And the Ottomans and Selims are Crimean partisans. Ismail Gasprinsky adyna kyrymtatar jumhuriet kutyuphanesi

Partisan movement in Crimea

Partisan and underground movement in Crimea

In the autumn of 1941, a resistance movement unfolded on the territory of Crimea, which became a response to the terror of the invaders. On October 23, by decision of the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement in Crimea (TSSHPD) was formed, and A.V. was appointed commander of the partisan movement. Mokrousov. This choice was not random. During the Civil War, Mokrousov already led the Crimean partisans. S.V. became the commissioner of the TsSHPD. Martynov - Secretary of the Simferopol City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The creation of partisan detachments began. For the convenience of operations, all detachments were distributed among partisan areas. In total, five such districts were created1. On October 30, 1941, the commander of the partisan movement, Mokrousov, issued his first order, which referred to the deployment of combat activities on enemy communications.

The unbending courage of the Soviet people manifested itself in the fight against fascism during the Great Patriotic War in Crimea. The Crimean partisans fought heroically against the Nazi invaders, demonstrating selfless devotion to their socialist Motherland.
The organizers of the partisan and underground struggle were the Crimean regional committee, city committees and district committees of the party, which, following the instructions of the Central Committee, did a great job of forming partisan detachments and underground groups. By the beginning of November 1941, 29 partisan detachments were created on the peninsula. The bureau of the Crimean regional party committee appointed a participant in the civil war as commander of the partisan movement A. V. Mokrousova, Commissioner - Secretary of the Simferopol City Party Committee S. V. Martynova. Partisan detachments were led by secretaries of city and district committees of the party, party, Soviet and Komsomol workers , N. D. Lugovoi, V. I. Nikanorov, V. I. Filippov, V. I. Cherny; business leaders M. A. Makedonsky and M. I. Chub; commanders of the Red Army D. I. Averkin, B. B. Gorodovikov, G. L. Seversky, F. I. Fedorenko and others.

The Biyuk-Onlar, Zuy, Ichkin, Karasubazar, Starokrymsky district party committees remained in the enemy rear almost at full strength.
In November 1941, soldiers, commanders and political workers of those units who, covering the retreat, joined the ranks of the partisans Soviet troops to Sevastopol, ended up in the rear of the Nazis. These were mainly fighters and officers of the 184th Rifle and 48th Separate Cavalry Divisions, units of the Marine Corps.
The territory of deployment of partisan detachments was divided into five districts. Their chiefs were A. A. Satsyuk (1st district - Old Crimean forests), I. G. Genov (2nd district - Zuysky and Belogorsk forests), G. L. Seversky (3rd district - forests of the state reserve), I. M. Bortnikov (4th district - the vicinity of Yalta), V. V. Krasnikov (5th district - the vicinity of Sevastopol). Partisan detachments were also based in the Kerch region, in the Adzhimushkay and Starokarantinsky quarries. It was essentially the 6th district, which was headed by I. I. Pakhomov. The general leadership of the detachments was carried out by the headquarters of the partisan movement in the Crimea, headed by A.V. Mokrousov.
From the first days of the occupation, the Crimean partisans launched active hostilities. When there were battles near Sevastopol and on the Kerch Peninsula, they provided all possible assistance to the units of the Red Army. Committing sabotage on highways and railways, attacking enemy garrisons, collecting intelligence data, brought victory closer.
During the first period of the partisan struggle, which ended with the end of the heroic defense of Sevastopol, the units of the people's avengers destroyed over 12,000 enemy soldiers and officers.
In the summer of 1942, when the Nazis completely occupied the Crimea, the position of the partisans became much more difficult. Given the important strategic importance of the peninsula, the Nazi command concentrated large military forces here. Enemy garrisons stood in almost every settlement. Actively cooperated with the occupiers in their repeated attempts
destroy partisan detachments, local nationalist elements and other renegades. But even when the peninsula became a deep rear, the Nazis failed to extinguish the flames. people's war. Part of the partisans, by decision of the regional party committee, was transferred to cities and villages - to help the underground. Those who remained in the forests continued subversive work on enemy communications.
By the autumn of 1943, the number of fighters in partisan detachments had increased significantly. Villagers, underground workers, prisoners of war, liberated by patriots from concentration camps, went to the forest. In this, the third, period of the partisan movement in the Crimean forests, there were 33 detachments, united in 7 brigades. On January 15, 1944, the number of Crimean partisans was 3733 people: Russians - 1944 (52%), Crimean Tatars - 598 (16%), Ukrainians - 348 (9%), Georgians - 134 (3.6%), Armenians - 69 (1.8%).
At a new stage in the struggle against the occupiers, which was taking on an ever wider scope, a decision was made in Moscow to create the Crimean headquarters of the partisan movement.
The general management of the activities of partisans and underground workers was carried out by the regional underground center, which from August 1943 was headed by the secretary of the Crimean Regional Party Committee P. R. Yampolsky. In November, he informed the chief of staff of the partisan movement, the first secretary of the regional party committee, V.S. goes..."
During this period, the partisans defeated large enemy garrisons in Zuya, in the villages of Sorokino, Tsvetochnoy, Generalskoye, Monetnoy, Golubinka. Combat operations were constantly carried out on the railways. On the night of September 9-10, 1943, sabotage groups simultaneously blew up the rails in several sections and derailed the enemy train. As a result, traffic on the railways of Crimea stopped for five days.
Great assistance to the Crimean partisans was provided by the Military Council of the North Caucasian Front and the command of the Separate Primorsky Army. Ammunition, food, medicines were regularly delivered to the forest. A group of combat commanders of the Red Army was sent to command positions in the detachments.
At the beginning of 1944, three partisan formations were formed in the Crimea; The North was headed by P. R. Yampolsky, the South - by M. A. Makedonsky, the East - by V. S. Kuznetsov.
Winter and spring of 1944 - the period of the most active hostilities of the Crimean partisans. In total, during the war years, the patriots destroyed and captured over 33,000 enemy soldiers and officers, destroyed 79 military echelons, 2 armored trains, dozens of fuel and ammunition depots, blew up 3 railway bridges, captured a lot of trophies.
During the preparation of the Crimean offensive operation, detachments of the Northern Formation controlled the advance of the enemy along the roads Simferopol - Alushta and Simferopol - Belogorsk. The southern connection operated in the Yalta region, on the Simferopol-Bakhchisaray-Sevastopol highway. And in the April days of 1944, the partisans, together with the Soviet troops, took part in the liberation of Simferopol, Yalta, Bakhchisaray, Belogorsk, Zuya and others settlements peninsulas.
From the very beginning of the German occupation of the Crimea, in the autumn of 1941, many residents of Simeiz went to the mountains and became members of the Yalta partisan detachment. In the autumn of 1942, several landings were made by sailors of the Black Sea Fleet. Many residents of the village died at the hands of the invaders, who practiced reprisals against civilians in response to partisan attacks. The Red Army liberated Simeiz on April 16, 1944. In May 1943 in Simeiz organized an underground patriotic group led by G S. Leonenko. Its members included V. M. Devisheva, L. A. Ermakov and others (Crimean Regional Party Archive, f. 1, op. 24, d. 375, ll. 61, 62.). They delivered the Krasny Krym newspaper and partisan leaflets and distributed them among the population. Having obtained a radio receiver, the patriots received reports from the Sovinformburo and rewrote them. From the underground, the inhabitants of the village learned about the situation on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. Members of the underground maintained close ties with the partisans, carried out their tasks until the arrival of the Red Army.
Liberation from fascist slavery brought the workers of Crimea spring 1944. On April 16, troops of the 16th Rifle Corps of the Separate Primorsky Army under the command of Major General K. I. Provalov and the 26th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 19th tank corps under the command of Colonel A.P. Khrapovitsky. The rapid offensive of the Soviet troops and the coordinated actions of the partisans deprived the enemy of the opportunity to completely destroy the village. On the main avenue of Simeiz, where the population met the liberators, red banners were hung out, saved by pioneer L. Ermakov (now L. A. Ermakov works as a doctor in Simeiz). Among the many residents of Simeiz who bravely fought against the hated enemy at the front, an artillery Guards Sergeant N. T. Vasilchenko was awarded the title of Hero Soviet Union. The scientist-astronomer Simeiz I. G. Moiseev passed the battle path. He courageously fought against the enemy in the partisan detachments of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, participated in the Slovak uprising of 1944, fought for the liberation of Czechoslovakia. In November 1967, a monument to 15 Simeiz residents who died in the Great Patriotic War was erected in the center of the village. The underground workers made a considerable contribution to the fight against the Nazi occupiers. They conducted political propaganda work among the population. They carried out acts of sabotage, passed intelligence information about the location and actions of enemy troops to the partisans and the command of the Red Army.
From October to December 1941, the activities of underground patriotic groups were directed by an underground center created by decision of the Bureau of the Crimean Regional Committee, headed by I. A. Kozlov, an experienced conspirator, member of the party since 1905.
The underground center was in Kerch; after the city was liberated by paratroopers in early 1942, it was legalized. In April 1942, authorized by clandestine affairs I. G. Genov was appointed to the Crimean regional party committee, and in October 1942 a regional underground party center was created, which included I. G. Genov and N. D. Lugovoi. From August 1943, the work of underground patriotic groups was organized and directed by the underground party center headed by P. R. Yampolsky. It included E. P. Stepanov, E. P. Kolodyazhny, N. D. Lugovoi and others. A total of 220 underground organizations operated in Crimea during the period of temporary occupation. There were over 2500 people in their ranks.
The motherland highly appreciated the exploits of the Crimean partisans and underground fighters. On April 13, Simferopol was liberated. After the liberation of the entire Crimea, the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Vasilevsky signed a submission for conferring the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on the most famous partisan commanders: A. Vakhtin, N. Dementiev, G. Gruzinov, V. Kuznetsov, M. Makedonsky, F. Fedorenko. Over 3,000 patriots have received government awards. The Order of Lenin was awarded to A. A. Voloshinova, N. M. Listovnichaya, A. F. Zyabrev, V. K. Efremov, P. D. Silnikov, N. I. Tereshchenko (all posthumously), V. I. Babiy, A N. Kosukhim, V. I. Nikanorov, G. L. Seversky, M. I. Chub and others. The head of the Sevastopol underground organization, V. D. Revyakin, was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Bedin Ivan Stepanovich, For participation in the partisan movement in the Crimea, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, medals "Partisan of the Patriotic War", "For the Defense of Sevastopol ». Motyakhin Ivan Ermolaevich For participation in the partisan movement in the Crimea, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Order of the Red Star: Barybkina Feodora Evdokimovna, Grishko Mikhail Davidovich, Leonova Galina Ivanovna, Leonov Fedor Konstantinovich, Pshenichny Dmitry Mikhailovich, Podtochilina Lidia Andreevna, Zhigarev Vladimir Semenovich, Yarmola Evgeny Petrovich, Tyuterev Kuzma Romanovich.
Chub Mikhail Ilyich, partisan commander. For participation in the partisan movement in Crimea, he was awarded the Order of Lenin . Tyuterev Kuzma Romanovich. For participation in the partisan movement in the Crimea, he was awarded the medal "Partisan of the Patriotic War" II degree, the Order of the Badge of Honor in September 1943 and the Order of the Red Star in July 1944.
The last award was made by order of the head of the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement No. 435 already on 07/25/46. In accordance with this order, the medal "Partisan of the Patriotic War" was awarded to another one hundred and forty-five former Crimean partisans.
Working with archival documents, the author identified a kind of "partisan guard": thirty-seven people who had four government awards. Even with a cursory study of the list, it is striking that it does not include such legendary personalities as Fedorenko, Sermul, Kadyev, Muratov ...
This is explained by the fact that the first two went to the front, the other two ended up in deportation, and therefore the subsequent awards did not touch them.
Considering the fact that the medal "For the Defense of Sevastopol" by its status is awarded not for
a manifestation of personal courage, but to the entire composition of the army, aviation and navy units that took part in the defense of the city. The medal "Partisan of the Patriotic War" de facto also acquired a similar status, we can draw a sad conclusion that fifty-six of the best of the best Crimean partisans, those who went through the whole epic from November 1941 to April 1944 were awarded only one or two combat awards each. Of this glorious cohort, only one of them is alive today - the former commander of the 6th partisan detachment of the Southern Force, Nikolai Dementyev, who was nominated for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and undeservedly did not receive it. I want to believe that the awards will still find their heroes.

Monument to the Yalta partisans installed on Ai-Petri
Mass grave of partisans of the Yalta detachment who died in battle with the Germans on December 13, 1941.
The inscription on the monument reads: "To the people's avengers-partisans of Crimea who gave their lives in the fight against the fascist invaders in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945."
Monument to partisans and underground workers of Crimea
On May 9, 1978, in Simferopol, on Kievskaya Street, in front of the building of the Mir cinema, a monument to partisans and underground workers of the Crimea was unveiled (authors - sculptor N. D. Soloshchenko, architect E. V. Popov). On a high pedestal is a sculptural composition depicting two patriots. One of them is wounded, but, supported by a comrade in arms, remains in the ranks. The monument symbolizes the indomitable courage of the Soviet people, shown by them in the fight against fascism, their devotion to their socialist Motherland.

The monument to partisans in Stary Krym was erected in 1961.

Memorial plaques made of white marble in the form of shields are fixed on the edges, the inscription: "April 1944. Your names will live forever in the hearts of the Soviet people!" .
The names of the commander of the partisan group, the former mathematics teacher of the Old Crimean secondary school, the communist N. I. Kholod, young patriots, yesterday's schoolchildren live in people's memory. The Starokrymsky detachment opened its combat account in the fall of 1941. At the end of October 1943, an underground youth group almost in full strength left for the partisan forest. It was headed by Georgy (Yuri) Stoyanov. Young underground workers - fearless, daring, elusive - made their way to the locations of enemy units; they did not miss a single transport convoy, they looked, counted, remembered. And then valuable intelligence was delivered to the partisan forest. In the partisan forest, young underground workers formed the combat core of the Komsomol Youth Detachment named after Leninist Komsomol. Its commander was a young officer of the Red Army A. A. Vakhtin. In January 1944, the favorite of the detachment, Yura Stoyanov, died a hero’s death in a battle on Mount Burus, in March - April, the Nazis captured and killed I. I. Davydov, the brothers Mitya and Tolya Stoyanov in the dungeons.
Day of partisans and underground fighters- a memorable date in Russia, which is celebrated on June 29, starting in 2010. The day of partisans and underground fighters will be celebrated with commemorative events.
Installed State Duma Russia in March 2009, on the initiative and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, party, Soviet, trade union and Komsomol organizations create partisan detachments and sabotage groups to fight the German troops.
Medal "Partisan of the Great Patriotic War" established . The author of the drawing of the medal is the artist N. I. Moskalev, the drawing was taken from the unrealized project of the medal “25 Years of the Soviet Army”.
As is known from historical documents, the actions of the partisans and the work of the underground played a huge role in the successful outcome of the Great Patriotic War. In total, more than one million partisans - men, women and children - operated behind enemy lines. At present, many documents telling about the true feat of partisans and underground fighters during the war years are still kept in state archives under the heading "Top Secret". Perhaps the introduction of this "military" memorable date will serve as a pretext for research and the discovery of unknown pages of partisan glory. And there is no doubt that the establishment of the Day of partisans and underground fighters was a tribute to the deep respect for the lives and deeds of people, thanks to whom the Motherland was liberated in 1945. On this Day, many commemorative events are held throughout the country with the laying of flowers at the monuments to those who died during the Great Patriotic War and other memorials. They also honor living veterans, partisans and underground fighters who operated behind enemy lines.

Greater Yalta was liberated from the Nazi invaders on April 16, 1944. Partisans and underground fighters, all of them - young and old, doctors and workers, fragile girls and strong men- covered each of us with themselves, gave us peace and a bright sky above our heads.

Sources
1. Broshevan V.M. Crimean headquarters of the partisan movement, 2001. - 101 p. 2. HAARQ. - F.151, op.1, file 197, L. 28. 3. Lugovoi N.D. Strada partisan: 900 days behind enemy lines. Simferopol: Elinyu, 2004. 4. Arunyan L.E. - teacher of history and law of the Simeiz UVK.

Crimea. Bekir Osmanov. Twice he was presented as a reconnaissance partisan to the Order of Lenin ...

Dedicated to the centenary of Seitbekir Osmanov
From left to right: Dzheppar Akimov, Bekir Osmanov (the founders of the National Movement of the Crimean Tatars), Mitrofan Zinchenko (former commander of the Sevastopol partisan detachment)

Seitbekir Osmanoglu - Osmanov Bekir Osmanovich - hard worker and warrior, thinker and creator. As long as our people are alive, their name is immortal. Our story is about him. We tell - the living and the dead. Memory speaks. Irresistible lines sound.

Bekir Osmanov was born on March 22, 1911 in the village of Buyuk-Ozenbash, located at the source of the Belbek River. His father, Osman Effendi, was a teacher at the Ozenbash Madrasah, one of the most enlightened people of that time in the Crimea and progressive people. In any case, Osman Efendi himself considered himself to have one of the most significant fortunes in the Crimea - scientific library in oriental languages, donated by his wife to the Bakhchisaray Museum in the 1920s.

Osman Efendi died in 1915. Mother - Hani Apte - taught girls in Ozenbash. There were 11 children in the family, but by the time of the revolution, four brothers remained alive: Yusuf, Muslim, Seitumer and Bekir, and a sister who died, however, on the wedding day. The family lived at the expense of hard peasant labor, having no other income. Already at the age of 7, Bekir and his brothers burned coal and took it to Yalta himself, exchanging it for flour from the local Greek confectioners. One day, the coal caught fire in the Mazhar. The seven-year-old boy did not lose his head, drove the horse to the stream, where he poured coal ...

Yu.B. Osmanov, “Osmanov Bekir Osmanovich. Some data for the biography»

The elder brother of Bekir Osmanovich Seitumer (1907), who lived in Tashkent, added to the above: “Seitbekir (as his father and mother called him) was a quiet, calm, inquisitive boy. His childhood years, like all of us, were difficult. After the death of the father, the mother was left with a bunch of children. There were five of us - children (four guys and one girl). The eldest - Yusuf was 16 years old, Muslim - 14 years old, and Seitbekir was only 6 years old. We had land. We had a cow, a horse, and a one-horse cart. Mother managed the house and garden, providing the family with vegetables. We all worked together, but it wasn't enough. The family was in constant need. Seitbekir helped his mother around the house and in the garden. He learned to cook early and spent his whole life willingly and skillfully doing it. Even when he visited us and noticed that chebureks were being prepared, he always took part ...

In childhood (at the age of 6 - 7 years) Bekir suffered a serious illness - smallpox. The high temperature persisted for a long time. He was on fire and delirious. We didn't expect him to recover.

Seitbekir constantly felt a craving for learning. And by the decision of the whole family, I took him through Yayla to Yalta, to the agricultural school Chair. At the Chair school, we were met by a representative of the Crimean Ministry of Education, Abdulla Kurkchi, who was then (1925) a well-known organizer of the education of the Crimean Tatars. I explained to him the purpose of our appearance at school. Abdula aga, having talked with his brother, answered literally the following: “You can consider that Seitbekir has been accepted into the Chair agricultural school and will be provided with everything necessary. You can safely return home and Buyuk-Ozenbash”… Then there was the Tobacco Breeding College in Yalta and the Agricultural Institute in Simferopol. All this was possible only thanks to the statehood of the Crimean Tatars - the Crimean ASSR"

From Seitumer Osmanov's letter to Areket

Yu.Osmanov continues the story about his father: “In the first year of the agricultural institute, the first arrest with the version of “Turkish spy” was being prepared for the massacre of brother Muslim, the deputy commissar of education of the Crimean ASSR. This vile performance was intended for this, which, however, failed within a few hours - Osmanov B., who was arrested at one in the morning, was already released at five in the morning - the thought that worked at lightning speed, iron will, determination and complete composure helped. The second "exam" came in 1937 - a trial for "counter-revolutionary activity", expressed by the definition of the director of the Toplinskaya breeding station, where Osmanov and his wife worked after the institute, that Osmanov in a scientific report concluded that T. Lysenko's theory of "Staging" to perennial crops. Supreme Court The Crimean ASSR rejected the arguments of the prosecution, determining that scientific disputes are not resolved in court ...

Somewhat earlier, Bekir Osmanov met the one who became the mother of his children and walked with him along the road of life, sharing both joys and troubles - Maria Vladimirovna Gushchinskaya. The elder brother Seitumer recalls this: “In 1935, Bekir married a fellow student, Maria, while still a student. Their modest wedding party took place in a house on the outskirts of Simferopol. In addition to me (a graduate student from Leningrad) and brother Muslim (then deputy minister of education of the Crimea), there were the mother and brother of the bride and several students - their comrades. The bride and groom prepared everything and served the guests. There were few people, but a lot of fun and joy. So Bekir and Maria got married for life.

Bekir Osmanov did not forget his native village. I rarely visited Ozenbash. Nobody lived in the house: the mother died, the brothers parted, where life called. There were villagers who often needed the help of a competent and courageous assistant - either to protest the illegal confiscation, or, on the contrary, to write down another fairy tale by the local folklorist Sofu. However, fairy tales were often composed by Bekir himself. Some of the tales that occupied listening to two or three evenings, he told many years later in the Uzbek exile. By the way, while studying at the institute, he played in the student theater, for which he wrote plays that were printed by students on a hectograph, naturally receiving a Krylit visa.

Y. Osmanov “Osmanov Bekir Osmanovich. Some data for the biography»

Before the start of the war, the Osmanov family had two children, the eldest, Tamila, and the younger Yuri, who was born on the eve of the Great Patriotic War - 04/01/1941.

A little more than a month remained before the start of the war. As Yuri Bekirovich wrote about that time: “At a district meeting in May on the preparation of equipment, he (Bekir Osmanov - approx. “Areketa”) demanded to speed up the pace, saying that we should be ready to immediately harvest each crop, as if our fields did not soon turn into fields of war!

Who told you this nonsense?! - shouted after the meeting, white with anger, the district security officer. "Sober analysis" - was the answer. "But who allowed!" that one exploded. "Responsibility," was the answer.

He immediately went to the open combat training courses and learned how to accurately hit with a revolver and accurately “stack” grenades. This was very useful in the partisans: in all operations, the first blow with an anti-tank grenade on the engine was always trusted to him. Accurate vision helped the accuracy of the shooting: he could see the smoke of a cigarette against the background of green foliage at a distance of more than a kilometer. He knew that they would not take him into the army - "an oblique heart", frequent attacks. After a skirmish with a district security officer, he was also not taken to the fighter battalion.

At the time of the relocation of the extermination battalion to the forest (by the way, a gross mistake in the organization of the movement, since the extermination - a military formation could not be transferred by order to a voluntary - partisan detachment, where they go at the call of their hearts, internally ripe for such a responsible step) Osmanov B., in- first, he became a candidate for the party, and secondly, he demanded from the commissar, exterminator Nezhmedinov, to give him, Osmanov, an order: "to deliver a radio to the forest." "Why?" asked the commissioner. “Because you probably didn’t take care of it, and in the conditions of a catastrophic retreat of the troops and in the absence of information from Moscow among the people, if panic doesn’t start, then morale will be suppressed.” - "But, where will you get a walkie-talkie?" - "This should not interest you" - But the deployment of the detachment is a military secret! "Well, leave it with you, for failure to comply with the order, I will be responsible." - "Consider that you received an order."

Having dismantled the Albatsky radio center (having requested the sanction of the bewildered secretary of the district committee Comrade Chernoy by phone), Osmanov delivered a walkie-talkie, battery, generator, receivers to the forest and, if I am not mistaken, these days the partisans were already listening to information about the battles near Yelnya.

Osmanov Bekir fought in the Kuibyshev partisan detachment, which was defeated by the Germans in mid-November 1941. Then the partisan activity of B. Osmanov took place mainly as part of the Sevastopol detachment. As Yuri Bekirovich recalled, his father described the death of the Kuibyshev detachment in an essay at the request of General Saburov in 1957, as well as in an oral story "accidentally recorded on tape in 1973." Further, the son continues about his father “then he fought in the Akmechet and Sevastopol detachments. Scout. Carried out reconnaissance on the instructions of the Crimean headquarters and TsShPD in Moscow. One of the seven tasks of Moscow was the "sea operation" (for the first time it was mentioned in the book by A. Basov "Crimea during the Second World War") - long years no documents could be found about her, and there could be no memories - all the development and conduct of the operation was carried out by Osmanov himself. Another major operation of this kind is an attack on a German column moving towards Sevastopol. In one and a half dozen points - also described by Osmanov in the mentioned essay.

The elder brother Seitumer, himself a participant in the partisan movement in the Crimea, recalls: “In 1941 and 1942, the name of the partisan Seitbekir was widely known. The Germans organized a hunt for him. But Seitbekir proved to be elusive. The miracle of Seitbekir's elusiveness is very simple. Bekir knew the area well - the mountains and forests of the Southern Crimea. In addition, Bekir was well known to the local population, who supported him. He lived and acted among his own, defended their interests. As an example, in early January 1942, Seitbekir and I met at the house of Barash Dzhelil in the center of Buyuk-Ozenbash. There were German and Romanian soldiers in 15-20 places from this house. We talked quietly from about the middle of the night until dawn.

Yu. Osmanov will continue the story in more detail about the “sea operation”:
"In October 1942. Bekir Osmanov, having carried out a deep reconnaissance, along the route he developed, led a group (about a hundred people of the party and Soviet activists who were in the partisans) to the sea. This operation failed several times, for which, according to the laws of war, the blame was placed on the scout. The initiative of another attempt (although everything was kept in the strictest confidence) belonged to Osmanov. When entering the place, coinciding with the moment the boats approached, the enemy discovered the operation by opening heavy fire from all firing points. However, the group was prudently placed in the "dead zone". The nervous tension was so great that the commander of the group (his authority began from the moment he was placed on the boats) H. Chussi, shouting "everything was lost" rushed to run. He was, however, followed only by the commissar. The rest did not succumb to panic and did not violate the regime of operation. Those who fled were given the opportunity to return and join the landing.

The place of the “sea operation” remained a mystery for many decades: evacuees, incl. Chussi, were simply not notified of either the place or the route. In 1957, the commander of the partisan movement, Seversky, asked his father to describe the operation and put it on a map, show it on the spot, but his father did not find it appropriate to do this then. Therefore, Seversky outlined the operation according to his (literary) legend, attributing it to the sailor of the Black Sea Fleet, who, according to him, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Such operations are indeed celebrated in this way (for example, the rescue of the headquarters of the Yugoslav liberation movement by Soviet pilots). A.V. Basov in his historical falsification “Crimea in the Second World War” (M.1987, p.216), relying on the archive of the Central Military District, restored the place and time of boarding the boats (Cape Kikeneiz, October 7, 1942), concealing and distorting that who performed the operation. By the way, the shells overturned the boats, some of the partisans drowned. Seven, including the Ottomans, having swum ashore, did not wait for the return of the boats - the delay (withdrawal) of the boats could have ended in the death of the operation. Osmanov Bekir led the partisans back into the forest, at the same time led the group of Major Ageev (about 40 people) who had fallen into the “mousetrap”.

According to certificate No. 9B-618 dated 05/06/1981. from the party archive of the Crimean Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine “Osmanov Bekir Osmanovich, 1911. birth, from November 1, 1941. listed as a political commissar of the group of the Sevastopol detachment of Crimean partisans. On October 26, 1942, he was evacuated to Sochi due to illness.

The son writes about the completion of the partisan activities of Bekir Osmanovich: for a long time was in a hospital in Sukhumi. Left hand hung with a whip - a fragment sat in a nerve. During the recovery period, he was sent to the Agdam region of the AzSSR to the family evacuated there, then to Krasnodar, where the Crimean Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was located. During the liberation of Crimea, he was appointed the first deputy commissar of agriculture and managed to draw up a plan for the 20-year restoration and development of agriculture in Crimea.

Attempts to discredit and repress Bekir Osmanov were also made during the war. “Even in the partisan forest, secret orders were issued several times to liquidate it. In the false, provocative book by I. Vergasov "In the mountains of Tavria" he is depicted as a German spy and shot. (The issue was discussed in the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1957, the book has been redone.

From a letter to a member of the Politburo, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Ligachev E.K. and Chairman of the State Commission A.A. Gromyko, sent on 12.08.198 7g. children of Bekir Osmanov: Yuri, Tamila and Artem.

Yuri Osmanov recalled this in more detail (according to his father):
“During the period of being in the forest, a secret order was given three times to shoot Osmanov B.O.

Once to Kalashnikov, the commander of the Akmechetsky detachment, who could not (did not want to fulfill) this order, because the detachment would inevitably fall into a trap and risk death. In such a situation, Kalashnikov apparently became an unwanted witness. According to the then favorite scheme, he was sent to work in the "underground" in his village, where before the war he was a party worker, known to every child as a partisan of the civil war; was immediately captured and hanged.

According to the second order, he was to be shot during the “sea operation”. The order failed for the same reason. Those who gave the order had a poor idea, apparently, of the impossibility of carrying out the operation without a scout until the very last moment - landing on boats.

The third order was given to Mitrofan Nikitich Zinchenko, the commander of the Sevastopol partisan detachment, who refused to comply with it and warned that anyone who tried to comply with such an order would be killed. In retaliation, Zinchenko was sent to an operation in which, according to the customers, he was supposed to die - to Romania.

Remembering his younger brother, Seitumer Osmanovich emphasized:
“He was a legendary intelligence officer, a political figure, closely associated with the local population of the temporarily occupied areas, and conducted intelligible anti-fascist agitation among his compatriots. He knew how to convince people, enjoyed the help and full support of the local population. What Bekir Osmanovich did was much more than other commanders and commissars sent from the mainland did. Involved in partisan movement, he had not passed the NKVD filter before. I know it well."

On May 18, 1944, together with the people, Bekir Osmanov was herded into cattle trains and arrived at the place of deportation to the Buttermilk Uchun Kurash collective farm. Later he achieved a transfer to where the family was - to a state farm near Fergana. From the first moment to last breath he joined the nationwide resistance to arbitrariness - in the struggle for an organized (i.e. state) return of the people to the Crimea with compact settlement in places of historical residence, for the restoration of the Crimean ASSR. He was subjected to furious and vicious harassment by false authorities under various pretexts: another "criminal", economic case or a political farce. But all the cases failed due to his crystal honesty and high management skills, as well as the high political level of the national movement.

Seytumer Osmanov recalls: “The variety testing site in Uzbekistan, where B. Osmanov worked, was subordinate to the USSR Ministry of Agriculture. The results of Bekir Osmanovich's work were excellent, so the Uzbek authorities could not remove him from work. They could not deprive the plot of water, because there was a state limit. This circumstance allowed Bekir Osmanovich, participating in the national movement, to keep his job. Bekir aga was a high-class agronomist with a wide profile: a tobacco grower, a vegetable grower, a viticulturist and winemaker, a specialist in fruit and berry crops. On the site, he created and equipped a laboratory for winemaking. One example: by order of the Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR of 17.08.1976. (when Osmanov B. lived already in the village of Dmitrovo, Simferopol region), he was recognized as the author of the varieties of pears "Tauride", "Golden", "Domestic" and "Dessert" with the issuance of copyright certificates.

“From 1961 to 1975. he was the head of the Gossortouchastka - a scientific farm, completely economically independent on 62 hectares of land leased from the collective farm and operating in the existing system of economic relations on equal terms of credit, supply, etc. Only the peach orchard is indicative. For 15 years of management, starting from a complete "zero" (the site was organized on a scorched rocky desert). This orchard yielded 94 crops of collective farm orchards in the Ferghana Valley, calculated per hectare. At the same time, it should be taken into account that the GSU was not a commodity economy - it was a scientific institution, which, following the results of scientific work invariably ranked first among the GSU of the pebble zone of the country. It should be said that I had to work in conditions of hard pressure from the administrative-command system.

Y. Osmanov. Osmanov Bekir Osmanovich. Some data for the biography»

Bekir Osmanov was deeply indifferent to awards, honors and "trinkets", he was a stranger to vanity. Looking ahead, here is just one example. Tells Kemal Kuku, who last met with Bekir Osmanovich in August 1978 in the Crimea in the village. Dmitrovo:

“With my wife and son, we specially drove to Bekir aga while in the Crimea. We talked, of course, mainly about the situation of the people and the problems facing the national movement. Bekir aga told me: “These dogs (meaning the punitive organs) do not leave me alone. Not so long ago, they called the KGB and said that my awards were found, they offered me to pick them up. “Further on, Bekir Osmanovich told how he answered them: “Since when has the KGB presented awards to participants in the war. Until now, as I know, this is the competence of military enlistment offices. Why did you call me? For me to take the awards from your hands? It was easy for you to want to trade me!” After that, he got up and left ... By the way, I also know another episode - immediately after the liberation of the Crimea, in April 1944, Bekir aga saw documents that he was twice presented as a reconnaissance partisan to the Order of Lenin. And both times, the first secretary of the Crimean regional committee, Vladimir Bulatov, did not give way to these ideas.

B. Osmanov was a model of a man of duty. His role in the formation and development of the national movement in 1956-1980 can hardly be overestimated. Thanks to him, hundreds of people came to the Movement and selflessly participated in it. His signature stands under thousands of documents, appeals of the National Movement of the Crimean Tatars, letters demanding the restoration of the national equality of the Crimean Tatars.

In 1966, he, who joined the party in January 1942 in the partisan forest, was expelled from the CPSU. An exception was made at the bureau of the regional committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan against the will of the primary party organization. The reason for the exclusion was a letter from Y. Osmanov addressed to L.I. Brezhnev. on the problem of restoring the national equality of the Crimean Tatars. This letter was one of the most profound and brilliant documents on national question Crimean Tatars. It combined a historical approach with a theoretical analysis of the anti-socialist concepts of strategy adopted by the party leadership since the 1940s.

A heavy blow for Bekir Osmanov was the sudden death of his wife, Maria Vladimirovna, in 1974. She was known, respected and loved by thousands of Crimean Tatars. As Seitumer Osmanov recalls: “I met Maria Vladimirovna only a few times, but I still remember her as a person of high moral standards ... I arrived at her funeral from Nukus. Immediately struck by the fact that it was buried by the Crimean Tatars. The funeral procession stopped on the outskirts of Ferghana. The dead woman was removed from the car and on a large sheet the Crimean Tatars carried her in their arms to the cemetery, to the grave.”

“Unable to remain in a hateful exile, crushed by grief, sick, Osmanov B.O. leaves for the Crimea, where for a year and a half he cannot register in own house, bought in the village. Dmitrovo. For almost the last 9 years of his life, he fought a hard struggle for his existence. He died in May 1983 with virtually no medical care", - recalled Yuri Bekirovich.

Joint life path Bekir Osmanovich and Maria Vladimirovna is a special story, a bright and piercing story of two loving hearts, father and mother, comrades-in-arms in the struggle, who gave Yuri Osmanov to the people:

I see the bright face of Jebbar,
Ozenbasha's son - Bekir
Yuri is the son of Bekir, a light,
Warrior, true seraskir...
S. Emin, Bakhchisarai

To the son, who was serving his first term of imprisonment for upholding the violated rights of the people, the father and mother in letters informed and transferred new forces:

“You must meet the difficult reality that has befallen you seriously, calmly and deeply meaningfully. We are always with you, my son. Thoughts, ideas, convictions, and reason and conscience have never been slaves of violence... You and I, like many others, are not on this path. And there is no doubt that the right path was chosen ... My son, my friend, you and I never dreamed of a calm, quiet life ... I am sure that the light will penetrate where you are today, and it will all pass like a bad bad dream : after all, we are with you, the truth is with us ... ".

From a letter from B. Osmanov to his son Yuri, 01/27/1968

"Dear Yuri. Every day I wait for you. Everything seems to me that you are knocking on the door. Because the fact that you are there seems so monstrous to me that I just can’t get used to this idea. Dear son! .. Your whole conscious life, all your work and actions speak of loyalty to your Motherland ... ".

From a letter from M. Gushchinskaya to her son on January 30, 1968
The son kept these letters and treasured them for many years.

After his father and mother passed away, Yuri until the end of his days experienced an orphan feeling of loneliness and a huge irreparable loss. It seeps through many of his poetic lines.

Like, for example, these are about those who gave him life:

Somewhere everything went back:
One and then a little - the second,
Three countries lie between them.
Graves - both somewhere in May!
And there, behind them, how light,
How bountiful joy was!
And the thought of a powerful brow,
And pure thoughts joy,
Shower unique unison
And nobility feat of arms
Do not repeat the magical dream
And don't go back into it

In a letter to his daughter and granddaughter (08/07/1975), Bekir Osmanov secretly wrote the following: “After all, you know very well that my life is behind me. I can't go to the horizon. Halt soon. I have no doubt that I went all the way with full observance of the norms of life ... It seems to me that a great and good reward in a person’s personal life is how it was understood, recognized and noted, and in that sense of self-understanding when the heart passes an exam before the mind with an assessment of "all possibilities have been exhausted." Usually this voice is heard only by the mind. This inaudible voice is the brightest radiance of a pure conscience.

And it seems to me that when the path ends and the light goes out, in the last fractions of a moment in the mirrors of life, the signal glow “all possibilities have been exhausted” is lit. Life does not spoil everyone with such an award. Is this a reward?
Yet many are rewarded. This is the highest destiny of satisfaction - a sense of pride in one's own conscience that everything possible has been done. It is impossible to deceive yourself. This is the truth of conscience ... ".

Bekir Osmanov, whose centenary we are celebrating these days, was, is and, undoubtedly, will continue to be an amazing example of life, completely given to society, to the people. As a hero of the spirit, a man of "long will", a deep and penetrating mind, as a son of his people, selflessly fighting for the restoration of their national equality in their native land, he remained in the memory of the people for centuries. He is alive in countless lines of documents of the national movement, which are the fruit of his irreconcilable conscience and pure thoughts, an indestructible dream to see his people happy again in his native land. In our prayers to the Creator, remembering Bekir Osmanov, we ask for him: “Rahmet olsun janyn!”.

Asan KHURSHUTOV,
Kenesh member Milli Firka, Yalta http://milli-firka.org/%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0...D0%BE%D1%81%D0%B2 %D1%8F%D1%89/
Bekir Osmanov, Mustafa Selimov, Refat Mustafayev - these and other names of the heroes of the Crimean partisan movement are well known. However, from the very beginning of the war, the partisan command of the Crimea, in order to justify their failures, deliberately spread the opinion that the local population of the peninsula was hostile to the partisans. Only on November 18, 1942, the Resolution of the CPSU (b) was adopted, refuting this lie.

Back in 1942, the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks recognized the accusation of the Crimean Tatars of complicity with the Nazis as a mistake

List of partisans - Crimean Tatars who held leadership positions * in the partisan detachments of the Crimea in 1941-1944 Aedinov Ablyaz (1905, according to other sources, 1907 - 08.1942, Crimea). Senior political officer, instructor of the political department of the 51st Army. Commander of the Red Army Detachment of the 4th District (11/01/1941 - 06/1942). Sent "to settle" to organize the underground. Captured by the Germans and executed. Ametov Abibulla (1907 - 02.1943, Crimea). Secretary of the Seitler RK of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, fighter, commissar of the Ichkin detachment (09/17/1942 - 10/10/1942), transferred to the Biyuk-Onlar detachment, commissar (10/10/1942 - 10/25/1942) chief of the detachment from 10/25/1942, later - fighter of the Seitler-Zuysky, 6th Red Army, 7th detachment of the 2nd sector. Missing. He was awarded the medal "For Military Merit". Ametov Bekir (1908(9) - 01/01/1944). Secretary of the Stalinist Republican Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Kerch. Sent to partisan detachments 06/26/1943 Commissar of the 6th partisan detachment of the 1st brigade, 6th detachment of the 5th brigade of the COG (11/25/1943 - 12/22/1943). He was taken prisoner in the district of Dolgorukovskaya Yayla, after torture he was executed by the Nazis. Ametov Seit-Ali (b. 1905, village of Biyuk-Ozenbash). A member of the Feodosia underground organization of M. M. Polishchuk until November 1943, the commissar of the 9th partisan detachment (11/25/1943 - 12/03/1943) of the 3rd brigade, the food chief of the 12th detachment of the same brigade, according to the GAARK, deserted in February 1944 Appazov Memet (1914, Degermenkoy - 10/26/1943, district of the Khiralan ridge) Lieutenant, platoon commander of the 91st regiment of the 51st army. From 11/14/1941 to 10/09/1942 the commander of the group of the Red Army detachment. In evacuation on the mainland. The group commander, chief of staff of the 7th detachment of the 1st sector (06/23/43 - 07/15/43), the 1st autonomous detachment (from 07/15/1943) arrived in the forest a second time in June 1943. Killed in battle. Awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Ashirov Abdul-Kerim (Abkerim) (b. 1907, village of Biyuk-Yankoy). Worker artel them. Chkalov, Simferopol district, fighter of the 3rd Simferopol partisan detachment, Alushta detachment. In evacuation on the mainland (10/26/42 - 06/25/43). Commissar of the 8th Partisan Detachment of the 7th Brigade of the Southern Connection. Awarded with the medal "For Courage". Belyalov Nafe (b. 1914). Chairman of the military tribunal 48 ocd, chairman of the military tribunal for the 3rd and 4th districts of the partisan detachments of Crimea, commissar of the 1st detachment of the 1st sector (10/25/1942 - 01/11/1943), chairman of the military tribunal of the Crimean partisan detachments, 08/17/1943 evacuated to the mainland. Betkeliev Moussa. Secretary of the Balaklava Republican Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Commissar of the Balaklava Detachment since (01. 11.1941 - 02.08.1942), political instructor of the group, deserted on 04/02/1942. Gaziev Gafar (1910 - 02/08/1942, Crimea). Head Rayzo Balaklavsky district. The commander of the Balaklava detachment from 11/01/1941, died in the district of the village. Alsu. Ibraimov. Instructor of the Kuibyshev RK of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, commander of the Kuibyshev detachment, deserted in November 1941. Izmailov Asan (b. 1906). Instructor of the Sudak RK of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, commissar of the Sudak detachment (11/01/1941 - 03/08/1942), fighter until 03/12/1942, deserted. Ilyasov Enver (b. 1922). One of the leaders of the underground organization in the city of Feodosia, in the forest since November 1943, commander of the 9th detachment of the 3rd brigade (11/25/1943 - 12/03/1943), chief of staff of the detachment, group commander. Irsmambetov Ismail (1911, p. Aji Mendy - 1975, Andijan). Assistant for the Komsomol of the head of the Crimean headquarters of the partisan movement. Awarded with the Order of the Red Star. He was the editor of the newspaper "Komsomolets", the magazine "Yash leningiler". Islyamov Seidamet (1910, village of Degermenka - 1985, village of Bogatoye, Belogorsky district, Crimean region). Fighter of the 1st Simferopol partisan detachment (since 11/01/1941). In evacuation on the mainland (10/09/1942 - 06/27/1943), commander of a reconnaissance group, commissar of the 4th partisan detachment of the 4th, then the 6th brigade of the Southern Connection (until 04/20/1944). He was awarded the medal "For the Defense of Sevastopol". Kadyev Seythalil (1913, Fridental village - 1979, Belgorod, RSFSR). Head of the Karasubazar RO NKVD, in the partisan movement from November 1941 to April 1944, assistant commander of the Karasubazar detachment, 6th Red Army detachment, 3rd detachment of the 2nd sector, 3rd, 5th detachments of the 1st brigade, 5th 1st detachment of the 3rd reconnaissance brigade, assistant commander of the 3rd reconnaissance brigade. He was awarded medals "Partisan of the Patriotic War" 1st class, "For Military Merit". Kolesnikov Dzhebbar (b. 1908, v. Otuzy). Second Secretary of the Leninsky Republican Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In partisan detachments from 08/28/1943. Commissar of the 8th detachment of the 3rd brigade of the Eastern formation (since 01/01/1943), then commissar of the 3rd brigade of the Eastern formation (02/19/1944 - 03/05/1944). Kurbetdinov Bekir (b. 1905). Serviceman of the 148th Shuma Battalion, transferred to the partisans in November 1943. Chief of Staff of the 9th detachment of the 7th brigade (since 11/14/1943). Kurtumerov Ramazan (b. 1905 (1904), p. Shuma). Head reception room of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the KASSR, sent to the forest on 06/26/1943. Commissar of the 17th detachment of the 6th (1st) brigade of the Northern connection (11/25/1943 - 02/13/1944). Evacuated to the mainland due to injury. Awarded with the medal "For Courage". Mamutov Mustafa (b. 1905, p. Style). Teacher of secondary school No. 12 Simferopol. Political instructor of the company 4th joint venture 351th division of the 51st army. Sent to the forest on 06/26/1943, from 11/14/1943 to 04/20/1944, the commissar of the 9th detachment of the 7th brigade of the Southern connection. Menadzhiev Saradzhadin (1916–1995, Taman). Art. lieutenant, commander of the reconnaissance group of the Black Sea Fleet, abandoned in the forest in the spring of 1943. Commissar of the 10th detachment of the 7th brigade (11/15/1943 - 01/28/1944). Posted to the mainland. Molochnikov Memet (b. 1912, Bakhchisarai). Secretary of the Military Tribunal of the 2nd Crimean, then the 48th Cavalry Division. In the partisan movement from November 1941 to April 1944, fighter, political instructor of the group, secretary of the military tribunal of the Crimean partisan detachments. Commissar of the 2nd, 1st Detachment of the 7th Brigade of the Southern Formation. Awarded the Order of the Red Star. Subsequently, a member of the national movement. One of the authors of the Appeal of the 18. Muratov Kurtseit (b. 1908). Captain of State Security, Head of the Kirov District Department of the NKVD. In the partisan movement from November 1941 to April 1944. Commissar of the partisan detachment, head of the operational group of the 3rd brigade of the Eastern Connection. He was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st class, the medal "For Courage". Lived in Perm. Muratov Ramazan (b. 1907, Biyuk-Yankoy). Fighter 14th Guards. mortar regiment, participant in the fighting near Volokolamsk. Sent to the forest on July 22, 1943, fighter, group commander of the 3rd detachment of the 4th brigade, commissar of the 2nd detachment of the 4th brigade, transferred to the commissar of the 9th (Southern formation) detachment of the 7th brigade. From 02/24/1944 to 04/20/1944 commander of the 9th detachment. He was imprisoned for participation in the Crimean Tatar national movement. Murtazaev Osman (b. 1903). Art. lieutenant, in the Red Army from August to November 1941, participant in the battles near Perekop, then in captivity, in partisan detachments from October 5, 1943 Chief of Staff of the 2nd detachment of the 4th brigade (11/25/1943 - 01/28/1944) , then appointed assistant detachment for the rear. Mustafaev Refat (b. 1911, village of Biyuk-Yankoy). Battalion Commissar. Secretary of the Crimean Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks from March 16, 1940, of the underground regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks from October 1942 to August 1943, sent to the forest as an authorized underground regional committee, arbitrarily flew to the mainland, after which he was sent to the forest commissar of a partisan detachment, then the 3rd brigade (11/25/1943 - 02/19/1944). Commissioner of the Eastern Union (02/19/44 - 04/20/1944). Mustafaev Shevkhi (b. 1914). Chief of Staff of the 11th Detachment (No. 1 named after Appazov) of the 7th Brigade. Osmanov Ablyaziz (1909, the village of Savryutino, Bakhchisaray district - 01/24/1944). Secretary of the Sudak district committee of the CPSU (b). He was appointed to the post of commissar of the 1st district of the partisan detachments of the Crimea, but for some reason did not take office, commissar of the Sudak detachment, commissar of the 6th detachment of the 2nd sector. Evacuated to the mainland. Thrown into the forest again in the summer of 1943, commissar of the 5th autonomous detachment (07/15/1943 - 11/1943), 7th detachment of the 3rd brigade. Killed in battle, buried in Berlyuk. Selimov Mustafa Veis (b. 1910, the village of Kokkoz, Simferopol district of the Tauride province). Member of the CPSU (b) since 1931, senior political instructor. He served in the Red Army in 1939-1940. Manager of affairs, head of the personnel department, instructor of the Bakhchisarai Republican Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Secretary of the Republican Committee of the Komsomol. Since 1941, secretary of the Yalta district committee of the CPSU (b). He was appointed commissar of the 4th district of the Crimean partisan detachments, but recalled by the regional committee. Sent to the forest in the summer of 1943 as secretary of the Crimean regional committee of the CPSU (b). Commissar of the detachment, brigade, Southern connection (01/29/1944 - 04/20/1944). Since 1944 in deportation: deputy. Chairman of the Begovat District Executive Committee, since 1945 Director of the Central Asian branch of the All-Union Institute "Magarach" in Kibray (Tashkent region). Tyncherov Talat (1908, Simferopol - 1968, ibid.). Commander of the 4th Detachment of the 2nd Brigade (11/25/1943 - 01/21/1944), Chief of Staff of the 2nd Brigade of the Central Operational Group, (02/25/1944 - 03/14/1944), Commander of the 3rd Detachment of the 2nd Brigade of the Eastern Connection ( 03/14/44 - 04/09/1944). Khairullaev Izzet (1907, Seitler-Vakuf village - 1980, Sukhumi). Member of the Crimean headquarters of the partisan movement, commissar of the 22nd detachment of the 6th brigade (01/10/1944 - 01/24/1944), commissar of the 4th brigade of the Southern connection. Khalilov Emir (b. 1911). Head of the Sudak RK VKP(b), fighter, commissar of the Sudak detachment (03/08/1942 - 04/19/1942), political instructor of the group, evacuated to the mainland. Emirov Asan (b. 1907). Member of the defense of Sevastopol. Commissar of the 20th detachment of the 5th brigade of the Northern connection (October 1943 - April 1944). Yusufov (Yusupov) Emirkhan (1908 - 06.12.1942, Crimea). Commander of the Sudak detachment (11/01/1941 - 03/1942), Group commander of the 7th detachment of the 2nd sector, died.

Crimea during the German occupation [National relations, collaborationism and partisan movement, 1941–1944] Romanko Oleg Valentinovich

Soviet partisans and the Crimean Tatar population

Soviet propaganda during the war and Soviet historians in the post-war period inspired the people that the vast majority of the population in the occupied territories fully supported the partisans and was waiting for the return of "native people's power." However, no matter how seditious it may seem to many, when considering the history of the partisan movement, the position of the population seems to be the most ambiguous factor. Now it is no secret that not everywhere this population belonged to Soviet partisans loyal or even neutral. There were also cases of outright hostility. For example, such a situation developed in the newly annexed territories (the Baltic States, Western Ukraine or Western Belarus) or in territories where the non-Russian population was either predominant or equal in number to the Russian (Caucasus). It was here that collaborationism took its most extreme forms, and the Soviet partisan movement numbered several thousand people (and there were negligibly few locals among them). Although one cannot discount the fact that in a number of cases Soviet partisans did not behave better than the Germans if it was believed that the population supported the invaders. Naturally, the population answered them the same.

The German historian B. Bonwetsch argued that "the question of the support of partisans by the population is, in fact, the flip side of the question of readiness for collaborationism". It's hard to disagree with him. In the case of relations between the partisans and the Tatar population on the territory of Crimea, this thesis is the best illustration of the current situation. But why?

Crimean Tatars were not the predominant ethnic group in this region. Moreover, they were not even equal in number to the Slavic population of the peninsula. Nevertheless, the Crimean Tatar factor was the reason that until the middle of 1943 the partisan movement on the territory of Crimea was, in fact, paralyzed. Of course, this was not the only factor, but it should not be taken into account either.

In general, the problem of relations between the Soviet partisans and the Crimean Tatar population should be considered from three interrelated aspects:

1. The attitude of the Tatar population towards the Soviet partisans under the conditions of the German occupation regime and the evolution of this attitude;

2. The attitude of partisans towards the Tatar population in the conditions of the crisis of the latter's loyalty to the Soviet government and the evolution of this attitude;

3. And finally, the role of the Crimean Tatars in the partisan movement on the territory of the peninsula.

What were the Tatar-partisan relations in initial period occupation of Crimea and how did they evolve in the future? On October 23, 1941, the Bureau of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the top leadership of the partisan movement on the territory of the Crimean Peninsula. A. Mokrousov, who had been a partisan here during the Civil War, was appointed its commander, and S. Martynov, the first secretary of the Simferopol City Party Committee, was appointed its commissar. And already on October 31, the leadership of the partisan movement issued its first order, according to which the Crimea was divided into five partisan regions, each of which was subordinate to 2 to 11 detachments with a total number of about 5 thousand people.

The Crimean party leadership was counting on the Crimean Tatars. As you know, a significant number of them were included in partisan detachments - about 1000 people, which amounted to more than 20% of total strength partisans at that time. Thus, the Kuibyshev and Albat partisan detachments were organized exclusively from them. In the Balaklava, Leninsky and Alushta detachments there were an overwhelming majority of them (for example, in the latter up to 100 people). In other detachments, the percentage of Crimean Tatars was also very significant. Naturally, the commanders and commissars in these partisan units were also Tatars. They were also in the top leadership of the movement. For example, A. Osmanov and M. Selimov, who had held high positions in the Crimean party nomenclature before the war, were appointed commissars of the 1st and 4th districts, respectively. In addition, the Tatar population of the mountainous and foothill regions was involved in the laying of partisan bases and the arrangement of future places for the deployment of detachments.

As you know, with the arrival of the Germans, a significant part of the Crimean Tatar population experienced a "crisis of loyalty" in relation to the Soviet government. This affected the partisan movement in the following way: the Tatars began to leave it both separately and in whole detachments. For example, the entire Kuibyshev partisan detachment went home: 115 people, led by their commander Ibragimov (by the way, this deserter was later hanged by the Germans, since it turned out that he did not indicate all the places where the food supplies of his detachment were located). Similar cases occurred in the Albatsky and other partisan detachments. Moreover, these former partisans often returned, sometimes with the Germans, sometimes with their fellow villagers, and plundered the partisan food bases.

For example, on December 18, 1941, the reconnaissance of the Feodosiya partisan detachment discovered in the forest 40 carts with armed Tatars, who, as it turned out, had come for the food of the partisans. This group was led by a deserter from the Sudak partisan detachment, a former lieutenant of the Red Army and member of the Communist Party Memetov.

Another example of such actions. The commanders of partisan detachments in the Zuya forests reported to the “mainland” that more than 10 tons of flour, 6.5 tons of wheat, 1.85 tons of corn, 9.6 tons of oats, 1 ton of beans and 6.5 t corned beef. As you can see, the numbers are very significant.

The inhabitants of the Tatar villages of Baksan, Tau-Kipchak, Mosque-Eli, Veyrat, Konrat, Eurtluk, Yeni-Sala, Molbay, Kamyshlyk, Argin, Yeni-Saray, Ulu-Uzen, Kazanly, Korbek, Koush, Biyuk were also engaged in the robbery of partisan food bases. -Uzenbash, Kuchuk-Uzenbash, Uskut. Together with the occupiers, they plundered the stocks of food and equipment, designed to supply 5-6 thousand partisans during the year. As a result, out of 28 partisan detachments operating in the Crimea in the winter of 1941, 25 were left without supply bases at all. The famine that followed and the actual defeat of the partisan movement on the peninsula is the result of the activities of these collaborators. In parentheses, we note that another result of the autumn-winter campaign of 1941 to plunder partisan food bases was that the spontaneous Tatar detachments formed for this purpose were then transformed into local self-defense units.

All this led to the fact that in the winter of 1941/42, the vast majority of the "people's avengers" were simply without means of subsistence and were forced to extract them in nearby villages. As a rule, such campaigns ended with requisitions of food or livestock, and in some cases, unjustified extrajudicial reprisals against real or imaginary collaborators. Similar events, for example, took place in the village of Markur. Its inhabitants helped the Sevastopol partisan detachment in every possible way. However, in the winter of 1942, on the orders of one of the leaders of the partisan movement, this detachment raided, in general, “their own” village. It is not known what the partisans were doing there. Nevertheless, the very next day the Germans were able to form a self-defense detachment in the village and send it against the Sevastopol detachment. It should be noted that the detachment was soon completely defeated, and the role of the "self-defenders" from the village of Markur in these events was far from the last.

The head of Task Force D, SS-Standartenführer O. Ohlendorf, noted that the Tatars were much more restrained in relation to cooperation with the invaders in those areas where partisan detachments were nearby. Although at the same time, if any danger arose (for example, an attack by partisans), they were immediately ready to take up arms. Yes, and German propaganda very skillfully used such facts, presenting the Crimean partisans in an unfavorable light and comparing their actions with ordinary banditry. This policy, in conjunction with the so-called " cunning tricks The occupation authorities really contributed, and to no small extent, to the growth of collaborationist sentiments among the Crimean Tatars. In turn, the command of the partisan movement and the majority of ordinary partisans began to believe that the Crimean Tatar population was entirely hostile to the Soviet regime. Moreover, they soon began to inform the “mainland” about this. So, already in March 1942, Mokrousov and Martynov reported the following: “The vast majority of the Tatar population in the foothill and mountain villages is pro-fascist, from among the inhabitants of which the Gestapo created volunteer detachments, which are currently used to fight partisans ... The activity of partisan detachments is complicated by the need for armed struggle on two fronts: against the fascist invaders, on the one side, and against the armed gangs of the mountain-forest Tatar villages ".

It must be said that the leadership of the Crimean ASSR, located in Krasnodar, at first refused to believe in the total collaborationism of the Crimean Tatars. The People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Republic G. Karanadze especially doubted this, who even sent a special memorandum addressed to L. Beria. The note was dated March 1942 and was, in fact, a response to the previous document. “According to the information we have, Karanadze wrote in this note, - it can be judged that, although a small, but still a certain part of the Tatar population of the Crimea remains on the side of the Soviet government ... which cannot be ignored when carrying out certain events in the Crimea. According to the agents, it was established that the majority of the Tatar population of the steppe part of the Crimea does not show hostility to the Soviet regime, on the contrary, there are reverse facts when they treat it with sympathy. It is known that a significant part of the settlements of the steppe Tatars refused to take weapons "for self-defense and protection from partisans", as the Germans suggested. As a result, in these villages armed mountain Tatars “protect the population from partisans”. Moreover, among the settlements of the South Bank there are such villages that provided great assistance to partisan detachments, as a result of which both Germans and armed Tatars dealt with their population. For example, the Tatars of the villages of Aylyanma, Chermalyk, and others provided great assistance to the partisans with food on difficult days, when the partisans experienced difficulties with supplies. The above-mentioned (Tatars) organized flocks of sheep of 50-100 heads to the partisans. In addition, the partisans were always hospitably received, giving them all possible assistance. For all this assistance that was provided to the partisans, the Germans and volunteer detachments destroyed and burned such villages as Aylyanma, Chermalyk, Beshui (in the Karasubazar region), Chair and Tarnair. Most of the population of these villages was shot, and those who remained were evicted from the South Bank. In addition, from these villages ... many families who did not want to arm themselves and serve the Germans were evicted. It should be noted that the attitude of the German invaders towards the Tatars, who refuse to take up arms, is the same as towards the Russians, Ukrainians and Greeks... These Tatars, like the other population, are taken to Germany. As a result of the foregoing, the indicated part (Tatars) is hostile both against the armed Tatars and against the Germans..

Karanadze was in favor of a differentiated approach to the Tatar population, as he believed that with their indiscriminate policy Mokrousov and Martynov could only alienate the last supporters of Soviet power on the peninsula, or, even worse, force the previously neutral Crimean Tatars to side with the Germans. His memorandum did not go unnoticed by the top military-political leadership of the country. First, in June 1942, Mokrousov and Martynov were removed from their posts. And five months later, on November 18, a resolution of the Crimean Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which has now become so famous, was adopted, entitled “On the mistakes made in assessing the attitude of the Crimean Tatars towards the partisans, measures to eliminate these mistakes and strengthen work among the Tatar population ". In this very remarkable document, the causes of collaborationism among the Crimean Tatars were analyzed for the first time. And it must be said that, to the credit of the party workers, these reasons were not explained by "manifestations of bourgeois nationalism" or "intrigues of the German occupiers." Thus, the command of the partisan movement was pointed out that not all units behaved in a worthy manner. There were also attacks on Tatar villages, and extrajudicial reprisals, and "drunken pogroms", which "extremely aggravated the relationship between partisans and the population." In addition, it was recognized that the party leadership made serious mistakes in recruiting partisan detachments, since not a single Crimean Tatar member of the regional committee was left “in the forest”. Was not "ignored" and the local NKVD. Its leadership, for example, was accused of “not promptly clearing the villages of the Tatar bourgeoisie, especially in the southern part of Crimea, of the remnants of nationalist, kulak and other counter-revolutionary elements that lurked there.”

In general, recognizing all the mistakes, the party leadership of the Crimea made the following conclusion: “The analysis of the facts, the reports of the commanders and commissars of the partisan detachments, the verification carried out on the spot, indicate that the allegations about the hostile attitude of the majority of the Crimean Tatars towards the partisans, as well as the fact that the majority of the Tatars went over to the service of the enemy, are incorrect, unfounded and politically harmful statements".

And in order to correct these errors as soon as possible, it was necessary to carry out the following measures:

1. To condemn as incorrect and politically harmful the assertion of the leadership of the partisans about the hostile attitude of the Crimean Tatars and explain to all the partisans that the Crimean Tatars, for the most part, are just as hostile to the German-Romanian occupiers as all the working people of Crimea;

2. To ask the Military Council of the Transcaucasian Front and the Black Sea Fleet to select and transfer to the disposal of the Crimean Regional Committee of the Communist Party a group of communists from the Crimean Tatars, proven in battles for the Motherland, to send them to partisan detachments and to work in the rear;

3. To oblige the editors of the newspapers "Krasny Krym" and "Kyzyl Kyrym" (supplement to the first newspaper in the Tatar language) to direct the main content of printed propaganda to expose the fascist demagogy regarding the Tatar population, their flirting with national-religious feelings, to show that Hitlerism brings the Tatar heavy misfortunes for the people;

4. To make it the duty of the command of the partisan movement in Crimea to systematically destroy fascist mercenaries, traitors to the Tatar people, to mobilize the population itself for this. Establish regular contact with the Tatar villages, explain to the population the meaning of the events taking place, and involve them in an active struggle against the Nazi occupiers.

The ruling concluded: “The Bureau of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks believes that if our commanders and political workers of partisan detachments, as well as all partisan fighters, draw the right conclusions from this decision, there is every reason to believe that we will not only correct the mistakes made, but also help the majority our comrades from the Tatar part of the population to join the ranks of fighters for the common cause against the fascist reptiles".

The Soviet military-political leadership correctly analyzed the causes of collaborationism among the Crimean Tatar population, on the whole correctly pointed out mistakes and outlined really constructive ways to solve them. So, already in November 1942, the third secretary of the Crimean regional committee, R. Mustafaev, was sent “to the forest”, who headed the underground party center here. In the same month, he prepared a series of letters in the Crimean Tatar language. These letters were distributed among the population of the Tatar mountain villages and called for the termination of cooperation with the invaders. In parallel with this, radio and print propaganda were significantly strengthened, both from the "mainland" and in the Crimea itself. However, as subsequent events showed, the Soviet military-political leadership was at least half a year late: this period was the peak of the development of Crimean Tatar collaborationism and its consolidation with the occupation regime. Moreover, the desertion of Tatars from partisan detachments continued. As a result, on June 1, 1943, among the 262 Crimean partisans, there were only six (!) Crimean Tatars.

Of course, such a number of Crimean Tatars among the partisans during this period does not mean that all the rest served in volunteer formations. It is known that many of them participated in the Crimean underground. So, in September 1942, the communist A. Dagdzhi (nicknamed "Uncle Volodya"), sent from the Yalta partisan detachment, created an underground patriotic organization in Simferopol, uniting about 80 people. 2 / 3 of its composition were Tatars, including the mother and sister of the head of the organization. The rest are people of other nationalities. The underground workers were engaged in the distribution of newspapers and leaflets brought from the partisans from the forest, organized the escape of prisoners of war from the concentration camp, carried out economic sabotage. In June 1943, due to poor secrecy, the organization was uncovered. Most of its members (including the leader) were captured and executed.

But, and this is the most important thing, the Soviet government lost the battle to the Germans for the majority of the Tatar population, which under any regime remains politically passive. No, this population did not begin to support the occupiers, but they were not going to help the partisans either. A radical change in the mood of these people occurred only in the summer of 1943. The reverse process began: only now the Tatars began to experience a "crisis of loyalty" in relation to the German occupiers. What are the reasons for this change of orientation? Each of the groups of the Crimean Tatar population had their own. For example, the intelligentsia was dissatisfied with the fact that the Germans did not give their people any political rights and freedoms. The peasantry began to experience the pressure of constant requisitions: other people who did not want to work in "white gloves" were already at the head of the occupation administration. The main reason for the hostility of the city dwellers towards the Germans was that any of them could at any moment go to Germany, where the sad fate of the "Ostarbeiter" awaited him. In addition, at the end of 1942, rumors about the resettlement plans of the Nazis leaked to the Crimea. And naturally, many Tatars immediately realized that there was no place for them in the future Gotenland. Finally, if until the middle of 1942 the Germans used selective repressions, now they could well deal with the Crimean Tatar and burn down the Tatar village. These sentiments took shape in the first half of 1943. Certainly they were important. However, it should be recognized that without a common background - the victories of the Red Army on the Soviet-German front - they would not have received such development. The general dissatisfaction of the population with the German occupation regime began to manifest itself in the second half of 1943: more and more Crimean Tatars began to desire the return of the former power. And this dissatisfaction was expressed, first of all, in the fact that they began to support her " long arm» on the peninsula - partisans.

Members of the Crimean Tatar collaborationist formations were part of their people, and such a military-political situation also had a serious impact on them. Therefore, since the summer of 1943, both Soviet and German sources have noted a weakening of discipline and a drop in morale in parts of the "auxiliary order police." Under the influence of these reasons, underground organizations were created in many of them, the purpose of which was often to go over to the side of the partisans. So, according to the reports of Soviet agents, the commander of the 154th police battalion A. Kerimov was arrested by the SD as “unreliable”, and in the 147th battalion the Germans shot 76 policemen at once, considering them a “pro-Soviet element”. Nevertheless, by the winter of 1943, this process became irreversible. It was during this period that a massive influx of Crimean Tatars into partisan detachments began. It is known, for example, that by December 406 of them had come there, and 219 of them had previously served in various parts"auxiliary order police".

As a result, according to the personnel department of the KShPD, there were 3,453 people in partisan detachments on the territory of Crimea, 598 of whom were Crimean Tatars.

The process of decomposition affected even, it seemed, the most reliable volunteer units. In the autumn of 1943, the most devoted to the Germans and the most combat-ready self-defense company from the village of Koush, headed by Major A. Raimov, went over to the side of the partisans. According to one of the partisan commanders, I. Vergasov, who was directly involved in this story, Raimov was an extreme collaborator and, at the same time, a good professional. Behind him was a special police school in Germany, two "Insignia for the Eastern Peoples" on his uniform and the personal patronage of the SS chief G. Himmler. The head of the German police on the peninsula appreciated him very much, since Raimov knew the Crimean forests well.

Nevertheless, in November 1943, he and his people (about 60 people), having previously killed a German instructor lieutenant, went over to the side of the partisans of the Southern Connection. It is interesting that his commander M. Makedonsky did not "spread" the volunteers into units, but allowed them to create their own separate detachment. For some time, the Raimovites, led by their commander, operated quite successfully near Bakhchisarai. However, soon he and his inner circle were secretly arrested and taken by plane to Moscow. Raimov was shot there. The ordinary soldiers of the company who remained in the forests were distributed among the detachments of the Southern Connection. Vergasov explains the reasons for this incident in the spirit of Soviet propaganda. According to him, Raimov planned to find out all the secrets and locations of the partisans and unexpectedly deliver a mortal blow to the entire movement. It was hardly true. The author himself writes a few pages above that Raimov was a coward and was looking for a way to atone for his guilt on the eve of the collapse of his German masters.

Probably, there was a usual reinsurance. Reinsurance, because of which many newly minted partisans preferred to return to their volunteer formations than to endure constant checks and sidelong glances of new comrades (by the way, there were also such reverse “transitions”). In those circumstances, this was probably a justified measure. However, often this and similar cases led to the fact that the collaborationist formations that were already ready for the transition began to delay with him, losing precious time. Let us give just one typical example. In January 1944, the head of the Northern unit of the Crimean partisans, P. Yampolsky, established contact with the chief of staff of the 147th police battalion, Kemalov. Everything seemed to be ok. Nevertheless, the scout S. Useinov, sent to the meeting, brought some unexpected information.

"Your letter, - he reported to Yampolsky, - I personally handed over to the chief of staff of the 147th volunteer battalion Kemalov. He agreed to your proposal, but he is afraid that, they say, "even if the entire detachment completes this task, anyway, after the occupation of the city (Simferopol), we will all be punished one by one." I convinced him with my agent Komurdzhaev. However, he refused to give a subscription, saying that, they say, a piece of paper is a mere formality.

Since all volunteers have now been tacitly declared distrust, they are being monitored and a strict barracks regime has been established, we have outlined a plan of action in the following form. The detachment remains in the city and, when fleeing from the city of the enemy, occupies all posts at important objects: radio, bank, post office, bridges, the building of the regional party committee, theater, and also organizes the destruction of torchbearers. The detachment organizes a terrorist group that destroys and arrests enemies in the battalion itself, and also controls the Germans and SD agents. If the enemy demands an exit from the city in advance, Kemalov undertakes to turn the detachment into the mountains. The mood of the soldiers is anti-fascist. Kemalov even has to take individual guys under protection before the command. He also undertook to individually process individual company commanders and non-commissioned officers in order to create a consensus.

There are 240 people in the battalion, that is, four companies, the fighters are armed with Russian and German rifles, there are 20 machine guns..

As you can see, in this case, everything ended well. Most likely, an important role was played by the fact that Kemalov really wanted to earn indulgence from the "native Soviet authorities." However, the report of the partisan intelligence officer is interesting not only for this. From it we learn that "tacit distrust" has been declared to all volunteers. Well, it was a completely objective reaction of the Germans to the disloyalty of the Crimean Tatars. Only if the invaders fought against the Tatar civilian population by destroying the villages supporting the partisans (only in December 1943-January 1944, 128 of them were burned), then they acted differently with demoralized volunteer units. Usually they were disbanded, and the personnel, at best, were sent to the auxiliary formations of the Wehrmacht. At worst, as we have seen, former policemen were either shot or sent to a concentration camp.

As a result, according to the report of the chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 17th German army, on March 5, 1944, only five (out of eight) Tatar police battalions remained subordinate to the chief of police in Crimea: 147, 154, 150, 149 and 148 . Moreover, only the last three of them had a full complement. In the first two, there were not even half of the personnel (in parentheses, we note that Kemalov probably partially succeeded in the transition plan: his 147th battalion is listed as half empty).

These remaining battalions, as well as other police units, in which, according to the Soviet leadership, served "real volunteers, former dissatisfied Soviet power elements”, continued to fight with the partisans: some more, some less zealously. In April-May 1944, all of them took part in the battles against the units of the Red Army that liberated the Crimea. For example, according to the memoirs of the commissar of the 5th detachment of the Southern formation of the Crimean partisans I. Kupreev, volunteers from the Bakhchisaray police battalion fought very hard for the city. And after the end of the fighting, many Tatars hid the surviving Germans in their homes.

It should be recognized that the figure of 15,000–20,000 Crimean Tatar volunteers, although impressive, explains little on its own. As you know, everything is known in comparison. So here are a few other numbers:

At the beginning of hostilities for the Crimea (autumn 1941), about 20 thousand Crimean Tatars were serving in the Red Army. However, only a fifth of them were located outside the peninsula. The rest did not leave its borders, being concentrated in units intended for the defense of the Crimea. For example, in the 51st Army, where there were about 10 thousand Crimean Tatars. During the autumn battles of 1941, this army was defeated - it lost more than a third of its personnel only as prisoners and missing in action. An insignificant part managed to escape and cross to the Taman Peninsula;

During the period from 1941 to 1944, more than 12 thousand people of different nationalities fought in the partisan detachments of the Crimea. According to official figures, there were 1,130 Crimean Tatars in their ranks. Of these, 96 people died, 103 went missing and 177 deserted;

In the underground organizations on the territory of the peninsula for the period from 1941 to 1944 there were about 2,500 people. Less than 100 of them were Crimean Tatars;

The total number of Crimean Tatar volunteers in the German armed forces was 7-9% of the population of this people. At the same time, about 10 thousand Crimean Tatars, or about 5% of their total number, served in the Red Army during the war years.

The Soviet military-political leadership undoubtedly knew all these facts. Therefore, on April 13, 1944, when, in fact, the fighting for the peninsula was still going on and there was almost a month before its liberation, the people's commissars of internal affairs and state security adopted a joint resolution entitled "On measures to clear the territory of the Crimean ASSR from anti-Soviet elements." According to this decree, the local leadership of the relevant people's commissariats was entrusted with the task of identifying and detaining on the territory of the peninsula "agents of spy residencies of German and Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, traitors to the Motherland and traitors, active accomplices and henchmen of the Nazi occupiers, members of anti-Soviet organizations, bandit formations and other anti-Soviet elements assisting the occupiers".

"Cleansing" was to be carried out throughout the Crimea, as it was liberated. In order to better organize these events, the peninsula was divided into seven operational sectors: Staro-Krymsky, Yalta, Sevastopol, Simferopol, Kerch, Evpatoria and Dzhankoy, where 5 thousand people of the operational staff of the NKVD and the NKGB were sent. The duties of these employees included the development of plans and the implementation of operational and investigative actions during the “cleansing”. In addition, they were supposed to strengthen the personnel of local law enforcement and security agencies. For military support of all the proposed activities, 20 thousand people were allocated from the composition internal troops NKVD.

As you can see, in general, this decree applied to the entire population of Crimea, without taking into account the nationality of its individual groups. However, already the first two weeks of the “cleansing” led to the fact that the Soviet state security agencies were forced to pay attention to the Crimean Tatar issue and its role during the period of German occupation. So, on April 25, 1944, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. Beria submitted a memorandum to the State Defense Committee (GKO), in which the Crimean Tatar collaborators were first singled out from among other German accomplices. This document specifically stated:

The “Tatar National Committee” (Dzhemil Abdureshid), having its branches in all the Tatar regions of Crimea, recruited spy agents to be sent to the rear, mobilized volunteers for the Tatar division created by the Germans, sent the local, non-Tatar population to work in Germany, etc. ” Thus, while schematically, the main areas of activity of the Crimean Tatar collaborators were named.

This Beria memorandum summed up the first two weeks of operational and investigative measures on the Crimean Peninsula and was in many ways far from exhaustive. Therefore, already on May 10, 1944, the day after the complete liberation of the Crimea, he prepared another one. This memorandum was markedly different from the previous document, since all of its informative part was based on more detailed and verified facts. Another feature of this note was its final part. If in the first document Beria only informed the GKO about the facts of collaborationism among the Crimean Tatars, then in the second he already proposed punishment for them. Thus, the People's Commissar emphasized: “The NKVD and NKGB authorities are carrying out work in Crimea to identify and seize enemy agents, traitors to the Motherland, accomplices of the Nazi invaders and other anti-Soviet elements. As of May 7 this year, 5,381 such persons have been arrested. Weapons illegally stored by the population were confiscated: 5,995 rifles, 337 machine guns, 250 machine guns, 31 mortars and a large number of grenades and rifle cartridges ... they fought with weapons in their hands against the Red Army ... Considering the treacherous actions of the Crimean Tatars against Soviet people and proceeding from the undesirability of the further residence of the Crimean Tatars on the border outskirts of the Soviet Union, the NKVD of the USSR submits for your consideration a draft decision of the State Defense Committee on the eviction of all Tatars from the territory of Crimea".

Stalin fully agreed with the opinion of Beria. As a result, the next day, the GKO decree appeared, which indicated the following reasons for the deportation of the Crimean Tatars:

“During the Great Patriotic War, many Crimean Tatars betrayed their homeland, deserted from the units of the Red Army defending the Crimea, and went over to the side of the enemy, joined the volunteer Tatar military units formed by the Germans, who fought against the Red Army; during the occupation of the Crimea by the Nazi troops, participating in the German punitive detachments, the Crimean Tatars especially distinguished themselves by their brutal reprisals against Soviet partisans, and also helped the German invaders in organizing the forcible deportation of Soviet citizens into German slavery and the mass extermination of Soviet people.

The Crimean Tatars actively cooperated with the German occupation authorities, participating in the so-called "Tatar National Committees" organized by German intelligence, and were widely used by the Germans to send spies and saboteurs to the rear of the Red Army. "Tatar National Committees", in which the White Guard-Tatar emigrants played the main role, with the support of the Crimean Tatars, directed their activities to the persecution and oppression of the non-Tatar population of Crimea and carried out work to prepare the forcible secession of Crimea from the Soviet Union with the help of the German armed forces ".

As you know, the deportation of the Crimean Tatars began on May 18, 1944 and lasted three days. In total, 191,044 representatives of this people were evicted from Crimea during the specified period. Most of them were settled on the territory of the Uzbek SSR, a smaller part - in other republics of Central Asia and in Russia. This, in general, was the sad result of the cooperation of a part of the Crimean Tatar people with Nazi Germany.