International relations at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries. The main directions of development of key regions of the world in the XX - XXI century

Questions:

1. Causes and consequences of the disappearance of the USSR.

2. Features of the socio-economic and political development Russia at the turn of the millennium.

3. Orientation and results of the social development of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet period. The influence of radical modernization on the place and role of Russia in the world community

Time: 2 hours

Guidelines

In preparation for first question it is necessary to analyze the external and internal factors of the disappearance of the USSR, the influence of the results of the policy of "perestroika" on the collapse of the Soviet socialist state. When studying the period 1985-1991. it is necessary to analyze the goals and objectives of the "perestroika" policy and its intermediate results at each stage. Next, we should consider the social processes that took place throughout the USSR, and, first of all, the program settings of various political movements, organizations, parties. Investigate the reasons for the deterioration economic situation countries, the changes that have taken place in the political sphere of the life of Soviet society. Pay special attention to the events of August 1991, trying to answer the following questions. What goals were pursued by supporters and opponents of the State Emergency Committee? Who and what political and social forces carried out a coup d'état in the country?

Next, it is necessary to single out classes, social groups of society, incl. and in the international arena, interested in the collapse of the Soviet Union, changing its social and state system, and therefore took an active part in this process. Answer the question. Did their activities meet the interests of the majority of the population of the Soviet Union?

In conclusion, consider the historical consequences of the disappearance of the USSR from the point of view of the development of the socio-economic, political and spiritual areas of the life of Russian society; to evaluate the fact of the disappearance of the USSR and other countries of the socialist Commonwealth in the context of the development of a planetary civilization.

When studying second question it is necessary to analyze historical processes in various spheres of internal and foreign policy. In the latter case, it must be borne in mind that foreign policy is carried out in order to ensure necessary conditions for the development of the state, the steady improvement of the well-being of its citizens, the security and safety of the country's population in all spheres of society. In light of this, the analysis of this aspect of the issue should be carried out on the basis of identifying the main directions of Russia's foreign policy. Possible consideration following directions: a) relations with the CIS countries; b) foreign policy ties with the United States; c) Russia and the European world; d) Russia's foreign policy towards the countries of the so-called. "third world", etc. Another typology of directions can also be proposed.

For each direction of Russia's foreign policy, it is necessary to study: the goals and objectives of foreign policy; ways and methods of achieving foreign policy goals and objectives; concrete results in the economic, social, political and spiritual spheres of society.

An important aspect problem is the study of the process of formation and development of the political system of society. Here it is necessary, first of all, to determine the chronological framework for the emergence of a new Russian statehood. Then highlight the factors that influenced the formation of the presidential republic, and the features of the emerging political structure of the Russian Federation. Next, analyze the changes that took place in the political system of Russia in the 90s. XX and early XXI centuries. After that, it is necessary to proceed to a detailed study of the structure, functions of the central and local executive and legislative authorities, the country's judicial system, and the powers of the authorities in the field of strengthening the state's defense capability.

This aspect of the problem also includes the question of the modern party-political system of the country and its influence on the development of the country as a whole. For a scientific characterization of the party-political system of the country, it is necessary first of all to try to divide the main parties of the country into groups. The basis for the division can be: a) the orientation of political parties to the form of ownership of the means of production; b) proclaiming in the programs of political parties the construction of a socialist (non-socialist) society; c) attitude towards the Soviet way of life (Soviet ideology), etc.

The main political parties of modern Russia include: United Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Liberal Democratic Party, Just Russia, Yabloko, Right Cause. For each political party, students should know: the time of its inception, the names of the party leaders, its approximate number, the main program settings and the social base of the party. Moreover, the social base of the party is understood as: a) the interests of which classes, social groups the party expresses; b) representatives of what classes, social groups are members of these parties.

Trainees should be guided in the approaches of the main political parties of the country to the most acute problems of the development of modern Russian society, the initiatives of the leaders of political parties to overcome the crisis. It is also recommended to critically approach the study of the results of parliamentary elections in Russia, not forgetting the nature and conditions of election campaigning, administrative resources, political technologies, falsification of voting results, media work, etc.

In preparation for third question seminars should pay attention to the following aspects:

Early elections of the President of the Russian Federation on March 26, 2000, victory of V.V. Putin. Changes in the organization of state power in the Russian Federation: the creation of seven federal districts; changes in the system of formation of the Federation Council; changes in the structure of executive authorities; the process of enlargement of the regions of the Russian Federation.

Analyze the priorities of domestic and foreign policy V.V. Putin: strengthening the role of the state; improvement of the mechanism of public administration; stabilization of situations in the economy and economic growth; fight against terrorism; integration with the Republic of Belarus; rapprochement with leading European countries – Germany, Great Britain, France.

Review the reforms of the federal executive bodies and their results; introduction of a new system for electing heads of constituent entities of the Russian Federation in February 2005; elections to the State Duma in December 2007; The fifth presidential elections in the Russian Federation in March 2008. D.A. Medvedev; elections to the State Duma in December 2012. Elections of the President of the Russian Federation in March 2012

In conclusion, it is necessary to consider the features of the construction of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the creation of modern structures for ensuring the safety of the population. Analyze the course, difficulties, achievements and shortcomings of this construction; determine the main directions of the state policy in the field of protection of the population and especially important objects.

Questions for self-control:

1. What changes in the international situation were marked by the beginning of the 90s? How were they characterized?

2. What was the direction of the "perestroika" policy? Why was it not possible to complete the tasks in full?

3. What is the political system of modern Russian society? What political parties are functioning in Russia today? What are their strategic objectives and social base?

4. What are the results of the socio-economic and political development of Russian society in the 90s? What changes took place at the beginning of the 21st century?

Inv. No. 1717u. History of Russia: textbook. 2nd ed., revised. and additional / A.S. Orlov, V.A. Georgiev, N.G. Georgieva, T.A. Sivokhina. M.: TK Velby, Prospect Publishing House, 2006 (2008).

Inv. No. 1408u, 578u. Munchaev Sh.M. History of Russia: textbook. for universities. 4th ed. M.: Norma, 2000 (2006, 2007).

Inv. No. 1693u. History of Russia from ancient times to the present day: textbook / ed. A. N. Sakharov. - M, 2008.

Inv. No. 1996 History of Russia from ancient times to the present day: textbook: in 2 volumes / Ed. A. N. Sakharova. T. 2. - M., 2010.

Inv. No. 1777u. Semennikova L.I. Domestic history: a textbook for universities - 9th ed., M .: KDU, 2008.

Inv. 1924 Fortunatov V.V. Domestic history: textbook. allowance. St. Petersburg: Peter, 2009.

Inv. No. 1744u. Reader on the history of Russia: tutorial/ Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov. - M, 2008.

Inv. No. 1746k, 1747k. Vinogradov A.V. Domestic history in tables and diagrams. Teaching aid. In 2 parts. - Novogorsk, 2001.

Inv. No. 2138u. Zhukova L.V. History of Russia in dates: reference book / L. V. Zhukova, L. A. Katsva. - M., 2011.

Dainichenko P.G. The Complete Encyclopedic Reference. History of Russia in maps, diagrams, tables, M.: Olma-Press, 2003

Inv. No. 2298u. Fortunatov V.V. History of world civilizations. SPb., 2011

The wave nature of the rise of traditionalism on turn XX-XXI centuries

But all this became known only in the 2000s, and in the 1970s. most Western intellectuals have demonized modernization in the Third World, describing it solely as a form of neo-colonialism, while idealizing the rise of national movements, the return of peoples to traditional social practices and ways of life. These ideas were quickly taken up by the intellectuals of the countries of the East. Anyway, constructors public opinion had a significant impact on changing global political strategies.

political change. The most significant factor in the resuscitation of traditional culture and the corresponding group forms of solidarity was the change in the concept of national cultural policy. Until that time, for several centuries, the process of transformation of empires and the formation of nation-states, naturally, adjusted for regional and historical specifics, was accompanied by a policy of encouraging cultural homogeneity, expressed in the famous slogan of the French Revolution: "One country, one language, one people."

Since the second half of the XX century. this paradigm has become increasingly negatively perceived by world public opinion, and since the 1970s. a victorious march across the planet began with another, directly opposite concept - multiculturalism, the purpose of which was to encourage cultural diversity, understood as a manifestation of group identity. In 1971, the principles of multiculturalism were included in the Constitution of Canada, in 1973 - in Australia, in 1975 - in Sweden. Since the early 1980s these principles have entered the political practice of most Western countries and have become a kind of Credo international organizations.

More than thirty years of observation of the consequences of the implementation of this political model in life give grounds for the conclusion that, by solving some problems, for example, people getting used to cultural diversity, it gives rise to others. Thus, multiculturalism in its modern form provokes the revival of group forms of cultural identity, inhibiting individual cultural diversity and freedom of choice of culture. In many European countries and in the US, it is not uncommon for people who have lost their ethnic or religious identity to reanimate it, because the government allocates benefits to groups! It turned out that multiculturalism strengthens the isolation of cultural groups, creating artificial boundaries between them, a kind of ghetto on a voluntary basis. The processes of national-civil disintegration have become noticeable even in the Netherlands, which until recently was considered the standard of a culture of tolerance and mutual trust.

Crushing of traditional civilizations

At the end of the XX century. the scientific community, being largely unprepared for the challenge of global traditionalism, considered its revival as a natural disaster and tried to find the natural roots of this phenomenon in the eternal specifics of national cultures from the standpoint of essentialism. They were credited with a certain unchanging set of internal qualities and properties. This largely explains the popularity of the "clash of civilizations" concept, interpreted as ultra-stable cultural macrosystems, living a special life, moving along their own special paths and acting as a permanent source of conflict.

Meanwhile, such an understanding of civilizations is not supported by empirical cross-cultural studies. Identified on the basis of the unity of religious roots, the communities were not confirmed in the course of sociological research: they did not represent single value complexes. Did not find empirical confirmation and another, very popular in the 1990s. the idea of ​​the sociologist G. Hamilton about the reproduction in modern conditions of the former diversity of civilizations. Scientific analysis convincingly shows that they do not remain the same, civilizations are divided into many new groups and subgroups. The global culture is changing.

This process manifests itself at different taxonomic levels. On the global level traditional civilizations are cut along the line of a gap in the degree of socio-economic development of countries. International comparative studies conducted under the leadership of R. Inglehart from 1981 to 1998 and published after a thorough theoretical reflection only in 2005 showed that different value systems prevail in countries at different stages of socio-economic development. In under- and medium-developed states, where most people have to fight for physical survival, it is precisely the values ​​of survival that prevail. (Survival) and existential security (Existential Security). In a small group of highly developed countries in Europe, in the USA and Japan, the priorities of citizens are shifting towards spiritual values ​​- self-realization and self-expression (self-expression) in various spheres of life. Moreover, the structure of value orientations of the inhabitants of these countries is more mosaic than in less economically developed countries.

On the nation-state level One of the most significant factors in the growth of cultural diversity is migration, which significantly changes the cultural image of states, forming closed areas of settlement of new ethnic and religious groups. The total number of migrants in the world in 2005 was estimated to be close to 200 million. According to UN forecasts, by the middle of this century their number will increase by at least another 90 million people. The vast majority of these are people from the economically underdeveloped "world South", who settle in the developed countries of the "world North", and it is the cultural image of the latter that changes to the greatest extent as a result of migrations.

Another global phenomenon, urbanization, also has a universal impact on cultural change. Traditional culture is largely preserved in non-urbanized societies, including China and India (the world's second and fourth largest national economies in terms of GDP). However, according to UN forecasts, both of them will become urbanized by the middle of this century. The transition to urbanization, in turn, causes a chain of changes in the demographic and social structure of the population, in the nature of its communication and, ultimately, in cultural norms. In urbanized countries, be it Iran, where the influence of Islam on all aspects of life is extremely strong, or Japan, with its cult of the emperor and considerable influence of Shintoism, the same type of processes are occurring - the birth rate is decreasing, the number of children in the family is decreasing, forms of collectivism are changing.

To the greatest extent, the process of fragmentation of traditional civilizations/cultures is associated with the growing social diversification of urbanized societies. In the mentioned studies of Inglehart, there are noticeable differences in the value systems of young people and older people. As a rule, the former demonstrates a greater commitment to the values ​​of life renewal, modernization in the broadest sense of the word. However, during periods of so-called "modernization breakdowns" it is young people who initiate a return to traditionalism. So, my research has shown that in Russia the youth, who were in the lead in the 1990s. in the field of ethnic tolerance, in the early 2000s. overtook representatives of older age groups in manifestations of archaic stereotypes of ethnic prejudice. A similar trend has emerged in the Arab countries. Here, the disruption of modernization processes as a result of economic downturns and geopolitical upheavals stimulated in the 1980s. the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, initiated and promoted by the youth.

The growth of interest in the archaic among a considerable part of the young during periods of fatigue from economic reforms or their failure is noted in different countries, and in itself this fact is not in doubt. The only question is whether such changes in mood can be called a return to tradition. In my opinion, this characterizes another phenomenon, which can be called constructing traditions.

Construction of cultural complexes

The phenomenon of "invention of traditions", discovered by E. Hobsbawm in the 1980s, unfortunately, is still little mastered in science today, although an approach from such positions makes it possible to eliminate the seeming inconsistency of many modern processes. Thus, with its help, one can explain the strange turn of the young towards the archaic. The fact is that often the norms that young people support just seem traditional but in reality they are innovation dressed up as tradition. Such, for example, is Islamic radicalism: according to the well-known Muslim theologian M. Fethullah Gülen, modern politically engaged Islamic fundamentalism is not traditional. On the contrary, this is an innovation that in many ways distorts the basis of Islam.

Even more noticeable is the quasi-traditional nature of Russian ethnic nationalism, one of the first carriers of which among the youth of Russia were "skinheads" - a movement that completely borrowed its name, symbols and ideology from the youth radical groups in Western Europe. Only at the beginning of the XXI century. these organizations began to dress up in Russian clothes, which was manifested mainly in their renaming. If in the 1990s groupings with names like "Blood & Honor" prevailed, then in the 2000s. became more titles, emphasizing their national character: "Russian Guard", "Russian Fist", "Russian Order", etc. These manifestations of Russian radical nationalism, as well as the beginning of the movement of Islamic fundamentalism, reflected typical youth protest moods dressed in the form of national traditions.

According to E. Giddens, most of the phenomena that are now perceived by the mass consciousness as a tradition, in fact, are "remakes", free copies of past experience or its imitation. In fact, even in truly traditional societies, intergenerational transfer of experience could be accompanied by distortions, losses due to conscious selection. In modern conditions, however, it is not so much authentic translations of past experience that are most often perceived as traditions, but rather its interpretation and selection - something that a well-known methodologist historical science P. Nora called "imaginary past" .

Often the selection of the past is carried out in order to legitimize innovations by emphasizing their local, national origin. Thus, the famous philosophy of Japanese management ("corporation - family"), perceived by foreigners as a standard for the use of ancient national traditions in the economy, has developed relatively recently. It grew out of the managerial experiment of K. Matsushita, whose innovations began to spread in Japan only in the second half of the 20th century. Of course, these inventions in the field of management are based on some fragments of the real Japanese traditions of patriarchal collectivism, which, however, are increasingly being squeezed out of the life of the Japanese by a new collectivism based on rationalism and individual selectivity of communication.

If this kind of Japanese tradition demonstrates the process of adapting fragments of traditional culture to the needs of the modern economy, then another version of such an invention - "Islamic economy" can serve as an example. adapting the economy to the challenges of ideologies and to the growing demand for traditionalism in the world.

Sharia has long imposed restrictions on the economic activity of a faithful Muslim. Thus, it prohibits the receipt of interest, investment in a business containing an element of uncertainty (gharar), not to mention participation in a business related to the production of alcohol, tobacco, pork or gambling. These restrictions, which existed for about a millennium, did not previously give rise to incentives for the creation of a special Islamic economy. It arose quite recently: the first Islamic bank, operating on the basis of interest-free financing, appeared only in 1963 in Egypt. In the same year, the Muslim Pilgrim Savings Corporation was established in Malaysia to help accumulate savings for the Hajj. It took more than twenty years to transform these inventions from local experiments into a global phenomenon. Moreover, the stages of the globalization of the Islamic economy coincide with the stages of the deployment of the process of "Islamic revival" - an ideological, social and political movement with the aim of consolidating Muslims, primarily in countries dominated by Islam.

Islamic revival is an example of negative consolidation on the principle: "We" are not "They", "We" are not "West"". In my opinion, it was not so much the specifics of the Muslim world that determined the movement of "Islamic solidarity" as this movement itself gave rise to images of a special civilization and its special path. To consolidate these images, it was not enough to emphasize only social characteristics Islamic way of life, associated with increased attention to the observance of religious rites, with the revival of interest in all the nuances of Islam in everyday life. The main manifestation of the "special path" was to be special political regimes (more religious than secular) and a special Islamic economy.

The conceptual foundations of such an economy were formulated in November 1988 on scientific and practical conference held in Tunisia under the auspices of the League of Arab States. The main thesis of the concept of Islamic economics reads: "Full ownership of everything that exists in the world belongs only to Allah (and through Him to the entire Muslim community). A person acts only as a trustee of the wealth and blessings at his disposal" . The idea of ​​developing such an economy was supported by the oil-producing countries of the Arab world, Iran, Malaysia and a number of other states, but international Islamic organizations became even more active promoters of it, spurring demand for traditionalism and substantiating the idea of ​​a "special path" for the Islamic world. By the end of the 1980s. three countries (Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan) declared their economies completely subject to Islamic norms. By 2010, according to S. Kamel, Chairman of the General Council for Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions, there were 270 such banks and investment funds in the world, whose assets amounted to $260 billion.

But any social construction has a limit of possibilities. And such an invention as the Islamic economy, which mimics the cultural tradition, is faced with the need to prove its viability in comparison with the conventional banking system, which was once Western, but has long since become universal. So far, this competition is not in favor of a quasi-traditional system based more on ideological than on economic foundations. Of the three states that have announced the Islamization of their economy, only Sudan, one of the poorest countries, which never became richer with the introduction of the new system (185th in terms of GDP per capita in 2008). Iran has effectively abandoned the Islamic economy. Even its most important component - the ban on the use of bank interest - is not applied in the financial system of this country. In Pakistan, the share of the Islamic economy is only 5-7% of the national economy. True, in a number of countries, and not only in Muslim countries, fragments of such a model are preserved, primarily its financial component. However, it turned out to be less reliable and more expensive than the generally accepted one. The cost of mortgage lending in Islamic banks in England, for example, is three to four times higher than in conventional ones.

It would seem that the Islamic banking system could prove its advantages during the financial crisis of 2008-2009, caused in no small measure by international financial speculation and fraud, which are unacceptable in Islamic banks. However, the Islamic banking system suffered from the crisis no less than the ordinary one, if only because the financial sector is inseparable from other sectors of the economy. For example, the unprecedented construction crisis that hit the Gulf countries in 2009 immediately triggered a financial crisis there. In other words, "Islamic economics" is one of many examples of the construction of traditions, more precisely, the dressing of innovations in a traditional form. This phenomenon also shows that in the modern world the survival rate of quasi-traditions is not the same. And purely ideological constructs have the least chance of survival.

"Reverse wave" in Russia

The global fashion for traditionalism, the search for "special civilizations" and the corresponding forms of their development at the beginning of the 21st century. embraced Russia. It was from that time that the state media began to spread an idea very similar to the doctrine of "Islamic revival" - the concept of cultural and civilizational predetermination of a special path for our country, destined, according to the wording of V. Surkov - the first deputy head of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, fate or God. This thesis is often supplemented by the assertion that culture also determines the eternal features of the political system. In the Russian case, this is centralized power, in which the role of the person of the leader is more important than laws.

The idea of ​​civilizational originality, as if predetermining the "special path" of the nation, should, according to political technologists, first of all justify the doctrine of "sovereign democracy", in which the ruling persons play an immeasurably greater role than is customary in democratic states. The same ideology should solve the problems of political therapy. Russians are instilled with the idea of ​​the senselessness and harmfulness of the habit of comparing their position with developed countries, since the West is a different civilization. The introduction of such ideas into the mass consciousness should fulfill the function of a cordon sanitaire preventing the penetration into Russia of "alien" liberal and democratic trends.

However, the motives for supporting the idea of ​​a "special civilization" are not the same for different political forces in Russia. Today, at least three main types of apologists for the idea of ​​civilizational predetermination of Russia's "special" historical track can be singled out. The first group can be called protective. These are, first of all, representatives of the power branch of the current power elite. It is they who most often refer to the cultural predetermination of the fate of the country, thus seeking to legitimize their political course towards the excessive powers of the state bureaucracy in the system of government.

The second group - decadent- is represented for the most part by figures who position themselves as liberal thinkers. They are involuntarily traditionalists: supporters of the Western path of development, which, in their opinion, unfortunately, is impossible in our country. For them, the cultural predetermination of a "special civilization" is an explanation and justification for the inaction or ineffective actions of liberal forces.

The third group consists of advocates of the concept, relatively speaking, aggressive civilizational nationalism. Their theoretical constructions go back to the idea that the specificity of Russian civilization determines the inevitability of not just the dominance of the state in the political system, but also the special role of the leader of the nation, its leader or monarch. For such a civilization, the natural territorial and political form is an empire, in which the Russian people should play the leading role, and its dominant position should be legally fixed.

Why is there such a great demand for traditionalism in Russia today? Because he is an indispensable companion of the "reverse wave". Its signs were clearly manifested in the early 2000s, when liberal reforms of the previous decade (albeit extremely inconsistent and contradictory in their consequences) were cut short. They were replaced by counter-reforms: a new round of recentralization, state monopolization of the economy, restrictions on freedom of speech and other manifestations of authoritarianism - a system in which the government limits the participation of the people in political life, relying on traditional institutions (church, patriarchal families, clan groups, etc.) and political apathy of the population. However, it is not at all easy to make an attempt to transition to authoritarianism, which needs to rely on traditionalism, in a country where the foundations of the transmission of folk traditions have been destroyed over decades of totalitarianism.

Traditionalism without traditions

It is now widely believed that the poor survival of new democratic and legal institutions in Russia is due to their inconsistency with traditional Russian culture, or the Russian institutional matrix. However, this point of view has not been confirmed in a number of Russian and international comparative studies. On the contrary, they pointed out that Russia suffers not from excessive traditionalism, but from a strong destruction of the traditional institutional matrix.

Tradition is the intergenerational transmission of cultural norms and values ​​that legitimize the behavior of members of a certain community. Such a transfer of accumulated experience is possible only if certain basic conditions for the transmission of culture are preserved, primarily social institutions that act as carriers, custodians, and, most importantly, controllers of compliance with traditional prescriptions. Social control uses moral rewards for observing traditions and moral sanctions for their violation.

Nowadays in Russia the mechanisms social control almost completely dismantled along with the institutions that kept them. Already by the end of the XIX century. they forgot about the rural community as a form of social self-organization. Orthodox parishes were destroyed during the Soviet era, and their role is unlikely to be restored, given that over 87% of Orthodox do not consider themselves part of any one parish, attend church occasionally and what ever they need. Until recently, in Soviet cities, there were yards in which pensioners, sitting on benches, gossiped about someone else's morality. This somehow made up for the lack of a full-fledged social control mechanism that operated on the principle of "what will people say?", but today there is none of that. In the same way, family relations are deformed. So the idea of ​​Russian society as collectivist and communal is a myth. On the contrary, today it is one of the most atomized in the modern world. According to the results of the European study 2006-2007. sociologists have come to the conclusion that Russians are leading among the inhabitants of European countries in terms of the level of atomization of social relations; at they also have the lowest values ​​of collectivism.

This circumstance just worsens the introduction of new social institutions in Russia, since they take root better where they grow out of long-standing participatory traditions. In our country, judging by the materials of cross-cultural studies, the level of readiness of the population for various forms voluntary associative activity. So, neighbors living on the landing of a multi-storey building can still agree; on the scale of more than a dozen apartments in the entrance of the same house, it is already more difficult to do this, and the residents of the whole house agree only when absolutely necessary. With such atomization of society, the likelihood of introducing the norms of a rule of law state is extremely low, and without a legal institutional system, a modern innovative economy cannot develop either.

So, is the path to innovative modernization closed for Russia? The answer to this question largely depends on understanding the nature of Russian inertia. It is based not so much on the pressure of past experience (cultural traditions) as on the lack of new experience in self-organization, self-government and participation in public administration. However, experience is a gain. At one time, the American diplomat J. Kennan, who worked in the USSR in the 1930s-1950s, wrote that an economic structure based on market principles because the country "was hardly familiar with private initiative, in the form we are accustomed to in America." However, in 1991-1994. the society, which seemed to have lost the remnants of the experience of private entrepreneurship during the years of Soviet power, demonstrated an increase in the number of entrepreneurs unprecedented in world history. In four years, only one of its varieties - shuttle trade - involved 10 million people. These are former doctors and teachers, engineers and workers. I will not evaluate the positiveness of the Russian experience of the forced growth of the entrepreneurial stratum (this is a special topic), I will only say that this experience has refuted theoretical dogmas. Labor orientation to one or another area of ​​activity was considered the most inert element of work culture, but it took three to four years to change it in Russia - less time than, say, to receive a higher education (5-6 years).

Another one important feature modern Russia is that, with a low level of the corresponding traditions of Russian society, there is a large proportion of people who are ready for risk and innovation. International comparative studies show that in terms of readiness to accept innovations, "Russia today is close to a wide range of European countries." At least in these respects, it does not differ from Belgium or the Netherlands.

Does this mean that the socio-cultural conditions in Russia do not create any barriers to innovative development? No, and such a conclusion would be wrong. First, Russian initiative is anarchic. We have one of the lowest levels of respect in Europe for rules, norms, and not only formal ones (laws), but also informal ones (religious, family, traditional ethnic, etc.). Secondly, in Russia there is a deficit of mutual trust and positive expectations. With low trust in partners and weak confidence in a favorable future, there is nothing to count on the development of long-term capital-intensive projects such as technology parks through the efforts of private initiative. Under such conditions, it seems quite natural to rely on the state as the only entity capable of initiating, financing and implementing the construction of large capital-intensive development projects. innovative economy. In any case, this is how many of our well-known economists understand the possibilities of development.

Meanwhile, real practice shows that the federal government cannot get out of the trap of general distrust. It turns out that it is not enough to redistribute the funds from the stabilization fund to the industrialization fund, it is also necessary to ensure that this money is not stolen, but spent on targeted needs. Even the highest-priority projects of national importance, like the Olympic Games, require not only huge investments, but also leadership with the help of a personally trusted person with special powers. It is difficult to imagine that with the help of such "commissioners" innovative projects can be implemented in various regions of the country. Experience shows that even in the most disciplined, closed and seemingly controlled branch of the Russian defense industry - rocket science - ""military-police" management methods did not stop the degradation of the military industry". This is not surprising, since the reproduction of the traditional for Russia model of vertical, top-level modernization also leads to the re-creation of the same type of socio-cultural relations in society: alienation, legal nihilism and total distrust.

There is also a strong relationship between various manifestations of the vertical hierarchical organization of society and trust. Thus, the concentration of power entails an increase in corruption, which, in turn, lowers the level of trust in society. In Russia, almost three-quarters of respondents are convinced that they will never be able to get a fair treatment from officials; in Hungary there are also many such doubters, but still only about half of the respondents; in Slovakia and the Czech Republic - just over a third. Corruption destroys not only the trust of the population in power, except for the highest, but also the horizontal trust of people in each other, if only because they have different possibilities access to corruption networks. Such networks are opaque, and this alone breeds mutual suspicion of any form of social advancement or access to the most scarce social goods.

So, with the revival of the traditional Russian path of modernization - only from above - the circle closes: the low level of trust and respect for the law seems to require an increase in the role of state power in the modernization of the country. But such a concentration of power reduces the level of trust and weakens the sense of justice of the people. The way out of this circle will be connected, first of all, with the realization that a rigidly vertical system of government is rather a cause than a consequence of people's low sense of justice and low mutual trust in society. Consequently, they cannot be overcome without providing conditions for institutional transparency, without encouraging human initiative and independence.

Research by RAS Corresponding Member N. Lapin shows that in most of Russia, the main obstacle to modernization is not so much cultural as bureaucratic barriers. They grow as a result of the gap between the interests of the main agents of innovation processes (authors of innovative ideas, investors, producers of innovations), on the one hand, and the selfish interests of officials, encouraged by the existing system of governance in the country, on the other. Therefore, the best indicators of the real growth of the innovation economy are typical for regions with average indicators of the socio-cultural climate, but in which local authorities provide more acceptable institutional conditions for development than the national average.

Thus, at present, modernization in Russia can only have a limited, focal character and somehow break through only in certain regions where local authorities are able to at least partially neutralize the country's general unpreparedness for the development of an innovative society and its economy. The involvement of the greater part of the country in this process can only be based on radical changes in socio-political and cultural conditions. By this I mean a purposeful policy of cultivating the traditions of modernization, a policy of cultivating a new institutional matrix from the remnants of traditional culture and through the moral legitimization of new values. In my opinion, global changes in cultural policy and in the general world cultural climate will push modernization changes in Russia.

The contours of the future: the expected change of the global cycle

The explosion of traditionalism in the world, celebrated at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries. and perceived by many as deep tectonic manifestations of the essence of culture itself and its inner nature, was, in my opinion, just a short-term wave that completes the cycle of industrial modernization. This wave was caused by impulses external to culture - the synergetic effect of the joint and unidirectional action of a combination of economic, political and social factors. The effect of this effect subsides over time, and those factors that raised the wave of traditionalism are already dampening it.

Thus, the industrial economy, as is known, itself simplified its technologies, adapting them to the socio-cultural standards of a particular territory. The post-industrial economy of high technologies is much less suitable for adaptation to local traditional cultures. The essence of such technologies excludes the possibility of their simplification, therefore they are more demanding on the quality of labor resources, assessed by universal and standardized criteria.

This circumstance is already changing the nature of the global division of labor. For example, "American firms prefer to locate the production of the first stage (highly skilled mental labor and pilot production) at home ... the second stage (production of elements requiring skilled manual labor) - in regions distinguished by a high quality of technical culture and a long tradition of skilled industrial labor (for example, in Scotland); the third stage of the production cycle, which requires routine, labor-intensive, low-skilled work (assembly, manufacturing of elements for electronic products, etc.) - in Hong Kong, the Philippines, Indonesia ".

That is, the share of countries that retain significant layers of traditional culture inherent in non-urbanized societies, in the modern division of labor, gets only labor-intensive industries that require routine and low-skilled labor. As these countries or some of them get involved in the development of their own post-industrial production (such an intention was announced by the leadership not only of Russia, but also of Kazakhstan), they will have to significantly change the cultural climate that has developed in the country. Under such conditions, the economy will again reproduce its creative function in relation to folk culture, which it partially lost in the era of its adaptation to local traditions. The post-industrial economy makes new demands not only on the quality of the workforce, but also on management both in the economic and political spheres.

Further, the industrial phase of modernization could be carried out under different political regimes: democratic, authoritarian and totalitarian. But with the transition to the post-industrial phase, "the emerging values ​​of self-expression provide the social force that calls into question former authorities and pushes towards truly mass and responsible, and not just electoral democracy" . At the post-industrial stage of modernization, the requirements for individual activity and creativity of the worker increase. The involvement of the masses in modernization is possible only if they participate in political decision-making, that is, in a democracy. It is no coincidence that the transition of a number of Asian countries (especially Japan and South Korea) to the innovative stage of modernization was accompanied by the process of their democratization. Similar changes took place in Latin America (for example, in Brazil), and even earlier - in the countries of Southern Europe.

Finally, the wave of traditionalism was in no small measure caused by a change in cultural policy - the rejection of the idea of ​​cultural homogeneity on the scale of nation-states in favor of encouraging the diversity of traditional group identities of the ascriptive type. Such a policy spurred the processes of intergroup clashes and the disintegration of cultures. Now this fact is recognized not only by the majority of experts, but also by political circles. So since the early 2000s. the strategy of multiculturalism in its primary form (unconditional support for the diversity of traditional cultures) is being adjusted even in those countries where it was enshrined as a constitutional principle, for example, in Australia. Both international organizations and practically all democratic countries have switched to a different strategy - "separation of the spheres of culture." AT public sphere cultural homogeneity is encouraged, based on the adoption of uniform formal norms and transparent, controlled civil society rules for their implementation. In the private sphere, cultural diversity is encouraged. It is assumed that such a compromise model makes it possible to ensure the observance of human rights, regardless of its cultural characteristics, while maintaining the diversity of a truly multicultural society.

The model of "separating the spheres of culture" undoubtedly reflects a change in public sentiment, but so far is not feasible in practice. AT real life it is impossible to draw a line of demarcation between private and public space. Defenders of the interests of a particular cultural group in the private sphere inevitably appeal to publicity. The very existence of ethnic or religious communities today is impossible without public meetings, their own publications, the system of education and other publicity, and even intergroup conflicts are initially public by definition.

All this makes it necessary to further search for new strategies of cultural policy. One of the most promising directions- the model of "individual freedom and cultural choice", the basic principles of which were outlined by A. Sen. Its essence lies in the gradual weakening of group forms of identification and "giving individuals the right to live and exist in accordance with their own choice, having a real opportunity to evaluate other options" . This concept, which sees cultural diversity not as an end in itself, but as a tool for the realization of cultural freedom, has been enthusiastically received by many specialists in the field of cultural policy studies. However, it has not become the norm Western countries. As for Russia, its implementation seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. And not because the Russian people, to whom it is customary to refer without asking, will prevent this. The most impenetrable social stratum is the so-called "Russian spiritual elite." It would seem that she has always been very sensitive to Western cultural fashion. But the imitation of the Russian elite is selective: they borrow what suits their tastes and habits, and most importantly, their interests. Now various representatives This layer is more inclined to borrow "not the first freshness" fashion for traditionalism. For the most part, the Russian "elite" is not ready for the relatively later ideas of neomodernism and neoliberalism: they either do not know such ideas or treat them with caution, if not hostility. References to the fact that the values ​​of progress and freedom are rejected primarily by the Russian people, driven by certain traditions, are, in my opinion, nothing more than an unsubstantiated excuse.

Pain Emil Abramovich - Doctor of Political Sciences, General Director of the Center for Ethnopolitical Studies, Professor of the State University - high school economy.
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K. Matsushita (1894 - 1989) - Japanese entrepreneur, founder of the Matsushita Electric Company, owner of the Panasonic, Technics, National trademarks. In 1929, during the beginning of the economic depression, a huge amount of unsold goods accumulated in the warehouses of his company, but the owner did not fire the workers, allowing them to work half the day while maintaining the same salary. For this, all employees, as well as their relatives and friends, had to buy and sell the company's products. This allowed Matsushita's firm to survive the difficult times of the crisis. After 1945, he substantiated the philosophy - "corporation as a family."
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It is the reliance on the political passivity of the population that authoritarianism differs from totalitarianism - a political regime in which the rulers of the state are not interested in it. On the contrary, they politically mobilize it, subjugate it ideologically, manipulating the mass consciousness and striving for total control over all spheres of society. Only totalitarianism in all its local manifestations tried to replace the traditional forms of legitimation of power with completely new, artificially formed ideological systems, which were based on the idea of ​​creating a "new world", "new society" and "new man" [ Linz J. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes // Macropolitical Theory (Handbook of Political Science, Bd. 3). Reading (Mass.), 1975].
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Thus, Academician A. Aganbegyan notes that in Russia there are no sources of so-called "long money" in the private sector, there are almost no private pension, large insurance, mutual, venture and other funds that perform the function of lending to long-term projects in the United States and Western Europe. Hence his conclusion - it is too early for us to abandon the leading role of the state in modernization, if only because the only source of innovative development can only be the federal stabilization fund [ Aganbegyan A. Do not dig up potatoes ahead of time // Stolitsa ISK. Information and analytical journal. Novosibirsk. 2009. N 2, p. eighteen]. The leading role of the federal government and the federal budget in innovative development has been repeatedly stated by other prominent economic theorists.
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Features of management of the 21st century are determined by modern economic realities. If the management of the 20th century was, first of all, production, today the management of non-profit organizations is developing and gaining priority positions. With the development of the school of human relations, the role of a person in any organization increases; at present, employees of any organization are perceived by modern managers not as a cost component, but as a fixed capital.

In the 21st century from management economic systems we are moving to the management of socio-economic systems, and the roll towards the social component in this concept is increasingly intensifying in the conditions of modern management. Modern management is interpreted as innovative management that functions in an era of change. A modern manager must be an innovator, he must be an opponent of all-round stabilization of the organization's position in the relevant market for goods or services, his approach to managing the organization must be creative. Speaking of modern management, the manager must implement innovative technologies both in business and non-profit organizations. Moreover, innovation management in non-profit organizations is becoming increasingly relevant and necessary. Realizing that the role of social innovations, and not technical (or technological) ones, as is commonly believed among most managers, is increasing, we must identify the factors that provide a competitive advantage for any organization and not for profit in the first place. In determining the priority of non-profit organizations, we must determine the position in modern management of knowledge workers, understand how to determine the effectiveness of their activities.

At the end of the 20th century, an increasing role began to play non-profit organizations. There were other changes in society that changed the views of specialists on management. There is a new management strategy or paradigm that comes from the following postulates:

1. Management is a specific and defining activity of any organization aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of its functioning.

2. Organizational management structure is essential for any organization. At the same time, the type of organizational management structure must correspond to the tasks assigned to the organization.

3. Human resource management should solve the problem not to manage, but to direct employees to constantly improve their skills, manage their knowledge and switch to the mode of self-learning organizations.

4. Management is obliged to solve all problems that affect the effectiveness of activities both within the organization and in the external environment.

What can a management strategy be based on in an era of rapid change and uncertainty that takes place at the beginning of the 21st century?

There are 7 phenomena that can be considered fully consistent with current reality. These phenomena categorically do not fit into the framework of the strategy of almost all modern organizations. They are inherently not directly related to economics, but rather related to sociology and politics.

These new 7 realities are:

1. A sharp decline in the birth rate in developed countries;

2. Changes in the distribution of disposable income;

3. Changing the definition of labor efficiency;

4. Globalization of the economy and competition in particular;

5. Discrepancy between economic globalization and political fragmentation.

6. Changes in the composition of the population of developed countries due to the influx of immigrants and their assimilation.

7. Strengthening state regulation of the economy in selected countries and the need for such regulation on a global scale.

The main provisions of the school of scientific management.

Option 1.

At the origins of the school of "scientific management" were F. Taylor, the spouses F. and L. Gilbert, G. Gant.

The first major step towards considering management as a management science was made by the American engineer F. Taylor (1856-1915), who led the scientific management movement. The area of ​​professional interests was the problem of increasing labor productivity in the organization.

The main works of F. Taylor:

"Factory management", 1903

"Principles of Scientific Management", 1911

They formulated methods for the scientific organization of labor based on the analysis of working time and work movements, standardization of methods and tools of labor. The effectiveness of joint work in the organization was considered from the standpoint of time and movement. The division of work into autonomous, fully programmable elements and their subsequent optimal integration into a single whole are prerequisites that, in accordance with the concept of the scientific management school, form a high-performance organization.

Taylor argued that management is a true science based on certain laws, rules and principles. Their correct use allows to solve the problem of labor productivity growth. If people are selected on a scientific basis, trained in progressive methods, energized with various incentives, and combined work and person, then it is possible to obtain an aggregate productivity that exceeds the contribution made by the individual labor force. His main merit is that he:

· Developed the methodological framework for labor rationing;

· standardized working procedures;

· introduced into practice scientific approaches to the selection and placement of personnel;

· developed methods of stimulating the work of workers;

· achieved recognition that work and responsibility are divided between workers and managers almost equally.

The authors of the theory of "scientific management" believed that using observations, measurements, logic and analysis, it is possible to improve many manual labor operations, achieving their more efficient implementation (analysis of the content of the work and definition of its components).

Accounting for the human factor. An important contribution was the systematic use of incentives with the aim of increasing the interest of workers in increasing labor productivity and production volumes. It also provided for the possibility of necessary rest and inevitable interruptions in production. This gave the management the opportunity to set production standards and pay extra to those who exceeded the established minimum.

Scientific management also advocated separating the managerial functions of thinking and planning from the physical execution of work. Taylor and his contemporaries recognized that management work is a specialty and that an organization would benefit if each group of employees focused on what they did best. Previously, workers planned their work themselves.

Thanks to the concept of scientific management, management has become widely recognized as an independent field of scientific research. For the first time, managers, practitioners and scientists saw that the methods and approaches used in science and technology can be effectively used in the practice of achieving the goals of the enterprise.

Option 2.

The date of birth of managerial activity is considered to be 1885, when the book “Scientific Management” was published, authored by Friedrich Taylor. It was he who became the founder of the first scientific school of management, which existed from 1885 - 1920.

It was called "Scientific Management" (after the title of the book). In addition to F. Taylor, there were such scientists as Henry Gantt, Frank and Lillian Gilbert. Scientific management was based on 2 fundamental principles: the principle of the vertical division of labor and the principle of labor measurement.

The principle of the vertical division of labor states that the function of task planning is assigned to the manager, and the function of its execution is assigned to the worker.

The principle of labor measurement states that there is the only way the most effective way to achieve goals and the manager must find this way using observations, measurements, logic.

Landowner: the task for the workers is to build a bathhouse. The workers themselves decided how to build it; they were represented by an overseer who only watched without doing anything (liberal management).

Taylor: Taskmaster - planning function (+)

The use of the principles of scientific management made it possible to increase labor productivity at enterprises by 2.5 times.

The main tasks of the leader according to the school of scientific management.

1) Development of a scientific foundation for the implementation of each element of the work (manager-engineer)

2) Careful selection of workers and subsequent education and training in order to create first-class workers (does everything, does not ask questions, i.e. similar to the army)

3) Collaboration with workers in order to adopt sound methods of doing work, stimulating qualities and expediting tasks. Initially, Taylor considered the piece-work system to be the most effective wage system, but then he abandoned it and switched to piece-bonus.

4) Equal division of labor and responsibility between workers and managers. Everyone should perform and be responsible for the work for which he is most adapted.

The main merit of "Scientific management" is that the need for professional labor management was justified, i.e. according to the results of the work of the “Scientific Management”, the board became professional activity. The disadvantage of this school was the lack of consideration of the human factor and social relations between workers and managers (social relations were not taken into account in any way).

During the post-Soviet state-political construction, the Russian Federation went through a historically significant era of reform, which can be conditionally divided into two periods. The first period (1991-1999) is associated with the name of the first President of Russia, Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin. At this time, there was a rapid destruction of the foundations of the former Soviet statehood and the socialist economy. The main role at this stage was played by a team of liberal reformers. The second period in the history of the renewed Russian statehood coincided with the beginning of the third millennium and the activities of the second President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. These periods respectively include a number of important stages.

The first transitional stage (1991-1993) is characterized by the breakdown of the state-political and party structures of the former Soviet statehood, the destruction of the existing planned economy. At the same time, the formation of a new democratic system in the RSFSR was underway with the implementation of forced market reforms, accompanied by a sharp struggle between the executive and legislative (in the form of Soviets) branches of power.

The second stage (1994-1999) was due to the adoption in 1993 of the fifth Constitution in the history of our country, which formalized the new state-political system and the established regime of presidential power. During this period, the effectiveness of the functioning of the entire state-political system has significantly weakened, the influence of financial-oligarchic groups and heads of regions has noticeably increased, while the corruption of the state apparatus and the criminalization of society have intensified.

The third stage (2000-2004) is associated with the election of VV Putin to the post of President of the Russian Federation for the first term. The characteristic features of this new stage in the evolution of Russian statehood were the strengthening of the executive vertical of power, the strengthening of the role of the state in socio-economic development while maintaining a course towards deepening market reforms and high rates of economic recovery.

The fourth stage (2004-2008) was characterized by the definition as the most important vector of state building, the transition from the stabilization of domestic political and international position Russia to its dynamic innovative development, strategic planning of all aspects of the life of our society for the period up to 2020.

Finally, the fifth stage (from mid-2008 to the present) is due to the election of Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev to the post of the third President of the Russian Federation and the activities of the Government headed by V.V. economic crisis.

State building of the Russian Federation in 1991-1993.

The process of forming a new Russian statehood began with the adoption on June 12, 1990 by the I Congress people's deputies RSFSR Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Russia, which became an important milestone in the formation of institutions of power and administration of the republic, independent of the union structures1. B. N. Yeltsin was elected to the post of Chairman of the Supreme Council at the congress, who became the leader of the renewing Russian Federation. Exactly one year later, on June 12, 1991, based on the results of the referendum held in April, as well as on the Law on the President of the RSFSR adopted by the IV Congress of People's Deputies of the Republic, B. N. Yeltsin was elected to this post as a result of a popular vote. After August 1991, when the Russian leadership, by its decisive actions, prevented the implementation of the plans of the State Emergency Committee, all the fullness of state-political power passed from the union center to the republics. In the autumn of 1991, the leadership of Russia set as its goal the destruction of the structures of the CPSU, the creation of a new system of executive power, as well as ensuring the transition of the levers of government from the union bodies to the republican ones.

In the field of state building the most important task Russian leadership was to resolve the issue of maintaining territorial integrity. Back in 1990, the autonomous republics within the RSFSR received the status of Union republics, which significantly expanded their state-legal competence and increased sovereignty. In the conditions of the most acute socio-economic crisis, centrifugal tendencies intensified between the regions, destructively affecting economic ties. This created for Russia a real threat of repeating the fate of the USSR. To prevent the "spreading" of the Russian Federation, it was necessary to create a solid legal barrier. The preservation of the Russian state as a single multinational power based on the principles of a federal structure and national equality was completely dependent on the successful implementation of radical socio-economic transformations that contributed to the revival of integration processes on a new foundation of market mechanisms.

An important milestone in the formation of the foundations of the new Russian statehood was the signing in the Kremlin on March 31, 1992 by the majority of the 89 constituent entities of the Russian Federation of the Federative Treaty. This document delineated the subjects of jurisdiction and powers between the federal executive and legislative authorities and the relevant authorities and administrations of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. The subjects of the Federation included the republics within the Russian Federation, territories, regions, autonomous entities, as well as the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. However, the signing of the Treaty did not give the expected results: the preservation of representative (Soviet) authorities both in the center and in the localities, which were also in a state of confrontation with the executive authorities, hampered the process of state building.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the acquisition of true independence by the RSFSR (since 1992 - the Russian Federation - Russia), Russian statehood in the highest echelon of power was represented by three branches:

• - supreme legislative power Congress of People's Deputies of Russia and elected from among the deputies bicameral the Supreme Council;
• - executive power was concentrated in the hands President and appointed by him Governments. The Chairman of the Government was approved on the proposal of the President by the Congress of People's Deputies;
• - the judicial system was crowned Constitutional Court and Supreme Court, the composition of which was also approved by the Congress of People's Deputies.

In the Constitution of the RSFSR in force at that time (1978), with numerous amendments made to it, the functions and limits of competence of the various branches of power were not clearly defined. The Basic Law could not ensure political stability in the context of the search for the optimal form of statehood. There was a paramount question on the agenda: should Russia be a presidential republic, a parliamentary republic, or a parliamentary-presidential republic? In a presidential republic, the head of state - the president - is at the same time the guarantor of the constitutional structure, heads the executive branch, has the right to issue decrees that have the force of laws, and also, under certain circumstances, dissolve parliament and call early elections.

During 1993, the main factor in the state-political development of Russia was the increasingly aggravated confrontation between the two highest institutions of state power: the executive, represented by the President of the Russian Federation and his staff, and the legislative, carried out by the leadership of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation. This confrontation was aggravated by the struggle for control over the process of denationalization of property. The role of arbiter in the escalating conflict was assumed by the Constitutional Court.

The polarization of the main political forces in Russian society intensified against the backdrop of economic reforms carried out using methods of shock therapy. In December 1992, under pressure from the VII Congress of People's Deputies (December 1-14, 1992), E. T. Gaidar's departure from the post of acting prime minister of Russia and the election of V. S. Chernomyrdin to this post did not lead to the restoration of political balance. The constitutional crisis was growing in the country.

In January 1993, as a way out of the current situation, the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin proposed to conclude constitutional agreement with the leadership of the Supreme Council. In connection with the debate that arose on this occasion, he put forward the idea of ​​putting the question of ways to resolve the constitutional crisis to a referendum. The leaders of the parliament opposed the idea of ​​a popular vote, they were supported by the Constitutional Court, and the VIII (extraordinary) Congress of People's Deputies, held on March 10-13, 1993, rejected the issue of holding a referendum. Then the President took drastic measures: on March 20, he addressed the citizens of Russia, declaring that he was signing decree on the special order of government of the country up to overcoming the crisis of power. This step aroused the indignation of most of the Russian deputies. On March 26, 1993, the IX (extraordinary) Congress of People's Deputies began, at which the question of the removal of the President from office in connection with the excess of his powers was raised. In the course of heated discussions, the majority of deputies agreed to hold an all-Russian referendum on the issues of confidence in the President, support for the course of reforms carried out by him, confidence in the Chairman of the Supreme Council, as well as the deputies.

The referendum took place on April 25, 1993. Its results, which confirmed the approval of the reformist course pursued by the President (of the 64% of Russians participating in it, the majority voted for confidence in the head of the executive branch), became the legal basis that allowed B. N. Yeltsin to continue discussing the constitutional reform.

To prepare the text of the new Constitution in the summer of 1993, a Constitutional Conference was convened in Moscow with the participation of representatives of state bodies and public organizations. In this situation, the main political opponents of Boris N. Yeltsin took retaliatory measures in order to neutralize the emerging process of "de-Sovietization" of the Russian state system.