The destroyer guarding the project 7. Stalin series

Project 7 destroyers, also known as Gnevny-class destroyers, are a type of destroyers built for the Soviet Union. Navy in the second half of the 1930s. One of the most massive types of destroyers in history Soviet fleet. Their design and construction was personally supervised by the head of the country. Therefore, the "sevens" were unofficially called the destroyers of the "Stalinist series". The lead ship was the Wrathful.

He became a member of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in 1938. A total of 53 units were laid down. Of these, 28 were completed according to the original project. 18 were completed under the 7U project. 6 were dismantled on the slipway. One ("Resolute") sank while being towed in a storm after launching and was not completed. The main caliber of the "Wrathful" is four 130 mm guns. Thirty-kilogram shells of one hundred and thirty flew 33 km, in the literal sense of the word - beyond the horizon. At the same time, the rate of fire of the main guns reached 13 rounds per minute. There were also torpedoes to match the artillery - the main heavy gun"sevens". Two three-tube apparatus fired the latest Soviet torpedoes of the 53-39 type. They were put into service just before the war. Torpedoes carried 317 kg of powerful explosives at a distance of up to 10 km.
"Naval cavalry" - the destroyers were called so for their speed and maneuverability. In the design of these ships, everything was subject to speed. That is why they did not put heavy armor protection on them, as on cruisers. Project 7 destroyers were designed for artillery combat and torpedo attacks. They had powerful artillery weapons, modern systems fire control, reliable power plants. But during the war, for their intended purpose, the "seven", like other ships of the Soviet fleet, were almost never used. However, today I have 10 cases for you. combat use destroyers of the "Stalinist series".

1. On March 28, 1942, the destroyer Thundering left Murmansk for Medvezhiy Island. The task is to meet and escort convoy PQ-13 to the Kola Bay. On the third day of a tense military campaign, the signalman saw an obscure silhouette through binoculars. After a few seconds, he disappeared, as if dissolving among the waves. The submarine is going to dive. The commander of the ship, captain of the 3rd rank Gurin, immediately gave the order: - Full speed ahead! Bombs go! "Thundering" rushed to the attack. The Red Navy took their places at the stern bombers. - "Reset the first series! The first went! The second went!" The destroyer dropped 6 depth charges, then lay back on her course for another attack. Fragments began to float to the surface in boiling foam. There was a large oil stain on the water. In the depths Barents Sea the German submarine Yu-585 found its grave. This was the first major victory for the Soviet destroyers of the famous "Stalinist series".

2. From the first hours of the war, the destroyer "Angry", the same one that became the lead "Stalinist series" received a combat mission to lay minefields at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland in order to prevent the enemy from breaking through to Leningrad. Minelayers went out to sea. They were covered by a detachment of light forces of the Baltic Fleet. Cruiser Maxim Gorky escorted by the destroyers Gnevny, Proud and Guard. It was not by chance that the "Sevens" became part of the cover detachment. In terms of the power of artillery and torpedo weapons, they surpassed any German destroyer. The detachment of light forces moved forward in full readiness for combat with enemy surface ships, but the danger came from under the water. The detachment moved directly to the minefield, set by the Germans at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland even before the start of hostilities, on the night of June 22. The destroyer "Wrathful" went first. Suddenly there was a deafening explosion, the ship was enveloped in clouds of smoke and steam. The destroyer was blown up by a German anchor mine of the EMS type. The explosion tore off the bow to the second gun. 20 people died. The destroyer "Proud" turned back on a course to provide assistance. It was impossible to take the damaged ship in tow. In order for the destroyer not to go to the enemy, it had to be sunk. 186 sailors were removed from the "Angry", and then they opened fire on it from the artillery of the main caliber. The lead ship of the "Stalinist series" was the first major loss of the Soviet fleet during the Great Patriotic War. But there were at this difficult time the first victories, even small ones.

3. On the third day of the war, the gunners of the destroyer "Thundering" shot down a German bomber. This would not be surprising if we were talking about anti-aircraft gunners. But the Junkers 88 fell apart in the air, having received a direct hit from the main caliber gun. The same one hundred and thirty in the passport data of which it was recorded - "does not have the properties of anti-aircraft fire."

4. On July 18, the 41st aircraft of the Baltic Fleet discovered an enemy convoy. Several transports, escorted by torpedo and patrol boats, went through the Irben Strait to Riga captured by the Germans. The destroyer "Guarding" headed to intercept the convoy. High speed travel - 39 knots, allowed the destroyer to catch up with the enemy already at the very entrance to the port. High-explosive shells of one hundred and thirty hit the German ships. Two vehicles caught fire. But the return fire of the enemy coastal batteries and the attacks of the Luftwaffe aircraft did not allow to build on success. "Guarding" lay down on the reverse course. The anti-aircraft crews of the destroyer repulsed all the attacks of the German aviation. There was no combat damage or loss of personnel on the Guardian.

5. In the second half of August 1941, German ground forces surrounded the main naval base of the Baltic Fleet, Tallinn. The evacuation of warships and auxiliary vessels began eastward to Kronstadt. I had to go 170 miles along the mine-strewn Gulf of Finland under the continuous attacks of German aircraft. The destroyers covered the cruiser "Kirov". On board were the Headquarters of the Fleet, the government of Estonia and the gold reserves of the state banks of the Baltic states. During the transition, five destroyers were killed. Another hit a mine, but survived. It was the destroyer Gordy. The semi-submerged ship was taken in tow by another destroyer, the Ferocious. For almost two days they literally crawled into the base. Two ideal targets for Luftwaffe bombers. Reflecting attacks from the air, the Gordoy anti-aircraft gunners fired all the ammunition - a thousand shells from each barrel. Two and a half hundred bombs were dropped on the destroyer, but none of them hit the target. The ship was able to reach Kronstadt.

6. In August 1941, the destroyer "Bodry" entered the firing position in the area of ​​besieged Odessa. Volleys of one hundred and thirty destroyed the command post and headquarters of the Romanian infantry division. For this, the crew received gratitude from the command of the Odessa defensive region.

7. In October 1941, the enemy approached Sevastopol. The Black Sea "sevens" came to the defense of the main naval base of the fleet. Under fire from German coastal batteries and aircraft, the destroyers broke through into the besieged city. They transported troops, equipment, ammunition and food, fired at enemy positions from main caliber guns. In total, 6 destroyers of the "Stalinist series" fought in the Black Sea theater of operations. Four of them died under the bombs of German aircraft.

8. On November 15, 1943, the destroyer Razumny was guarding convoy AB55. Acoustics heard the noise of propellers under water. "Reasonable" immediately turned around and lay down on a combat course. The destroyer attacked the enemy submarine with ten BB1 depth charges. The last three explosions were unusually powerful. The list of losses of the German submarine fleet was replenished by the submarine Yu387.

9. But victories were not easy. Until May 45, two "sevens" did not live Northern Fleet. Already at the beginning of the war, Junkers 87 dive bombers sank the destroyer Stremitelny in the Kola Bay. A hundred-kilogram aerial bomb hit the torpedo tube, the torpedoes detonated, the ship broke in half and sank in a matter of seconds.

10. On January 6, 1945, the destroyer Furious received heavy damage. It was attacked by an acoustic homing torpedo. The explosion tore off the "Furious" stern, a fire started on the ship. Thanks to the dedication of the crew, the destroyer was already afloat and was towed to the base.

Destroyers of steel universal soldiers seas. Day and night, in rain and snow, these ships went out on minelaying, attacked enemy submarines and transports, landed and supported landing forces with fire from their guns, delivered reinforcements and ammunition to the defenders of the besieged cities, took out the wounded and the civilian population, escorted transport ships, repelled raids enemy aviation. Per military honors during the Great Patriotic War, four Project 7 destroyers were awarded the Order of the Red Banner, and the Thundering one received the title of Guards.

By the early 1930s, as part of Naval Forces(Navy) of the Red Army there were only seventeen destroyers - "noviks":

12 units in the Baltic Sea;

5 units in the Black Sea.

Such destroyers, built before the First World War, could not solve the expanded combat missions of ships of their class with high efficiency. Therefore, in July 1931, the Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR decided to provide for the accelerated creation of new destroyers in the next program of naval construction. For these purposes, the Central Design Bureau of Special Shipbuilding (TsKBS-1) was created.

Project 7 destroyers, also known as the “Angry” type, are a type of destroyers of the so-called “Stalin series” built for the Soviet Navy in the second half of the 1930s, one of the most massive types of destroyers in the history of Russian and Soviet fleets. The most massive Soviet destroyers of the 1920s-1930s.

A total of 53 units were laid down. Of these, 28 were completed according to the original project. 18 were completed under the 7U project. 6 were dismantled on the slipway. One ("Resolute") sank while being towed after launching and was not completed.

Project 7

In TsKBS-1, the design of a "serial EM" began, which was given the designation "project 7". In 1932, under the leadership of the chief engineer of TsKBS-1 Nikitin V.A., the Soyuzverf commission was sent to Italy, which chose the largest shipbuilding company Ansaldo, which had many years of experience in designing high-speed EM and KRL. The commission got acquainted with the latest Italian destroyers and the documentation of the Mistrale-type destroyer under construction, which became the closest prototype in the development of the "7" project.

On December 21, 1934, the general project of the "serial destroyer" was approved by a resolution of the Council of Labor and Defense. The total number of ships to be built according to the approved project has changed more than once (increasing), as a result, it was planned to hand over to the fleet 21 ships in 1937, and 32 more in 1938. Of these 53 destroyers, 21 were destined for the Baltic and Northern Fleets, 10 for the Black Sea Fleet, and 22 for the Pacific Fleet.

The construction of the ships was envisaged at factories No. 189 of the Shipyard named after. Ordzhonikidze and No. 190 Shipyard named after. Zhdanov in Leningrad, and factories No. 198 of the Shipyard named after. Marty and No. 200 Shipyard im. 61 Communards in Nikolaev.

Comparison with foreign destroyers confirms that significant progress was made in designing a new series of destroyers and the ship was not inferior to the best foreign models of that time in terms of its combat qualities, and significantly surpassed them in terms of firing range of the main caliber guns and speed.

Powerful artillery armament, perfect fire control devices, good torpedoes and decent speed. The power plant, with all its disadvantages, has proven to be more reliable than that of the German destroyers. But the main merit of our designers and shipbuilders is that such a large series of ships was nevertheless built, and built on time. It was the "sevens" that updated the surface fleet and brought the Soviet Navy to a qualitatively new level.

Project 7-U

On May 13, 1937, the British destroyer Hunter, which was patrolling near the port of Almeria and acting as an observer of the hostilities of the warring parties (there was a civil war in Spain), was blown up by a drifting mine.

In August 1937, at a meeting of the Defense Committee in Moscow, the incident that happened with the Hunter was mentioned. The situation was analyzed when a ship with a linear arrangement of a boiler-turbine installation could lose its course as a result of a single hit by a projectile, mine or torpedo. As a result, project 7, which had the same scheme of the power plant, was called "wrecking". 14 Project 7 ships already launched were ordered to be redone, and the rest to be dismantled on stocks.

The project of the improved project 7-U was developed jointly by the design bureaus TsKB-17 (until October 1936 - TsKBS-1) and the Northern Shipyard named after. A. Zhdanova ( chief designer- Lebedev N. A.). The final draft was approved by the People's Commissariat of the Navy on August 29, 1938.

Initially, it was planned to relaunch absolutely all the ships of Project 7. However, fortunately, the Deputy People's Commissar of the Defense Industry Tevosyan I.F. managed to convince the committee to complete the construction of 29 destroyers under Project 7 and only the next 18 were relaid under Project 7U. The last 6 units under construction, which were in a low degree of readiness, were decided to be dismantled.

Thus, during 1938-1939, 18 hulls of project 7 destroyers, located on the stocks of the Leningrad plants named after Zhdanov and Ordzhonikidze, and the Nikolaev named after 61 Communards, were relaid under the 7-U project. For this, the almost finished buildings of Project 7 had to be partially dismantled. A number of structures in the area of ​​engine and boiler rooms were removed. As a result, the ships of the 7-U project became part of only two fleets - the Baltic and the Black Sea.

The Far Eastern destroyers, due to the busy work schedule and weak production base in Vladivostok and Komsomolsk-on-Amur, were completed according to project 7.

The lead destroyer of Project 7-U was the Sentry. During the factory tests, which took place in the fall of 1939, a significant overload of the ship was revealed and, as a result, its reduced stability. Correction work (stability was increased by laying solid ballast), as well as the elimination of many defects found, delayed the completion of the tests for more than a year. As a result, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, shipbuilders managed to hand over to the customer only half of all of the 18 declared ships of Project 7-U: 8 in the Baltic and 1 in the Black Sea. The remaining 9 were urgently completed and tested already in combat conditions.

Tactical and technical characteristics

Frame

The main difference between the destroyer of the 7-U project was the layout of the engine and boiler rooms. The fourth boiler that appeared and their increased dimensions, as a result of which the boilers did not fit inside the hull, led to the fact that the boilers towered about 2 meters above the main deck, eating up the volume of the central superstructures.

The case was made of low-manganese steel with a thickness of 5-10 millimeters. Most of connections was riveted, although the stringers, part of the upper deck and a number of other elements had a welded structure. During the war, a serious drawback of low-manganese steel was revealed: brittleness. Sheets made from it, when hit by fragments of bombs and shells, split and gave themselves a large number of fragments that hit personnel, instruments and mechanisms. The usual "Steel 3", which was used in the construction of decks and superstructures, did not crack and did not give such fragments.

Power plant

In 1936, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade ordered 12 sets of main turbo-gear units (GTZA) and auxiliary mechanisms for Project 7 ships from the British firms Metro-Vickers and Parsons. Such GTZA had a capacity of up to 24,000 liters. s., but they could be launched in a cold state, without preheating, which theoretically reduced the time it took to prepare the ship for going to sea.

In March 1938, the turbines received from England were distributed among the factories. Of the eight sets of power plants from Metro-Vickers, 7 went to Leningrad No. 189 and No. 190, and one more was sent to the KBF base as a backup. Four sets of the Parsons company went to the Black Sea: 3 - to the Nikolaev plant No. 200 and one - to the Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol. All imported GTZA hit the ships relaid under the 7-U project.

Steam for the turbines was produced by 4 tented vertical water-tube boilers with a side screen and one-way gas flow, equipped with loop superheaters. The heating surface of each boiler is 655 m², the productivity is 80 tons of steam per hour. The steam parameters are approximately the same as those of the Project 7 ships: pressure 27.5 kg/s², temperature 340 °C. Each boiler was placed in an isolated compartment.

One of the disadvantages of such a system can be called increased fuel consumption: four boilers compared to three for project 7. Moreover, it was not possible to increase the fuel reserves of project 7-U: after installing a more bulky power plant in a cramped building, there is already room for additional tanks did not remain. And after laying the solid ballast, the supply of fuel oil even had to be slightly reduced.

Armament

Main caliber

The artillery of the main caliber (GK) of the Project 7U destroyers remained the same as that of their predecessors: four 130-mm B-13-2 guns with a barrel length of 50 calibers, manufactured by the Bolshevik plant. The ammunition included 150 shots per barrel, in overload (according to the capacity of the cellars) the ship could take up to 185 shots per barrel - that is, up to 740 shells and charges in total. The supply of ammunition was carried out manually, delivery - pneumatic rammer.

Anti-aircraft weapons

Anti-aircraft armament consisted of a pair of 76-mm universal mounts 34-K, moved to the stern. A third 45mm 21-K semi-auto was added. Thus, all three small-caliber anti-aircraft guns were located on the site behind the first chimney, for which heavy 90 cm searchlights had to be sacrificed (instead of them, one 60 cm was now installed on the foremast).

The number of 12.7-mm DShK machine guns doubled - two more were added to the two on the upper bridge behind the forecastle cut. However, despite some strengthening compared to its predecessors, the anti-aircraft weapons of the 7-U project continued to be extremely weak and poorly placed: the ship was practically defenseless from the forward heading nodes, and the crowding of all anti-aircraft weapons on two sites made them extremely vulnerable.

The experience of the first months of the war showed how dangerous it is to ignore the threat of air attacks. Therefore, already in July 1941, destroyers began to additionally mount 37-mm 70-K assault rifles on the superstructure in the area of ​​​​the second pipe, and then replace them with 45-mm 21-K.

In May 1942, two 20-mm Oerlikons and one four-barreled 12.7-mm Vickers machine gun were installed on the "Strong".

By the end of the war, the Baltic destroyers ("Strong", "Resistant", "Glorious", "Watchdog", "Strict", "Slender") received the third 76-mm gun mount 34-K (on poop).

By 1943, the most powerful in terms of air defense systems, the Black Sea “Sposobny” and “Savvy” were armed with two 76-mm 34-K cannons, seven 37-mm 70-K submachine guns, four 12.7-mm DShK machine guns and two twin 12.7-mm Colt-Browning machine guns with water-cooled barrels.

Torpedo armament

Torpedo armament included two 533-mm triple-tube 1-N torpedo tubes. Unlike the 39-Yu gunpowder apparatus installed on Project 7 ships, the 1-N had a combined firing system - gunpowder and pneumatic. The torpedo departure speed was 15 - 16 m / s (against 12 m / s for 39-Yu), which made it possible to significantly expand the sectors of fire: project 7 destroyers could not fire torpedoes at sharp heading angles due to the risk that they would hit the deck . In addition, a number of improvements were made to the design of the TA, which doubled the accuracy of its guidance to the target. Project 7-U ships have never had a chance to use their completely modern torpedo weapon in battle.

Anti-submarine weapons

Mining and anti-submarine weapons destroyers of the "Watchdog" type was practically no different from that used on its predecessors. On the rails located on the upper deck, the ship could take 58 minutes of KB-3, or 62 mines of the 1926 model, or 96 minutes of the 1912 model (in overload). The standard set of depth charges is 10 large B-1s and 20 small M-1s. Large bombs were stored directly in the stern bombers; of the small ones, 12 in the cellar and 8 in the aft rack on the poop.

Already during the war, the destroyers received two BMB-1 bombers, capable of firing B-1 bombs at a distance of up to 110 m.

Destroyer "Grozny" (project 7)

Displacement 1525 - 1670t

Travel speed 39 knots

Length 112.5 m

Width 10.2 m

Armament:

130 mm guns 4

76 mm guns 2

45 mm guns 2

37 mm guns 3

Anti-aircraft machine guns 2

Mines, depth charges - 60 KB-3, or 65 minutes of the 1926 model, or 95 minutes of the 1912 sample.

"Storozhevoy" class destroyer (Project 7U)

Displacement 2000 t

Travel speed 39 knots

Length 115 m

Width 11.8 m

Armament:

130 mm guns 4

76 mm guns 2

37 mm guns 3

Anti-aircraft machine guns 4

Triple torpedo tubes 2

Mines, depth charges

Combat losses.

18 project 7 EM units took part in the hostilities.

11 units died

Causes of death

Navigation accidents - 2 cases

Air bombs - 5 cases

Mines - 4 cases

Of the 11 dead EMs

died without breaking the hull - 1 (Guardian)

died with a broken body - 1 (Proud)

died with a complete break of the hull - 9 (including EM Bystry), incl. with a broken body in two places - 2 (Resolute I and Sharp-witted)

with a break and a break in the hull - 1 (Merciless)

There were 29 cases of heavy damage to the EM project 7.

Typical places of cracks, breaks and breaks in the hull of destroyers of project 7 were the transition areas from the longitudinal framing system in the middle of the hull to the transverse framing system at the extremities - places of high stress concentration.

18 project 7U EM units took part in the hostilities

Of these, 9 units died

Causes of death

Air bombs - 4 cases

Mines - 5 cases

Artillery - 1 case

Out of 10 cases of death of EM

died without breaking the hull - 4

died with a broken body - 2

died with a broken hull - 4

There were 19 cases of severe damage to the EM project 7U.

The destroyers of the Pacific Fleet did not take part in the hostilities - 11 units.

Despite the measures taken to strengthen the hulls of the EM project 7U in comparison with the EM project 7, this did not bring the desired result. The weakness of the hull design became one of the significant shortcomings of the EM of both projects, which, of course, affected their military fate.

According to the latest data, of the destroyers of the "Stalinist" series, only one ship, the Reasonable, can claim a real combat victory. It was he who, together with the destroyer Zhivuchy transferred by the British, on December 8, 1944, pursued the German submarine U-387, which after that did not get in touch and did not return to the base.

In the history of the destroyers of both projects, the Guards EM project 7U "Savvy" stands apart. Its commander, Vorkov, recalled the combat path of his ship as follows: “56 times the destroyer fired at enemy battle formations, suppressed more than ten batteries, destroyed up to 30 tanks and vehicles, a lot of manpower. He used up more than 2,700 shells of the main caliber while participating in the artillery support of our ground forces. He escorted 59 transports without loss to Odessa, Sevastopol, Feodosia and the ports of the Caucasus ... He transported on board about 13 thousand people wounded and evacuated from Odessa and Sevastopol. He transported more than a thousand tons of ammunition to Odessa and Sevastopol. Repelled more than 100 enemy air attacks ... Shot down five enemy aircraft. 200 times the destroyer went to fighting, having traveled more than 60 thousand miles without repair. During the war, he spent almost 200 days at sea and did not lose a single fighter. There were no wounded on the ship."

The article uses the materials of A. Tsarenko and S. Balakin.

Article from the almanac "Marine Archive", No. 1, 2011
Chairman of the Editorial Board Markov A.G.
Editor-in-chief Maslov N.K.

Also known as type "Sentry"- type of destroyers built for the Soviet Navy in the 1930s. Project 7-U was laid down as an improved project 7.

Prerequisites

The construction of the ships was envisaged at factories No. 189 of the Shipyard named after. Ordzhonikidze and No. 190 Shipyard named after. Zhdanov in Leningrad, and factories No. 198 of the Shipyard named after. Marty and No. 200 Shipyard im. 61 Communards in Nikolaev.

Project 7-U

Initially, it was planned to relaunch absolutely all the ships of Project 7. However, fortunately, the Deputy People's Commissar of the Defense Industry Tevosyan I.F. managed to convince the committee to complete the construction of 29 destroyers under Project 7 and only the next 18 were relaid under Project 7U. The last 6 units under construction, which were in a low degree of readiness, were decided to be dismantled.

By the end of the war, the Baltic destroyers ("Strong", "Resistant", "Glorious", "Watchdog", "Strict", "Slender") received the third 76-mm gun mount 34-K (on poop).

By 1943, the most powerful in terms of air defense systems, the Black Sea "Able" and "Savvy" were armed with two 76-mm 34-K cannons, seven 37-mm 70-K submachine guns, four 12.7-mm DShK machine guns and two twin 12.7-mm Colt-Browning machine guns with water-cooled barrels.

Torpedo armament

Torpedo armament included two 533-mm triple-tube 1-N torpedo tubes. Unlike the 39-Yu gunpowder apparatus installed on the Project 7 ships, the 1-N had a combined firing system - gunpowder and pneumatic. The torpedo departure speed was 15 - 16 m / s (against 12 m / s for 39-Yu), which made it possible to significantly expand the sectors of fire: project 7 destroyers could not fire torpedoes at sharp heading angles due to the risk that they would hit the deck . In addition, a number of improvements were made to the design of the TA, which doubled the accuracy of its guidance to the target. Project 7-U ships have never had a chance to use their completely modern torpedo weapons in battle.

Anti-submarine weapons

The mine and anti-submarine armament of the Sentry-class destroyers was practically no different from that used on their predecessors. On the rails located on the upper deck, the ship could take 58 minutes of KB-3, or 62 mines of the 1926 model, or 96 minutes of the 1912 model (in overload). The standard set of depth charges is 10 large B-1s and 20 small M-1s. Large bombs were stored directly in the stern bombers; of the small ones, 12 in the cellar and 8 in the aft rack on the poop.

Already during the war, the destroyers received two BMB-1 bombers, capable of firing B-1 bombs at a distance of up to 110 m.

Navigation armament

The fire control system of the main caliber - PUS "Mina", created by the Leningrad plant "Elektropribor" specifically for the ships of project 7. Its main element was the central automatic firing system TsAS-2 - a calculating and decisive device, which, based on data received from rangefinder posts, continuously generated coordinates , speed and heading angle of the target, simultaneously giving out the full angles of horizontal and vertical aiming of the guns. TsAS-2 was considered a relatively small-sized device. In practice, its capabilities were severely limited due to the low accuracy of the Kurs gyrocompass, from which the circuit automatically received data on the course of its ship.

Information about the target went to the PUS system from the rangefinders of the KDP2-4 command and rangefinder post (factory index B-12) and night sights 1-Y. The Mina system made it possible to separate the fire of the bow and stern artillery groups, as well as to fire at a temporarily hiding sea target. In addition, she ensured the firing of torpedo tubes.

On some ships ("Able" and "Savvy"), auto-correctors were additionally installed for conducting aimed fire along the coast.

But there were no anti-aircraft fire control devices. Back in project 7, to ensure effective firing of 76-mm guns, it was planned to install MPUAZO, but by the time most destroyers were commissioned, these devices existed only on paper. The first MPUAZO Soyuz-7U system was installed literally on the eve of the war - in June 1941 on the Black Sea destroyer Sposobny. It included a fairly advanced Soyuz anti-aircraft gun (according to the principle of operation, it is an analogue of the TsAS-2, but intended for firing at air targets), the Gazon gyro vertical and a stabilized sighting post SVP-1. Although the system operated in one plane and was ineffective against dive bombers, it significantly increased the ship's air defense. In 1942, the Soyuz-7U (with the replacement of the unsuccessful SVP-1 with the new SVP-29) was mounted on two more destroyers - the Black Sea Svobodny and the Baltic Strogiy. On the other ships of projects 7 and 7-U, the 76-mm 34-K guns were "self-guided".

see also

Notes

Literature

• Balakin S. A."Savvy" and other destroyers of project 7U (Russian) // Marine Collection: Magazine. - 1997. - No. 6.

Russian destroyers by type
Destroyers (1877-1903)
destroyers, reclassified to destroyers (1900-1907)
mine cruiser, reclassified to destroyers (1904-1906)

"Sevens" - project 7 destroyers - rightfully occupy a prominent place in our naval history. And no wonder - after all, these are active participants in the Great Patriotic War, the most massive Soviet surface ships built in the 30s, from which several generations of destroyers, large missile ships and even cruisers. One destroyer of this type became guards, four - red banner.

At the same time, a lot of contradictory things have been said and written about them. This is especially true of their military operations during the war years - here real, often tragic events were replaced by legends for a long time. But this is in literature intended for the mass reader. And for professionals, classified as "secret", other materials were prepared containing an impartial analysis of military operations, their results, tactics, combat damage to ships. Access to such information has appeared quite recently, and therefore many of the facts and conclusions presented in this issue may seem unexpected to the reader. We hope that they will clearly show both the advantages and disadvantages of the "sevens" - these certainly interesting and beautiful ships of our fleet.

The Decree "On the program of naval shipbuilding for 1933-1938", adopted on July 11, 1933 by the Council of Labor and Defense, provided for the construction of 1493 combat and auxiliary ships, including 8 cruisers and 50 destroyers. Its implementation caused a lot of problems in all industries. National economy, but in those years it was not customary to reckon with the price. “We are building and will build a large naval fleet” - this almost poetic appeal from the Pravda newspaper of December 9, 1936 could become an epigraph to a story about pre-war Soviet shipbuilding.

The development of the project for the new destroyer was entrusted to the Central Design Bureau of Special Shipbuilding TsKBS-1 back in 1932, V.A. Nikitin was appointed the chief project manager, and P.O. Trakhtenberg was appointed the responsible executor. By that time, the team already had some experience in similar work (the creation of the leader of the destroyers of the Leningrad type), but the shortcomings of the latter and the short design time forced them to resort to the help of the Italian companies Ansaldo and Odero.

This choice was by no means accidental. First, Italy was then our important military and political ally. Secondly, in 1928-1932, it was these firms that built a series of ships of the Dardo class, which anticipated the type of destroyer of the Second World War. Everything in them was unusual: the general layout, one chimney, 120-mm artillery in twin deck mounts ... A modification of this type was 4 enlarged Maestrale-class destroyers, laid down in 1931. The last ships were chosen as the basis for the creation of new Soviet destroyers. In 1932, a delegation of shipbuilders headed by Nikitin visited Italy, and the set of Maestrale drawings they brought formed the basis of the future project. Our designers borrowed the layout of the machine-boiler plant and the general architecture of the ship, but domestic weapons, mechanisms and equipment forced us to move away from the prototype in many respects. In reality, the contribution of Italian colleagues was limited to the development of a theoretical drawing (Ansaldo firm) and running the model in an experimental pool in Rome.

The technical design of the destroyer (named "Project No. 7") was approved in December 1934. Its main tactical and technical elements were as follows: standard displacement 1425 tons, total displacement 1715 tons, maximum length 112.5 m, width 10.2 m, draft 3.3 m, speed 38 knots, armament - four 130-mm guns and two three-pipe torpedo tubes (TA) caliber 533 mm. It should be noted that by that time most of the equipment and armament did not exist even on paper, but no displacement reserve was included in the project.

The final design work was carried out in extreme haste, since Stalin demanded that the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry lay down the first destroyers as early as 1935, and hand over the entire series (increased to 53 units) to the fleet in 1937-1938. The government clearly overestimated the capabilities of the domestic industry at that time.

The experience of the First World War, which was considered a "criterion of truth" for shipbuilders of the 20s and 30s, testified that the destroyer, as the most versatile ship in the fleet, was steadily turning from a purely torpedo ship into an artillery-torpedo one. Therefore, the increase in the firepower of the destroyers of the interwar period was primarily due to an increase in the caliber and ballistic characteristics of artillery mounts.

Perhaps the Soviet designers went the furthest in this direction. Project 7 destroyers were originally designed for the "cruising" caliber - 130mm. True, the guns of the Obukhov plant with a barrel length of 55 calibers, which were the main weapons of the cruisers of the Soviet fleet in the 20s, turned out to be too heavy, and the Bolshevik plant was instructed to develop new ones, shortened by 5 calibers. In 1935, the new artillery system, which received the designation B-13, was put into service, and a year later its mass production began.

It is curious that initially the B-13 guns were created for shells of 55-caliber guns, for which they were equipped with liners with shallow (1 mm deep) cutting. At the end of 1936, they decided to switch to deep (2.7 mm) liners, for which new shells were developed. Thus, the same gun model required different ammunition, which created additional problems during the war years. For example, in November 1941, the Loud had to change almost new ANIMI liners for NII-13 liners only because the shells for the first ones in the Northern Fleet ran out.

The B-13 gun in a deck installation with a shield made of bulletproof armor 13 mm thick had a barrel length of 50 calibers, a weight of 12.8 tons, and a vertical guidance angle from -5 to +45 °. All types of shells (high-explosive fragmentation, semi-armor-piercing and remote grenades) were of the same weight - 33.5 kg and were fired from the barrel at an initial speed of 870 m / s to a maximum range of 139 kbt (27.5 km). The ammunition also included diving shells weighing 33.14 kg and lighting shells weighing 34.5 kg. They were fired with the help of reduced charges at a range of 17 and 58 kbt, respectively. The survivability of the barrel at first was only 150 - 200 shots, but then, thanks to a number of improvements, it was brought to a quite decent value - about 1100 shots (although the "passport" value is only 420 shots). The swinging part was equipped with a device for blowing the bore. The ammunition is separate, the shutter is piston, with a plastic obturator. Ammunition, amounting to 150 shots per barrel (175 in overload), was located in four cellars. Its supply was carried out by two elevators (one for charges, the other for shells) for each gun; in case of failure, there were pipes for manual feeding. The loading was carried out manually, the rate of fire depended on the elevation angle and fluctuated within 6-10 rounds per minute. According to the former artillery electrician of the destroyer "Razumny" K.A. Lyubimov, the rate of fire of 13 rounds per minute was achieved in training firing at the Pacific Fleet. The angles of fire of a pair of bow guns of the "seven" - from 0 ° to 14 ° on both sides, stern - from 14 ° to 18 °.

By their own ballistic performance guns B-13 significantly outnumbered the artillery of foreign destroyers. For comparison, it can be noted that the shell of a 127-mm Japanese gun weighed 23.1 kg, 127-mm American - 24.4 kg, 128-mm German - 28 kg, 120-mm Italian - 22.1 kg, 120-mm English - 22.7 kg, and only in the French 130-mm guns the shells weighed almost the same as the Soviet ones - 34.8 kg. But the barrel length of the latter was only 40 calibers, and the maximum firing range did not exceed 17 km. The only foreign guns that outnumbered the Soviet ones were the 138mm guns. French leaders and 140-mm guns of the Yugoslav leader "Dubrovnik". However, these ships, close to light cruisers, were much larger than the "sevens" and cannot be considered as analogues.

The artillery and the fire control system were quite consistent. Especially for the destroyers of project 7 in 1937, they created the central firing machine TsAS-2, leading its ancestry from the "central" of the Italian company "Galileo" (this system was installed on leaders of the "Leningrad" type). The machine gun was located in the fighting compartment under the bow superstructure and made it possible to continuously determine the full angles of vertical and horizontal guidance of the guns while constantly monitoring the target or "self-propelled". Surveillance of the surface target was carried out using two 4-meter rangefinders located in the command and rangefinder post (KDP) B-12-4. In general, the system met modern requirements and was not inferior to the best foreign analogues.

Thus, the task assigned to Soviet designers was completed: by the end of the 30s, the artillery armament of the "seven" was rightfully considered the best in the world. But, unfortunately, all this turned out to be unnecessary! While extolling the experience of the First World War, naval strategists did not take into account the rapid development of new combat means, and above all, aviation.

As a result, the magnificent B-13 guns, together with an advanced fire control system, were mainly used to perform an unusual task - firing at ground targets. But in front of the Luftwaffe bombers, the Sevens turned out to be practically defenseless.

However, this was not only our misfortune: pre-war destroyers of foreign fleets were also armed only with anti-ship artillery. The exception was the US Navy. And as a result, the American 127-mm cannon with a barrel length of 38 calibers, which is very modest in its characteristics, turned out to be rightfully the best weapon of the destroyers of the Second World War precisely because of its versatility - the ability to fire at both surface and air targets.

The anti-aircraft weapons of the “sevens” at the time of their commissioning included two 76-mm 34-K guns, two 45-mm semi-automatic 21-K and two 12.7-mm DShK machine gun or DC. Alas, such a composition of weapons cannot be called satisfactory either in quantity or quality. The 45 mm guns had a low rate of fire, the 76 mm guns were located very unsuccessfully, and the machine guns turned out to be almost useless in general. But the main drawback was the lack of naval anti-aircraft fire control devices (MPUAZO). The latter in the USSR began to be developed belatedly, and the first such system "Horizon-1" (for the cruiser "Kirov") appeared only in 1939. Its analogue for destroyers, created on the basis of the Soyuz anti-aircraft gun, was put into service just before the start of the war and managed to appear only on the Sevens-U.

At the very beginning of the war, the “sevens” began to arm with more effective anti-aircraft guns - 37-mm 70-K assault rifles. On the North Sea destroyers, they were first (in July - August 1941) installed in addition to 45-mm guns - one on the rosters behind the chimney and one on the poop. Later (on the "Thundering", "Terrible", "Crushing" in June 1942), they also replaced 45-millimeter guns at the forecastle sections. By 1943, all North Sea "sevens" had 4 70-K assault rifles. The Black Sea destroyers of Project 7 during the war carried mainly 5 such anti-aircraft guns: they were not installed on the poop, but they were mounted in pairs on the bow superstructure, next to the second 130-mm gun. In 1942, all the “sevens” remaining in service in the Northern Fleet and Black Sea Fleet were re-armed with two coaxial 12.7-mm Colt-Browning machine guns. The most powerful anti-aircraft armament during the war years was the Baltic "Grozychiy": four DShK machine guns, four 37-mm machine guns and three 76-mm 34-K guns.

An important part of the anti-aircraft armament was British radars, supplied under Lend-Lease to equip Soviet ships. The first radar station (RLS) of type 286-M was received in 1942 by Thundering. Most of the Pacific "sevens" installed radar type 291.

But in general, the anti-aircraft armament of Soviet destroyers remained frankly weak until the end of the war. Compare: American destroyers the Allen M. Sumner and Gearing types in 1945 carried up to 16 barrels of 40-mm automatic Bofors, not counting the Oerlikons. And this is with six universal 127-mm guns! It is not surprising that some of them managed to shoot down up to 10 or even 20 Japanese aircraft in one battle.

The torpedo armament of the Project 7 destroyers included two triple-tube 39-Yu torpedo tubes with 7° outer tubes, which were a copy of the Novikov tubes with a caliber increased to 533 mm instead of 450 mm. Shooting method - powder. According to the project, the destroyers could carry an additional 6 spare torpedoes in racks, but manually reloading the vehicles in fresh weather turned out to be impossible. The command of the Northern Fleet was the first to understand this and in March 1942 ordered the spare torpedoes to be removed. The Soviet steam-gas torpedoes 53-38 and 53-39 were very advanced, but in battle they were used by the "sevens" only once - "Courageous" and "Merciless" in December 1942 (and even then unsuccessfully).

More often used mine weapons. "Seven" could take on deck up to 60 mines of KB-3, or 65 mines mod. 1926, or 95 min arr. 1912 (in overload).

Anti-submarine armament initially consisted of lever-operated bomb releasers and diving projectiles for 130 mm guns. The stock of depth charges was only 25 pieces - 10 large B-1 and 15 small M-1; later it was brought up to 40 B-1 and 27 M-1 (on the Grozny in 1944). During the war, two BMB-1 bombers were installed on all ships. In 1942, Grozny was the first of the Soviet ships to receive the Dragon-128s sonar (sonar).

The destroyers were equipped with stern smoke equipment DA-2B (continuous time 30 minutes, productivity 50 kg/min), steam-oil equipment DA-1 with exhaust through the chimney (three nozzles of white and black smoke) and smoke bombs MDSH (10 - 20 pieces). Anti-chemical protection was provided by filter-ventilation installations that supplied the wardroom, officers' cabins and the bow washing point with purified air. To eliminate poisonous substances, there were two combat chemical posts and two washing points. The total supply of degassing agents is 600 kg of bleach and 100 liters of reagents. In addition, 225 sets of protective anti-chemical clothing were stored on each ship.

As an anti-mine weapon, the “sevens” had two sets of K-1 paravantrals and LFTI demagnetizing windings, the installation of which began in July 1941. It is impossible not to note the quality of domestic paravanes. Their "whims" brought a lot of trouble to the Soviet sailors. But it's still half the trouble. Instead of fighting mines, K-1 paravanes often turned into "killers" of their own ships, sinking the mines and bringing the mine to the side. Similar cases occurred, in particular, with the destroyers Gordy, Grozyashchiy, Guarding, Sharp-witted.

Summarizing the above, we should highlight such advantages of the Project 7 destroyers as powerful artillery weapons, advanced fire control devices (TsAS-2), good torpedoes and, in general, a decent speed. The power plant, with all its disadvantages, has proven to be more reliable than that of the German destroyers. But the main merit of our designers and shipbuilders is that such a large series of ships was nevertheless built, and built on time. It was the "sevens" that updated the surface fleet and brought the Soviet Navy to a qualitatively new level.

As for the shortcomings, the most serious of them were the unsatisfactory strength of the hull, short cruising range, weak anti-aircraft weapons, and the absence of MPUAZO. To this can be added the unimportant living conditions crew: with a staff of rank and file of 231 people, there were only 161 permanent places (together with hanging bunks), which forced the Red Navy to sleep on tables, on deck or together in one bunk.

Interesting conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of combat experience. Of the 28 "sevens" that entered service in 1938-1942 (not counting the one who died while towing the "Resolute"), the Pacific ships, except for the "Reasonable" and "Furious", practically did not participate in the war. Thus, 18 destroyers directly fought the enemy. 10 of them died (including the "Guardian", later raised and restored). If we add here the destroyers of the 7U project, it turns out that out of 36 warring ships, 18 were killed - exactly half.

The distribution of the sunken "sevens" and "sevens-U" by causes of death: mines - 9 units, from air bombs - 8, from navigational accidents - 1 ("Crushing"). Another 11 destroyers were heavily damaged, including the loss of the bow or stern of the hull.

Most of all, the "seven" suffered from mines. However, significant losses do not at all indicate their low survivability. The fact is that for 9 "deadly" explosions on mines, there are 9 more when the ship was saved (or another mine was needed for the death - as in the case of the Proud and Sharp-witted). In addition, two ships received one torpedo hit each: the Watchtower with torpedo boats, "Furious" - from a submarine. In both cases, the destroyers suffered heavy losses (the bow of the first was torn off, the stern of the second), but remained afloat and later recovered. Thus, 9 destroyed destroyers account for 20 mine-torpedo explosions, which is 45%. That is, according to this indicator, the “sevens” turned out to be much more tenacious than all their foreign counterparts in the class of the period of the Second World War. True, none of our destroyers had a chance to withstand the simultaneous impact of two mines or torpedoes, although there were such examples in the British and American fleets.

If you try to compare the losses among the "sevens" with the damage they inflicted on the enemy, then the picture will turn out to be very bleak. Confirmed enemy losses include one submarine (U-585, sunk by Thundering 29/3/1942) and no more than 40 aircraft. Of course, these figures cannot be compared purely mechanically. The Black Sea, and even the Baltic, "sevens" simply did not have a worthy enemy at sea, and the tasks that they had to perform were not envisaged by any pre-war plans. For example, the evacuation of troops from the besieged Sevastopol or Hanko - for these purposes, the destroyers were far from the best means.

“Crushing” is one of the most disliked topics by our historians. If possible, they generally prefer not to remember it once again. If the latter fails, then they talk about "Crushing" in passing and patter. There are plenty of reasons for such persistent dislike. For a long time, nothing was ever written about "Crushing" at all. The disgraced destroyer was mentioned only in the memoirs of the commander of the Northern Fleet during the Great Patriotic War, Admiral Golovko.

The destroyer "Crushing" belonged to a series of destroyers of the "7" project. The destroyers of the project "7" (or, as they are usually called, "sevens") rightfully occupy a prominent place in our naval. And no wonder - after all, they were active participants in the Great Patriotic War, they were the most massive Soviet surface ships built in the 30s, it is from the "sevens" that several generations of domestic destroyers, large missile ships and even cruisers trace their ancestry. One destroyer of the "7" type became guards, four - red banner. At the same time, a lot of contradictory things have been said and written about them. This is especially true for the combat operations of the "sevens" during the war years - here real, often tragic events were replaced by legends for a long time. There were always a lot of rumors around tragic death destroyer"Crushing". The first six "sevens" managed to be laid at the end of 1935, and the next year - and all the rest. By the beginning of World War II, the Soviet Navy had 22 destroyers of the "Wrathful" type. These were our most massive pre-war ships.

The destroyer "Crushing" was built at the plant number 189 named after S. Ordzhonikidze. Serial number C-292. Laid down on 10/29/1936, launched on 08/23/1937, acceptance certificate was signed on 08/13/1939. Shortly after commissioning, he was transferred via the White Sea-Baltic Canal (September - November 1939) to the Northern Fleet. In November, the destroyer arrived at Polyarny. During the war with Finland, he carried out sentinel and escort service, then he was engaged in combat training. From July 18, 1940 to July 4, 1941, a warranty repair was carried out at the plant number 402 in Molotovsk. In total, before the start of World War II, he walked 10,380 miles.

After the completion of sea trials, the "Crushing" was included in the White Sea Flotilla, where it remained until September 29. During this time, he escorted transports several times, made 3 mine laying (delivered 90 mines of KB-1 and 45 mines of the 1908 model), underwent a short-term preventive maintenance.

October 1 "Crushing" arrived in Polyarny and became part of a separate division of destroyers.
The Northern Fleet during the Great Patriotic War was the youngest and smallest, but at the same time the most active operational formation of our Navy. By June 1941, it was the Sevens that were his largest ships. Five destroyers of this type ("Loud", "Terrible", "Thundering", "Swift" and "Crushing"), together with three "novices", made up the 1st separate division of destroyers. At the end of 1942, with the arrival of the Pacific "Reasonable", "Furious" and the leader "Baku", a brigade of destroyers was formed (commander - captain of the 1st rank, then rear admiral, P.I. Kolchin).

Until January 1, 1942, he went out 11 times to shell enemy positions, fired 1297 130-mm shells. In addition, together with Grozny and the English cruiser Kent, he participated in the search for German destroyers (though without results), and escorted transports. The most difficult campaign was the joint escort operation with Grozny on December 24–26. During a 9-point storm with a 7-point wave and heavy icing of the superstructures, the ship's roll reached 45 °, and due to the salinity of the refrigerator, for some time it was necessary to go on one TZA. By some miracle, the ships escaped major damage. This time, the Crusher was just lucky, and he got to the base.

On March 28, after the completion of scheduled preventive maintenance, the Crushing, together with the Thundering and the British destroyer Oribi, went out to meet the PQ-13 convoy, and in the morning of the next day they entered its guard. At 11:18, in poor visibility, shooting was heard, and after 2 minutes, splashes from five artillery shells rose near the port side of the Crushing. After 6-7 seconds, 3 more shells fell on the bow and stern. The destroyer increased its speed. A few seconds later, at a heading angle of 130 ° and a distance of 15 cables, the silhouette of a ship was discovered, identified as a German destroyer of the Raeder class. "Crushing" opened fire and with the second volley achieved coverage with a shell hitting the area of ​​​​the second pipe of the enemy ship. He sputtered and veered sharply to the left. Our destroyer followed up with 4 more volleys, but no more hits were observed. The falling snow charge hid the enemy from sight. In total, "Crushing" fired 20 130-mm shells.

Sailors of the Soviet destroyer of project 7 "Crushing" with a ship's pet, the area of ​​the bow torpedo tubes, a view of the bow. Northern Fleet

This fleeting battle occupies a prominent place in the history of Soviet naval art, since it is the only episode in the entire Great Patriotic War when our surface warship collided with an enemy of its own class and even emerged from it as if the winner. The German destroyer Z-26 is usually indicated as the enemy of the "Crushing". However, in recent times materials appeared in the press in which other versions are put forward. So, the authors of a number of publications, rightly pointing out that by the moment described, the Z-26 was badly damaged and fired from the Trinidad cruiser from the only surviving gun, and the Z-24 and Z-25 circling around the convoy were far enough from the skirmish site, express the hypothesis that the "Crusher" fought with ... the English destroyer "Fury". This seems unlikely, since a hit on an allied destroyer (which, by the way, arrived in Murmansk the next day) would certainly have been reflected in documents and historical literature. It is more logical to assume that the Z-26 was still the target for the commandors of the “Crushing”, only someone else fired on the Soviet destroyer, since the first 5-gun volley could not be made by any of the destroyers located nearby (both English and German ships had 4 guns of the main caliber). By the way, in the report of the commander of the "Crushing" nothing is said about the conduct of fire by the Germans. So the two volleys that fell at the side could well have belonged to the same Trinidad cruiser, which mistook the Crushing and Thundering for Z-24 and Z-25. In any case, there is no unambiguous explanation for some of the inconsistencies in the Soviet, German and English descriptions of this battle.

In April, "Crushing", while guarding convoys, repeatedly repelled air attacks, again suffered a 9-10-point storm. On the evening of April 30, she entered the guard of the Edinburgh cruiser torpedoed by a German submarine, which had five tons of gold on board, intended to pay for the United States under lend-lease. However, the lack of fuel forced the "Crushing" after 8 hours to go to the base. Having replenished the supply of fuel oil, "Crushing" on the evening of May 1 returned to the location of the cruiser, but, alas, it was too late. Six hours before the approach of the destroyer, Edinburgh was sunk. Later, the British claimed that Soviet destroyers left their damaged cruiser at the most difficult moment. These claims had nothing to do with the commander of the "Crushing" and his team and are fully related to the command of the Northern Fleet, which, when planning the operation, did not take into account the fuel reserves and their consumption on their ships.

On May 8, the “Crushing” twice went to the Ara Bay to shell coastal targets. According to reconnaissance, both attacks were successful and inflicted some damage on the enemy. The second campaign, however, almost ended in tragedy. During the shelling of coastal targets, "Crushing" was suddenly attacked by 28 German aircraft at once. The destroyer managed to urgently rivet the anchor chain (there was no time to choose the anchor) and, successfully maneuvering, avoided hits from the bombs raining down on it. At the same time, the anti-aircraft gunners of the ship managed to shoot down one bomber from a 37-mm machine gun.

Torpedo tube 39-Yu of one of the destroyers of the Northern Fleet ("Crushing")

From May 28 to May 30, “Crushing”, along with “Terrible” and “Kuibyshev”, was guarding the allied convoy PQ-16. All this time, the convoy transports were subjected to massive attacks by fascist bombers and torpedo bombers. On May 29, in just one attack, the Germans dropped 14 torpedoes on the convoy ships, but none of them hit the target, but the Focke-Wulf torpedo bomber was shot down by a 76-mm projectile from the Smashing from a distance of 35 cables. The next day, another aircraft, this time a Junkers-88, was destroyed by a direct hit from a 76-mm destroyer shell, and two others were damaged. And here the Crushing team was the best of the best. As for the destroyer's anti-aircraft gunners, they were rightfully considered the best in the entire Northern Fleet. On the evening of May 30, the convoy transports, securely covered by our destroyers, safely reached the Kola Bay.

On July 8, the Crushing, together with the Thundering, were heading towards the infamous PQ-17 convoy. Along the way, the destroyers hit the floating 4-point ice. Forced to slow down to a small speed and deprived of the ability to maneuver, on the night of July 10 they were attacked by four Ju-88 bombers, which dropped 8 bombs on each ship. Fortunately, there were no direct hits, but the Crushing received light damage and deformation of the hull from close explosions. Later, the attack was repeated, but the destroyers were lucky again - they repulsed this attack without loss. However, our ships failed to meet the transport, and they were forced to return to Vaenga.

During the summer-autumn of 1942, the Crusher underwent a short-term scheduled preventive maintenance. At this time, the ship was also used to escort transports, and was engaged in combat training. In total, from the beginning of the war until September 1, 1942, the Crushing made 40 combat campaigns, covering a total of 22,385 miles in 1,516 running hours. Without a doubt, it was one of the most combat ships of the Soviet Navy at that time.

In total, over the years of the war, "Crushing" fired 1639 130-mm shells (including 84 - on aircraft), 855 - 76-mm and 2053 - 37-mm projectiles, while shooting down 6 enemy aircraft (2 of them together with other ships ). During the same time, two cases of spontaneous firing of torpedoes occurred on the ship (during one of them, the Red Navy Starchikov died). Two more sailors drowned as a result of accidents - this exhausts the loss of the ship's personnel until its last campaign. Not a single person was injured from the combat impact of the enemy on the Crushing.

On November 17, 1942, another QP-15 convoy went to sea from Arkhangelsk. 26 allied transports unloaded in the port of Arkhangelsk and 11 British ships guards were returning to Iceland for a new batch of military supplies for the fighting Soviet Union.
At the first stage of the transition in the zone of responsibility of the Northern Fleet, the cover forces of the convoy were always reinforced by the ships of the Northern Fleet. This time, the leader of the "Baku" was assigned to escort the QP-15 under the pennant of the division commander, Captain 1st Rank P.I. Kolchin (commander of the leader - captain of the 2nd rank V.P. Belyaev) and the destroyer "Crushing" (commander - captain of the 3rd rank M.A. Kurilekh). In the conditions of a severe storm, which reached hurricane strength by the morning of November 20, with frequent snow charges and almost zero visibility, the convoy ships and escort ships lost sight of each other. The convoy dispersed and there was, in fact, no one to guard. For the convoy ships, the severity of the storm was offset by safety from possible attacks by German submarines and aircraft. It was impossible to attack in a stormy sea with such a huge force of wind and great excitement. Therefore, with the permission of the convoy commander, the Soviet ships, not having reached the designated escort point, began to independently return to the base.

76-mm guns 34-K on one of the destroyers of the Northern Fleet ("Grozny" or "Crushing"), 1942

When returning to Polyarny on the leader "Baku", the hull's tightness was broken from the impact of waves of nine-point force, all the bow rooms along the 29th frame were flooded, water penetrated into the 2nd and 3rd boiler rooms - only boiler No. 1 remained in operation. The condition of the ship was critical, the roll reached 40 ° on board. The personnel fought a desperate struggle for unsinkability. With serious damage, but "Baku" still reached the base, where it was forced to get up for repairs.

The destroyer "Crushing" had much worse. Strong wind with snow charges spread a big wave. The Crusher's speed dropped to a minimum, the ship holding her bow against the wave. But that didn't help much. Soon the "Baku" was lost from sight, and in order to find it, the destroyer began to shoot illuminating shells and shine a searchlight, but to no avail ...

It is not known whether the division commander, Captain 1st Rank Kolchin, ordered the commander of the "Crushing" Kurilekh to go to the base on his own. The fact that missiles were fired from the "Crushing" in an attempt to find the "Baku" suggests that, most likely, no command was received from the divisional commander to the destroyer at all. So Kurilekh had to act at his own peril and risk.

Thus, we can talk about the failure of the divisional commander to fulfill his direct duties - after all, as a detachment commander, he was responsible not only for the leader on whom he held his pennant, but also for the destroyer subordinate to him. Kolchin, in essence, abandoned the "Crushing" to the mercy of fate. The only thing that justifies the commander in this case is the plight of the “Baku” itself, which barely made it to the base. Of course, in this state, the leader could not provide any significant assistance to the destroyer. Most likely, it was this argument that was taken into account during the investigation of what happened with the "Crushing", and no one accused Kolchin of anything. It's like they just forgot about him.

Left to itself, "Crushing", successively changing course from 210 to 160 ° and gradually slowing down to 5 knots, with difficulty "raked out" against the wave, having main boilers No. 1 and 3 in operation (No. 2 was in "hot reserve" ), 2 turbogenerators, 2 turbofire pumps, the fuel supply was about 45% of the total (only in the area of ​​​​engine and boiler rooms), the rest of the reserves were within normal limits. November 20 at 14:30 a strong crack was heard in the aft cockpit (audible on the bridge too) - this was the bursting of the upper deck flooring sheets between the aft superstructure and the 130-mm gun No. 4, just where the stringers ended and the hull area with a transverse framing system began (173rd frame ). At the same time, a corrugation formed on the outer skin of the port side, followed by a break in both shaft lines. Within 3 minutes, the stern part broke off and sank, taking with it six sailors who did not have time to leave the tiller and other aft compartments. Soon followed powerful explosion- it worked, reaching a predetermined depth, depth charge fuses ... The situation became critical in an instant.
The remaining aft compartments were quickly filled with water up to the aft bulkhead of the 2nd engine room (159th frame). The ship, which had lost its course, turned with a lag to the wave, the side roll reached 45–50 °, the keel - 6 °. There was a trim to the stern, the stability decreased somewhat, which was noticeable by the increased pitching period; the ship "stale" in a heeled position. The wave constantly covered the deck and superstructures, movement along the upper deck was extremely difficult, while hard work was in full swing below; reinforced and compacted the aft bulkhead of the engine room, drained the compartments of the 159-173rd frame, using not only a regular ejector, but also an oil pumping electric pump. All mechanisms operated flawlessly, the operation of drainage facilities and lighting was fully ensured, water filtration almost stopped, aft bulkheads absorbed wave shocks, ship stability improved and trim decreased. Even the reserve boiler No. 2 was put into operation (the commander of the electromechanical warhead took the initiative) in order to "load the personnel with work." All that was left was to wait for help. However, this hope in the conditions of the most severe storm was rather doubtful ...

Having learned about the accident, Golovko ordered the leader of “Baku” to immediately go to the aid of “Crushing”. At the same time, orders were given to the destroyers "Uritsky" and "Kuibyshev", located in Iokanka, and the destroyer "Razumny", located in the Kola Bay, to also go to the aid of the "Crushing" and, having found it, lead to the Kola Bay; the rescue ships “Shkval” and “Memory of Ruslan”, tugboat No. 2 be ready to go to sea.

The destroyers left on purpose. And an hour later, another radiogram was received from Kurilekh: “The stern was torn off by a wave to the engine room. Korma sank. I stay on the surface. Wind - south, ten points ... "

Aft of the "Crushing" with an additional 37-mm machine gun, 1942

The place of the “Crusher” is latitude 75 degrees 1 minute, longitude 41 degrees 25 minutes. It's four hundred and twenty miles north of Iokanka.
At about 18 hours 15 minutes, “Kuibyshev” (commander of the ship Gonchar) and “Uritsky” (commander of the ship Kruchinin) approached under the general command of Simonov (commander of the division). Later, "Reasonable" (commander of the ship Sokolov) approached.

The state of the sea in the area where the "Crushing" was found was no better than the day before. Attempts by "Reasonable" to approach the ship that had crashed and take it in tow ended in failure. The tugboat was started twice, and twice the tugboat burst. Meanwhile, the weather worsened even more. Having reported this, Sokolov asked permission to remove people and refuse to tow. Apparently, filming people is the only way to save them. Sokolov's decision is correct in the first part, but it is premature to refuse towing. First you need to remove people, then it will be seen.

It is clear from the following message that Sokolov failed in both. It was impossible to approach the side of the Crusher. The ships were thrown so hard that when they came close they had to break from hitting each other. Attempts to keep the "Reasonable" cars in place when approaching the maximum possible distance were not successful. Many times the Sentient approached the Crusher in order to allow the people of the damaged ship to get to the Sapient's deck. Only one person managed to safely jump from the side of the “Crushing” onto the deck of the “Reasonable”. That was the end of Sokolov's attempts to remove people.

Soon Kuibyshev and Uritsky, both types of Novik, approached. Ships of this type kept better on the wave.
Since a notification was sent from the headquarters of the fleet about enemy submarines in the area, Sokolov on the Rational took on the task of providing the ships with anti-submarine defense, and the Kuibyshev and Uritsky took up the removal of personnel from the Crushing.
Of course, nothing came of Simonov's intention to bring the Kuibyshev on board to the Crushing. I had to organize the crossing of people with the help of a gazebo. At the same time, fuel oil was produced from the emergency ship, which somewhat reduced the sea roughness near the side. And yet the steel ends snapped almost immediately. Then a hemp cable from the Kuibyshev was brought in and a gazebo was attached to the cable. It seemed impossible to transport people in such a way, in such a wave, and even in snow charges. And yet it was done. Simonov ordered at the stern, from where he started the cable and where they began to transport the people of the “Crushing”, and the commander of the “Kuibyshev” Gonchar controlled the machines with the help of a machine telegraph, trying to maneuver the moves in such a way as not to break the hemp cable. Both, Simonov and Gonchar, acted not only skillfully, but also with great skill, both fully possess maritime skills, instinct and will.

Ninety-seven people of the “Crushing” had already been transferred to the “Kuibyshev” when the hemp cable also burst.
The weather continued to worsen. I had to resort to another method: to shoot people with the help of life buoys, tied every two meters into a new hemp cable. Such cables, each 300 meters long, were fed to the “Crushing” from one side by the “Kuibyshev”, from the opposite side - by the “Uritsky”. It is hard to imagine how it all looked in the snow charges that now and then covered the ships, with a sea of ​​seven or eight points, in the dark ... Nevertheless, there is already a message that in this way, pulling up lifebuoys with people in them, they managed to take on seventy-nine more people on board the Kuibyshev. "Uritsky" took eleven.

15 people remained on board the “Crushing”, among them a miner senior lieutenant Lekarev and deputy commander for political affairs of the BCH-5 senior lieutenant Vladimirov. Where are the rest of the officers? It is clear with Kurilekh: he hurried to save his person, but where is the deputy, first mate, navigator, artilleryman and others? Did they follow the example of Kurilekh?..

Requested by the fleet headquarters, Vladimirov reported that the command had abandoned the ship. Immediately, he very sensibly reported on the measures he had taken: raised the steam, launched the mechanisms. The final words of Vladimirov's report: - the destroyer is holding up well.

In connection with the departure of the destroyers from the Crushing, Golovko ordered the Loud to go there immediately. He left at 5 pm. Information about his movement is not comforting. At 18 hours 10 minutes, when leaving the Kola Bay, lay down on a course of 60 degrees, went at a speed of 20 knots with a light wind and calm sea. However, as the ship moved northward, by 9 p.m., the wind and wave gradually increased to six points. Due to strong wave impacts on the hull, the speed of the Loud was reduced to 15 knots. After 45 minutes, the wind and wave are already seven points. Having reduced the speed to ten knots, “Loud”, in order to weaken the blows of the waves, turned into the wind.

Golovko later recalled in his memoirs:
“I regret that I didn’t send minesweepers yesterday to the Crushing. Rumyantsev offered to send them, but I did not accept his offer then. That's my fault. I was sure that after the destroyers discovered the Crusher, they would be able to take it in tow. A day has been lost, because it is still necessary to send minesweepers.

Calling P.V. Panfilov (commander of the minesweeper division) and set him the task of reaching the “Crushing” with two minesweepers - TShch-36 and TShch-39; remove all who remained on the broken ship; then take it in tow and take it to the Kola Bay, weather permitting; if the weather does not allow either to remove people or tow the ship, then stay at the “Crushing” and guard it until the weather improves; if the destroyer, due to its condition, cannot be towed even in good weather, remove all personnel from it, after which the ship will be blown up and destroyed. At 23 o'clock both minesweepers went to their destination.

“Reasonable” at 15:15, and “Kuibyshev” and “Uritsky” at 15:30 left “Crushing”, since it is impossible to continue rescuing personnel with the help of ends and lifebuoys, and the fuel supply does not allow waiting for the weather to improve : it on all three ships was left short on the way back. Before leaving, Simonov sent a signal to the Crushing that everyone who remained on board the wrecked ship would be removed by the submarine as soon as the weather improved.

It was impossible to continue the withdrawal of the personnel of the "Crushing" on the destroyers in the situation that had developed. The waves began to roll over the ships, and a threat was created to the life of all people on all ships. The removal of personnel was accompanied by casualties: eight people died from the impact of waves on the hull and under the propellers, ten people were taken aboard the Kuibyshev and Uritsky in an unconscious state, it was not possible to save their lives.

In total, 179 people were accepted for Kuibyshev, 11 for Uritsky, and one for Razumny.
Finally, they asked how many people were left on board. From the destroyer they answered: "Fifty fuel oil." The question was repeated, adding that the minesweepers were already on their way. Then a rocket shot up over the “seven”, then another, a third ... At first they decided on the bridge that a table of conditional signals was used, but the fourth rocket went, the fifth, and it became clear that each rocket is a farewell volley over a grave that has not yet been dug, and such missiles counted fifteen.

Both minesweepers (TShch-36 and TShch-39) arrived at dead reckoning at 9:10 am on November 25 in the area of ​​the “Crushing” accident and began to search in formation of the front, shifting the tacks to the east. The ships kept within sight of each other. Visibility at the start of the search is from 10 to 12 cables. The search is carried out in conditions of snow charges with a northwest wind of up to five points. The excitement of the sea is four points. Nothing like what happened for several days. "Crushing" was not found ...

November 26 People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov signed a directive on the investigation of the sinking of the destroyer "Crushing" No. 613 / Sh, and on November 30 - a directive on the preparation of an order on the fact of the death of the destroyer "Smashing" No. 617 / Sh.

In mid-December 1942, the commander of the Northern Fleet, Vice Admiral Golovko, with a pain in his heart, as he writes in his memoirs, signed the order: to stop the search for the "Crushing" ship, to consider the ship dead.

Kurilekh, Rudakov, Kalmykov, Isaenko were put on trial. The navigator, signalman and lekpom were sent to a penal platoon. The commander of the ship Kurilekh was shot.

The history of the tragedy of the destroyer "Crushing" showed not only examples of cowardice, but also great self-sacrifice in the name of saving comrades. Therefore, those who are trying to hide the truth about this tragic page in our naval history are wrong. "Crushing" was, and we must remember those who died at his combat posts, having fulfilled their military and human duty to the end.
1. Lekarev Gennady Evdokimovich, born in 1916, senior lieutenant, commander of the warhead-3.
2. Vladimirov Ilya Alexandrovich, (1910), political instructor BCh-5.
3. Belov Vasily Stepanovich, (1915), chief foreman, foreman of the bilge machinist team.
4. Sidelnikov Semen Semenovich, (1912), midshipman; chief bosun.
5. Boyko Trofim Markovich, (1917), foreman of the 2nd article, commander of the department of turbine drivers.
6. Nagorny Fedor Vasilievich, (1919), Red Navy sailor, signalman
7. Lyubimov Fedor Nikolaevich, (1914), senior sailor, senior boiler engineer.
8. Gavrilov Nikolai Kuzmich, (1917), senior Red Navy sailor, senior turbine driver.
9. Purygin Vasily Ivanovich, (1917), senior sailor, senior boiler engineer.
10. Zimovets Vladimir Pavlovich, (1919), sailor, electrician.
11. Savinov Mikhail Petrovich, (1919), Red Navy sailor, bilge engineer.
12. Ternovoy Vasily Ivanovich, (1916), foreman of the 2nd article, commander of the minders department.
13. Artemiev Prokhor Stepanovich, (1919), Red Navy sailor, boiler engineer.
14. Dremlyuga Grigory Semenovich, (1919), Red Navy sailor, boiler engineer.
15. Chebiryako Grigory Fedorovich, (1917), senior Red Navy sailor, senior rangefinder.
16. Shilatyrkin Pavel Alekseevich, (1919), Red Navy sailor, boiler engineer.
17. Bolshov Sergey Tikhonovich, (1916), senior sailor, senior electrician.
The approximate place of the death of the destroyer "Crushing": latitude 73 degrees 30 minutes north, longitude 43 degrees 00 minutes east. Now this area of ​​the Barents Sea has been declared a memorial place, passing through which the ships of the Northern Fleet lower the St. Andrew's flags at half-mast.