procedure for calculating the pensions of citizens who have served in the military is being changed in such a way that, by reducing the amount of monetary allowance accepted for calculating pensions, in order to ensure an increase in the pensions themselves, on average, by at least 1.5 times." This is much less than what military pensioners expect, and directly contradicts what was stated in Serdyukov's strategy.

MAIN CONCLUSIONS FROM THE RESULTS OF THE EXAMINATION OF BILLS

The considered bills are an attempt to implement the instructions of the top military-political leadership of the Russian Federation on the introduction of new, significantly increased sizes of military personnel's allowances from 2012. Such an attempt deserves support in principle. Undoubtedly positive in the bill is, for example, the establishment of lump-sum benefits in the amount of 3 and 2 million rubles. and further descending by 500 thousand rubles. - solid, although it is not clear from what considerations the developers proceeded.

At the same time, the bills do not solve many problems that are among the most relevant for citizens and society, as well as for the state:

1. According to the main parameters of DD and EP, the bills do not contain direct action laws - instead of them, references are made to future by-laws. The published tables of the future sizes of DD and VP, given as supposedly illustrating the submitted bills, in fact, have no direct relation to the law - the mentioned sizes are not fixed by law. This means that the DD parameters actually promised to citizens after the adoption of laws will not receive guaranteed grounds. And by-laws, due to established traditions, will be drawn up without proper public (and even parliamentary) control. And whether the parameters they introduced will meet today's promises is a big question.

2. The general impression of future laws, if we abandon solid promises, is that in terms of their content and semantic load, these are not independent new laws, but modified versions of Articles 12 and 13 of the 1998 Law No. 76-FZ “On the Status of Military Personnel” and a number of changes in other articles of the said and other laws.

3. Separate legal provisions are not productive, not precise or even clearly erroneous, they contain provisions that look like they contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993 (paragraph 2 of article 19 and paragraph 2 of article 55), and therefore need justification, which not in the explanatory note. There are also discrepancies with a number of existing laws, while their provisions are not proposed to be canceled in connection with the entry into force of new laws.

4. Prerequisites are being laid for the destruction of the unity of the civil service system in the Russian Federation, provided for by the Federal Law of 2003 No. 58-FZ “On the System of the Civil Service of the Russian Federation” (clause 1, article 3), in particular, due to deepening discrepancies between the system of DD for military personnel and the DS system for civil servants. The previously formulated requirements of Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 2002 No. 249 "On measures to improve the system of monetary allowances for military personnel" are called into question. This even applies to such a provision as the status of an official who establishes the size of the DD of military personnel and DS of state civil servants. Now they are different. Article 12 of the Federal Law No. 76 of 1998 “On the Status of Military Personnel” (clause 2, part 3) states: “Salaries for standard military positions of military personnel, salaries for those undergoing military service under a contract, and additional payments are determined by the Government of the Russian Federation upon submission Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (another federal executive body in which military service is provided for by federal law) in compliance with the condition of unity of the basic norms of the monetary allowance of military personnel. And in Article 50 of the Federal Law No. 58 of 2003 "On the State Civil Service of the Russian Federation" it is written that "the size of official salaries and salaries for the class rank of federal civil servants are established by decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the proposal of the Government of the Russian Federation."

The preservation of this distinction proposed in the bill actually lowers the status of servicemen.

In the same way, the proposed division of military personnel into "grades" corresponding to their departmental affiliation is a violation.

Most of all, the rights of low-paid categories of military personnel to a decent DD are ignored, which undermines the plans for the accelerated transfer of regular Russian troops to voluntary military service under a contract by recruiting the necessary specialists on a competitive basis; Ultimately, the achievement of the goal set in the Address of the President of the Russian Federation is not ensured.

5. Some legal norms regulated by other laws are abolished; changes in a number of existing norms are not stipulated; there are still opportunities for sub-legislative expansion of the supposedly “final” list of payments and the finite number of categories of citizens to whom the bill applies, in particular, this applies to the “equal persons” mentioned in the bill.

WHAT CAN YOU OFFER IN THE CURRENT SITUATION

The authors of this publication attempted two possible answers to the question posed. The first is the development of a new alternative project and proposals for its wide open discussion. The second is the formulation of conceptual (fundamental) provisions, which the introduced laws must comply with when they are finalized. Materials on both attempts were handed over to a number of officials involved in solving this problem, in due course.

For implementation, the second answer seems more realistic. His wording, proposed by us, about the size of DD is as follows.

The size of the DD for military personnel is annually (during the development of the federal budget) established (adjusted) by the President of the Russian Federation on the proposal of the Government of the Russian Federation with the participation of all federal executive bodies in which military service is provided for by law, based on the following values ​​achieved:

a) the size of the SZP in the country - this size is most important for citizens concluding the first contract for service in the regular forces (with a coefficient exceeding DD over SZP of 1.25, which can be specified when preparing the draft federal budget);

b) the size of the DS of civil servants - these sizes are important for all (especially for high-ranking) contracted military personnel who are reassigned to new positions and (or) renegotiate contracts, in accordance with the updated scale of correspondence between the positions of military and civil servants.

The specified data is used to adjust the grid of tariff categories and, accordingly, salaries.

Citizens called to fulfill their constitutional duty to defend the Fatherland and perform military service on conscription are assigned the following DD:

- during the period of study in training military units (centers) to prepare for further service in the regular troops or for staying in a military-trained reserve (reserve) - corresponding to standard state student scholarships;

- during the period of further conscription service in the positions of soldiers, sailors and sergeants in the regular troops - the corresponding DD of military personnel undergoing the same service under the contract.

All servicemen doing military service in the Russian Federation receive DD in accordance with the same scales of official salaries, salaries by military rank and all allowances, except for an allowance for special conditions of military service. It may be different for various authorities in which military service is provided for by federal law.

And, of course, we cannot ignore the problem of anti-corruption expertise of the submitted bills. Indeed, the methodology for conducting anti-corruption expertise of regulatory legal acts and draft regulatory legal acts, which was approved by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 2010 No. 96 “On anti-corruption expertise of regulatory legal acts and draft regulatory legal acts”, defines the following as corruption factors: wording like “right” and excessive freedom of sub-legislative rule-making.

This is exactly what the bill under consideration does. So, for example, the draft law contains the phrase “they have the right to establish ... in a larger amount” than the upper limit set by the future law. When listing possible payments, words are suddenly added that "other payments may be established." They are a temptation to develop new orders, rewarding especially valuable officials with bonuses for their especially effective activities.

Let us note in conclusion that now the moment is coming when, not in words, but in deeds, the statements made during the approval of the strategy mentioned at the beginning of the article will be verified. This will include a real test of the openness of further work on the project and the involvement of civil society control over the implementation of the strategy.

V. Tsymbal, A. Privetkin. "Independent military review".