Civil Wars of the Middle Ages. Who destroyed the Khazaria

By June 24, the crusaders were on the brink of collapse and sent two envoys to negotiate with Kerboga. Historians are in the habit of accepting the explanation given by the Latins themselves for this undertaking. They called it an exercise in bravado. In fact, most likely, it was a hopeless attempt to negotiate the terms of surrender. An unbiased Eastern Christian source describes how "the Franks were threatened with famine, and they decided to get a promise of amnesty from Carboga, on the condition that they give him the city and retire to their own country." A later Arabic chronicle corroborates this version, saying that the crusader leaders "wrote to Kerboge asking for safe passage through his territory, but he refused, stating, 'You will have to fight your way through'."

After that, it became clear that there was no chance of safely leaving Antioch. Realizing that open battle was their only hope, and no matter how small the chance of victory, the Latins began to prepare for the last suicidal battle. According to one of them, they decided that it was better to die in battle than to become a victim of hunger and disease.

Those last days Christians did everything they could. Ritual processions, confessions, communions - all this was done for spiritual purification. In the meantime, Bohemond, now commander-in-chief of the army, set about drawing up a battle plan. On paper, the position of the Franks was hopeless. They were in the minority - the crusaders now numbered no more than 20 thousand, including women and the elderly. The elite force - mounted knights - ceased to be such, having lost war horses. Many knights fought on pack animals or on foot. Even the German Count Harman of Dillingen, once a proud and very rich crusader, was forced to ride a donkey, and so small that the count's legs dragged along the ground. Bohemond had to develop a strategy based on the actions of the foot soldiers in order to hit the enemy with maximum speed and strength.

Despite their giant size, Kerboga's army had two potential weaknesses: its main forces still remained at some distance to the north - the troops surrounding Antioch were relatively few in number. And the people of Kerboga lacked the unity given by the consciousness of a common cause. They were connected only by the appearance of an alliance. Should Muslims begin to lose confidence in their general, collapse would be inevitable.

By June 28, the crusaders were ready for battle. At dawn, they began to leave the city, and the clergy, standing at the walls, offered up prayers to the Lord. People thought they were going to die. Bohemond preferred to appear unexpectedly from the gates of the Bridge, cross the Orontes and clash with the Muslims on the plain. If the crusaders did not want to be immediately stopped and killed, speed and cohesion were vital. As the gates opened, the vanguard of the Latin archers fired a "volley" of arrows to drive back the enemy and clear their way across the bridge. The Franks then came forward in four close-knit battle groups, deployed in a semicircle and rushed at the Muslims.

As soon as the gates of the Bridge opened, Kerboga, who was in the main camp, was warned - a black flag was raised over the citadel occupied by Muslims. At this point, he could bring his main forces into action, hoping to capture the crusaders at the exit from the city and destroy their battle formation. But he hesitated. And not at all because, as the legend later claimed, he was too keen on playing chess. Rather, Kerboga hoped to strike a decisive blow, allowing the Franks to deploy outside the city so that he could finish them all at once, and thereby bring the siege of Antioch to a triumphant conclusion. Such a strategy had some advantages, but required exceptional composure. But just when the general had to stand still, allowing the enemy to move forward to engage in battle in the territory of the choice of the Muslims, he broke. Feeling that the Franks were gaining a fleeting advantage in the fight in front of the city, he threw his entire army into a panicky disorganized attack.

The timing couldn't be worse. The Franks repelled a series of Muslim counterattacks blockading Antioch, including a potentially lethal attack by rear troops left to guard the south gate of St. George. Losses mounted, but Bohemond nevertheless advanced to seize the initiative, and Muslim resistance began to weaken. Kerboga's main force arrived just as the battle took a different turn. Shocked that they could not defeat the supposedly exhausted Frankish army, the Muslims fighting near the gates of the Bridge turned to flight. Along the way, they ran into the close ranks of their advancing comrades, causing chaos. At this defining moment of the battle, Kerboga failed to muster and organize his men. The battle formation finally collapsed, and one by one the Muslim detachments began to retreat. The shock of the indomitable determination of the Franks revealed the hidden disunity of the Muslim army. A Muslim chronicler later wrote: “The Franks, although in a state of extreme weakness, advanced in battle formation against the armies of Islam, which were at the height of their strength and had a multiple advantage in numbers. The Franks broke the ranks of the Muslims and scattered them.

Muslim losses were negligible, and yet Kerboga was forced to retreat in disgrace. Abandoning the treasures of his camp, he fled to Mesopotamia. Seeing how events turned out, the Muslim garrison of the Antioch citadel surrendered. The huge city was now completely in the hands of the Latins. The Christians achieved a stunning victory. Never before had the Crusade been so close to destruction, and yet, contrary to all expectations, Christianity won triumphant victory. It is not surprising that many saw the hand of the Lord in this, and immediately there were numerous reports of all kinds of miracles. At one point a whole army of Christian martyrs, dressed in white, came out of the mountain to help the Franks. In another, Raymond of Aguilera himself carried the Holy Spear in a detachment of the southern Franks, which was led by Bishop Ademar. Later it was said that the sight of the holy relic paralyzed Kerboga. With or without these Divine interventions, piety still played a central role in all events. The crusaders certainly fought in an atmosphere of deep spiritual conviction and were supported by the clergy who walked with them, reciting prayers. First of all, the feeling of a common pious mission, combined with primitive despair, which bound the Latins during this terrible battle, enabled them to resist and drive back a terrible enemy.

Immediately after this miraculous success, hopes arose for a quick and triumphant end to the Crusade. And so already the expedition lost direction and momentum as its leaders argued over the spoils of Syria. The heat of summer caused an epidemic, and many of the crusaders, who had endured the terrible hardships of the previous months, now died of disease. An unknown infection did not spare even the nobility, and on August 1, the papal legate Adémar, Bishop of Puy, died.

At this time, there was a fierce dispute among the crusaders regarding the future of Antioch, which stopped the advance to Palestine. Bohemond claimed the city for himself. After all, it was he who organized the fall of Antioch, his flag fluttered over the city walls at dawn on June 3. In the hours before Kerboga's defeat, he strengthened the Frankish position by personally taking control of the citadel, although Raymond of Toulouse did everything to get ahead of him. Bohemond demanded that the other leaders of the campaign recognize his unconditional rights to the city, despite the promise that they all made to the Byzantine emperor. Remembering that Alexei had left them at Philomelium, the majority yielded, but Raimund was again in opposition, recalling the expedition's obligations to the Greeks. Therefore, an embassy was sent to Constantinople with a proposal to the emperor to personally present his rights to Antioch, he did not appear, and the matter came to a standstill.

Philippe Contamine

War in the Middle Ages

PHILIPPE CONTAMINE AND HIS WORK

Philippe Contamine, born in 1932, belongs to the older generation of French historians who continue the tradition of what is sometimes called the "new science of history" in French historiography. The founders of this trend were the well-known scientists Mark Blok and Lucien Febvre, but it is useful to recall here that they were inspired by Henri Burr, the founder of the school of historical synthesis and the author of the philosophical, historical and methodological work Synthesis in History, published in 1911. Proceeding from the principle of pluralism, that is, the plurality of factors of historical development, in contrast to the monistic view of history characteristic of Marxism with the allocation of one determining factor - economic, he believed that historical research should cover the most diverse aspects of society. True, his dream of some kind of comprehensive historical synthesis turned out to be unrealizable in practice, but the important thing is that the desire for such a synthesis, even if on a limited scale, has become characteristic feature historians of the new direction.

The book by F. Kontamine “War in the Middle Ages”, offered to the reader in Russian translation, is not just a history of military affairs, but a history of war as the most important factor in the life of medieval Western European society in its various manifestations and consequences. Many researchers turned to the events of the military history of the Middle Ages, but no one tried to give a comprehensive analysis of the war as a phenomenon of socio-political and spiritual-religious life. That is why the work of the French scientist is unique, his book is translated into different languages, and now the Russian-speaking reader will be able to get acquainted with it.

Using great amount a wide variety of sources, F. Contamine carried out a historical synthesis in two main directions. He provided rich material on the history of wars in European countries ah and analyzed many related problems. The book provides both classical material on the history of weapons and an original analysis of medieval tactics and strategy, which military historians have always neglected in the past, believing that, compared with antiquity, they practically did not exist in the Middle Ages. F. Contamine also addresses such rare but important topics as the "history of courage", which was considered the main virtue of a warrior, as a manifestation of war in church and religious life. In other words, his work covers purely military, social, political, and spiritual and religious aspects of the war in the Middle Ages.

Interest in the phenomenon of war in a wide historical plan F. Contamine arose not by chance. Being primarily a researcher of the late Middle Ages, that is, the XIV-XV centuries, he studied the Hundred Years War between France and England for a long time. The range of problems that were considered in his works devoted to this era is very wide. As Contamine himself said, in his books appears “by no means the France of peasants and villages, not the France of clerics and monks, merchants and fairs, artisans and workshops, but France, also very real, wars and diplomacy, the state and its servants, nobility and power haves." The scientist was especially interested in the history of the nobility, which remained the "enzyme of freedom" and "the main or at least the central figure on the socio-political chessboard." In this regard, he also refers to the evolution of chivalry in the late Middle Ages, believing that talking about its inevitable decline in the XIV-XV centuries. in France, as historians usually do, prematurely.

A privileged place among the topics that F. Contamine previously dealt with belongs to history Everyday life in France and England during the Hundred Years War, mainly in the XIV century. After a comprehensive analysis of the conditions and means of subsistence in both countries, Contamine came to the conclusion that in terms of lifestyle, worldview, social organization and other "parameters" these peoples were very close. And their relationship, according to the researcher, partly explains, although it does not justify, the conquering ambitions of the kings. Studying the history of the XIV-XV centuries, which, unlike the classical Middle Ages, did not enjoy the attention of medieval historians, F. Contamine raised the question of whether these centuries can be attributed to the “real” Middle Ages, or whether adjustments should be made to periodization. Characteristically, he finds weighty arguments in favor of his conclusions that we should talk about the continuation of the Middle Ages thanks to a careful analysis of the ideological foundations of war and peace.

However, F. Contamine was always more interested in war as the most important factor human existence in the Middle Ages. The result of his many years of scientific research was the book "War in the Middle Ages" written in 1980.

Yu. P. Malinin

FOREWORD

Per last years excellent summarizing studies have appeared on French about the war as a phenomenon, the armies of both antiquity and Europe in modern times. About the Middle Ages similar works does not exist, and the first task of this book was to fill in the gap and, in accordance with the rules of the New Clio series, to provide readers with a fairly rich bibliography, to reveal the general features of the military history of the Middle Ages, and finally to reveal some topics more specifically, since they either became the subject modern research, or, in our opinion, deserve closer attention.

Of course, it is hard work to try to cover at once, in one volume, the period of more than ten centuries, during which the war made its presence felt. We would gladly take on our own account the remark of one researcher: "No scientist can hope that he will master all the sources on such a vast subject over the course of a millennium." Moreover, medieval warfare was a whole world that combined both canon law and intercessory inscriptions on swords, both equestrian fighting techniques and the art of healing wounds, both the use of poisoned arrows and the food recommended to fighters. In a word, the subject requires consideration from different angles if we want to comprehend it in its entirety: military art, weapons, recruitment into the army, the composition and life of armies, the moral and religious problems of war, the relationship between the phenomenon of war and the social, political and economic environment . And at the same time, it is necessary to observe chronology (understood more as a difference between "before" and "after" than as a sequential chain of events), which, as it seems to us, means as much for history as perspective does for classical painting.

Crusades

The Crusades are military expeditions to the Middle East (through North Africa to Palestine and Syria), organized by Western European feudal lords and the Roman Christian Church under the banner of fighting the "infidels" (Muslims) and with the aim of liberating the Holy Sepulcher and the Holy Land (Palestine). They did not fulfill their purpose - Palestine and Jerusalem remained in the hands of Muslims until 1917.

1096-1099 First crusade. Proclaimed by Pope Urban II in 1095. About 100 thousand people participated in the campaign. In 1097 the Crusaders crossed from Constantinople to Asia Minor. In July 1099 they captured Jerusalem and created the Kingdom of Jerusalem and three vassal states: the counties of Tripoli and Edessa and the Principality of Antioch.

1147-1149 Second crusade. It was headed by the French king Louis VII and the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, the German king Conrad III. The German crusaders who had come out earlier were defeated by the Turks in Asia Minor. The attempts of the French crusaders to take possession of Damascus ended unsuccessfully.

1189-1192 Third crusade. The crusaders were led by the emperor of the "Holy Roman Empire" Frederick I Barbarossa, the French king Philip II Augustus and the English king Richard the Lionheart. The German crusaders made their way through all of Asia Minor with heavy losses, but after Barbarossa drowned while crossing the river (1190), his army disintegrated. Philip, having taken the port of Acre (the city of Akka in modern Israel), returned to France in 1191 with part of the crusaders. Richard, having achieved success in Syria, took possession of Cyprus, but Jerusalem remained in the hands of the Muslims.

1202-1204 Fourth crusade. Organized by Pope Innocent III. The crusaders moved into the Byzantine Empire, conquered the Christian cities of Zadar in Dalmatia (1202) and Constantinople (1204). On part of the territory of the collapsed Byzantine Empire, the crusaders formed several states, the largest of which was the Latin Empire that existed until 1261. As a result of the campaign, Venice monopolized trade with the East, capturing a number of Byzantine possessions important in trade and military relations.

1217-1221 Fifth crusade. Organized by Pope Innocent III. It was undertaken against Egypt by a combined crusader army led by Jean de Brienne (“King of Jerusalem”) and the Hungarian king Endre P. Having landed in Egypt, the crusaders captured the fortress of Damietta, but were forced to conclude a truce with the Egyptian sultan and return to Europe.

1228-1229 Sixth crusade. The emperor of the "Holy Roman Empire" Frederick II, who headed it, through negotiations (and not military actions) concluded an agreement (1229) with the Egyptian sultan, according to which Jerusalem was returned (in words, not in deeds) to Christians.

1248-1254 Seventh Crusade. Organized by the French King Louis IX the Saint. The troops began the conquest of Egypt, but in the battle of Mansur (1250) the king was captured; it was later bought out.

1270 Eighth Crusade. Organized by King Louis IX the Saint. The campaign did not take place, as the king died after the landing of troops in Tunisia.

1291 Capture of Acre, the last stronghold of the Crusaders in the Holy Land by the Muslims. The Crusades never resumed again.

Hundred Years War

The Hundred Years War is the confrontation between England and France for the possession of parts of French territory (Normandy, Anjou) and independent Flanders. Attempts of England to keep their possessions in France (Guienne). It ended with the surrender of England.

1337 England's claim to the French throne, represented by King Edward III, triggers the Hundred Years' War.

1340 Naval battle of Sluis (Holland). The victory of the British in the battle for supremacy at sea.

1346, August 26 Battle of Crecian-Ponthieu in northern France. The victory of the British thanks to the actions of the archers.

1347 Siege and capture by the British of the French naval fortress of Calais (on the coast of the Pas de Calais).

1360 Peace treaty on difficult terms for France. England received land from the Loire River to the Pyrenees.

1415, October 25 British victory at Agincourt (south of Calais) and the capture of northern France, including the capital Paris.

1429, May 8 Besieged by the British, Orleans is liberated by French troops led by Joan of Arc.

1453, October 19 End of the Hundred Years War - capitulation of England in Bordeaux. On the European continent, the British had only the city of Calais (until 1558).

Italian wars

Italian wars - the struggle of France, Spain, the Papal States, the "Holy Roman Empire" (Germany), Venice, Florence and Milan for the possession of Italy. As a result, France abandoned its claims, most of Italy came under Spanish rule.

1494 Start of the Italian Wars. The French king Charles VIII invaded Italy and took Naples (1495), but was forced to retreat, having been defeated at Fornovo in a battle with the troops of the coalition of Milan, Venice, the Spanish king Ferdinand II of Aragon, Pope Alexander VI and Emperor Maximilian I.

1508 Formation of the League of Cambrai as part of the Pope, the "Holy Roman Empire", France and Spain against the Venetian Republic.

1509 France captured the Lombard possessions of Venice and won a major victory at Agnadello.

1511 Formation of the "Holy League" consisting of Venice, the Pope, Spain, England and the Swiss cantons with the aim of expelling the French invaders from Italy.

1512 The Holy League troops (mostly Spanish) are defeated by the French at Ravenna.

1515 French troops defeated the Swiss mercenaries of the Duke of Milan at Marignano and occupied Milan

1516 Treaty of Noyon between France and Spain. Milan was given to France, Naples to Spain.

1522 The defeat of the French army by the troops of the "Holy Roman Empire" at Bicocca.

1525 In the battle of Pavia, the troops of the "Holy Roman Empire" inflicted a crushing defeat on the French. King Francis I was taken prisoner and was forced by the Treaty of Madrid (1526) to renounce his conquests in Italy.

1526 League of Cognac composed of the Pope, Venice, Milan, Florence and France against Emperor Charles V and Spain.

1527 Rome captured by German troops and subjected to barbaric destruction and robbery, Pope Clement VII was captured.

1529 Under the Treaty of Cambrai, the French king Francis I again renounced his claims to Italy, which actually remained in the power of the Spaniards.

1544 Victory of the French troops over the army of the "Holy Roman Empire" at Cerezol.

1557 The defeat of the French army by the Spanish troops in France near Saint-Quentin.

1559, April 3 Cato-Cambrese peace between France and Spain as the end of the Italian wars. France abandoned its claims to Italy, retaining the Lorraine duchies of Toul, Metz and Verdun. The Kingdom of Naples, Sicily, Sardinia, the Duchy of Milan, part of the possessions in Central Italy were under the rule of Spain, which reinforced the feudal fragmentation of Italy.

Thirty Years' War

The Thirty Years' War is a confrontation between the Habsburg bloc (Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs, the Catholic princes of Germany, supported by the papacy and the Commonwealth) and the anti-Habsburg coalition (German Protestant princes, France, Sweden, Denmark, supported by England, Holland and Russia). The Habsburg bloc acted under the banner of Catholicism, the anti-Habsburg coalition under the banner of Protestantism (especially at the beginning). It is divided into periods: Czech, Danish, Swedish, Franco-Swedish. As a result, the plans of the Habsburgs to create a "world empire" and the subjugation of national states collapsed, political hegemony in Europe passed to France. The war ended with the Peace of Westphalia.

1618-1623 Czech period. The attack of the Habsburgs on the political and religious rights of the Czech Republic, which retained some independence within the Habsburg monarchy, caused the Czech Uprising of 1618-1620. In 1620, the Habsburg army defeated the Czech troops at the Battle of Belaya Gora. The Czech Republic was completely subordinate to the Habsburgs, in 1621-1623 the troops of the Catholic League (Spain) occupied the center of the Protestant Union - the electorate of the Palatinate.

1625-1629 Danish period. The troops of the Habsburg bloc defeated Denmark, driving the Danish troops out of Germany.

1630-1635 Swedish period. The Swedish army, having invaded Germany under the command of Gustav II Adolf, won victories at Breitenfeld (1631) and Lützen (1632), but was defeated at Nördlingen (1634). The result of the last defeat was the refusal of the German Protestant princes from an alliance with Sweden and the conclusion of the Peace of Prague with the Habsburgs.

1635-1648 Franco-Swedish period. France openly entered the war on the side of the anti-Habsburg coalition and led it. Having won a number of victories, the troops of the anti-Habsburg coalition created a direct threat to Vienna. The Habsburgs sued for peace.

1648 Peace of Westphalia. Sweden received the mouths of almost all the navigable rivers of Northern Germany, France - part of Alsace, the rights of sovereign sovereigns were actually recognized for the German princes. Fixed and strengthened political fragmentation Germany.

As a result of the explosive collapse of pax Romania, the transition from commodity production to subsistence farming was inevitable, closing economic life in the narrow framework of small estates (feuds). With the extreme decline of economic life, the tools of warfare were concentrated in a few hands, which led to the creation of such a primitive military structure like a knightly roysko. The knight's castle becomes an impregnable fortress. The knights were not numerous (the typical number of troops was dozens, only in the second millennium - hundreds of people) and in principle could not be subject to discipline.

The result was the poverty of tactical formations and the fundamental impossibility of somehow managing the battle. The huge difference in the armament of the equestrian knight and the infantry militia led to the almost complete displacement of the infantry from the battlefield. In the Middle Ages, the essence of war was determined by Christian theological ethics.

Warriors with non-Christians, infidels and heretics were considered charitable. The right of war between the feudal lords in Europe itself, formed under the influence of religious ethics and the code of chivalry, was a clearly fixed system of prescriptions. Both those and others were considered fair, subject to the legal norms developed by theological lawyers in accordance with Christian doctrine. The wars themselves often began with duels with that. so that it was clear in advance "whose side God is on." But the period of medieval wars was marked not only by feudal military conflicts, but also by pirate raids, interethnic wars and wars of "migration of peoples", military conflicts of an inter-civilizational nature.

Pirate wars - the attack of small but well-armed units on merchant ships and coasts for the purpose of robbery. The Norman conquest of England can be attributed to the type of interethnic wars. In 1066, William the Conqueror (prince of Normandy) defeated the Anglo-Saxon troops of King Harold II at Hastings and became king of England. An example of an interethnic war is the clash between the French and the Germans. In the battle of Buvnpe, which took place on July 27, 1214, Philip and Augustus defeated the army of the German emperor Otto IV. This victory contributed to the unification of France. The wars of the migration of peoples expressed the struggle of barbarism, primitive chaos with civilization. In the Middle Ages, the following waves of conquests can be traced: the “great migration of peoples” proper - IVVbb. (early Middle Ages), especially the creation of the barbarian Hunnic empire should be highlighted; Hungarian conquest - X century. (later Middle Ages); Tatar-Mongol conquest - XIII century. (Renaissance). The Gupis are a nomadic people that developed in the 2nd-4th centuries. in the Urals from the Turkic-speaking Xiongnu, local Ugrians and Sarmatians - began his movement to the West. The Huns gave impetus to the Great Movement of Nations.

Having subjugated a number of Germanic and other tribes, the Huns led a powerful alliance of tribes, launching a series of devastating raids on other European countries. The Hunnic Empire reached its greatest Moi-being under Attila (434 453). The advance of the i-Unns was put to a stop in the Battle of the Catalaunian Fields (451). The blows of nomads and barbarians led to the collapse of many flourishing countries. Of course, every time military victory for the nomadic tribes turned into a collapse of their usual way of life: in the conquered territories, under a new name, the old agricultural state was reborn. Thus, the barbarian invasions did not so much destroy civilization as throw it back several centuries ago.

In the Middle Ages, the conflict between civilizations manifested itself as a confrontation between the Christian West and the Muslim East. It can be traced throughout the history of the Middle Ages. The Arabs, having conquered the Christian states of Africa in the 7th century, in 711-714. capture the Iberian Peninsula In the future, this conflict resulted in a sluggish struggle between the Europeans and the Arabs of the Iberian Peninsula. Like all long wars, the struggle ended in mutual defeat. But at the same time, the great culture of the Muslim renaissance was destroyed and a number of Christian kingdoms were created.

The collapse of the Arab state provoked new wave legs of them processes. The Catholic Church organizes the First Crusade (1096-1099), the liberation of I Rob I Ospodius. A milestone in the inter-civilization conflict. The First Crusade led, but in essence, to the revival of Mediterranean maritime trade. Thus, the centripetal processes in European countries received the financial and organizational base they needed so much. The feudal structure of production is losing stability, and gradually the feuds are absorbed into centralized national governments with open, i.e. trade-oriented, commodity economy. The nature of war is also changing.

In the Renaissance, the infantry again becomes a mainstay order of battle. The collapse of the feudal structure and the ousting of the knightly cavalry from the battlefield is also explained by the invention of firearms. The heyday of the Renaissance was marked primarily by the Hundred Years' War (133? 1433) - the Anglo-French "showdown", which ended in the first interethnic WAR in the history of Europe. The reason for the Hundred Years' War was the ambiguity in the interpretation of the legal status of the English fiefs in France and, accordingly, the form of the vassal oath. \\ three battles of this war entered (at Crecy, 1346; at Poits, 1366; at Azincourt, 1415). They all ended in resounding British victories, while the war as a whole was won by the French. In Western Europe XIV XVI centuries. marked by a new round of "wars for hegemony". France waged a long and almost unsuccessful struggle for Italy with the Holy Roman Empire. The Renaissance ended with the transition of the leading European countries to colonial expansion. In the 16th century, the Spanish and Portuguese colonial empires(conquest).

The development of Western European civilization was characterized by the ability to conduct effective military operations. This required not only the development of new weapons (that is, capable of helping people destroy their own kind faster and more! "Its mass production, but also ways to organize forever, improve the communications, transportation and supply system, organize rear service, attack planning and methods to hold power in the occupied territories.This can be done through military innovations.Their brief chronology is as follows.II 1242 Roger Bacon, the famous philosopher, writes down the formula for black powder, which he enachigelly improves in 1275 Albert the Great.In 1326 a cannon was invented, and the British used it in real conditions already in 1346. In 1364, manual firearms, which is rapidly spreading across Europe. In 1493, the first rifled barrels appeared. In 1510 the first pistol was created.

In 1520, a musket appeared, which surpassed all the weapons of the East. In 1571, the Christians defeated the Turks in the naval battle of Lepanto, thanks to the dominance of multi-gun gallons. In 1878, revolvers appeared, and in 1960, Kalthoff received a monopoly in the Netherlands on the production of multiply charged weapons. There is no doubt that western civilization emerges as a military social system because it has paid increased attention to the development military equipment, military art, but a special acceleration, and qualitative, these processes received from the XIV century.

Dobrenkov V.I., Agapov P.V. War and security of Russia in the XXI century.

D. Uvarov

The problem of assessing losses is primarily a problem of assessing sources, especially since until the 14th century chronicles were almost the only sources.

Ring city walls of Visby

Chronicles, in turn, cannot be correctly interpreted without understanding the psychology of that time.

The European Middle Ages professed two concepts of war. In the era of "developed feudalism" (XI-XIII centuries), they existed de facto, in the late Middle Ages, military treatises also appeared, directly and explicitly expounding and investigating them (for example, the work of Philippe de Maizières, 1395).

The first was the war "mortelle", "death", the war of "fire and blood", in which all "cruelties, murders, inhumanities" were tolerated and even systematically prescribed. In such a war it was necessary to use all forces and methods against the enemy, in battle it was necessary not to take prisoners, to finish off the wounded, to catch up and beat the fugitives. It was possible to torture high-ranking prisoners in order to obtain information, kill enemy messengers and heralds, break agreements when it was beneficial, and so on. Similar behavior was allowed in relation to the civilian population. In other words, the greatest possible extermination of "trash" was proclaimed the main virtue. Naturally, these are primarily wars against "infidels", pagans and heretics, but also wars against violators of the "established by God" social order. In practice, wars against formally Christians, but sharply different in terms of national, cultural or social characteristics, also approached this type.

The second concept was "guerroyable" warfare. "chivalrous", "guerre loyale" ("honest war"), waged between "good warriors", which should be waged in accordance with the "droituriere justice d" armes "(" direct right of arms ") and" discipline de chevalerie ", ( "knightly science"). In such a war, the knights measured their strength among themselves, without interference from the "auxiliary personnel", in compliance with all the rules and conventions. The purpose of the battle was not the physical destruction of the enemy, but to determine the strength of the parties. Capture or put the knight to flight the opposite side was considered more honorable and "noble" than to kill him.

Let us add from ourselves that the capture of a knight was also economically much more profitable than killing him - you could get a large ransom.

In essence, the "knightly war" was a direct descendant of the ancient German concept of war as "God's judgment", but humanized and ritualized under the influence of the Christian church and the general growth of civilization.

Here some digression would be appropriate. As you know, the Germans considered the battle as a kind of trial(judicium belli), revealing the "truth" and "right" of each side. Characteristic is the speech put by Gregory of Tours into the mouth of a certain Frank Gondovald: "God will judge when we meet on the battlefield, whether I am the son or not the son of Chlothar." From today's point of view, this way of "establishing paternity" seems anecdotal, but for the Germans it was quite rational. Indeed, in fact, Gondovald did not claim to establish the "biological fact" of paternity (which at that time was simply impossible), but to the material and legal rights arising from this fact. And the battle was to establish whether he possessed the necessary powers and abilities to retain and exercise these rights.

Alexander the Great fights monsters. French miniature of the 15th century

At a more particular level, the same approach was manifested in the custom of "judicial duel", and healthy man he was obliged to defend himself, and a woman or an old man could appoint a deputy. It is noteworthy that the replacement of the duel with wergeld was perceived by the early medieval public opinion not as a sign of "humanization" of society, but as a sign of "corruption of morals", worthy of all condemnation. Indeed, in the course of a judicial duel, the stronger and more skilled warrior prevailed, and therefore the more valuable member of the tribe, already by virtue of this, more deserving, from the point of view of public benefit, to possess the disputed property or rights. A "monetary" settlement of the dispute could give an advantage to a less valuable and necessary tribe to a person, even if he possesses great wealth due to some accidents or baseness of his character (a tendency to hoarding, cunning, bargaining, etc.), that is, it stimulated not "valor" and "vice". It is not surprising that with such views, the judicial duel in various forms (including martial arts) could be preserved among the Germanic peoples until the end of the Middle Ages and even survive them, turning into a duel.

Finally, the Germanic origin of the concept of "knightly" war is also visible at the linguistic level. In the Middle Ages, the Latin word for war, bellum, and the German word for war, werra (turned into French guerre), were not synonyms, but names for two different types of war. Bellum was applied to an official, "total" interstate war declared by the king. Werra originally referred to war as the realization of "fiida", family blood feuds, and "divine judgment" under customary law.

Let us now return to the chronicles, the main source of information about losses in medieval battles. It is hardly necessary to prove that in the vast majority of cases the chronicle is not an objective "clerical" document, but rather a semi-artistic "panegyric-didactic" work. But after all, one can glorify and teach on the basis of different, even opposite premises: in one case, these goals are to emphasize ruthlessness towards "enemies of faith and order", in the other - "chivalry" in relations with "noble" opponents.

In the first case, it is important to emphasize that the "hero" beat the "infidels" and "villains" as best he could, and achieved considerable success in this; from here appear tens of thousands of slain Saracens or commoners in chronicles devoted to "deadly" wars. The record holder for this part is the description of the battle on the Salado River in 1341 (the last major attempt by the African Moors to invade Spain): 20 knights killed by Christians and 400,000 killed by Muslims.

Modern researchers emphasize that although one cannot literally understand the exaggerated figures "20,000", "100,000", "400,000" of the "crusader" chronicles (the killed "pagans" were rarely counted), they have a certain semantic load, since they convey the scale and significance of the battle in understanding of the chronicler and, most importantly, serve as psychologically accurate evidence that we are talking about a "mortal" battle.

On the contrary, in relation to the "chivalrous" war, that is, the ritualized "God's judgment" within the knighthood, a large number of killed "brothers" of the winner can in no way put him in a favorable light, testify to his generosity and "correctness". According to the concepts of that time, the commander who put to flight or captured enemy nobles, and did not arrange their extermination, looked more “chivalrous”. Moreover, taking into account the tactics of that time, the heavy losses of the enemy imply that the knights who were knocked out of the saddle or wounded, instead of being captured, were achieved by the knechts-commoners walking behind - shameful behavior according to the concepts of that time. That is, here a good chronicler should rather strive to underestimate the losses among the knights, including the enemy.

St. Louis, King of France, sets out on the Seventh Crusade in 1248.

Unfortunately, "minimalist" historians, while rightly criticizing the obviously inflated figures, did not take into account the other side of the coin - that in a different psychological situation"poets"-chroniclers could be just as prone to downplaying losses (since "objectivity" in the modern sense was alien to them anyway). After all, if you think about it, 3 French knights killed out of one and a half thousand after a three-hour close hand-to-hand fight at Buvin (1214) are no more plausible than 100 thousand Muslims killed at Las Navas de Tolosa.

As a standard of "bloodless battles" of the XII-XIII centuries, they cite such as at Tanshbre (1106), when only one knight was allegedly killed on the French side, at Bremul (1119), when out of 900 knights participating in the battle died only 3 with 140 prisoners, or under Lincoln (1217), when only 1 knight (out of 400) died among the victors, 2 among the vanquished with 400 prisoners (out of 611). The statement of the chronicler Orderic Vitalis about the battle of Bremul is characteristic: “I found that only three were killed there, because they were covered with iron and mutually spared each other, both out of fear of God and because of brotherhood in arms (notitia contubernii); they tried not to kill the fugitives, but to capture them. Truly, like Christians, these knights did not thirst for the blood of their brethren and rejoiced in an honest victory provided by God himself ... ". It can be believed that in these cases the losses were small. But are such battles the most characteristic of the Middle Ages? In fact, this is only one of their categories, significant, but not predominant. Knights of the same class, religion and nationality participated in them, for whom, by and large, it was not so important who would become their supreme overlord - one applicant or another, Capet or Plantagenet.

However, even in battles of this type, such low losses are possible only if the opponents deliberately spared each other, avoiding mortal blows and finishing off, and in a difficult situation (being wounded or knocked out of the saddle) easily surrendered, instead of fighting to the end . The chivalrous method of individual close-quarters combat fully allows for "dosage of the damaging effect." However, this same method can also be extremely bloody - if the opponents intend to act not only in full force, but also ruthlessly to each other. Breaking away from an aggressive opponent and escaping in a melee situation is extremely difficult.
Richard the Lionheart in a duel knocks Salah ad-din out of the saddle. A drawing embodying the dream of the crusaders. England, ca. 1340.

The latter is confirmed by the mutually exterminating crusader-Muslim battles in the Middle East and in Spain - they took place at the same time and with the participation of the same knights that fought at Bremul and Lincoln, but here the chroniclers count the losses by thousands, tens and even hundreds of thousands (for example, 4 thousand crusaders and a clearly exaggerated 30 thousand Turks under Dorilei in 1097, 700 crusaders and 7 thousand Saracens under Arzuf in 1191, etc.). Often they ended with the total extermination of the defeated army, without distinction of class rank.

Finally, many European battles of the XII-XIII centuries are, as it were, an intermediate character between "chivalrous" and "deadly", adjoining either the first or the second type. Obviously, these are battles in which a strong national feeling was mixed in and in which foot militias from commoners (usually townspeople) actively participated. There are few such battles, but usually these are the largest battles.

Capture of Jerusalem in July 1099. Beginning of the XIV century.

The battle of 1214 near Buvin, which was mentioned above, adjoins the "chivalrous" type. It is known from three sources - a detailed rhymed chronicle by Guillaume le Breton "Philippis", a similar poetic chronicle by Philippe Muske, as well as an anonymous chronicle from Bethune. It is noteworthy that all three sources are French, and their preferences are visible to the naked eye. This is especially true of the most detailed chronicles of Le Breton and Muske - it seems that the authors competed in writing laudatory odes to their king Philip-August (the first of them was Philip's personal chaplain at all).

It is from the poems of Le Breton and Musk that we learn that under Buvin, 3 French and 70 German knights (with at least 131 prisoners) perished for 1200-1500 participants on each side. Delbrück and his followers take these casualty figures as an axiom. The later Verbruggen suggests that about 170 knights died among the allies (since a memorial inscription in the church of St. Nicholas in Arras speaks of 300 enemy knights killed or captured, 300-131=169). However, the French losses of 3 killed knights are all left without discussion, although the texts of the same chronicles can not be combined with such a ridiculously low figure:

1) Two hours of hand-to-hand combat between the French and Flemish knights on the southern flank - were all of these traditional rivals inclined to spare each other? By the way, after Bouvin, Flanders submitted to the French king, and his court chroniclers had every political reason not to offend new subjects and emphasize the "knightly" nature of the test.

2) Before Duke Ferdinand of Flanders was taken prisoner, all 100 of his bodyguard sergeants were killed after a fierce battle. Did these certainly not bad warriors allow themselves to be slaughtered like sheep without inflicting any losses on the French?

3) The French king himself barely escaped death (it is noteworthy that the German or Flemish infantrymen who knocked him off his horse tried to kill him, and not capture him). Did his entourage not suffer in any way?

4) The chronicles also speak of the valiant behavior of the German emperor Otto, who fought with an ax for a long time, and his Saxon entourage. When a horse was killed near Otto, he barely escaped capture and was hardly beaten off by bodyguards. The battle was already being lost by the allies and the Germans had no reason to hope to save the prisoners, i.e. they had to beat to death in order to save themselves. And as a result of all these exploits, 1-2 Frenchmen were killed?

5) On the northern flank, 700 Brabancon spearmen, lining up in a circle, fought off the attacks of the French knights for a long time. From this circle, Count Renaud Dammartin of Boulogne made sorties with his vassals. The count was an experienced warrior and, as a traitor, he had nothing to lose. Did he and his people manage to kill 1-2 French knights, at best?

6) Finally, almost the entire load of the French in this long and important battle fell on the knights, since the French communal foot militia almost immediately fled. These one and a half thousand French knights coped with the German-Flemish knights, and with the many times more numerous, aggressive, albeit poorly organized German-Dutch infantry. At the cost of only 3 dead?

In general, the statements of le Breton and Muske could only be believed if they were confirmed by the same data from the German and Flemish side. But the German and Flemish descriptions of this major battle of that time have not been preserved - apparently, it did not inspire the chroniclers of these countries. In the meantime, we have to admit that the chronicles of le Breton and Muske are a tendentious propaganda panegyric and the casualty figures in them are not credible.

Another example of this kind is the battle of Muret on September 12, 1213, the only major battle of the Albigensian Wars. In it, 900 northern French horsemen with an unknown number of foot sergeants under the command of Simon de Montfort defeated 2,000 Aragonese and southern French ("Occitan") horsemen and 40 thousand infantrymen (Toulouse militia and rutiers). The Aragonese king Pedro II (an active participant in the Reconquista and the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212), while in the vanguard, collided with the French avant-garde and was killed, after a fierce battle, all his maynade, i.e. several dozen knights and sergeants of the inner circle. Then the French, with a blow to the flank, overturned the Aragonese knights demoralized by the death of the king, they carried away the Occitan knights in their flight, then the French dismembered and drove the Toulouse foot militia into the Garonne, and supposedly 15 or 20 thousand people were hacked to death or drowned (too an outstanding achievement for 900 cavalry soldiers ).

At the same time, according to the "History of the Albigensian Crusade" by the monk Pierre de Vaux-de-Cerny (aka Peter Serneysky, an ardent panegyrist of Simon de Montfort), only 1 knight and several sergeants were killed by the French.

You can still believe that the French cavalry slaughtered the Toulouse foot militia like a flock of sheep. The figure of 15-20 thousand dead is clearly exaggerated, but on the other hand, the death of a significant part of the male population of Toulouse in the battle of Muret is an objective and subsequently repeatedly manifested fact. However, it is impossible to believe that King Pedro II and his court knights allowed themselves to be killed so cheaply.

In conclusion, a little about another well-studied battle of the same era, at Worringen (1288). According to the rhymed chronicle of Jan van Heel, the victorious Brabantians lost only 40 people in it, and the losing German-Dutch coalition - 1100. Again, these figures do not correspond in any way with the course of the battle described in the same chronicle, long and stubborn, and even "minimalist" Verbruggen considers the number of Brabant losses disproportionately underestimated. The reason is obvious - van Heelu was the same panegyrist of the Duke of Brabant, like Peter of Serney - Montfort, and Le Breton and Muske - Philippe-August. Apparently, it was good form for them to underestimate the losses of their victorious patrons to the point of implausibility.

All of the above battles are characterized by the same features: detailed descriptions of them have been preserved only from the side of the winners, and each time there is a huge gap in combat losses between the winners and the vanquished, which is in no way compatible with detailed description long and hard struggle. This is all the more strange because all these battles were no less significant for the vanquished, who had their own continuous chronicle tradition. Obviously, the losing side, not experiencing any poetic delight, preferred to limit itself to a few lines in the general chronicles. We also add that the chroniclers' restraint immediately disappears when it comes to common soldiers - here thousands of numbers are a common thing.

This is what concerns the battles of the XII-XIII centuries. Their sad feature is the impossibility, in the overwhelming majority of cases, of verifying the figures of the chronicles describing them, no matter how incredible they may be.

The picture changes dramatically at the turn of the 13th-14th centuries, after the battles of Falkirk in 1298 and Courtrai in 1302. "Anemia" battles practically disappear, no matter what series of battles of the late Middle Ages you take - only bloody battles with the death of 20 to 50% of active participants in the losing side. Indeed:

A) The Hundred Years War - the "pathetic" 15% of those killed by the French in the battle of Crecy (1346) are explained only by the passive defensive tactics of the British and the night that came, which allowed most of the wounded to escape; but in the battles of Poitiers (1356) and Agincourt (1415), which took place during the day and ended in a successful counterattack by the British, up to 40% of the French knights were killed; on the other hand, at the end of the war, the French, having gained a tactical advantage, killed up to half of the English soldiers in the battles of Pat (1429), Formigny (1450) and Castillon (1453);

B) on the Iberian Peninsula - in the largest battles at Najera (1367) and Aljubarrota (1385), English archers made exactly the same blockage of the corpses of Castilian and French knights as at Poitiers and Agincourt;

C) Anglo-Scottish wars - more than 5 thousand Scots killed (probably about 40%) at the Battle of Falkirk (1298), 55% of the Scottish cavalry were killed at Halidon Hill (1333), more than half died (perhaps 2/3, including prisoners) of the Scots who participated in the Battle of Neville's Cross (1346); on the other hand, at least 25% of the English army (against about 10% of the Scots) was killed at the Battle of Bannockburn (1314), more than 2 thousand killed by the British (20-25%) at the Battle of Otterburn (1388);

D) Franco-Flemish wars - 40% of French knights and mounted sergeants killed at the Battle of Courtrai (1302), 6 thousand Flemings killed (i.e. 40%, according to French, possibly inflated data) and 1,500 French killed in the battle of Mont-en-Pevel (1304), more than half of the Flemish army was exterminated in the battles of Cassel (1328) and Rosebeck (1382);

E) wars involving the Swiss - more than half of the Austrian knights were killed in the battles of Morgarten (1315) and Sempach (1386), in the battle of Saint-Jacob-en-Birse before last person the Bernese-Basel detachment of 1500 people was destroyed, an unknown number of Baselians who tried to save it died, 4 thousand people were allegedly killed by French mercenaries, more than half of the Burgundian army, 12 thousand people, were killed in the Battle of Murten (1476);

E) wars in the North - at Visby (1361) more than 1500 people were killed, the Danes completely destroyed the Swedish detachment defending the city, at Hemmingstedt (1500) the peasants of Dithmarshen, having lost 300 killed, destroyed 3600 soldiers of the Danish king Johann I (30 % of the entire army);

G) battles of the Hussite wars of 1419-1434. and the wars of the Teutonic Order with the Poles and Lithuanians, including Grunwald (1410) - are also known for the merciless extermination of the losing side.

Emblem of the Holy Roman Empire

Previously, only the wars of the condottieri in Italy were presented as a kind of island of "chivalrous" war (although already in a perverted form). The opinion about the habit of the leaders of the condottieri to conspire among themselves and arrange almost bloodless imitations of battles, thereby deceiving employers, is based mainly on the works of the Italian politician and writer Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527). His "History of Florence" (1520), written under the clear influence of antique models and with its specificity compares favorably with medieval chronicles, up to recently unconditionally accepted on faith as the most important source on the late medieval history of Italy. For example, about the battle between the Florentine-papal and Milanese troops at Anghiari (1440), he writes: "Never before has any other war on foreign territory been less dangerous for the attackers: with such a complete defeat, despite the fact that the battle lasted four hours , only one person died, and not even from a wound or any masterful blow, but from the fact that he fell off his horse and expired under the feet of the fighters. But about the battle between the Florentines and the Venetians at Molinella (1467): "However, not a single person fell in this battle - only a few horses were injured and, in addition, several prisoners were taken from both sides" . However, when the archives of Italian cities were carefully studied in recent decades, it turned out that in reality 900 people died in the first battle, 600 in the second. Maybe this is not so much for armies of thousands of 5 people, but the contrast with Machiavelli's statements is striking .

Thus, it became obvious that the "History of Florence", contrary to external impression, is not an accurate account of the events of that time, but rather a tendentious political pamphlet in which the author, defending certain ideas (the need to replace condottiere mercenaries with regular national armies), very freely deals with facts.

Manuscript Illustration Depicting the Taking of Damietta During the Fifth Crusade 15th

The case of the "History of Florence" is indicative in the sense that even the most convincing and plausible, at first glance, medieval descriptions may be very far from the true state of affairs. "History of Florence" modern researchers managed to "bring to clean water", for the chronicles of the XII century, this, alas, is impossible.

Hans Burgkmair the Elder. Fight with the Wild Man.

However, certain patterns can be detected. Two types of wars have already been mentioned at the beginning of the article. It is even more significant that the degree of "bloodyness" of medieval wars is inseparable from the general social and cultural development of medieval society. The early period (until the 11th century) was characterized by "feudal anarchy", the instability of social institutions and morality. The morals at that time were barbaric, the battles, although small in scale, were bloody. Then came the "golden age" of chivalry, when its hierarchy and morality were already formed and were not yet too spoiled by commodity-money relations. At that time, the dominant military and political role of the knights was not questioned by anyone, which allowed them to play power and property according to their own, sparing rules. Most of the Western European "battles-tournaments" belong to this not so long period (XII-XIII centuries). However, on the periphery of the Catholic world and at that time there were old rules- with the Gentiles and heretics there was a struggle not for life, but for death.

Wall painting in the Templar church in Cressac-sur-Charentes

However, the "golden age", if you look closely, was internally heterogeneous. The most "feudal" was the XII century, the time of the highest religiosity and the power of the papacy in Europe. This leading role of the church had a profound effect on military morality, gradually modifying the original Germanic-pagan mentality of chivalry. It was in the XII century that intra-European (that is, inter-knightly) wars were the most bloodless and external "crusading" aggression was the most bloody. In the XIII century, the church begins to be pushed into the background by royal power, and religiosity - by "state interests", "brotherhood in Christ" begins to give way to nationalism again. Little by little, intra-European wars escalate, which is facilitated by the kings' extensive use of commoners-townspeople. The real turning point comes around 1300, when the "chivalrous war" and within Europe finally gives way to the "mortal war". The bloody battles of the XIV-XV centuries can be explained by several factors:

1) The forms of combat operations are becoming more and more complicated, one main type of troops and method of combat operations (a head-on collision of knightly cavalry in an open field) is being replaced by several types of troops and many tactics with sharply different sets of advantages and disadvantages. Using them in different, not yet fully understood conditions can lead to both complete victory and catastrophic defeat. A good example is the English archers: in some battles they destroyed the French heavy cavalry almost without loss, in others the same cavalry destroyed them almost without loss.

2) The same complication of the forms of hostilities leads to the regular participation in battles of mercenary formations of infantrymen-commoners, whose uncontrollability is sharply different from the former knechts - knightly servants. Along with them, inter-class hatred returns to the fields of regular battles.

3) New technical means and tactics, such as massed shooting of archers in areas, are fundamentally incompatible with the "consciously sparing" method of conducting combat operations.

4) The aggressive "state interest" and the specifics of more and more regular and disciplined armies turn out to be incompatible with the international chivalrous "brotherhood in arms". A good example is the order of Edward III during the Battle of Crecy in 1346 not to take prisoners until the end of the battle.

5) The morality of the chivalry itself is also decomposing, no longer having sole control over the course of battles. "Christian generosity" and "knightly solidarity" are increasingly yielding to rational interest - if in the given specific conditions it is not possible to receive a ransom for oneself personally from a captured "noble" enemy, it turns out to be natural to kill him.

However, even the "anemic" battles of the 12th century were not harmless for the losers - there is nothing good in a ruinous ransom. Recall that under Bremul (1119), a third of the knights of the defeated side were captured, and under Lincoln (1217), even two-thirds.

In other words, throughout the Middle Ages, a general battle in the open field was an exceptionally risky affair, threatening irreparable losses.

Alfred Rethel. Death is the winner. Woodcut

From here distinguishing feature medieval military affairs in the period under review (from 1100 to 1500) - emphasis on the defense / siege of fortresses and "small war" (ambushes and raids) while avoiding large battles in the open field. Moreover, general battles were most often associated with unblocking actions, that is, they were of a forced nature. A typical example is the Albigensian Wars (1209-1255): over 46 years, in dozens of sieges and thousands of small skirmishes, many tens of thousands of soldiers on each side died, and the knights were killed to the same extent as common sergeants, but there was a major battle only one - under Muret in 1213. Thus, a medieval knight could have a huge, regularly updated combat experience, and at the same time participate in only 1-2 big battles in his whole life.