Leonid Savin. Indo-Pacific: USA in the space of two oceans

The US military is renaming a huge part of the Eastern Hemisphere

On May 30, U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis announced the renaming of Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific Command. So, the largest (in the geographical sense) structure of the Pentagon has acquired more larger size.

The new term was introduced gradually, but in recent months it has been used more and more often. And on May 21, Pentagon Speaker Colonel Rob Manning announced the upcoming renaming.

The American media dismissed the suggestion that the rebranding is associated with the containment of China and Iran. However, China is washed by the Pacific Ocean, Iran has access to the Indian Ocean. The need to counteract their growing capabilities was already declared by the Obama administration, under Trump this began to be translated into action. On May 23, the Pentagon announced that China would no longer take part in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval maneuvers, which take place every two years under the auspices of the United States off the Hawaiian Islands. The formal reason was the exercises conducted by the PLA in the South China Sea, when PRC nuclear bombers landed on the contested islands.

Anti-Chinese sentiment in the American establishment has become commonplace - like anti-Iranian, anti-North Korean and anti-Russian.

In terms of equipping US troops and the geography of their presence, renaming a huge geographical part of the Eastern Hemisphere does not provide any advantages. Rather the opposite. Changing the symbolism - from the manufacture of new chevrons to the replacement of a huge number of various inscriptions and plates - will only increase costs, and the reassignment of structures will cause additional bureaucratic troubles.

Behind this decision, in addition to anti-Chinese and anti-Iranian rhetoric, is the close cooperation of the United States with India. Recently, Washington has been paying increased attention to New Delhi, characterizing India as one of the future poles of regional security along with Japan, Australia and its other allies. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on June 3 at the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) conference in Singapore commented on the change in the name of the American command, noting that for India, the unification of the Indian and Pacific Oceans into a single geographical array looks quite natural. At the same time, it became known that the United States, Australia, Japan and India, united in the Quad group (Four), will henceforth consider the two oceans as a single strategic space.

On June 11-16, the joint US-Indo-Japanese naval exercises "Malabar" took place near the island of Guam. In an official statement, the US Navy said that the maneuvers are aimed at improving combat skills, consolidating naval superiority and projecting power. Given that Pakistan is rapidly moving out of the orbit of US influence, the Pentagon's interest in India is natural. India's neighbors, Pakistan and China, have certain territorial claims against it (as it does against them), and this is also taken into account by Indian-American strategists.

The U.S. concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific strategy (FOIP) was the umbrella idea for deeper US involvement in Asian affairs. Its goal is to replace the Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership, which was abandoned by Donald Trump, and win over the ASEAN participants to its side, or at least remove them from the influence of China. This is an operational approach, but there are also factors associated with the formation of a new geopolitical narrative. This is a well-known technique: the creation of imaginary geographical images, which then form geopolitical models and set the foreign policy agenda.

An example is the term "Middle East", which is now a universal designation for a group of countries between the Mediterranean, Red and Arabian seas. For whom is this region near? And for whom is it the east? For India and China, this is, for example, the west. We owe the origin of the term to the Anglo-Saxon political school, more precisely, to a number of English diplomats, historians, politicians, intellectuals: Thomas Taylor Meadows, David George Hogarth, Henry Norman, William Miller, Arnold Toynbee. It is also the product of reflections on the geography of strategic communications by the British diplomat Thomas Edward Gordon and the American admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. And these thoughts would hardly have appeared if it were not for the colonial possessions of Great Britain, which needed to be managed, controlled, and, if necessary, applied military force. If it were not for the British colonies, we would now use the Arabic self-names Magreb, Mashrek, or other more precise geographical terms (for example, Western Asia). It is the same with the term IndoPacific - expansionism is behind its appearance.

Another example. The concept of Atlanticism, uniting the Old World and America, demonstrates how one can justify interventions in the affairs of Europe under the guise of helping or protecting against communism, or creating common system security. And the appearance of the doctrine of Euro-Atlantism (a by-product of Atlanticism) shows that European clients themselves are beginning to justify their subordinate position in relation to the American patron.

And the last example is the framework model for the Asia-Pacific region (APR). If the United States had direct access to the Pacific Ocean for several centuries, then in order to justify the American presence in Asia, it was necessary to create a mental link, prepare the concept of the Asia-Pacific region. As a result, despite everything that America did in Asia in the 20th century (nuclear bombing of Japanese cities; participation in the war on the Korean Peninsula; provocation in the Gulf of Tonkin with aggression against Vietnam; support for various anti-communist movements; subversive activities), the presence of the United States in the Pacific part of the Asian continent has become a stable narrative.

Now the Americans will introduce the understanding of this region as "Indo-Pacific". This means that they move deeper into Eurasia even further from east to west. Although the US maritime presence is global, and all countries of the world fall into the zone of responsibility of the Pentagon commands one way or another, the official justification for the presence of American military forces from the Horn of Africa to the Gulf of Malacca will become even more offensive. The Indo-Pacific massif can turn into a "structure of long duration" (longue durée), if we use the concepts of the Annales school of French historians.

For Russia, in particular, this will mean a shift in US attention from a European direction to an Asian one. In the context of the shift in the center of economic activity to Asia and Donald Trump's frequent statements that NATO members should decide the organization's budget issues themselves, and not rely on Washington, there is logic here. The NATO summit on July 11-12 in Brussels should show this.

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Indo-Pacific front: why did a new region appear on the geopolitical map and what does it promise Russia?

After that, in the American foreign policy lexicon, the concept of the “Indo-Pacific region”, which used to be rather marginal, began to be increasingly used. Now the concept of a “free and open Indo-Pacific region” (free and open Indo-Pacific) has become entrenched both in official American documents and in the rhetoric of most major powers in this very region.

In Russia, the new terms have traditionally been treated with suspicion. What does the emergence of these new concepts and strategies mean, and what does it change for Russian policy in Asia?

Ten years together

The emphasis on the strategic nature of the interaction of the four countries and their very choice clearly pointed to the main goal of the format - if not to build a system to contain China, then at least send a signal to it that its growth will be accompanied by the appearance of a counterbalance. Beijing caught the signal and on the eve of the first official meeting of the group gave each of the four countries a demarche. A month later, Abe left his post, and Australia quickly lost interest in the four-way format.

Returning to power in 2012, Shinzo Abe brought back the idea of ​​the Quartet, this time calling it "Asian Democratic Security Diamond". The Chinese threat was again declared as the raison d "être of the strategic interaction of the four maritime democracies. In the first paragraphs of his policy article, Abe directly pointed to disturbing trends in the East China and South China Seas. China, according to Abe, intended to turn the latter into " Beijing Lake" by model Sea of ​​Okhotsk in the hands of the USSR.

However, the new four-sided format was reminiscent of a Japanese rock garden, where from whichever side you look, one stone eludes the eye. In practical terms, either Australia or India were bound to drop out of specific cooperation projects (although the four countries have experience of real naval cooperation, but even before the conceptual design: in 2004 they worked together to eliminate the consequences of the tsunami).

However, in last years the idea of ​​closer interaction between the Quartet was in the air. The increased activity of China and the rapid growth of its military potential, obeying the logic of the balance of power, were bound to provoke opposition. Attempts at a symmetrical American response in the form of a policy of pivot (pivot to Asia) and rebalancing to Asia seem to have had almost the opposite effect.

In the new paradigm, "local" powers should take more responsibility for balancing China. This, perhaps, can explain the lively reaction of observers to the ordinary meeting of the "quartet" in Manila: the excitement that has arisen suggests not so much that something important has happened, but that something like this has long been expected as an inevitable reaction to more bold and confident use by China of its objectively increased power.

By the end of 2017 and the beginning of 2018, the conditions for the new birth of the Quartet were ripe. In Japan, Shinzo Abe again won the elections and confirmed his mandate to rule, with the clear intention of leaving behind a country that represents a serious strategic competitor to China: hence his strategy of "proactive peacemaking" and persistent attempts to achieve a revision of the anti-war clause of the Japanese Constitution.

Australia wants to balance its economic dependence on China with its own proactive strategic stance and a more active involvement in maintaining at least a semblance of regional rules of the game. The latest scandals about Chinese influence in Australian politics only increase the local elites' suspicion of Beijing.

India seems to be just beginning to come to the point where interest in what is happening in the Western Pacific ceases to be idle.

The connecting glue of the new-old format this time can be the United States, for which the revival of interest in the Quartet is just in time. Throughout the past year, the Trump administration has been criticized for its weak Asian policy. At best, it was spoken of as flying on autopilot: in fact, the United States was doing everything that the Obama administration did, only a little less consciously.

In the worst case scenario, Trump was said to have "left" Asia and left it to China when he withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and began to demand from Japan and South Korea greater responsibility for the well-being of their military alliances with the US. A particular subject of criticism was Trump's tolerant attitude towards the leaders of Asian countries, problematic in terms of the ideals of democracy and human rights, such as Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte or Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak.

The Manila meeting of the Quartet gave new hope to Trump's strategy in Asia, and by the end of the year, the administration was in earnest to promote the concept of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region" (FIP). The new concept is firmly entrenched both in oral rhetoric and in conceptual documents: the recent National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy of the United States speak of building a “free and open ITR” as a priority goal of American foreign policy.

Words and meanings

In the Russian expert tradition, American lexical constructions are viewed with suspicion. Anxiety around the term "Indo-Pacific" is somewhat similar to how they once resented the concept of "greater Middle East". It is understood that the unification of countries into a mental construct of the region must necessarily entail political consequences, and since the construct was built by Russia's foreign policy competitors, therefore, it is hostile to its interests.

True, as often happens, Russia itself does not shy away from using such a “terminological weapon”, for example, putting forward the concept of “greater Eurasia”, where the processes of interstate interaction should revolve around Russia and China or anyone else, if only not the United States.

However, it is also unreasonable to deny the logical consequences of the unification of countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The term itself has long been used in the Australian foreign policy lexicon. Due to the peculiarities of geography, Australian strategists see not so much the four cardinal points familiar to us as divergent semicircles. In defense

In the 2016 White Paper, the Indo-Pacific region is just the furthest and largest of these semicircles.

The unification of the ITR into a single analytical entity emphasizes the growing economic and strategic interconnection between the spaces of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. For example, the US Pacific Command (US PACOM) also has a large part of the Indian Ocean as a zone of responsibility - up to a line extending south from the western border of India. Therefore, the term "Indo-Asia-Pacific region" has also been present in the PACOM lexicon for quite a long time.

There is also an obvious geopolitical signal in the adoption of the new term. In the Indo-Pacific, China is not the only emerging power. The United States has been urging India for years to assume a role appropriate to its demographic and economic potential. American political scientists credit Barack Obama with giving India the status of a "major defense partner". It is possible that in the next 15 years we will also see India being given the status of a “major non-NATO ally” (MNNA).

The revival of the "quartet" as the main defender of the very "free and open" IPR - apparently, there is a new way to build a more elegant and subtle system of containment of China's regional ambitions. Military alliances are not the most effective tool if the countries of the region want to maintain constructive trade and economic relations with China.

Many Asian countries also want to maintain as much foreign policy autonomy as possible in an environment where US presence in Asia fluctuates from administration to administration. Therefore, there is a natural desire to shift some of the responsibility to the local powers, whose belonging to the region will make them more legitimate agents of China's "smart containment" (recall the concept of leading from behind). But whatever the Quartet becomes, it will definitely not be a military alliance.

The new Indo-Pacific Quartet will be built on interests rather than values ​​and will have a more flexible structure. In this sense, it somewhat continues the logic of the “principled security network” of former US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, an initiative that did not really take off during the rebalancing. The pragmatic nature of the new quadripartite format is underscored by the fact that no one talks about "maritime democracies" anymore. Instead of this phrase, the formula “like-minded states” is actively used.

The Quartet will inevitably grow into a second circle of regional partners, among which there are not particularly reference democracies left, so it is not very convenient to introduce extra criteria. Such partners, apparently, in the first row will be Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand. Visiting Vietnam shortly after the publication of the new NSC, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis had already referred to Vietnam as a "like-minded partner" of the US. Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam are sure to be interested in bolstering their ability to deter China's ambitions, for example, in territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

This recourse to closed formats may have the unintended consequence of yet another weakening of the multilateral security arrangements around ASEAN (EAC, ARF, SIOA+). The notorious “central role” of ASEAN in the security system in the Asia-Pacific region is already often reduced to organizing summits, meetings and seminars and does not work well in case of real crises in the region, be it the South China Sea or the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar.

The enthusiasm of countries like Vietnam and Singapore about the “forceful” format in their original idea of ​​​​the United States - India - Japan - Australia will become new evidence of the weakness of the very regional “rules-based order” that the “four” seems to be going to defend. It turns out that the supremacy of international law will be defended not by universal multilateral mechanisms for participation, but by semi-closed "coalitions of the willing".

The Indo-Pacific Quartet sees more than just the security sector as a field for coordinating its activities. We are talking about strengthening competitiveness in the "interconnection" that is so popular today. Here the US and its partners seem to want to play in the same field as China with its Belt and Road Initiative. The US statement following the quadripartite meeting in Manila spoke of strengthening "interconnectivity based on international law and standards and prudently funded."

As early as February 2018, it became known that the Quartet was discussing some kind of infrastructure plan, an “alternative” to the Belt and Road. It is interesting that infrastructure construction is put on a par with security issues and is perceived as an unambiguously strategic area.

The Quartet's economic wing could come at a time when concerns are growing over Chinese investment around the world, from the European Union and Africa to Southeast Asia and Australia. Major Chinese projects are perceived as a purchase of loyalty by the main competitor of the "leaders of the free world." Apparently, the Quartet expects that recipient countries will inevitably want to diversify the sources of investment in infrastructure.

We have no concrete outlines of what the Quartet will be like. The highest-level meeting of representatives of the US, India, Japan and Australia since the Manila workshop was the January panel on maritime security with the four admiral-commanders of the navies of the Quartet at the Raisin Dialogue in Delhi.

After all the speeches, it was obvious that the four admirals did not have a common understanding of the formats for future interaction. By the way, the United States was represented by the head of the Pacific Command, Harry Harris, who was recently nominated as ambassador to Australia - such an appointment should, apparently, strengthen the Trump administration's Indo-Pacific strategy.

Nevertheless, new meetings in the quadripartite format are inevitable, as reported by Japanese interlocutors. The first breakthrough event in the real interaction of the "quartet" may be the involvement of Australia on a permanent basis in the tripartite exercise "Malabar" (so far this has not happened due to the cautious position of India).
…

Further text on the topic “What does all this mean for Russia and its position in Asia?”, Which is not copied

This article was written by General Robert B. Brown, US Army, Commander, United States Army Pacific. The article was published in the March-April issue of the Military Review. Translation into Russian was carried out by the SGS-mil team, when using a link to the site is required.

The United States military is at a crossroads, facing both institutional and operational challenges. The nature of modern warfare continues to change rapidly which requires military leaders to reassess some core beliefs. This situation has led to the testing and refinement of concepts and capabilities, as well as people, so that the US Armed Forces are ready for the conflicts of today and tomorrow.

Without a doubt, any future conflict will become increasingly complex and distributed, including simultaneously with multiple actions in many areas - on land, in the air, at sea, in space, as well as in cyberspace. The emerging concept of multi-domain combat, some elements of which are described in an upcoming official publication jointly developed by the Army (Army) and the Marine Corps, is devoted to the complexity of the battlefield and its requirement for future integration .

Still in development and experimentation, this concept is already affecting operational and resource decisions, especially in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

This article introduces three themes that illustrate how we think to implement the concept of battle in many areas in the area of ​​​​responsibility of the Pacific Command. First, it briefly discusses the strategic situation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, which characterizes the need for a new operating concept to integrate the entire United States military. She goes on to describe the concept of combat in many areas, including three elements that help determine the desired effects: co-integration, technology, and human development. Finally, it presents a drawing of the definition of several areas, since the concept is already applicable at the tactical level.

Strategic context of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region

Given that the international state of affairs in this region is weaker than ever, the concept of battle in many areas is urgently needed. The region consists of thirty-six countries that are in sixteen time zones; these countries make up more than half of the world's population and twenty-four of the thirty-six metropolitan areas on Earth, and they also cover more than half of the planet's surface area.

The region is home to three of the world's largest economies, seven of the largest military forces, and five of the seven mutual defense partners with the United States. According to Admiral Harry B. Harris (" junior"), Commander, United States Pacific Command," annual global trade of approximately $5.3 trillion. The US is based on unfettered access to sea lanes [such as the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea] $1.2 trillion. from this maritime trade destined for or exported from the United States". Besides, " The Strait of Malacca alone handles more than 25 percent of oil tanker transits and 50 percent of all natural gas transits every day».

In addition, this area is prone to natural disasters: typhoons, earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis and other events that are " more than 60 percent of natural disasters in the world". Simply put, global prosperity depends on stability and security in this vast and complex region.

These demographic and economic dynamics interact with the increased pace of technological change, adding to the political and military complexity already present in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Dramatic technological shifts being created by unmanned capabilities, robotic learning, artificial intelligence, nanotechnologies, biotechnologies and big data, only intensify military competition between geopolitical rivals.

Many of these new technological tools depend on the use of digital communications - seven billion devices connected to the Internet in 2016 and a projected fifty billion by 2020 - only increase the already dangerous situation in cyberspace and its reliance on space assets to provide communications. .

Picture 1. Multinational forces marching in formation in a single unit on February 15, 2017, after the official opening ceremony of the exerciseCobraGold ("Golden Cobra") 2017, inutapao,Thailand. TeachingsCobraGold, now in its 36th year, is the largest security cooperation event in the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. This year's focus is on strengthening regional security and effectively responding to regional crises by bringing together a robust multinational force to meet common security challenges and commitments in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region..

Technological shifts are also fueling and intensifying security challenges in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, with some of the world's most intractable problems among them. Challenges include:

an increasingly militant North Korea that shares increasingly effective missile technology with Iran;

‒ a rising China that defies international rules and regulations;

- revanchist Russia (Muscovy), which is increasingly trying to act in the Pacific Ocean with a provocative military position;

‒ continued nuclear support for friction between India and Pakistan;

• - revitalization of violent extremist networks operating in partner countries and allies;

‒ Political and diplomatic instability resulting from changes in the executive leadership of key regional allies and partners.

The most dangerous threat in the Asia-Pacific region comes from regional actors with nuclear arsenals and intent to undermine the international order. Difficult failure options and small state-run military forces backed by large military forces with internal lines of communication pose a danger of a fait accompli .

As in the international mode, the military environment is also becoming more and more dangerous. Rivals and enemies alike have learned from the successes and failures of the US military over the past few decades. They acknowledge that US strengths based on power projection, joint operations, and technological transition have led to unprecedented tactical success. .

Thus, rivals have developed capabilities and concepts that try to eliminate these advantages, increasing the complexity of the battlefield for the United States Armed Forces. This has led to participation in an increasingly contested global commons, with the loss of U.S. air and sea military superiority to technology and denial tactics. Whether adversaries take gradual or sudden action, the United States needs to significantly improve its strategic advantage in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, otherwise the United States risks losing its position in military, diplomatic and economic terms. .

Because of these strategic trends, both positive and negative, US and partner forces must maintain current military advantages and regain those that have been lost. Reducing the risk of conflict and ensuring the stability of the current international system depends on our ability to deter key actors from aggressive and harmful actions. We must break the enemy's decision-making cycles and present the enemies with multiple dilemmas that create uncertainty and paralyze their efforts. However, if aggression leads to conflict, we must be prepared to unequivocally defeat our enemies. .

This approach is the driving force behind the concept of combat in many areas (domains), which is designed to overcome technologies of failure and jointly influence all areas (i.e., domains) to create localized areas of force. These effects will re-activate the maneuver for the entire combined force operating in any region, thereby placing the enemy at a disadvantage so that US forces can gain the initiative to act. .

Elements of the concept of battle in many areas

The concept of combat in many areas may at first sound like something new, not like a traditional joint operation. There is a deal of truth in it. However, what we are trying to achieve - effects in the intersection of areas - is not entirely new. For example, at Thermopylae and Salamis, the ancient Greeks used both land and naval forces to defeat the invading Persians. . Much closer to our time, the United States of America owes its independence to the effective use of American and French land and sea forces against Lord Cornwallis' army at Yorktown.

Another historical example is the Vicksburg campaign during civil war in the USA. With the ability to control shipping on the Mississippi River, the Vicksburg Confederate artillery, infantry, and cavalry forces presented a formidable problem of countering access and defense denials to Allied forces. Union General Ulysses S. Grant only overcame this problem by combining the capabilities and effects of his own artillery, cavalry and infantry forces with naval ships led by his staff officer Andrew Hull Foote.

The introduction of the aircraft, submarine, and aircraft carrier during World War I, and the introduction of mobile radio communications and radar systems during World War II, greatly increased the strategic commander's ability to operate simultaneously in multiple areas.

More recently, the development of air-to-land combat in the 1980s, and then air-to-sea combat in 2013, has shown that military thinking is developing along the same general line - how to achieve decisive results. Even if they are outnumbered, including technologically, by integrating operations in multiple areas to present multiple dilemmas to enemies.

The various services regularly supported each other in all areas. So when Harris says he wants the army to provide off-terrestrial effects, he's not asking for it to be done without precedent. From 1794 to 1950, the army was responsible for the defense of the coasts and ports, and later for the air defense of their homeland. The junior officer corps of the Army arose from the need during the First World War to have the proper number of technical specialists to staff army personnel and submarine fleet. The idea or desire for combat effects of intersections in many areas is not new. .

While all services are encouraged to carry out their missions in a way that is not much different from the past, there will be differences. We in the army can no longer simply focus on the land, leaving the air and sea to other services. The Marines, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard can no longer focus solely on " their» areas. We all need to better integrate planning, operations, command and control across all areas .

Achieving integration requires a new approach, a new approach. All US forces must change their culture of service to a culture of inclusion and openness, focusing on " purple (or joint) first» mentality. The Army must further integrate a mission command image where each individual is entitled to receive initiative based on his or her role and function. And he must focus on developing Leaders who thrive in ambiguity and chaos. .

1. Joint integration

It is assumed that the concept of battle in many areas (domains) will include three key areas: organization and processes, technologies, and people . Changes in organizations and processes will be aimed at providing different and more focused military tools to the joint force to overcome the loss of US superiority or parity in certain areas, especially in the air, at sea and in cyberspace.

Army (i.e. Ground Forces) can no longer focus exclusively on the ground component. As part of the joint forces, army troops must provide other services in their areas to overcome their operational tasks and vice versa. This means that changes need to focus on greater capability, have cross-domain effects, and be more focused and effective integration across joint forces. .

At the United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) we are trying to do this in three ways:

- Firstly, is development and experimentation with flexible management teams, adaptable and scalable modules, and flexible policies in key areas.

• - Secondly, most of of these experiments will be carried out as part of a redesigned exercise program designed to make all events collaborative and multinational, in order to conduct an exercise in 2018 " Pacific Fleet».
• - Thirdly, we support an increase in innovation across all services in cross-company and combat team processes.

2. Technology

Another key area is technological change. We must overcome and harness the speed of technological change instead of losing our coping capabilities with acquired slow programs . The Department of Defense and the Army have already established a framework for rapid material solutions with the Strategic Capabilities Office at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Rapid Response Office at Army Department Headquarters.

These departments are doing an admirable job of reorienting current technology towards application innovation, a key ingredient in reclaiming our tactical advantage. USARPAC is closely associated with these efforts. This binding includes all the equipment in the exercises and experiments. As it has been in this theater for many years, USARPAC uses a lot of culture" combat laboratories that this team has developed over the past decade (or more).

The technology offers key tools for decision support, mortality and protection. We must use this technology to empower our men and women and increase their effectiveness. .

3. Prepared people

The final area in which the concept of combat in many areas (domains) is considered is people . The U.S. military must use its people to overcome the challenges of being outnumbered, outclassed, and " find out» from enemies and opponents.

People are America's main strategic advantage. To use this advantage, the Armed Forces must develop flexible and adaptable Leaders through education and training. . Strict iterations of decision making, including " impossible» scripts or « black swans that Soldiers don't expect can help develop critical thinking skills. Refusal should be an option, in keeping with the principle that training exercises develop Leaders who will respond better to actual conflicts.

Leaders must also receive some degree of cultural education and training that will allow them to experience different ways of thinking. . At USARPAC, we address both critical thinking and cultural understanding through the Regional Leader Development Program, which is led by staff and at the command level of the Army.

As Army advisory and advisory teams come online, we will also be including Pacific-bound unit personnel in this educational and training resource to prepare them for operations in the region. .

Figure 2. Battlefield in many areas.

Battle in many areas (domains) in practice

The following fictitious picture illustrates the concept of combat in many areas, applied at the tactical level. This example based on a hypothetical location in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

Let's say there is a chain of islands or a coastal land mass whose location would make it a decisive landform, affecting air or sea navigation or access to a strategic port. The possession of this function by some enemy would pose a serious threat to the international order, stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Let's say an enemy seizes control of this feature and announces that it is restricting commercial air and sea traffic, denying access to any nation allied with the United States. Treaty commitments would require the United States to intervene militarily, although the enemy's arsenal of weapons and electronics is substantial.

A military option that applies the concept of combat in many areas could include the use of cyberspace and space assets to temporarily blind and destroy enemy command and control systems so that the Special Task Force can advance and gain a foothold along the chain of islands. . They will then assist the amphibious forces to provide a foothold, an airfield and other major facilities necessary to establish a secure foothold.

Immediately behind them were to be army ships loaded with heavy engineering equipment to repair the runway (if necessary) and build up good defensive positions. Simultaneously transport aviation Air Force C-17s and C-130s bring in a ground force battalion group, a high mobility artillery battery, and specially equipped anti-ship missile defenses. And batteries of indirect fire protection systems for air defense close range. In addition, a battery of 155mm long-range howitzers would be unloaded, using an empty aircraft, to restore their capacity for subsequent forced entry operations if necessary.

Within ninety-six hours, the main position would have been dug out and ready for the Stryker Battalion Combat Team. With air force manned and unmanned systems, naval ships and underwater unmanned aerial vehicles, a complex of army radar systems (such as AN / TPQ-36, AN / TPQ-37 or AN / MPQ-64 Sentinel).

As well as the air threat detection system of the Joint Network System of Ground Protection Sensors against a possible missile attack in order to see beyond the horizon. An overlapping, multi-domain sensor network would emerge that could operate indefinitely to identify, target, and deploy lethal and electronic fire support in all areas - on land, at sea, in the air, in cyberspace and in space - simultaneously.

A tactical group may be cut off from resupply or communications for an indefinite period of time. This is why this tactical group of approximately one thousand men will be able to sustain itself for thirty days, ten times the current doctrinal requirement of 72 hours for a unit of this size. .

But with advances in mobile water purification, solar panels, wind turbines and wave and tidal power, and additional printers to make spare parts, such a unit could be self-sustaining for much longer than even the larger ones of the previous century. They would still need fuel for their vehicles, but with drones and other autonomous platforms boosting force defenses, they could limit the need for fossil fuel vehicles and supplement organic support with a precision aerial reconnaissance system. Air Force.

I repeat, these units could operate in extremely harsh conditions with limited resources and without a permanent land, sea or air line of communication linking them with other friendly forces. However, these men and women would be ready, with exceptional Leaders on a mission.

Practical conclusion about the concept of battle in many areas

Again, this is just a mental exercise based on how the Army forces in the Pacific think and experiment with wrestling in many areas. The application of the concept may look different in other parts of the world or even in different areas of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

However, it is clear that regardless of geography or rivalry, army units must be well led, well trained and well armed to work in different areas in support of joint forces. .

One way to ensure this is through holistic operational testing, in which the Army command component and support units work hand in hand with the concept and doctrine developers at US Army Command. This is happening in the Pacific today. We apply co-integration, technology and people to the concept of combat in many areas by rigorously incorporating concepts and capabilities into all of our exercises that will culminate in serious test at the Naval Basic Ring exercise in the Pacific in 2018. Moreover, we are considering how to integrate a multi-domain approach to combat with our planning, equipping, and Leader development efforts. .

The army should not be shy about the resource and check these efforts. Many of the concepts and capabilities offered in the Concept of Combat in Many Areas (Domains) will be needed not only for future conflicts, but also for near conflicts, which may require us to be ready " to fight today». Make no mistake: Testing and implementing a multi-domain approach will increase our readiness today, as well as prepare our men and women to win wars if the country demands it. .

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It has been almost a year since Donald Trump came to power in the United States. To what extent has US policy towards Asian countries changed, and to what extent does it retain continuity? Preliminary conclusions can already be drawn, especially given that Trump made a 12-day tour in the first half of November 2017, visiting five Asian countries. On October 18, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson delivered the keynote address at the Center for Strategic and international studies in Washington. This speech preceded his visit to India and was devoted to US-Indian relations, but actually contained a number of orientation statements about US Asian policy in general. Finally, in December, a new US National Security Strategy was made public, in which a considerable place is given to the Asia-Pacific direction.

Creation of the Indo-Pacific

One of the most striking changes is in the names. As you know, the Obama administration called its strategy in the Asia-Pacific region first a "reversal" ( pivot), and then "rebalancing" ( rebalancing).Given Trump's dislike of just about anything related to the previous administration, it's no surprise that the term rebalancing has disappeared from the lexicon of top officials in the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon. It has not yet been replaced by an officially approved name. Nevertheless, a term has appeared that is most often heard in the speeches of Trump, Rex Tillerson and other senior American leaders on Asian issues. This is Indo-Pacific Indo-Pacific), or the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, I would conditionally call the US line in Asia that is being formed under Trump the “Indo-Pacific strategy”.

The Indo-Pacific concept was not invented by the Trump administration and has been in circulation for about a decade. It was also used under Obama, although not as actively. One of the first uses of the term "Indo-Pacific Region" (IPR) in the political-strategic sense was recorded in 2007 in an article by Indian author Gurpreet Khuran. Since then quite quickly the concept Indo-Pacific has turned from exotic into a noticeable element of international political discourse. In Washington's interpretation, the Indo-Pacific region is a vast expanse "from the western shores of India to the western coast of the United States." Tillerson emphasizes: “The Indo-Pacific—including the entire Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific, and the countries that surround them—will be the most important part of the globe in the 21st century." The United States of America needs the ITR, first of all, in order to balance the obvious strengthening of China in East Asia. It is East Asia that is the natural axis of the Asia-Pacific region. So, to paraphrase Halford Mackinder's famous saying, whoever controls East Asia controls the Asia-Pacific Region, and later, perhaps, the whole world. The expansion of the geopolitical picture beyond the East Asian coast and its shift towards the Indian Ocean allows the introduction of new players who will “blur” the influence of China. These hopes are pinned primarily on India. It is also noteworthy that the Indo-Pacific region almost exactly corresponds to the area of ​​responsibility of the US Pacific Command.

Region-building, that is, the purposeful creation of political regions, is not a rare phenomenon in international relations. We can recall the "Euro-Atlantic" (aka "North Atlantic") - a concept that was designed to ensure the indestructible unity of the United States and Western Europe. The same Asia-Pacific region, which has now received a competitor in the form of an engineering and technical one, is also largely an artificial formation. As Oleg Arin, the author of the book Asia-Pacific: Myths, Illusions and Reality, rightly points out, the narrative about the Asia-Pacific region, created in the 1970s–80s, was largely caused by the need for an ideological and political justification for maintaining and strengthening the dominant position of the United States in Pacific Ocean and East Asia. Russia also does not remain aloof from such regional building games to ensure its geopolitical interests. A striking example is the promotion of the Eurasia geoconcept and the project Eurasian Union. How successful the attempt to construct an Indo-Pacific region will be, time will tell.

For Russia, the idea of ​​ITR does not promise bright prospects. The Pacific Ocean, of course, will not disappear anywhere, and Russia will not cease to be a Pacific power, but the shift of the geopolitical focus to the west from the Strait of Malacca will most likely weaken Moscow’s influence in the region: in the Pacific Ocean, our positions have never been particularly strong, let alone in Indian they are practically non-existent. Therefore, one should be careful about borrowing the term ITR into the official Russian lexicon. Probably, it is worth remaining faithful to the APR, although, I repeat, it also has a Western origin. It is noteworthy that the Americans speak of a "free and open Indo-Pacific." Under this firstly, implies rejection of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, which, according to Washington, poses a threat to China's geo-economic dominance in Asia. Secondly, this is freedom for American and friendly naval and air force act ( sail, fly and operate) in all parts of the Pacific and Indian Oceans in accordance with the principle of freedom of navigation. China's attempts to establish sovereignty over the South China Sea, as well as its territorial dispute with Japan, are seen as a direct encroachment on the principle of "freedom and openness." The context of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” also fits accusations addressed to China of “undermining the sovereignty of neighboring countries”, using “predatory economic methods” and turning other countries into their “satellites”.

Despite all the hysteria surrounding Russia and Moscow's alleged interference in the US elections today, Washington sees China as the main long-term geopolitical threat, not in Russia. The identification of China as a key US rival dates back to the early 2000s, when George W. Bush proclaimed China the main "strategic competitor". Since then, regardless of the change in presidential administrations, Washington has been quite consistently pursuing a policy of limiting the growth of Beijing's strategic influence. This is also recorded in Trump's National Security Strategy. Among the main rivals of the United States, the document names China first, and only after it Russia. In the list of regional priorities for American foreign policy, the Strategy puts the Indo-Pacific in first place, where again China is the main challenge. Europe - where, of course, Russia is named as the main threat - is put in second place. And the general tone of the document, in which the challenge emanating from China is portrayed in more verbose and more bright colors than the "Russian threat" leaves no doubt about the US strategic planning priorities.

As mentioned above, it is India that the United States would like to assign the role of the main counterweight to China in Asia. Objectively, only India is able to balance the Chinese giant in terms of its aggregate indicators. By 2050, the Indian economy may become the second largest in the world in terms of GDP. By 2030, India's population should surpass China's, with the Indian population, with a median age of just 25 years, much younger than China's steadily aging population, which should affect economic growth, innovation, and more. Even today, the growth rate of the Indian economy exceeds that of China.

Of course, the Americans also rely on common “democratic values”. Here is a typical quote from Tillerson's speech: “The US and India are increasingly becoming global partners with ever closer strategic interests. Indians and Americans don't just share a common commitment to democracy. We have a common vision for the future…Our nations serve as two pillars of stability – on both sides of the globe…We will never have the same relationship with China, an undemocratic society, that we can have with a large democratic country.”. Such rhetoric indicates that Washington sees as its main promising partner in Asia not a fading and insecure Japan, but a growing and increasingly ambitious India. The Trump administration has clearly indicated that it intends to strengthen strategic relations with India in every possible way, both in the political-diplomatic and military spheres, including joint exercises, the supply of weapons and military technologies. It should be noted that the Trump administration's policy towards India demonstrates complete continuity with the administrations of both Obama and Bush Jr. It was under Bush Jr. that an active rapprochement between Washington and Delhi began, which continued under Obama.

However, the question remains whether India itself is ready for such a mission as the main US strategic partner in Asia, since this role inevitably means one degree or another of opposition to China. In general, Delhi is behaving rather cautiously towards China and so far there is no reason to say that India has abandoned its traditional line of "strategic autonomy", which implies avoiding too close alliances with great powers. It is significant that Delhi is not ready to participate in the "patrol" of the South China Sea to maintain the principle of freedom of navigation, which the Americans would very much like from India.

"Networkization" of military-political alliances

Allied relations with other states are one of the most important tools for maintaining and strengthening Pax Americana in key geopolitical regions, including Asia. As you know, during the presidential campaign, candidate Trump was very critical of US alliances in Europe and Asia, questioning their benefits to America. Alliances with Japan and South Korea have been criticized. On this wave, many even began to predict, if not the end, then the weakening of the US's cornerstone Asian alliances. However, this did not happen in 2017. Moreover, in the case of Japan, there is even a strengthening of allied relations, which is explained by the personal friendship between Trump and Shinzo Abe, as well as by the factor of the increased “North Korean threat”.

As for South Korea, Trump's personal relationship with President Moon Jae-in is not as close as with Abe, but the institutional military-political alliance of the United States and the Republic of Korea looks quite strong today, which is also facilitated by the North Korean factor. If the US-South Korean alliance begins to weaken, this will most likely happen not on the initiative of Washington, but on the initiative of Seoul, which increasingly feels its economic and geopolitical dependence on China and tries not to irritate its giant neighbor once again (which was evidenced by the November 2017 Seoul promised Beijing not to deploy additional THAAD systems in South Korea, not to participate in the US-created regional and global missile defense systems, and not to enter into a trilateral military-political alliance with the US and Japan).

In addition, under Trump, steps were taken to restore military-political relations with Thailand, a treaty ally of the United States, relations with which deteriorated significantly under Obama after the military junta came to power in Bangkok. Traditionally, in the San Francisco system, there were only two-way vertical links between Washington and the junior allies, while there were practically no horizontal links between the latter. Neither the US nor their Pacific clients were particularly interested in going beyond the time-honored “axle and spoke” model ( hub and spokes). However, since the 2000s, American diplomacy has taken a course towards promoting military-political cooperation between the "spokes" - junior allies and partners. It develops both in bilateral and multilateral formats. In addition to its traditional allies, the United States is actively involving new partners in these strategic alliances, primarily India and Vietnam. In a number of cases (for example, in the Japan-USA-Australia triangle), Washington is a direct participant and leader. In others (for example, India-Australia-Japan, the Philippines-Japan, South Korea-Australia), the Americans are formally absent, but even in these cases there is little doubt that the process is taking place with the blessing of Washington.

The most developed is the Australian-US-Japanese Triangle, officially launched in 2002 with the launch of the Security Dialogue at the level of senior officials. Since 2006, it has been held at the ministerial level and is called the Tripartite Strategic Dialogue. Since 2011, a US-India-Japan trilateral dialogue (at the level of deputy ministers) has been held, and in September 2015, the first trilateral ministerial meeting was held. Since 2015, Japan has joined as the third permanent participant in the large-scale US-Indian naval exercise Malabar. In June 2015, the first trilateral meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of India, Japan and Australia took place in Delhi. Thus, the “axle and spokes” system gradually transforms into a “network”, the nodes of which are connected by numerous connections, although with varying degrees of formalization and intensity. The main "hub" of the network, which manages its construction and operation, is still the United States.

Under Trump, the “networking” trend has continued and developed further. On the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in Manila in November 2017, another trilateral summit of the President of the United States, the Prime Ministers of Japan and Australia was held, which confirmed the viability of the trilateral coalition. But the most significant event was the meeting in Manila in the Quartet format ( Quad), consisting of the US, Japan, and Australia and India. The US and Japan have been promoting the idea of ​​the Quartet for quite some time, but have not received support from Canberra and Delhi, who did not want to provoke China once again: everyone understands that the Quartet has a distinct flavor of containing China. That is why the first meeting in a quadripartite format, which took place in 2007 at the initiative of Japan (this was during Shinzo Abe's first term as prime minister), did not continue afterwards. And now the Quartet is being revived, although so far it has not been a meeting at the level of leaders of states or ministers, but only of senior officials. Significantly, in a communiqué following the meeting, all four sides declared their commitment to a "free and open Indo-Pacific."

From “free” trade to “fair”

If the US military-political strategy in the Asia-Pacific region has remained basically the same, then the same cannot be said about the sphere of trade and economic relations, where the protectionist inclinations of the Trump administration were fully manifested. The Trump administration's emphasis is not on "free trade" ( free trade), but to "fair trade" ( fair trade). Trump famously withdrew the US from the Obama administration's multilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership and signaled that the US would prioritize bilateral trade and economic agreements, as such a format gives America much more leverage in negotiations. In abandoning the Chamber of Commerce, the Trump administration has opted for the obvious and short-term trade advantages over the long-term prospect of building an economic regime in the Asia-Pacific region — and the world at large — based on the model of liberal post-industrial capitalism that until recently was the basis of US foreign economic policy. It is not yet entirely clear how exactly the withdrawal from the Chamber of Commerce, as well as the desire of the United States to change the free trade agreement with South Korea, will affect Washington's strategic position in the region, whether they will lead to a weakening of US influence and a strengthening of China's position, how quickly and to what extent.

North Korea factor

Finally, North Korea has become another fundamentally new factor influencing US policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Trump's coming to power coincided with the moment when the North Korean nuclear missile program began to pose a real threat to the United States (the DPRK likely or expected to have an intercontinental ballistic missile, thermonuclear warhead, etc.). Trump, like any American president in his place, must respond to this. North Korea has become one of the main items on the American agenda in the Asia-Pacific region, which has also affected relations with China. Washington proceeds from the premise that only Beijing, which essentially controls the vast majority of North Korea's foreign economic contacts, is capable of forcing Pyongyang to back down. The Americans are counting on the Chinese to impose harsh economic sanctions on North Korea and possibly use some additional leverage they have with regard to the North Korean regime. Dependence on Beijing in the North Korean issue makes Trump seek friendship with Xi Jinping. This is one of the main reasons why Trump abruptly abandoned his campaign anti-China rhetoric.

In exchange for cooperation on North Korea, the White House is willing to make concessions to China on trade and perhaps even on Taiwan and the South China Sea. Significantly, in the early months of the Trump administration, the United States famously conducted several “freedom of navigation operations” ( FONOPs) in close proximity to Chinese-controlled islets in the South China Sea, but as the Korean Crisis escalated, these operations ceased (at least there is no public information about them). The Trump administration clearly does not want to quarrel with Beijing and is not making serious attempts to block Chinese expansion in the South China Sea. A number of American analysts believe that even under Obama, Washington has actually come to terms with Chinese expansion in the South China Sea and are calling on the Trump administration for a much more decisive rebuff, including by militarizing the South China Sea through the supply of modern American weapons to China's opponents in Southeast Asia. But Trump is unlikely to do so as long as North Korea is perceived as the main immediate threat and there is hope for China's help in eliminating it.

Not everyone in Washington believes that China is ready to help solve the North Korean problem. Thus, a prominent conservative Republican senator and Trump ally Tom Cotton, who is tipped to be the director of the CIA, is sure that China is playing a double game. In his opinion, the presence of a nuclear North Korea is beneficial to Beijing, as it diverts US attention from economic expansion and other hostile actions taken by China. It is impossible not to admit that there is a rational grain in these statements. On the one hand, North Korea is a headache for China. But, on the other hand, it can be used as a trump card in bargaining with the US on other important issues for China. Therefore, Beijing is hardly interested in a complete and final solution of the North Korean issue.

Conclusion

So, in 2017 - the first year of the Trump administration - US policy in the Asia-Pacific region was characterized by both significant elements of continuity that it perceived from previous administrations, and differences. Continuity - identifying China as the main geopolitical challenge for America, relying on India as China's most important potential balancer, as well as strengthening and expanding Washington's network of alliances and military-political partnerships, where the most notable event was the revival of the "quartet" (USA, Japan , Australia, India). This network is again aimed at the long-term strategic deterrence of China. The most significant changes took place in the area of ​​trade policy: a turn from the ideology of “free trade” and a liberal globalization agenda based on multilateral regional blocs to protectionism, an emphasis on bilateral agreements, and the associated withdrawal from the TPP.

North Korea has become a new factor that has made noticeable adjustments to the US Asia-Pacific policy. Largely because of the need to enlist the support of Beijing in the pressure on North Korea, Trump turned his anger into mercy in relations with China. However, the big question remains how US-China relations will develop if China's actions on North Korea do not lead to the result Washington wants or if the White House begins to suspect Beijing of a double game and unwillingness to finally resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. In this case, a sharp and significant deterioration in relations between the US and China cannot be ruled out.

Moscow, 05/28/2018

Andrey Kortunov, CEO RIAC

To say that the next one or two decades promise us many changes in world politics is to say nothing. Changes in the international sphere are constantly and non-stop, sometimes almost imperceptibly, sometimes in the most dramatic forms. But the coming fifteen to twenty years will most likely become a special period: by their end, the foundations of a new world order for a much more distant future, up to the end of this century, should be determined. The article is published in partnership with Russian Council for International Affairs (RIAC).

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin

Who will determine the rules of the game in the coming world order? What will be the main "currency" of power and influence? To what extent will the hierarchy of world leaders change? How will global governance be arranged? A fierce struggle has already begun around these issues, the stakes in which are exceptionally high - both for individual states, and for entire regions, and for the entire world system. It is clear that the epicenter of the struggle that has begun is and will be the Eurasian continent. After all, it not only remains the main historical core and economic locomotive modern world, but not without reason is considered as the main prize in the upcoming redistribution of this world.

Today, two competing long-term "Eurasian projects" are becoming more and more clear. Behind each of them are the national interests of the leading players, a set of regional military-political and economic strategies, bilateral and multilateral international mechanisms, appropriate ideological and conceptual design. For each of the projects, coalitions are assembled, allies are mobilized, resources are being accumulated. The main battles are yet to come, but there is a distinct smell of gunpowder in the air.

The confrontation is likely to be long and intense. Tactical compromises between the two projects are possible and, most likely, even inevitable. But in the long run, the two projects are unlikely to be fully compatible. In the end, there can be only one winner, leaving the fate of the dead-end direction of the historical evolution of the Eurasian continent to the alternative option.

Indo-Pacific, Quadro and containment of China

The term "Indo-Pecific" came to geopolitics from biogeography, which studies the patterns of geographical distribution and distribution of animals, plants and microorganisms. Biologists have noticed that the vast territory of the oceans from the south of Japan to the north of Australia and from the Hawaiian Islands in the east to the Red Sea in the west has many common features and is essentially a single ecosystem.

Approximately ten years ago, geopoliticians borrowed the biological term, giving it a different meaning. The right of "discoverers" of the geopolitical Indo-Pacific should be awarded to the Indian and Japanese strategists, who substantiated the expediency of strengthening bilateral Indo-Japanese cooperation. But by now, especially after the Donald Trump administration came to power in Washington, the idea of ​​building the Indo-Pacific, having undergone significant metamorphoses, has taken on the appearance of a predominantly American strategy.

In fact, we are talking about the long-term construction of Eurasia along its outer contour, by strengthening cooperation between the predominantly “marine” powers of the eastern and southern periphery of the Eurasian continent (from South Korea to the countries of the Arabian Peninsula) and the Pacific island states (from Japan to New Zealand). And the main goal of the new Eurasian project, as you might guess, is the political and military-strategic containment of China, the creation of a rigid "framework" that does not allow Beijing to take a dominant position in the region.

The practical implementation of the Indo-Pacific strategy proceeds both along the lines of strengthening bilateral relations between the United States and the countries of the region, and along the lines of creating multilateral cooperation formats. The main of the latter is the so-called "Quad" (Quad - quadrangle), designed to unite the four "democracies" of the Indo-Pacific region - the United States, Japan, Australia and India. Attempts to create "Quadro" have been going on for many years, but the administration of Donald Trap gave them an additional impetus and has already achieved certain, although so far modest, successes in this direction. And this is against the background of the general disdainful attitude of the current American leadership towards international institutions and multilateral formats!

Of course, it would be premature to exaggerate the importance of "Quadro" for the general situation in Eurasia at the moment. And the very concept of the Indo-Pacific is still more than amorphous. Its actual Indian interpretation differs significantly from the American one both in geography and content. Some Indian experts interpret the Indo-Pacific as a historical sphere of Indian cultural and civilizational influence (something like the “Indian world” by analogy with the “Russian world”), while others, on the contrary, suggest including China and even Russia in the construction of the Indo-Pacific. Nevertheless, the general vector of the strategic design of a new Eurasia in Washington in the format of the Indo-Pacific is aimed at the military-political containment of Beijing in one form or another.

"Community of Common Destiny", RIC and Consolidation of Eurasia

An alternative strategy for building a new Eurasia involves the consolidation of the continent not from the outside, but from the inside, not from the periphery to the center, but, on the contrary, from the center to the periphery. The role of the main “framework” of the continent should be played not by an external frame, but by a whole system of complementary axes (transport and logistics corridors), pulling together the west and east, north and south of the vast and very heterogeneous Eurasian space into a single whole. The general philosophy of this approach was outlined by Xi Jinping in November 2012 at the 18th CPC Congress. Although the Chinese leader gave the idea of ​​a "community of common destiny" universal significance, extending it to international relations in general, in fact, it was and still is primarily about the future of Eurasia.

Subsequently, this approach was developed in defining the goals of Beijing's policy towards neighboring states (China's "peripheral diplomacy"). This approach is also seen in the promotion of various multilateral initiatives on a continental scale, in particular, the Belt and Road Initiative and the Comprehensive Regional Economic Partnership project. Characteristically, in addition to the ASEAN countries, the traditional "sea" allies of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region - South Korea, Australia and New Zealand - became participants in this last project.

Unlike the American Indo-Pacific, the "community of common destiny" does not imply strict allied obligations on the part of the participating countries, and China itself does not change its non-bloc status. Although, of course, China also cannot completely get away from measuring security when designing the future of Eurasia, the main thing in the Chinese approach is the economic and social development of all regions that make up the Eurasian continent, overcoming the current disproportions in their living standards and the degree of involvement in the continental and world economy. It is clear that the more vigorously Washington builds an external military-political framework around China, the more military-political elements Beijing will lay in the internal Eurasian "framework".

Projecting the Chinese scheme onto the map of modern Eurasia, it is logical to assume that, ideally, the China-India-Russia triangle should become the basis for the framework of the new structure. The Triangle Cooperation Mechanism (RIC) has been around for a long time, although in recent years it has been partly absorbed by the broader BRICS and SCO formats. The basic triangle could be supplemented by more complex multilateral structures covering the three most important Eurasian regions - Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and, in the future, also West Asia (Middle East).

In an even more distant perspective, it could come to the integration into this new architecture of the westernmost periphery of the Eurasian continent - actually (Western and Central) Europe, as well as the easternmost periphery - the island states of the Pacific Ocean. Apparently, such large-scale tasks could be put into practice no earlier than the middle of this century.

Opening stage of the game: position on the board

At the moment, only the first moves have been made in the big game for the future of Eurasia, the game has not yet left the opening stage. And the task of the opening, as we know from chess, is to mobilize resources, bring your pieces to the most advantageous positions and put the development of the opponent's pieces. Let's look at the geopolitical chessboard: what can be said about the position of the players at the moment?

It is obvious that neither of the two alternative projects for the construction of a new Eurasia has yet acquired the form of a detailed "road map". Each has its strengths and weaknesses, its advantages and disadvantages. Strong point The American Indo-Pacific is the already existing and time-tested system of bilateral agreements between the United States and its numerous allies and partners in the waters of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Washington's undoubted advantage remains its predominant military power, primarily the potential of the naval and air forces.

The main weakness of the American project, in our opinion, is its shaky economic basis. The refusal of the United States to participate in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) objectively sharply narrows the American possibilities for the comprehensive implementation of the Indo-Pacific project and the economic containment of China. Considering that for the majority of Eurasian countries the tasks of socio-economic development are in the first place, it can be concluded that without an economic dimension, the project will have only limited effectiveness. When seventy years ago, the United States set itself the goal of containing the USSR in Europe, along with the “Truman Doctrine”, they also proclaimed the “Marshall Plan”, which many historians still consider the most successful program economic assistance in the history of mankind. And today, when the issue of containing China in Asia has arisen, the United States is not only not ready to implement the “Marshall Plan” for the Indo-Pacific, but has already begun to consistently tighten its positions on the economic aspects of relations with its closest Asian allies and partners.

The Chinese project looks more preferable in this sense - it has a solid basis economic basis. Or at least claims to be. It is the economy, and not security, that is its main content, although, of course, the Chinese project also does not involve large-scale economic philanthropy in the spirit of the “Marshall Plan” of the middle of the last century. In addition, Beijing, unlike Washington, can afford the luxury of long-term strategic planning, possessing "strategic depth" that allows one to think in terms of decades, rather than the current four-year political cycle.

China's main weakness lies in the fears of neighboring powers regarding the economic, political and military-strategic Chinese hegemony in Eurasia. The current American hegemony on the periphery of the Eurasian continent seems to many of them less burdensome and more acceptable than the potential dominance of Beijing. At the same time, it must be admitted that over the past one and a half to two years, Chinese diplomacy has achieved tangible success in cooperation with its neighbors both in the northeast (North and South Korea) and in the southeast (Vietnam and ASEAN as a whole).

It is worth noting another important comparative advantage of the Chinese project compared to the American one. Indo-Pacific somehow suggests a split of the Eurasian continent, since neither China, nor Russia, nor other "continental" states of Eurasia fit into this construction. And if the project is limited only to “maritime democracies”, then many more countries will have to be excluded from it - from Vietnam to the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf. A "community of common destiny", at least in principle, is capable of uniting the whole of Eurasia without any exceptions.

India as a decisive swing state

In the American electoral lexicon, there is such a term as swing state (“swing state”). The term refers to a state where neither party has a clear advantage and the outcome of the vote is uncertain. There are few such states in each election cycle, but it is they who determine who will eventually become the owner of the White House. In the case of Eurasia, the role of the swing state falls to India.

It is hardly worth talking about the demographic, economic, strategic and geopolitical potential of this country, which will only grow over time. Without the participation of Delhi, and even more so with opposition from the Indian leadership, neither the American nor the Chinese project can be fully implemented. The Chinese project of a "common destiny" without India remains at least incomplete and unfinished; it is turning from a continental into a trans-regional one. BUT American project The Indo-Pacific, if India falls out of it, generally loses one of its two main pillars and is reduced to a scattering of separate and loosely connected US agreements with its traditional Asia-Pacific partners. It would not be an exaggeration to say that today, and especially tomorrow, partnership with India is no less a priority for the United States than the alliance with Japan was during the Cold War.

And India, of course, is trying to maintain maximum room for maneuver and is in no hurry to make a choice. On the one hand, India has accumulated an impressive baggage of historical disputes and traditions of overt or covert competition with China in Southeast and South Asia. The question of wounded national pride remains - the memory of India's unsuccessful border war with China in 1962. There remains the question of a disadvantaged global status - India, unlike China, is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and Beijing, as far as one can judge, is not too disposed to help Delhi in obtaining this membership. Suspicions remain about Beijing's possible support for Indian separatists.

Even more practical and not entirely unfounded fears concern the economic, political and military-strategic expansion of China in the Indian Ocean zone. The “string of pearls” theory, popular in India, describes the Chinese strategy in the Indian Ocean basin as a strategy of “encircling” India by creating a chain of bases and other military infrastructure facilities of the PRC along the line Hong Kong - Hainan - Paracel Islands - Spratly Islands - Kampong Som (Cambodia) - Kra channel (Thailand) - Situe and Coco Islands (Myanmar) - Hambantota (Sri Lanka) - Marao (Maldives) - Gwadar (Pakistan) - Al-Ahdab (Iraq) - Lamu (Kenya) - Port Sudan. There is concern about potential problems for India's access to the Pacific Ocean, which remains one of the most important transport arteries for Delhi. Difficult problems also face Delhi in the economic sphere: India's total trade deficit with China has exceeded $50 billion a year; in addition, Beijing widely uses the practice of non-tariff restrictions on Indian pharmaceuticals, food and IT products.

On the other hand, within the framework of the Indo-Pacific project, India will hardly be able to avoid the position of the "junior partner" of the United States with all the costs arising from this position. Even if Washington is not ready to see Beijing as an equal international player, it is unlikely that it will readily offer this role to Delhi. Although the current leadership of India is gradually moving away from many of the principles of Jawaharlal Nehru, including the basic principle of non-alignment, a complete break with the traditions on which the Indian state was created seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. The inconsistency of US strategy and the rigidity with which the current administration is negotiating economic issues, even with its closest allies, should give rise to great fears in the Indian leadership. Of course, the deficit in US trade with India is much smaller than in trade with China, but it is not difficult to predict that Donald Trump's economic pressure on Narendra Modi will only increase over time.

The Indian political establishment as a whole supports the policy of strengthening cooperation with Donald Trump's America, but is extremely painful about the prospect of losing even part of the freedom of hands on the world stage. And a formal entry into some kind of military-political union under the auspices of the United States will certainly limit this freedom not only in the direction of China, but also in Delhi's relations with other important partners for India, primarily with Moscow and Tehran.

In all likelihood, India will continue to hesitate. Much will depend not only on the evolution of the strategic vision of the Indian elite, but also, to no lesser extent, on the professionalism, flexibility, and adaptability of American and Chinese diplomacy. It seems that, given the peculiar negotiating style of the current American administration and the numerous problems with making foreign policy decisions in general, at the moment China has at least serious tactical advantages in the Indian direction.

However, tactical advantages are clearly not enough to seriously increase the attractiveness of the "common destiny" project for India. China will have to make significant concessions on issues that are important for India - in the interpretation of the problem of international terrorism in Eurasia, on the issue of India's permanent membership in the UN Security Council, on issues of bilateral trade, etc. Apparently, Beijing will have to form to recognize the special role of Delhi in South Asia - just as he recognizes the special role of Russia in Central Asia. The later Beijing takes serious steps towards Delhi, the more difficult it will be to draw India into a “community of common destiny”.

Russia's interests

Strictly speaking, the Indo-Pacific project has no direct relation to Russia at all. The current American strategy does not consider Moscow as a serious player not only in the Indian Ocean, but even in the Asia-Pacific region. Geographically, the Indo-Pacific zone does not extend north of Hokkaido and the Korean Peninsula. Perhaps that is why Washington turns a blind eye to the ongoing attempts of Japanese-Russian rapprochement under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and also ignores the political opposition of South Korea, which has been consistently sabotaging the regime of anti-Russian Western sanctions for several years.

The only potential gain for Moscow in the implementation of the Indo-Pacific project is that if this project is successfully implemented, the value of partnership with Moscow objectively increases for Beijing. In this sense, the confrontation between the “marine” and “continental” parts of Eurasia is obviously preferable for Russia to the hypothetical version of close American-Chinese cooperation according to the “G2” formula, which would obviously reduce the value of Moscow as a partner not only in the eyes of Washington, but also in the eyes of Beijing. But the costs of the new "Eurasian bipolarity" for Moscow, as one might assume, will in any case outweigh the possible gains - Russian policy in Eurasia will lose its flexibility, and many traditional partnerships - with Vietnam and India - will be jeopardized. The general decline in stability in the Asia-Pacific region, which will be an inevitable side effect of the implementation of the Indo-Pacific project, will also create additional problems for Moscow.

The “Community of a Common Destiny” looks like a clearly more promising project for Russia – already for the reason that in this project for Russia it is possible not to play the role of a spectator in the hall and not even an extra in the background of the stage, but one of the main characters. But is Moscow capable of playing this role? To do this, it is necessary that Russia act not as one of the “spokes” attached to the central Chinese “Eurasian axis”, but as another, parallel “axis”, albeit of a smaller diameter. That is, Russia should enter the “community of a common destiny” not empty-handed, but with its own Eurasian integration project (EAEU).

The creation of a parallel Russian “axis” is not so much a political task as a socio-economic one. Its solution is impossible without a transition to a new, more efficient and more attractive model of economic development for the neighbors. It would be a strategic mistake to consider the prospect of joining the “community of a common destiny” as a viable alternative to long overdue structural transformations in the Russian economy. Or hope that the Eurasian construction will allow Russia to miraculously avoid the challenges of globalization. On the contrary, joining the “community” will impose additional requirements on the effectiveness of the Russian economic model and on the level of openness Russian economy. The obviously superfluous "axle" in the new design of the Eurasian mechanism hardly has any chance of any long-term existence - it will make the structure heavier, will be quickly discovered and dismantled in one way or another.

In passing, we note that the same challenge is facing India, if the latter still leans in favor of the "community of common destiny." It would be logical for Delhi to fulfill a system-forming function in relation to South Asia, similar to the one that Russia should fulfill in Central Eurasia. Russia, for its part, is interested in maintaining and even strengthening India's position in South Asia - not to contain China, but to create a more stable multipolar balance of power and interests on the Eurasian continent. At the same time, the Indian leadership should proceed from the fact that the times of exclusive "spheres of interest" of the great powers are a thing of the past, and it is no longer necessary to count on the unconditional loyalty of even such closest Indian neighbors and partners as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal, and for their attention and goodwill will have to fight hard.

From debut to middlegame

One of the main strategic testaments of Henry Kissinger says: in any geopolitical triangle, the most advantageous position is the corner whose relationship with each of the other two corners is better than their relationship with each other. Actually, it was on this notion that Kissinger's by no means unsuccessful geopolitical strategy in the US-USSR-China triangle in the early 1970s was based. Following the behest of the classic of geopolitics, theoretically Russia would have to be interested in maintaining a certain level of tension in Sino-Indian relations in order to be at the top of the Russia-China-India triangle.

However, the international relations of our time are built on other foundations. Geopolitics no longer works in the format it did half a century ago. Russia cannot derive anything of value from the aggravation of Sino-Indian contradictions. To be fair, it should be noted that it does not try to play on these contradictions either in multilateral formats or in bilateral relations. However, Moscow has much more to do - Russian foreign policy should consider as its top priority (no less important than the restoration of relations with the West!) efforts to overcome Sino-Indian differences and strengthen Sino-Indian cooperation.

And here one can think about giving new meaning and new content to the structure of the RIC, which has been largely dissolved in the broader structure of the BRICS. Although RIC meetings at the level of foreign ministers have been continuing on a regular basis since September 2001, the documents adopted at them are of an extremely general, sometimes purely declarative nature. The agreed trilateral documents on countering international terrorism, on maintaining stability in Afghanistan, and on the need to strengthen global governance camouflage serious differences within the Troika on many fundamental aspects of these and other problems.

Apparently, discussions in the RIC format should become more frank, specific and trusting. The main goal should be defined not as a formal fixation of coinciding positions on the most general issues, but as the identification of disagreements on specific problems and the search for mutually acceptable ways to overcome these differences. This work is extremely complex and delicate, but too important and urgent to be postponed to an indefinite future.

It would be possible to start working on a new RIC agenda by deepening trilateral cooperation in those areas where the positions of Moscow, Beijing and Delhi generally coincide or diverge slightly. For example, in matters of energy regimes in Eurasia, climate change, the problem of reforming international financial institutions. The new agenda should include a discussion of the practical steps of the three countries in such areas as the fight against "double standards" in human rights issues, and the prevention of external interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries. The common concern of Russia, China and India about the use of sanctions in international trade, the rise of protectionism and the crisis of many international organizations create additional opportunities for consensual or parallel actions.

Of course, sooner or later, India and China will have to solve numerous and very painful bilateral problems. For example, the Indian-Chinese border (which is more than 3000 km!) remains a line of possible collisions. Clashes on the territory of third countries are also possible, which was once again demonstrated by the Doklam incident in October 2017. The potentially unstable border with China fetters a significant part of the Indian army, which under other circumstances could be transferred to the border with Pakistan. The parties accuse each other of unjustified rigidity and unwillingness to compromise on the settlement of border problems.

There is little Russia can do to help its partners resolve the remaining territorial issues. But it would be useful to recall that two decades ago the situation on the Russian-Chinese border (even longer than the Chinese-Indian border) also caused a lot of concern on both sides. The level of militarization of the border between Russia and China was even higher than the level of militarization of the Sino-Indian border. After all, Moscow and Beijing were able to achieve a radical change in this situation, and even in an extremely short time! Perhaps the Russian-Chinese experience of the beginning of the century will be of some use to Beijing and Delhi today?

Endgame: Losing the USA?

Is the Common Destiny project anti-American? Does its implementation mean a strategic defeat for the United States? Undoubtedly, the majority of American experts will give unambiguously affirmative answers to these questions. But, in our opinion, these answers are not so obvious. First, the project of "common destiny" can only be successful if it is based primarily on the basic internal needs of the countries of Eurasia, and not on their collective desire to resist the United States or anyone else. This project should not be a mirror image of the Indo-Pacific; as a mirror image of the American plan, it has no prospects.

Secondly, if we ignore geopolitical metaphysics, leaving aside the arguments about the eternal civilizational dualism of Land and Sea, "tellurocracy" and "thallasocracy", then we must admit that, in the end, a stable, predictable, economically successful Eurasia meets American interests. The implementation of the “common destiny” project does not at all exclude the preservation of the principle of freedom of navigation in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, which implies, among other things, freedom of movement for the naval and air forces of countries that do not belong to the Eurasian continent.

The implementation of this project also does not exclude the preservation of the openness of the new Eurasia for the rest of the world in matters of trade, investment and migration. If the Americans want to look for supporters of protectionism and opponents of the liberal world economic order, then for this it is not at all necessary to turn their eyes to the Dongcheng district of Beijing (“ Eastern city”), where, as you know, the powerful Ministry of Commerce of the PRC is located. The easiest place to look for protectionists is in Washington, DC, at 1800 Pennsylvania Avenue.