Losses in the Finnish. Winter War through the eyes of the Finns

Finnish War lasted 105 days. During this time, over one hundred thousand Red Army soldiers died, about a quarter of a million were wounded or dangerously frostbitten. Historians are still arguing whether the USSR was an aggressor and whether the losses were unjustified.

A look back

It is impossible to understand the reasons for that war without an excursion into the history of Russian-Finnish relations. Before gaining independence, the “Land of a Thousand Lakes” never had statehood. In 1808 - an insignificant episode of the twentieth anniversary of the Napoleonic Wars - the land of Suomi was conquered by Russia from Sweden.

The new territorial acquisition enjoys unprecedented autonomy within the Empire: the Grand Duchy of Finland has its own parliament, legislation, and since 1860 - its own monetary unit. For a century, this blessed corner of Europe has not known war - until 1901, Finns were not drafted into the Russian army. The population of the principality increases from 860 thousand inhabitants in 1810 to almost three million in 1910.

After October revolution Suomi gained independence. During the local civil war, the local version of the “whites” won; chasing the “reds”, the hot guys crossed the old border, and the First Soviet-Finnish War began (1918-1920). Bleeded Russia, having still formidable white armies in the South and Siberia, chose to make territorial concessions to its northern neighbor: as a result of the Tartu Peace Treaty, Helsinki received Western Karelia, and the state border passed forty kilometers northwest of Petrograd.

It is difficult to say how historically fair this verdict turned out to be; The Vyborg province inherited by Finland belonged to Russia for more than a hundred years, from the time of Peter the Great until 1811, when it was included in the Grand Duchy of Finland, perhaps also as a sign of gratitude for the voluntary consent of the Finnish Seimas to pass under the hand of the Russian Tsar.

The knots that later led to new bloody clashes were successfully tied.

Geography is a sentence

Look at the map. It's 1939, and Europe smells of a new war. At the same time, your imports and exports mainly go through seaports. But the Baltic and the Black Sea are two big puddles, all the exits from which Germany and its satellites can clog in no time. The Pacific sea routes will be blocked by another Axis member, Japan.

Thus, the only potentially protected channel for export, for which the Soviet Union receives the gold it desperately needs to complete industrialization, and the import of strategic military materials, remains only the port on the Arctic Ocean, Murmansk, one of the few year-round ice-free harbors in the USSR. The only railway to which, suddenly, in some places passes through rugged deserted terrain just a few tens of kilometers from the border (when this railway was laid, back under the Tsar, no one could have imagined that the Finns and Russians would fight on opposite sides barricades). Moreover, at a distance of a three-day journey from this border there is another strategic transport artery, the White Sea-Baltic Canal.

But that’s another half of the geographic troubles. Leningrad, the cradle of the revolution, which concentrated a third of the country's military-industrial potential, is within the radius of one forced march of a potential enemy. A metropolis, whose streets have never been hit by an enemy shell before, can be fired upon from heavy guns from day one probable war. Baltic Fleet ships are losing their only base. And there are no natural defensive lines, right up to the Neva.

friend of your enemy

Today, wise and calm Finns can only attack someone in an anecdote. But three quarters of a century ago, when, on the wings of independence gained much later than other European nations, accelerated national building continued in Suomi, you would have had no time for jokes.

In 1918, Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim uttered the well-known “oath of the sword,” publicly promising to annex Eastern (Russian) Karelia. At the end of the thirties, Gustav Karlovich (as he was called during his service in the Russian Imperial Army, where the path of the future field marshal began) is the most influential person in the country.

Of course, Finland did not intend to attack the USSR. I mean, she wasn't going to do this alone. The young state's ties with Germany were, perhaps, even stronger than with the countries of its native Scandinavia. In 1918, when the newly independent country was in intense debate about the form government structure, by decision of the Finnish Senate, Emperor Wilhelm's brother-in-law, Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse, was declared King of Finland; By various reasons Nothing came of the Suoma monarchist project, but the choice of personnel is very indicative. Further, the very victory of the “Finnish White Guard” (as the northern neighbors were called in Soviet newspapers) in the internal civil war of 1918 was also largely, if not completely, due to the participation of the expeditionary force sent by the Kaiser (numbering up to 15 thousand people, despite the fact that total local “reds” and “whites”, who were significantly inferior to the Germans in terms of fighting qualities, did not exceed 100 thousand people).

Cooperation with the Third Reich developed no less successfully than with the Second. Kriegsmarine ships freely entered Finnish skerries; German stations in the area of ​​Turku, Helsinki and Rovaniemi were engaged in radio reconnaissance; from the second half of the thirties, the airfields of the “Land of a Thousand Lakes” were modernized to accept heavy bombers, which Mannerheim did not even have in the project... It should be said that subsequently Germany, already in the first hours of the war with the USSR (which Finland officially joined only on June 25, 1941 ) actually used the territory and waters of Suomi to lay mines in the Gulf of Finland and bombard Leningrad.

Yes, at that time the idea of ​​​​attacking the Russians did not seem so crazy. The Soviet Union of 1939 did not look like a formidable adversary at all. The asset includes the successful (for Helsinki) First Soviet-Finnish War. The brutal defeat of the Red Army soldiers from Poland during the Western Campaign in 1920. Of course, one can recall the successful repulsion of Japanese aggression on Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, but, firstly, these were local clashes far from the European theater, and, secondly, the qualities of the Japanese infantry were assessed very low. And thirdly, the Red Army, as Western analysts believed, was weakened by the repressions of 1937. Of course, the human and economic resources of the empire and its former province are incomparable. But Mannerheim, unlike Hitler, did not intend to go to the Volga to bomb the Urals. Karelia alone was enough for the field marshal.

Negotiation

Stalin was anything but a fool. If to improve the strategic situation it is necessary to move the border away from Leningrad, so it should be. Another question is that the goal cannot necessarily be achieved only by military means. Although, honestly, right now, in the fall of ’39, when the Germans are ready to grapple with the hated Gauls and Anglo-Saxons, I want to quietly solve my little problem with the “Finnish White Guard” - not out of revenge for an old defeat, no, in politics following emotions leads to imminent death - and to test what the Red Army is capable of in a battle with a real enemy, small in number, but trained by the European military school; in the end, if the Laplanders can be defeated, as our General Staff plans, in two weeks, Hitler will think a hundred times before attacking us...

But Stalin would not have been Stalin if he had not tried to settle the issue amicably, if such a word is appropriate for a person of his character. Since 1938, the negotiations in Helsinki had been neither shaky nor slow; in the fall of 1939 they were moved to Moscow. In exchange for the Leningrad underbelly, the Soviets offered twice the area north of Ladoga. Germany, through diplomatic channels, recommended that the Finnish delegation agree. But they did not make any concessions (perhaps, as she transparently hinted Soviet press, at the suggestion of the “Western partners”) and on November 13 they left for home. There are two weeks left until the Winter War.

On November 26, 1939, near the village of Mainila on the Soviet-Finnish border, the positions of the Red Army came under artillery fire. The diplomats exchanged notes of protest; According to the Soviet side, about a dozen soldiers and commanders were killed and wounded. Was the Maynila incident a deliberate provocation (as evidenced, for example, by the absence name list casualties), or one of the thousands of armed men who had been standing tensely for long days opposite the same armed enemy finally lost their nerve - in any case, this incident served as the reason for the outbreak of hostilities.

The Winter Campaign began, where there was a heroic breakthrough of the seemingly indestructible “Mannerheim Line”, and a belated understanding of the role of snipers in modern warfare, and the first use of the KV-1 tank - but for a long time they did not like to remember all this. The losses turned out to be too disproportionate, and the damage to the international reputation of the USSR was severe.

Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940 or, as they say in Finland, the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union is one of the most significant episodes of the Second World War. Timo Vihavainen, a professor of Russian studies at the University of Helsinki, shares his point of view on this issue.

The battles of the Soviet-Finnish War, which lasted 105 days, were very bloody and intense. The Soviet side lost more than 126,000 people killed and missing, and 246,000 wounded and shell-shocked. If we add to these figures Finnish losses, 26,000 and 43,000 respectively, then we can safely say that in terms of its scale, the Winter War became one of the largest battlefields of the Second World War.

It is quite common for many countries to evaluate the past through the prism of what happened, without even considering other options possible development events - that is, history turned out the way it did. As for the Winter War, its course and the peace treaty that ended the fighting were unexpected results of a process that initially, as all parties believed, would lead to completely different consequences.

Background of events

In the fall of 1939, Finland and the Soviet Union negotiated high level on territorial issues, within the framework of which Finland had to transfer to the Soviet Union some areas on the Karelian Isthmus and islands in the Gulf of Finland, as well as lease the city of Hanko. In return, Finland would receive twice the size but less valuable territory in Soviet Karelia.

Negotiations in the fall of 1939 did not lead to results as acceptable to the Soviet Union as happened in the case of the Baltic countries, despite the fact that Finland was ready to make some concessions. For example, the lease of Hanko was considered a violation of Finnish sovereignty and neutrality.

Finland did not agree to territorial concessions, maintaining its neutrality along with Sweden

Earlier, in 1938 and later in the spring of 1939, the Soviet Union had already unofficially recognized the possibility of transferring the islands in the Gulf of Finland, or leasing them. In a democratic country, such as Finland, these concessions were unlikely to be feasible in practice. The transfer of territories would mean the loss of homes for thousands of Finns. No party would probably want to take on political responsibility. There was also fear and antipathy towards the Soviet Union, caused, among other things, by the repressions of 1937-38, during which thousands of Finns were executed. In addition, by the end of 1937, the use of the Finnish language was completely stopped in the Soviet Union. Finnish-language schools and newspapers were closed.

The Soviet Union also hinted that Finland would be unable, or perhaps unwilling, to remain neutral if Germany, now an international troublemaker, violated the Soviet border. Such hints were not understood or accepted in Finland. To ensure neutrality, Finland and Sweden planned to jointly build fortifications on the Åland Islands, which would quite effectively protect the neutrality of the countries from a possible German or Soviet attack. Due to a protest filed by the Soviet Union, Sweden abandoned these plans.

Kuusinen's "People's Government"

After negotiations with the official Finnish government, Risto Ryti, stalled, the Soviet Union formed the so-called "people's government" of Finland. The “People's Government” was headed by the communist Otto Ville Kuusinen, who fled to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union announced its recognition of this government, which provided an excuse not to negotiate with the official government.

The government asked the Soviet Union for “help” in creating the Republic of Finland. During the war, the government's task was to prove that Finland and the Soviet Union were not at war.

Apart from the Soviet Union, no other country recognized the people's government of Kuusinen

The Soviet Union concluded an agreement on territorial concessions with the self-formed “people's government”

Finnish communist Otto Ville Kuusinen fled to Soviet Russia after the civil war of 1918. His government was said to represent the broad masses of the Finnish people and the rebellious military units that had already formed the Finnish “people's army.” Finnish communist party stated in her address that a revolution is underway in Finland, which, at the request of the “people's government,” should be helped by the Red Army. Thus, this is not a war and certainly not an aggression of the Soviet Union against Finland. According to the official position of the Soviet Union, this proves that the Red Army entered Finland not to take away Finnish territories, but to expand them.

On December 2, 1939, Moscow announced to the whole world that it had concluded with “ people's government» agreement on territorial concessions. Under the terms of the agreement, Finland received huge areas in Eastern Karelia, 70,000 square kilometers of old Russian land that never belonged to Finland. For its part, Finland transferred to Russia a small area in the southern part of the Karelian Isthmus, which reaches Koivisto in the west. In addition to this, Finland will transfer some islands in the Gulf of Finland to the Soviet Union and lease the city of Hanko for a very decent amount.

It was not about propaganda, but about a state treaty that was announced and put into effect. They planned to exchange documents on ratification of the treaty in Helsinki.

The cause of the war was the struggle between Germany and the USSR for spheres of influence

After the official Finnish government did not agree to territorial concessions, the Soviet Union began the war by attacking Finland on November 30, 1939, without declaring war, and without any other ultimatums to Finland.

The reason for the attack was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact concluded in 1939, in which Finland was recognized as a territory within the zone of influence of the Soviet Union. The purpose of the attack was to implement the pact on this part.

Finland and Germany in 1939

Finnish foreign policy was cool towards Germany. Relations between the countries were rather unfriendly, which was confirmed by Hitler during the Winter War. In addition, the division of spheres of influence between the Soviet Union and Germany suggests that Germany was not interested in supporting Finland.

Finland sought to remain neutral until the outbreak of the Winter War and for as long after it as possible.

Official Finland did not follow friendly German policies

Finland in 1939 in no way pursued a policy friendly to Germany. The Finnish parliament and government were dominated by a coalition of farmers and social democrats, which relied on an overwhelming majority. The only radical and pro-German party, the IKL, suffered a crushing defeat in the summer elections of 1939. Its representation was reduced from 18 to 8 seats in the 200-seat parliament.

German sympathies in Finland were an old tradition, which was primarily supported by academic circles. At the political level, these sympathies began to melt in the 30s, when Hitler's policy towards small states was widely condemned.

Sure victory?

With a high degree of confidence we can say that in December 1939 the Red Army was the largest and best equipped army in the world. Moscow, confident in the fighting ability of its army, had no reason to expect that Finnish resistance, if any, would last many days.

In addition, it was assumed that the powerful leftist movement in Finland would not want to resist the Red Army, which would enter the country not as an invader, but as an assistant and give Finland additional territories.

In turn, for the Finnish bourgeoisie, the war, from all sides, was extremely undesirable. There was a clear understanding that no help should be expected, at least not from Germany, and the desire and ability of the Western allies to conduct military operations far from their borders raised great doubts.

How did it happen that Finland decided to repel the advance of the Red Army?

How is it possible that Finland dared to repel the Red Army and was able to resist for more than three months? Moreover Finnish army It did not capitulate at any stage and remained in combat capability until the last day of the war. Fighting ended only because the peace treaty came into force.

Moscow, confident in the strength of its army, had no reason to expect that Finnish resistance would last many days. Not to mention that the agreement with the “people's government” of Finland will have to be canceled. Just in case, strike units were concentrated near the borders with Finland, which, after an acceptable waiting period, could quickly defeat the Finns, who were armed primarily with only infantry weapons and light artillery. The Finns had very few tanks and aircraft, and actually had anti-tank weapons only on paper. The Red Army had a numerical superiority and almost a tenfold advantage in technical equipment, including artillery, aviation and armored vehicles.

Therefore, there was no doubt about the final result of the war. Moscow no longer negotiated with the Helsinki government, which was said to have lost support and disappeared in an unknown direction.

For managers in Moscow, the planned outcome was finally decided: a larger Finlyandskaya democratic republic- ally of the Soviet Union. They even managed to publish an article on this topic in the “Concise Political Dictionary” of 1940.

Brave Defense

Why did Finland resort to armed defense, which, soberly assessing the situation, had no chance of success? One explanation is that there were no other options other than surrender. The Soviet Union recognized the puppet government of Kuusinen and ignored the Helsinki government, which was not even presented with any ultimatum demands. In addition, the Finns relied on their military skills and the advantages that the local nature provided for defensive actions.

The successful defense of the Finns is explained both by the high fighting spirit of the Finnish army and by the great shortcomings of the Red Army, in whose ranks, in particular, major purges were carried out in 1937-38. The command of the Red Army troops was carried out unqualified. On top of everything else, she acted poorly military equipment. The Finnish landscape and defensive fortifications turned out to be difficult to pass, and the Finns learned to effectively disable enemy tanks using Molotov cocktails and throwing explosives. This, of course, added even more courage and bravery.

Spirit of the Winter War

In Finland, the concept of the “spirit of the Winter War” has been established, which is understood as unanimity and the willingness to sacrifice oneself for the defense of the Motherland.

Research supports claims that already in Finland on the eve of the Winter War there was a prevailing consensus that the country must be defended in the event of aggression. Despite heavy losses, this spirit remained until the end of the war. Almost everyone, including the communists, was imbued with the “spirit of the Winter War.” The question arises as to how this became possible when the country went through a bloody civil war in 1918 - just two decades ago - in which the right fought against the left. People were executed en masse even after the main battles had ended. Then at the head of the victorious White Guard was Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim, a native of Finland, former lieutenant general Russian army, who was now leading Finnish soldiers against the Red Army.

The fact that Finland decided on armed resistance at all, purposefully and with the support of the broad masses, quite likely came as a surprise to Moscow. And for Helsinki too. The “Spirit of the Winter War” is not a myth at all, and its origins require explanation.

An important reason for the appearance of the “Spirit of the Winter War” was the deceitful Soviet propaganda. In Finland, they treated Soviet newspapers with irony, which wrote that the Finnish border was “threateningly” close to Leningrad. Just as absolutely incredible were the allegations that the Finns were staging provocations on the border, shelling the territory of the Soviet Union and thereby starting a war. Well, when, after such a provocation, the Soviet Union broke the non-aggression treaty, which Moscow did not have the right to do under the treaty, distrust grew more than before.

According to some estimates of the time, confidence in the Soviet Union was largely undermined by the formation of the Kuusinen government and the vast territories it received as a gift. Although they assured that Finland would remain independent, Finland itself had no special illusions about the veracity of such assurances. Trust in the Soviet Union fell further after urban bombings that destroyed hundreds of buildings and killed hundreds of people. The Soviet Union categorically denied the bombings, although the people of Finland witnessed them with their own eyes.

The repressions of the 1930s in the Soviet Union were fresh in my memory. For the Finnish communists, the most offensive thing was to observe the development of close cooperation between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, which began after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

World

The result of the Winter War is well known. According to the peace treaty concluded in Moscow on March 12, Finland's eastern border moved to where it remains today. 430,000 Finns lost their homes. For the Soviet Union, the increase in territory was insignificant. For Finland, the territorial losses were enormous.

The prolongation of the war became the primary prerequisite for the peace agreement concluded in Moscow on March 12, 1940 between the Soviet Union and the bourgeois government of Finland. The Finnish army put up desperate resistance, which made it possible to stop the enemy advance in all 14 directions. Further prolongation of the conflict threatened the Soviet Union with severe international consequences. The League of Nations on December 16 deprived the Soviet Union of membership, and England and France began negotiating with Finland on the provision of military assistance, which was supposed to arrive in Finland through Norway and Sweden. This could lead to a full-scale war between the Soviet Union and the Western allies, who, among other things, were preparing to bomb oil fields in Baku from Turkey.

Difficult truce conditions were accepted due to desperation

It was not easy for the Soviet government, which had entered into an agreement with the Kuusinen government, to re-recognize the Helsinki government and conclude a peace treaty with it. Peace, however, was concluded and conditions for Finland were very difficult. Finland's territorial concessions were many times greater than those negotiated in 1939. The signing of the peace agreement was a bitter ordeal. When the terms of peace were made public, people cried in the streets and flags were lowered in mourning over their houses. The Finnish government, however, agreed to sign a difficult and intolerable “dictated peace” because the situation militarily was very dangerous. Promised Western countries the amount of assistance was insignificant, and it was clear that from a military point of view it could not play a decisive role.

Winter War and its aftermath hard world are some of the most tragic periods in Finnish history. These events leave their mark on the interpretation of Finnish history in a broader perspective. The fact that this was an unprovoked aggression, which was carried out vilely and without a declaration of war by its eastern neighbor, and which led to the rejection of the historical Finnish province, remained a heavy burden in the Finnish consciousness.

Having put up military resistance, the Finns lost a large territory and tens of thousands of people, but retained their independence. This is the difficult image of the Winter War, which resonates with pain in the Finnish consciousness. Another option was to submit to Kuusinen's government and expand the territories. For the Finns, however, this was tantamount to submission to the Stalinist dictatorship. It is obvious that, despite all the officiality of the territorial gift, it was not taken seriously at any level in Finland. In today's Finland, if they remember that state treaty, it is only that it was one of the insidious, lying plans that the Stalinist leadership was in the habit of proposing.

The Winter War gave birth to the Continuation War (1941-1945)

As a direct consequence of the Winter War, Finland joined Germany in attacking the Soviet Union in 1941. Before the Winter War, Finland adhered to the Northern European policy of neutrality, which it tried to continue after the end of the war. However, after the Soviet Union prevented this, there were two options left: an alliance with Germany, or with the Soviet Union. The latter option enjoyed very little support in Finland.

Text: Timo Vihavainen, Professor of Russian Studies, University of Helsinki

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 became Russian Federation quite a popular topic. All authors who love to walk through the “totalitarian past” love to remember this war, remember the balance of forces, losses, failures initial period war.

Reasonable reasons for the war are denied or hushed up. The decision about war is often blamed on Comrade Stalin personally. As a result, many of the citizens of the Russian Federation who have even heard about this war are sure that we lost it, suffered huge losses and showed the whole world the weakness of the Red Army.

Origins of Finnish statehood

The land of the Finns (in Russian chronicles - “Sum”) did not have its own statehood; in the 12th-14th centuries it was conquered by the Swedes. Three attacks were committed on the lands of the Finnish tribes (Sum, Em, Karelians). Crusades- 1157, 1249-1250 and 1293-1300. The Finnish tribes were conquered and forced to convert to Catholicism. The further invasion of the Swedes and crusaders was stopped by the Novgorodians, who inflicted several defeats on them. In 1323, the Orekhovsky Peace was concluded between the Swedes and Novgorodians.

The lands were ruled by Swedish feudal lords, the control centers were castles (Abo, Vyborg and Tavastgus). The Swedes had all administrative and judicial power. The official language was Swedish, the Finns did not even have cultural autonomy. Swedish was spoken by the nobility and the entire educated layer of the population, Finnish was the language of ordinary people. The church, the Abo episcopate, had great power, but paganism retained its position among the common people for quite a long time.

In 1577, Finland received the status of a Grand Duchy and received a coat of arms with a lion. Gradually, the Finnish nobility merged with the Swedish one.

In 1808, the Russian-Swedish war began, the reason was Sweden’s refusal to act together with Russia and France against England; Russia won. According to the Friedrichsham Peace Treaty of September 1809, Finland became the property of the Russian Empire.

For a little over a hundred years Russian empire turned the Swedish province into a practically autonomous state with its own authorities, monetary unit, mail, customs and even the army. Since 1863, Finnish, along with Swedish, became the state language. All administrative posts, except for the governor-general, were occupied by local residents. All taxes collected in Finland remained there; St. Petersburg almost did not interfere in the internal affairs of the grand duchy. Migration of Russians to the principality was prohibited, the rights of Russians living there were limited, and Russification of the province was not carried out.

In 1811, the principality was given the Russian Vyborg province, which was formed from lands transferred to Russia under the treaties of 1721 and 1743. Then the administrative border with Finland approached the capital of the empire. In 1906, by decree of the Russian Emperor, Finnish women, the first in all of Europe, received the right to vote. The Finnish intelligentsia, nurtured by Russia, did not remain in debt and wanted independence.

Beginning of independence

On December 6, 1917, the Sejm (Finnish Parliament) declared independence, and on December 31, 1917, the Soviet government recognized the independence of Finland.

On January 15 (28), 1918, a revolution began in Finland, which grew into civil war. The White Finns called for help German troops. The Germans did not refuse; in early April they landed a 12,000-strong division on the Hanko Peninsula (“ Baltic Division") under the command of General von der Goltz. Another detachment of 3 thousand people was sent on April 7. With their support, the supporters of Red Finland were defeated, on the 14th the Germans occupied Helsinki, on April 29th Vyborg fell, and in early May the Reds were completely defeated. The Whites carried out massive repressions: more than 8 thousand people were killed, about 12 thousand rotted in concentration camps, approximately 90 thousand people were arrested and imprisoned in prisons and camps. Genocide was unleashed against the Russian inhabitants of Finland, they killed everyone indiscriminately: officers, students, women, old people, children.

Berlin demanded that a German prince, Frederick Charles of Hesse, be placed on the throne; on October 9, the Diet elected him King of Finland. But Germany was defeated in the First World War and therefore Finland became a republic.

The first two Soviet-Finnish wars

Independence was not enough, the Finnish elite wanted an increase in territory, having decided to take advantage of the Troubles in Russia, Finland attacked Russia. Karl Mannerheim promised to annex Eastern Karelia. On March 15, the so-called “Wallenius plan” was approved, according to which the Finns wanted to seize Russian lands along the border: the White Sea - Lake Onega - the Svir River - Lake Ladoga, in addition, the Pechenga region was to go to Suomi, Kola Peninsula, Petrograd was supposed to become a “free city”. On the same day, volunteer detachments received orders to begin the conquest of Eastern Karelia.

On May 15, 1918, Helsinki declared war on Russia; there were no active hostilities until the fall; Germany concluded the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty with the Bolsheviks. But after its defeat, the situation changed; on October 15, 1918, the Finns captured the Rebolsk region, and in January 1919, the Porosozero region. In April, the Olonets Volunteer Army launched an offensive, captured Olonets, and approached Petrozavodsk. During the Vidlitsa operation (June 27-July 8), the Finns were defeated and expelled from Soviet soil. In the fall of 1919, the Finns repeated their attack on Petrozavodsk, but were repulsed at the end of September. In July 1920, the Finns suffered several more defeats, and negotiations began.

In mid-October 1920, the Yuriev (Tartu) Peace Treaty was signed, Soviet Russia ceded the Pechenga-Petsamo region, Western Karelia to the Sestra River, the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula and most Middle Peninsula.

But this was not enough for the Finns; the “Greater Finland” plan was not implemented. The second war was unleashed, it began with the formation in October 1921 on the territory of Soviet Karelia partisan detachments, on November 6, Finnish volunteer detachments invaded Russian territory. By mid-February 1922, Soviet troops liberated the occupied territories, and on March 21 an agreement on the inviolability of borders was signed.

Svinhuvud, Per Evind, 3rd President of Finland, March 2, 1931 - March 1, 1937

Helsinki did not give up hopes of profiting from Soviet territories. But after two wars, they made conclusions for themselves: they need to act not with volunteer detachments, but with an entire army (Soviet Russia has become stronger) and allies are needed. As the first Prime Minister of Finland, Svinhuvud, put it: “Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland.”

With the deterioration of Soviet-Japanese relations, Finland began to establish contacts with Japan. Japanese officers began to come to Finland for internships. Helsinki had a negative attitude towards the USSR's entry into the League of Nations and the mutual assistance agreement with France. Hopes for a major conflict between the USSR and Japan did not materialize.

Finland's hostility and its readiness for war against the USSR was no secret either in Warsaw or in Washington. Thus, in September 1937, the American military attache to the USSR, Colonel F. Faymonville, reported: “The most pressing military problem of the Soviet Union is preparing to repel a simultaneous attack by Japan in the East and Germany together with Finland in the West.”

There were constant provocations on the border between the USSR and Finland. For example: on October 7, 1936, a Soviet border guard making a round was killed by a shot from the Finnish side. Only after much wrangling did Helsinki pay compensation to the family of the deceased and admit guilt. Finnish planes violated both land and water borders.

Moscow was especially concerned about cooperation between Finland and Germany. The Finnish public supported Germany's actions in Spain. German designers designed submarines for the Finns. Finland supplied Berlin with nickel and copper, received 20-mm anti-aircraft guns, and planned to purchase combat aircraft. In 1939, a German intelligence and counterintelligence center was created on the territory of Finland, its main task there was intelligence work against the Soviet Union. The center collected information about the Baltic Fleet, the Leningrad Military District, and Leningrad industry. Finnish intelligence worked closely with the Abwehr. During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 identification mark The Finnish Air Force now has a blue swastika.

By the beginning of 1939, with the help of German specialists, a network of military airfields was built in Finland, which could accommodate 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force had.

Helsinki was ready to fight against the USSR not only in alliance with Germany, but also with France and England.

The problem of defending Leningrad

By 1939, we had an absolutely hostile state on our northwestern borders. There was a problem of protecting Leningrad, the border was only 32 km away, the Finns could fire at the city heavy artillery. In addition, it was necessary to protect the city from the sea.

In the south, the problem was solved by concluding a mutual assistance agreement with Estonia in September 1939. The USSR received the right to station garrisons and naval bases on the territory of Estonia.

Helsinki did not want to resolve the most important issue for the USSR through diplomatic means. Moscow proposed an exchange of territories, a mutual assistance agreement, joint defense of the Gulf of Finland, selling part of the territory for military base or rent out. But Helsinki did not accept either option. Although the most far-sighted figures, for example, Karl Mannerheim, understood the strategic necessity of Moscow's demands. Mannerheim proposed moving the border away from Leningrad and receiving good compensation, and offering the island of Yussarö for a Soviet naval base. But in the end, the position of not making a compromise prevailed.

It should be noted that London did not stand aside and provoked the conflict in its own way. They hinted to Moscow that they would not interfere in a possible conflict, but the Finns were told that they needed to hold their positions and give in.

As a result, on November 30, 1939, the third Soviet-Finnish war began. The first stage of the war, until the end of December 1939, was unsuccessful; due to a lack of intelligence and insufficient forces, the Red Army suffered significant losses. The enemy was underestimated, the Finnish army mobilized in advance. She occupied the defensive fortifications of the Mannerheim Line.

The new Finnish fortifications (1938-1939) were not known to intelligence, and the required number of forces was not allocated (to successfully break into the fortifications, it was necessary to create a superiority in a ratio of 3: 1).

Western position

The USSR was expelled from the League of Nations, violating the rules: 7 countries out of 15 that were on the Council of the League of Nations spoke in favor of expulsion, 8 did not participate or abstained. That is, they were excluded by a minority of votes.

The Finns were supplied by England, France, Sweden and other countries. More than 11 thousand foreign volunteers arrived in Finland.

London and Paris eventually decided to start a war with the USSR. They planned to land an Anglo-French expeditionary force in Scandinavia. Allied aircraft were to carry out airstrikes against the Union's oil fields in the Caucasus. From Syria, the Allied troops planned to attack Baku.

The Red Army thwarted its large-scale plans, Finland was defeated. Despite the entreaties of the French and British to hold out, on March 12, 1940, the Finns signed peace.

The USSR lost the war?

According to the Moscow Treaty of 1940, the USSR received the Rybachy Peninsula in the north, part of Karelia with Vyborg, the northern Ladoga region, and the Hanko Peninsula was leased to the USSR for a period of 30 years, and a naval base was created there. After the start of the Great Patriotic War The Finnish army was able to reach the old border only in September 1941.

We received these territories without giving up ours (they offered twice as much as they asked for), and for free - they also offered monetary compensation. When the Finns remembered compensation and cited the example of Peter the Great, who gave Sweden 2 million thalers, Molotov replied: “Write a letter to Peter the Great. If he orders, we will pay compensation.” Moscow also insisted on 95 million rubles in compensation for damage to equipment and property from lands seized by the Finns. Plus, 350 sea and river transport, 76 steam locomotives, and 2 thousand carriages were also transferred to the USSR.

The Red Army gained important combat experience and saw its shortcomings.

It was a victory, albeit not a brilliant one, but a victory.

Sources:
Civil war and intervention in the USSR. M., 1987.
Diplomatic Dictionary in three volumes. M., 1986.
Winter War 1939-1940. M., 1998.
Isaev A. Antisuvorov. M., 2004.
international relations(1918-2003). M., 2000.
Meinander H. History of Finland. M., 2008.
Pykhalov I. The Great Slandered War. M., 2006.

The Soviet-Finnish military conflict, which began on November 30, 1939, cannot be considered out of context historical events, which took place in Europe after the Munich Agreement and the German invasion of Poland - on September 1, 1939, the Second World War began.

In an increasingly escalating situation, the Soviet leadership simply could not help but think about the state of its borders, including in the northwestern direction, since Finland was an unconditional military supporter of Nazi Germany. Back in 1935, General Mannerheim visited Berlin, where he held negotiations with Goering and Ribbentrop, which resulted in an agreement to grant Germany the right in the event of war to station its troops on Finnish territory. In exchange, the German side promised Finland Soviet Karelia.

In connection with the agreements reached, as a springboard for future hostilities, the Finns built an impenetrable chain of barrier structures on the Karelian Isthmus, called the “Mannerheim Line”. In Finland itself, the Finnish fascist organization “Lapuan Movement” actively raised its head, whose program included the creation of “Greater Finland”, which included Leningrad and all of Karelia.

Throughout the second half of the 30s, secret contacts between the highest Finnish generals and the Wehrmacht leadership were carried out; in August 1937, Finland hosted a squadron of 11 German submarines, and in 1938, immediate preparations began for the introduction of a German expeditionary force into Finland. By the beginning of 1939, with the help of German specialists, a network of military airfields was built in Finland, capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force had. By the way, their identification mark, as well as tank troops, became a blue swastika. On the Finnish side, on the border with the USSR, all kinds of provocations, including armed ones, were constantly organized on land, in the sky and at sea.

In connection with the current situation and in order to secure the northwestern borders of the USSR, the Soviet leadership began to make attempts to persuade the Finnish government to mutually beneficial cooperation.

On April 7, 1938, the resident of the INO NKVD in Helsinki, Boris Rybkin, also the second secretary of the Soviet embassy in Finland, Yartsev, was urgently summoned to Moscow and received in the Kremlin by Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov. Stalin said that there was a need to start secret negotiations with the Finnish side, the main goal of which should be an agreement on moving the Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus away from Leningrad. It was proposed to interest the Finns by offering to transfer significantly larger territories in exchange, but in a different area. In addition, given that in the central part of Finland almost all the forest has been cut down and wood processing enterprises are idle, the Finns were promised additional supplies of wood from the USSR. Another goal of the negotiations was to conclude a bilateral defense treaty in case Germany attacked the USSR through the territory of Finland. At the same time, the Soviet side will give guarantees of independence and territorial integrity Finland. All upcoming negotiations, Stalin emphasized, must be exclusively secret.

On April 14, 1938, Rybkin arrived in Helsinki, immediately called the Finnish Foreign Ministry and asked to connect him with Foreign Minister Holsti, to whom he approached with a proposal for an immediate meeting, which took place on the same day. On it, Rybkin outlined to the minister everything that Stalin had said and added that if Germany was allowed to unhindered the landing of its troops on the territory of Finland, then the Soviet Union was not going to passively wait for the Germans to arrive in Rajek (now Sestroretsk, 32 km from Leningrad), but would abandon its armed forces deep into Finnish territory, as far as possible, after which battles between German and Soviet troops will take place on Finnish territory. If the Finns resist the German landings, then the USSR will provide Finland with all possible economic and military assistance with the obligation to withdraw its armed forces immediately after the end of the military conflict. Rybkin emphasized the need for special secrecy when considering this issue.

Holsti reported to Prime Minister Cajander about the conversation with Rybkin, but after discussing the situation, they decided to continue negotiations, but take the most wait-and-see approach to them, without promising anything. Rybkin went to Moscow with a report to Stalin, who at that time was satisfied at least with the very fact of starting negotiations with the Finnish side.

Three months later, on July 11, on the initiative of the Finnish side, Rybkin was received by Prime Minister Kajander, but no progress took place in the negotiation process, and, moreover, by entrusting its further management to cabinet member Tanner, the Finnish leadership demonstrated that it was not paying due attention to Soviet proposals, lowering their level and finally choosing delaying tactics.

However, on August 5, 10, 11 and 18, meetings between Rybkin and Tanner took place, during the latter of which the Soviet proposals were finally fleshed out.

1. If the Finnish government does not believe that it can conclude a secret military agreement with the USSR, then Moscow would be satisfied with Finland's written commitment to be ready to repel a possible attack and, for this purpose, to accept Soviet military assistance.

2. Moscow is ready to give consent to the construction of fortifications on the Aland Islands, necessary for the security of both Finland and Leningrad. But on the condition that the USSR will be given the opportunity to take part in their strengthening.

3. As a return favor, Moscow hopes that the Finnish government will allow the USSR to build defensive air and naval bases on the Finnish island of Sur-Sari (Gogland).

If the Finnish side accepts these conditions, the USSR guarantees Finland the inviolability of its borders,, if necessary, will provide it with weapons on favorable terms and is ready to conclude a profitable trade agreement with it that would favor the development of both agriculture and industry.

Tanner reported Soviet proposals Prime Minister Kajader, and he found them unacceptable, which was reported to Rybkin on September 15: the Finnish side itself is not curtailing the secret negotiations, they are even ready to purchase some weapons, but proposals on the Aland Islands and the island of Gogland are rejected without counter-proposals.

Stalin recommended that Rybkin continue the negotiation process, which he did until December 1938, and only when it finally became clear that the positions of the parties were too different, it was decided to recall him to Moscow and continue negotiations at the official level.

Such negotiations with Finland began in Moscow in March 1939. However, the exchange of views was sluggish, the Finnish government was increasingly inclined towards close cooperation with Nazi Germany, and no progress was achieved.

But the aggravation of the situation in Europe in connection with the outbreak of World War II forced the Soviet leadership to again urgently urge the Finnish side to continue negotiations, which began in Moscow on October 12. At them, the Kremlin sharply demanded that Finland fulfill the previously proposed conditions, and, above all, move the border from Leningrad in exchange for another territory. Stalin stated so directly: “We ask that the distance from Leningrad to the border line be 70 km. These are our minimum requirements, and you should not think that we will reduce them. We cannot move Leningrad, so the border line must be moved" ( territorial waters Finland reached almost the outer roadstead of the Leningrad port).

The Finnish government, and above all, President Kallio, who takes an irreconcilably tough pro-German position, hoping for help from Germany, which was secretly supplying the Finns with weapons, instructed their delegation, after its repeated departures and returns, supposedly for consultations in the chosen delaying tactics, to interrupt the negotiations on November 13 finally and leave, rejecting all fundamental Soviet proposals.

And a mutual assistance pact has already been proposed at various stages; rent, purchase or exchange for Soviet territory of islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland; exchange of Finnish territory on the Karelian Isthmus for a significantly larger part Soviet territory in Eastern Karelia near Rebola and Porosozero (5529 sq. km versus 2761 sq. km); establishment of a Soviet air and naval base on the Hanko Peninsula, etc.

But everything is in vain. Even despite the fact that the USSR had already signed a non-aggression pact with Germany and reached agreements on spheres of influence. By the way, when the returning Finnish delegation crossed the border, the Finnish border guards opened fire on the Soviet border guards. After all this, at the military council, Stalin said: “We will have to fight with Finland,” and it was decided to ensure the security of the northwestern borders by force, and therefore, until the end of November, Soviet troops were hastily drawn up to the border.

On November 26 at 15.45, an incident occurred near the border near the village of Maynila with artillery shelling by Soviet troops, as a result of which, according to the official report, 4 Red Army soldiers were killed and 9 were wounded.

On the same day, the Soviet government sent a note of protest to the Finnish side and demanded, in order to prevent future similar incidents, to withdraw its troops from the border line by 20 - 25 km.

In a response note, the Finnish government denied the involvement of Finnish troops in the shelling of Mainila and suggested that “the matter is about an accident that occurred during training exercises on the Soviet side...” As for the withdrawal of troops, the note proposed “to begin negotiations on the issue on mutual withdrawal to a certain distance from the border."

In a new note dated November 28, the Soviet government qualified the Finnish response as “a document reflecting the deep hostility of the Finnish government towards the Soviet Union and designed to bring the crisis in relations between both countries to the extreme.” The note indicated that the proposal for a mutual withdrawal of troops was unacceptable for the USSR, since in this case parts of the Red Army would have to be pulled back to the suburbs of Leningrad, while Soviet troops did not threaten any vital center of Finland. In this regard, the Soviet government "considers itself free from the obligations assumed by virtue of the non-aggression pact..."

On the evening of November 29, the Finnish envoy in Moscow Irie Koskinen was summoned to the NKID, where Deputy People's Commissar V. Potemkin handed him a new note. It said that in view of the current situation, for which responsibility falls entirely on the Finnish government, “the USSR government came to the conclusion that it could no longer maintain normal relations with the Finnish government and therefore recognized the need to immediately recall its political and economic representatives from Finland.” This was a break in diplomatic relations, which meant the penultimate step separating peace from war.

Early the next morning the last step was taken. As stated in the official statement, “by order of the High Command of the Red Army, in view of new armed provocations on the part of the Finnish military, troops of the Leningrad Military District crossed the border of Finland at 8 a.m. on November 30 on the Karelian Isthmus and in a number of other areas.”

The war began, later called the Winter War, which at that moment promised to be uncomplicated and end in two to three weeks. But due to underestimation of the enemy, who managed to increase the size of his armed forces from 37 to 337 thousand, his own insufficient combat readiness, excessive illusions about the “class solidarity of the Finnish workers,” who would almost come out with flowers to greet the soldiers of the Red Army, the war lasted 105 days , can hardly be considered completely successful for the Soviet side, and ended only on March 12, 1940 with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty.

In general, along the entire front, 425 thousand Red Army soldiers acted against 265 thousand Finnish military personnel; on the impregnable “Mannerheim Line” on the Karelian Isthmus, 169 thousand Red Army soldiers acted against 130 thousand Finns.

Finnish casualties in the war: 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. Our losses are significantly greater: 126,875 Red Army soldiers were killed, died or went missing.

As a result of the war, the Soviet Union acquired about 40 thousand square meters without any compensating exchange. km of Finnish territories (and it was proposed to give 5529 sq. km in exchange for only 2761 sq. km), including a naval base on the Hanko Peninsula. As a result, after the start of the Great Patriotic War Finnish troops were able to reach the old line state border only by September 1941

The USSR also demanded an amount of 95 million rubles. as compensation, Finland had to transfer 350 sea and river Vehicle, 76 locomotives, 2 thousand carriages and cars.

And it is very important that the Soviet troops acquired invaluable combat experience, and the command of the Red Army received reason to think about shortcomings in troop training and urgent measures to increase the combat effectiveness of the army and navy. There was already a little over a year left until June 22, 1941, and Stalin knew about it.

Finland was included in the Soviet sphere of influence by secret protocols to the 1939 Soviet-German non-aggression pact. But, unlike other Baltic countries, it refused to make serious concessions to the USSR. The Soviet leadership demanded that the border be moved away from Leningrad, since it ran 32 km from " northern capital" In exchange, the USSR offered larger and less valuable territories of Karelia. Referring to the threat to Leningrad in the event of aggression from a potential enemy through the territory of Finland during the Second World War, the USSR also demanded the rights to lease the islands (primarily Hanko) to create a military base.

The Finnish leadership, led by Prime Minister A. Kajander and the head of the Defense Council K. Mannerheim (in his honor, the Finnish line of fortifications became known as the “Mannerheim Line”), in response to Soviet demands, decided to play for time. Finland was ready to slightly adjust the border so as not to affect the Mannerheim Line. From October 12 to November 13, negotiations were held in Moscow with Finnish ministers V. Tanner and J. Paasikivi, but they reached a dead end.

On November 26, 1939, on the Soviet-Finnish border, in the area of ​​the Soviet border point Mainila, a provocative shelling of Soviet positions was carried out from the Soviet side, which was used by the USSR as a pretext for an attack. On November 30, Soviet troops invaded Finland in five main directions. In the north, the Soviet 104th Division occupied the Petsamo area. South of the Kandalaksha area, the 177th division moved to Kemi. Even further south, the 9th Army was advancing on Oulu (Uleaborg). By occupying these two ports in the Gulf of Bothnia, the Soviet army would have cut Finland in two. North of Ladoga, the 8th army advanced to the rear of the Mannerheim line. And finally, on the main direction 7, the army was supposed to break through the Mannerheim Line and enter Helsinki. Finland was to be defeated in two weeks.

On December 6-12, troops of the 7th Army under the command of K. Meretskov reached the Mannerheim Line, but were unable to take it. On December 17-21, Soviet troops stormed the line, but unsuccessfully.

An attempt to bypass the line north of Lake Ladoga and through Karelia failed. The Finns knew this territory better, moved faster and were better camouflaged among the hills and lakes. Soviet divisions moved in columns along the few roads suitable for the passage of equipment. The Finns, bypassing the Soviet columns from the flanks, cut them in several places. This is how several Soviet divisions were defeated. As a result of the battles between December and January, the forces of several divisions were surrounded. The most severe defeat was the 9th Army near Suomussalmi on December 27 - January 7, when two divisions were defeated at once.

Frosts hit, snow covered the Karelian Isthmus. Soviet soldiers died from cold and frostbite, since the units arriving in Karelia were not sufficiently provided with warm uniforms - they did not prepare for the winter war, counting on a quick victory.

Volunteers of various views went to the country - from social democrats to right-wing anti-communists. Great Britain and France supported Finland with weapons and food.

On December 14, 1939, the League of Nations declared the USSR an aggressor and expelled it from its membership. In January 1940, Stalin decided to return to modest tasks - not to take all of Finland, but to move the border away from Leningrad and establish control over the Gulf of Finland.

The Northwestern Front under the command of S. Timoshenko broke through the Mannerheim Line on February 13-19. On March 12, Soviet troops broke into Vyborg. This meant that Helsinki could fall in a few days. The number of Soviet troops was increased to 760 thousand people. Finland was forced to accept the conditions of the USSR, and they became stricter. Now the USSR demanded that the border be drawn near the line determined by the Treaty of Nystad in 1721, including the transfer of Vyborg and the Ladoga coast to the USSR. The USSR did not withdraw its demand for the lease of Hanko. A peace agreement on these terms was concluded in Moscow on the night of March 13, 1940.

The irretrievable losses of the Soviet army in the war amounted to more than 126 thousand people, and the Finns - more than 22 thousand (not counting those who died from wounds and diseases). Finland retained its independence.

Sources:

On both sides of the Karelian Front, 1941-1944: Documents and materials. Petrozavodsk, 1995;

Secrets and lessons of the Winter War, 1939-1940: According to documents from declassified archives. St. Petersburg, 2000.