Ural Tank Plant 183. Tank industry: evacuation test (9 photos)

At the famous Kharkov Tractor Plant (KhTZ), which once produced not only tractors, but tracked military equipment - the same MTLBs, the "LIQUIDATION" operation began:

“They have already begun to cut the iron foundry and steel foundry. The molds are being taken out of the iron foundry. As far as I know, they are being taken to Smela in the Cherkasy region. Nobody explains anything to us, of course. They cut all day. They just destroy everything, turning it into scrap metal,” they say factory employees.

Tank (armored tractor) HTZ-16 (post-war copy) in Kyiv.

Kharkov Tractor Plant named after Sergo Ordzhonikidze and years of work has released more than 3 million tractors into the fields different models and modifications. KhTZ is the largest and the only enterprise in Ukraine and the CIS countries that simultaneously manufactured caterpillar, wheeled and universal tractors with power from 12 to 220 hp.

It is usually mistakenly believed that it was at KhTZ in Kharkov that the famous T-34 tanks were made. This is not so - the plant of Malyshev and Morozov Design Bureau, where the famous 34 was born - this is a steam locomotive plant not far from the Metallist stadium and the Horse Market. But KhTZ produced tanks.

As early as the beginning of 1932, after a series of tests and trials, the mechanization department of the Red Army recognized the armored tractor as unsuitable for combat operations - the ersatz tanks did not justify themselves.

And only against the backdrop of the nightmare of the summer of 1941, on July 20, 1941, following the results of the meeting of the State Defense Committee of the USSR, Resolution No. 219 “On organizing the production of 2 thousand armored tractors” was adopted. In accordance with it, it was planned to deploy mass production of armored tractors at two leading tractor-building enterprises: the Kharkov Tractor Plant (KhTZ) and the Stalingrad Tractor Plant (STZ). Moreover, the armored tractors were supposed to be a by-product: at the same time, the factories were preparing for the production of tanks: medium T-34s at Stalingrad and light T-60s at Kharkov.

By the time of the evacuation (September 18, 1941), no more than a hundred armored sets for tractors had been delivered to Kharkov from the Novokramatorsky plant, while more than 800 tractor tracked chassis for the KhT3-16 had already been prepared at KhTZ, another 142 were produced. This is where the story of the T-16 KhTZ ended.

In exactly one month, all tank production of the Kharkov plant was curtailed and sent to a new location. Instead of the Kharkov Tractor Plant, the Ural Tank Plant No. 183 appeared.

On October 19, the plant was located on the territory of the Ural Carriage Works in Nizhny Tagil. The Moscow Machine Tool Plant named after S. Ordzhonikidze, part of the equipment and employees of the Moscow Krasny Proletary and Stankolit factories were evacuated to the same site.

By the end of December 1941, the first 25 T-34 tanks were assembled. By this time, eleven enterprises had been evacuated here, including the Kharkov Locomotive Plant and the Bezhitsky Steel Plant. Until the end of the war, Uralvagonzavod produced 25,266 T-34s. Every second T-34 that took part in the hostilities left the assembly line of this plant.

Hull welding at factory #183. 1942

There is no need to talk about what UVZ is producing today. But one of his parents, HTZ, is now dying. And this is good - they will NEVER produce self-propelled guns "Gvozdika" on it.

Note. On June 4, 2016, the SBU announced that KhTZ CEO Andriy Koval (photo below) was put on the wanted list. According to the Ukrainian secret services, he prepared for the dismantling and export to Russia of foundry equipment, and was also preparing to dismiss almost a third of the workers from the enterprise.

In the summer, the SBU claimed that everything was going to a complete cessation of the plant, where it was planned to place an order from the Ministry of Defense of the Junta - the production of self-propelled guns. Back in early May, KhTZ announced searches conducted by the SBU in the office of the enterprise, during which financial and other documents were seized. At that time, no charges were officially filed against the tractor production.

And here is an earlier story - August 2014:

PJSC "Kharkiv Tractor Plant" was unable to renew the license for the production of dual-use equipment.

This was announced on August 22 CEO enterprises Vladislav Gubin. According to him, a license was needed for the production of snow and swamp vehicles based on a lightly armored multi-purpose tractor, which was recognized as a dual-use vehicle. The license was to be extended by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

“After the production of dual-use equipment was prohibited at our plant, we supported this production for another six months, paying wages to workers. They hoped that it would be possible to prove the need to continue production. Now the site has been disbanded, about 200 workers have been fired. KhTZ irrevocably lost its competence in the production of military equipment and dual-use equipment, including the Gvozdika howitzer. It is impossible to restore production. The topic is closed,” said the director of the plant.

According to Gubin, every month the company received about UAH 30 million from sales of snow and swamp vehicles. “In addition, India's order for a lightly armored multi-purpose tractor worth $900 million has been lost. MTLB is unique technique, it has no analogues in the world,” said Gubin.

According to him, the plant proved to the authorities that geologists and oil workers needed snow and swamp vehicles for civilian purposes, and there was no need to ban their production. “These non-military vehicles are in demand due to their unique cross-country ability and buoyancy, they can deliver cargo to hard-to-reach areas. And any machine can be recognized as a dual-use technique. For example, they put a bazooka on our tractor in Africa, so the tractor can also be recognized military equipment. But no arguments were accepted,” Gubin said.

That is, the Junta itself systematically choked and is choking even the production of military equipment, if it finds a market abroad. In fact, with the hands of the Junta, the Yankees are fighting against any competitive industries in the remnants of Ukraine.

Kharkov Tractor Plant was founded in 1930. The volume of production at the enterprise before the coup (in 2012) exceeded 1.6 thousand tractors, the revenue amounted to more than 635 million hryvnia (77.6 million dollars). After the coup, everything was covered with a copper basin.

In August 1941, by decision of the State Defense Committee, on the basis of Uralvagonzavod and 11 evacuated enterprises, the Ural Tank Plant No. Comintern.

At the end of 1941, eleven enterprises were evacuated here from the western part of the USSR, including a group of scientists from the Bauman Moscow Higher Technical School, the State Union Laboratory cutting tools and electric welding named after Ignatiev, Moscow machine-tool plant named after Ordzhonikidze, Kharkov tank plant No. 183, Mariupol armored plant named after Ilyich, Kharkov steam locomotive plant, Bezhitsky steel plant. The Ural Carriage Works, one after another, curtailed production: a carriage, an experimental workshop, freeing up sites for the creation of the new Ural Tank Plant on the basis of the enterprises evacuated to Nizhny Tagil. The basis of its production was the Kharkov Tank Plant No. 183 named after the Comintern. The director of plant No. 183, Yury Evgenievich Maksarev, arrived in Nizhny Tagil. By order of the plant dated November 14, 1941, the scheme for organizing the management of the plant was approved.

During the war, UTZ produced 25,266 T-34 tanks. Every second T-34 tank that took part in the hostilities left the assembly line of this plant. In addition, the plant produced 63 thousand artillery limbers, hundreds of thousands of air bombs, shells and guides for self-propelled missiles. anti-aircraft installations("Katyusha"). For two aircraft factories evacuated from Moscow and Leningrad, UTZ supplied about four thousand armored hulls of IL-2 aircraft. Every ninth legendary attack aircraft had a UTZ armored hull. The Ural Tank Plant in 1943 played an exceptional role in the creation of the Ural Volunteer tank corps. Of the more than 200 tanks needed to complete the corps, he produced 145. In the spring of 1943, 185 factory workers left as volunteers for the front. Total on the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War more than six thousand workers fought, of which 3111 people gave their lives for their homeland. Ural Tank Plant No. 183 was awarded the Orders of the Red Banner of Labor (1942), the Order of the Red Banner (1943), and the Order of the Patriotic War, I degree (1945), for their services in creating tanks during the Great Patriotic War. 28,000 tank builders were awarded the medal "For Valiant Labor in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945."

On the basis of Decree No. 667 / SGKO, the director of the plant, Yu.E. Maksarev gave the order to evacuate the plant to the rear. The first echelon left Kharkov on September 19 and headed to the Urals, to Nizhny Tagil, to the vast territory of the Ural Carriage Works (in total, 43 echelons were sent by the second decade of October). The Moscow Machine-Tool Plant named after S. Ordzhonikidze, part of the equipment of the Moscow factories "Krasny Proletarian", "Stankolit" and some other institutions arrived at the same site.

The first tank at the new location was already assembled on December 18, and by December 31, 25 combat vehicles were assembled and handed over to the troops from units and parts brought from Kharkov. The arrangement of equipment on the new site of the plant was carried out based on the production of 20 T-34 tanks per day. For this, it was necessary to have 1200-1250 machine tools and at least 2000 workers. 1254 machine tools arrived from Kharkov (including auxiliary ones). On November 1, 1941, Plant No. 183 had 6,324 production and 5,813 auxiliary workers at Uralvagonzavod. Of these, 2500 - plant number 183, 550 - Mariupol plant named after. Ilyich, 150 - plant No. 184 "Kommunar" (Mariupol) and 12 skilled workers of the plant "Red Profintern" (Mariupol). And yet this number barely provided 60% of the need for factory workers. By November 20, 1941, the plant had about 11,000 workers of various qualifications.

The conditions caused by the war and the forced evacuation of a large number of industrial enterprises to the Urals created many difficulties in expanding tank production at the new production area. Almost all subcontractors that previously supplied plant No. 183 with appliances, rubber, electrical equipment, etc. stopped deliveries due to evacuation. These difficulties were superimposed by problems caused by the need for the speedy restructuring of Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) for the production of tanks and requiring exclusively great job all parts of the plant. In the interests quick decision From the very first days of its stay in Nizhny Tagil, the design department of plant No. 183 reorganized the work of designers and directed all its attention only to revising the design of the T-34 tank parts so that they would meet the production capabilities available at UVZ. In late November - early December 1941, in the conditions of the harsh Ural winter, the staff of plant No. 183 had to simultaneously plan future workshops, mount equipment, start production and produce the first Ural T-34 tanks.

At the end of 1941 - the first half of 1942, the production of T-34 tanks was carried out at three plants: No. 183 in Nizhny Tagil, Stalingrad Tractor Plant (STZ) and No. 112 Krasnoye Sormovo in Gorky. Plant No. 183 was considered the head plant, as well as its design bureau - department 520. It was assumed that all changes made to the design of the thirty-four by other enterprises would be approved here. In fact, everything looked a little different. Only remained unshakable TTX of the tank, in the details of the machines of different manufacturers differed significantly from each other.

((direct))

Generic signs

For example, from October 25, 1941, at plant No. 112, they began to manufacture prototypes of simplified armored hulls - without machining the edges of the sheets after gas cutting, with a “quarter” connection of parts and a spike connection of the frontal sheet with sides and fender liner.

On the drawings of the head plant, received by Krasnoye Sormovo, there was a hatch in the rear wall of the tower, closed by a removable armor plate with six bolts. The hatch was intended for dismantling a damaged gun in the field. According to their technology, the metallurgists of the plant cast a solid aft wall of the tower, and a hole for the hatch was cut out on milling machine. It soon became clear that when firing from a machine gun, a vibration occurs in the removable sheet, leading to the separation of the bolts and its disruption.

Attempts to abandon the hatch were made repeatedly, but each time representatives of the customer objected. Then the head of the weapons sector, A. S. Okunev, proposed using two tank jacks to raise the rear of the tower. At the same time, in the hole formed between its shoulder strap and the roof of the hull, the gun, removed from the trunnions, freely rolled out onto the roof of the MTO. During tests, a stop was welded onto the leading edge of the hull roof, which prevented the turret from slipping during lifting.

The production of such towers began at factory number 112 on March 1, 1942. The military envoy A. A. Afanasiev proposed instead of a thrust strip for the entire width of the roof of the hull, to weld an armored visor, which would simultaneously serve as an emphasis and protect the gap between the end of the tower and the roof of the hull from bullets and shrapnel. Later, this visor and the absence of a hatch in the rear wall of the tower became hallmarks Sormovo tanks.

Due to the loss of many subcontractors, tank builders had to show miracles of ingenuity. So, in connection with the cessation of supplies from Dnepropetrovsk of air cylinders for emergency engine start at Krasny Sormovo, they began to use artillery shells rejected for machining for their manufacture.

They got out as best they could at the STZ: from August 1941, there were interruptions in the supply of rubber from Yaroslavl, so from October 29, all thirty-fours at the STZ began to be equipped with cast road wheels with internal shock absorption. As a result of the characteristic external feature Stalingrad tanks was the lack of rubber bandages on all road wheels. A new track design with a straightened treadmill was also developed, which made it possible to reduce noise when the machine was moving. Eliminated the "rubber" and on the drive and guide wheels.

One more characteristic feature tanks STZ steel hull and turret, manufactured according to a simplified technology developed by plant number 264 following the example of "Krasny Sormovo". The armor parts of the hull were interconnected into a "thorn". The options in the "castle" and in the "quarter" were preserved only in the connection of the upper frontal hull sheet with the roof and the bottom with the lower sheets of the bow and stern. As a result of a significant reduction in the amount of machining of parts, the hull assembly cycle was reduced from nine days to two. As for the tower, they began to weld it from sheets of raw armor, followed by hardening already assembled. At the same time, the need for straightening parts after hardening was completely eliminated, and their fitting during assembly “in place” was facilitated.

The Stalingrad tractor plant produced and repaired tanks right up to the moment when the front line approached the factory shops. On October 5, 1942, in accordance with the order of the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry (NKTP), all work at the STZ was stopped, and the remaining workers were evacuated.

Plant No. 183 remained the main manufacturer of thirty-fours in 1942, although after the evacuation it did not manage to reach the required mode immediately. In particular, the plan for the first three months of 1942 was not fulfilled. The subsequent growth in the production of tanks was based, on the one hand, on a clear and rational organization of production, and on the other, on a decrease in the labor intensity of manufacturing the T-34. A detailed revision of the design of the machine was made, as a result of which the manufacture of 770 was simplified and the manufacture of 5641 items was completely canceled. 206 purchased items were also cancelled. The labor intensity of the hull machining has decreased from 260 to 80 standard hours.

Has undergone significant changes chassis. In Nizhny Tagil, they began to cast road wheels like the Stalingrad ones - without rubber tires. Starting from January 1942, three or four such rollers were installed on one side of the tank. Scarce rubber was removed from the guide and drive wheels. The latter, in addition, was made in one piece - without rollers.

The oil cooler was excluded from the engine lubrication system and the oil tank capacity was increased to 50 liters. In the power system, the gear pump was replaced by a rotary type pump. Due to the short supply of electrical components until the spring of 1942, most tanks did not install some instrumentation, headlights, taillight, fan electric motor, signal and TPU.

It should be emphasized that in a number of cases, changes aimed at simplifying the design and reducing the labor intensity of manufacturing combat vehicles were not justified. Some of them subsequently turned into a decrease in the operational characteristics of the T-34.

Helped by science and ingenuity

The increase in the production of thirty-fours in 1942 was facilitated by the introduction, first at plant No. 183, and then at other enterprises, of automatic submerged arc welding, developed by Academician E. O. Paton. The 183rd plant turned out to be the leader in this matter not by chance - by the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Institute of Electric Welding of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR was evacuated to Nizhny Tagil, and to the territory of the Ural Tank Plant.

In January 1942, as an experiment, a hull was made, in which one side was welded by hand, and the other side and nose were submerged. After that, to determine the strength of the seams, the hull was sent to the landfill. As E. O. Paton said in his memoirs, “the tank was subjected to fierce shelling from a very short distance with armor-piercing and high-explosive shells. The very first hits on the side, welded by hand, caused a solid destruction of the seam. After that, the tank was turned and the second side, welded by a machine gun, came under fire ... Seven hits in a row! Our seams survived, did not succumb! They were stronger than the armor itself. The seams of the nose section also withstood the test of fire. It was complete victory automatic high-speed welding.

At the factory, welding was put on a conveyor. Several wagon bogies left from pre-war production were rolled into the workshop, bevels were cut out in their frames according to the configuration of the sides of the tank hull. Above the line of carts, a tent of beams was placed so that the welding heads could move along the beams along and across the body, and by connecting all the carts together, they got a conveyor. At the first position, transverse seams were welded, at the next, longitudinal ones, then the body was moved to the edge, first on one side, then on the other. Finished welding by turning the body upside down. Some places where it was impossible to use the machine were cooked by hand. Thanks to the use of automatic welding, the labor intensity of manufacturing the case has decreased by five times. By the end of 1942, only six automatic welding machines were operating at plant No. 183. By the end of 1943, their number at tank factories reached 15, and a year later - 30.

Along with the problems of welding, the production of cast towers, which were molded into the ground, remained a bottleneck. This technology required more work on trimming and gas trimming sprues and fills in the seams between the mold blocks. The chief metallurgist of the plant, P.P. Malyarov, and the head of the steel shop, I.I. Atopov, proposed introducing machine molding. But this required a completely new design of the tower. Her project in the spring of 1942 was developed by M. A. Nabutovsky. It went down in history as a tower of the so-called hexagonal or improved form. Both names are very conditional, since the previous tower also had a hexagonal shape, perhaps more elongated and plastic. As for “improvement”, this definition entirely refers to manufacturing technology, since the new tower was still very cramped and uncomfortable for the crew. For its close to the correct hexagon shape, it was nicknamed "nut" by tankers.

More manufacturers, worse quality

In accordance with the order of the GKO dated October 31, 1941, Uralmashzavod (Ural Heavy Engineering Plant, UZTM) was connected to the armored hull production for the T-34 and KV. However, until March 1942, he only issued cutouts of hulls, which he supplied to Krasnoye Sormovo and Nizhny Tagil. In April 1942, the complete assembly hulls and the manufacture of thirty-four turrets for plant No. 183. And on July 28, 1942, UZTM was instructed to organize the production of the entire T-34 tank and double the production of turrets for it due to the shutdown of plant No. 264.

Serial production of the T-34 began at Uralmash in September 1942. At the same time, many problems arose, for example, with the towers - due to the increase in the program, the foundries could not ensure the implementation of the plan. By decision of the director of the plant, B. G. Muzurukov, the free capacities of the 10,000-ton Shleman press were used. Designer I. F. Vakhrushev and technologist V. S. Ananiev developed the design of a stamped tower, and from October 1942 to March 1944, 2050 units were manufactured. At the same time, UZTM not only fully provided for its program, but also delivered a significant number of such towers to the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant (ChKZ).

However, Uralmash did not produce tanks for long - until August 1943. Then this enterprise became the main manufacturer of self-propelled guns based on the T-34.

In an effort to compensate for the inevitable loss of the Stalingrad Tractor, in July 1942, the State Defense Committee gave the task of starting the production of thirty-fours at ChKZ. The first tanks left his workshops on August 22. In March 1944, their production at this enterprise was stopped in order to increase the production of heavy tanks IS-2.

In 1942, plant No. 174 named after K. E. Voroshilov, evacuated from Leningrad to Omsk, also joined the production of the T-34. The design and technological documentation was handed over to him by Plant No. 183 and UZTM.

Speaking about the production of T-34 tanks in 1942-1943, it should be noted that by the fall of 1942, a crisis of their quality had come. This was led to a constant quantitative growth in the manufacture of thirty-fours and the attraction of more and more new enterprises to it. The problem was considered at a conference of NKTP factories held on September 11-13, 1942 in Nizhny Tagil. It was led by the deputy commissar of the tank industry Zh. Ya. Kotin. In the speeches of him and the chief inspector of the NKTP G. O. Gutman, harsh criticism of the factory teams was voiced.

The spacing had an effect: during the second half of 1942 - the first half of 1943, many changes and improvements were introduced on the T-34. Since the autumn of 1942, external fuel tanks began to be installed on tanks - aft rectangular or onboard cylindrical (on ChKZ vehicles) shape. At the end of November, the drive wheel with rollers was returned to the thirty-four, stamped road wheels with rubber tires were introduced. From January 1943, tanks were equipped with Cyclone air cleaners, and from March-June, five-speed gearboxes. In addition, the ammunition load was increased to 100 artillery rounds, and an exhaust turret fan was introduced. In 1943, the PT-4-7 periscope sight was replaced with the PTK-5 commander's panorama, and many other, smaller improvements were introduced, such as landing rails on the turret.

Serial production of T-34 tanks of the 1942 model (as unofficially, but they are most often referred to in the literature) was carried out at factories No. 183 in Nizhny Tagil, No. 174 in Omsk, UZTM in Sverdlovsk and ChKZ in Chelyabinsk. Until July 1943, 11,461 tanks of this modification were produced.

In the summer of 1943, the T-34 began to install commander's cupola. An interesting detail: three plants - No. 183, Uralmash and Krasnoye Sormovo defend priority in this matter in their reports on tank building during the Great Patriotic War. In fact, the Tagilites offered to place a turret in the rear of the turret behind the hatches and put a third tanker in the turret, as on an experimental T-43 tank. But even two crew members were cramped in the "nut", what a third! The Uralmash turret, although it was located above the left commander's turret hatch, was of a stamped design, and it was also rejected. And only cast Sormovo "registered" on the thirty-four.

In this form, the T-34s were mass-produced until the middle of 1944, and the last to complete their production was plant No. 174 in Omsk.

Meeting with the Tigers

It was these vehicles that bore the brunt of the fiercest tank confrontation on the Kursk Bulge (in parts of the Voronezh and Central Fronts, thirty-fours accounted for 62%), including the famous Prokhorov battle. The latter, contrary to the prevailing stereotype, did not take place on any single field, like Borodino, but unfolded on a front with a length of up to 35 km and was a series of separate tank battles.

On the evening of July 10, 1943, the command of the Voronezh Front received an order from the Supreme Command Headquarters to launch a counterattack on the group German troops advancing in the Prokhorovka direction. For this purpose, the 5th Guards Army of Lieutenant General A. S. Zhadov and the 5th Guards Tank Army of Lieutenant General were transferred from the reserve Steppe Front to the Voronezh Front tank troops P. A. Rotmistrova (the first tank army of uniform composition). Its formation began on February 10, 1943. Back to top Battle of Kursk it was stationed in the Ostrogozhsk region (Voronezh region) and included the 18th and 29th tank corps, as well as the 5th guards mechanized corps.

On July 6, at 2300, an order was received demanding that the army be concentrated on the right bank of the Oskol River. Already at 23.15 the advance detachment of the association set off, and after 45 minutes the main forces moved behind it. It is necessary to note the impeccable organization of the redeployment. On the routes of the columns, oncoming traffic was prohibited. The army marched around the clock, with short halts to refuel their vehicles. The march was reliably covered by anti-aircraft artillery and aircraft, and thanks to this, it went unnoticed by enemy reconnaissance. In three days, the association moved 330–380 km. At the same time, there were almost no cases of failure of combat vehicles for technical reasons, which indicates both the increased reliability of tanks and their competent maintenance.

On July 9, the 5th Guards Tank Army concentrated in the Prokhorovka area. It was assumed that the association with two tank corps attached to it - the 2nd and 2nd Guards at 10.00 on July 12, would attack the German troops and, together with the 5th and 6th Guards Combined Arms Armies, as well as the 1st Tank Army, would destroy the wedged on Oboyan direction of the enemy grouping, preventing its retreat to the south. However, the preparation of a counterattack, which began on July 11, was thwarted by the Germans, who delivered two powerful blows to our defenses: one in the direction of Oboyan, the other on Prokhorovka. As a result of the partial withdrawal of our troops, artillery, which played a significant role in the counterattack, suffered losses both in deployment positions and in movement towards the front line.

July 12 at 8.30 the main forces of the German troops as part of the motorized divisions of the SS "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", "Reich" and "Dead Head", numbering up to 500 tanks and assault guns, went on the offensive in the direction of Prokhorovka station. At the same time, after a 15-minute artillery preparation, the German group was attacked by the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army, which led to the deployment of an oncoming tank battle, in which about 1200 armored vehicles took part on both sides. Despite the fact that the 5th Guards Tank Army, which operated in the 17-19 km zone, was able to achieve a density of battle formations of up to 45 tanks per 1 km, it was unable to complete the task. The losses of the army amounted to 328 tanks and self-propelled guns, and together with attached units reached 60% of the original number.

So the new German heavy tanks turned out to be a hard nut to crack for the T-34. “We were afraid of these “Tigers” on the Kursk Bulge,” recalled the former commander of the thirty-four E. Noskov, “I honestly admit. From his 88-mm cannon, he, the "Tiger", with a blank, that is, an armor-piercing projectile, pierced through our thirty-four from a distance of two thousand meters. And we, from a 76-mm cannon, could hit this thickly armored beast only from a distance of five hundred meters and closer with a new sub-caliber projectile ... "

Another testimony of a participant in the Battle of Kursk - the commander of a tank company of the 10th tank corps P. I. Gromtsev: “First they fired at the Tigers from 700 meters. shoots our tanks. Favored only strong July heat - "Tigers" here and there caught fire. It turned out later that gasoline fumes often flared up, accumulating in the engine compartment of the tank. It was possible to directly knock out the "Tiger" or "Panther" only from 300 meters, and then only on board. A lot of our tanks then burned down, but our brigade nevertheless pressed the Germans for two kilometers. But we were at the limit, we couldn’t withstand such a fight again. ”

N. Ya. Zheleznov, a veteran of the 63rd Guards Tank Brigade of the Ural Volunteer Tank Corps, had the same opinion about the Tigers: 500 meters, they stood at open space. And try to come? He will burn you for 1200-1500 meters! They were cheeky. In essence, while there was no 85-mm gun, we, like hares, ran from the "Tigers" and looked for an opportunity to somehow wriggle out of it and slam it into the side. It was hard. If you see that a "Tiger" is standing at a distance of 800-1000 meters and begins to "baptize" you, then while moving the barrel horizontally, you can still sit in the tank. As soon as you start to drive vertically, it's better to jump out. You will burn! It didn’t happen with me, but the guys jumped out. Well, when the T-34-85 appeared, it was already possible to go one on one ... "

On the basis of Decree No. 667 / SGKO of September 12, 1941, the director of the plant, Yu.E. Maksarev gave the order to evacuate the plant to the rear.

The first echelon left Kharkov on September 19 and headed to the Urals, to Nizhny Tagil, to the vast territory of the Ural Carriage Works (in total, 43 echelons were sent by the second decade of October).

The Moscow Machine-Tool Plant named after S. Ordzhonikidze, part of the equipment of the Moscow factories "Krasny Proletarian", "Stankolit" and some other institutions arrived at the same site. On the basis of these enterprises, the Ural Tank Plant No. 183 was formed.

The first tank at the new location was already assembled on December 18, and by December 31, 25 combat vehicles were assembled and handed over to the troops from units and parts brought from Kharkov.

The arrangement of equipment on the new site of the plant was carried out at the rate of production of 20 tanks per day. For this, it was necessary to have 1200-1250 machine tools and at least 2000 workers. 1254 machine tools arrived from Kharkov (including auxiliary ones).

On November 1, 1941, Plant No. 183 had 6,324 production and 5,813 auxiliary workers at Uralvagonzavod. Of these, 2500 - plant number 183, 550 - Mariupol plant named after. Ilyich, 150 - plant number 184 "Kommunar" (Mariupol) and 12 skilled workers of the plant "Red Profintern" (Mariupol).

And yet this number barely provided 60% of the need for factory workers. By November 20, 1941, the plant had about 11,000 workers of various qualifications. The conditions caused by the war and the forced evacuation of a large number of industrial enterprises to the Urals created many difficulties in expanding tank production at the new production area.

Almost all subcontractors that previously supplied plant No. 183 with appliances, rubber, electrical equipment, etc. cut off deliveries in connection with the evacuation. These difficulties were superimposed by problems caused by the need for the speedy restructuring of Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) for the production of tanks and requiring exceptionally hard work from all parts of the plant.

In the interests of a quick solution to this complex and responsible task, the design department of plant No. 183 from the very first days of its stay in Nizhny Tagil reorganized the work of designers and directed all its attention only to revising the design of the parts of the T-34 tank so that they corresponded to the production capabilities available at UVZ.

In late November - early December 1941, in the conditions of the harsh Ural winter, the staff of plant No. 183 had to simultaneously plan future workshops, mount equipment, start production and produce the first Ural T-34 tanks.

How this work was carried out can be judged from the summary of Uralvagonzavod, compiled by the senior representative of the VP (military acceptance) of plant No. 183 Kozyrev and sent on December 20, 1941 to the head of the BTU GABTU KA Korobkov: 170 tanks were produced. As of December 20, 1941 - 65 tanks. In fact, there are 11 tanks accepted by the run. There are no definitive shipments. Non-fulfillment of the program - due to machine shops, instead of 963 machines, 717 were installed, and only 435 were in operation.

In January 1942 (g.), the plant can produce 120 - 150 tanks, subject to the normal operation of the thermal shops of the former Mariupol plant. Due to the lack of radio stations, only line tanks will be produced.

Moshchansky I. Tanks T-34-76, T-34-57 in the battles for Moscow.

The evacuation of plant No. 183 from Kharkov to Nizhny Tagil, to the Uralvagonzavod site, began in the second half of September and ended in mid-October 1941. During this time, 43 echelons with equipment, people, materials and blanks were sent from Kharkov.

At the new site, other evacuated enterprises joined plant No. 183: the Mariupol Ilyich Metallurgical Plant and the Moscow Orzhonikidze Machine-Tool Plant.

The installation of equipment in Nizhny Tagil was carried out based on the calculation of the output of 20 per day, for which it was necessary to have up to 1250 machines that worked only for production (without auxiliary equipment) and at least 20,000 workers. 1254 machine tools were brought from Kharkov (together with auxiliary ones), and workers by the beginning of November

In 1941, there were only 11,000, including the former staff of Uralvagonzavod. Therefore, additional contingents of workers from other cities were transferred to Nizhny Tagil, as well as a large number of people who did not dare industrial qualifications. The new enterprise was named Ural Tank Plant No. 183.

In December 1941, plant No. 183 assembled the first 25 T-34 tanks from the brought Kharkov backlog, and by the beginning of 1942, almost all the evacuated equipment was installed and prepared for launch. It should be said that the site of Uralvagonzavod made it possible to accommodate three evacuated enterprises without any problems. In addition, there was a powerful steel and hot-forging production. This feature, along with the loss of supplier factories, required a large number of design and technological changes to be made to the design of T-34 components and parts.

Tank production in Nizhny Tagil was organized according to the principle of a complete cycle in Yahoo - the workshop that manufactured parts. he assembled components and mechanisms from them. In total, 16 main workshops were created: mechanical assembly "PO" (chassis) and "119" (transmission). fastener "125" (bolts, nuts, studs, etc.), body parts "710" (machining of body parts), forging "630" (hot stamping), press "640" (cold stamping), stamped fasteners " 690", foundry - "550" (small steel casting). "563" (large steel casting). "595" (non-ferrous casting), thermal "680" (heat treatment of parts), copper "160" (radiators, tanks, tubes, etc.), assembly "130" (assembly of tanks), hull department "700" (assembly and welding of hulls and towers), instrumental "430" (tool manufacturing) and mechanical repair "800" (equipment repair). In addition, there were several auxiliary workshops.

During the deployment of T-34 production in Nizhny Tagil, 1691 pieces of equipment were restored, modernized and installed, 4876 fixtures, 1025 cold stamps, 215 molds and 200 sets of metal models were manufactured.

Processing of the upper edge of cast towers on a grinding machine.

Plant No. 183, 1942 (RGAE).